Prevention and deterrence of bid rigging : a look from the new EU directive on public procurement
chapter
posted on 2014-10-22, 14:33authored byAlbert Sanchez Graells
As a departing point and before entering the analysis of the new EU Directive 2014/24 on public procurement, it is worth stressing that the effectiveness of public procurement and its ability to contribute to the proper and most efficient carrying on of public interest obligations is conditional upon the existence of competition in two respects or separate dimensions. One of them has been expressly recognised for a long time by public procurement regulations, which have tried to foster competition within the specific tender by attracting a relatively large number of participants (or, at least, a sufficient number to ensure effective competition for the given public contract) and by preventing collusion or bid rigging amongst tenderers. Public procurement rules protect and promote competition - in this narrow sense - as a means to achieve value for money and to ensure the legitimacy of purchasing decisions. From this perspective, competition is seen as a tool, as an instrument to allow the public purchaser to obtain the benefits of competitive pressure among (participating) bidders, as well as a key instrument to deter favouritism and other corrupt practices and deviations of power. [Opening paragraph]
History
Citation
Sanchez Graells, A, Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging : A Look from the New EU Directive on Public Procurement, ed. Racca, G. M.;Yukins, C, 'Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts', Bruylant, 2014, pp. 171-198
Author affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND LAW/School of Law
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