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The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality
chapterposted on 2016-02-29, 15:00 authored by Tyler Millhouse, Lance S. Bush, David Moss
Machery and Mallon [The moral psychology handbook (pp. 3–47). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010] argue that existing evidence does not support the claim that moral cognition, understood as a specific form of normative cognition, is a product of evolution. Instead, they suggest that the evidence only supports the claim that a general capacity for normative cognition evolved. They argue that if this is the case, then the prospects for evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) of morality are bleak. A debunking argument which relied on the fact that normative cognition in general evolved seems like it would debunk all areas of normative belief, including the epistemic norms upon which the argument relies. For the sake of argument, we accept their claim that specifically moral cognition did not evolve. However, we reject their contention that this critically undermines EDAs of morality. A number of strategies are available to solve what we call the “containment problem” of how to effectively debunk morality without thereby debunking normative cognition tout court. Furthermore, the debunking argument need not rely even on the claim that normative cognition in general evolved. So long as at least some aspects of moral cognition have evolved, this may be sufficient to support an EDA against many of our moral beliefs. Thus, even if Machery and Mallon are right that specifically moral cognition did not evolve, research in evolutionary psychology may have radical implications for moral philosophy.
CitationMillhouse, T., Bush, L.S., Moss, D. The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality in Shackelford T.K;Hansen R.D; The Evolution of Morality. Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 113-135
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