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A Problem for the Unambitious View of Legal Normativity

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journal contribution
posted on 2019-05-14, 09:27 authored by Stefano Bertea
In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do?

Funding

This research was supported by a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Research Grant.

History

Citation

Revus, 2019

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Leicester Law School

Version

  • AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Revus

Publisher

Revus Klub

issn

1855-7112

Acceptance date

2018-09-16

Copyright date

2018

Publisher version

https://journals.openedition.org/revus/4542

Notes

The file associated with this record is under embargo until 24 months after publication, in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The full text may be available through the publisher links provided above.

Language

en

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