A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
journal contribution
posted on 2015-05-26, 08:49 authored by Y. Chun, M. Mitra, Suresh MutuswamiWe characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.
Funding
Chun’s work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF- 2013S1A3A2055391) and the Center for Distributive Justice, Seoul National University
History
Citation
Games and Economic BehaviorAuthor affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE/Department of EconomicsVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)
Published in
Games and Economic BehaviorPublisher
Elsevierissn
0899-8256Available date
2016-10-15Publisher DOI
Publisher version
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000652Notes
JEL classification C72; D63; D82Language
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