posted on 2016-04-01, 12:59authored bySergio Currarini, Jesse Matheson, Fernando Vega-Redondo
Biases in meeting opportunities have been recently shown to play a key role for the emergence
of homophily in social networks (see Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2009). The aim of this paper
is to provide a simple microfoundation of these biases in a model where the size and typecomposition
of the meeting pools are shaped by agents’ socialization decisions. In particular,
agents either inbreed (direct search only to similar types) or outbreed (direct search to population
at large). When outbreeding is costly, this is shown to induce stark equilibrium behavior of a
threshold type: agents “inbreed” (i.e. mostly meet their own type) if, and only if, their group is
above certain size. We show that this threshold equilibrium generates patterns of in-group and
cross-group ties that are consistent with empirical evidence of homophily in two paradigmatic
instances: high school friendships and interethnic marriages.
Funding
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation,
grant No. 14.U04.31.0002, administered through the NES CSDSI.
History
Citation
European Economic Review, 2016, 90, pp.18-39
Author affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Economics
JEL Classification: D7, D71, D85, Z13.;The file associated with this record is embargoed until 24 months after the date of publication. The final published version may be available through the links above.