2012 BEJTE Asymmetric.pdf (357.47 kB)
Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
journal contributionposted on 2019-10-02, 14:44 authored by Francisco Martínez-Mora, M. Socorro Puy
The asymmetry of single-peaked preferences has scarcely been incorporated as an assumption in economic models. We analyze how to deal with asymmetric single-peaked preferences in a tractable way. We define natural types of asymmetries, provide the tools to compare degrees of asymmetry, and propose concrete utility functions that represent different directions and degrees of asymmetry. As an application, we provide a representative voter theorem which establishes the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents that is compatible with the median being the representative voter.
The authors thank Subir Bose, Luis Corchon, Gianni De Fraja, Juanjo Dolado, Mark Fey, Sidartha ´ Gordon, Michel Le Breton, Roberto Leon, Miltos Makris, Jordi Mass ´ o, Antonio Nicol ´ o, Clara ´ Ponsati, Ludovic Renou, Luigi Siciliani, Al Slivinsky and, especially, John Duggan for their helpful comments. Financial assistance from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion under the project ´ ECO2011- 29355 and by the Junta de Andaluc´ıa under the project SEJ 5980 is gratefully acknowledged.
CitationThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012, 12(1) (Topics), Article 31
Author affiliation/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Economics
- VoR (Version of Record)