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Depth of strategic reasoning in games

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journal contribution
posted on 2007-06-21, 08:40 authored by Andrew M. Colman
Orthodox game theory assumes indefinitely recursive reasoning (‘I think that you think that I think . . .’), but human decision makers, who are limited by bounded rationality, cannot handle limitless layers of complexity. Recent research corroborates earlier findings that human players tend to operate at only one or two levels of strategic depth.

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Citation

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003, 7, pp.2-4.

Version

  • AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Publisher

Elsevier (Cell Press)

issn

1364-6613

eissn

1879-307X

Copyright date

2002

Available date

2007-06-21

Publisher version

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661302000062#

Language

en

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