False memories and real epistemic problems revised.pdf (268.83 kB)
False memories and real epistemic problems
journal contribution
posted on 2016-11-08, 12:25 authored by Steven D. Brown, P. ReaveyThe dichotomy between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in relation to memory is difficult to
clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on
the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical,
social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically
either ‘relatively falsified’ or ‘relatively as-yet-unfalsified’. False Memory Studies
claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer
criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’
victims. The narrative of the discovery of the ‘false memories’ themselves is
inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and
suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war Psychology. In attending to the
setting-specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work
impacts on the experience-ecologies to which they contribute.
History
Citation
Culture and Psychology, 2017, 23(2), pp. 171-185Author affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/School of ManagementVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)
Published in
Culture and PsychologyPublisher
SAGE Publications (UK and US)issn
1354-067Xeissn
1461-7056Acceptance date
2016-10-01Copyright date
2017Available date
2017-06-17Publisher DOI
Publisher version
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354067X17695764Language
enAdministrator link
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