Is the Autonomy of the Will a Paradoxical Idea?

This essay tackles head on the argument that sees an inherent paradox in the autonomy of thewill as the ground for the authority of the fundamental practical norms. It points out that onlyon reductive understandings of the autonomy of the will can this idea be qualified asparadoxical,   thereby   yielding   outcomes   that   either   contradict   their   premises   or   presentautonomy under a false guise. With that done, it will proceed to offer a conception of theautonomy of the will which is not vulnerable to the paradox, and which may therefore beequipped   to   rest   the   fundamental   practical   norms   on   solid   ground.   Throughout   thisdiscussion, I will rely on constitutivism about practical reasons to specifically defend thetwofold conclusion that (a) the paradox of autonomy can be avoided and that, relatedly, (b) ifautonomy is properly conceptualised, it is fully equipped and well positioned to ground theauthority of the fundamental practical norms.