Legal Form and Agency: Variations on Two Central Themes in Fuller’s Legal Theory

[From Introduction] In Forms Liberate, 1 Kristen Rundle closely engages with Lon L. Fuller’s jurisprudence, her primary goal being to reconstruct Fuller’s theory of law. By adopting a methodology both descriptive and analytical, Rundle sets out to revise the mainstream understanding of Fuller as ‘an outsider within the intellectual climate of mid-twentieth century legal philosophy’ and as a ‘natural lawyer who apparently lost the debate about the connection between law and morality to his analytically superior opponent’, namely, H. L. A. Hart (1). In a rigorous, beautifully written and carefully designed monograph, Rundle draws on both Fuller’s published works and archival material to reconstruct a number of Fuller’s theses whose interest lies not just in their historical significance but also, and indeed primarily, in the role they can play in the contemporary debate in the philosophy of law.