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Random assignments and outside options

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journal contribution
posted on 2021-04-30, 09:49 authored by C Calsamiglia, F Martínez-Mora, A Miralles
Most environments where assignment mechanisms (possibly random) are used are such that participants have outside options. For instance private schools and private housing are options that participants in a public choice or public housing assignment problems may have. We postulate that, in cardinal mechanisms, chances inside the assignment process could favor agents with better outside options. By imposing a robustness to outside options condition, we conclude that, on the universal domain of cardinal preferences, any mechanism must be (interim) ordinal.

History

Citation

Soc Choice Welf (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01328-9

Author affiliation

School of Business

Version

  • AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Social Choice and Welfare

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

issn

0176-1714

eissn

1432-217X

Acceptance date

2021-03-15

Copyright date

2021

Available date

2022-03-29

Language

en

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