Revisiting compulsory alternative dispute resolution in the English civil justice system

This note critically considers the landmark decision ofChurchill v Merthyr TydfillCounty Borough Councilin which the Court of Appeal confirmed that the courts could compel disputing parties to engage with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processesprovided any order or stay in favour of ADR did not undermine their right to proceed to a judicial hearing, and wasproportionate to achieving the legitimate aim of settling the dispute fairly, quickly and at reasonablecost.In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal departedfromits previous controversial comments in Halseyv Milton KeynesGeneral NHS Trustthat to compel parties to engage with ADR would undermine their right to a fair trial.Thenote considers the impact of Churchill on the civil court process and its relevance to the pre-action protocols. It is argued that,for the courts to effectively exercise their discretion in ordering ADR or staying proceedings in favour of ADR, the courts must have an understanding of thefull range andnatureof ADR procedures beyondmediation, and constructively engage in an ‘ADR dialogue’ with the partiesbefore referringthemto the most appropriate ADR procedure.