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Signaling about norms: Socialization under strategic uncertainty
journal contribution
posted on 2016-11-14, 11:48 authored by Fabrizio Adriani, Silvia SondereggerWe consider a signaling model where adults possess information about the dominant
social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate
information, take the observed behavior of their parent as representative. We show that this
causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest.
Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the
way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm.
We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.
History
Citation
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2018, 120(3), pp. 685-716Author affiliation
/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of EconomicsVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)