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Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games

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journal contribution
posted on 2018-08-17, 10:30 authored by Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality.

Funding

Gold was supported by funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERCGrant Agreement No. 283849.

History

Citation

Topoi, 2018

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF LIFE SCIENCES/Biological Sciences/Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour

Version

  • VoR (Version of Record)

Published in

Topoi

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

issn

0167-7411

eissn

1572-8749

Acceptance date

2018-06-04

Copyright date

2018

Available date

2018-08-17

Publisher version

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-018-9575-z

Language

en

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