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Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation

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Version 2 2023-06-23, 15:45
Version 1 2022-10-04, 08:42
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-23, 15:45 authored by Andrew Colman
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game.

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Author affiliation

School of Psychology and Vision Sciences, University of Leicester

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  • VoR (Version of Record)

Published in

Economics and Philosophy

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP)

issn

0266-2671

Copyright date

2022

Available date

2022-10-04

Language

en

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