The Dual Nature Thesis as a Cornerstone of Jurisprudence

In this work I defend the view that the “dual nature thesis” (as I refer to the claim that law’s institutional existence does not rule out its robust normativity, both components being essential to it) stands as a cornerstone of jurisprudence, in the sense that there cannot be any general theory of law that can afford to do away with it. Defending this stance requires me to first characterize the dual nature thesis in some detail. In this process, I will argue for a basic sense of the thesis under which law is best conceived as a social practice that could not work as such without the ability to engender at least some reasons for action, which reasons are grounded in rationality, are not inherently conclusive, and may or may not be moral. With that done, I move to defend the view that the thesis so characterized is compatible with both positivist and nonpositivist accounts of the nature of law and is also theoretically interesting and significant. These claims will be further consolidated in the final part of the work, where it is argued that the standard attempt to reject the dual nature thesis rests on an objectionable methodological premise and a questionable substantive assumption.