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Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

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posted on 2010-03-03, 15:21 authored by Ludovic Renou, Karl H. Schlag
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in "-minimax regret equilibrium for all " ∈ [0, 1).

History

Publisher

Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester

Available date

2010-03-03

Publisher version

http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/discussion/papers2009.html

Book series

Papers in Economics;09/24

Language

en

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