University of Leicester
Browse
econ02-7.pdf (225.63 kB)
Download file

Wages, Supervision and Sharing:An Analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey

Download (225.63 kB)
report
posted on 2009-05-19, 15:31 authored by Sarah B. Brown, John G. Sessions
Instrumental efficiency wage models predict an inverse relationship between wages and supervision with this relationship becoming more pronounced amongst firms that participate in some form of employee sharing. To be sure, our theoretical exposition predicts that an increase in total remuneration will elicit a larger cut in optimal monitoring in ‘sharing’ rather than ‘non sharing’ firms. In this paper, we explore these predictions empirically using the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. Our results confirm an inverse relationship between supervision and pay but the trade-off is only heightened by the presence of performance related pay and employee share ownership schemes. We also find that employee share ownership and performance related pay are relatively more successful in alleviating the need to monitor, with the rate of profit sharing impacting insignificantly on the level supervision.

History

Publisher

Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester

Available date

2009-05-19

Publisher version

http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/discussion/papers2002.html

Book series

Papers in Economics;02/7

Language

en

Usage metrics

    University of Leicester Publications

    Categories

    Exports