posted on 2014-04-11, 13:27authored byAdrian Fernando Rossignolo
Since the late 1980s, the Basel Committee has been intending to regulate the financial
sector with a view to establish common regulatory standards for the banking industry
through the Basel Capital Accords. Successive crises have uncovered several flaws in
those directives that were remedied enacting tougher and more sophisticated mandates,
particularly regarding the calculation of the Minimum Capital Requirements after the
introduction of Value-at-Risk as the official measure to quantify market risks. However,
Basel regulations have, in many respects, been incapable to forestall the adverse effects
that market turmoil exerts on the banking system. The present thesis aims at analysing
the MCR scheme employing the former Basel II and the current Basel III Capital
Accords applying the VaR-based Internal Model Approach and the Standardised
Approach through a variety of specifications in times of crisis using a sample of
Emerging and Frontier stock markets. The findings detected structural glitches in the
configuration of the Basel’s MCR formula, given the fact that both the SA and many
inaccurate VaR models are allowed to compute MCR. Furthermore, there is clear
evidence of the superiority of the Extreme Value Theory to calculate an adequate capital
base during abrupt market swings. Basel regulations must act accordingly and reward
the accuracy calibrating the extrinsic multiples and additional buffers in line with the
behaviour of the models: the thesis underlines that, provided appropriate schemes had
been applied, Basel II MCR would have prevented capital shortages in 2007-2008. The
thesis also detects the presence of moral hazard and adverse incentives to utilise sharp
models like EVT in Basel regulations and proposes a radical overhaul of the SA and a
taylor-made evaluation of the parameters of the VaR-based IMA as a methodology to
reward and entice the adoption of models that allow the correct estimation of market
risk.