Determinants Of Successful Peacekeeping In Civil Wars: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Peacekeeping is a significant tool for promoting the settlement of civil wars in the post-Cold War period. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) was applied to a comprehensive dataset of peacekeeping operations between 1946 and 2014 that includes not only United Nations missions, but missions led by regional intergovernmental organizations and ad hoc coalitions. The conditions evaluated in the QCA were drawn from the literature on civil war initiation, duration, and termination. Results of the QCA indicate that characteristics that alter belligerent behaviour consistent with rationalist explanations for war are related to peacekeeping success. Multidimensional missions are most successful and traditional peacekeeping operations are least effective due to the importance of addressing the reconstruction of the state after war and the delivery of public goods, particularly security. Security sector reform and a large peacekeeping contingent are a sufficient cause of success in some cases, however, when the central state has collapsed peacekeeping operations are likely to fail. Geographic conditions that hinder the exercise of sovereignty are a malign condition, however physiographic conditions conducive to sustaining an insurgency less so. Island nations constitute the easier cases of peacekeeping, being the opposite of a hinterland country. The policy implications are that (1) unarmed observation missions are successful in pacific contexts with a high level of commitment to peace among the belligerents or when monitoring a robust mission for compliance with international norms, (2) great powers are better suited for robust missions, but the intervention must further state interests, (3) UN multidimensional missions are the most effective at establishing a durable peace even if liberal peacebuilding fail to result in liberal governance, (4) intervention in some cases, principally failed states, are unlikely to be successful and should be considered a tool for the management of the negative externalities of the conflict.