The Chemical Weapons Convention and Libya: An Analysis of the Application of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons between 2003 and 2014

The thesis studies and assesses the application of the Regime for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Libya since the country started the negotiations to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2003 until the end of 2014. Regime Theory is used to separate the role of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from the role of the United States (USA) in the case of Libya. Using this approach leads to the conclusion that the OPCW was unable to work independently from the USA in Libya at any stage, and that this negatively affected the regime‘s ability to complete its task. The thesis uses Regime Theory to analyse Muammar Qaddafi‘s decisions to start the chemical weapons programme in 1980, and to end the programme in December 2003, it also examines the role of the OPCW in dismantling the Libyan chemical weapons programme since 2004. By doing so, the thesis studies the key role of the USA in administering the Libyan chemical disarmament process. The dominant role of the USA in Libya prevented the OPCW from carrying out its duty as the sole international actor responsible for supervising the dismantlement of chemical weapons stockpile. The thesis demonstrates the practical problems that faced the OPCW in Libya both during Qaddafi‘s era (2004–2011) and after his reign (2012-2014). These problems are reflective of the limitations that encounter the OPCW in the current international system. In the conclusion the thesis suggests some ways to improve the effectiveness of the Regime for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the future.