

# Public Discourse and Socially Responsible Market Behavior

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
## Supplemental Appendix

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
## A. Additional Figures and Tables for Study 1

**Figure A.1:** Market shares of responsible products across periods




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. Data are aggregated in blocks of two periods to smooth random variation across periods.

**Figure A.2:** CDFs of market shares of responsible products




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. We conducted eight markets per treatment, which serve as units of observation in the figure.

**Figure A.3: Average prices of products by type, treatment and country**



*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. “Excl.” is short for Exclusive.

**Figure A.4: Sellers’ average profit by product type, treatment and country**



*Notes.* “Excl.” is short for Exclusive. Sellers’ profit is determined by the difference between the posted price and the production cost for a sold product, and equals 0 if the offer is not accepted.

**Table A.1:** Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-values at the market (buyer) level, two-sided

<i>p</i> -values	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Veil</i>	<i>No Veil</i>	<i>Exclusive</i>
<i>Baseline</i>	-	0.005 (0.000)	0.012 (0.000)	0.027 (0.000)
<i>Veil</i>	0.001 (0.000)	-	0.248 (0.145)	0.093 (0.008)
<i>No Veil</i>	0.001 (0.000)	0.014 (0.001)	-	0.293 (0.055)
<i>Exclusive</i>	0.001 (0.000)	0.340 (0.126)	0.140 (0.049)	-

*Note.* We focus on completed transactions and ignore the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. The p-values in the lower triangle correspond to Switzerland, the p-values in the upper, shaded area correspond to China.

**Table A.2:** Probit (random-effects) regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	Switzerland		China	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Veil</i>	3.368*** (0.444)	3.171*** (0.465)	1.966*** (0.474)	1.798*** (0.449)
<i>No Veil</i>	1.827*** (0.339)	2.538*** (0.373)	1.571*** (0.403)	1.603*** (0.399)
<i>Exclusive</i>	2.635*** (0.423)	2.399*** (0.619)	1.149*** (0.454)	0.591 (0.514)
<i>Period</i>		-0.013 (0.011)		-0.033** (0.013)
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Veil</i>		0.018 (0.036)		0.016 (0.021)
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>No Veil</i>		-0.049** (0.022)		0.000 (0.019)
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Exclusive</i>		0.021 (0.031)		0.047** (0.019)
<i>Constant</i>	0.191 (0.259)	0.357 (0.314)	-1.560*** (0.372)	-1.190*** (0.349)
Observations	3,770	3,770	3,705	3,705
Subjects	160	160	160	160

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the 70 cases in Switzerland and the 135 cases in China in which a buyer did not purchase a product. *Baseline* serves as the omitted category. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. The table reports raw probit coefficients. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A.3:** OLS regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	Switzerland			China		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Veil</i>	0.467*** (0.053)	0.432*** (0.065)	0.456*** (0.058)	0.441*** (0.101)	0.447*** (0.112)	0.447*** (0.100)
<i>No Veil</i>	0.376*** (0.053)	0.449*** (0.067)	0.371*** (0.056)	0.336*** (0.081)	0.413*** (0.104)	0.343*** (0.080)
<i>Exclusive</i>	0.428*** (0.060)	0.392*** (0.076)	0.424*** (0.062)	0.224** (0.097)	0.119 (0.127)	0.246** (0.094)
<i>Period</i>		-0.003 (0.002)			-0.004** (0.002)	
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Veil</i>		0.003 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.004)	
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>No Veil</i>		-0.006 (0.004)			-0.006 (0.005)	
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Exclusive</i>		0.003 (0.003)			0.008** (0.004)	
<i>Constant</i>	0.490*** (0.049)	0.523*** (0.060)	0.494*** (0.052)	0.154** (0.069)	0.209** (0.085)	0.149** (0.068)
Observations	3,770	3,770	160	3,705	3705	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.222	0.228	0.371	0.110	0.118	0.247

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1(0) if a buyer purchased a responsible (harmful) product. We omit 70 cases in Switzerland and 135 cases in China in which a buyer purchased no product. *Baseline* serves as the omitted category. In models 1, 2, 4 and 5, we ignore the panel structure of the data and consider each transaction within a market as independent. In models 3 and 6, each observation represents the average proportion of responsible products bought by a buyer over the 24 periods. In models 2 and 5, *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A.4:** Wald tests of equality of coefficients from regressions of responsible buyer product choice

<i>p</i> -values	<i>Veil</i>	<i>No Veil</i>	<i>Exclusive</i>
<i>Veil</i>	-	0.217	0.038
<i>No Veil</i>	0.009	-	0.203
<i>Exclusive</i>	0.448	0.186	-

*Notes.* To test for equality of coefficients, we use the results of model 1 for Switzerland and model 3 for China of Table 2. The p-values in the lower triangle correspond to Switzerland, the p-values in the shaded area correspond to China.

**Table A.5:** Random-effects GLS regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)
<i>Veil</i>	0.457*** (0.056)	
<i>No Veil</i>	0.371*** (0.055)	
<i>Exclusive</i>	0.424*** (0.061)	
<i>Pooled discourse conditions</i>		0.417*** (0.053)
<i>China</i>	-0.344*** (0.084)	-0.344*** (0.084)
<i>China × Veil</i>	-0.010 (0.114)	
<i>China × No Veil</i>	-0.029 (0.096)	
<i>China × Exclusive</i>	-0.180 (0.111)	
<i>China × Pooled discourse conditions</i>		-0.073 (0.094)
<i>Constant</i>	0.494*** (0.051)	0.494*** (0.051)
Observations	7,475	7,475
Subjects	320	320
R <sup>2</sup>	0.500	0.479

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 (0) if a buyer purchased a responsible (harmful) product. We omit 205 cases in which a buyer purchased no product. *Baseline* in Switzerland serves as the omitted category. The variable *Pooled discourse conditions* takes on value 1 in all three discourse treatments and 0 otherwise. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A.6:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	Switzerland (1)	China (2)
<i>Lowest price of responsible product</i>	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.003)
<i>Lowest price of harmful product</i>	0.024*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.004)
<i>Constant</i>	0.807*** (0.138)	0.639*** (0.057)
Observations	1,641	2,101
Number of buyers	145	158
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.176

*Notes.* The dependent variable in both models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 otherwise. *Lowest price of responsible product* and *Lowest price of harmful product* refer to the prices of products available to the buyer. Both models omit the cases in which a buyer made no product purchase and cases in which either only responsible or harmful products were available to a buyer. The models allow for individual level fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A.7:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible seller product decisions

	Switzerland (1)	China (2)
<i>Expected responsible product profit premium</i>	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
<i>Constant</i>	0.677*** (0.001)	0.457*** (0.004)
Observations	2,532	3,324
Number of sellers	174	192
R <sup>2</sup>	0.017	0.011

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a seller offered a responsible product and 0 otherwise. The variable *Expected responsible product profit premium* measures the average realized profit difference between offering a responsible product and offering a harmful product in the preceding period. Note that if an offer is not accepted, the seller's profit equals zero. Recall that in our experiment, sellers observe all product types and prices offered and sold in a period. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table A.8:** Regressions of social appropriateness

	OLS			Ordered probit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Switzerland	China	Pooled	Switzerland	China	Pooled
<i>Veil</i>	-0.469*** (0.054)	-0.354*** (0.102)	-0.469*** (0.054)	-1.358*** (0.228)	-0.951*** (0.276)	-1.389*** (0.228)
<i>No Veil</i>	-0.333*** (0.054)	-0.156** (0.065)	-0.333*** (0.054)	-0.859*** (0.158)	-0.447** (0.181)	-0.888*** (0.161)
<i>Exclusive</i>	-0.375*** (0.071)	-0.245*** (0.086)	-0.375*** (0.071)	-0.985*** (0.226)	-0.672*** (0.238)	-1.032*** (0.234)
<i>China</i>			0.625*** (0.060)			1.528*** (0.171)
<i>China × Veil</i>			0.115 (0.115)			0.507 (0.338)
<i>China × No Veil</i>			0.177** (0.084)			0.477** (0.232)
<i>China × Exclusive</i>			0.130 (0.111)			0.411 (0.318)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.370*** (0.023)	0.255*** (0.055)	-0.370*** (0.023)	-	-	-
Observations	512	512	1,024	512	512	1,024
R <sup>2</sup>	0.161	0.087	0.481	-	-	-

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models take values from -1 to 1. Models 1 and 4 concern Switzerland, while models 2 and 5 concern China. In these models, *Baseline* serves as omitted category. For models 3 and 6, we pooled the data from both countries. In these cases, *Baseline* in Switzerland serves as the omitted category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## B. Supplementary Condition in Study 1: Reflection

In this section, we report the results of an additional, *post hoc*, treatment added to Study 1 in order to investigate the extent to which the positive impact of public discourse on market social responsibility is due to discourse *per se*—i.e., the *exchange* of views and arguments between market participants—or due to prompting individuals to spend time *reflecting* on appropriate market behavior, which does not necessarily involve discourse. In fact, earlier experiments that study the role of communication in strategic settings typically do not distinguish the two channels.

To separate these two possible channels, we conducted condition *Reflection*. As in *No Veil*, subjects in *Reflection* first learn their roles in the market game. In contrast to *No Veil*, however, subjects do not have the opportunity to engage in public discourse with others but can, instead, write their thoughts about what constitutes “appropriate” or “acceptable” market behavior privately into the computer interface during eight minutes. This way, subjects are encouraged to think about appropriate market behavior without being influenced by others.<sup>1</sup>

The *Reflection* condition also allows us to investigate a kind of prime often present in campaigns that are intended to foster socially responsible behavior by encouraging people to reflect on their behavior and the right thing to do. It is an open question how encouraging people to think about the appropriateness of their market behavior changes their conduct.

Figure B.1 illustrates that encouraging people to reflect on the appropriateness of their market behavior fosters socially responsible behavior in our experimental markets, both in Switzerland and China. The market share of the responsible product is 67 percent in *Reflection* in Switzerland, compared to 49 percent in *Baseline*. The same result prevails in China, where the market share of the responsible product is 43 percent in *Reflection*, compared to 15 percent in *Baseline*. Wilcoxon rank-sum test at the market (buyer) levels indicate that these differences are statistically significant;  $p=0.036$  ( $p=0.023$ ) for Switzerland and  $p=0.016$  ( $p=0.000$ ) for China.<sup>2</sup>

Figure B.1 further illustrates the additional impact of discourse *per se*, i.e., the impact of discourse on top of making people reflect on appropriate market behavior, by comparing market shares of the responsible product in *Reflection* and *No Veil*. The effect of discourse in *No Veil* is


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<sup>1</sup> We collected data from 8 markets with 16 participants each in both countries; hence, 256 subjects participated in total in condition *Reflection*. We followed the same procedures as described in Section 3.1.4.

<sup>2</sup> The prices of the responsible and harmful products in *Reflection* are comparable to those in other conditions. The responsible and harmful products trade, on average, at 26 and 20, respectively, in Switzerland and at 26 and 18, respectively, in China.

about twice as large as the effect of private deliberation in *Reflection* in Switzerland. In China, in contrast, the effect of discourse is only slightly higher than that of private deliberation. Indeed, the difference between *Reflection* and *No Veil* is statistically significant only in Switzerland,  $p=0.002$  ( $p=0.011$ ), but not in China,  $p=0.207$  ( $p=0.196$ ). Overall, the data show that a sizable part of the effect of public discourse on socially responsible market behavior is driven by encouraging people to reflect on the appropriateness of their behavior, suggesting that public campaigns can also be effective when they prompt individuals to think about the consequences of their market activities. Indeed, many campaigns take this form.


**Figure B.1: Public Discourse vs. Reflection**



The results from this section might be of broader interest, beyond our research question, in light of the large experimental literature on communication in economic contexts. Experimental papers that study the effect of adding some form of communication among players to a game typically do not disentangle whether communication *per se* causes treatment differences or whether these differences are observed because the option to communicate prompts players to reflect on their behavior and provides them with time to do so. However, in many cases it can be of interest to better understand the underlying mechanisms that drive behavioral change. In our case, for example, it is valuable to know that a policy that encourages people to think about what constitutes “appropriate” market behavior can be effective, even without providing the opportunity to engage in public discourse.


## C. Additional Figures and Tables for Study 2

**Figure C.1:** CDFs of market shares of responsible products




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. Each market serves as a unit of observation in the figure.

**Figure C.2:** Prices of products by type, treatment and part




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. “Exper.” is short for *Experienced*.

**Figure C.3:** Sellers’ profit by product type, treatment and part



*Notes.* “Exper.” is short for *Experienced*. Sellers’ profit determined by the difference between the posted price and the production cost when their product is sold, and equals 0 if the offer is not accepted.

**Figure C.4:** Effect of Public Discourse on Social Norms



*Notes.* The figure shows the average rating of the appropriateness of exchanging the harmful product. “Very socially appropriate = 1,” “Somewhat socially appropriate = 1/3,” “Somewhat socially inappropriate = -1/3,” “Very socially inappropriate = -1.” The numerical rating values follow Krupa and Weber (2013). The bars indicate 95-percent confidence intervals, calculated at the market level.

**Table C.1:** Random-effects probit regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)
<i>Discourse</i>	1.783*** (0.464)	2.061*** (0.486)
<i>Experienced</i>	0.433 (0.311)	0.721** (0.316)
<i>Part II</i>	-0.048 (0.139)	-0.246*** (0.093)
<i>Part II</i> $\times$ <i>Discourse</i>	-0.491** (0.249)	0.185 (0.257)
<i>Part II</i> $\times$ <i>Experienced</i>	0.832*** (0.309)	1.609*** (0.334)
<i>Period</i>		0.016 (0.010)
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Discourse</i>		-0.057*** (0.014)
<i>Period</i> $\times$ <i>Experienced</i>		-0.063*** (0.014)
<i>Constant</i>	0.241 (0.264)	0.173 (0.270)
Observations	5,619	5,619
Number of subjects	240	240

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. *Baseline* and *Part I* serve as omitted categories. *Part II* is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 9 to 24 and 0 otherwise. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table C.2:** OLS regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Discourse</i>	0.335** (0.074)	0.371*** (0.073)	0.325*** (0.073)
<i>Experienced</i>	0.130* (0.065)	0.181*** (0.064)	0.125* (0.064)
<i>Part II</i>	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.038** (0.018)	-0.004 (0.024)
<i>Part II</i> × <i>Discourse</i>	-0.072* (0.038)	0.024 (0.037)	-0.072* (0.039)
<i>Part II</i> × <i>Experienced</i>	0.163*** (0.055)	0.299*** (0.055)	0.158*** (0.054)
<i>Period</i>		0.003 (0.002)	
<i>Period</i> × <i>Discourse</i>		-0.008*** (0.003)	
<i>Period</i> × <i>Experienced</i>		-0.011*** (0.003)	
<i>Constant</i>	0.501*** (0.052)	0.487*** (0.052)	0.510*** (0.051)
Observations	5,619	5,619	480
Number of subjects	240	240	240
R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.084	0.124

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 (0) if a buyer purchased a responsible (harmful) product. We omit 141 cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. In models 1 and 2, we ignore the panel structure of the data and consider each transaction within a market as independent. In model 3, each observation represents the average proportion of responsible products bought by each buyer in each of the two parts of the experiment. In models 1 and 3, *Baseline* and *Part I* (periods 1 to 8) serve as omitted categories. *Part II* is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 9 to 24 and 0 otherwise. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table C.3:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)
<i>Lowest price of responsible product</i>	-0.021*** (0.003)
<i>Lowest price of harmful product</i>	0.022*** (0.003)
<i>Constant</i>	0.713*** (0.077)
Observations	3,080
Number of buyers	222
R <sup>2</sup>	0.110

*Notes.* The dependent variable takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 otherwise. *Lowest price of responsible product* and *Lowest price of harmful product* refer to the prices of products available to the buyer. The model omits the cases in which a buyer made no product purchase and cases in which either only responsible or harmful products were available to a buyer. The models allow for individual level fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table C.4:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible seller product decisions

	(1)
<i>Expected responsible product profit premium</i>	0.005*** (0.001)
<i>Constant</i>	0.556*** (0.000)
Observations	4,776
Number of sellers	270
R <sup>2</sup>	0.013

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a seller offered a responsible product and 0 otherwise. The variable *Expected responsible product profit premium* measures the average realized profit difference between offering a responsible product and offering a harmful product in the preceding period. Note that if an offer is not accepted, the seller's profit equals zero. The models allow for individual level fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.


**Table C.5:** Regressions of social appropriateness

	OLS	Ordered Probit
<i>Discourse</i>	-0.292** (0.102)	-0.686*** (0.235)
<i>Experienced</i>	-0.394*** (0.081)	-0.914*** (0.190)
Constant	-0.136** (0.055)	-
Observations	528	528
R <sup>2</sup>	0.108	-

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models take values from -1 to 1 corresponding to the numerical scores previously described. *Baseline* serves as omitted category. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.


## D. Additional Figures and Tables for Study 3

**Figure D.1:** Market shares of responsible products over periods




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. Data are aggregated in blocks of two periods to smooth random variation across periods.

**Figure D.2:** CDFs of market shares of responsible products




*Notes.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. Each market serves as a unit of observation in the figure.

**Figure D.3: Prices of products by type and treatment**




*Note.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product.

**Figure D.4: Sellers' profit by product type and treatment**



*Note.* Sellers' profit is determined by the difference between the posted price and the production cost when their product is sold, and equals 0 if the offer is not accepted.

**Figure D.5:** Market shares of responsible products over periods by treatment and participation



*Note.* The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product.

**Table D.1:** Random-effects probit regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	1.337*** (0.463)	1.661*** (0.517)
<i>Optional</i>	0.326 (0.445)	0.809 (0.545)
<i>Passive</i>	0.544 (0.362)	0.687* (0.359)
<i>Period</i>		-0.009 (0.009)
<i>Period × Discourse (Neutral)</i>		-0.025 (0.021)
<i>Period × Optional</i>		-0.038** (0.018)
<i>Period × Passive</i>		-0.011 (0.013)
<i>Constant</i>	0.667*** (0.222)	0.788*** (0.241)
Observations	6,933	6,933
Number of subjects	295	295

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which the buyer purchased no product. *Baseline* serves as omitted categories. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.2:** OLS regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	0.199** (0.075)	0.222*** (0.075)	0.201*** (0.074)
<i>Optional</i>	0.034 (0.072)	0.092 (0.079)	0.038 (0.071)
<i>Passive</i>	0.124** (0.061)	0.143** (0.057)	0.126** (0.060)
<i>Period</i>		-0.002 (0.002)	
<i>Period × Discourse (Neutral)</i>		-0.002 (0.003)	
<i>Period × Optional</i>		-0.005 (0.003)	
<i>Period × Passive</i>		-0.001 (0.002)	
<i>Constant</i>	0.585*** (0.041)	0.610*** (0.041)	0.585*** (0.040)
Observations	6,933	6,933	295
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.030	0.043

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the 147 cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. *Baseline* serves as omitted categories. In models 1 and 2, we ignore the panel structure of the data and consider each transaction as independent. In model 3, each observation represents the average proportion of responsible product bought by each buyer over the 24 periods. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.

**Table D.3:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)
<i>Lowest price of responsible product</i>	-0.024*** (0.003)
<i>Lowest price of harmful product</i>	0.019*** (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	0.920*** (0.078)
Observations	4,141
Number of buyers	273
R <sup>2</sup>	0.093

*Notes.* The dependent variable takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 otherwise. *Lowest price of responsible product* and *Lowest price of harmful product* refer to the prices of products available to the buyer. The model omits the cases in which a buyer made no product purchase and cases in which either only responsible or harmful products were available to a buyer. The models allow for individual level fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.4:** Fixed-effects panel regressions of responsible seller product decisions

	(1)
<i>Expected responsible product profit premium</i>	0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Constant</i>	0.573*** (0.001)
Observations	6,282
Number of sellers	330
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models is a binary variable taking on value 1 if a seller offered a responsible product and 0 otherwise. The variable *Expected responsible product profit premium* measures the average realized profit difference between offering a responsible product and offering a harmful product in the preceding period. Note that if an offer is not accepted, the seller's profit equals zero. The models allow for individual level fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table D.5:** Regressions of social appropriateness

	Before market activity		After market activity	
	OLS	Ordered Probit	OLS	Ordered Probit
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	-0.122 (0.082)	-0.361* (0.210)	-0.292** (0.130)	-0.637** (0.293)
<i>Optional</i>	-0.062 (0.076)	-0.177 (0.184)	-0.022 (0.113)	-0.054 (0.226)
<i>Passive</i>	-0.094** (0.043)	-0.220** (0.108)	-0.217** (0.099)	-0.445** (0.210)
Constant	-0.342*** (0.030)	-	-0.190*** (0.066)	-
Observations	649	649	649	649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009		0.053	

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models take values from -1 to 1 corresponding to the numerical scores previously described. *Baseline* serves as omitted category. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.6:** Description of the questionnaire items

Variable	Description
Item 1	I believe that it is important to trade the product that does not reduce the donation.
Item 2	I think that it is more important to keep the cost down than to pay more for products that avoid impacting the donation.
Item 3	All the other participants in my group believe that it is important to trade the product that does not reduce the donation.
Item 4	I am confident that other participants in my group will exchange the product that does not reduce the donation.
Item 5	Other participants in my group expect me to trade the product that does not reduce the donation.
Item 6	Participants in my group know what type of product will be traded.
Item 7	Participants in my group know at what prices products will be traded.
Item 8	I paid attention to the messages sent in the discussion forum. (asked in <i>Discourse (Neutral)</i> , <i>Optional</i> and <i>Passive</i> )
Item 9	It was important for me to express my opinions in the market forum. (asked in <i>Discourse (Neutral)</i> and <i>Optional</i> )
Item 10	Other participants in my group paid attention to the messages sent in the discussion forum. (asked in <i>Discourse (Neutral)</i> , <i>Optional</i> and <i>Passive</i> )
Item 11	I would think less of myself if I traded the product with a reduction to the donation.
Item 12	I believe that other people would think less of me if I traded the product with a reduction to the donation.

*Notes.* Questionnaire administered immediately after discourse, or in *Baseline* after the instruction. Participants must select one of seven answers that best describes their agreement or disagreement with the respective statement, from “Strongly disagree” (-3) to “Strongly agree” (3). Colors refer to the factors to which items are assigned in subsequent exploratory factor analysis (see Table D.9). We selected the specific measures based on variables that previous research documented as important for pro-social behavior, and which might plausibly change through communication. These include individuals’ personal values regarding the two kinds of products (Items 1 and 2), beliefs about others’ values (Item 3), beliefs about others’ behavior (Item 4) and second-order beliefs about behavior (Item 5). We also included items to measure self- (Item 11) and social-image (Item 12) concerns related to market behavior. The remaining measures used across all conditions (Items 6 and 7) were introduced to identify the potential role of discourse on coordination on products and prices (we thank a reviewer for suggesting this possibility). Finally, we introduced measures relevant for specific conditions, like perceived attention to messages (Items 8 and 10) and a desire to express one’s opinions (Item 9).

**Table D.7:** Descriptive statistics for questionnaire items

Variable	All treatments			<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Disc (N)</i>	<i>Optional</i>	<i>Passive</i>
	N	Mean	SD	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Item 1	649	1.30	1.73	0.97	1.57	1.26	1.45
Item 2	649	-0.48	1.82	-0.34	-0.86	-0.37	-0.43
Item 3	649	0.64	1.76	0.12	1.16	0.70	0.60
Item 4	649	0.54	1.66	0.08	0.97	0.56	0.59
Item 5	649	1.09	1.65	0.63	1.53	1.14	1.06
Item 6	649	0.69	1.87	0.27	1.26	0.97	0.16
Item 7	649	0.84	1.75	0.25	1.36	1.26	0.34
Item 8	495	2.40	1.39	-	2.63	2.06	2.66
Item 9	352	0.70	2.01	-	0.90	0.56	-
Item 10	495	1.66	1.33	-	1.74	1.59	1.68
Item 11	649	-0.01	2.01	0.04	0.21	-0.11	-0.12
Item 12	649	0.57	1.72	0.27	0.68	0.47	0.92
Beliefs about others *	649	-0.00	1.00	-0.29	0.21	-0.00	0.11
Personal values **	649	-0.00	1.00	-0.01	0.11	-0.09	0.03
Coordination***	649	0.00	1.00	-0.27	0.30	0.22	-0.34

Notes. “Disc (N)” is short for *Discourse (Neutral)*. Items 8 and 10 only elicited in *Discourse (Neutral)*, *Optional* and *Passive*; item 9 only in *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional*. Colors refer to the factors to which items are assigned in subsequent exploratory factor analysis (see Table D.9). \*Corresponding to Factor 1 in Tables D.8 and D.9; \*\* corresponding to Factor 2 in Tables D.8 and D.9; \*\*\* Corresponding to Factor 3 in Tables D.8 and D.9

**Table D.8:** Results of factor analysis

Factor	Eigenvalue	Proportion of variance explained	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.63	0.40	0.40
Factor 2	1.49	0.17	0.57
Factor 3	1.17	0.13	0.70
Factor 4	0.73	0.08	0.78
Factor 5	0.57	0.06	0.84
Factor 6	0.42	0.05	0.89
Factor 7	0.38	0.04	0.93
Factor 8	0.32	0.04	0.97
Factor 9	0.28	0.03	1.00

**Table D.9:** Factor loadings

Variable	Beliefs about others (Factor 1)	Personal values (Factor 2)	Coordination (Factor 3)
Item 1	0.37	0.75	0.06
Item 2	0.06	-0.79	-0.13
Item 3	0.83	0.06	0.17
Item 4	0.76	0.22	0.18
Item 5	0.82	0.15	0.18
Item 6	0.15	0.09	0.91
Item 7	0.14	0.04	0.91
Item 11	0.22	0.80	0.03
Item 12	0.55	0.38	0.07

**Table D.10:** Treatment effects on values and beliefs, separately by item

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5	Item 6	Item 7	Item 11	Item 12
<i>Discourse</i>	0.599**	-0.522***	1.037***	0.881***	0.902***	0.986***	1.103***	0.171	0.406
<i>(Neutral)</i>	(0.246)	(0.178)	(0.278)	(0.288)	(0.279)	(0.221)	(0.227)	(0.274)	(0.292)
<i>Optional</i>	0.289*	-0.031	0.575**	0.471**	0.514**	0.699***	1.005***	-0.149	0.201
	(0.171)	(0.150)	(0.268)	(0.204)	(0.251)	(0.238)	(0.247)	(0.209)	(0.233)
<i>Passive</i>	0.474***	-0.089	0.478***	0.510***	0.433**	-0.112	0.082	-0.158	0.643***
	(0.153)	(0.168)	(0.142)	(0.169)	(0.201)	(0.213)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.203)
<i>Constant</i>	0.974***	-0.338***	0.123*	0.084	0.630***	0.273*	0.253	0.039	0.273**
	(0.084)	(0.122)	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.146)	(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Obs.	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649	649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.013	0.040	0.032	0.035	0.057	0.083	0.004	0.018

Notes. The dependent variable in each model is one of the items from the questionnaire. *Baseline* serves as the omitted category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.11a:** Treatment effects on values and beliefs (OLS, buyers only)

	Beliefs about others	Personal values	Coordination
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	0.388 (0.245)	0.216 (0.164)	0.403** (0.168)
<i>Optional</i>	0.277 (0.201)	0.021 (0.124)	0.358** (0.161)
<i>Passive</i>	0.453*** (0.159)	0.107 (0.127)	-0.343* (0.174)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.302** (0.122)	-0.106 (0.097)	-0.196 (0.119)
Observations	295	295	295
R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.007	0.075

Notes. The dependent variable is *Beliefs about others* in model 1, *Personal values* in model 2 and *Coordination* in model 3. *Baseline* serves as omitted categories. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.11b:** Treatment effects on values and beliefs (OLS, sellers only)

	Beliefs about others	Personal values	Coordination
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	0.589*** (0.175)	0.034 (0.172)	0.704*** (0.150)
<i>Optional</i>	0.289* (0.168)	-0.162 (0.136)	0.595*** (0.178)
<i>Passive</i>	0.344*** (0.107)	-0.010 (0.195)	0.153 (0.188)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.276*** (0.081)	0.070 (0.108)	-0.324** (0.127)
Observations	354	354	354
R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.006	0.097

Notes. The dependent variable is *Beliefs about others* in model 1, *Personal values* in model 2 and *Coordination* in model 3. *Baseline* serves as omitted categories. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.12:** GLS (random-effects) regressions of responsible product choice

	Buyers and Sellers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Beliefs about others</i>	0.089*** (0.017)			0.089*** (0.016)
<i>Personal values</i>		0.194*** (0.014)		0.194*** (0.014)
<i>Coordination</i>			0.042** (0.019)	0.042*** (0.014)
<i>Constant</i>	0.667*** (0.024)	0.667*** (0.025)	0.667*** (0.027)	0.667*** (0.021)
Observations	15,429	15,429	15,429	15,429
Subjects	649	649	649	649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.059	0.276	0.013	0.347

	Buyers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Beliefs about others</i>	0.065*** (0.021)			0.074*** (0.019)
<i>Personal values</i>		0.188*** (0.018)		0.190*** (0.018)
<i>Coordination</i>			0.016 (0.024)	0.019 (0.019)
<i>Constant</i>	0.671*** (0.026)	0.674*** (0.027)	0.670*** (0.029)	0.678*** (0.024)
Observations	6,933	6,933	6,933	6,933
Subjects	295	295	295	295
R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.257	0.002	0.304

	Sellers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Beliefs about others</i>	0.116*** (0.020)			0.101*** (0.019)
<i>Personal values</i>		0.199*** (0.018)		0.198*** (0.016)
<i>Coordination</i>			0.072*** (0.026)	0.066*** (0.020)
<i>Constant</i>	0.662*** (0.023)	0.660*** (0.025)	0.661*** (0.026)	0.654*** (0.020)
Observations	8,496	8,496	8,496	8,496
Subjects	354	354	354	354
R <sup>2</sup>	0.085	0.291	0.032	0.394

*Notes.* For buyers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if a buyer purchased a harmful product; we omit the cases in which buyers did not purchase a product. For sellers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the seller offered a responsible product and 0 if a seller offered a harmful product. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.13:** Coefficients from GLS (random-effects) regressions of responsible product choice

	<i>Buyers and Sellers</i>		<i>Buyers</i>		<i>Sellers</i>	
	Coefficient	Constant	Coefficient	Constant	Coefficient	Constant
a. Item 1	0.113*** (0.009)	0.519*** (0.032)	0.103*** (0.014)	0.537*** (0.039)	0.123*** (0.011)	0.504*** (0.032)
b. Item 2	-0.084*** (0.008)	0.626*** (0.028)	-0.070*** (0.012)	0.642*** (0.029)	-0.096*** (0.011)	0.611*** (0.029)
c. Item 3	0.054*** (0.010)	0.632*** (0.026)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.643*** (0.027)	0.067*** (0.010)	0.622*** (0.026)
d. Item 4	0.081*** (0.010)	0.623*** (0.025)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.645*** (0.027)	0.099*** (0.012)	0.597*** (0.024)
e. Item 5	0.067*** (0.010)	0.593*** (0.028)	0.060*** (0.012)	0.608*** (0.029)	0.074*** (0.013)	0.580*** (0.030)
f. Item 6	0.034*** (0.009)	0.644*** (0.026)	0.016 (0.012)	0.660*** (0.029)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.626*** (0.025)
g. Item 7	0.037*** (0.010)	0.636*** (0.027)	0.026** (0.013)	0.650*** (0.029)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.619*** (0.026)
h. Item 11	0.089*** (0.008)	0.667*** (0.025)	0.085*** (0.010)	0.676*** (0.026)	0.092*** (0.009)	0.660*** (0.025)
i. Item 12	0.050*** (0.009)	0.638*** (0.027)	0.041*** (0.012)	0.646*** (0.028)	0.059*** (0.011)	0.632*** (0.027)
Observations	15,429		6,933		8,496	
Subjects	649		295		354	

*Notes.* Each of rows a through i reports the coefficient and constant from a single regression, first for buyers and sellers combined and then separately for buyers and sellers. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer (seller) purchased (offered) a responsible product and 0 if the buyer (seller) purchased (offered) a harmful product. For buyers, we omit cases in which the buyer did not purchase a product. The column *Coefficient* reports the coefficient for the included item. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table D.14:** Random-effects GLS regressions of responsible buyer product choice  
(*Baseline* and *Discourse* conditions from Studies 2 and 3)

	(1)	(2)
<i>Discourse conditions</i>	0.242*** (0.045)	0.278*** (0.071)
<i>Study 3</i>		0.078 (0.066)
<i>Study 3 × Discourse conditions</i>		-0.077 (0.116)
<i>Constant</i>	0.543*** (0.033)	0.507*** (0.052)
Observations	6,916	6,916
Subjects	295	295
R <sup>2</sup>	0.106	0.112

*Notes.* We pooled the data for Study 2 and 3 restricting the sample to *Baseline* conditions, *Discourse* condition in Study 2 and *Discourse (Neutral)* condition in Study 3. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 (0) if a buyer purchased a responsible (harmful) product. We omit the cases in which a buyer purchased no product. The variable *Discourse conditions* takes on value 1 if *Discourse* condition in Study 2 and *Discourse (Neutral)* condition in Study 3 and 0 otherwise. *Baseline* and *Baseline* in Study 2 serve as the omitted category in model 1 and 2 respectively. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table D.15:** GLS (random-effects) regression of responsible buyer product choice

	(1)	(2)
<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	0.201*** (0.074)	0.228*** (0.074)
<i>Optional (Not all participate)</i>	0.034 (0.087)	0.142 (0.098)
<i>Optional (All participate)</i>	0.011 (0.117)	-0.090 (0.134)
<i>Passive</i>	0.126** (0.060)	0.148*** (0.056)
<i>Period</i>		-0.002 (0.002)
<i>Period × Discourse (Neutral)</i>		-0.002 (0.003)
<i>Period × Optional (Not all participate)</i>		-0.009* (0.003)
<i>Period × Optional (All participate)</i>		0.008* (0.004)
<i>Period × Passive</i>		-0.002 (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	0.585*** (0.040)	0.608*** (0.040)
Observations	6,933	6,933
Number of subjects	295	295
R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.042

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the 147 cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product. *Baseline* serves as omitted categories. *Period* takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.

## **E. Content Analysis**

In this section, we provide details on the content analysis of the discourse transcripts from each market in which discourse took place. Section E.1 describes the coding procedures and provides several tables summarizing the results of the coding. Section E.2 provides additional tables referred to in the main text. Section E.3 provides exploratory analysis of the relationship between the content of the discourse and market outcomes.

### **E.1 Procedural Details**

We organized four sessions with 128 coders at the University of Zurich, drawing from the same populations as participants in our experiments. The coders did not participate in the experiment prior to the coding sessions. We provided coders with a general description of the market experiment that was similar to the experimental instructions.

The coders' task was to read the complete transcript of discourse in a market and rate each independent statement as belonging to any of several applicable categories. We provided the coders with a detailed description of each category as shown in Tables E.1-E.3. Each message could be assigned to multiple categories.

Each coder classified the discourse transcript in four markets. For markets from Study 1 and 2 conducted in Mandarin or German, research assistants (unaware of the market results) translated the transcripts into English, in which all coding took place. Each market's discourse was evaluated by four different coders. We consider a statement as belonging to a category if at least 3 of 4 coders assigned it to that category.

Tables E.4-E.6 show the proportion of messages assigned to each category in each treatment and country for all three studies. Table E.7 provides Fleiss' Kappa, a measure of interrater agreement, rejecting that the observed level of agreement arose by chance for the measures we employ in our analysis.

**Table E.1:** Different coding categories and their description (Study 1)

<b>Category</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Recommending no impact on Cs</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with no effect on Participant C,” or the boycott of the “products with a loss for Participant C,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Recommending impact on Cs</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with a loss for Participant C,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Discussion of prices</i>	Any statement mentioning or discussing the prices of the products exchanged.
<i>Fairness</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to fairness, the “right thing to do” or morality, or demonstrating empathy for Participants C.
<i>Efficiency</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to efficiency (maximizing the total earnings of everybody), sustainability, or comparing the cost of having no impact on Participants C with the loss incurred by Participants C.
<i>Self-interest</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to selfishness, maximization of own profit or earnings.
<i>Agreement</i>	Any statement agreeing with or supporting a previous argument.
<i>Questions about what to do in the market game</i>	Any statement questioning what participants should do in the market game, in the form of a question or not.
<i>General discussion of the game or the experiment</i>	Any statement that mentions or discusses the market game or the experiment without clearly prescribing, supporting or justifying any particular behavior.
<i>No category / Unclear</i>	Any statement that does not fit in any category or for which the meaning is unclear. Use this category for any messages that you cannot otherwise categorize. You should not use this category if you also assign another category to a message.

**Table E.2:** Different coding categories and their description (Study 2)

<b>Category</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Recommending no impact on the donation</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with no effect on the donation,” or the boycott of the “products with a reduction for the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Recommending impact on the donation</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with a reduction for the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Discussion of prices</i>	Any statement mentioning or discussing the prices of the products exchanged.
<i>Fairness</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to fairness, the “right thing to do” or morality, or demonstrating some concern for the environment and/or poverty.
<i>Efficiency</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to efficiency (maximizing the total earnings of everybody), sustainability, or comparing the cost of having no impact on the donation with the loss incurred by the donation.
<i>Self-interest</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to selfishness, maximization of own profit or earnings.
<i>Agreement</i>	Any statement agreeing with or supporting a previous argument.
<i>Mentioning COTAP and/or its purposes</i>	Any statement that mentions or discusses the charity (COTAP) and/or its objective to fight climate change and poverty. It can be any statement that expresses support or aversion for the charity, irrespective of whether or not a reason is given.
<i>Referring to past behavior</i>	Any statement referring to past behavior to justify supporting either no impact or impact on the donation.
<i>Questions about what to do in the market game</i>	Any statement questioning what participants should do in the market game, in the form of a question or not.
<i>General discussion of the game or the experiment</i>	Any statement that mentions or discusses the market game or the experiment without clearly prescribing, supporting or justifying any particular behavior.
<i>No category / Unclear</i>	Any statement that does not fit in any category or for which the meaning is unclear. Use this category for any messages that you cannot otherwise categorize. You should not use this category if you also assign another category to a message.

**Table E.3:** Different coding categories and their description (Study 3)

<b>Category</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Recommending no impact on the donation</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with no effect on the donation”, or the boycott of the “products with a reduction for the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Recommending impact on the donation</i>	Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with a reduction for the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit.
<i>Discussion of prices</i>	Any statement mentioning or discussing the prices of the products exchanged.
<i>Fairness</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to fairness, the “right thing to do” or morality, or demonstrating some concern for the environment and/or poverty.
<i>Efficiency</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to efficiency (maximizing the total earnings of everybody), sustainability, or comparing the cost of having no impact on the donation with the loss incurred by the donation.
<i>Self-interest</i>	Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to selfishness, maximization of own profit or earnings.
<i>Agreement</i>	Any statement agreeing with or supporting a previous argument.
<i>Mentioning COTAP and/or its purposes</i>	Any statement that mentions or discusses the charity (COTAP) and/or its objective to fight climate change and poverty. It can be any statement that expresses support or aversion for the charity, irrespective of whether or not a reason is given.
<i>Engagement or attention</i>	Any statement that mentions the extent to which participants are engaged in or attentive to the discussion.
<i>Leaving the discussion</i>	Any statement that recommends ending the discussion and/or starting the market game.
<i>Questions about what to do in the market game</i>	Any statement questioning what participants should do in the market game, in the form of a question or not.
<i>General discussion of the game or the experiment</i>	Any statement that mentions or discusses the market game or the experiment without clearly prescribing, supporting or justifying any particular behavior.
<i>No category / Unclear</i>	Any statement that does not fit in any category or for which the meaning is unclear. Use this category for any messages that you cannot otherwise categorize. You should not use this category if you also assign another category to a message.

**Table E.4:** Fraction of all messages assigned to each category (Study 1)

	<i>Veil</i>		<i>No Veil</i>		<i>Exclusive</i>	
	Switzerland	China	Switzerland	China	Switzerland	China
No impact on Cs	0.13	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.18	0.03
Impact on Cs	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Prices	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.16	0.04
Fairness	0.11	0.06	0.18	0.07	0.19	0.04
Efficiency	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.05	0.01
Self-interest	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04
Agreement	0.19	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.20	0.05
Questions	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.05
General discussion	0.15	0.22	0.14	0.22	0.18	0.25
No category	0.27	0.25	0.18	0.22	0.09	0.24

*Notes.* The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. Coders could assign a message to several categories. Third parties are considered in *Veil* and *No Veil* (where they participate in discourse) but not in *Exclusive*.

**Table E.5:** Fraction of all messages assigned to each category (Study 2)

	<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Experienced</i>
No impact on the donation	0.17	0.17
Impact on the donation	0.03	0.04
Prices	0.15	0.20
Fairness	0.09	0.11
Efficiency	0.03	0.05
Self-interest	0.02	0.02
Agreement	0.20	0.19
COTAP	0.01	0.02
Past behavior	0.00	0.01
Questions	0.09	0.06
General discussion	0.10	0.08
No category	0.19	0.19

*Notes.* The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. Coders could assign a message to several categories.

**Table E.6:** Fraction of all messages assigned to each category (Study 3)

	<i>Discourse (Neutral)</i>	<i>Optional</i>
No impact on the donation	0.15	0.12
Impact on the donation	0.02	0.05
Prices	0.18	0.21
Fairness	0.04	0.06
Efficiency	0.03	0.03
Self-interest	0.03	0.04
Agreement	0.21	0.21
COTAP	0.02	0.01
Engagement	0.00	0.02
Leaving	0.00	0.03
Questions	0.05	0.06
General discussion	0.10	0.10
No category	0.12	0.06

*Notes.* The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. Coders could assign a message to several categories.

**Table E.7.** Fleiss' Kappa-statistic measure of interrater agreement by study and country

	Study 1				Study 2		Study 3	
	Switzerland		China		Kappa	Prob.	Kappa	Prob.
	Kappa	Prob.	Kappa	Prob.				
<i>No Impact</i>	0.448	0.000	0.410	0.000	0.419	0.000	0.546	0.000
<i>Impact</i>	0.282	0.000	0.283	0.000	0.324	0.000	0.407	0.000
<i>Fairness</i>	0.406	0.000	0.337	0.000	0.327	0.000	0.258	0.000
<i>Self-interest</i>	0.356	0.000	0.326	0.000	0.212	0.000	0.236	0.000

*Notes.* *Kappa* refers to Fleiss' Kappa, a measure of agreement for ratings provided by multiple, possibly non-overlapping, coders. *Prob.* refers to the probability of the observed level of agreement arising by chance.

## E.2 Additional Tables

**Table E.8a:** Ordered probit regressions of *Prosocial* communication type (Study 1)

	Switzerland (1)	China (2)
<i>No Veil</i>	0.291 (0.242)	-0.048 (0.184)
<i>Exclusive</i>	0.138 (0.265)	-0.613*** (0.206)
Observations	344	344
Test: <i>No Veil</i> = <i>Exclusive</i>	p= 0.478	p=0.002

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if *Prosocial*>0, 0 if *Prosocial*=0 and -1 if *Prosocial*<0. Model 1 concerns Switzerland and model 2 concerns China. The data only concerns the *Veil*, *No Veil* and *Exclusive* conditions. As third parties in *Exclusive* did not participate in public discourse with market actors, we exclude them from the data. In both models, *Veil* serves as omitted category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table E.8b:** Ordered probit regressions of *Prosocial* communication type (Studies 2 & 3)

	Study 2 (1)	Study 3 (2)	Study 3 (3)
<i>Experienced</i>	-0.007 (0.203)		
<i>Optional</i>		-0.407*** (0.180)	-0.356* (0.185)
Observations	352	352	333

*Notes.* The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if *Prosocial*>0, 0 if *Prosocial*=0 and -1 if *Prosocial*<0. In model 1, the data only concerns the *Discourse* and *Experienced* conditions of Study 2. In models 2 and 3, the data only concerns the *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions of Study 3. Model 2 includes participants who did not enter the chat (coded as *Prosocial* = 0) and model 3 excludes them. *Discourse* in Study 2 and *Discourse (Neutral)* in Study 3 serve as omitted categories, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table E.9.** Average number of messages sent belonging to *Fairness* and *Self-interest* categories, by *Prosocial* position in discourse

	Study 1				Study 2		Study 3	
	<i>Switzerland</i>		<i>China</i>		<i>Fairness</i>	<i>Self-interest</i>	<i>Fairness</i>	<i>Self-interest</i>
	<i>Fairness</i>	<i>Self-interest</i>	<i>Fairness</i>	<i>Self-interest</i>				
<i>Prosocial</i> > 0	1.21	0.09	1.17	0.26	0.84	0.05	0.47	0.12
<i>Prosocial</i> = 0	0.53	0.15	0.34	0.26	0.12	0.07	0.10	0.14
<i>Prosocial</i> < 0	0.43	0.71	0.24	0.76	0.58	0.55	0.38	0.88

*Notes.* The modal value in each column is shaded. Data from participants in all conditions involving discourse. As third parties in *Exclusive* did not participate in public discourse with market actors in Study 1, we exclude them from the data. Classification based on the relative frequencies of messages advocating for *No Impact* or *Impact* sent by a participant. *Prosocial*>0 (*Prosocial*<0) corresponds to participants who sent strictly more (fewer) messages advocating for the responsible product than for the harmful product. *Prosocial*=0 corresponds to participants who sent equal numbers of messages (possibly zero) of both types. The numbers in each column indicate the average number of messages assigned to each category (*Fairness*, *Self-interest*) by participants in that study and condition who are assigned to the particular *Prosocial* communication strategy.

### E.3 Exploratory Analysis of the Impact of Discourse Content on Market Outcomes

We conduct exploratory analysis to investigate whether variation in the communication strategies employed by participants that we observe in Table 7 (in the main text) provides any insights into the sources of variation in the impact of discourse across our treatments.

#### E.3.1 Relationships between discourse content and market shares

Tables E.10a, E.10b and E.10c report regressions, using observations from both buyers and sellers, of the decision to select a responsible product—i.e., to purchase a responsible product for buyers and to offer one for sellers. Each table reports the results for one study. The first panel in each table provides pooled results for buyers and sellers, while the second and third panels provide separate results for buyers and sellers, respectively. The first regression in each panel studies the relationship between a participant's own *Prosocial* classification, according to the messages sent by that participant, and subsequent socially responsible market behavior. The second regression includes the average of *other* market participants' *Prosocial* scores, capturing the degree to which a participant was exposed to others supporting responsible exchange. The third regression includes both participants' own and others' average *Prosocial* scores.<sup>3</sup>

The coefficient for *Prosocial (self)* is positive and at least marginally statistically significant in every specification, indicating that those participants who advocated for socially responsible market behavior in discourse tended to act more socially responsibly in the subsequent market. The coefficient for *Prosocial (others)* is also positive in every specification, indicating that being exposed to more arguments supporting socially responsible market behavior is positively correlated with subsequently buying or offering more responsible products. These relationships are always statistically significant for Studies 2 and 3, but generally not so for Study 1. Nevertheless, this provides suggestive evidence that exposure to others' arguments supporting socially responsible market conduct may play a role in the beneficial impacts of discourse on socially responsible market conduct, though these results should be interpreted cautiously due to their exploratory and correlational nature.

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<sup>3</sup> For Study 3 (Table E.10c), we omit participants in the *Passive* condition from the first model because these participants did not send any messages. In model 3, we assign these participants a *Prosocial (self)* score equal to zero.

**Table E.10a:** GLS (random-effects) regressions of responsible product choice (Study 1)

	Buyers and Sellers					
	Switzerland				China	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.023*** (0.009)		0.022*** (0.008)	0.107*** (0.024)		0.099*** (0.022)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.033 (0.029)	0.022 (0.028)		0.139* (0.082)	0.090 (0.083)
<i>Constant</i>	0.881*** (0.020)	0.871*** (0.032)	0.861*** (0.031)	0.450*** (0.041)	0.434*** (0.054)	0.420*** (0.054)
Observations	6,293	6,293	6,293	6,254	6,254	6,254
Subjects	264	264	264	264	264	264
R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	0.008	0.028	0.089	0.028	0.100

	Buyers					
	Switzerland				China	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.023*** (0.008)		0.021*** (0.008)	0.111*** (0.021)		0.108*** (0.021)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.029 (0.032)	0.011 (0.032)		0.106 (0.079)	0.082 (0.080)
<i>Constant</i>	0.890*** (0.019)	0.882*** (0.034)	0.881*** (0.033)	0.458*** (0.038)	0.455*** (0.055)	0.430*** (0.055)
Observations	2,837	2,837	2,837	2,798	2,798	2,798
Subjects	120	120	120	120	120	120
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.006	0.026	0.114	0.017	0.124

	Sellers					
	Switzerland				China	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.025* (0.013)		0.024* (0.013)	0.103*** (0.037)		0.086** (0.039)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.035 (0.028)	0.030 (0.027)		0.169** (0.086)	0.105 (0.093)
<i>Constant</i>	0.872*** (0.024)	0.862*** (0.032)	0.843*** (0.032)	0.444*** (0.045)	0.415*** (0.053)	0.411*** (0.053)
Observations	3,456	3,456	3,456	3,456	3,456	3,456
Subjects	144	144	144	144	144	144
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.009	0.032	0.069	0.040	0.083

*Notes.* The data considered in the analysis is restricted to the treatments following discourse, i.e., *Veil*, *No Veil* and *Exclusive*. As third parties did not participate in public discourse with market actors, we exclude them from the data. For buyers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if a buyer purchased a harmful product; we omit the cases in which buyers did not purchase a product. For sellers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the seller offered a responsible product and 0 if a seller offered a harmful product. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table E.10b:** GLS (random-effects) regressions of responsible product choice (Study 2)

	Buyers and Sellers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.097*** (0.013)		0.082*** (0.013)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.180*** (0.050)	0.134*** (0.050)
<i>Constant</i>	0.717*** (0.036)	0.660*** (0.049)	0.634*** (0.051)
Observations	6,984	6,984	6,984
Subjects	352	352	352
R <sup>2</sup>	0.144	0.098	0.196

	Buyers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.100*** (0.012)		0.087*** (0.014)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.177*** (0.049)	0.131*** (0.051)
<i>Constant</i>	0.732*** (0.032)	0.661*** (0.052)	0.646*** (0.051)
Observations	3,144	3,144	3,144
Subjects	160	160	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.101	0.220

	Sellers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.097*** (0.021)		0.080*** (0.022)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.182*** (0.052)	0.135*** (0.053)
<i>Constant</i>	0.704*** (0.043)	0.659*** (0.048)	0.625*** (0.052)
Observations	3,840	3,840	3,840
Subjects	192	192	192
R <sup>2</sup>	0.131	0.096	0.180

*Notes.* The data considered in the analysis is restricted to the treatments and periods following discourse, i.e., *Discourse* and Part II of *Experienced*. For buyers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if a buyer purchased a harmful product; we omit the cases in which buyers did not purchase a product. For sellers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the seller offered a responsible product and 0 if a seller offered a harmful product. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table E.10c:** GLS (random-effects) regressions of responsible product choice (Study 3)

	Buyers and Sellers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.130*** (0.015)		0.109*** (0.015)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.169*** (0.043)	0.125*** (0.037)
<i>Constant</i>	0.621*** (0.042)	0.598*** (0.038)	0.584*** (0.038)
Observations	8,352	11,766	11,766
Subjects	352	495	495
R <sup>2</sup>	0.187	0.065	0.163

	Buyers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.123*** (0.016)		0.106*** (0.015)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.161*** (0.046)	0.116*** (0.042)
<i>Constant</i>	0.628*** (0.045)	0.607*** (0.038)	0.594*** (0.040)
Observations	3,744	5,286	5,286
Subjects	160	225	225
R <sup>2</sup>	0.208	0.060	0.177

	Sellers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Prosocial</i> (self)	0.140*** (0.022)		0.113*** (0.022)
<i>Prosocial</i> (others)		0.175*** (0.043)	0.133*** (0.037)
<i>Constant</i>	0.613*** (0.043)	0.591*** (0.038)	0.575*** (0.038)
Observations	4,608	6,480	6,480
Subjects	192	270	270
R <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.071	0.152

*Notes.* The data considered in the analysis is restricted to treatments *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* in model 1 and to treatments *Discourse (Neutral)*, *Optional* and *Passive* in models 2 and 3. For buyers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if a buyer purchased a harmful product; we omit the cases in which buyers did not purchase a product. For sellers, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the seller offered a responsible product and 0 if a seller offered a harmful product. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

### E.3.2 Relationship between discourse content and beliefs and values (Study 3)

We next study whether the content of discourse provides insights into variation in the measures of beliefs, values and norms elicited in Study 3. Table E.11 tests how one's own *Prosocial* communication and exposure to others' *Prosocial* communication influence the measures of beliefs, values and social norms elicited immediately after discourse and before market interaction. As in Table E.10c, we omit *Baseline*, which involved no discourse, and we omit the *Passive* condition from regressions that only include *Prosocial (self)* as an explanatory variable.

The first four coefficients are all positive and statistically significant, indicating that producing and being exposed to more prosocial argumentation is correlated with stronger beliefs that others support socially responsible exchange and personal support for such exchange. Notably, *Prosocial (others)* has a particularly strong relationship with *Beliefs about others*, consistent with an important impact of public discourse being that it reinforces expectations that others support socially responsible exchange. Both coefficients for *Coordination* are small and statistically insignificant, indicating that *Prosocial* argumentation is largely unrelated to the general sense that there is agreement on prices or product types. Finally, we also observe that social norms elicited prior to market exchange are correlated with both a participant's own *Prosocial* communication and also by exposure to others' *Prosocial* messages, with the latter relationship being stronger.

**Table E.11:** OLS regressions of values, beliefs and social norms on own and others' communication strategies (Study 3)

	Beliefs about others		Personal values		Coordination		Social norms (prior to market)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Prosocial (self)</i>	0.158** (0.058)		0.259*** (0.042)		0.046 (0.043)		-0.081*** (0.024)	
<i>Prosocial (others)</i>		0.617*** (0.103)		0.149*** (0.051)		-0.024 (0.100)		-0.251*** (0.055)
Constant	0.004 (0.110)	-0.249** (0.095)	-0.138*** (0.050)	-0.079* (0.045)	0.231*** (0.070)	0.096 (0.089)	-0.388*** (0.051)	-0.293*** (0.047)
Obs.	352	495	352	495	352	495	352	495
R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.115	0.107	0.007	0.004	0.000	0.038	0.087

*Notes.* The dependent variable is *Beliefs about others* in models 1 and 2, *Personal values* in models 3 and 4, *Coordination* in models 5 and 6 and *Social norms* (coded such that lower numbers indicate perceptions that it is less appropriate to exchange the harmful product) before market interaction in models 7 and 8. Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 include a participants' own *Prosocial* classification according to the messages that participant sent during discourse. For these models, we pooled the data for the treatments in which participants could send a message, i.e., *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional*. Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 include the average of other participants' *Prosocial* scores. For these models, we pooled the data for treatments with discourse, i.e., including *Passive*. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Overall, the results in Table E.11 suggest that, in particular, being exposed to others' arguments advocating for social responsibility strengthens the degree to which market actors believe that others support exchanging socially responsible products and social norms against the exchange of harmful products. Of course, the exploratory and correlational nature of this analysis means it must be interpreted cautiously.

### *E.3.3 Discourse content and market shares in Discourse (Neutral) and Optional (Study 3)*

We next focus on the *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions, where we observe substantial differences in the market shares for socially responsible products, despite widespread participation in discourse. Our objective here is to investigate whether differences in the discourse produced in these conditions may contribute to the subsequent differences in market shares. Specifically, one possible reason behind this difference in market behavior might be the differences in *Prosocial* communication observed between these two conditions (see Table 7 in the main text).<sup>4</sup> We investigate whether variation in participants' exposure to *Prosocial* messages from others impacts expectations, norms and initial behavior in these conditions.

First, we observe a strong correlation between the mean *Prosocial* value in a market and the corresponding market share of the responsible product (0.584,  $p < 0.001$ , using a market as the unit of analysis).<sup>5</sup> This correlation is slightly higher when looking only at the market shares in the first period (0.609,  $p < 0.001$ ). These observations indicate that the amount of prosocial communication produced during discourse in the *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions is strongly related to the subsequent degree of socially responsible market behavior in those conditions.

Table E.12 confirms, at the individual level, strong positive relationships between exposure to others' prosocial arguments and beliefs that others support exchanging the socially responsible product (model 1), social norms of the appropriateness of exchanging the harmful product (model 2). Note that these two models correspond to models 2 and 8 from Table E.11 but focus on the *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions. Furthermore, the table shows strong positive relationships between exposure to others' prosocial arguments and first-period product choices for

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<sup>4</sup> As the discourse observed in the *Passive* condition is not produced by participants in that condition—but, instead, by participants in the *Discourse (Neutral)* condition—we omit this condition from the analysis here.

<sup>5</sup> The correlation is similarly high when looking separately at *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* (respectively, 0.536 and 0.555).

both buyers (model 3) and sellers (model 4). While this analysis is highly exploratory and should be interpreted cautiously, it nevertheless provides some indication that the degree to which individuals are exposed to others' statements advocating socially responsible market behavior may influence beliefs and norms and, subsequently, market behavior and outcomes.

**Table E.12:** OLS regressions of beliefs, norms and initial behavior on prosocial discourse (Study 3, *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions only)

	Beliefs about others (1)	Social norms (prior to market) (2)	Responsible buyer product choice (3)	Responsible seller product choice (4)
<i>Prosocial (others)</i>	0.710*** (0.099)	-0.291*** (0.064)	0.211*** (0.054)	0.211*** (0.049)
Constant	-0.270** (0.106)	-0.283*** (0.053)	0.707*** (0.049)	0.692*** (0.045)
Observations	352	352	153	192
R <sup>2</sup>	0.147	0.104	0.097	0.093

*Notes.* The data only concerns the *Discourse (Neutral)* and *Optional* conditions of Study 3. The dependent variable in model 1 is *Beliefs about others* and in model 2 social norms elicited before the market activity. In model 3, we focus on buyers and the dependent variable takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a responsible product and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product (we omit cases in which a buyer did not purchase a product). In model 4, we focus on sellers and the dependent variable takes on value 1 (0) if a seller offered a responsible (harmful) product. For model 3 and 4, we restricted our data to the first period. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



## **F. Instructions for Study 1**

### **F.1. Market Game**

*We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and/or those of the other participants – earn money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive as an initial endowment for participating. It is thus very important that you read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please contact us.*

*Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the study. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all of the associated payments.*

*During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study. The following conversion rate applies: 10 points = CHF 2.50.*

*At the end of today's study, you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus the initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages. For the sake of simplicity, we will always use male forms for participants; the instructions also obviously refer to female participants.*

#### *The study*

*There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The participants in this study are divided into groups of 16 people. There are 6 participants A, 5 participants B, and 5 participants C in each group.*

*Participants A are sellers, participants B are buyers. Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions between the participants A and B.*

*The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one sales offer for a product. Participant A thereby determines the type of product and the price for the product.*

- *There are two types of products:*
  1. *“Products with no effect on participant C” and*
  2. *“Products with a loss for participant C”.*
- *Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price.*

*The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on participant C” amount to 10 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of a “product with a loss for participant C”.*

*The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what type of product it is.*

*The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price and the type of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can decide one after the other in a random order. Each participant B can only accept one offer. This means that a maximum of five of the six participants A can sell a product.*

*In each period, each of the five participants B will be randomly assigned to one of the five participants C. If a participant B purchases a “product with a loss for participant C”, the assigned participant C incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant B purchases a “product with no effect on participant C” or no product at all, the assigned participant C incurs no loss.*

*You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the beginning of the study. Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same during the entire study.*

*In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 points. The payment in points of participant A (seller), participant B (buyer), and participant C in a period are thus determined as follows:*

*Participant A's payment*

- *If a participant B accepts his sales offer:  $100 - \text{production cost} + \text{price of the product}$  where the production cost amounting to 10 points are incurred only with a “product without effect on participant C”. The production costs for a “product with a loss for participant C” amount to 0.*
- *If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100*

*Participant B's payment:*

- *If participant B accepts a sales offer:  $100 + 50 - \text{price of the product}$*
- *If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100*

*Participant C's payment:*

- *If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product with loss for participant C:”  $100 - 60 = 40$*
- *If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product without effect on participant C” or does not purchase a product: 100*

### *Procedures on the computer:*

*In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen:*

**Your offer**

What type of product would you like to offer? ☐ Product without effect on participant C  
☐ Product with a loss for participant C

Which price would you like to ask?

OK

*Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on participant C” or a “product with a loss for participant C.” to do this, the corresponding type of product must be clicked on.*

*Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the product. The corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 up to and including 50 are possible.*

*Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the lower right-hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the OK button is clicked.*

*Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see the sales offers (the price and the type of product) of all of the other participants A in a table. Here is an example:*

Price of the product	Type of the product	Order of acceptance
This is where the participants A see the price of the product for every sales offer	This is where the participants A see the type of product for every sales offer	accepted SECOND - accepted FIRST -

*The participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can always see in the column on the right whether and in which order the participants B accept the offers.*

*Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of his own payment. If his offer is accepted, participant A will also learn participant B’s payment and the payment of the corresponding participant C.*

The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:

Price of the product	Type of the product	
This is where the participants B see the price of the product for every sales offer	This is where the participants B see the type of product for every sales offer	
		<div>ACCEPT</div> <div>DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER</div>

Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one after the other. Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in time. Only when the current participant B has made his decisions will the next participant B see the screen above, where he can then accept an offer.

The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The participant B who is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining offers, as each offer can only be accepted by one participant B.

If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain that can no longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot conclude a sale in this period.

The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be randomly determined anew in each period.

The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, the corresponding row must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then appear with a blue background.

In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT button.

The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on.

If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will be declined if the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on.

When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of his own payment and that of his assigned participant C.

*Participants C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the participants C, however, to indicate in each period their expectations about the behaviors of participants A and B.*

*When all participants A and B have made their decisions, the participants C will learn of their own earnings, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of participants A and B.*

*After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next period will begin.*

*Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period.*

*Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must consider your decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully.*

*At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment.*

*Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages.*

### *Control questions*

1. *Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C?*

2. *Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C?*

3. *Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 15 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C?*

4. *Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 15 and no participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a participant B who does not accept an offer? How high is the payment for the corresponding participant C?*

*Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to you at your workplace.*

## **F.2. Public Discourse**

The instructions are shown on the screen after subjects read the instructions but before they entered the market game. In the following, we provide the instructions for condition *No Veil*. The instructions for conditions *Veil* and *Exclusive* are identical, except that the subjects are not informed about their role on Screen 1 (in *Veil*) or that participants A and B are informed that participants C will communicate separately (in *Exclusive*).

### **Screen 1**

*You are a participant A (seller) / participant B (buyer) / participant C for the entire duration of the study.*

*Participants C only: We know that this role might be not satisfying! For scientific reasons it is however necessary that participants C participate in this study. We very much hope for your understanding.*

### **Screen 2**

*Before we begin with the study, the 16 participants who will make up a group of 6 players As, 5 player Bs and 5 player Cs will have the opportunity to communicate with each other through a discussion board.*

*During this time, we ask you to discuss with the other participants how “socially appropriate” or “socially inappropriate” it is to trade the “product with a loss for participant C.” That is, as a buyer or seller, to what extent is trading this product consistent or inconsistent with what most people agree is the “appropriate,” “right” or “moral” thing to do?*

*You have eight minutes to discuss with the other participants in your group. Please use this time to discuss this topic.*

*Please click the "next"-button to get to the chat page.*

### **Screen 3**

*Please enter your messages in the blue box at the bottom of the page. After typing in your message to the other participants, please press the “Enter” key to display your message. Each participant has been assigned a random number, which is displayed in front of the respective messages. This number is displayed along with the corresponding participant’s role (A, B, or C). You see your number when you enter your first message. This number is simply so that you can keep track of each other during the discussion. Afterward, you will not see or use these numbers. Please refrain from sending any messages that could personally identify you.*

*You are a participant A/B/C. Participants A are sellers, Participants B are buyers. Participants C can incur losses due to the transactions between the participants A and B.*

### **F.3. Norm Elicitation**

#### **Screen 1**

*Thank you very much for taking part in the study. We now ask you to rate how “socially appropriate” or “socially inappropriate” it is to trade the “product with a loss for participant C.” That is, as a buyer or seller, to what extent is trading this product consistent or inconsistent with what most people agree is the “appropriate,” “right” or “moral” thing to do? You may choose from four possible responses: “very socially appropriate,” “somewhat socially appropriate,” “somewhat socially inappropriate,” and “very socially inappropriate.”*

*The rating you provide affects how much money you earn today. Specifically, we are going to ask you to match your rating to those of the participants in your group with which you interacted in the main part of the study. Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be “right” but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen in your group.*

*At the end of the study today, we will find out which response was selected by the most people in your group. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by the participants in your group, then you will receive an additional CHF 10 (on top of your earnings from the main part of the study). Otherwise you would receive no additional money. The amount you earn from both parts of the study will be paid to you, in cash, at the conclusion of the study.*

*For instance, suppose that you respond “very socially inappropriate,” then you would receive an additional CHF 10 if the most common response in your group is also “very socially inappropriate,” but you receive CHF 0 if the most common response is something else. Similarly, if you respond, for example, “somewhat socially appropriate,” then you would receive an additional CHF 10 if the most common response in your group is also “somewhat socially appropriate,” but you receive CHF 0 if the most common response is something else.*

*If you have any questions, please raise your hand.*

#### **Screen 2**

*Below, please provide your rating of how socially appropriate or socially inappropriate it is to trade the “product with a loss for participant C.” You may provide your rating by placing a check mark in the corresponding box and then confirming this choice.*

*Recall that you earn additional money if you give the same response as that most frequently selected by the other participants in the group. Specifically, if you match the most common answer in your group, then you will receive an additional CHF 10.*

*What do you think is the most commonly selected answer? Trading the “product with a loss for participant C” is: very socially appropriate / somewhat socially appropriate / somewhat socially inappropriate / very socially inappropriate*

#### **Screen 3**

*The most common response in your group is that trading the product with a loss for participant C is: [result here]. Your response was that trading the product with a loss for participant C is: [choice here] Your rating did match the most frequently selected rating. Hence you earn an additional 10 CHF. / Your rating did not match the most frequently selected rating. Hence you do not earn an additional 10 CHF.*

## **G. Instructions for Study 2**

### **G.1. Market Game**

#### ***The study***

*There are two types of participants in this study: Participants A and B. The participants are divided into groups of 11 people. There are six Participants A and five Participants B (buyers) in each group. Participants A are sellers and Participants B are buyers. You will see whether you are Participant A or B on your screen at the beginning of the study. Your role as Participant A or B will remain the same during the entire study.*

*For each participant B, a donation to the charity COTAP of potentially 100 points (25 CHF) will be made. The organization COTAP (Carbon Offsets To Alleviate Poverty) supports certified forestry projects in under-developed countries, which help reduce CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere and create life-changing income for the world's poorest people. More details about COTAP's mission are provided at the end of the instructions. The exact amount of the donation to COTAP depends on what type of product a seller (Participant A) and buyer (Participant B) trade. This will be explained in more detail below.*

*The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one sales offer for a product. Participant A thereby determines the type of product and the price for the product.*

- *There are two types of products:*
  1. *“Products with no effect on the donation” and*
  2. *“Products with a reduction for the donation”.*
- *Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price.*

*Production cost:*

- *The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on the donation” amount to 20 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of a “product with a reduction for the donation”.*

*Value of the product:*

- *The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what type of product it is.*

*Effect on the donation:*

- *If a participant B purchases a “product with no effect on the donation” or no product at all, the donation will not be reduced and will be of 100 points.*
- *If a participant B purchases a “product with a reduction for the donation”, the donation will incur a reduction of 60 points to 40 points.*



### **Market Activity**

*The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price and the type of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can decide one after the other in a random order. Each participant B can only accept one offer. This means that a maximum of five of the six participants A can sell a product.*

### **Payment**

*In each period, each Participant A and Participant B initially receives an endowment of 100 points. The payments in points of Participant A (seller) and Participant B (buyer) in a period are then determined as follows:*

#### *Participant A's payment*

- *If a participant B accepts his sales offer:  $100 - \text{production cost} + \text{price of the product}$  where the production cost amounting to 20 points are incurred only with a “product without effect on the donation”. The production costs for a “product with a reduction for the donation” amount to 0.*
- *If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100*

#### *Participant B's payment:*

- *If participant B accepts a sales offer:  $100 + 50 - \text{price of the product}$*
- *If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100*

#### *Amount donated by Participant B:*

- *If a participant B chooses a “Product with reduction for the donation:”  $100 - 60$*
- *If a participant B chooses a “Product without effect on the donation” or does not purchase a product: 100*

### **More about COTAP:**

*The mission of COTAP is to empower individuals and organizations in developed countries to address both climate change and global poverty. COTAP counteracts carbon emissions through certified forestry projects in under-developed regions, which create transparent, accountable, and life-changing earnings for rural farming communities where income levels are less than \$2 per day.*

*COTAP sources carbon offset funds from those who care about both climate change and poverty alleviation, pools those funds, and transparently matches those funds with their partners' forestry projects in order to fill the forestry carbon finance gap, restore landscapes, and create direct, significant, verifiable, and lasting benefits for the most economically vulnerable people in the world.*

*Through COTAP, you are paying smallholder farmers in developing countries for planting and maintaining trees, which capture and store your CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. A donation of 10 points (= CHF 2.5) offsets 0.25 tons of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), or 250 Kg of CO<sub>2</sub>.*

### ***Procedures on the computer:***

*In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen:*

**Your offer**

What type of product would you like to offer? ☐ Product without effect on participant C  
☐ Product with a loss for participant C

Which price would you like to ask?

OK

*Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on the donation” or a “product with a reduction for the donation.” To do this, the corresponding type of product must be clicked on.*

*Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the product. The corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 up to and including 50 are possible.*

*Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the lower right-hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the OK button is clicked.*

*Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see the sales offers (the price and the type of product) of all of the other participants A in a table. Here is an example:*

Price of the product	Type of the product	Order of acceptance
This is where the participants A see the price of the product for every sales offer	This is where the participants A see the type of product for every sales offer	accepted SECOND - accepted FIRST -

*The participant's own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can always see in the column on the right whether and in which order the participants B accept the offers.*

*Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of his own*

payment. If his offer is accepted, participant A will also learn participant B's payment and the corresponding amount donated.

The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:

Price of the product	Type of the product	
This is where the participants B see the price of the product for every sales offer	This is where the participants B see the type of product for every sales offer	
		<div>ACCEPT</div> <div>DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER</div>

Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one after the other. Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in time. Only when the current participant B has made his decisions will the next participant B see the screen above, where he can then accept an offer.

The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The participant B who is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining offers, as each offer can only be accepted by one participant B.

If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain that can no longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot conclude a sale in this period.

The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be randomly determined anew in each period.

The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, the corresponding row must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then appear with a blue background.

In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT button.

The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on.

If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will be declined if the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on.

When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of his own payment and the corresponding amount donated.

After all participants have been informed about their payments and the amount donated in a period, the next period will begin.

*Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period. This selected period will also determine the actual donation that is made to COTAP.*

*Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must consider your decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully.*

*At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment.*

*We will also make the donation to COTAP. If you want to verify that COTAP actually received the money donated, you will be prompted to type in your e-mail address at the end of the study and we will send you a dated receipt indicating the donated amount.*

*Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages.*

### **Control questions**

1. *Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on the donation” at the price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated?*

2. *Assume that participant A offers a “product with a reduction for the donation” at the price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated?*

3. *Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on the donation” at the price of 25 and participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated?*

4. *Assume that participant A offers a “product with a reduction for the donation” at the price of 25 and no participant B accepts the offer.*

*How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a participant B who does not accept an offer? How high is the corresponding amount donated?*

## **G.2. Public Discourse**

Instructions correspond to the ones in Study 1, with respective minor changes implemented.

Subjects are informed about their roles prior to engaging in the discourse.

## **G.3. Norm Elicitation**

Instructions correspond to the ones in Study 1, with respective minor changes implemented.

## **H. Instructions for Study 3**

### **H.1. Market Game**

Instructions correspond to the ones in Study 2, with only minor changes (e.g., referring to “Sellers” and “Buyers” rather than “Participants A” and “Participants B”).

### **H.2. Public Discourse**

#### **H.2.1. Discourse (Neutral)**

##### **Screen 1**

*You are a Seller/Buyer for the entire duration of the study.*

##### **Screen 2**

*Before we start the study, you have the opportunity to communicate with the other people in your group, which consists of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers, in a discussion forum. This forum provides the possibility to discuss the upcoming market activity.*

*All participants in your group will participate in the discussion forum.*

*The discussion forum will last for 8 minutes. Once the forum closes, we will proceed with the study.*

*During the time that the discussion forum is active, all participants will have access to the forum and can read and post messages. Once the forum closes, participants will no longer see the messages.*

*Please click the "start discussion" button (that will appear soon) to go to the discussion forum.*

##### **Screen 3**

*You can enter your contributions to the discussion in the blue input field at the bottom of the screen. You have to press the “Enter” key for your message to be displayed in the forum. In the box below, you can also see the messages contributed by other participants in your group.*

*Each participant has a random number that is displayed in front of the messages sent by that participant. The number is displayed together with the respective role of the participant (“S” for Seller or “B” for Buyer). You have been notified of your role and you will see your number when you post messages.*

*This number is only used to assign the individual participants to their contributions during the discussion forum. It will not be displayed or used later in the study.*

*Please do not write any messages that could identify you personally.*

*Remember that all participants in your group can read and post messages in this discussion forum.*

*In total, there are 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers in the forum.*

*As a reminder of your role: You are a Seller/ Buyer.*

#### **H.2.1. Optional**

##### **Screen 1**

*You are a Seller/Buyer for the entire duration of the study.*

##### **Screen 2**

*Before we start the study, you have the opportunity to communicate with the other people in your group, which consists of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers, in a discussion forum. This forum provides the possibility to discuss the upcoming market activity.*

*Each participant in your group will decide, independently, whether or not to participate in the discussion forum. Any participants who decide to participate are free to leave the forum at any point. If you decide either not to participate or to leave, you cannot (re-)enter the forum later on.*

*The discussion forum will last for up to 8 minutes. The forum will close early, i.e., before 8 minutes elapse, if at any point there are less than two participants in the forum. Once the forum closes, the first period of the market activity will begin. If less than two participants decide to initially participate in the forum, then there will be no forum and we will proceed with the study.*

*During the time that the discussion forum is active, those participants who are currently participating in the forum can read and post messages. Once the forum closes, participants will no longer see the messages. If a participant does not participate in the forum, that participant will not see the messages; if a participant leaves the forum, that participant will no longer have access to the messages.*

*Please click the "start discussion" button (that will appear soon) to go to the discussion forum or the "skip discussion" button (that will appear soon) if you do not want to join the discussion forum.*

### **Screen 3**

*You can enter your contributions to the discussion in the blue input field at the bottom of the screen. You have to press the "Enter" key for your message to be displayed in the forum. In the box below, you can also see the messages contributed by those other participants in your group who are currently participating in the forum.*

*Each participant has a random number that is displayed in front of the messages sent by that participant. This number is displayed together with the respective role of the participant ("S" for Seller or "B" for Buyer). You have been notified of your role and you will see your number when you post messages.*

*This number is only used to assign the individual participants to their contributions during the discussion forum. It will not be displayed or used later in the study.*

*Please do not write any messages that could identify you personally.*

*Remember that not all participants in your group may be participating in this discussion forum. Only participants in your group who are currently in the forum can read and post messages.*

*As a reminder of your role: You are a Seller/ Buyer.*

*Number of Sellers currently in the forum:[amount]*

*Number of Buyers currently in the forum:[amount]*

## **H.2.1. Passive**

### **Screen 1**

*You are a Seller/Buyer for the entire duration of the study.*

### **Screen 2**

*In a previous session, a separate group of participants took part in the same market activity. Before starting the study, these participants had the opportunity to communicate with the other people in their group, which also consisted of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers, in a discussion forum. The forum provided the possibility to discuss the upcoming market activity.*

*All participants in the group participated in the discussion forum.*

*The discussion forum lasted for 8 minutes. During the time that the forum was active, all participants had access to the forum and could read and post messages. Once the forum closed, participants could no longer see the messages.*

*Before we start the study in this session, you have the opportunity to view the discussion that took place in this earlier group's discussion forum. Specifically, all the participants in your group, which consists of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers, will see the messages that participants in the earlier group typed into their discussion forum. These messages will be displayed on your screen in the same manner as they appeared for the earlier group.*

*Once you are done viewing the discussion forum, we will proceed with the study.*

*During the time that you are viewing the discussion forum, all participants in your group can read the messages posted by the earlier group, but you cannot write any messages. Once the forum closes, participants will no longer see the messages.*

*Please click the "view discussion" button (that will appear soon) to view the earlier group's discussion forum.*

### **Screen 3**

*In the box below, you can see the messages contributed by participants in a previous session of this study. These contributions appear sequentially, in the order in which they were posted.*

*Each participant had a random number that was displayed in front of the messages sent by that participant. This number was displayed together with the respective role of the participant ("S" for Seller or "B" for Buyer). These participants were notified of their role and could see their number when posting messages. This number was only used to assign the individual participants to their contributions during the discussion forum. It was not displayed or used later in the study. All participants in the earlier group could read and post messages in this discussion forum. In total, there were 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers in this forum.*

*Neither you nor the other participants in your group can post messages to the discussion forum. All participants in your group can only read the messages that were contributed by the participants in a previous session. As a reminder of your role: You are a Seller/ Buyer.*

## **H.3. Norm Elicitation**

### **H.3.1. Before the market activity**

#### **Screen 1**

*We now ask you to provide a rating of how "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate" it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation. You can earn money by providing the rating that is the **most common rating provided in your group** of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers. We thus do not ask you for the rating that you personally think is the "correct" rating, but for the rating that you think will be the most frequently chosen rating in your group.*

*In providing your rating, you should think about your group's perspective on how consistent with moral or proper social behavior it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation. You can give one of four possible ratings: "very socially appropriate," "somewhat socially appropriate," "somewhat socially inappropriate," or "very socially inappropriate."*

*At the end of today's session, we will determine the most frequently chosen rating in your group. If your rating coincides with the most frequently chosen rating, you will earn an additional CHF 5. If your rating does not coincide with the most frequently chosen rating, you will not earn additional money.*

*You will not find out what is the most common rating until the end of the study. You will receive your earnings from this task at the end of the study, in cash, together with your other earnings from this study.*

*Please raise your hand if you have a question. An experimenter will come to your desk.*

## **Screen 2**

*Please indicate your rating on the screen below regarding how "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate" it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation.*

*You provide your rating by ticking the respective box and then confirming your rating by clicking the "OK" button. You earn money by selecting the rating that is the most frequently chosen rating in your group.*

*Please select a rating:*

*Trading the product with a reduction to the donation is:*

### **H.3.2. After the market activity**

## **Screen 1**

*We now ask you again to provide a rating of how "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate" it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation. As before, you can earn money by providing the rating that is the **most common rating provided in your group** of 6 Sellers and 5 Buyers. We thus do not ask you for the rating that you personally think is the "correct" rating, but for the rating that you think will be the most frequently chosen rating in your group.*

*In providing your rating, you should think about your group's perspective on how consistent with moral or proper social behavior it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation. You can give one of four possible ratings: "very socially appropriate," "somewhat socially appropriate," "somewhat socially inappropriate," or "very socially inappropriate."*

*After this decision, we will determine the most frequently chosen rating in your group for this decision. Note that the most frequently chosen rating in this decision may differ from the one for the decision you made earlier. If your rating coincides with the most frequently chosen rating in this decision, you will earn an additional CHF 5. If your rating does not coincide with the most frequently chosen rating, you will not earn additional money. Whether or not you earn CHF 5 for this decision is not affected by whether or not you earned CHF 5 in the earlier decision.*

## **Screen 2**

*Please indicate your rating on the screen below regarding how "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate" it is to trade the product with a reduction to the donation.*

*You provide your rating by ticking the respective box and then confirming your rating by clicking the "OK" button. You earn money by selecting the rating that is the most frequently chosen rating in your group.*

*Please select a rating:*

*Trading the product with a reduction to the donation is:*

## **H.4. Questionnaire Items**

Study 3 also comprised a questionnaire administered on the computer screen immediately after discourse, or in Baseline after the instruction. See, e.g., Table D.6 of this appendix.