

EARTHQUAKE OR HURRICANE?¹

THE RISE AND FALL OF POPULIST PARTIES IN POLAND

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Introduction

In this chapter, we study the development of the Polish party system since the 1989 Round Table talks, examining the impact that populism might have had on the party system, especially given that populist forces have been present in Poland since its transition to democracy and that populism has always permeated its party system. Populism, encapsulated in the grassroots of the Solidarity movement during the transition and Lech Wałęsa's presidency in the first half of the 1990s (see Kubik and Lynch 2006), finally found political opportunity structures in the democratic process at the turn of the twenty-first century during the EU accession process, its aftermath and beyond.

This chapter opens with a brief presentation of party politics in Poland. Before analysing the eventual effects that populist parties had on the development of the Polish party system – with a special focus on polarisation, competition, fragmentation and closure – this chapter introduces the concept of (Polish) populism, exploring its demand side and its role in the competition surrounding political issues. In our analysis, we stress the distinctive features of Poland's democratisation, which left individuals 'lost in a maze, baffled by the outcomes of the democratic process' (Jasiewicz 2008: 11). In particular, we argue that, while populism in the form of discourse and representation has always been present in Poland, populist parties' success has resulted from the confluence of different factors, including historical legacies, the social costs of economic reforms, the EU integration process, and the

¹ See Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015).

recent economic and financial crisis. We also argue that populism *per se* has only had a limited (and indirect) effect on the Polish party system by consolidating and amplifying what, otherwise, was and is a party system primarily characterised by weak party organisations, disloyal elites, volatile electorates and a continuously open structure of competition.

The Polish Party System: Still Alphabet Soup

Contrary to most Western European party systems (*see* other chapters in this volume and the Hungarian party system (Enyedi and Rona in this volume), the Polish party system's history cannot be summarised with a couple of names.² Since the first free and fair legislative elections took place in 1991, no less than thirty-nine political parties have managed to obtain representation in the Polish parliament (*Sejm*). Figure 1, which summarises the history of party development in Poland between 1989 and 2015,³ clearly portrays the kind of alphabet soup that Polish voters have faced before almost every election (the 2005 and the 2007 elections being perhaps the only exceptions).

Figure 1. Polish political party tree (1989–2015)⁴

[Figure 1 around here]

Note: The thickness of the lines closely corresponds with the party's electoral support.

As the Figure 1 conveys, the history of party development in Poland over the past twenty-five years of democratic politics can be summarised in two words:

² For a more in-depth study of Polish party systems, please see Szczerbiak (2001), Millard (2010) and Gwiazda (2015).

³ Given the extremely fragmented character of the 1991–3 legislature, Figure 1 displays all parliamentary parties between 1993 and 2015, along with the most successful (i.e. ≥ 4 seats) ones in 1991.

⁴ A complete list of party acronyms and names can be found at the end of the chapter.

constant change. Thus, parties not only have come and gone – with greater or lesser degrees of success – but also have been affected by numerous splits and mergers. The clearest proof of this constant change is that only one (i.e., Polish Peasant Party) of the aforementioned thirty-nine parties has managed to obtain parliamentary representation in every single election.

Such instability at the party level has had important effects, as explained elsewhere (Casal Bertoa 2012) at the systemic level. Thus, throughout its history, the Polish party system has been characterised by moderate fragmentation, high electoral instability and an open structure of competition, as we will have the opportunity to observe later in this chapter. However, the Polish party system should not necessarily be classified as a chaotic system or as a ‘non-system’ (Sanchez 2009). In fact, notwithstanding the system’s aforementioned inchoate character, Polish politics have been characterised by a cross-cutting multidimensional space of interparty competition that revolves around two cleavages (i.e., economy and history/culture) that divide the political spectrum into four different politico-ideological fields (Casal Bertoa 2014):

- (a) social-democratic (strong support for state interventionism and cosmopolitanism);
- (b) agrarian (support for state interventionism combined with traditionalism);
- (c) conservative (a combination of pro-market attitudes and traditionalism, usually in a Christian Democratic version); and
- (d) liberal (strong support for free-market/enterprise and modern values).

Throughout its twenty-five-year democratic history, these four fields have been represented by different parties, especially on the right side (i.e., conservative and liberal) of the political spectrum. Thus, the conservative field had Solidarity (S), the Christian National Union (ZChN) and the Centre Accord (PC) as its principal

representatives between 1991 and 1996, before converging into Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in 1997, which was soon replaced by the short-lived League of Polish Families (LPR) and Law and Justice (PiS) in 2001. Between 1994 and 2001, the liberal field was represented by the Freedom Union (UW), a merger of the Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) (Szczerbiak, 2001). Since 2001, the liberal field's principal representative has been the Civic Platform (PO), a splinter party of the UW, which then became the Democratic Party (PD). By contrast, and with the brief interlude of Self-Defence (SRP) between 2001 and 2007, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a merger of various former Communist parties, trade unions and associations in 1999, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) have always been the major players in the social-democratic and agrarian fields.

As we will see later in this chapter, a second constant in the Polish party system has been its bipolar structure of competition. This structure pitted post-communist parties, combining the social democrats with the agrarians, against post-Solidarity parties, combining the conservatives and the liberals, between 1991 and 2004; however, since 2005, with the demise of the SLD and the disappearance of the so-called post-communist cleavage, it has pitted the two parties within the post-Solidarity camp – namely, the liberal PO and the conservative PiS – against one another.

To understand to the extent to which populist parties have influenced in this already rather open party system, particularly given the changes that took place in 2005, we will first define populism and examine why it exists in the Polish context.

Populism in Poland: emergence and persistence

This chapter suggests that Polish populism, as a discourse and representative doctrine within the party system, has emerged and been present since the very beginning of the democratization process (see also Kubik and Lynch 2006). However, its success is a consequence and confluence of varying factors, where agency – understood as the specific coalitional strategies that party leaders adopt at particular points in time – is significant. We use ‘populism’ to refer to ‘popular resentment against the order imposed on society by a long-established...ruling class’ (Shils 1956: 101). Populism ‘strongly oppos(es)...the Establishment...(and) feel(s) alienated from the centres of power’ (Wiles 1969: 67). It emerges from an ‘extreme’ crisis – whether ‘real or perceived’ – and shares a ‘common rhetoric...compatible with ideologies of different kinds or with lack of ideology altogether’ (Canovan 1981: 552), which is ‘moralistic rather than programmatic’ (Mudde 2004: 544; Wiles 1969: 167).

Polish society resisted the communist regime and maintained a *de facto* degree of societal pluralism despite attempts to impose a totalitarian system. Totalitarianism was rejected by most Poles (Linz and Stepan 1996). During the communist regime, the Catholic Church represented the cradle of resistance and autonomy, legitimising organised protest and opposition. The arrest of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (1952–6) was one of several attempts to weaken the Church’s resistance, but it further reinforced the dichotomy between ‘we, the people’ and ‘they, the communists’. This dichotomy was strengthened by the unity of the Polish state, partly due to the partitions (1764–95) and Poland’s ethnic homogeneity, following the absorption of Byelorussian and Ukrainian minorities after World War Two, the extermination of most of the Jewish population and the expulsion of the German minority.

The Catholic Church maintained its vital role across society and supported the

Polish ‘Solidarity’ ‘refolution’.⁵ In Kubik’s words, Solidarity ‘was never simply a trade union or a movement, but a cultural class in *statu nascendi*...subjected to tremendous internal centrifugal tensions...held’ together by ‘a polarized vision of “we/the people/Solidarity” versus “them/authorities/communists”’ (in Kubik and Lynch 2006: 11), which became a political force. This dichotomy persisted and created a clear distinction between opponents of the regime (the Solidarity Republic) and the governing elites (the Polish People’s Republic).

When Lech Wałęsa was elected as President of Poland (1990–5), he described himself as the leader of Polish civil society rather than emphasising his institutional role as President of the Polish Republic (see De Lange and Guerra 2009). Wałęsa represented ‘the people’ and called attention to the division between politics and the people, politically recognising its existence. He was the former leader of Solidarity, the Polish trade union, and was acting as the spokesperson for civil society. His opponent, Stanisław Tymiński, who was defeated in the presidential electoral race, used ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric and spoke in the language of the people (Wysocka 2009). The ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy endured as the dominant cleavage in the 1990s, as a historical legacy and religiosity represented the most important explanatory factors underpinning citizens’ behaviours (Jasiewicz 2009; Markowski 1999).

Table 1 displays the percentage of votes (and seats) obtained by populist parties in both presidential and legislative elections⁶ as well as the level of populism observed in political discourse according to political parties’ stances in ‘election

⁵ The term ‘refolution’ refers to the process of political, social and economic change that took place in Central and Eastern Europe. It was similar to a revolution but relied on the old political system without major purges; in most cases, it was half reform, half revolution (Ash 1989).

⁶ For a detailed list of populist parties, presidential candidates, and the parties that supported them, please see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. In contrast to some scholars (Bakke and Sitter, 2005: 248; Van Kessel, 2015), though similar to Enyedi and Rona (in this volume), we consider PiS to be a social national conservative party rather than a populist party (Buzalka, 2008: 757; De Lange and Guerra, 2009; Szczerbiak, 2007)

manifestos, speeches of the party leader during and immediately after the election campaign, and the parliamentary debate that takes place prior to the vote of confidence for a new government' (Stanley 2015a: 247-248).

Table 1. Level of populism in the Polish party system (1991–2015)

Elections	1990–1	1993–5	1997	2000–1	2005	2007	2010–11	2015
Presidential	23.1	8.2		3.6	15.5		2.4	25.1
Legislative	0.6 (0.7)	8.3	5.7 (1.3)	18.1 (19.8)	21.1 (19.6)	2.8	0.6	13.6 (9.1)
Discourse ⁷	0.44	0.44	0.46	0.64	0.64	0.46	0.49	n/a

Note: The percentage of seats is shown in brackets.

After Tymiński's surprising performance in 1990, during the first decade of Polish politics (1991–2001), populism had a rather moderate presence, as shown in Table 1. In fact, no other populist parties managed to enter parliament, with the exception of Tymiński's political platform (Party X) in 1991 (3 seats) and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) in 1997 (6 seats), which took advantage of former premier Jan Olszewski's reasonable performance in the presidential elections in 1996 (*see* Tables A1 and A2).

Indeed, populism had not increased at all levels until the run-up to EU membership in 2004 and the emergence of two Eurosceptic parties: namely, the LPR, a fundamentalist extreme right-wing party, and the populist agrarian SRP. When, later in 2007 Poland held pre-term elections, the LRP and the SRP did not secure enough votes to obtain a parliamentary seat, showing that, despite its persistence, populism could not emerge at a time of perceived economic and/or social crisis. However, the populists did not have to wait long. Only seven years after the electoral extinction of both the SRP and the LPR, a new populist party (Kukiz'15), led by former rock star Paweł Kukiz, won 8.8 per cent of the vote (42 seats) (*see* Table A2). Its electoral success in the October 2015 legislative elections should not have come as a surprise,

⁷ The index ranks from 0 (lack of populist stances) to 1 (full-flesh populist discourse).

especially if we consider that young people's disappointment and disillusionment had already brought Kukiz more than 20 per cent of the vote in the May 2015 presidential elections, making him the third most popular candidate with just 10 fewer points than the sitting president, Bronisław Komorowski (the PO's candidate), and the ultimate winner, Andrzej Duda (PiS).

In the 2015 October elections, characterised by both low (roughly 50 per cent) turnout – a constant in Polish politics – and youth discontent/protest, Kukiz'15 made the threshold by coming third with 8.8 per cent of the votes. In addition, both KORWiN (21.20 per cent) – led by Janusz Korwin Mikke, a 72-year-old politician advocating a radical right and Eurosceptic programme – and Kukiz'15 (20.90 per cent) received most of the student vote (see Guerra and Casal Bertoa 2015).

Explaining populism in Poland: demand and party competition

In the late 1990s, Poland was close to securing membership in both NATO and the EU. The social and economic costs of the democratisation process materialised at this time. The public's support for EU membership suddenly dropped (to 55 per cent in May 1999), while the percentage of those opposed to EU membership rose (to 26 per cent in May 1999) (CBOS data). According to *Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej* (CBOS, Public Opinion Research Centre), farmers were more strongly opposed to membership,⁸ and scepticism and anxiety had an impact on the changing patterns of attitudes towards the EU.⁹ Growing scepticism could be detected in the surveys on the pace of Poland's accession: the option of joining 'as soon as possible' (50 per cent in April 1998; 42 per cent in May 1999) increasingly lost support, whilst citizens

⁸ In 1998, nearly half (45 per cent) of the respondents, among them farmers, declared their opposition to EU membership (CBOS 1998, 06/98); 74 per cent of them had concerns about their future in the EU (CBOS 1998, 05/98).

⁹ After the beginning of the negotiations, 45 per cent of Poles felt 'hopeful', while 36 per cent felt 'anxious' (CBOS 1998, 05/98).

perceived that accession ‘as late as possible’ could benefit Poland (23 per cent in April 1998; 32 per cent in May 1999) (CBOS 1999, 07/99). This shift may be explained by the domestic politics of EU integration: the AWS government introduced new policies for healthcare, education, administration systems and social insurance (Guerra 2003). Conditionality and the social costs linked to the reforms could have affected public attitudes towards the EU and the pace at which Poland was moving towards membership. Levels of support for EU membership dropped from 80 per cent in 1996 to 55 per cent in 2001 (Guerra 2013).

In the 2001 parliamentary elections, stronger opposition – mobilised by the LPR, a fundamentalist extreme right-wing party – came to the fore (see De Lange and Guerra 2009). In November 2001, two-thirds of the LPR’s potential electorate opposed EU membership (CBOS 2001, BS/155/2001). As Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart stress in the case of the 2003 accession referendum (2004: 575), the presence of more Eurosceptic parties brought more contestation to political debates, and people’s preferences became more strongly defined. In Poland, concerns regarding the impact of EU integration were salient issues on voters’ minds after the negotiation process began.

Dissatisfaction with the government persisted. The reforms implemented by the new post-Solidarity minority government, in office since February 1999, were considered unsatisfactory.¹⁰ In January 2001, discontent was widespread: 62 per cent, 37 per cent, and 28 per cent thought that the situation was getting worse with regard to healthcare, education, and the pension system and local administration, respectively (CBOS 2001 02/2001). Government policy was thought to be affecting the economic situation; fewer citizens believed that policy was creating opportunities

¹⁰ Fifty-nine per cent considered the actions on public health service unsatisfactory, and 74 per cent felt this way about agrarian policies (CBOS 1999, 02/99).

(approximately 30 per cent); and more citizens felt it did not create any kind of prospects (approximately 60 per cent) (CBOS 1999 02/99). Reflecting decreased government employment, the unemployment rate rose from 10.6 per cent in 1999 to 16.1 per cent in 2000 and 18.2 per cent in 2001.¹¹ However, the inflation rate decreased from the 11.8-per cent annual average in 1998 to 5.3 per cent in 2001, as a result of tight monetary policy (Guerra 2013).

The LPR and the SRP were the two political parties that were able to capitalise not only on the discontent that had been emerging since the late 1990s but also on nationalist issues, conservative values, economic concerns about closing accounts with the communist past and Polish policy towards the EU. Although this analysis suggests and stresses that Poland actually does not show much higher levels of polarisation compared with the average polarisation of party systems in Europe, these parties emerged and were electorally successful between 1997 and 2011, and the levels of polarisation increased (*see* Table 3). This success and consequent increase in polarisation was not only linked to a shared sense of national belonging that went hand by hand with the democratisation process but also reflected widespread discontent about the social and economic costs of reforms (see also De Lange and Guerra 2009). This polarised environment was also reflected at the presidential level by the Solidarity President Lech Wałęsa (1990–5) and the heir of the rebranded former communist party (SLD), Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who was Minister of Sport in the communist government in the 1980s and President of Poland from 1995 to 2005.

According to Andrea Pirro (2015: 17), populist parties on the radical right are ‘capable of shaping their own fortune as far as their proclaimed *and* actual stands over certain issues are concerned’. These stands can be not only mobilised at the domestic

¹¹ www.stat.gov.pl, GUS, Główny Urząd Statystyczny (undated).

level but also externally determined, as in this case with the process of EU integration. As documented in the literature (De Lange and Guerra 2009; Guerra 2012) and supported by this analysis, the LPR's success can be explained by historical legacies and opportunity structures that are shaped both internally and externally. The interplay between party agency and policy competition increases the salience of issue ownership in ways that can determine the success of political parties and reshape party competition. Historical legacies were linked to three core ideological traits of the League, 'Catholic conservatism, nationalism, and populism', while domestic and external dimensions influenced another two omnibus issues, 'anticommunism and Euroscepticism' (De Lange and Guerra 2009). The age of discontent (2001–5) that witnessed the emergence of successful populist parties, including the LPR, a populist radical right party, produced an electorate that was mainly concerned with protecting Polish values (in 2005, important issues included 'abortion', 6.91; 'low birth and decreasing population', 8.07; and the 'role of the Church', 6.67), grappling with Poland's communist past and addressing the possible settlement of foreigners in Poland (*see* Table 2).

Table 2. Salient issues in the 2001 and 2005 general elections

Issue	2001			2005		
	PL	LPR	SRP	PL	LPR	SRP
Crime	8.92	9.08	8.79	8.89	8.77	4.16
Privatisation	4.94	5.38	4.02	5.84	6.34	5.42
Unemployment	9.69	9.86	9.65	9.64	9.78	9.81
Tax policy	8.25	8.49	8.64	8.27	8.26	4.60
State subsidies for agriculture	7.48	8.25	7.89	7.04	7.82	8.36
State social responsibility	7.78	8.33	7.84	8.15	8.37	8.45
Tax policy	8.25	8.49	8.64	8.27	8.26	4.60
Polish policy towards the EU	6.10	4.96	5.35	7.30	7.25	6.79
Closing accounts with Poland's communist past	3.29	4.75	3.23	5.16	6.43	5.15
Foreign capital in	5.35	4.95	5.01	6.48	6.62	6.43

Poland						
Settlement of foreigners	n/a	n/a	n/a	4.50	5.50	4.06

Source: 2001 and 2005 PNES. The values appear in **bold** when LPR and SRP voter scores higher (-0.50/1 or +0.50/1) than those of the average Polish voter (PL). Values range between 0 (marginal) and 10 (priority).

Note: Table adapted from De Lange and Guerra (2009) and FitzGibbon and Guerra (2009).

As the Table 2 shows, the SRP, the populist agrarian party that became electorally successful between 2001 and 2005, was the defender of farmers and citizens who believed Poland was moving in the wrong direction with regard to EU membership, and privatisation was one of the main concerns in 2001 among its voters (*see* Table 2). Andrzej Lepper, the leader of the SRP and a farmer from the northeast and west of the country, was a son of these regions in Poland, where the Balcerowicz (shock therapy) plan and other reforms had a considerable impact on the social costs of democratisation. Lepper could understand the distress of ‘his people’ because he was one of them. His economic ruin due to the growing interest on the loans that he had taken out due to the economic reforms also initiated his political career, and his protests and illegal blockades received widespread popular support (Szczerbiak 2002: 12). When the relationship between Poland and the EU became more intense because of the opening of the negotiation process, the idea that the political elite was going to sell Poland and the concrete fear that foreigners would occupy Polish lands won votes for the SRP. The widespread fear of an alleged international conspiracy set on buying Polish lands and destroying the Polish nation characterised this period (*see* Fitzgibbon and Guerra 2009). Lepper promised to fight corruption, and crime, economic issues and EU integration became salient for the SRP electorate between 2001 and 2005 (*see* Table 2).

PiS, the main party in the coalition in 2006 and 2007, ‘stole’ most of these issues, increasing its economic and conservative agenda and shifting its position from a typical right-wing conservative party ‘with noticeable though weak nationalist and

populist leanings, into a radical nationalist, and visibly populist-socialist one' (Markowski 2006: 820), and the LPR and the SRP subsequently lost many voters. A focus on EU integration was beneficial in the short term (Guerra 2013), and PiS absorbed the populist vote.

The big turn in partisan competition was apparent during the 2005 presidential and general elections, and it will be examined in the following sections. The polarisation that accompanied the emergence of a populism based on an 'us vs. them' cleavage changed into a 'social vs. liberal' dichotomy, which was absorbed by the two post-Solidarity political parties, the PO and PiS, because of the lack of any alternative on the centre-left.

The Polish party system: from atomisation to never-ending stabilisation

As has been already mentioned, the Polish party system can be considered one of the most inchoate in the post-communist region and, in turn, across Europe (Casal Bertoa 2013). Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, which captures the most important party splits and mergers in Poland, and Table 3, which presents some of the most important dimensions¹² of the Polish party system, the Polish party system has always been characterised by high electoral volatility and party turnover, moderate fragmentation and polarisation, and a bipolar structure of competition, initially pitting 'post-communist' parties against 'post-Solidarity' parties first (1991–2004) and 'liberal' parties against 'social' parties later on (2005–15).

¹² Ranging from 0 (non-polarised) to 1 (polarised), Dalton's polarisation index is calculated using the formula $\{[\sum(v_i) * ([x_i - x]/5)^2]\}^{1/2}$, where v_i is the proportion of votes of the i^{th} party, x_i refers to its left-right score, and x represents the *average* party system score on the left-right scale (2008: 9). Both ENEP and ENPP are calculated according to Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) well-known formulae: $1/\sum(s_i)$, where v_i and s_i are the proportion of votes and seats, respectively, of the i^{th} party. Electoral volatility is measured by the formula provided by Pedersen (1979): $V = \sum |C_{i,t} - C_{i,t-1}|/2$, where V is volatility, $C_{i,t}$ is the vote share for a i^{th} party at a given election (t) and $C_{i,t-1}$ is the vote share of the same i^{th} party at the previous elections ($t-1$).

Table 3. Polish party system indicators (1991–2015)

Year	Polarisation (Dalton's index)	Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)	Effective number of legislative parties (ENPP)	Electoral disproportionality	Number of new parties ($\geq 0.5\%$ votes)	Electoral (and bloc) volatility
1991	0.25	13.8	10.9	3.6	-	-
1993	0.3	9.8	3.9	17.8	4	28.9 (19.1)
1997	0.4	4.6	3	10.6	4	19.3 (6.7)
2001	0.44	4.5	3.6	6.3	4	35.2 (18.5)
2005	0.45	5.9	4.3	7	3	34 (25.7)
2007	0.44	3.3	2.8	4.7	0	23.7 (11.8)
2011	0.34	3.7	3	6	4	7.7 (2.4)
2015	n/a	4.4	2.7	13.6	4	31.9 (18.2)


Source: Casal Bértoa (2016), Casal Bértoa and Walecki (2014: 314), Gwiazda (2016: 101), and Döring and Manow (2012).

However, despite this flux in electoral preferences (even at the inter-bloc level) and political formations, the constant (if any) in the history of the Polish party system is its multi-dimensional *space of competition*, which, as most scholars have noted, revolves around two primary axes: historical-cultural and economic axes (Grzybowski and Mikuli 2004; Jasiewicz 2007; Markowski 2007).¹³ The historical-cultural axis is characterised by two overlapping cleavages and/or divides, religious and post-communist, but the second axis focuses solely on economic issues. The religious cleavage pits those advocating a stronger role for the Catholic Church in public life and education against those preferring the state to be neutral; the ‘post-communist cleavage’ (Grabowska 2004) distinguishes between those who are favourably disposed to the previous communist regime and those who oppose it and call for a purge of previous communist party members or collaborators. By contrast, the economic cleavage distinguishes between citizens with strong statist and egalitarian orientations and those who identify with more market-orientated and economically liberal beliefs (Castle and Taras 2002; Szczerbiak 2006a).

¹³ For a comparison with other East-Central European countries, please see Casal Bértoa (2012, 2014).

Contrary to some expectations, between 1991 and 2004, the historical-cultural axis, rather than the economic axis, defined the logic of competition and coalition formation in Poland. As a result, ‘left’ and ‘right’ referred to attitudes towards the social role of the Church and de-communisation (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) rather than the role of the state (Jasiewicz 2002; Kitschelt et al. 1999). As Figure 2a demonstrates, this historical-cultural focus led to what Sielski (2004: 18) called ‘a two-bloc stabilised multiparty system’, which pitted the post-communist parties, primarily the social-democratic SLD and the agrarian PSL, against the post-Solidarity parties. The latter party bloc consisted of the liberal UW and PO and a diverse group of Christian Democratic parties, particularly the AWS and PiS.

Figures 2a and 2b. Polish political parties and ideological orientations during two different periods



Source: Casal Bertoa (2014: 28).

As Figure 2b shows, the previous logic of partisan competition ended in October 2005 when the ‘communist vs. anti-communist’ opposition (Brier 2009) gave way to what Szczerbiak (2006b) has defined as a confrontation between ‘social and liberal Poland’. While a CBOS poll earlier that year (April–May 2005) had already suggested a wane in the historical-cultural opposition among Polish voters, only after the first round of the presidential elections held on 9 October 2005 did the economic

axis replace the historical-cultural axis as the main structural factor underlying the process of partisan interaction and coalition formation. In particular, because candidates from the two main post-Solidarity parties (Donald Tusk from the PO and Lech Kaczyński from PiS) made it to the second round, to the detriment of the main post-communist candidate (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz from the SLD),¹⁴ both Tusk and Kaczyński were forced to emphasise their ideological differences. Because the PO and PiS were both post-Solidarity and pro-Catholic Church parties,¹⁵ the candidates and their parties turned to economic issues to differentiate their platforms. The PO was more pro-market, while the PiS was more interventionist.¹⁶ In turn, they started portraying themselves as representatives of ‘transition winners’ and ‘transition losers’ (Słomczyński et al. 2007).

A ninety-degree turn in the two-dimensional cross-cut space of competition (*see* Figures 2a and 2b) not only constituted a shock to the mechanics of the party system but also opened the door for a rapprochement between PiS and the two main populist parties, the LPR and the SRP. The SRP’s candidate and party leader, Andrzej Lepper, had come in third with 15 per cent of the vote during the first round of the presidential elections. A simply mathematical calculation clearly showed not only Lech Kaczyński but also Tusk that the candidate who received Lepper’s endorsement in the second round would become President.¹⁷

Conscious of his pivotal role, the SRP leader sent a letter to both presidential candidates, promising to support their presidential aspirations in exchange for his

¹⁴ Amid (never proved) corruption allegations, he resigned just three weeks before the first round of elections.

¹⁵ However, they differed in their religious intensity, with PiS being much more clerical than the PO (Casal Bertoa 2014: 27-29).

¹⁶ On the one hand, the PO was a splinter party of the UW, which was founded through a merger of the UD and the extremely neo-liberal KLD, whose leader was Donald Tusk. On the other hand, PiS was founded by the Kaczyński twins as a splinter party of the AWS; it is thus open to the social teachings of the Catholic Church.

¹⁷ The difference between Tusk and Kaczyński during the first round was barely three percentage points in favour of the former.

participation in the future government.¹⁸ Although Tusk explicitly refused to collaborate with Lepper's party during the final debate of the campaign, Kaczyński's position was ambiguous. With the support of Lepper's electorate, Kaczyński defeated Tusk in the 2005 presidential election. Soon afterwards, coalition talks began between PiS, the LPR – which had withdrawn its own presidential candidate¹⁹ – and the SRP. Three weeks later, PiS formed a minority cabinet with parliamentary votes from the LPR, the SRP and, eventually, the PSL.

This *ad hoc* solution proved temporary, and a proper coalition was subsequently formed, first at the parliamentary level (the so-called 'stabilisation pact') in February 2006 and then at the government level three months later (Stanley 2015b). With the formation of this coalition and the establishment of the PO as the main opposition party, the so-called 'post-communist cleavage' in Poland lost its hold on party politics, and the economic (i.e., liberal-statist) cleavage became the main division between 'left and right' and the main axis of competition and coalition formation. This shift was confirmed by the coalition between the PO and the PSL in 2007, two years after the appointment of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as prime minister with the support of PiS, the LPR and the SRP (Casal Bértoa 2012: 462-463). This coalition endured until 2015 when a new 'social' coalition was formed between PiS, its splinter party United Poland (SP) and Poland Together (PRPZ), a splinter party of the most conservative faction of PO (*see* Figure 1).

The impact of populist parties in a muddy context

As shown in Table 1, populist discourses in general and populist parties in

¹⁸ Notably, on 25 September 2005, PiS won legislative elections by a small margin (27 per cent against the PO's 24 per cent). The SRP came in third again with 11.4 per cent of the vote. Any eventual cabinet, excluding a PO-PiS grand-coalition, now prevented by its two leaders' presidential ambitions, would certainly have to obtain Lepper's endorsement.

¹⁹ Maciej Giertych, father of Roman Giertych (LPR's leader at the time).

particular have been a constant in Poland since the first free and fair elections in November 1990. However, the SRP and the LPR did not gain parliamentary seats until 2001; in fact, populism and populist parties lacked the opportunity to exert any impact on party system development in Poland until 2006, when the ‘populist coalition government’ was formed (Stanley 2015b) that. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the six years from 2001 to 2007.

Competition

Considering the discussion thus far and the electoral, parliamentary and governmental irrelevance of Party X and the ROP, the only two populist parties with parliamentary representation during the first ten years of the Polish democracy, the impact of populist parties on the logic of partisan competition (i.e., the post-communist left vs. the post-Solidarity right) that structured the Polish party system at the end of the twentieth century (Bakke and Sitter 2005: 249) can arguably be considered non-existent. The same can be said about the LPR or the SRP between 2001 and 2005, even if the SLD had considered the latter a potential government partner in September 2001.²⁰

However, both the SRP and the LPR had an impact on the change from a historical-cultural (i.e., religious) logic to an economic logic of competition in October 2005, even if this effect was only indirect. In fact, neither the rise of these two populist parties, which already existed in 2001, nor the increase in polarisation (*see* the section on polarisation below), which was certainly fostered by the political discourse and ideological claims of both the SRP and the LPR, necessarily caused the change in the logic of competition and coalition formation; instead, as explained

²⁰ This idea was immediately rejected due to the SRP’s ‘image as an organisation too radical for the taste of the mainstream public in Poland and too unpredictable for the smooth conduct of Poland’s foreign relations’ (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2002: 1066).

above, the 2005 presidential campaign and the internally driven collapse of the main post-communist party (the SLD) as the principal element [or party] on the party system's second pole contributed to this shift. Indeed, the collapse of the SLD caused a 'core' change (Smith's 1989) and transformed the logic of subsequent inter-party competition. In other words, the 2005–7 'populist coalition' (Stanley 2015a) helped consolidate the current confrontation between PiS, representative of 'transition losers' or 'social Poland', and the PO, representative of 'transition winners' or 'liberal Poland', but it did not cause this confrontation. Even after the demise of both the SRP and the LRP, 'social and liberal Poland' are still the only two alternatives for voters, which clearly proves the populist coalition's indirect influence on the Polish party system.

Polarisation

As shown Figure 1, Poland's ideological spectrum has ranged from the extreme right, which has tended to be fragmented and unstable (Kasprowicz 2015; Pankowski 2010), to the social-democratic SLD, the successor of the communist party, on the left (Millard 2010). However, from a comparative perspective, the Polish party system has been characterised by an average level of ideological polarisation. Further, in contrast to other Eastern and Western European democracies, Poland's level of polarisation not only is close to the average European level but also occupies sixteenth place in terms of polarisation (Casal Bertoa 2013: 409), closer to moderately polarised Germany or the United Kingdom than to the more extreme cases of Cyprus (in Western Europe) and the Czech Republic (in Eastern Europe).

As the first column in Table 3 shows, the 1991 and 1993 elections did not display a high level of ideological polarisation, which cannot be said of the

subsequent four elections. Indeed, Poland experienced a major increase in the level of polarisation in 1997. Polarisation would remain high between 2001 and 2007, peaking in 2005, before falling to more moderate levels in 2011. Should the Polish populist parties be considered responsible for this increase? A first glance at Table 3 would suggest these parties are somewhat responsible: the increase in polarisation coincides with the entry of the ROP, the first populist party to form a parliamentary group, into parliament, and the subsequent decrease coincides with the electoral demise of the SRP and the LPR, the only other populist parties to gain parliamentary seats.

However, an in-depth study of the 1997 elections shows that the change observed in the levels of ideological polarisation was not due to the rise of populism (*see* Table 1) or the ROP's breakthrough (*see* Table A2) because their electoral and/or parliamentary leverage was weak; instead, the increased polarisation stems from the increased confrontation between post-communist (i.e., the SLD and the PSL) and post-Solidarity (i.e., the AWS and the UW) parties (Castle and Taras 2002).

With the exception of *ad hoc* episodes of collaboration between post-communist and post-Solidarity forces at the time of the so-called 'contract parliament' (the ZSL and Solidarity), Waldemar Pawlak's unsuccessful cabinet in 1992 (UD, ZChN and PSL), or the constitutional process of 1996-7 (SLD and UW), these two types of parties had always been at odds. However, the polarisation between these two camps did not reach its peak until the unsuccessful re-election of Lech Wałęsa in 1995, the right's subsequent failure to win the 1997 constitutional referendum and the unification of all the major post-Solidarity conservative parties under the AWS banner. At this point, scholars (Grabowska 2004; Szczerbiak 2001) began talking about the emergence of a post-communist 'cleavage' that was driving the Polish political competition (both in terms of voters and parties) into two inimical camps.

The split of AWS, which had previously taken conservatives under its wing, Christian Democrats and radicals, the appearance of the LPR in 2001, and the SRP's electoral surge (from 2.8 in 1993 to 10.2 in 2001), contributed to the increased level of polarisation. In 2005, polarisation increased again when both the LPR and the SRP got their hands on the Polish government, as explained in more detail below.

Still, the level of polarisation in the Polish party system did not change much after the electoral disappearance of both the SRP and the LPR (only 2.8 per cent of the overall vote and no seats) in 2007 (*see* Table 3). However, we should not forget that such lack of change in terms of polarisation was due to PiS's initial attempt to take over the populist electorate. The polarisation in Poland neared the low levels of 1993 only after the moderation of PiS's discourse and the substitution of historical-cultural for economic issues in the 2011 electoral campaign. Despite the success of populist parties in 2001 and the formation of the 'populist coalition' in 2005 (Stanley 2015b), which increased ideological polarisation, the Polish party system had already become more polarised (since 1997) and retained the same level of polarisation until 2011.

Fragmentation (newness) and volatility

Although Poland was the first East European country to rid itself of communism, its process of party development was 'tortuous' and suffered from 'extreme fragmentation and instability' (Szczerbiak 2001: 12). The first legislative elections in October 1991, with 111 electoral lists and 29 political groupings with at least one parliamentary seat, stand out in the Polish party system, which has always been fragmented – with, on average, between five and six²¹ 'effective electoral'

²¹ Depending on whether the 'exceptionally fragmented' elections of 1991 are excluded or included.

parties (*see* Table 3) and no less than seven political parties obtaining at least 0.5 per cent of the vote (Casal Bertoa and Walecki 2014: 340).

In a way, the 1991 elections, which certainly had ‘all the makings of what Giovanni Sartori called extreme multipartism’ (Grzybowski 1994: 69), set the pattern for subsequent elections. However, the introduction of a 5-per cent electoral threshold in 1993 reduced the number of parties in parliament by more than 70 per cent. As Table 3 demonstrates, electoral disproportionality increased from 3.6 per cent in 1991 to 17.8 per cent in 1993. With an electoral coalition of 33 right-wing parties under the AWS umbrella in 1997 (Szczerbiak 2001), electoral disproportionality dropped to 10.6 per cent, and it has remained at a rather high average of 7.5 per cent ever since.

Below, we examine the extent to which populist parties have had affected the format of the Polish party system by increasing the level of fragmentation, provoking change in terms of the type of party system (e.g., from limited to extreme), or both. The second column in Table 3 demonstrates that the effective number of ‘legislative’ parties has always oscillated between three (1997, 2007 and 2011) and four (1993, 2001, 2005). With the exception of the 1991 elections, the Polish party system has always been a ‘limited pluralist’ (Sartori 1976) system. Even if ‘more or less populist newcomers still keep popping up’ (Bakke and Sitter 2005: 249), the total number of new parties with more than 0.5 per cent of the vote per election has been, on average, around three (*see* Table 3) – a rather low number compared with those of other party systems in the region. This number did not even increase during the October 2015 parliamentary elections (*see* Table A2), which introduced two new populist forces (i.e., Kukiz’15 and KORWiN).

If we employ Sartori’s 1976 typology and consider the extent to which populist parties have contributed to change in the party system, we see that populist

parties had an impact on the party system by increasing the level of fragmentation and polarisation, but these parties' rise did not lead to real change in terms of the type of the party system, as the effective number of parties continued to be over four and the level of polarisation has been more than 0.4 (*see* Table 3).²² Especially considering its 'bipolar' structure throughout its history (*see* Section 1 and the last column in Table 3), the Polish party system certainly continues to be – as it was in 1991 – an extremely fragmented but moderately polarised party system.²³

Both fragmentation and polarisation (especially of the elites) contributed to the instability of voters' preferences in Poland, making the party system one of the most electorally unstable in Europe (Casal Bertoa 2013: 417). Indeed, as the last column in Table 3 demonstrates, electoral volatility scores remained quite high before and after 2011. In 2001, the rise of populist parties and the peak of volatility coincide. However, the latter was not so much due to the former but rather due to the organisational collapse of the AWS and the electoral revival of the SLD, which was in a coalition with the UP in 2001 (Markowski and Cześnik 2002). In a similar vein, the high volatility scores in 2005 reflected the electoral collapse (from 41 to 11 per cent) of the SLD²⁴ coalition rather than the rise of the SRP and the LPR (Szczurbiak 2006b). The same can be said of the 2015 parliamentary elections, in which the swing from the PO to PiS and .N, from the SLD to Razem and from TR to .N – rather than the surge of Kukiz'15 and the swing from the KNP to KORWiN – contributed to three-quarters of the net electoral volatility.

Moreover, electoral volatility scores only reached the single digits in 2011,

²² As mentioned in a previous work (Casal Bertoa 2013: 401), party systems 'with an ENPP of 4.0 or higher [...] correspond to [Sartori's] category of extreme pluralism' (see also Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 32).

²³ According to Sartori (1976), even an extremely fragmented party system might be 'bipolar', provided that it revolves around two – moderately distanced – ideological poles.

²⁴ In 2005, the SLD also suffered its first major split due to the formation of *Socjaldemokracja Polska* (SdPL, Social Democracy of Poland).

well after the collapse of populist parties in 2007 and the changes in the structure of competition that were reflected in the highest level of bloc volatility in 2005. In Poland, high volatility (both inter- and within-bloc) levels can be explained by the lack of organisational loyalty among the elites, which has prompted continuous splits and *short-lived* mergers and thereby hindered the process of party institutionalisation (*see* Figure 1), rather than by changes in voters' electoral preferences or the success of populist alternatives (Powell and Tucker 2014).

Party system closure: populist parties in government

As we have seen, with the possible exception of the 2011 elections, when populist parties received less than 1 per cent of the popular vote and captured no seats, populist parties have been a constant presence in the Polish party system in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas (*see* Tables 1, A1 and A2). However, the same cannot be said for their presence in the governmental arena. Between 1991 and 2006, populist parties were deliberately excluded from government, even in instances in which they had 'coalition' potential (e.g., SRP in 2001). Therefore, to what extent did the inclusion of the SRP and the LPR in May 2006 alter the structure of inter-party competition at the time of government formation?

Following Mair (1997), we examine the degree to which the patterns of inter-party competition for government remain closed or have changed over time (Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2011; Linz and Montero 2001; Toole 2000).

Table 4. Chronology of Polish governments (1991–2014)


1991 (PC-ZChN-PL-PSL/S)	1992 (UD-ZChN-KLD-Others)	1993 (SLD-PSL)
ELECTIONS 4 government parties	GOV. FALLS Partial alternation Innovative formula Open access	ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation Innovative formula Open access
1997 (AWS-UW)	2000 (AWS)	2001 (SLD-UP-PSL)
ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation	GOV. REORGANISATION Partial alternation	ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation

Innovative formula Open access	Innovative formula Closed access	Innovative formula Open access
2003 (SLD-UP)	2004 (SLD-UP-SdPL)	2005 (PiS)
GOV. REORGANISATION Partial alternation Innovative formula Closed access	GOV. REORGANISATION Partial alternation Innovative formula Open access	ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation Innovative formula Open access
2006 (PiS-SRP-LPR)	2007 (PiS)	2007 (PO-PSL)
GOV. REORGANISATION Partial alternation Innovative formula Open access	GOV. REORGANISATION Partial alternation Familiar formula Closed access	ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation Innovative formula Open access
2011 (PO-PSL)	2015 (PiS-SP-PRZP)	
ELECTIONS No alternation Familiar formula Closed access	ELECTIONS Wholesale alternation Innovative formula Open access	

Source: Adapted and updated from O'Dwyer (2006: 46-47).

As Table 4 shows, government alternations in Poland have occurred after elections (seven times) and between elections (six times). However, while the former were wholesale (i.e., when the new cabinet includes none – or all – of the previous government parties), the latter have all been partial (i.e., the new cabinet includes some of the parties present in the previous cabinet). Moreover, with just two exceptions (in 2007 and in 2011), innovative coalition governments have always been the norm. Finally, in terms of access to power, the Polish party system can also be considered particularly open. If we consider all seventeen parties with parliamentary representation between 1993 and 2015,²⁵ only five (i.e., the KPN, the ROP, TR, Kukiz'15, and .N) have not formed part of the government at least once (Casal Bertoa 2012).

²⁵ Minorities, to which a 5-per cent electoral threshold does not apply, are excluded.

Figure 3. Party system closure in Poland (1992–2015)

Source: Casal Bertoa (2016).

In such an open context, in which the structure of partisan competition for government was predominantly characterised by partial alternation, innovative formulae and open access, the formation of the ‘populist coalition’ in May 2006 cannot be considered a change in an already unstable and volatile Polish party system; its formation is instead a manifestation of one of the party system’s characteristics (O’Dwyer 2006; Toole 2000).

Figure 3, which uses Casal Bertoa and Enyedi’s (2014) new index to show the degree of closure *per annum* of the Polish party system, clarifies this relationship. A rather open party system exists,²⁶ and, with the exception of 2011, it has always suffered an important shock after every election. Moreover, although the 2006 ‘populist coalition’ certainly helped increase the instability/openness of the party system, it can be regarded as another rock cast into what was already a sinking ship.

Discussion: An Earthquake or a Hurricane?

The analysis shows that populism, as a discourse and representative doctrine within the Polish party system, has been present in the electoral and parliamentary

²⁶ As Casal Bertoa (2013: 413) demonstrates, the Polish party system is one of the most open in Europe.

arenas since the fall of communism. The pathway to government opened only in 2006, when populist parties gained additional support in the run-up to EU integration (2004). The Polish party system has always been one of the more fragmented systems in Europe, but populist parties have only affected the system indirectly. Polarisation increased in those years because of the confrontation between post-Solidarity and post-communist ideologies, with the former falling under the AWS umbrella and the latter waving the rebranded social democratic banner. The presidencies of Lech Wałęsa (1990–5), former leader of the Solidarity movement, and Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995–2005), former Minister of Sport under the communist regime, reinforced this polarisation. This two-bloc competition (i.e., post-communist *vs.* post-Solidarity) continued to characterise the Polish party system until 2005 when the political confrontation between the presidential candidates of PiS and the PO gave rise a new but nevertheless bi-polar (i.e., social *vs.* liberal) structure of party competition. Nevertheless, populist parties did play a role in (1) bringing about the consolidation of the current two-bloc competition (social *vs.* liberal) and (2) reinforcing its open character.

Table 5. The impact of populist parties on party system development in Poland: a summary

Competition	Polarisation	Fragmentation	Volatility	Closure	Overall
2	1	1	1	2	7/15 (46.7%)

Notes: 0 = none; 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high.

However, as Table 5 shows, the impact of these parties is quite limited. The system was quite open before and after the changes in 1993, 1997, 2005 and 2007 (*see* Figure 2a), which were not directly linked to the emergence and success of populist parties. On the contrary, populism was absorbed into this very open system and helped sustain what was already a fertile breeding ground for political parties in general. In this sense, the recurrent populism in Polish politics has seemingly been

more like a hurricane than an earthquake. Our review of populist parties and the Polish party system since democratisation has revealed the following:

1. Populism has been always present, but it was not significant until 2005 and then again, between 2007 and 2014;
2. Volatility and fragmentation are mostly due to party elites and voters' discontent with government policies;
3. Competition has been influenced by presidential elections, especially in 2005;
4. Polarisation has stemmed from the weight of the past, particularly the historical confrontation between post-communist and post-Solidarity parties.

The rise and fall of populist parties in Poland between 2001 and 2007 wreaked havoc on the Polish party system, but parties (the PO, PiS, the SLD, and the PSL) with strong foundations (i.e., social-democratic, agrarian, liberal and conservative) endured. Unlike an earthquake, these parties did not produce 'sudden, unpredictable and massive disruption' (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2015: 61); instead, they forced the two main post-Solidarity parties (i.e., the PO and PiS) to adapt to the new political environment. The entry of these parties led to a ninety-degree turn, rather than a rupture, in the logic of competition.²⁷

Although historical legacies were very influential before 2006, the shift towards a 'social vs. liberal' Poland has also changed the types of populist discourse that are likely to succeed. The discontent emerging from the financial and economic crisis, although not hitting a low point in Poland, was channelled in controversial debates that had already emerged in the pre-accession years. Lepper gave voice to the fight against crime and to the Polish peasantry, but his electorate was more concerned with the costs of the economic transition and market economy. 'Generation Y',

²⁷ While an electoral earthquake would have changed the dimensions of competition, the latter did not change; it instead rotated, driven (though only indirectly) by the populist cyclone.

frustrated by the economic and political situation can provide a stronger impetus for populist success. In 2015, young people's disappointment and disillusionment delivered more than 20 per cent of the student vote to PiS, Kukiz'15, and KORWiN, led by Janusz Korwin Mikke, a 72-year-old politician advocating a radical right and hard Eurosceptic programme. The main legacy of populism is the persistence of a fertile breeding ground and populism's survival in a very open (and crippled) party system, characterised by disloyal political elites, continuous electoral discontent, and the lack of a credible alternative on the left end of the political spectrum. The illiberal turn of the new PiS-led government, with the appointment of various controversial ministers (e.g., Antoni Macierewicz and Zbigniew Ziobro) and the speedy adoption of various legislative reforms (i.e., Constitutional Court, media, civil service), shows a rather exclusive concept of 'law and justice' and confirming the worst fears of the 2006–7 'populist coalition' (see Guerra and Casal Bértoa 2016). If, as Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015) have maintained, hurricanes are more predictable than earthquakes, then the next populist windstorm will likely come soon.

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List of Party Acronyms

Populist parties

DO = Ancestral Home; IRP = Initiative for the Republic of Poland; KNP = Congress of the New Right; KORWiN = Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic – Freedom and Hope; Kukiz'15 = Kukiz 2015; LPR = League of Polish Families; NDP = Our Home Poland; NOP = National Revival of Poland; ONP-LP = Organisation of the Polish Nation-Polish League; PFN = Polish National Front; PP = Polish Agreement; PPN = Polish National Party; PR = Right of the Republic; PWN = National Polish Society; RdR = Movement for the Republic; RN = National Movement; ROP = Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland; RP = Patriotic Movement; SP = Patriotic Self-Defence; SRP = Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland; X = Party X.

Other (non-populist) parties

AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action; BBWR= Non-Partisan Bloc for Support of Reforms; KLD = Liberal Democratic Congress; .N = Modern; PC = Centre Agreement; PChD = Christian Democratic Party; PD = Democratic Party; PiS = Law and Justice; PL = Peasant Alliance; PO = Civic Platform; PRZP = Poland Together United Right; PSL = Polish People's Party; TR = Your Movement; S = Solidarity; SD = Alliance of Democrats; SdPL = Social Democracy of Poland; SLD = Left Democratic Alliance; SP = United Poland; UD = Democratic Union; UPR = Real Union Politics; UW = Freedom Union; ZChN = Christian National Union; ZSL = United People's Party.

Appendix

Table A1. Electoral and parliamentary support for populist parties in Polish legislative elections (1991–2015)

Party	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015
PWN	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	-	-	-	-
X	0.5 (0.7)	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
SRP	-	2.8	0	10.2 (11.5)	11.4 (12.2)	1.5	-	-
RdR	-	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
PFN	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
ROP	-	-	5.6 (1.3)	-	-	-	-	-
LPR	-	-	-	7.9 (8.3)	8 (7.4)	1.3	-	-
RP	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	-
PPN	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-
DO	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-
IRP	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
NOP	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
SP	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
KNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0
PR	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-
NDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
Kukiz'15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.8 (9.1)
KORWiN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8

Note: The percentage of legislative seats appears in brackets.

Table A2. Electoral support for populist parties/candidates in Polish presidential elections (1990–2015)

Candidates (party)	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Stanisław Tymiński (Independent)	23.1*			0.2 ²⁸		
Andrzej Lepper (SRP)		1.3	3.1	15.1	1.3	
Jan Olszewski (RdR)		6.9				
Jan Łopuszański (PP)			0.5			
Leszek Bubel (PPN)				0.1		
Jan Pyszko (ONP-LP)				0.1		
Marek Jurek (PR)				-	1.1	
Paweł Kukiz (Independent)				-	-	20.8
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (KORWiN)				-	-	3.3
Marian Kowalski (RN)				-	-	0.5
Jacek Wilk (KNP)				-	-	0.5

Note: Candidates continuing on to the second round are marked with an asterisk (*).

²⁸ Supported by ~~OKO~~ *Ogólnopolska Koalicja Obywatelska* (~~OKO~~, the All-Polish Citizens' Coalition).