

Politics, Society and the Crusade in England and France, 1378-1400

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by

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BEC</i>	<i>Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes</i>
<i>BIHR</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</i>
<i>BN</i>	<i>Bibliothèque nationale, Paris</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>The Chaucer Review</i>
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
<i>JMH</i>	<i>Journal of Medieval History</i>
<i>MLN</i>	<i>Modern Language Notes</i>
<i>PMLA</i>	<i>Publications of the Modern Language Association of America</i>
<i>PRO</i>	<i>Public Record Office, London</i>
<i>TRHS</i>	<i>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society</i>

PREFACE

During the time which it takes to complete a thesis, the number of people to whom the author becomes indebted is considerable, and an effort will be made here to acknowledge the help and support received. I would like to thank the British Academy which has been my financial benefactor, since without their funding the Ph.D. could not have been undertaken. It was also the Academy's generosity which enabled a crucial research visit to Paris, of which I have many fond memories. I must also register my thanks to the staff of the University Library, Leicester, especially to those involved in the inter-library loans, who handled my regular orders with patience and efficiency. Similarly, the staff of the Public Record Office were extremely helpful with my many enquiries, as were the staff of the Bibliothèque nationale, who coped with my idiosyncratic French with admirable forbearance. I would also like to thank M. Paviot for allowing me to read a paper at the Dijon Nicopolis colloquium in such distinguished company, and Prof. B. Hamilton, Dr. D. Williams and Dr. P. Lindley for their assistance on specific issues.

However, my debt to these institutions and individuals is greatly overshadowed by that which I owe to Professor Norman Housley. Inspirational at undergraduate level, he paid me a great compliment by offering the opportunity to research under his enthusiastic

guidance. He has been unstinting in the time and effort which he has expended on my behalf, despite the burdens imposed by a career in modern academia. While the work which follows is very much my own, I hope that in some measure it repays the faith which Norman has shown in me.

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INTRODUCTION

While the later fourteenth century is a period which has always attracted interest from historians and literary scholars, the crusades which were launched in the 1380s and 1390s have been a neglected area of research. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Delaville le Roulx wrote a seminal work on French crusading against the Infidel which focused upon the exploits of marshal Boucicaut (1366-1421).¹ Delaville le Roulx's study was a harbinger of the pluralist strand of crusade historiography which would contend that crusading activity was not confined geographically to the recovery and defence of the Holy Land or temporally to the period 1095-1291; Atiya in his two books carried forward the research begun by Delaville le Roulx.² The pluralist approach has recently been championed by Riley-Smith and Housley, who have broadened the horizons of what could be regarded as legitimate crusades, enriching and invigorating the study of crusading in the process.³ However, the crusade experience of England and France in the closing decades of the fourteenth century has still received no systematic treatment. Delaville le Roulx's study was

¹ J. Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle, expéditions du maréchal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886).

² A.S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938); *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934).

³ J. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (London, 1977); *The Crusades: A Short History* (London, 1987); N.J. Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378* (Oxford, 1986). A rationale for the pluralist approach was set out by Housley in his *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-6.

limited in scope (and it is now over 100 years old), while the later fourteenth century was not the specialist area of either Riley-Smith or Housley, who focused on earlier periods. Other scholars have dealt with the crusading of the later fourteenth century only in passing or as part of broader studies. Setton focused almost exclusively upon the activity of the papacy in the period, and although Tyerman considered English crusading at the end of the fourteenth century, this was part of a general study of English crusading in the Middle Ages and beyond.⁴ Keen demonstrated in a number of works that crusading was central to the chivalric mentality of the fourteenth century, but it was not his purpose to explore this idea in practice to any great extent.⁵ The monumental studies of Valois and Perroy were concerned primarily with the Schism in England and France, and so while crusades against Christians were an aspect of their work, crusades against the Infidel received little attention.⁶ Palmer devoted a chapter to crusading against the Infidel at the courts of Charles VI and Richard II, but he was less familiar with this aspect of the period than its politics; despite the general acceptance of his arguments, his treatment of crusading at the end of the fourteenth century was the weakest area of an otherwise impressive study.⁷ Indeed, the politics and government of England and France have been the main focus of more recent works on the

⁴ K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1976); C.J. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades 1095-1588* (London, 1988).

⁵ M. Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven and London, 1984). See also M. Keen, 'Chaucer's Knight, the English Aristocracy and the Crusade', *English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages*, V.J. Scattergood, J.W. Sherborne, eds. (London, 1983), pp. 45-61.

⁶ N. Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme d'Occident*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1896-1901); E. Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le grand Schisme d'Occident* (Paris, 1933).

⁷ J.J.N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom, 1377-99* (London, 1972). For example, Palmer's assertion that the Wilton Diptych was a crusade icon in which Richard II indicated his desire to undertake the recovery of the Holy Land have exerted considerable influence, despite the tentative nature of the case which he made: *ibid.*, appendix (q), pp. 242-4.

later fourteenth century, with studies by Famiglietti, Autrand, Goodman, and most recently, Saul, contributing to an understanding of the political climate of the 1380s and 1390s.⁸

In such circumstances, an examination of crusading in the first decades of the Schism is a necessary corollary, as it is clear that crusading remained a dynamic force in the political and social life of the period. The following study is offered as a contribution towards this end as it explores aspects of the involvement of the English and the French in crusades against both Christians and the Infidel in the last decades of the fourteenth century. With certain exceptions, crusading by the fourteenth century was the preserve of the nobility, and as a result four out of the six chapters into which this work is divided deal with crusading as a noble enterprise. The courts of England and France were clearly foci of crusade enthusiasm in the aftermath of the truce of Leulingham in 1389, and chapter three examines this crusade activity and the extent to which it was a feature of royal policy in each country. This study will reveal that Richard II had little interest in crusading and there is no evidence that he was planning a joint expedition to the Holy Land with Charles VI, as Palmer had asserted.⁹ It is unlikely that Charles VI was in control of government after the first outbreak of his recurrent mental illness in 1392, and this raises questions about how far he was involved in the launching of the Nicopolis crusade. This expedition is of seminal importance to an understanding of the dynamism of crusading in the period as it encapsulates the political and social motivation which lay behind the movement. Thus chapter four is devoted to a fresh analysis of the diplomacy which surrounded the launching of the Nicopolis expedition, and it is argued that the crusade was conceived at the court of Philip

⁸ R.C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI 1392-1420* (New York, 1986); F. Autrand, *Charles VI: la folie du roi* (Paris, 1986); A. Goodman, *John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1992); N. Saul, *Richard II* (London, 1997).

⁹ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, pp. 204-05.

the Bold, and not that of Charles VI as the French chronicles had suggested. This reflects the fact that control over crusading had devolved away from the papacy and the king of France as a result of the Schism and the outbreak of Charles VI's mental illness. Nicopolis is revealed to have been a highly unusual crusade in the sense that the involvement of both the papacy and the French crown was kept to a minimum. The Burgundian dominance of the Nicopolis crusade is reflected in the composition of the crusading force which left France for Hungary in 1396, and in chapter five the various contingents on the crusade are analysed in some detail. Philip the Bold clearly used his position as the virtual head of the French government after 1392 to assume the direction of French crusading, and thus Vaughan's depiction of Philip as a state-builder who saw crusading as a means of raising the prestige of his duchy is confirmed.¹⁰ While chapters four and five deal with the broader political and military context of the crusade to Nicopolis, chapter six examines the behaviour of French knights on crusade in the context of the demands imposed by their adherence to chivalric values. The French decision to occupy the vanguard in the battle against the Turks provides an insight into the chivalric mentality of the period, as it indicates clearly that the winning of secular renown was the driving force of chivalry. The demands which the chivalric ethos placed upon demonstrating individual valour were always liable to produce the sort of rash behaviour witnessed at Nicopolis, especially when the knights of France and England had been frustrated in their desire to prove themselves in battle in previous decades. This was something which the writers of the time either failed to appreciate or were reluctant to acknowledge.

¹⁰ Vaughan concluded that "...all the available resources had been applied in the formation of the Burgundian state; for the Nicopolis crusade and Sluis castle, just as much as the court and the administration, all contributed to this end.": R. Vaughan, *Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State* (London, 1962), p. 236.

While the main thrust of the thesis is concerned with reassessing where control over crusading lay and its continued relevance to the nobility of France and England, the fact that this period was also a time of schism in the Church meant that the crusades against Christians which occurred in the 1380s are also considered. The Great Schism predictably followed Christendom's existing political fault lines, and for almost forty years after 1378 England and France supported rival popes. The crusades which occurred during the Schism have received attention from scholars, most notably in the works of Valois and Perroy which have already been mentioned, and accounts of the events of the crusades to Flanders and Castile have been provided by Wrong and Russell respectively.¹¹ However, the popular nature of the two crusades has not been considered in any depth, and in particular the preaching campaigns launched by Despenser and Gaunt have been somewhat neglected.¹² Thus chapter one provides an analysis of the crusade preaching and indulgence-selling which preceded the crusades of 1383 and 1386. The popularity of Despenser's campaign is highlighted while Walsingham's view that John of Gaunt's indulgence-selling campaign aroused little interest in England is reassessed in the light of new research. The theme of popular participation on the crusades to Flanders and Castile is continued into chapter two, which examines the social composition of the two forces in a depth which is rarely possible for medieval armies. It emerges that while the crusade armies of 1383 and 1386

¹¹ E.M. Wrong, *The Crusade of 1383, Known as that of the Bishop of Norwich* (London, 1892); P.E. Russell, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955). For the crusade to Flanders see also M. Aston, 'The Impeachment of Bishop Despenser', *BIHR*, vol. 38 (1965), pp. 127-48, and N.J. Housley, 'France, England and the "National Crusade," 1302-1386', *France and the British Isles in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, G. Jondorf, D.N. Dumville, eds. (Woodbridge, 1991), pp. 194-7.

¹² W.E. Lunt examined the indulgences administered for Despenser's crusade in his *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England 1327-1534*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 535-44. He examined those administered for the crusade to Castile in *ibid.*, pp. 544-8.

both contained professional fighters, there was in each force an element of civilians and clergy who had taken the Cross in order to participate on the expedition.

The thesis only covers a period of twenty-two years, but despite this limited time-span, crusading in the 1380s and 1390s is a broad topic and it has not been possible to consider as many of its facets as was originally intended. While the *reysen* are of central importance to an understanding of the crusade mentality of the knights of England and France, Paravicini has recently explored the subject in such detail and with such skill that a separate chapter in this thesis would be superfluous.¹³ The crusade to Al-Mahdiya has been considered in detail by several scholars and the extant evidence allows for little to be added to this work.¹⁴ The most notable omission, however, has been a discussion of Louis of Anjou's crusade to lay claim to the throne of Naples which left France in 1382. The first two chapters were to include an analysis of the preaching campaign which preceded Anjou's crusade and the composition of the army which he led, alongside the work on the crusades to Flanders and Castile. This did not prove possible because there is not enough surviving material upon which to base such research. The French chroniclers did not cover the crusade in great detail, and although the Flemish chronicles raised the tantalising prospect that Anjou may have taken du Guesclin's mercenary force to Italy, research could proceed no further.¹⁵ The holdings of the Bibliothèque nationale could shed precious little additional light on any aspect of the expedition, and it was with great regret that the decision was taken to omit an analysis of the duke's ill-fated crusade.

¹³ W. Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, 2 vols. so far (Sigmaringen, 1989-).

¹⁴ See L. Mirot, 'Une expédition française en Tunisie au XIV^e siècle: le siège de Mahdia (1390)', *Revue des études historiques*, vol. 97 (1931), pp. 357-406; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 331-40.

¹⁵ *Istorie et croniques de Flandres*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., vol. 2 (Bruxelles, 1880), p. 173.

The problems encountered when attempting to conduct new research on Louis of Anjou's crusade to Naples raises the issue of the sources for crusading in the later fourteenth century. Despite the lack of extant documentation in certain areas, this is a period for which a substantial amount of source material survives. The thesis ranges broadly between two countries and their experiences of crusading, and this is reflected in the diversity of the sources which have been consulted. A number of manuscript collections have proved particularly useful. The research for chapter two on the crusaders who participated on the expeditions to Flanders and Castile was made possible by the existence of the Treaty Rolls for 1383 and 1386, on which the names of those to whom letters of protection and attorney had been issued by the crown were recorded.¹⁶ The additional information provided in these entries allowed a unique analysis of the social composition of the two armies to be attempted. The original documents were recorded on individual pieces of parchment which are now part of the Chancery Warrants (C81) series. However, the Treaty Rolls have been preferred since the Chancery Warrants are illegible in places, and it is clear that the entries in the Treaty Rolls were transcribed from the Chancery Warrants soon after their issue. The transcription of entries relating to the crusades to Flanders and Castile onto the Treaty Rolls reflects the fact that these expeditions were considered to be royal campaigns to a certain extent. The Chancery Warrants have proved useful on occasion, and other holdings in the PRO have also been consulted, such as the Exchequer Various Accounts and Issue Rolls.¹⁷

In general terms, much less manuscript material has survived relating to the workings of the French government at the end of the fourteenth century compared with what has

¹⁶ See PRO, C76/67 and C76/70 for 1383 and 1386 respectively. The Treaty Rolls, formerly known as the *Rotuli Francorum*, were concerned with information relevant to the crown's overseas activities and amongst other things protection and attorney taken out for secular campaigns was recorded onto them.

¹⁷ PRO, E101 and E403 respectively.

survived for the English. There are some manuscripts relating to French armies in the period such as the accounts of Charles VI's treasurer of war, Arnoul Boucher,¹⁸ but such material relates only to secular campaigns and there are no similar records for French participation at Al-Mahdiya and Nicopolis. This reflects the fact that the crusades of the later fourteenth century were undertaken by the knights of France and England in an individual capacity; only the Burgundian contingent at Nicopolis could be considered an official force which represented a prince. Charles VI and Louis of Orléans also patronised the crusading activity of members of their household, and it is largely through records of royal and ducal payments to help meet individuals' expenses that French crusading activity can be traced.¹⁹ One collection in the *Bibliothèque nationale* proved particularly important. The *Collection Bourgogne* contains transcripts of the archival holdings of the *Chambre des comptes* in Dijon, undertaken by various eighteenth-century Dominicans who held the post of Keeper of these archives. The transcribed documents, the accuracy of which can be verified from other sources, were mainly records of payments for goods and services authorised by the dukes of Burgundy. These payments included sums dispatched to envoys who undertook negotiations for Philip the Bold in the 1390s, and from this information it became possible to reassess the launching of the Nicopolis crusade. The *Collection Bourgogne* was also the starting point for the analysis of the Burgundian contingent which was the core of the French crusading force which went to Nicopolis. Wherever possible, an effort has been made to consult the original manuscripts, and so only limited use has been made of Rymer's *Foedera*, for example. However, the Calendars of Patent and Close Rolls have been used in preference to the originals since they are reliable summaries and the volumes are fully

¹⁸ BN, *Français* 4482.

¹⁹ For example, see BN, *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises* 3638 (165) for Orléans paying 1000 *francs* in 1392 to four men who intended to go to Prussia.

indexed.²⁰ They proved particularly useful when researching the connections of the captains on Despenser's crusade. The Calendars of Papal Registers have also been consulted, as have a number of other printed versions of official documents, such as John of Gaunt's Register, and extracts from the accounts of Philip the Bold.²¹

Chronicles have been a major source of information for both the English and the French sides of the thesis. While they bring the period to life in a way that the official records often fail to do, they have to be used with caution. The main chronicle sources for English history in the later fourteenth century are those composed by Henry Knighton, Thomas Walsingham and the anonymous monk of Westminster.²² All three men were generally well-informed about the government and politics of the time, although it has to be remembered that they were all clerics and tended to be unfavourable towards Richard II. Thomas Walsingham in particular was liable to offer scathing moral condemnations when his passions were aroused, and in this respect John of Gaunt was a particular target of his dislike in the 1370s.²³ Although his attitude towards the duke softened in the 1380s after an alleged religious awakening, Walsingham did not retract the previous indictments of the duke in his work.²⁴ Thus the reader has to consider the extent to which Walsingham's observations were coloured by his opinion of John of Gaunt and others. Walsingham's discussion of the

²⁰ See, for example, *Calendar of Patent Rolls, Richard II*, vols. 1-5, 1377-1396, 6 vols. (London, 1895-1905); *Calendar of Close Rolls, Richard II*, 6 vols., 1377-1399 (London, 1914-27).

²¹ *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, W.H. Bliss, J.A. Twemlow, eds., *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, A.D. 1362-1404 (London, 1902); *ibid.*, vol. 5, A.D. 1396-1404 (London, 1904); *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372-1376*, 2 vols., S. Armitage-Smith, ed., Camden Third Series, vols. 20-1 (London, 1911); *John of Gaunt's Register, 1379-1383*, 2 vols. E.C. Lodge, R. Somerville, eds., Camden Third Series, vols. 56-7 (London, 1937); *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne (1363-1419), d'après les comptes de dépenses de leur hôtel*, E. Petit, éd. (Paris, 1888).

²² *Knighton's Chronicle 1337-1396*, G.H. Martin, ed., trans. (Oxford, 1995), T. Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, A.D. 1381-1422, H.T. Riley, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1864), *The Westminster Chronicle 1381-1394*, L.C. Hector, B.F. Harvey, trans., eds. (Oxford, 1982).

²³ A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, vol. 2 (London, 1982), p. 129.

²⁴ For Walsingham's account of Gaunt's repentance, see, for example, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 43.

indulgence-selling campaign which preceded Gaunt's crusade was written when he had not changed his attitude towards the duke to any significant extent, and as a result he dismissed the sale of indulgences out of hand.²⁵ However, the lack of consistency in his account of the preaching campaign for the crusade to Castile was suspicious, as in the same work he let slip the fact that Gaunt's confessor was successfully selling papal privileges to raise funds for the crusade.²⁶ These instances of chroniclers choosing not to provide information can be particularly misleading, as further research suggested that Gaunt did indeed launch a vigorous campaign to sell indulgences and other privileges in 1386.

The main chronicles for the reign of Charles VI are those compiled by John Froissart and the monk of St. Denis, believed to be one Michael Pintoin. In the absence of extensive government records, greater reliance tends to be placed on the chronicles of Froissart and St. Denis for French affairs than on Knighton and Walsingham for those of England. In a sense this is unfortunate, since both these works have their drawbacks. Froissart's aim was to record noble feats of arms, and while his work provides a fascinating insight into chivalric culture at the end of the fourteenth century, it is a difficult source to use. Froissart had little concept of searching for historical truth and he was not averse to providing several accounts of the same event, leaving the reader to choose which was the most likely or which he preferred.²⁷ In particular, the historian must be wary of Froissart's account when it is the only source for a particular event. Thus Froissart was the only chronicler to describe an ambush laid by Coucy on the eve of the battle of Nicopolis in which a large number of Turks

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143. Walsingham's attitude to John of Gaunt only softened to a marked extent after 1389 when it had become clear that Gaunt's presence in government was necessary to maintain stability: V.H. Galbraith, 'Thomas Walsingham and the St. Alban's Chronicle 1272-1422', *EHR*, vol. 47 (1932), p. 25.

²⁶ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, pp. 157-8.

²⁷ For a discussion of Froissart's technique see J.J.N. Palmer, ed., *Froissart: Historian* (Woodbridge, 1981).

were killed.²⁸ The incident may have actually occurred, but it is also possible that Froissart invented it in order to increase the prestige of one of his leading patrons. The monk of St. Denis is more reliable since he appears to have been concerned with the accurate reporting of events rather than producing a work of literary value, as Froissart was. The abbey of St. Denis was not far from the centre of government and so the monk was well-placed to gather information about the court. Indeed, his account is a semi-official royal biography and like Knighton's work it was furnished with official documents. However, the monk of St. Denis provides a theocentric view of events as one would expect and this can produce a strongly biased judgement. Most notably, the failure of the crusade to Nicopolis was explained in terms of the wrath of God having been incurred by the French knights as a result of their sinful behaviour.²⁹ Even so, this moral tone is at least applied equally, and as a result the chronicle is essentially even-handed in its treatment of the figures of the day. In addition to the official government sources and the chronicles, the works of the prominent poets and the writers of the period have also been consulted. Their comments upon crusading have a particular relevance since the courts which were the location of their patronage were also the focus of crusade activity. The poetry of Chaucer and Gower in England and the works of Deschamps and Christine de Pisan in France have all been considered in the context of what they reveal about the status of crusading at the two courts. The works of Philip de Mézières have received particular attention since it is contended that Charles VI's *marmouset* government was attempting to implement his policy of peace with England, an end to the Schism and the launching of a major crusade to the East.

²⁸ J. Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., *Chroniques*, vol. 15 (1392-1396) (Bruxelles, 1871), pp. 264-8.

²⁹ *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys*, M.L. Bellaguet, éd., vol. 2 (Paris, 1840), pp. 485, 497-9.

CHAPTER ONE: THE PREACHING CAMPAIGNS OF 1383 AND 1386

The outbreak of the Great Schism in 1378 opened up new possibilities in the conflict between England and France. It was inevitably superimposed upon existing political fault lines, so England backed Urban VI while France and Scotland supported Clement VII. After more than seventy years of enduring what was perceived as a pro-French papacy, in 1378 England found herself for the first time the main supporter of the Holy See. It could be expected that the war between France and England would assume a religious dimension, with both sides being given crusading sanction to continue their struggle. In fact this was not to occur, and although several crusades against Christians were launched at the end of the fourteenth century, neither pope gave his blanket approval to the war. There were only three crusades against Christians in the period under consideration, two being dispatched from England and one from France, and neither crown specifically launched a crusade against the other. The first Schism crusade was that launched in 1382 by Louis, Duke of Anjou, to try to claim the kingdom of Sicily, which will not be discussed in this chapter.¹ In 1383 Henry Despenser, the Bishop of Norwich, led a crusade to Flanders, which was

¹ The lack of evidence on this subject has meant that the preaching campaign which may have preceded Louis of Anjou's crusade has not been discussed. The French chroniclers focused on Anjou's crusade once it had set out for Sicily and very little was said of the preparations. Apart from the bulls which Clement VII granted Louis, I have not been able to find any archival evidence which may have contributed towards an analysis of the preaching of Anjou's crusade.

Urbanist, despite the fact that her count was Clementist and in the pocket of the French.² Despenser captured many of the key towns of the county, but withdrew from the siege of Ypres on hearing of the arrival in Flanders of a massive French relief force and returned to England to face impeachment at the hands of the government. In 1386 John of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster, having finally succeeded in gaining acceptance for his crusade, attempted to enforce his rights to the throne of Castile. After failing to bring his adversary, John I, to battle, and having watched a large part of his army die from disease, Gaunt renounced his right to the throne and returned to England with a generous cash settlement. The events of these three crusades have been dealt with at length by previous historians and no attempt will be made here to go over this well-trodden ground.³ The focus will instead be on a specific aspect of the crusades to Flanders and Castile: the preaching campaigns which were organised to sell the crusade indulgence. There will be an analysis of the steps which Despenser and Gaunt took to launch a preaching campaign to raise support for their crusades in 1383 and 1386, and this will include an assessment of the roles played by the pope, the Church and the crown. Despenser's preaching campaign emerges as well-organised and successful, just as the leading chroniclers affirmed, even if it could be considered coercive and exploitative. It will become clear that despite the lack of enthusiasm of chroniclers such as Knighton and Walsingham, John of Gaunt also made a determined effort to publicise his crusade and sell the indulgences and other favours which

² The estates of Flanders had declared in favour of Urban VI in 1379: Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le grand Schisme*, p. 169.

³ For the background to Despenser's crusade see R. Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, in 1383* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1931). For a survey of the Bishop's campaign in Flanders see Wrong, *The Crusade of 1383, Known as that of the Bishop of Norwich*. The best account of John of Gaunt's crusade is to be found in Russell, *The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal*, pp. 400-525. Aspects of Anjou's crusade have been covered by Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 1, pp. 145-93; *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 1-89.

he had been granted by Urban VI. His success in this enterprise is uncertain, but an effort will be made to provide a balanced assessment of his achievement, taking into account the extent to which his campaign suffered from the controversy which Despenser's crusade generated.

The role of the papacy is the first area which needs to be examined in considering the preaching campaigns of Despenser and Gaunt. Urban VI had announced the excommunication of Clement VII in *Nuper cum vinea*, issued on 6 November 1378 and published by Archbishop Sudbury on 30 March in the following year.⁴ The crown saw the possibilities which Urban's full support could open up, and so it dispatched Nicholas Dagworth and Walter Skirlaw to Rome in February 1382.⁵ The purpose of this mission was to persuade Urban to give his full spiritual and financial backing to the war against France.⁶ Urban was not prepared to go this far as he feared that the conflict would become irresolvable and the chances of re-uniting Christendom under his pontificate would be reduced. Urban feared that if he allowed the English government to declare crusades on its enemies whenever it chose to do so, control of crusading would be taken out of his hands and could be put to uses of which he might not approve. Urban was also more concerned about the situation in Italy than with England's desire to receive papal backing for the struggle with France. In particular, Louis of Anjou's plans to invade Sicily and Clement VII's desire to establish himself at Rome were occupying much of Urban's attention.

⁴ *Concilia Magna Britanniae et Hiberniae*, D. Wilkins, ed., vol. 3 (London, 1737), pp. 138-41.

⁵ Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, p. 178.

⁶ Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le grand Schisme, pièces justificatives*, nos. 3-6, pp. 392-404. For this mission see also Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, pp. 178-192; Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, vol. 2, pp. 536-7.

Indeed, in 1382 Urban was trying to hire the renowned mercenary captain Sir John Hawkwood and was offering indulgences to those who would fight the Duke of Anjou.⁷

Urban's refusal to grant crusade status to the struggle with France seems to have been anticipated by Henry Despenser and John of Gaunt. In 1380 both men sent their procurators to Rome, Henry Bowet representing Despenser and John Gutiérrez, a Castilian exile, representing Gaunt.⁸ Despenser relished the opportunity which the Schism presented to lead a military expedition, having already fought for the papacy against the Visconti in the late 1360s.⁹ Gaunt wanted his claim to the throne of Castile to be given crusade status since John I had, after a period of neutrality, declared in favour of Clement VII. Even though Urban's attention was on Italy, he probably felt that it would be prudent to grant these requests in the hope of placating the English government. Despenser was issued with two bulls on 23 and 25 March 1381, entitled *Dudum cum vinea Domini* and *Dudum cum filii belial*.¹⁰ The first of these granted the full crusade indulgence to all those who served on crusade against the antipope for a year, or who contributed sufficient sums for the cause. In *Dudum cum filii belial*, Despenser, as papal *nuncio*, was enjoined to preach a crusade against Clement VII, and any member of the clergy was allowed to take the Cross without the permission of his superior.¹¹ Probably as a result of the embassy of Dagworth and

⁷ Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 2, p. 48.

⁸ A royal letter which safeguarded Bowet's rights while he was on the crusade to Flanders mentioned the good service which he had performed for Despenser and the crown in Rome: C81/479/2642. All manuscript references in this chapter are to the holdings of the Public Record Office. Aston attributed the granting of Despenser's two bulls of 1381 to the activities of Henry Bowet: Aston, 'The Impeachment of Bishop Despenser', p. 133. Gutiérrez had gone to Rome to obtain bulls for Gaunt in 1380 and this visit may have been to do with Gaunt's crusade: *John of Gaunt's Register, 1379-1383*, vol. 1, pp. 50, 151.

⁹ It was this military service which had secured Despenser the bishopric of Norwich.

¹⁰ Copies of these two bulls are to be found in *Wykeham's Register*, T.F. Kirby, ed., vol. 2, Hampshire Record Society (London and Winchester, 1899), pp. 198-200, 206-09. Walsingham provided a paraphrase of *Dudum cum vinea Domini*: Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, pp. 72-6.

¹¹ The clergy who went on the crusade were allowed to keep the revenues of their benefices provided that they supplied vicars to maintain the services: *Wykeham's Register*, vol. 2, p. 208; Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, vol. 2, p. 536.

Skirlaw, Urban gave Despenser a third bull, *Dignum censemus*, on 15 May 1382.¹²

Despenser was empowered to defend the good character of the pope and to deprive clerical adherents of the antipope in England and send them to Rome for trial. By 1382 John of Gaunt had also received at least one crusade bull from Urban VI as although there is no longer any record of its text, John Gilbert referred to it in his speech to Parliament in the October of this year when he put forward the “ways” of Flanders and Spain, as the two crusade options came to be known.¹³ Urban added three more bulls in 1383. On 21 March Gaunt was appointed Urban’s *vexilliferum crucis*, or “standard-bearer of the Cross”, while in a bull of 8 April those going on crusade with Gaunt were granted the plenary indulgence.¹⁴ Gaunt’s crusade was not approved by the English government until 1385 and by the time that the crusade set sail in the following year Urban had added another four bulls to help increase revenue. Gaunt was empowered to create fifty papal notaries, fifty papal chaplains, to allow illegitimate men to become priests and to restore polluted churches in England.¹⁵ It is notable that none of the bulls which Despenser and Gaunt received specifically mentioned the kingdom of France, and so while Urban was prepared to assist the English cause, he would not go so far as to sanction crusading action directly against the French.

As far as the indulgences conceded by Urban VI were concerned, Despenser and John of Gaunt were treated equally. Urban allowed both men to offer the plenary

¹² For the text of this bull see *Wykeham’s Register*, vol. 2, pp. 209-11.

¹³ *Rotuli Parliamentorum ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parlamento*, J. Strachey, ed., vol. 3 (London, 1767), p. 134. Coulborn stated that this first bull was dated 28 March 1382: *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, p. 190. This bull may also have been brought back to England by the embassy of Daggworth and Skirlaw, which returned in August 1382: *ibid.*, pp. 190, 192.

¹⁴ For the text of these bulls see *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. 26, 1356-1396, A. Theiner, ed. (1872), no. 7, p. 446 and *ibid.*, no. 8, pp. 446-7. They have been translated in part in *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, pp. 264-5.

¹⁵ These four bulls are mentioned in the Carmelite sermon referred to below: *Fasciculi Zizaniorum Magistri Johannis Wyclif Cum Tritico*, W.W. Shirley, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1858), p. 508. They are also discussed by S. Armitage-Smith in his *John of Gaunt* (London, 1904), p. 305.

indulgence enjoyed by those going on crusade to the Holy Land. The form of the indulgence was not new, but it is significant that Urban extended the methods by which it could be obtained. It had long been accepted that a person wishing to purchase an indulgence could do so, but the amount was usually supposed to be roughly equivalent to the costs of sending someone on the crusade, or a year's service in person. Urban allowed Despenser and Gaunt to decide the amount which they considered sufficient to acquire an indulgence.¹⁶ It would seem that this was Urban's concession since he had not given the English government his financial backing as had been requested. By reducing the amount for which an indulgence could be purchased, Urban expected more people to take up the offer, and hence more revenue would be generated for the two crusades. He did not want to donate any money himself, as papal funds were needed to keep Clement VII and his supporters from making gains in Italy. Although both Henry Despenser and John of Gaunt had been granted the same attractive indulgences for their crusades, it is interesting that in other respects the two men received unequal treatment at the hands of Urban VI. Gaunt had been appointed the leader of a crusade expedition whose destination was explicitly stated as Castile. This meant that although he was undeniably in charge of the crusade, as far as the preaching campaign was concerned, he did not have the power to coerce the clergy to preach his crusade. Despenser, on the other hand, had been given the status of papal *nuncio* which meant that he was elevated above the Archbishop of Canterbury in matters relating to the crusade. Urban probably did this as he saw in Despenser a man whom he could trust in the English clergy which even by the fourteenth century enjoyed a certain independence from papal demands. Gaunt could not be given this status even if Urban had wished to bestow it since he was not

¹⁶ The phrase was "ministrabant sufficientia stipendia": *Wykeham's Register*, vol. 2, p. 206.

a member of the clergy. Despenser took full advantage of his position as papal *nuncio* and he used his authority to its fullest extent in the organisation of his preaching campaign. He even presumed to lead the expedition himself; even though none of the bulls which he received named Despenser as the leader of the crusade, this was how the bishop chose to interpret them.¹⁷

The preaching campaign launched by the Bishop of Norwich in the spring of 1383 was unlike anything else which had been seen in England. Despenser had published the three bulls which he had been granted on 17 September 1382, before he had been allowed to proceed by the crown.¹⁸ He sent copies of these bulls to all the prelates in England, and Walsingham remarked that they were affixed to the doors of churches throughout the land.¹⁹ Despenser was ensuring that he achieved the maximum exposure for his crusade. He hounded the secular clergy into publicising his crusade, taking advantage of his new position of papal *nuncio*. Walsingham has preserved a mandate which the bishop sent to all the chaplains, vicars and rectors in the city of York, ordering the publication of his bulls, and he sent similar letters to the other dioceses of the country.²⁰ Despenser wanted to ensure that no-one could claim that they were ignorant of the powers which Urban had bestowed upon him, and in particular the attractive terms on which the plenary indulgence was being offered. The bishop was aware that the main reason why his crusade had been accepted by the crown was because the sale of indulgences could be used to offset a portion of the costs

¹⁷ The crown wanted Despenser to accept a secular lieutenant but he was allowed to side-step this request as it was stated that if he could not agree to any of the proposed candidates, then he could lead the expedition alone: *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 148. Churchmen had led armies in living memory, but they had been cardinal-legates or officials in the papal state and not *nuncios*.

¹⁸ Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, p. 198. The crown authorised Despenser to begin preaching his crusade on 6 December 1382: C76/67 m. 15.

¹⁹ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, pp. 71-2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79. This letter was apparently dated 9 February 1382, but this is probably old style, and should be read as 9 February 1383.

of the expedition. The crown was desperately short of cash and it could not afford to squeeze too much out of a population which had so recently revolted because of the impositions placed upon it. Despenser had been granted £37,475 from parliamentary subsidy, and this was not enough to pay for the 2,500 men-at-arms and 2,500 archers which the bishop had contracted to provide.²¹ The indulgence-selling campaign would have to raise large enough sums to make up for any shortfall. Despenser was not just concerned about raising money, however. He also needed men to take the Cross since the crown had restricted the people who could participate on the crusade. No-one from the king's household was allowed to go, and retainers had to gain permission from their lords before they could take part.²² Despenser did not have a military retinue on which he could draw, and so the preaching of the crusade would have to be aimed at recruitment as much as fund-raising.

Henry Knighton printed a remarkable document which shows the drive and organisation behind the preaching and indulgence-selling campaign initiated by Despenser, entitled *Ordinationes episcopi pro cruciata publicanda*.²³ It was probably written by someone close to the bishop such as Henry Bowet or the treasurer of the expedition, Robert Fulmer.²⁴ It reveals that a well-organised army of receivers and preachers descended upon the parishes of England in 1383, doing their utmost to extract money from the faithful. Preachers were to be sent throughout the country, accompanied by a clerk who was to note

²¹ The subsidy amounted to £37,475 7s 6d: Lunt, *Financial relations of the Papacy with England*, vol. 2, p. 543. For Despenser having indented with the crown see *Foedera, Conventiones, Literae et cujuscunque Generis Acta Publica*, T. Rymer, ed., vol. 3, pt. 3 (3rd ed., The Hague, 1740), p. 153. For the figure of 2,500 men-at-arms and archers, see, for example, *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 147. The going rate for the period appears to have been roughly £10,000 for every 1,000 men raised.

²² *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 148.

²³ *Knighton's Chronicle*, pp. 331-3.

²⁴ This was suggested by Martin: *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 331, n. 1.

down the names of those who contributed money to the crusade and the amount given. The preacher was then to give this information to the receiver, along with the names of those who had promised to go on the crusade in person. The receivers were also to enlist a number of local people in each area to assist in drawing the crusade to the attention of the inhabitants.²⁵ The preaching of the crusade was to be undertaken by the mendicant friars, who received an early form of commission, being allowed to keep six pence from every pound which they helped to raise.²⁶ If the practice elaborated in the thirteenth century was followed, the friars sent advance notice to the local clergy that they were coming to preach in an area, and the clergy then summoned people to a particular place so that they could hear the preacher.²⁷ The friars enjoyed the monopoly of confession in the middle ages and this close contact with the laity made them the obvious choice for the preaching of the crusade; they had been used in this capacity since the early thirteenth century.²⁸ Despenser and whoever helped to draw up these ordinances paid close attention to detail, providing a structure which would efficiently extract money from the populace. This was backed by a coercive element which was introduced by Despenser, exercising his powers as *nuncio*. The preachers were to be warned by the receivers to carry out their duties without defrauding, under pain of excommunication.²⁹ This would suggest that the receivers were men in whom Despenser had confidence and they were presumably trusted servants and retainers, hand-picked by him. The receivers were also empowered by Despenser to exercise a degree of coercion on the parish clergy, who were ordered to persuade their parishioners to contribute

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ S. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade 1216-1307* (Oxford, 1988), p. 61.

²⁸ Tyerman saw the use of the friars for crusade preaching as a particularly significant innovation: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 94.

²⁹ *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 333.

towards the expedition under pain of excommunication.³⁰ These orders seem to have had some effect, as Wyclif criticised priests who withheld the sacrament from parishioners who had refused to contribute to the crusade.³¹

Despenser's crusade was preached all over the country, but certain areas received special attention. In general the preaching would have centred on the towns as these were the focal points where people from the surrounding areas could be gathered. London was a particular target for the preaching of Despenser's crusade. Londoners were well aware of the public struggle which had taken place between Despenser and Gaunt in 1382 to gain the acceptance of Parliament, and Gaunt's unpopularity with the city led them to sympathise with Despenser. John Philpott, the wealthy London merchant, was heavily involved in Despenser's crusade, and Nicholas Brembre, another prominent London merchant and occasional mayor of London, traded extensively in wool. These two men were friends and political allies, opposed to John of Gaunt and his creature John of Northampton, and they doubtless brought the weight of the victuallers' guilds behind Despenser's crusade.³² There is evidence that the crusade was especially popular in London, Walsingham noted that a large number of apprentices in the city set off to join the expedition when its success became known.³³ London was also the centre of the ceremonies associated with the crusade and this again meant that the expedition enjoyed a high profile in the capital which Despenser and the collectors doubtless cashed in on. Despenser took the Cross on 21 December 1383, and the monk of Westminster remarked that a search had to be made to find the form of the service,

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ J. Barnie, *War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War, 1337-1399* (Ithaca and London, 1974), p. 124.

³² Philpott's and Brembre's wives were sisters, daughters of the wealthy vintner John Stodeye: R. Bird, *The Turbulent London of Richard II* (London, 1949), p. 2.

³³ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 95. There were also a number of civilian crusaders who came from London and were members of the force which Despenser led to Flanders: see below, pp. 48-9.

which he mistakenly claimed had not been seen before in England.³⁴ In April 1383 Despenser received the crusade banner at Westminster Abbey, and this was another public service which would have kept the crusade on the minds of the people of the capital.

Despenser's preaching campaign was also backed by the Church which helped to maintain the high profile of the crusade, particularly when it was close to departure. The Archbishop of Canterbury co-ordinated the activities of his suffragans and ensured that the crusade was well publicised. On 10 April 1383, Courtenay wrote to all his bishops through Robert Braybrooke, the Bishop of London, ordering prayers and other activities to be performed for Despenser's crusade.³⁵ The clergy were to be offered forty days' enjoined penance if they conducted masses, sermons and processions three times a week. The aim was presumably to have one final push before the crusade's departure. Courtenay, again acting through his bishops, also helped to speed up the collection of money for the crusade.³⁶ Courtenay was only carrying out the tasks which were expected of him, but it is likely that he was quite keen on Despenser's crusade. Despenser and Courtenay moved in the same political and social circles and were at least acquaintances, if not friends.³⁷ Courtenay was involved in government in 1383 and he was a member of the committee of nine lords selected to confer with the Commons in the spring of that year.³⁸ As a result, he

³⁴ *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 33. Lunt noted that there had been crusade preaching in England in 1335 for the crusade being planned by Philip VI: Lunt, *Financial Relations of England with the Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 528-30. Thus it was almost fifty years since the Cross had been preached in England.

³⁵ Copies of this letter are to be found in the bishops' registers for the period, for example, see *Registrum Johannis Gilbert, Episcopi Herefordensis (1375-1389)*, J.H. Parry, trans., ed., Canterbury and York Series, vol. 18 (London, 1915), pp. 27-30; *The Register of Robert Braybrooke, Bishop of London, 1382-1404* (microfilm), ff. 273r.-274v.

³⁶ *Concilia*, vol. 3, pp. 177-8.

³⁷ In connection with the extent of Despenser's relations with Courtenay, it is notable that the Bishop of Norwich was not named in Courtenay's will, which did include a number of other bishops such as those of Winchester, Lincoln, London, Salisbury, Exeter, Bath and Wells and the Archbishop of York: J. Dahmus, *William Courtenay, Archbishop of Canterbury 1381-1396* (Pennsylvania, 1966), pp. 273-4.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

may have had a hand in gaining parliament's acceptance of Despenser's crusade. His relations with John of Gaunt, on the other hand, were decidedly frosty. Courtenay and Gaunt had fallen out badly in 1377 over Wyclif's appearance in London, when Gaunt had enraged the London crowd by threatening Courtenay with physical violence.³⁹ While relations between the two men had probably improved by 1382, they were not friends. As a result, it is likely that the archbishop did all that he could to assist Despenser's preaching campaign.

After the defeat of the Ghentois at Roosebeke at the end of November 1382, the crown accepted that a force would have to be sent to Flanders, and it saw Despenser's crusade as a cheap way of doing this. Despenser's preaching campaign received the backing of the crown, which was anxious to see that it raised as much money as possible. The crown seems to have been aware of the risk which it was taking in using a crusade instead of a royal expedition, and it tried to ensure that all went smoothly. It is clear from the records of Chancery that by the spring of 1383 the crusade to Flanders was occupying a great deal of the crown's attention and it used its network of local agents to assist in publicising Despenser's crusade. In the order of 6 December 1382, the crown instructed all its sheriffs, mayors and other officials to announce its decision to allow the crusade to go ahead "in locis ubi melius expedire."⁴⁰ Presumably these officials would also have announced details of the bulls which Despenser had been granted, and with the crown, the Church, and Despenser's team of preachers all promoting the crusade, it would have been extremely difficult to have remained unaware of Despenser's expedition in the first half of 1383. As the date for the departure of the crusade came nearer, the crown began to step up activity to ensure that the

³⁹ T. Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 1, A.D. 1272-1381, H.T. Riley, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1863), p. 325.

⁴⁰ C76/67 m. 15.

money which was being collected around the country reached Despenser. On 8 April, for example, the king wrote to the bishop's collectors in York, ordering that the money raised by them was to be brought to Sandwich within ten days, under penalty "of all which you can forfeit to us."⁴¹ A similar order was to go to all Despenser's other collectors throughout England. On 23 April, Thomas Seyvill and John Allerton, sergeants-at-arms, along with one William Kele, were empowered by the crown to look into what had been collected for Despenser's crusade so far and to accept whatever extra donations the people wished to make.⁴² As the discussion below reveals, the crown also acted swiftly to stifle any criticism of the crusade, presumably fearful that this could lead to a decline in the sale of indulgences.

Unfortunately, the records kept by Despenser's receivers of the amounts collected from the indulgence-selling campaign have not survived, but there is at least the evidence of the chroniclers, which is unanimous in describing the sale of indulgences as a great success. Knighton adopted a fairly neutral attitude towards the preaching of the crusade, and there was a note of incredulity when he recounted that the preachers were claiming that the souls of dead relatives and friends would be released from purgatory by the purchase of an indulgence.⁴³ However, Knighton accepted that the preaching of the crusade brought in massive amounts of money, mentioning that women were especially generous.⁴⁴ Walsingham, despite the fact that his abbey of St. Albans had recently been involved in a dispute with the Bishop of Norwich, was an unequivocal supporter of the crusade.⁴⁵ He

⁴¹ *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 152.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁴³ *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 325. As Housley remarked, this practice was not new in 1383, but it was not to be official papal policy until the late fifteenth century: N.J. Housley, *Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580* (London, 1996), p. 98, n. 3.

⁴⁴ *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 325.

⁴⁵ There had been a dispute between the Despenser and the abbey of St. Albans over the priory of Wymundham: T. Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae ab Anno Domini 1328 usque ad Annum 1388*, E.M. Thompson, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1874), pp. 258-61.

described the granting of Parliament's assent for the crusade in quasi-miraculous terms, and he also suggested that the indulgence-selling campaign was a great success.⁴⁶ The author of the *Eulogium Historiarum* was one of the few chroniclers who was favourable to John of Gaunt, and while he was critical of the crusade to Flanders and drew attention to the dubious practice of offering indulgences for both the living and the dead, he accepted that Despenser had raised great sums for his crusade.⁴⁷ News of the success of Despenser's preaching campaign reached the ears of Froissart, who suggested that 25,000 *francs* had been raised.⁴⁸ Froissart's figures usually have to be treated with the utmost caution, but it would seem that on this occasion he was not exaggerating wildly. Even John Wyclif, the harshest critic of the crusade, acknowledged that the friars had extracted "many thousande poundis" from the king's subjects.⁴⁹

There were a variety of factors which contributed to the success of Despenser's preaching campaign. The crusade seems to have touched a nerve with the English people who saw that it was aimed at striking a blow for both *regnum Angliae* and the *ecclesia Anglicana*. It was also the first manifestation of support for Urban VI, or "our Urban" as he was known in England. Despenser's crusade also had a certain novelty value as it was the first of its kind in England, and to make it even quirkier, it was led by a bishop. It was not particularly unusual for a bishop to take part in fighting on either secular or crusade campaigns, but it was rare for a bishop to be in overall charge of a force, especially one who

⁴⁶ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, pp. 84-5.

⁴⁷ *Eulogium Historiarum Sive Temporis Continuatio*, F.S. Haydon, ed., vol. 3 (Rolls Series, London, 1863), pp. 356-7.

⁴⁸ J. Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., *Chroniques*, vol. 10 (1382-1386) (Bruxelles, 1870), p. 207.

⁴⁹ John Wyclif, 'Fifty Heresies and Errors of Friars', *Select English Works of John Wyclif*, T. Arnold, ed., vol. 3, *Miscellaneous Works* (Oxford, 1871), p. 386.

was contracted to serve the crown.⁵⁰ The terms on which the plenary indulgence could be granted were also to prove attractive and Despenser was careful to ensure that no-one was refused provided he contributed a reasonable sum. There was a limited yet vociferous criticism of the practice, as will be revealed, but on the whole the population approved wholeheartedly of the sale of indulgences in 1383. Despenser's crusade always had the potential to be popular, but the bishop ensured that he tapped this potential to its fullest extent by implementing an aggressive preaching campaign. Indeed, it is notable that the capacity of Despenser's preaching machine to persuade people to part with their money outstripped its capacity to ensure the efficient collection of the sums raised. In 1386, the general papal collector in England, Cosmatius Gentilis, was still trying to gather in money from collectors who had not yet rendered accounts to the Bishop of Norwich.⁵¹ In November 1386 Gentilis contacted Thomas Arundel, the Bishop of Ely, to discuss the fact that five collectors who had operated in his diocese had not yet delivered any money.⁵² Despite these problems of collection, however, the preaching campaign had generated so much interest that even if Despenser only received the greater part of the money raised, this was still a considerable amount.

Compared with the coverage which Despenser's indulgence-selling campaign received, the leading chroniclers had much less to say about the preaching which preceded John of Gaunt's crusade. Knighton was virtually silent on the subject, while Walsingham

⁵⁰ For example, the Bishops of Durham and London had fought at Crécy: S.L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 150. A Bishop of Durham was also on the royal expedition to Scotland in 1385: N.B. Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385', *EHR*, vol. 73 (1958), pp. 25-6. Walter Skirlaw, Bishop of Durham, prepared a force for the battle of Otterburn in 1388: A. Goodman, 'Religion and Warfare in the Anglo-Scottish Marches', *Medieval Frontier Societies*, R. Bartlett, A. Mackay, eds. (Oxford, 1989), p. 254.

⁵¹ Lunt, *Financial Relations of England with the Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 543.

⁵² *Ibid.*

dismissed the campaign, remarking that while Gaunt had indulgences on offer in 1386, the English people were not interested in them.⁵³ The author of the *Eulogium Historiarum* stated that Gaunt's preaching campaign was a success, but his opinion has not been considered sufficiently important to outweigh those of Knighton and Walsingham.⁵⁴ Knighton's silence and Walsingham's dismissal have led historians to view the sale of indulgences in 1386 as unsuccessful and unworthy of further investigation.⁵⁵ Of course, there is no record of those who purchased indulgences or the amounts which they paid, but it is clear that Gaunt organised a systematic preaching campaign which achieved some degree of success. In 1389 Urban VI wrote a most revealing letter to the Archbishop of Bordeaux to prevent John of Gaunt's preachers from continuing to preach the crusade in the province, since Gaunt was no longer attempting to enforce his rights to the throne of Castile.⁵⁶ Although no record has survived, it is almost certain that Urban would have sent similar letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Urban's letter sheds light on various aspects of Gaunt's preaching campaign. Most importantly, it reveals that there certainly was a campaign, and that it had four main preachers, who were named in the letter as John [Gilbert], the Bishop of Hereford, John [Gutiérrez] the Bishop of Dax, William [Battlesham] the Bishop of Llandaff, and Walter Dyse, Gaunt's Carmelite confessor.⁵⁷ This

⁵³ Knighton began his account of the crusade with Gaunt's departure for Spain: *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 341; Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 143.

⁵⁴ The chronicler remarked that Gaunt had collected "magna pecunia": *Eulogium Historiarum*, vol. 3, p. 358.

⁵⁵ Ramsay suggested that the indulgence-selling campaign did not meet with much success: J.H. Ramsay, *The Genesis of Lancaster, or the Three Reigns of Edward II, Edward III and Richard II, 1307-1399*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1913), p. 230. More recently, Tyerman has concurred: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 262. Lunt more generously suggested that the success or otherwise of the indulgence-selling campaign was "problematical": Lunt, *Financial Relations of England with the Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 545. Armitage-Smith, however, claimed that there was a "...brisk market for papal wares.": Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, p. 305.

⁵⁶ *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, pp. 270-71.

⁵⁷ These men were identified as Gaunt's crusade preachers by the monk of Westminster: *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 165.

would suggest that the organisation of the preaching and indulgence-selling which preceded Gaunt's crusade was different to that implemented by the Bishop of Norwich. Despenser's preachers had been overseen by receivers, whereas Gaunt had four preachers who seem to have been in charge of the preaching campaign. Gaunt had only one main receiver, John Sergeant of Monmouth, and the four main preachers were to hand over the money which they had collected to him.⁵⁸

The three bishops named in Urban's letter reveal something of Gaunt's connections with the higher clergy of England. John Gilbert in particular had a high-profile political career, he was Chancellor of England in 1382, and Treasurer in 1386.⁵⁹ He was also one of the pool of people drawn upon to negotiate with France.⁶⁰ Gaunt was obviously a friend of William Battlesham, the Bishop of Llandaff, although I have not been able to uncover details of their relationship.⁶¹ John Gutiérrez was something of a special case as he was one of the handful of Castilian nobles who had found a new home in the court of John of Gaunt after the latter's marriage to Constanza. He was a staunch ally of the duke, and it is possible that he owed his bishopric to Gaunt's influence. Gaunt enjoyed good relations with several members of the higher clergy, and he employed them to fill key posts in his household, such as that of chancellor. Between 1371 and 1375, for example, Ralph Ergum, Bishop of Salisbury, served Gaunt in this capacity.⁶² Gaunt was also on good terms with Robert Braybrooke, the Bishop of London, with whom he stayed on occasion.⁶³ Intensive research

⁵⁸ For example, David Hay, John Gilbert's deputy, was ordered to hand over the money and names to Sergeant on 1 June 1386: *Registrum Johannis Gilbert*, p. 101.

⁵⁹ Gilbert was also one of the executors of Edward III's will: G. Holmes, *The Good Parliament* (Oxford, 1975), p. 160.

⁶⁰ Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, pp. 182, 254.

⁶¹ Battlesham does not appear in Gaunt's register and very little of his own bishop's register has survived.

⁶² *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372-1376*, p. xi.

⁶³ Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 254.

could doubtless reveal other links between Gaunt and members of the episcopate, but it is clear that he had strong ties with senior members of the secular clergy. Urban's letter to the Archbishop of Bordeaux reveals that the duke drew upon these associations for the preaching of his crusade in 1386.

The fact that Urban's letter to the Archbishop of Bordeaux mentioned Walter Dysse as one of Gaunt's four main preachers is also highly significant. Gaunt was an enthusiastic patron of the Carmelite Order and Dysse was not the duke's only Carmelite confessor;⁶⁴ Gaunt was close to other senior members of the order such as William Badby and Richard Maidstone.⁶⁵ The Carmelites were to be the preachers of Gaunt's crusade and it was a distinct advantage that the duke had such strong links with the order. There is evidence that the Carmelites worked hard for Gaunt in 1386. A fragment of a Carmelite sermon preached in favour of the crusade has survived, in which the right to crusade against the Castilians was defended, and the issue of indulgences was addressed.⁶⁶ The people used to preach Gaunt's crusade reveal a further difference to Despenser's campaign. In 1383 the Bishop of Norwich had ordered all the orders of friars to preach on his behalf, whereas Gaunt made use of a select group with whom he had close ties; Gaunt did not have to grant his preachers six pence in the pound to encourage them to preach his crusade. At the parish level, the organisation of the preaching undertaken by the Carmelites in 1386 would have been broadly similar to that carried out in 1383. Indeed, it is possible that many of Gaunt's Carmelite friars had preached Despenser's crusade three years previously and this provided useful experience. In 1386, Carmelite preachers toured the country accompanied by ^a clerk who

⁶⁴ Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, pp. 171-2.

⁶⁵ G.R. Owst, *Preaching in Medieval England: An Introduction to Sermon Manuscripts of the Period c.1350-1450* (Cambridge, 1926), p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, pp. 506-11. The sermon is discussed in more detail below.

noted down the names of those who purchased an indulgence and the amount given.

London may have been a centre for the preaching of the crusade in 1386, as Gaunt did have some support in the city, and it was also the place where the ceremony associated with crusading would take place.⁶⁷

John of Gaunt also had the authority of the Church and the crown to buttress his preaching campaign. It is quite possible that William Courtenay was not an enthusiastic supporter of Gaunt's crusade, but even if this is the case he still carried out his duty as head of the English clergy. The archbishop wrote to all his suffragans in the spring of 1386 to request prayers for the success of Gaunt's crusade.⁶⁸ The clergy were offered forty days' enjoined penance once more for sermons, masses and processions to maintain the profile of the crusade before it set sail. Gaunt's links with members of episcopate helped to ensure that Courtenay's instructions were carried out to the letter. John Gilbert published Courtenay's request and Robert Braybrooke wrote to the dean and chapter of St. Paul's asking for the prayers and masses to be said for Gaunt's crusade in their jurisdiction.⁶⁹ This practice would have been mirrored around the country, with bishops writing to their subordinates to ensure that the crusade was publicised in their diocese. On 11 April 1386 the king ordered the sheriffs to publicise Gaunt's crusade around the country, the same initial steps which he had taken to help Despenser's crusade three years previously.⁷⁰ The crown also intervened to stifle criticism of the crusade, as will be seen below. In general

⁶⁷ It is notable that many of the civilians who took the Cross in 1386 were from London: see below, p. 55.

⁶⁸ For example, see the copy sent to John Gilbert, once again via the Bishop of London: *Registrum Johannis Gilbert*, pp. 95-6. Gilbert had it published on 21 June 1386, and it presumably arrived a month or so earlier. It is interesting that Courtenay only asked for the sermons and masses to be performed twice a week, whereas in 1383 it was specified that they were to be performed three times a week. Even so, it is probably reading too much into this to suggest that Courtenay was favouring Despenser by asking for more prayers to be offered for his crusade.

⁶⁹ *The Register of Robert Braybrooke*, f. 116.

⁷⁰ *Calendar of Patent Rolls, Richard II*, vol. 3, 1385-1389 (London, 1900), p. 134.

terms, however, the crown was not as active on Gaunt's behalf as it had been in 1383, and there were a number of reasons for this. Gaunt was an experienced military commander and so the crown was content to leave the preaching of the crusade and the organisation of the force in the duke's hands. The crown was also less interested in Gaunt's crusade because it was not so closely tied to the crown's interests. The crusade to Flanders had been little more than an instrument of royal policy, whereas the crusade to Castile was seen as John of Gaunt's private project. The crown had never been convinced that the war with France could be won through Spain and it regarded Gaunt's Spanish plans as something of a side-show. However, Richard II knew that his uncle would not easily abandon his claims to the Castilian throne, and he probably accepted that the crusade would be launched at some point. Circumstances were favourable from the end of 1385. The Castilians had been decisively defeated by the Portuguese at Aljubarotta in August and since England's relations with both France and Scotland were at a low ebb, the crown was not worried that an invasion of Castile^{would} jeopardise the peace negotiations. Relations between Richard II and John of Gaunt were also deteriorating at this time and this had culminated in a very public quarrel on the expedition to Scotland in the summer of 1385.⁷¹ Richard was quite keen to see his uncle leave the country and once Parliament had granted Gaunt's request at the end of 1385, Richard even lent his uncle £13,300 towards his expenses.⁷²

Urban's letter to the Archbishop of Bordeaux referred to the fact that Gaunt's four main preachers had already collected "much money" and it can be assumed that the

⁷¹ *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 129-31.

⁷² *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 192. This grant could also have been a mark of favour, but since relations between Richard and Gaunt were strained, Richard probably wanted to encourage his uncle to pursue his Castilian ambitions to keep him out of English affairs for a time. For Parliament accepting Gaunt's request see *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 143. Goodman suggested that Parliament provided £13,300 for the crusade: Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 115.

preaching of the crusade was a success in English territories in France.⁷³ It is likely that the indulgence-selling was also popular in England. Gaunt had made use of his links with the clergy to produce what appears to have been a well-organised preaching campaign, and the same indulgences were on sale in 1386 that had been offered in 1383. Indeed, Gaunt had even more to offer than Despenser, as Urban had authorised the creation of fifty papal notaries and chaplains, and granted powers to deal with polluted churches and people barred from joining the clergy through illegitimacy. There is evidence that these extra favours proved popular. Walsingham noted that the offer of the papal chaplaincies aroused interest in his abbey where a numbers of monks purchased them, and he mentioned that Walter Dysse was still selling them in 1387.⁷⁴ There was also interest in the other concessions granted to Gaunt by Urban VI. The Bishop of Hereford, for example, issued dispensations for an illegitimate person to be promoted to Holy Orders, and did the same for someone who was married to a person to whom he was related in the third degree.⁷⁵

In the light of the evidence for the organisation and likely success of John of Gaunt's preaching campaign, it is striking that Knighton and Walsingham said so little about the promotion of the crusade to Castile. This is especially true of Knighton, as his abbey of St. Mary of the Meadows in Leicester was patronised by the duke, and he usually took an interest in Lancastrian affairs, in which he presented the duke in a favourable light.⁷⁶ In general Knighton was quite well-informed on events surrounding John of Gaunt and his family, but there were occasions on which he did not manage to obtain much information.

⁷³ *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, p. 271.

⁷⁴ T. Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani*, vol. 2, A.D. 1290-1349, H.T. Riley, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1867), pp. 417-18. For Dysse making Peter Patershulle (whom Walsingham called a Lollard) a papal chaplain, see Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, pp. 157-8.

⁷⁵ *Registrum Johannis Gilbert*, pp. 102, 102-03.

⁷⁶ *Knighton's Chronicle*, p. 1.

Knighton knew very little about Henry of Derby's first *reyse*, for example, and he did not even mention the earl's second one.⁷⁷ The preaching campaign which preceded John of Gaunt's crusade is another area in which Knighton's lack of knowledge is revealed. This was probably due to the fact that Knighton obtained his information from members of Gaunt's household, and while these men accompanied their lord on the crusade, they were not involved in the preaching campaign. Walsingham's cursory treatment of Gaunt's indulgence-selling campaign suggests that he also knew little about it, but this did not prevent him from claiming that it aroused little enthusiasm. Walsingham possibly had access to John Philpott to furnish detail for Despenser's crusade in 1383, and he clearly had access to a copy of *Dudum cum vinea Domini*.⁷⁸ He did not have this much information for John of Gaunt's preaching campaign, but even had he done so it is not clear whether he would have made use of it. Walsingham was not fond of John of Gaunt, and when recounting the events of the 1370s he had regularly vilified the duke.⁷⁹ Walsingham's attitude had softened a little after Gaunt's apparent repentance in 1381, and Walsingham's portrayal of the duke in the 1380s was less harsh than hitherto.⁸⁰ However, it was not until Gaunt's return to England in 1389 that Walsingham more firmly altered his opinion of the duke. Gaunt's three-year absence on crusade had proved to Walsingham that Gaunt's presence in

⁷⁷ Martin suggested that Knighton had access to Henry of Derby: *Knighton's Chronicle*, pp. xli-ii. This would explain why Knighton knew little about the crusade to Castile, but not Derby's *reysen*.

⁷⁸ Walsingham mentioned that Philpott was a source of information: *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 1, p. 435. Riley stated that it was "not improbable" that Philpott provided details of the crusade to Flanders: *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. xix.

⁷⁹ In an entry for 1376, for example, Walsingham remarked: "Think, unhappy man, you who regard yourself as prosperous and believe yourself most blessed, how your miseries oppress you and your lust tortures you, never satisfied with what you have, never fearing the none too distant future!": Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 75; this translation by A. Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, vol. 2 (London, 1982), p. 129.

⁸⁰ For Walsingham's account of Gaunt's repentance in 1381 see *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 43; *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 328.

government was needed to bring stability to Richard II's reign.⁸¹ Despite this change of attitude, Walsingham did not re-write his earlier comments on Gaunt, and so his summary dismissal of Gaunt's preaching campaign was written at a time when he was still unfavourably disposed towards the duke. Indeed, it is possible that Walsingham's excessive zeal for Despenser's crusade and his description of the success of his indulgence-selling campaign was intended to give added point to his brief reference to the alleged failure of John of Gaunt's preaching campaign.

Despite Walsingham's bias, it is likely that Gaunt's preaching campaign was not as successful as Despenser's and a number of factors lead to this conclusion.⁸² Gaunt's preaching campaign may have had some structure, but it was not as efficient or coercive as that imposed by Henry Despenser. Despenser had been granted the title of papal *nuncio*, and this allowed him to threaten the clergy with excommunication if they did not throw their weight behind his crusade. No ordinances for the preaching of Gaunt's crusade have survived and this is almost certainly because the duke did not publish any, since he did not have Despenser's power to coerce the clergy. Despenser also had the advantage that he was already a member of the body on whose help he was calling. Gaunt did have links with the highest levels of the clergy, but his control over the preaching of his crusade was not as direct and personal as Despenser's had been. Gaunt was forced to work through others, and the bishops of Hereford, Llandaff and Dax had other duties to attend to. In particular, John Gilbert's political career forced him to delegate his role as one of Gaunt's main preachers to

⁸¹ V.H. Galbraith, 'Thomas Walsingham and the St. Albans Chronicle 1272-1422', *EHR*, vol. 47 (1932), p. 25. More recently, this view of Walsingham's changing opinion of Gaunt was supported by J. Taylor in his *English Historical Literature in the Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1987), p. 75.

⁸² Lunt remarked "...it may be a reasonable conclusion that the financial return [from Gaunt's indulgence sales] was less than that of the indulgences for the crusade to Flanders.": Lunt, *Financial Relations of England with the Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 547.

one David Hay, “ordinis fratrum minorum Herefordie.”⁸³ Gaunt was also rather slow to initiate his preaching campaign. He did not publish his bulls until 18 February 1386, and the actual administration of the indulgences did not take place until April.⁸⁴

It is quite likely that John of Gaunt’s crusade did not capture the public attention as the crusade to Flanders had done. However far from reality this may have been, Despenser’s crusade was seen as a defence of the English Church, the kingdom and the pope. In contrast, Gaunt’s crusade could not really have looked like anything but the realisation of a private ambition. It did not even have the novelty value of being the first of its kind in England, and this raises the difficult issue of how far the crusade to Castile was tarnished by the controversy which came to surround the crusade to Flanders. Fraud had been a problem in 1383 and this may have ~~discouraged~~ the indulgence-selling which preceded Gaunt’s crusade. As early as 3 March 1383 the crown had appointed Thomas Savylle and William Kele to investigate the instances of counterfeit bulls being used to trick the faithful.⁸⁵ On 19 July 1383 the crown appointed a commission to arrest those pretending to be Despenser’s collectors.⁸⁶ Fraud inevitably accompanied the indulgence-selling of 1386, on 8 June the crown issued orders for the arrest of those forging bulls and indulgences.⁸⁷ It is difficult to estimate the effect that such fraudulent activity had on the preaching of Gaunt’s crusade. It probably made people more wary in 1386, but fraud was a hazard regularly encountered in medieval life and it did not necessarily reduce the desire for indulgences. A more serious threat to Gaunt’s preaching campaign was the opposition which Despenser’s crusade had aroused. Walsingham noted that Despenser issued special directions to silence

⁸³ *Registrum Johannis Gilbert*, pp. 99-101.

⁸⁴ *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 165; *Patent Rolls*, 1385-9, p. 134.

⁸⁵ *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 149.

⁸⁶ *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 2, 1381-1385 (London, 1897), p. 350.

⁸⁷ *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 179.

those who were voicing their opposition to the crusade.⁸⁸ This criticism had focused on a number of issues, although they did not all apply to Gaunt's crusade. John Gower, for example, was particularly disapproving of the fact that Despenser's crusade had witnessed the clergy taking up arms, and in a marginal note in *Vox Clamantis* he specifically criticised Despenser for leading a crusade on which priests behaved like laymen.⁸⁹ Walsingham also disapproved of the fact that clergy had fought on crusade to Flanders.⁹⁰ This sort of criticism did not apply to John of Gaunt's crusade, as he was not a member of the clergy, and only a small number of clerics fought on his crusade. However, Despenser's crusade had also raised other issues such as the right to crusade against Christians and the sale of indulgences which did have implications for Gaunt's preaching campaign.

The crusade of 1383 had been criticised most vociferously by John Wyclif, who was appalled that it had occurred.⁹¹ One strand of his attack on Despenser's crusade which had a particular bearing on Gaunt's expedition was the issue of indulgences. Indeed, Wyclif had gone so far as to question the whole practice of granting indulgences as he felt that popes were presuming to dispense the will of God.⁹² It is difficult to gauge the impact that Wyclif's work had on those who were buying the indulgences in 1383 or 1386, but he had at least raised the issue of their validity. Wyclif had enjoyed the patronage and protection of Gaunt in the 1370s but this would not have stopped him from attacking the duke's crusade. Wyclif died in 1384, however, and so the expedition to Castile escaped his denunciation. John Gower, another critic of Despenser's crusade, was a Lancastrian retainer, and while he

⁸⁸ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 79.

⁸⁹ *The Major Latin Works of John Gower*, E.W. Stockton, ed. (Seattle, 1962), pp. 267, 392-3.

⁹⁰ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁹¹ See for example, 'Cruciata', *John Wyclif's Polemical Works in Latin*, vol. 2, R. Buddensieg, ed. (London, 1883), pp. 577-632.

⁹² See 'De Pontificum Romanorum Schismate', *Select English Works*, vol. 3, *Miscellaneous Works*, pp. 242-66. This was an issue to which Wyclif returned, see 'The Church and Her Members', *ibid.*, pp. 354, 362.

may have been troubled by Gaunt's crusade, he obviously deemed it prudent to remain silent on the matter. This has meant that there is a lack of extant written criticism of the crusade to Castile, but there is evidence to suggest that it aroused verbal opposition at least. On 12 February 1387, the crown ordered the arrest of John Elys for preaching against Gaunt's indulgence-selling, but since he had been formerly employed by Gaunt to preach his crusade, it is possible that he was motivated by some personal disagreement as much as by conscientious objection to the sale of indulgences.⁹³

There is evidence, however, to suggest that the Lollards were busy preaching against John of Gaunt's crusade in 1386. A fragment of a Carmelite sermon preached in favour of Gaunt's crusade has survived, entitled "Defence of the Crusade Against Objectors." The work in which this extract is to be found was compiled by a Carmelite in the early fifteenth century whose aim was to provide a volume of texts relating to Lollardy. The fragment of the sermon is written in Latin, but it is likely that it was translated into this language from English for insertion into the collection. The tone of the piece and the commonplace biblical examples which the author used suggest that it was part of a model sermon which was to be used by the Carmelites when preaching to the laity, and so was originally written in the vernacular. The fragment provides a truly fascinating insight into the sorts of criticisms which were being raised while Gaunt's crusade was being preached. It is significant that it is to be found in a work relating to Lollardy, as it shows that the Carmelite compiler saw the Lollards as vociferous critics of the crusade. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether this criticism was restricted to the Lollards, or whether it was being expressed by a wider body of the public. It is possible that the Carmelites prepared a defence of the crusade

⁹³ *Patent Rolls, 1385-1389*, p. 319.

because they would be preaching in an area such as the Midlands, which was a stronghold of Lollardy as well as Lancastrian power. Even so, the fragment's existence is enough to show that criticism of the crusade was sufficiently widespread for the Carmelites to go to the trouble of preparing a defence for the preachers of the crusade. It is also interesting that the Carmelites knew the grounds on which the crusade was liable to be attacked. The author of the sermon dealt first with the charge that the Castilians should not be crusaded against because they were Christians, which he rebutted by asserting that the Castilians and other schismatics were destroying the unity of the Church.⁹⁴ It is submitted while that this questioning of the validity of crusading against schismatics was an issue which the Lollards would have raised, it was unlikely to have been a concern of the public at large. Wyclif had been appalled by the crusade to Flanders while the population as a whole seems to have had no such qualms. The Carmelite then moved on to the issue of indulgences and it is clear that criticism had already been encountered on the grounds that they should not be sold.⁹⁵ The Carmelite obviously found this a difficult charge to answer and he justified the sale of indulgences by making an unconvincing distinction between what is obtained *for* money (*pro pecunia*) and what *through* money (*per pecuniam*).⁹⁶ There was obviously concern that the sale of the indulgence looked like simony since the money was being handed over in such a direct way.

⁹⁴ *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*, pp. 508-09.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 510. Here is my translation of the section in which the Carmelite states the argument which has been raised against the sale of indulgences: "As far as indulgences are concerned they say that the indulgences which the pope grants for the furtherance of his crusade are not valid because they have not been given free, as Christ commands in the gospel, saying: 'you have freely taken, freely give'. But they are given for money and so through them simony has been committed because the spiritual has been given for the temporal."

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

In conclusion, both Henry Despenser and John of Gaunt organised sophisticated preaching campaigns in an attempt to raise revenue for their crusades and supplement the grants from Parliament. Urban VI gave both men the power to raise money, in contrast with Clement VII who handed over vast amounts of papal revenue directly to Louis of Anjou to assist in the launching of his crusade to Sicily. Despenser had the greater powers to coerce the clergy to assist in the indulgence-selling and it seems that people were more than willing to purchase the indulgences on offer. John of Gaunt's powers were more limited, as he was a member of the laity, and he relied on his links with the regular and secular clergy to organise his preaching campaign. The chroniclers paid little attention to his efforts, but they were not inconsiderable and they met with some success. Even so, it is likely that Gaunt's preaching campaign was not as successful as the one which had preceded the crusade to Flanders. Gaunt was hampered by the fact that his crusade lacked the intrinsic appeal of Despenser's and the novelty value of having been the first of its kind. Despite the difficulties of interpretation, it would also seem that Gaunt's crusade suffered from the attacks of the Lollards. Gaunt persevered, however, because he needed to supplement the grants from Parliament and the loans from the crown.⁹⁷ Despenser had indentured with the crown to take a certain number of men on crusade, and so the bishop was aiming at recruiting crusaders through his preaching campaign, since he needed both men and money to make his crusade viable. John of Gaunt, as the leader of the largest retinue in England, already possessed the skeleton of his crusading force, but he needed the money to pay for it. The armies which the

⁹⁷ Despite the income generated from his extensive holdings, Gaunt's expenses were high, particularly for the maintenance of his retinue, and financial security arguably came only after the treaty of Bayonne. Walker argued that Gaunt's annuities to his retainers took £3,500 out of an estate income of £11,000: S. Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity, 1361-1399* (Oxford, 1990), p. 20.

two men raised for their crusades are in part a reflection of the success of their preaching campaigns and they will be analysed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CRUSADE ARMIES OF 1383 AND 1386

The historian rarely has the chance to analyse the composition of a late fourteenth-century army or the means by which it was recruited. As far as English forces are concerned, the Muster Rolls for the period have seldom survived, and the accounts of the chroniclers or the chance preservation of subcontracts are all too often the only source for the identification of individuals. It is fortunate that rather more information is available concerning the combatants on the crusades to Flanders and Castile. In 1383 and 1386, hundreds of men preparing to join the crusades of Henry Despenser and John of Gaunt took out letters of protection and general attorney before they set sail, and copies of these documents have survived. This has allowed many more of those who served on the crusades to Flanders and Castile to be identified than is usually possible, and it has provided the basis for the following discussion of the composition of the crusade armies and the means by which they were recruited. Despenser's force is revealed to have been a heterogeneous mix of civilians, clerics and military personnel, and it was clearly a more complex company than the inexperienced mob which it has been remembered as.¹ Surprisingly, John of Gaunt's force also contained civilians, although probably not in the same numbers as Despenser's crusading army. Gaunt's army contained fewer clerics, and a much larger number of knights

¹ Wrong remarked that the army was "...composed largely of parish priests, of monks, and of friars.": Wrong, *The Crusade of 1383, Known as That of the Bishop of Norwich*, p. 61.

and esquires. The captains or company leaders formed the core of Despenser's force, and it will be suggested that the bishop drew upon his association with Sir William Elmham in order to recruit these men. The core of John of Gaunt's force was the ducal retinue, which provided a strong element of continuity with the previous armies which the duke had raised. Thus the crusade armies of 1383 and 1386 emerge as a blend of recognisable contract army of the type typical at the end of the fourteenth century, combined with an element of voluntary civilian crusaders which made these forces unique to the Schism.

Before proceeding to relate the findings on these two armies, a brief discussion of the evidence upon which much of the research has been based is necessary. The letters of protection and general attorney which were taken out by crusaders before the crusades to Flanders and Castile provided the starting point for the investigation of the two armies.² Letters of protection were issued by the crown to those who requested them and they safeguarded the recipient's possessions while he was away on campaign. A *volumus* clause was often added, which gave judicial protection from litigation for a specified period, usually one year.³ Particularly wealthy individuals would also take out letters of general attorney which were the corollary to letters of protection, since they allowed the recipient to name people who would act in his interests while he was out of the country. The commander of a force would usually submit a list to the Chancellor of the names of those taking part on his expedition who had requested letters of protection and attorney.⁴ It is interesting that in 1383 and 1386, men who presumably already enjoyed the protection afforded by their status

² The names of those who took out letters of protection and general attorney for the crusades of 1383 and 1386 are to be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. Those who have been recorded as participating on either of the crusades from other sources have also been included.

³ Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, p. 166.

⁴ A.E. Prince, 'The Indenture System Under Edward III', *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, J.G. Edwards, V.H. Galbraith, E.F. Jacobs, eds. (Manchester, 1933), p. 296.

as *crucesignati* were taking out letters of protection and general attorney to safeguard their interests while they were away. However, this^{is} an issue with significant implications which will be discussed in more depth in the conclusion.

Copies of these letters of protection and attorney have been recorded in the Treaty Rolls (formerly the *Rotuli Francorum*) held in the PRO, and they have yielded 562 names for the crusade to Flanders 1383 and 452 for the crusade to Castile.⁵ Of course, the letters of protection and general attorney can only provide a limited amount of information, both about the individuals themselves and the crusades on which they were serving. By definition, a person taking out these letters would have something to protect, and since the crown did not issue them for free, he would also have to possess the money to purchase them.⁶ As a result, letters of protection and general attorney were purchased by the upper elements of the men-at-arms in an army, as the common footsoldiers and archers were too low in the social scale to have afforded (or needed) to request them. These letters are far from perfect even as a record of those who purchased them, as there appears to have been no consistency in the detail which was recorded about the individual. They always provided the recipient's name, of course, but on occasion they also gave his place of origin and his status or occupation. It must have been the recipient who added these extra details voluntarily as they were obviously not systematically demanded by those issuing the letters. This extra information, in particular a person's social status, is vital if those taking out letters of protection and attorney are not to remain mere names, and the fact that it was not demanded or recorded systematically is a cause for regret. It is also the case that the issuing

⁵ See Appendix 1, pp. 226-48; Appendix 2, pp. 249-67.

⁶ It is not known how much letters of protection cost in the late fourteenth century, but the Bishop of Ely was charged twenty *marks* for letters of protection and general attorney in 1259: Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, p. 165, n. 46.

of such letters does not prove that a person went on the expedition for which he received them, but only that he appeared to be preparing to go. A number of men took out letters of protection in 1383 and 1386 to avoid prosecution for debt and had no intention of going on crusade. However, these people had their protection revoked by the crown since they had not left the country, and these revocations have been recorded in the Patent Rolls.⁷ A few people undoubtedly slipped through the net and took out letters of protection and general attorney which were not revoked even though they did not go on the expedition. It is submitted that the numbers of people in this position were small, and would not affect the findings to any significant extent. Despite their obvious limitations, the letters of protection and general attorney are by far the largest surviving source for the two crusades and they provide an invaluable starting point in reconstructing at least a proportion of the armies of 1383 and 1386. On 8 May 1383, the crown ordered a muster of Despenser's army at Sandwich and at Calais, but there is no evidence that these instructions were ever carried out.⁸ Similarly, there would have been at one time a record of the muster of Lancastrian forces, probably taken at Plymouth where John of Gaunt's crusade army was gathered, but this is no longer extant. Gaunt's crusaders were doubtless paid through the ducal administration, but nothing more than the occasional record of payment survives.⁹

Of the 562 men who have been identified as crusaders in 1383, the status or occupation of 168 is known. There were at least fifty-one knights on the crusade to Flanders, twenty-three esquires, forty-one members of the clergy (regular and secular) and

⁷ See below, pp. 52-3.

⁸ For the order for the muster at Calais, see C76/67 m. 6. Thomas Credenche and William Howelot were to go to Sandwich and observe "...de numeris et forma hominum ad arma et aliorum.": E403/496 (5). Despenser admitted in his impeachment that he had not arranged a muster at Calais: *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 154.

⁹ Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal*, p. 406. See the payment received by Sir John Marmyon below as one of the few records of the payment of the crusaders in 1386.

fifty-three civilians. For these figures to have any significance they need to be set in context, and an estimate must be provided of the total number of men-at-arms who accompanied Henry Despenser on the crusade.¹⁰ Despenser indentured with the crown to provide 2,500 men-at-arms and 2,500 archers, but he did not manage to raise a force of this size since this was one of the charges brought against him in his impeachment on returning to England.¹¹ In his defence, Despenser claimed that by the time the army reached Ypres it was over 5,000 strong, but this was once reinforcements had arrived from England.¹² There can be little doubt that Despenser did go to Flanders with fewer than 2,500 men-at-arms, and for the crown to have made it an article of impeachment the number was probably significantly below this figure. It is submitted that the bishop left England with a force of approximately 1,500 men-at-arms and a similar number of archers. This means that the 562 crusaders for whom a record of their participation on the expedition to Flanders has survived represent about one third of the total men-at-arms in the force. As these men have been traced mainly from the letters of protection and general attorney which they took out, what has survived is a record of the top third of the men-at-arms in socio-economic terms. Thus the 168 crusaders for whom an occupation or status can be provided is roughly the top one tenth of the men-at-arms on the crusade.

Of the 452 men who were serving on the crusade to Castile in 1386, the status or occupation of 256 has been recorded. Thus the group is slightly smaller than that for Despenser's crusade, but information has survived for a larger proportion of them. Of these

¹⁰ The term 'men-at-arms' is being used as a generic one in this chapter to refer to all the combatants on the crusades to Flanders and Castile who were not archers, and not just to the knights and esquires who served on these crusades.

¹¹ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, pp. 147, 153-4. No record of Despenser's indenture with the crown survives, but one almost certainly existed: Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, p. 221.

¹² *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 154.

256 men, 118 were knights and eighty-seven were esquires, significantly more than those recorded on Despenser's crusade, and drawn from a smaller number of letters of protection and attorney. Since Gaunt was one of the crown's most experienced commanders and possessed the largest magnate retinue in the country, such a large number of knights and esquires is to be expected, and was a feature of all the forces which he raised. However, it is interesting that thirty-eight of the men for whom the letters of protection and general attorney have provided an occupation were civilians and thirteen were clerics. This suggests that like Despenser's army, John of Gaunt's force contained a proportion of civilians and clerics who served as crusading combatants. The findings will be discussed in more detail below, but once again the numbers of those recorded as taking out letters of protection and general attorney should be set in the context of the total number of men-at-arms on the crusade to Castile. In 1382 Gaunt had asked Parliament to find the money to pay for 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers, and although he did not receive as much money as he had hoped, it is likely that he managed to raise the number of men which he had originally intended.¹³ If it is assumed that Gaunt did take the 2,000 men-at-arms which he had proposed, then the 452 names which have survived represents just under one quarter of this force. The 256 men on the crusade to Castile for whom an occupation has been given is thus about one eighth of the 2,000 men-at-arms, roughly similar to the one tenth that the 168 men with a recorded status or occupation on the crusade to Flanders represents. Although the examination of the forces which served in Flanders and Castile is limited to a select group in each case, the results have proved revealing and the labour worthwhile.

The presence of large numbers of civilians and clergy among those taking out letters of protection and attorney for the crusade to Flanders needs to be examined. In order to

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

make his offer of a crusade to Flanders as attractive as possible, Henry Despenser had contracted with the crown to provide a force of 2,500 men-at-arms and 2,500 archers.¹⁴ The bishop had set himself a difficult task as this was a substantial force, and even a great magnate such as John of Gaunt would have struggled to raise an army of this size.¹⁵ As Despenser was not a lay magnate he did not have a military retinue, and so he did not possess a body of men which could form the core for his force. He also refused to have a secular lieutenant on the crusade and this denied him the opportunity to make use of another's retinue. The pool of military manpower had been restricted by the crown, which had excluded members of the king's household and stipulated that no-one from a magnate's retinue could go on the crusade without his lord's permission.¹⁶ If he was going to find 2,500 men-at-arms, Despenser would have to use his preaching campaign to try and encourage those who did not normally go to war, namely civilians and clerics, to take the Cross. This would help to keep the costs of the crusade low, since most of the expense of raising a force was in the wages which were paid, often in advance, to the troops. Civilians could be paid at a lower rate than knights and esquires, and while there is no record of what this rate might have been, it was probably close to that paid to the archers. It is possible that members of the clergy who went on the crusade were not paid anything at all, especially members of the regular clergy, who were supposed to hold everything in common. The

¹⁴ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 147.

¹⁵ John of Gaunt took about 3,000 men to Scotland in 1385 for example: Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy', p. 17.

¹⁶ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 148. The crown probably took these steps as an expedition to be led by Richard II was also being considered, but there was also some unease at allowing the crusade to go ahead. Michael de la Pole possibly tried to cancel the crusade before it set sail: E403/493 (13); Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 88.

“Ordinances for the Preaching of the Crusade” printed by Knighton show that it was expected that some people would take the Cross rather than purchase the indulgence.¹⁷

The letters of protection reveal that Despenser’s crusade and preaching campaign attracted civilians, and it is likely that they were present in large numbers on the crusade.¹⁸ Fifty-three crusaders who took out letters of protection in 1383 can be described as ‘civilians’ in the sense that they were engaged in non-military occupations, and it is submitted that the actual number of civilians in Despenser’s force was several times greater than this. Since a person’s status was not recorded automatically, there may have been many who took out letters of protection or attorney in 1383 but did not bother to state their occupation. It is likely that there were also many civilians who took the Cross in 1383 but were too poor to take out protection, or did not feel it necessary. With the information available it is difficult to estimate how many civilians were in Despenser’s force, but the number quite conceivably ran into hundreds. Medieval armies had always contained artisans who supplied goods to the army, but the number of civilians recorded in 1383 and the variety of trades in which they were engaged suggests very strongly that these men were going on crusade as part of the fighting force. Despite the reservations which he may have had, Despenser needed civilians to take the Cross if he was to amass the 2,500 men-at-arms which he had indentured to provide. The fifty-three civilians were clearly men of differing social status, from merchants to travellingmen, but they all possessed enough wealth to take out letters of protection, and they had been allowed to go on the crusade. Despenser tried to ensure that there was at least some discretion exercised when choosing those civilians

¹⁷ *Knighton’s Chronicle*, p. 333. The Ordinances stated that a person who had promised to go on the crusade in person was to come before the bishop or his deputy to make indentures of service.

¹⁸ Indeed, the letters of protection and general attorney have been the only source for the identification of individual civilians on the crusade of 1383 as they were too lowly to be identified by the chroniclers.

who would serve on the expedition. The “Ordinances” printed by Knighton mentioned that if a person wanted to send another on the crusade in his place, he should ensure that he was a suitable combatant who would not be turned down at the muster.¹⁹ There were probably many civilians who wished to go on the crusade, but were deemed physically unsuitable by the receivers, who encouraged them to pay for someone to go in their place or to purchase the indulgence. There is evidence that Despenser also found some people unacceptable in terms of their social status. He requested that the letters of protection which had been issued to a brewer, Roger Bedford, be cancelled, because he did not deem him suitable on account of his “low degree.”²⁰

The fifty-three civilians who did take out letters of protection before going on the crusade to Flanders were engaged in a variety of occupations, including that of merchant, taverner, fishmonger, tailor and chandler.²¹ These were all essentially urban trades, and it is notable that those civilians who had their place of residence recorded in their letters of protection were from towns. This may be a reflection of the fact that Despenser’s preaching campaign had focused upon the urban centres, but there were doubtless other factors involved. Townsmen were more likely than country dwellers to have possessed the economic status which would make the purchase of protection necessary, and it is also possible that Despenser and his receivers found them more acceptable as crusaders and fighters than members of the peasantry. Twenty-five of these fifty-three artisan crusaders came from London, and ten were citizens of the city, reflecting the centrality of the capital to

¹⁹ *Knighton’s Chronicle*, p. 333. It is to be doubted whether a muster was held at Sandwich, however, and the bishop admitted that one had not been organised at Calais.

²⁰ Coulborn, *The Economic and Political Preliminaries of the Crusade of Henry Despenser*, p. 235. See *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 240, for the revocation of Roger’s protection, in which he was also described as a citizen of London. This is interesting, as it would suggest that Roger was of a similar standing to the fifty-three people who have been recorded as taking out letters of protection and for whom no revocations have been discovered. Perhaps there was another reason why Despenser did not want him on the crusade.

²¹ See Appendix 1, pp. 227-9.

Despenser's crusade.²² This bias was partly due to the fact that the more wealthy artisans lived in the capital and they were the ones who could afford to take out letters of protection and would consider it necessary. The prominence of these London artisans also suggests the influence of John Philpott, who was heavily involved in the crusade and doubtless used his influence to raise support for it. He ferried a large number of London apprentices over to Flanders once the crusade had commenced,²³ and he was probably played a role in the initial recruitment. Like Despenser, Philpott knew that civilians were needed if the crusade was going to be viable, and he may have had some sympathy with the merchants and other London artisans who wanted to participate, since he was himself an ennobled artisan who had seen military action.²⁴ However, the presence of civilians on the crusade was not down to Philpott's efforts alone. Artisans joined the crusade whose trades were grouped in the victualling and non-victualling guilds, and the expedition's popularity clearly cut across the divisions in London's economic and political life. The crusade had a national appeal, however, and while almost half the civilians recorded as taking out protection for the crusade were from London, this was not the only town represented. Civilians also came from York, Newark and Coventry and there was similar diversity among those crusaders who took out protection but did not provide their status or occupation.²⁵ It is likely that this is a reflection of the total number of civilians on Despenser's crusade; a significant proportion were from London, but many other towns of England were represented.

²² *Ibid.*, A further ten crusaders whose occupation was not stated were recorded as being from London.

²³ For the apprentices, see Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 95.

²⁴ In 1378 Philpott had fitted out ships in order to drive off pirates in the Channel who were damaging trade, and his operation was successful, much to the resentment of the magnates: Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 1, pp. 370-1.

²⁵ Appendix 1, pp. 227-8.

It is notable that a proportion of the fifty-three civilians were from trades associated with the cloth industry, including four drapers, three mercers, two dyers, five tailors and two woolmongers.²⁶ While it cannot be assumed that the recent French disruption of the movement of wool to Flanders in 1382 had particularly influenced these people to take the Cross, it is possible that some of these men (in particular the two woolmongers) joined the crusade in order to intervene directly in the hope of restoring stability to the export of English wool. Indeed, it is quite likely that there were more woolmongers on the crusade for whom there is no record. Not all the artisans who took out letters of protection joined the crusade to protect their livelihoods, however. The five taverners, the hosteler and the fishmonger at least were probably going on the crusade because it was a rare chance to fight in an army and travel overseas.²⁷ There were also a number who may have seen an opportunity to combine the activities of their trade with fighting on crusade, such as the armourers, Egidius Fleshhewer (!) and John Millward.²⁸ The variety of possible motives for joining the crusade of 1383 among civilians reveals something of the extent of the appeal of the expedition to Flanders. Artisans were not given the chance to fight in the secular campaigns of the period and the age of mass participation in crusading had long passed. The majority of the population were not members of Parliament or connected with the organs of government, and they felt that they had virtually no influence on the political decisions made in London. This was particularly galling for the wealthy middle classes as they were the ones helping to finance a war which since the 1370s had not been going well. In 1383 these people were given the chance to take part in a royal expedition which hitherto they had only provided taxes for. This opportunity to participate and shape events rather than reacting to

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

them was attractive enough, but there were added incentives. Those serving in Flanders were to be paid wages, and even more important was the fact that the expedition was also a crusade, and those who participated would receive the plenary indulgence. It is not possible to isolate a particular factor, but the crusade to Flanders clearly offered the English people several extremely attractive and novel opportunities. Whatever the reality of the situation, people were led to believe that they were being given the chance to fight for the economic well-being of the country, and to strike a blow against France. The preaching campaign would have stressed that those going on the crusade would be fighting for the crown, the Church, the 'English' pope, and for God. In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why people flocked to take the Cross and purchase the indulgences on offer in 1383.

It would seem that a certain element were also attracted by the immunity offered by the letters of protection and attorney. The Patent Rolls contain records of people who had had their letters of protection revoked because they had obtained them in order to avoid being pursued for debt. John Geywood of Norwich, for example, received letters of protection for the crusade but then had his status revoked on 18 June 1383 because he had obtained it "in fraud of his creditors."²⁹ Hugh Heriherde had his protection revoked since he had obtained letters "...fraudulently to exclude John Lilebone, knight, of the county of Wilts. from an action for land."³⁰ Those who took the Cross did so on an individual basis or at most with a few friends or relatives, and so they had to be assimilated into the crusading force. Since Despenser had no retinue of his own, it is likely that he took many of the

²⁹ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 279.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-1. For other revocations of protection for similar reasons and others unspecified see *ibid.*, pp. 211, 219, 222, 224, 225, 233, 238, 239, 240, 242, 277, 290, 292, 298, 300, 303, 306, 318, 319, 326, 342, 366.

civilians in his company, but this was not always the case. The letters of protection received by Thomas Brome, a tailor, specifically stated that he would be going on the crusade in the company of Sir Hugh Calveley.³¹ Calveley was not usually in the habit of recruiting tailors as part of his contingent, and so it must be assumed that Brome had taken the Cross and had been assigned to Calveley by Despenser.

There were thirty-eight civilians who took out letters of protection before going on John of Gaunt's crusade to Castile.³² This compares reasonably closely with the fifty-three for Despenser's crusade, bearing in mind that the sample group for the expedition to Flanders was about one-fifth larger than that for the crusade to Castile. Once again, it is quite likely that there were more civilians than the thirty-eight for whom the occupations have been recorded on Gaunt's crusade, as some may not have bothered to state their occupations, or to take out letters of protection at all. This presence of a significant number of civilians is rather surprising since John of Gaunt was not as desperate to raise men as Despenser had been. He had spent the previous twenty years raising forces for the crown, using the ducal retinue as the core of his army. In 1382 Gaunt had asked Parliament for money to pay for a force of 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers, a smaller force than Despenser had indentured with the crown to provide, and one which it was within Gaunt's means to raise.³³ Gaunt does not seem to have indentured with the crown to raise his force and so there was no pressure on him to find the men, except in terms of his own ambitions for Castile. Gaunt was surely not keen on recruiting civilians as part of the fighting force since he was used to leading seasoned professionals, and he would have to pay the civilians wages which he doubtless considered better spent on trusted men-at-arms. It is also the case

³¹ Appendix 1, p. 227.

³² Appendix 2, pp. 249-50.

³³ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 114.

that Gaunt wanted to take the most impressive army that he could afford to Castile. This was partly to maintain his dignity as a royal prince, but there were also practical reasons. Gaunt had fought in Spain before, and he knew that the terrain and climate would make for a harsh campaign. He could not hope to win the crown (if this was his aim) or to extract a favourable treaty from John I with an army of commoners who had no experience of the rigours of campaigning. Despite these considerations, there were certainly civilians on the crusade and an explanation of their presence is needed. It could be suggested that these civilians were not in fact part of the fighting force, and it is notable that there were a significant number whose trades were of direct use on campaign. For example, there were two saddlers, a bowyer, a fletcher, and an armourer among those taking out letters of protection in 1386.³⁴ There was also a painter, John Alybon, who may have been employed designing armorial bearings for the duke.³⁵ However, the majority of those civilians recorded as taking out protection for the crusade were artisans whose occupations were useful to the army only in the general sense that their trades were useful to all men. Thus there was a brewer, William Robyn (a member of whose trade Despenser had refused to have on crusade), a fishmonger, a goldsmith, a taverner and several tailors and drapers, all preparing to go to Castile.³⁶ It is submitted that such a diverse group could not all have been going as non-combatants, and at the very least the crusade provided an opportunity for these people to practise their trade and take part in the fighting.

It is interesting that the civilians taking out protection for the crusades to Flanders and Castile were broadly similar in socio-economic terms. In 1386 the civilians were once again urban artisans, and there was a similar difference of status within the group, from the

³⁴ Appendix 2, pp. 249-50.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-50.

skinner Richard Clare to the merchants John atte Fen and John Wye.³⁷ A large proportion of the civilians in 1386 came from London, with sixteen out of the thirty-eight specifically recorded as from the city, which compares quite closely with the figures for the civilians recorded on Despenser's crusade.³⁸ This further underlines the fact that the greatest proportion of richer artisans who needed protection for their possessions were from the capital. The prominence of London artisans among the civilians preparing for the crusade to Castile also suggests that the preaching of the crusade was concentrated there, and the population of the city was doubtless well aware of John of Gaunt's planned crusade. There was also a similar proportion of citizens among the civilians who took out protection in 1383 and 1386, with eight out of thirty-eight possessing this status, seven of them citizens of London.³⁹ Gaunt saw the presence of a strictly limited number of civilians as the unavoidable result of having his expedition granted the status of a crusade, and he was prepared to countenance the involvement of a limited number of civilians. It was considered too much of a risk to refuse to accept all those who wanted to take the Cross, as there was a strong chance that consequently the preaching campaign would be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to make money. However, even if Gaunt accepted that some civilians would have to be allowed on the crusade, he must have managed to keep the number who participated quite small, since chroniclers such as Knighton and Walsingham made no mention of their presence. Indeed, the expedition to Castile was characterised by the quality of the military personnel in the force; the author of the *Eulogium Historiarum* remarked, for example, that Gaunt embarked for Spain "cum magna juventute militari."⁴⁰ Although the

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Eulogium Historiarum*, vol. 3, p. 359.

crusade to Castile lacked the broad appeal of the expedition to Flanders, the presence of civilians among those receiving letters of protection in 1386 reveals that there was interest in participating on the crusade rather than purchasing the indulgence. John of Gaunt was the crown's foremost military commander, and despite his unpopularity in some quarters, there were probably many civilians who relished the chance to serve on one of his campaigns. As in 1383, the crusade to Castile possessed the added attraction of wages and the crusade indulgence. It can also be argued that the crusade to Castile gave the populace the chance to take direct action in foreign policy once more. While there was no disguising the fact that the crusade represented little more than Gaunt's personal ambition for the throne of Castile, the Castilian fleet had been the scourge of the southern coast in the 1370s and its activities had created a climate of insecurity which had reached as far inland as the Thames. Perhaps civilians saw the crusade as a chance to secure the Channel in the face of Castilian and French naval activity, and this could help to explain the presence of a draper from Great Yarmouth and the prominence of London artisans on the crusade.⁴¹

The letters of protection and general attorney reveal that the crusade to Flanders appealed to the clergy for whom the chance to acquire the plenary indulgence and to fight overseas were powerful incentives. Urban VI had specifically allowed the clergy to go on the crusade without the permission of their superiors in *Dudum cum filii belial*, and this produced a lively response.⁴² The forty-one members of the clergy who can be identified as such from the letters of protection and other sources are likely to have been only the tip of the iceberg.⁴³ As in the case of the civilians, not all those clerics who took out protection for the crusade to Flanders would have given their status, and there were probably many

⁴¹ Appendix 2, pp. 249-50.

⁴² *Wykeham's Register*, vol. 2, p. 208.

⁴³ Appendix 1, pp. 229-30.

more members of the clergy who did not bother to take out letters of protection or general attorney at all. Indeed, it is likely that fewer clerics took out protection compared with civilians as they did not enjoy the same levels of wealth. The regular clergy in particular were only supposed to hold possessions in common, and so lesser members of monastic orders probably had little need of royal protection. There is some evidence that this was the case, as there is no record of the monks whom Walsingham named from his order as going on the crusade to Flanders having taken out letters of protection or general attorney.

The letters of protection reveal that Despenser's expedition had attracted a cross section of both the secular and regular clergy. Among the secular clergy who took out letters of protection in 1383 were ten chaplains, eight parsons, three vicars, a rector, and an archdeacon.⁴⁴ From the regular clergy, three priors took out letters of protection, and Walsingham added the names of several Benedictines.⁴⁵ Although the information is limited, it appears that the geographical distribution of the clergy who took out letters of protection for the crusade was more widespread than that of the known civilians. Many of the civilians were from London, but the capital had no such prominence among members of the clergy. Perhaps this has no particular significance, but the fact that London clerics did not form a majority would suggest that the crusade to Flanders appealed to the clergy on different terms compared to the civilians. The lives of the clergy were even more restricted than those of civilians and for many clerics the crusade to Flanders represented a rare opportunity to travel (and to fight) overseas. In particular, the regular clergy were offered a chance to escape from the confines of the cloister and to serve God on an expedition overseas, with or without the consent of their superiors. Despenser was probably happy to have members of

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

the clergy on his crusade as they could perform a variety of functions such as hearing confession, granting absolution, leading the saying of prayers on the campaign and providing burial services. They had been given permission by Urban VI to take part in the fighting and since Despenser was himself a warrior prelate, this was presumably a trait which he acknowledged in other members of the clergy. Indeed, it is quite possible that Despenser identified more closely with the clerics on the crusade than he did with the artisans from London and elsewhere. The presence of the clergy on the expedition to Flanders was noted by a number of chroniclers including Walsingham and the author of the *Eulogium Historiarum*, and by critics of the expedition such as Wyclif and John Gower.⁴⁶ Their comments reveal that the clergy were fighting on the crusade, and the fact that they had attracted so much attention suggests that they were on the expedition to Flanders in fairly large numbers, certainly more than the forty-one whose names have been recorded.

There were also a number of clerics among those who took out letters of protection and attorney before participating on the crusade to Castile in 1386. Of the 256 men for whom a status or occupation has been recorded, thirteen were members of the clergy.⁴⁷ It is possible that there were more who did not give their status when they took out letters of protection or even bother to purchase them, and so the total on the crusade to Castile was almost certainly higher. It has already been suggested in the context of the crusade to Flanders that it is likely that fewer members of the clergy would have needed to take out

⁴⁶ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416; *Eulogium Historiarum*, vol. 3, pp. 356, 357. In *Vox Clamantis*, which was written shortly after the crusade to Flanders, Gower remarked: "If it is good for the clergy to win triumph for itself in battle, then what good are the deeds of a valiant knight?": *The Major Latin Works of John Gower*, Stockton, ed., p. 126. Wyclif was similarly scathing of warlike clerics; in his 'Grete Sentence of Curs Expounded' of 1383, he wrote: "...what mirroure of mekenesse is this, that bischopis and prestis, monkis chanons and freris, that schulden be meke and pacient and lambren among wolvys bi techyng of Crist, ben more proudly arraied in armer and othere costis of werris, and more cruel in here owene cause than ony othere lord or tiraunt.": *Select English Works*, vol. 3, *Miscellaneous Works*, pp. 295-6.

⁴⁷ Appendix 2, p. 251.

letters of protection compared with the artisans, and this applies equally to those going on the crusade to Castile. Even so, it is notable that the number specifically recorded as members of the clergy in the letters of protection in 1386 is less than half that recorded for the crusade to Flanders. This may have no significance since the numbers involved are all relatively small, but it is possible to offer another interpretation. It may be the case that the thirteen clerics recorded as going on the crusade to Castile represent the majority of the clergy on the crusade. It is striking that none of the chroniclers mention any members of the clergy as having been on the crusade to Castile, and so their numbers were obviously small enough to avoid attracting attention. The clergy had not been given permission by Urban VI to take part in Gaunt's crusade and so it is unlikely that they flocked to join the expedition as they had done in 1383. It is interesting in this respect that the thirteen names which have been recorded were all members of the secular clergy. The secular and regular clergy had been allowed to go on the crusade to Flanders, but in 1386 both needed the permission of their superiors. It is likely that this made it more difficult for the regular clergy to go on Gaunt's crusade, as their lives were more closely supervised and their superiors probably refused to give their consent. This also gave John of Gaunt more power over who joined the crusade from the clergy; he could not easily refuse civilians who wished to take the Cross, but he could refuse members of the clergy by pointing out that in the absence of any authorisation from Urban VI, only their superiors could allow them to leave. Gaunt did need a few clerics in his army to perform the services associated with their profession, and he was probably even prepared to allow them to take part in the fighting. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that this was the case. Edward Langham, cleric, was granted letters of protection to go on the crusade to Castile, and even though they were revoked

when he failed to leave England, he was supposed to have gone in the company of Sir Thomas Morieux, one of Gaunt's marshals.⁴⁸ This suggests that Langham had taken the Cross and had been assigned to Morieux's company as a combatant. While Gaunt wanted the clergy to carry out their duties on the crusade, he probably did not encourage them to take the Cross, and their numbers on the crusade to Castile were probably rather small compared with the contingent on Despenser's expedition.

An analysis of the knights and esquires who participated on the crusade to Flanders has proved especially interesting. The Treaty Rolls and other sources have provided the names of fifty-one knights⁴⁹ and twenty-three esquires.⁵⁰ The fifty-one knights almost certainly represent a higher proportion of the total number of knights who were going on the crusade to Flanders than the fifty-three civilians and forty-one clergy who have been identified as such. It is unlikely that knights going on the crusade to Flanders would have failed to take out letters of protection as theirs was the social group for which the safeguard was devised. There is some evidence, however, that some of the crusaders in the 562 names collected were in fact knights and were not recorded as such. William Chaworth, for example, took out letters of protection for the crusade and no extra details about him were provided.⁵¹ John Haneberk also took out letters of protection for the crusade, and in his entry it was specifically stated that he was going in the company of William Chaworth, knight.⁵² There were also several crusaders who were described as the sons and heirs of knights, suggesting that if they were not yet knights at the time they took out the protection,

⁴⁸ For the letters of protection, issued 29 May 1386, see C76/70 m. 11. For the revocation on 20 June see *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 164.

⁴⁹ Appendix 1, pp. 230-2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 240.

they would be in the future.⁵³ The number of esquires who took out letters of protection in 1383 is less than half the number of knights and this is probably not a true reflection of their strength on the crusade. Armies in this period tended to have more esquires than knights and it is likely that each of the knights who took out protection in 1383 brought one esquire at least. Fewer esquires would have taken out letters of protection because of their lower status, and it is submitted that there were possibly around several hundred on the crusade to Flanders.

Walsingham was a keen supporter of Despenser's crusade, and he reproached the knights of England for not taking part in the expedition.⁵⁴ It is submitted that his comments along with the presence of civilians and clergy, has led the force of 1383 to be regarded as something of a rabble. The evidence from the letters of protection and attorney proves that this was not entirely the case. Despenser managed to enlist at least fifty-one knights and at least as many esquires, despite the fact that magnates had to give their permission before they allowed members of their retinues to go on the crusade. It has been suggested that in the armies of the 1370s and 1380s, less than ten per cent of a force of men-at-arms would have been knights, and so in this context the number on Despenser's crusade was low but probably not unusually so.⁵⁵ It also has to be remembered that the later fourteenth century has been recognised as a period when the number of knights serving in expeditions was declining.⁵⁶ Among the knights serving on the crusade to Flanders were men of high quality, both in terms of their social standing and military expertise. In particular, the letters of protection and attorney allow the identification of a number of the captains or company

⁵³ See the entry for Robert Poyntz: *ibid.*, p. 232.

⁵⁴ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 104.

⁵⁵ A. Ayton, 'English Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War', *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, A. Curry, M. Hughes, eds. (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 29-30.

⁵⁶ M. Prestwich, 'Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War', *TRHS*, 6th ser., vol. 5 (1995), pp. 202-03.

leaders on the crusade to Flanders.⁵⁷ The figure of the highest standing was probably John Lord Beaumont, but while he was a tenant-in-chief of the crown and commanded a force on the crusade, he had only recently come into his majority and was a man with little campaigning experience.⁵⁸ His military career lay ahead of him in 1383: he was to become a Knight of the Garter and hold the posts of Admiral to the North, Keeper of Carlisle castle, Constable of Dover castle and Warden of the Cinque Ports, before his death in 1396.⁵⁹ Beaumont was something of an exception, however, and on the whole Despenser's captains in 1383 were already mature fighters and experienced company leaders. An examination of the careers and connections of the most prominent of these captains has proved very revealing, especially in terms of their recruitment and how they raised their own contingents.

Taking the captains for whom the surviving records allow examination, Sir Hugh Calveley, Sir Thomas Trivet, Sir William Elmham, Sir Richard Grene, Sir Henry Ferrers and Sir Richard Redeman were all members of the lesser nobility who earned their living as professional soldiers.⁶⁰ Several of these men had established their reputations fighting as independent company leaders on the continent. However, none had ever fought against their sovereign; Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir William Elmham, for example, had left Henry of Trastamara's army in 1366 once it became clear that the Black Prince was bringing a force to Spain.⁶¹ Indeed, all the captains mentioned above had spent the greater part of their

⁵⁷ The captains on the crusade have been indicated: Appendix 1, p. 226.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁵⁹ Beaumont was Admiral to the North in 1391: *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 4, 1389-1392 (London, 1922), p. 235. He was keeper of Carlisle castle at around the same time: *ibid.*, p. 124. He was appointed constable of Dover and Warden of the Cinque ports on 5 March 1393 on the death of his stepfather, Sir John Devereux: *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 5, 1392-1396 (London, 1925), p. 58.

⁶⁰ Appendix 1, pp. 231-2.

⁶¹ J.C. Bridge, 'Two Cheshire Soldiers of Fortune of the Fourteenth Century: Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir Robert Knolles', *Journal of the Architectural, Archaeological and Historical Society for Chester and North Wales*, n.s., vol. 14 (1908), p. 131. On Calveley, see also K. Fowler, 'L'Emploi des mercenaires par les pouvoirs ibériques et l'intervention militaire anglaise en Espagne (vers 1361 vers 1379)', *Realidad e imagenes del poder*, Adeline Rucquoi (Valladolid, 1988), p. 32.

careers serving the crown. Calveley in particular was one of the most celebrated knights of his day, having been in arms for almost forty years by 1383. His career seems to have begun in Brittany in the mid 1340s with another famous Cheshire soldier of fortune, Sir Robert Knolles. Calveley was the veteran of many English campaigns in France and in 1382 he was captain of Cherbourg, being relieved of this post in order to participate on the crusade to Flanders.⁶² Sir William Elmham had also enjoyed a distinguished and lengthy military career in the wars against France. In 1375 he was governor of Bayonne, in 1382 he was Admiral of the Fleet to the North and was described as a banneret by the time of Despenser's crusade.⁶³ Sir Thomas Trivet was another veteran of the wars with France, having served the Black Prince at Najéra and the Earl of Cambridge in Aquitaine two years later.⁶⁴ Indeed, Trivet had fought under a number of the most distinguished commanders of the period, including Sir Robert Knolles and Sir John Chandos. He served on Thomas Woodstock's expedition to Brittany in 1380 and was made a banneret at Troyes.⁶⁵ He was present on the expedition to Scotland in 1385, and he was appointed Admiral to the West in 1386.⁶⁶ Sir Richard Grene and Sir Richard Redeman had also fought on many of the campaigns in France, the former leading a company at sea in 1373, for example.⁶⁷ Sir Henry Ferrers was about forty-three at the time of the crusade to Flanders, and his military career was similar to

⁶² E403/493 (16).

⁶³ Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369-1380', *EHR*, vol. 79 (1964), p. 734; *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, Edward III, vol. 16, 1374-1377 (London, 1916), p. 127. For Elmham as Admiral see *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 2, 1381-85 (London, 1920), p. 34. For Elmham as a banneret see Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 10, p. 222.

⁶⁴ For Trivet at Najéra see Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., *Chroniques*, vol. 7 (1364-1370) (Bruxelles, 1869), p. 214. For details of Trivet's career, see *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 57, S. Lee, ed. (London, 1899), pp. 236-7.

⁶⁵ Trivet was made a banneret on the field at Troyes: Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions', p. 738.

⁶⁶ For Trivet in Scotland see Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions', p. 734. For Trivet as Admiral to the South and West see *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 188.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 739.

that of Despenser's other captains. Ferrers served in many of Edward III's armies and he had also fought on the *reysen*.⁶⁸

It comes as no surprise to find that several of these men were made king's knights during the course of their careers. Trivet was granted £40 a year by Edward III in 1375 which was raised to £100 a year by Richard II ten years later.⁶⁹ He was deemed to be sufficiently close to the king to have been imprisoned by the Appellants in 1388.⁷⁰ Elmham had been a king's knight since Edward III's reign and he also remained close enough to the crown to join Trivet in the Tower.⁷¹ Grene was granted 100 *marks* a year by Edward III in 1375, and this annuity was continued into the reign of Richard II.⁷² Redeman was a king's knight by 1390, when he was recorded as receiving 40 *marks* a year from the crown.⁷³ Men such as Trivet, Elmham and Beaumont were also leading figures in their counties, serving the crown in a civic capacity as local MPs and on commissions of array and commissions of the peace. Sir Thomas Trivet served on commissions of array for Somerset in 1377 and 1380,⁷⁴ while in 1381 he served on commissions of array and *Oyer* and *Terminer* for Kent.⁷⁵ Sir William Elmham was an MP for Suffolk in 1394 and 1397.⁷⁶ It is notable that the more prominent captains were involved in suppressing the Peasants' Revolt,⁷⁷ and it is clear that

⁶⁸ N.H. Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry*, vol. 2 (London, 1832), p. 445.

⁶⁹ *Patent Rolls*, 1374-1377, p. 181; *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 43. Trivet was described as a king's knight in an entry dated 13 January 1385, but he had presumably achieved this status in the reign of Edward III: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 517.

⁷⁰ *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 3, 1385-1389 (London, 1921), p. 382.

⁷¹ *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Edward III, vol. 13, 1369-1374 (London, 1911), p. 444. This entry shows that Elmham had been a king's knight since at least 1372. For Elmham in the Tower of London, see *Close Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 382.

⁷² *Patent Rolls*, 1374-1377, p. 204; *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 535.

⁷³ *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 4, 1388-1392 (London, 1902), p. 322.

⁷⁴ *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 1, 1377-1381 (London, 1895), pp. 39, 473.

⁷⁵ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 574, 75.

⁷⁶ *Close Rolls*, 1392-1396, p. 278; *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 6, 1396-1399 (London, 1927), p. 135.

⁷⁷ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, pp. 23, 74, 84, 85, for Trivet, Beaumont, Elmham and Courtenay respectively.

they were men of extensive military and civic experience; it was doubtless due to their skill that the crusade to Flanders was initially so successful.

In the Parliament of the spring of 1383 Despenser had promised the crown that he would recruit the best captains for his crusade, excepting the princes of the blood.⁷⁸ On his return to England after the failure of the expedition, one of the charges brought against Despenser by the Chancellor, Michael de la Pole, was that he had failed to bring the best captains as he had promised, to which the bishop replied that the ones who accompanied him were suitable.⁷⁹ It might be expected that since captains like Calveley, Trivet, Elmham and Redeman had connections with the crown, they were chosen for Despenser by the king and his council. However, the fact that Despenser was impeached for not having brought the best captains (amongst other things) would suggest that the king and his council had not recruited them for the crusade. If the crown had chosen the captains who were on the crusade, then the bishop would surely have raised this in his defence. It is submitted that Despenser recruited these captains himself and it is possible to suggest how he did this. The key figure was almost certainly Sir William Elmham. Elmham held lands in Norfolk and Suffolk, and he was also a kinsman of Despenser by marriage.⁸⁰ They were both supporters of Richard II and they were to take up arms together in the face of the usurpation of Bolingbroke in 1399.⁸¹ Despenser doubtless knew that he could count on Elmham to serve as one of the captains on his crusade, but he also relied upon Elmham's connections to recruit many of the other captains. In 1379 Elmham was a member of a commission which

⁷⁸ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 148.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁸⁰ T. John, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham, East Anglian Society and the Dynastic Revolution of 1399', *Norfolk Archaeology*, vol. 35 (1970), p. 99.

⁸¹ *Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti*, J de Trokelowe et Anon., *Chronica et Annales*, H.T. Riley, ed. (Rolls Series, London, 1866), p. 246.

included Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir William Faryngdon.⁸² Elmham had probably known Calveley for about twenty years by 1383, and the two men were obviously still in contact a few years before Despenser's crusade. It is likely that Calveley and Faryngdon were recruited for the crusade through Elmham, as there is no evidence that either of them knew Despenser. Elmham and John Lord Beaumont acted as mainpernors for Hugh Hastings in 1385,⁸³ and while this may be an association which began after the crusade to Flanders, it probably predated the expedition. Beaumont's seat was in Lincolnshire, not far from Elmham, and it is likely that Elmham knew his family and possibly served with John's father, Henry.⁸⁴ In October 1379, Elmham was a mainpernor for another of Despenser's captains, Sir John Clifton,⁸⁵ and the two men were on a commission of the peace for Norfolk together in 1381.⁸⁶ Elmham also knew Sir Thomas Trivet through service under Richard II, and both men were in the Tower (with Sir Simon Burley) in 1388.⁸⁷ Trivet was another important link in the recruitment of captains for Despenser's crusade. On 8 March 1380 he acted as a mainpernor for a fellow professional soldier and crusade captain, Sir Henry Ferrers.⁸⁸ Trivet also knew Sir Peter Courtenay, as they had both served on a commission to deal with the rebels in 1381.⁸⁹ Trivet served on a commission of array in 1385 with Sir Thomas Fychet, another of Despenser's captains in 1383.⁹⁰ The pool of knights in the later fourteenth century was not large and was decreasing, making it likely that figures with the experience

⁸² *Patent Rolls*, 1377-81, p. 420.

⁸³ *Close Rolls*, 1385-89, p. 98.

⁸⁴ For the lands held by John's father, Henry Beaumont (Bello Monte), in 1369 see *Inquisitions Post Mortem*, vol. 12, Edward III (London, 1938), pp. 291-7.

⁸⁵ *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Richard II, vol. 1, 1377-1381 (London, 1914), p. 339. For Clifton on the crusade see Appendix 1, p. 231.

⁸⁶ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 84.

⁸⁷ *Close Rolls*, 1385-89, p. 382.

⁸⁸ *Close Rolls*, 1377-1381, p. 367.

⁸⁹ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 70; Appendix 1, p. 231.

⁹⁰ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 591; Appendix 1, p. 232.

of Sir William Elmham and Sir Thomas Trivet came into contact with many of them. Even so, it is revealing that many of the captains who served on the crusade to Flanders were associated with these two men.

Tracing Sir William Elmham's connections has also shed some light on how he recruited a portion of the force which he brought on the crusade to Flanders. Elmham almost certainly entered into a subcontract with Despenser to provide a certain number of men, and since he was a banneret by 1383 he would have brought more than a handful on the crusade with him. No subcontracts survive to show how Elmham raised his force, but it is striking that a number of the men on the crusade to Flanders can be linked to him. A William Ashman took out letters of protection for the crusade to Flanders, and although this was quite a common name and there is no record of whose company he served in, it is probably no coincidence that Elmham had a long-standing association with a Norfolk man of the same name.⁹¹ Elmham acted as a mainpernor for Ashman in 1374,⁹² and in 1379 the two men acted as mainpernors for a third party.⁹³ Similarly, there was a Sir Ralph Shelton on the crusade in 1383, and this was almost certainly the same Sir Ralph Shelton who can be identified as a friend of Elmham.⁹⁴ Shelton was a Norfolk landowner like Elmham, and the two men were charged by Edward III to raise 1000 *marks* in the county in 1372.⁹⁵ In this order Shelton was described as a king's knight, a title also held by Elmham. In 1374 Sir Ralph Shelton was the other mainpernor with Elmham for William Ashman.⁹⁶ Their association continued after the crusade to Flanders, the two men serving together on a

⁹¹ Appendix 1, p. 234.

⁹² *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Edward III, vol. 14, 1374-1377 (London, 1913), p. 113.

⁹³ *Close Rolls*, 1377-1381, p. 339.

⁹⁴ Appendix 1, p. 232.

⁹⁵ *Close Rolls*, 1369-1374, p. 444.

⁹⁶ *Close Rolls*, 1374-1377, p. 113.

commission of *Oyer and Terminer* for Norfolk in April 1386.⁹⁷ Elmham also knew a man called John Aleyn, and there was a person of the same name on the crusade who came from Cambridgeshire, not far from Elmham's lands.⁹⁸ There was a Sir John Brewes on the crusade to Flanders, and Elmham had served on a commission of the peace in Norfolk with a knight of this name in 1381.⁹⁹ Sir John had been in arms since the siege of Calais in 1347 and so he was an experienced knight who had possibly fought with Elmham on a number of previous occasions.¹⁰⁰ Elmham acted as a mainpernor with Sir Thomas Gerberge in 1384 and this was probably the same man who took out letters of protection for Despenser's crusade.¹⁰¹ None of these men had the captain under whom they were serving in Flanders noted in the letters of protection which they received, but it is likely that they were all going to Flanders in Elmham's company.

There is also evidence to suggest that Elmham took relatives of knights with whom he had close links on the crusade to Flanders. The letters of protection granted to Sir Ingehamus Bruyn in 1383 mentioned that he was serving in the company of Sir William Elmham.¹⁰² In 1379 Elmham and Sir Maurice Bruyn were both members of the commission which included Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir William Faryngdon.¹⁰³ Sir Maurice had a distinguished record of service which included campaigns in France, Gascony, Brittany, Normandy, Spain and Prussia, and it is quite possible that he had fought in Elmham's company on many occasions.¹⁰⁴ There was also a John Wyngefelde going to Flanders in

⁹⁷ *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 82.

⁹⁸ *Close Rolls*, 1396-1399, p. 126; Appendix 1, p. 234.

⁹⁹ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 84; Appendix 1, p. 231.

¹⁰⁰ Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, pp. 208-09.

¹⁰¹ *Close Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 595; Appendix 1, p. 232.

¹⁰² Appendix 1, p. 231.

¹⁰³ *Patent Rolls*, 1377-1381, p. 420.

¹⁰⁴ Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, p. 366.

Elmham's company,¹⁰⁵ and Elmham can be linked to a Sir William Wyngfelde who was presumably an older relative. Indeed, Elmham seems to have been particularly close to Sir William Wyngfelde, who also owned lands in Norfolk and Suffolk, and the two men can be found acting together over a number of years. Elmham was witness to a quitclaim involving Sir William in 1377, and in 1380 the two men were part of a group who received a charter concerning certain manors in Norfolk and Suffolk.¹⁰⁶ Sir William Wyngfelde was named by Elmham as one of his attorneys before he went on crusade in 1383,¹⁰⁷ while in 1386 Elmham and Sir William were witnesses to a charter and served on a commission of array for Suffolk together.¹⁰⁸ Thus it seems clear that Sir William Elmham used his regional connections (and especially those in Norfolk) to raise at least some of the men who were to serve under him in 1383. This was quite usual, and several of these men had doubtless accompanied him on previous secular campaigns in France and elsewhere.

Elmham probably entered into contracts with knights such as Sir Ralph Shelton and Sir John Brewes to provide a certain number of men to make up the total which he had indented with Despenser to provide. However, no record of these contracts survives for the crusade of 1383, and the men who would have been brought by Shelton and Brewes were probably not wealthy enough to bother taking out letters of protection themselves. It is difficult to estimate the size of the force which was brought to Flanders by Elmham, but it is possible that it was quite large, perhaps totalling around 100 men. It is notable that in 1372 Sir Hugh Calveley indented to provide 100 men-at-arms and 100 archers when he agreed to serve John of Gaunt on the expedition which the duke was hoping to make to Castile in that

¹⁰⁵ Appendix 1, p. 248.

¹⁰⁶ *Close Rolls*, 1377-1381, p. 139; *Close Rolls*, 1392-1396, p. 236.

¹⁰⁷ C76/67 m. 8.

¹⁰⁸ *Close Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 139; *Patent Rolls*, 1385-89, p. 176.

year, and it is likely that Calveley also took a large force to Flanders.¹⁰⁹ For an idea of the sort of force which Sir Thomas Trivet may have led in 1383, he served in Aquitaine in 1375 with one knight, seventy-eight esquires and seventy-eight archers,¹¹⁰ while on the royal campaign to Scotland in 1385 he brought twenty men-at-arms and twenty archers.¹¹¹

The knights and esquires who took out letters of protection and general attorney for John of Gaunt's crusade to Castile provide a contrast with those on the crusade to Flanders. In the first instance, the number of knights and esquires who purchased protection in 1386 is significantly higher than those recorded as doing so in 1383. The letters of protection and general attorney taken out before the crusade to Castile recorded 118 knights¹¹² and eighty-seven esquires,¹¹³ which is more than double the number of knights and four times the number of esquires who have been traced as participating on the crusade to Flanders. These 205 knights and esquires who were preparing for the crusade to Castile represent about one tenth of the men-at-arms on the expedition and it has to be remembered that there may have been more whose names have not been recorded. However, as in the case of Despenser's crusade, it is likely that the majority of the knights on the crusade are represented by these 118 men, since they were the people with the possessions to make letters of protection necessary. As in 1383, there were certainly more esquires on the crusade to Castile than the eighty-seven recorded, and the number was probably several times greater. Indeed, there were almost certainly more esquires than knights on the crusade and it would seem that many of them did not take out letters of protection or general attorney. In 1373 Gaunt led a force to France which consisted of six bannerets, 119 knights and 654 esquires, and it is

¹⁰⁹ *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372-1376*, vol. 2, pp. 61-2.

¹¹⁰ Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions', p. 734.

¹¹¹ Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, p. 418.

¹¹² Appendix 2, pp. 251-6.

¹¹³ Appendix 2, pp. 256-60.

likely that the men-at-arms on the crusade to Castile were distributed in roughly similar proportions, since the number of esquires was increasing and the number of knights decreasing in the 1370s and 1380s.¹¹⁴ Gaunt's indentures of retinue with knights usually stipulated that they were to be accompanied on campaign by one, two or more esquires.¹¹⁵

It is also notable that a further twenty-six people have been identified as Lancastrian retainers among those who had no status or occupation recorded when they received letters of protection, and it is submitted that these people were all esquires at least.¹¹⁶ However, an analysis of the knights and esquires who were recorded as such when they took out protection in 1386 reveals that Gaunt's crusading force was of a high calibre. Among the crusaders were some of the most famous fighters of the day such as Sir John Trailly and Sir Walter Blount, and others who in 1386 were establishing their reputations, such as Sir Thomas Erpingham.¹¹⁷ It is also notable that the knights and esquires on the crusade to Castile were recruited from different sources than the crusade to Flanders, as very few appear to have served on both crusades. Sir Ralph Shelton took out protection for the expeditions to Flanders and Castile,¹¹⁸ and a few members of Gaunt's retinue had also been in Flanders, including Robert Fitz Ralph, esquire, Sir John Assheton, Nicholas Athirton and Sir Thomas Fychet.¹¹⁹ Fitz Ralph and Fychet led companies in 1383, but none of Despenser's leading captains such as Calveley, Trivet, Elmham and Faryngdon served under John of Gaunt in Castile.¹²⁰ This was due in part to the fact that these men were all king's knights and Richard II was probably not keen to spare them for an expedition which would

¹¹⁴ A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward I', *EHR*, vol. 46 (1931), p. 370.

¹¹⁵ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 47.

¹¹⁶ Appendix 2, pp. 260, 262-7. These men have not been counted as part of the group of esquires who were on the crusade since it is not certain that they all held this status, even though most of them probably did.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 256, 251, 252 respectively.

¹¹⁸ Appendix 1, p. 232; Appendix 2, p. 255.

¹¹⁹ For these men see Appendix 1, pp. 233, 230, 234, 232; Appendix 2, pp. 257, 251, 260, 253.

¹²⁰ Sir Hugh Calveley's nephew took out protection for the crusade to Castile: Appendix 2, p. 257.

take them away from the country for a considerable period of time. It also reflects the fact that Gaunt was not recruiting from the same areas as Despenser had done. Despenser had looked to professional soldiers with connections with the crown since he could not take the retainers of other magnates without permission.¹²¹ There were a number of professional soldiers on the expedition to Castile, such as Sir Ralph Shelton mentioned above, but it is notable that fifty of the 118 knights and twenty of the eighty-six esquires who received letters of protection and attorney in 1386 can be identified as Lancastrian retainers.¹²² If the eighteen retainers who received protection without giving their status are included, eighty-eight Lancastrian retainers at least were on the crusade to Castile, and there were almost certainly more who have not been identified.

While some of the members of John of Gaunt's retinue served the duke more as administrators than as fighters, the retinue's main purpose was to provide a military force. The Lancastrian retinue formed the core of the armies which Gaunt raised in the service of the crown, and it was also the core of the crusade army which he took to Castile. The presence of the retinue and its power to recruit others meant that Gaunt's army of 1386 possessed a quality in depth which was lacking in the force taken to Flanders by the bishop of Norwich three years previously. This is revealed in the depositions which members of Gaunt's retinue and others gave in the case between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor for the right to bear the arms "azure a bend or".¹²³ The soldiers were waiting to sail from Plymouth to Spain in the summer of 1386 when they were asked to give testimony

¹²¹ One wonders whether Gaunt gave the retainers who were recorded as going on the crusade to Flanders permission to take part in the expedition, or whether they went without telling him.

¹²² Appendix 2, pp. 251-9. This is based on a comparison with the list of retainers and annuitants of John of Gaunt printed in Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, Appendix 1, pp. 262-84.

¹²³ The depositions themselves are to be found in N.H. Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry*, vol. 1 (London, 1832). In the second volume of this work, Nicolas provided abstracts of the depositions and biographical information about the deponents.

in favour of Gaunt's retainer, Sir Richard Scrope. Sixty-eight men gave their depositions at Plymouth (not counting Gaunt himself and Henry of Derby), most of whom were members of the Lancastrian retinue, and the rest were presumably men with connections with Gaunt. Not all of the deponents at Plymouth served on the crusade to Castile, but the majority certainly did. The soldiers were asked to provide details of the campaigns on which they had seen the arms of the two men, and they often gave their age or the number of years which they had been in arms to support their testimony. In particular, the depositions of Gaunt's retainers is most interesting. The retainers emerge as a group with a long record of military service, most of it to the house of Lancaster. Some of them had served at Najéra, and many had served on the campaigns in France in the 1360s and 1370s.¹²⁴ It is striking that a number of retainers deposed that they were over forty years old, yet the fact that they had been to Scotland in the previous year and were waiting to sail to Spain at the time of their deposition suggests that they were still active soldiers. Sir Walter Urswyk and Thomas Driffeld, esquire, were both sixty years old in 1386¹²⁵ and it is notable that the average age of Gaunt's retainers who provided this information in their depositions was around forty-two years. Thus it would seem that a knight's career lasted well into middle age and beyond, which is quite understandable given the strength which a man would need to develop in order to endure the rigors of campaigning and to fight in full armour.¹²⁶ It is worth noting at this point that the Knight described by Chaucer in the *Prologue* to the *Canterbury Tales* had a similar record of long service, dating back to the siege of Algeçiras.

¹²⁴ Sir Hugh Hastings and Sir Walter Urswyk both deposed that they had served Gaunt at Najéra: Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, pp. 168, 169; Appendix 2, pp. 253, 256. Hastings was not officially a member of the retinue, but his father had been a Lancastrian retainer, and Sir Hugh junior spent at least a part of his military career in Lancastrian service.

¹²⁵ Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, pp. 169, 197; Appendix 2, pp. 256, 257.

¹²⁷ Since it is accepted that the Prologue was set in the time of writing, and that this was around 1387, the Knight must have been well into his sixties when he went on the pilgrimage to Canterbury. Thus like several of Gaunt's crusaders, the Knight had been in arms for more than forty years, and it is submitted that Chaucer, a Lancastrian retainer himself, did not expect his audience to find anything unusual in this. Gaunt could choose whom he wanted to retain, and it is significant that he deliberately chose older men to form a portion of his retinue.¹²⁸ He did this because he needed men with experience who were competent fighters but who could also be relied on to serve as his captains. Members of John of Gaunt's retinue tended not to serve under other commanders and so his older, more senior retainers provided continuity in the duke's armies.¹²⁹ Nearly all the retainers questioned at Plymouth mentioned that they had been on the expedition to Scotland in 1385 and this reveals that the army which Gaunt took to Castile would have looked like many others which he had raised for the crown, with the Lancastrian retinue at its core. Henry Despenser also knew the value of experience, and his leading captains such as Elmham and Trivet were well into middle age when they served on the crusade to Flanders; Calveley must have been in his sixties.

From the early 1370s, John of Gaunt's desire to claim the throne of Castile was a factor which alongside his military commitments to the crown fuelled the ongoing expansion of his retinue. Between 1372 and 1376 Gaunt recruited thirty knights and thirty-one esquires, while between 1379 and 1383 he added a further ten knights and seventeen

¹²⁶ Prestwich stated: "It is clear that many of the knightly class continued to take an active part in war long after they would have been encouraged to take early retirement in more recent times.": Prestwich, *Miles in Armis Strenuus*, pp. 217-18.

¹²⁷ For the Knight having fought at the siege of Algeçiras (1343) see *The Riverside Chaucer*, L.D. Benson, ed. (3rd edition, Oxford, 1991), p. 24, l. 57.

¹²⁸ Thus Walker remarked: "Whom he [Gaunt] chose to retain remained very much his own decision; the Lancastrian affinity [was] very much his own creation.": Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 31.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

esquires.¹³⁰ By this latter period Gaunt had 222 retainers and while they were not all part of his fighting force, the military potential of the retinue was considerable.¹³¹ Part of this process of expansion involved Gaunt firming up existing relationships with men by adding them to his retinue. Arnald Fauconer received 100 shillings from Gaunt on 11 May 1380, and he was formally retained on 1 March 1383.¹³² There was nothing unusual about Gaunt retaining men with whom he was already connected, but it is submitted that they were being retained in preparation for the crusade to Castile.¹³³ John of Gaunt's relations with William Tunstalle, esquire, would suggest that this was the case. Gaunt had dealings with Tunstalle over a number of years, and the pardon for various offences which the latter received suggests that he was quite a volatile character.¹³⁴ Gaunt obviously valued him and was apparently grateful for the help which Tunstalle had given him during the Peasants' Revolt,¹³⁵ and he retained him on 24 July 1381.¹³⁶ The indenture made specific reference to the fact that Tunstalle would receive the same as other esquires if Gaunt was to lead an expedition of his own, as opposed to one in the service of the crown.¹³⁷ At the time when this indenture was drawn up it is submitted that Gaunt was thinking of his plans to launch a campaign to invade Castile.

¹³⁰ A. Goodman, 'John of Gaunt', *England in the Fourteenth Century*, W.M. Ormrod, ed., Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 79.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, pp. 99, 25-6.

¹³³ Walker remarked: "By 1380, it had become clear that the duke's projected invasion of Castile would have to be undertaken with a private army maintained at his own expense and Gaunt was, in consequence, anxious to obtain the best men available. Even between campaigns, he took the opportunity to consolidate the military potential of his retinue.": Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 43.

¹³⁴ Tunstalle was ordered to pay 100 marks for "diverses trespasses", on 10 November 1380: *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, p. 137. He received a pardon on 14 July 1381: *ibid.*, p. 186.

¹³⁵ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 158.

¹³⁶ *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, p. 19.

¹³⁷ The phrase was "son viage propre": *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, p. 19.

The fact that the retinue was the core of the crusade army of 1386 meant that it was raised in a different way to Despenser's force. The retainers had indentured to serve Gaunt for life in peace and war, in which latter case they would bring a specified number of men with them. In November 1382, when Gaunt felt that his crusade proposal would be accepted by Parliament, he took steps to raise his retinue for the coming expedition. An order has survived from John of Gaunt to William Horneby, his receiver in Lancashire, in which the duke stated that he had sent letters to the receiver addressed to all the knights and esquires in the county who were members of his retinue.¹³⁸ The receiver was then to pass these letters on to the individuals concerned without delay, and Gaunt sent similar orders to his other receivers around the country.¹³⁹ Parliament did not give its consent to Gaunt's proposal in 1382 and so the preparations did not proceed beyond this stage, but in the late autumn of 1385 Gaunt almost certainly sent similar instructions to his receivers so that his retainers would be ready in the following spring. In 1386 Gaunt's retainers were expected to bring the number of men which was set out in their indenture with the duke, and thus a proportion of his force would have been raised in this way. The retainers who were esquires or knights bachelor would bring fairly small numbers of men with them, in many cases it may only have been one or two. Gaunt's letters to his honorial receivers in 1382 also mentioned that anyone else in the region who was suitable for service was to be contacted, and this order was doubtless repeated in 1386 as a means of raising extra men-at-arms.¹⁴⁰

John of Gaunt's bannerets were always relied upon to provide a large proportion of his force. It has been noted that there were fourteen bannerets in the force which Gaunt took to Scotland in 1385, and it is likely that there was a similar number on the crusade to

¹³⁸ *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 2, pp. 250-1. The order was dated 20 November 1382.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

Castile in the following year.¹⁴¹ The bannerets were the most prominent figures on the crusade, such as the constable, Sir John Holland, the admiral Sir Thomas Percy, and the marshals Sir Richard Burley and Sir Thomas Morieux.¹⁴² Holland and Percy were men of high rank and so they were annuitants rather than retainers, receiving fees but not having their obligations formally laid down by indenture. These men made substantial contributions to Gaunt's host, the largest was probably the 240 men which Sir Thomas Percy contracted to bring with him.¹⁴³ Sir John Marmyon, a banneret and a chamberlain on the crusade to Castile, was paid £342 9s 9d for the men-at-arms and archers which he had brought for the first six months of the campaign, suggesting that he had also provided a considerable force.¹⁴⁴ The bannerets raised these forces through subcontracts, and it is likely that each banneret entered into a large number of them. They probably provided about one quarter of Gaunt's men-at-arms in 1386, and perhaps a similar number of archers.¹⁴⁵

In addition to his bannerets, John of Gaunt also indented with subcontractors from outside his retinue. These were men who entered into temporary military indentures with the duke in which they promised to provide an agreed number of men for the duration of the campaign. In 1380, for example, Sir Hugh Hastings entered into twenty-six subcontracts which raised fifty-three men, or just under half the number of men which he had contracted with the crown to provide.¹⁴⁶ It is likely that Hastings brought a similar number of men on Gaunt's crusade, involving him in numerous subcontracts which were of limited duration.

¹⁴¹ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 41.

¹⁴² Appendix 2, pp. 253, 255, 252, 254 respectively.

¹⁴³ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 49. Sir Thomas was to bring a further 150 men to reinforce the crusade army in 1388: *ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 2, p. 407; Appendix 2, p. 251.

¹⁴⁵ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 48.

¹⁴⁶ A. Goodman, 'The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings, 1380', *EHR*, vol. 95 (1980), pp. 116-17. Goodman pointed out that Hastings was expected to raise sixty men-at-arms and sixty archers in total, so he probably entered into over fifty subcontracts: *ibid.*, p. 117.

He was joined by men who were not formally retainers of John of Gaunt, but who were on the “outer edges of the Lancastrian affinity” such as Richard Lord Poynings, and others with no Lancastrian connections such as Sir Miles Windsor and Sir Richard Massy.¹⁴⁷ The civilians and clerics who had taken the Cross were assimilated into this force, but otherwise Gaunt’s crusade army was similar to the ones which he had been raising for the crown since the 1360s.

The letters of protection and general attorney have allowed a proportion of the men-at-arms in each force to be examined, but this leaves large portions of each crusade army about which little can be known. In particular, the archers on the crusades of 1383 and 1386 have remained in the shadows since their social status meant that they did not have enough wealth or property to warrant the purchase of royal protection. However, it was English practice at the time for an army to have a similar proportion of archers to men-at-arms, which makes it likely that both Despenser and Gaunt took between 1,500 and 2,000 archers with them on their crusades. Their names and personal details will almost certainly never be recovered, but it is possible to reveal a little about the archers on the two crusades.

Despenser had indented with the crown to provide 2,500 archers but it is unlikely that he managed to raise this number. Some would have been brought by his captains and the other knights and esquires on the crusade, and he may have been allowed to recruit others through commissions of array, although no record of this survives. It is likely that many archers joined the crusade by taking the Cross as individuals, attracted by the chance to serve for wages and to receive the crusade indulgence. There was a certainly a sizeable body of archers on the crusade to Flanders as their presence was noted by a number of chroniclers. Walsingham stated that the archers had performed well in the battle against the Flemings

¹⁴⁷ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, pp. 49-50; Appendix 2, pp. 255, 256, 254 respectively.

fought on St. Urban's day outside Dunkirk, and this was echoed by several of the Flemish chroniclers.¹⁴⁸ The presence of the archers is also attested by the crown's letter to Sir John Devereux, the captain of Calais, dated 27 June 1383, which ordered him to take 200 of the better archers to guard Gravelines.¹⁴⁹ Unfortunately, even less is known about the archers on Gaunt's crusade, but they may have been raised by commissions of array.¹⁵⁰ Retainers, bannerets and subcontractors would all have brought archers with them as part of their indentures. Russell stated that the best 100 archers from the duchy of Lancaster were to go on the crusade, which suggests that Gaunt raised a body of them himself.¹⁵¹ Archers would also have been encouraged to take the Cross in 1386 as they would contribute to the strength of the force.

In conclusion, the motivation for the launching of England's two Schism crusades of 1383 and 1386 combined secular interests with religious ones and this was reflected in the armies themselves. Both forces featured the familiar system of contracting by indenture and they were led by captains of long experience. However, they also contained an element not seen in England in the fourteenth century, and this was the presence of civilians and clerics who had joined the army as crusaders and who were incorporated into the armies.

Dispenser seems to have made greater use of these auxiliaries than did John of Gaunt, almost certainly because in the face of the royal restrictions he needed men to fill the terms of his indenture. John of Gaunt had no need of civilian crusaders in his force and yet the letters of protection have revealed their presence. They probably did not join the crusade to

¹⁴⁸ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 92; *Istore et croniques de Flanders*, vol. 2, pp. 293, 307. The effectiveness of the archers was also noted by Froissart: *Chroniques*, vol. 10, pp. 224-5.

¹⁴⁹ C76/67 m. 28.

¹⁵⁰ Walker remarked that Gaunt used commissions of array to raise archers in 1366 and 1373: *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 48.

¹⁵¹ Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal*, p. 406.

Castile in large numbers since it was a less attractive expedition than the crusade to Flanders had been, and Gaunt doubtless did his best to discourage people from taking the Cross. Gaunt was not particularly keen to attract members of the clergy as part of the fighting force and this, along with a lack of permission from Urban VI, meant that there were also fewer clerics on the crusade to Castile than there had been in 1383. In contrast with Despenser's army, Gaunt's force was made up of a high proportion of knights and esquires, and it resembled his previous armies raised to fight the French and Scots. Despenser's force was more unusual as it was not based around a single magnate retinue, and as a result the bishop was left to piece together the best force that he could manage. He used his contacts, and in particular Sir William of Elmham, to recruit captains who were freelance professionals to lead the army and bring contingents with them. The ultimate failure of the crusade and Despenser's subsequent impeachment have perhaps clouded his achievement. He managed to raise a force without magnate help and with crown restrictions and weld it into a recognisable fighting machine. Both armies reveal a remarkable social spectrum, in 1383 and 1386 letters of protection were being issued to men as lowly as drapers and as distinguished as tenants-in-chief of the king. The crusade to Flanders and to a lesser extent the crusade to Castile provided a rare opportunity for those who sought adventure, and the evidence suggests that many people were not slow to take advantage of the chance to acquire the plenary indulgence for fighting in Flanders and Castile.

CHAPTER THREE: CRUSADING AT THE COURTS OF CHARLES VI AND RICHARD II

The 1390s witnessed the chivalry of France and England involved in the most intense crusade activity of the fourteenth century. This was a decade of unbroken truce and combatants had the opportunity to go on crusade for the first time since the aftermath of the treaty of Brétigny some thirty years earlier. There was a steady flow of English and French crusaders to Prussia to participate in the *reysen*, and major expeditions were organised from France to North Africa and Hungary.¹ Even in the aftermath of the defeat of Nicopolis, marshal Boucicaut led a small force to the relief of Constantinople.² French and English knights were fighting side by side in the various theatres of crusading and while their motivation and aims will be the subject of a later chapter, an attempt will be made here to examine the extent to which crusading was a feature of governmental policy in either France or England in the 1390s. This study centres around the kings of these two countries as it was their influence which would be critical in shaping policy towards crusading. Charles VI emerges from this analysis as an intending crusader who surrounded himself with advisors, most notably Philip of Mézières, who supported his plans for peace and an end to the

¹ For French and English knights in Prussia in the fourteenth century see Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, pp. 93-104, 115-35.

² For an account of this expedition see *Le Livre des fais de bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquat, mareschal de France et gouverneur de Jennes*, D. Lalande, éd. (Genève, 1985), pp. 133-147.

Schism in order to pave the way for royal-led crusading with Jerusalem as its ultimate goal. Charles's illness in 1392 wrecked these plans, and Philip the Bold used his position at the head of French government to launch a Burgundian crusade which was defeated at Nicopolis. Richard II is revealed as a monarch who concerned himself little with crusading, and whose overseas interests lay in asserting English lordship over Ireland.

As the new king of France in 1380, Charles VI was inevitably going to be under pressure to be a crusading king. This pressure came from several directions, most notably from the tradition encouraged by the French monarchy itself. By the start of the fourteenth century the French crown saw itself and its people as enjoying a special relationship with God. Louis IX became the patron saint of the royal house in 1297, and ancestors such as Clovis and Charlemagne were portrayed as prototype crusaders as the French monarchy strove to link itself with the recovery of Jerusalem.³ The French king had emerged as the self-confessed *rex christianissimus*, and this brought with it the responsibility of leadership of crusading activity. However, the French kings' record in this area since the days of Louis IX had been poor. John II had taken the Cross, as had Philip VI before him, and both had died with their vow unfulfilled.⁴ Charles V had been the first king in living memory who had not taken the Cross, but since he had spent his reign clawing back much of what had been conceded under duress at Brétigny, he could perhaps be forgiven. Even so, the fact remained that the French kings cultivated an image of themselves as crusaders, and when

³ C. Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, S. R. Huston, trans. (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 93, 75. One later fourteenth-century writer had even suggested that Clovis had gone to Jerusalem: *ibid.*, p. 75. See also C.J. Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the Recovery of the Holy Land', *EHR*, vol. 100 (1985), pp. 25-51; J. Strayer, 'France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People and the Most Christian King', *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe*, T.K. Rabb, J.E. Seigel, eds. (Princeton, 1969), pp. 3-16.

⁴ John II had taken the Cross in 1363, while Philip had done so in 1332: N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières 1327-1405 et la croisade au xiv^e siècle* (Paris, 1896), pp. 165-6, 37.

Charles VI came to the throne it was hoped that he would be the one to reverse the recent trend and resume activity against the Infidel. These hopes were set in the context of the prophecy which asserted that a king of France would defeat his enemies, become emperor, and liberate the Holy Land.

The prophecy which surrounded the French king by the fourteenth century was a fusion of much which had gone before. It drew from the idea of a saviour king which dated from at least Egyptian times, and took the mantle of the liberator of Jerusalem from the German emperors.⁵ With the dramatic decline in the emperors' fortunes by the end of the thirteenth century, the kings of France, whose star appeared to be in the ascendant, had become the focus of prophetic attention.⁶ In 1356 John of Roquetaillade in his *Liber Ostensor* had written that a king of the race of Pipin would rule in Jerusalem, while in the same year in *Vade Mecum in Tribulatione* he had discussed the idea of the king of France becoming emperor.⁷ At the time that Roquetaillade was writing, the Anglo-French war had entered its most disastrous phase as far as France was concerned, and there was little chance that either of these roles, emperor or liberator of Jerusalem, would be assumed by a French king in the near future. Indeed, 1356 witnessed the humiliating defeat of Poitiers at the hands of the English, which resulted in John II being carried off to captivity in England. Charles V's reign had similarly been an unsuitable time, as between 1369 and 1380 France was involved in its most vigorous (and successful) phase of the war. By 1380, although Charles V had left a country which was still embroiled in conflict with England, the French were aware that their fortunes had improved since the humiliations of Poitiers and Brétigny.

⁵ M. Chaume, 'Une prophétie relative à Charles VI', *Revue du moyen âge latin*, vol. 3 (1947), p. 41.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷ M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 322-3.

The prophecy found new life at the opening of Charles VI's reign, reflecting the hopes which were placed in the young man. In 1380, an anonymous author wrote that the king of France would chastise his enemies (described as the English and Italians), become emperor, and recover Jerusalem.⁸ In the early part of Charles VI's reign, Telesphorus of Cosenza in his *Libellus* was writing that 'Charles son of Charles' would achieve much the same thing.⁹ Charles VI was seen as the second Charlemagne and he was well aware that he was expected to launch a crusade to recover Jerusalem. It is submitted that Charles VI was determined to fulfil these hopes and be the first French crusading king of the century.

Charles V's choice of tutor for his son and heir would suggest that he was preparing him to be a great crusader. Charles V was concerned with the affairs of the East and his library contained many works on the crusade.¹⁰ It is possible that his failure to take the Cross frustrated him and he hoped to see the French crusading tradition continued under his son. Charles appointed Philip of Mézières, one of the most remarkable men of the century, as the prince's tutor. Mézières in 1380 was in his mid fifties and had pursued a varied military and diplomatic career, the high point of which had been his serving as chancellor to Peter I of Cyprus.¹¹ After the latter's assassination in 1369, Mézières had returned via Venice to his native land, which he reached in 1373. He was well-received by Charles V and soon became a prominent royal counsellor before being chosen to be the tutor to his son.¹² Mézières was a travelled and intelligent man, and although he was perhaps not the most

⁸ Chaume, 'Une prophétie relative à Charles VI', p. 29.

⁹ Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy*, pp. 325-8. Reeves reckoned that the *Libellus* was written between 1378 and 1390.

¹⁰ Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 417.

¹¹ For Mézières' life before his arrival at the French court see Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 9-416.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 423-9. Mézières was also named on the council of regency which would govern if Charles VI ascended the throne as a minor: *Letter to Richard II, a Plea Made in 1395 for Peace Between England and France*, G.W. Coopland, trans. (Liverpool, 1975), p. xii.

scholarly figure whom Charles V could have chosen, he possessed a deep piety and concomitant morality which the king would have found appealing.¹³ However, Mézières was above all a crusade enthusiast and he essentially dedicated his life to the recovery of the Holy Land. For Mézières, the recovery of Jerusalem was no idle fantasy, it was a goal which could be achieved if men's hearts were set upon it. It was this fervour for crusading which had attracted him to Peter I of Cyprus in whom he had found a kindred spirit. They had been joined by a third crusade fanatic, Peter Thomas, the papal legate, and these three men had engineered the largest crusade of the century so far, the expedition to Alexandria in 1365. Mézières claimed that as a young man he had conceived the idea of a regenerated order of knighthood, the Order of the Passion, which would prepare the way for the reconquest of Jerusalem.¹⁴ This would be made up of the chivalry of Europe, but at its head would be the king of France. In his virtual retirement from public life after Charles V's death in 1380, it was his dream of establishing the Order of the Passion to recover the Holy Land which was still driving the "Old Pilgrim", as Mézières referred to himself. This was the man whom Charles V had chosen to bring up his young son; he must have been well aware of the implications. It is likely that Mézières was the most influential figure in Charles VI's upbringing. In his *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, Mézières addressed Charles in terms of some intimacy, and did not refrain from reproving the king. For example, Mézières chided the king for his excesses, such as his fondness for dancing, jousting and hunting, which suggests that he had played an almost paternal role in Charles's formative years.¹⁵ There can be no doubt that Mézières would have ensured that Charles VI was fully aware of his crusading

¹³ Coopland remarked that "Philippe was well read, without being a profound scholar of the type of Oresme.": *Le Songe du vieil pèlerin*, G.W. Coopland, ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 20.

¹⁴ Mézières claimed that he had a vision while in the church of the Holy Sepulchre in 1347 in which Jesus presented him with tables of law upon which were written the rules for the Order of the Passion: Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 73.

responsibilities as king of France, and the role which he would play in his tutor's plans for the recovery of Jerusalem.¹⁶ On Charles V's death, his son's tutelage passed on to Philip the Bold, and while this association would have broadened Charles VI's experiences further, it was almost certainly the influence of Mézières which had already shaped the young king.¹⁷ By the time he ascended the throne Charles was also a crusade enthusiast; the combined influence of Mézières and the weight of his heritage meant that he could hardly have been otherwise. The leading chroniclers of Charles's reign certainly saw the king as an intending crusader. Although Froissart has to be treated with caution, it is nevertheless interesting that he claimed that when Coucy and Bourbon returned from Al-Mahdiya, Charles VI expressed a desire to fulfil the vows of Philip VI and John II and go on crusade to the Holy Land.¹⁸ The monk of St. Denis also portrayed Charles VI as an intending crusader.¹⁹

In the early 1380s, Charles's relationship with Mézières did not have a chance to bear fruit. Charles was a minor on his accession and government was in the hands of the royal uncles. The first two years of the reign witnessed Philip the Bold asserting himself as the dominant voice in government at the expense of his elder brother, Louis of Anjou. Anjou quickly tired of this struggle and in 1382 he left France to try to enforce his claim to the throne of Naples, never to return.²⁰ Philip the Bold was left in virtual control of French government, assisted by his younger brother John of Berry. The war with England meant that crusading could not be on the agenda in this period. Philip's attention was focused

¹⁵ *Le Songe du vieil pèlerin*, G.W. Coopland, ed., vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 212-14.

¹⁶ Mézières admitted through Queen Truth that he wrote the *Songe du vieil pèlerin* to encourage Charles to go on crusade to recover the Holy Land: *ibid.*, pp. 428-9.

¹⁷ Autrand believed that this was the case, remarking "...c'est lui qui a formé le futur roi.": Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 27. Palmer did not doubt that Mézières exerted influence over Charles VI: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 188.

¹⁸ J. Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., *Chroniques*, vol. 14 (1389-92) (Bruxelles, 1872), pp. 279-80.

¹⁹ *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys*, M.L. Bellaguet, éd., vol. 1 (Paris, 1839), p. 711.

²⁰ Louis of Anjou died in Bari in September 1384; *ibid.*, pp. 337-9.

upon the situation in Flanders, and then upon stepping up the war with England, culminating in the failed invasion plan of 1386. Philip the Bold managed to keep himself at the helm of French government for most of the 1380s, but by 1388 Charles, twenty-one years old at the time, asserted his right to rule France in person.²¹ Philip had to bow to the inevitable and stand aside. This throwing off of the tutelage of his uncles heralded the start of a new era in Charles VI's reign, one in which the king and his advisors were directing affairs without the need to seek the approval of Philip the Bold. It is contended that in this period crusading became a matter of governmental policy for the first time in living memory.

Charles VI gathered around him men who had been loyal servants of his father, the most prominent of which were Bureau of la Rivière, John le Mercier, Oliver Clisson and John of Montague.²² Mézières was in virtual retirement in the convent of the Celestines after 1380 and was never to hold an official post in Charles VI's government. This makes it difficult to assess his role in shaping policy between 1388 and 1392, and probably explains why he has received little attention from the chroniclers such as the monk of St. Denis and Froissart. Although Mézières was not an active member of the king's council in Charles VI's reign, his influence should not be underestimated.²³ Charles's ministers, or the *marmousets* as they were disparagingly known, were all men who were familiar to Mézières from the days when he had been a prominent figure in Charles V's government.²⁴ He was on personal terms with these men, and he seems to have been particularly close to Bureau

²¹ For Charles's takeover of government, see *ibid.*, pp. 555-63.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 569. For a discussion of the *marmousets*, see J.B. Henneman, 'Who Were the Marmousets?', *Medieval Prosopography*, vol. 5 (1984), pp. 19-63.

²³ Jorga certainly felt that Mézières' influence was great in the 1380s: "Il n'y a pas de grand événement a cette époque, où l'on ne puisse retrouver l'influence de Philippe de Mézières.": Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 448.

²⁴ These men were known as the *marmousets* or 'little ones' because of their lack of a princely leader. They had been associated with Louis of Anjou, but after his departure in 1382 no-one filled the gap: Henneman, 'Who Were the Marmousets?', p. 19.

of la Rivière, to whom he had devoted at least one work in the 1380s.²⁵ Although Mézières kept himself out of the public gaze after 1380, and was not counted as one of the *marmousets*, he was certainly associated with this group. His advice was almost certainly sought and valued, in particular on matters relating to the East. The king's brother Louis of Touraine also gave the *marmousets* his support, but as he was only sixteen in 1388 he had barely begun to flex his political muscles. He was a friend of Mézières and apparently spent time in the Celestines with him.²⁶ Louis was also close to Bureau of la Rivière, and John le Mercier was one of his chamberlains.²⁷ Louis supported the policies pursued by these men, and he also saw them as a counterweight to the influence of Philip the Bold. In later years he was to weld the members of this group into an anti-Burgundian faction, although in 1392 his support was not enough to prevent their fall.²⁸

It is significant that Mézières' literary output increased towards the end of the 1380s as he saw a chance that his hopes would be fulfilled. He had written the second redaction of the Order of the Passion in 1384, his first major work since the first redaction of 1367.²⁹ With Charles's take-over of government at the end of 1388 and the rise to prominence of the *marmousets*, Mézières' writing entered its most productive phase. The *Songe du vieil pèlerin* was finished in 1389, closely followed by the *Oratio Tragedica*, and a few years later

²⁵ Autrand stated that the two men were friends: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 199. The work which Mézières dedicated to Bureau of la Rivière was entitled *Le Pèlerinage du povre pèlerin*, which Cooplund felt was probably written in the early 1380s: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, pp. 13-14. Indeed, Cooplund suggested that Mézières may have written two works for Bureau, as a work entitled *Le Petit pèlerinage du povre pèlerin* would appear to be distinct from the one mentioned above: *ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁶ Mézières and Louis were to become particularly close in the later 1390s: Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 505.

²⁷ For le Mercier as one of Louis' chamberlains see E. Jarry, *La Vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans 1372-1407* (Paris, 1889), p. 97, n. 1. On 4 September 1389, Louis presented Bureau of la Rivière a gift of 4000 francs: *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises*, 3638 (127). Froissart mentioned that Louis was close to Oliver Clisson: *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 56. Henneman believed that Louis was close to all six leading *marmousets*: Henneman, 'Who Were the Marmousets?', pp. 22-3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁹ Both these redactions are to be found in ms form in *Bibliothèque Mazarine*, ms. 1943.

by a third redaction of the Order of the Passion.³⁰ It is significant that Mézières himself was the “Old Pilgrim” in the *Songe*, and he was accompanied by his sister, “Good Hope”. Coopland felt that her presence was not sufficiently explained, but surely she reflected Mézières’ hope that he was entering an era in which his dream of recovering Jerusalem could be fulfilled.³¹

Mézières had good reason for believing that crusading would be on the agenda of the *marmouset* government. In August 1389, during the Queen’s fête held in Paris, a pageant was enacted representing the battle on the Third Crusade in which Saladin had fought Richard the Lionheart and Philip Augustus.³² Here was a visual demonstration that in the new period of Charles’s reign, crusading would be placed at the forefront of policy. The *marmousets* had a clear internal and external policy, and it is striking that their aims coincided in broad terms with what Mézières wanted to see. Indeed, Mézières’ *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, written in 1389, is a virtual manifesto for *marmouset* government. As far as internal affairs were concerned, the *marmousets* were aiming at efficiency and centralisation of government, reduction of taxes and encouraging the king to live off the proceeds of his own domains.³³ These were all policies advocated by Mézières in his *Songe*. Mézières stated in this work that the revenues from the royal domain should be sufficient to meet the costs of government, and he suggested that a commission should be appointed to look into this.³⁴ He also suggested that *aides* should only be levied in times of emergency and should not become a regular feature of financial policy.³⁵ Mézières was well aware of the waste

³⁰ The third redaction of the Order of the Passion was completed in 1396. It is to be found at *Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal*, ms. 2251.

³¹ For Coopland’s remark see *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, p. 30.

³² Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 9.

³³ Henneman, ‘Who Were the Marmousets?’, p. 28.

³⁴ *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, pp. 355-62.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 362-7.

caused by the multiplication of royal officials and he was critical of the increase in the staff of the *Chambre des comptes*, and the number of people employed to collect revenue for the government.³⁶ In 1389 the *marmousets* began to undertake sweeping reforms in the kingdom, and in particular they scrutinised the Duke of Berry's period of administration in Languedoc, which led to the duke's removal in the following year for his corruption.³⁷ Mézières and the *marmousets* were of a like mind in their desire to see domestic reform, even if Mézières approached the issue more from a moral perspective and the *marmousets* from one of efficiency.³⁸ It is also the case that in general terms the *marmousets* were pursuing an external policy of which Mézières approved. In his *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, Mézières proposed that the three aims of French policy should be the securing of peace with England, an end to the Schism, and the launching of a crusade to recover the Holy Land.³⁹ This was also the order in which Mézières felt that these goals had to be pursued, as peace and an end to the Schism were essential prerequisites before crusading could take place. Mézières also believed that peace between England and France was necessary before a general peace could be established in Europe as a whole.⁴⁰ The *marmousets* were clearly committed to achieving peace with England and ending the Schism, and it is submitted that they would have left more evidence that they intended to launch a royal crusade to Jerusalem if they had been in charge of government for longer.⁴¹

³⁶ *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, pp. 459-60, 462.

³⁷ For Charles VI's tour of Languedoc see *Saint-Denys*, vol. 1, pp. 627-31; for the territory being taken out of Berry's hands, see *ibid.*, p. 647.

³⁸ For example, Mézières suggested that a person should be appointed to Charles's council who would ensure that nothing was done to offend the law of God, and one wonders whether the *marmousets* were prepared to go this far: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, pp. 333-4.

³⁹ For Mézières on the need for peace with England so that the kings of France and England could go on crusade together see *ibid.*, pp. 373-5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

⁴¹ Autrand identified the *marmousets*' external aims as peace with England, an end to the Schism, and the preparation of a major crusade: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 193.

The *marmousets* were not slow to begin implementing their external policy.

Negotiations for a peace with England commenced in earnest almost as soon as the *marmousets* came to power, and by 1389 a truce had been signed at Leulingham which was to herald the ending of hostilities for the rest of the century, the longest period of truce since the war began.⁴² The Schism was a more difficult problem because it was not an issue which could be put on hold, unlike the territorial differences between England and France. With the immediate election of a successor on the death of the rival pope, Urban VI, in 1389, Charles and his ministers despaired of negotiating an end to the Schism. By 1390 Charles and the *marmousets* were in the advanced stage of planning a radical solution. It was decided that the *via facti* should be attempted and an audacious plan was conceived in which Charles and his brother Louis of Touraine were to sweep down into Italy with a force of some 12,000 men and having ejected Boniface IX from Rome, install Clement VII in his place.⁴³ Froissart stated that it was Charles's leading ministers who were advocating this campaign as something which had to be achieved before any plans could be made for the recovery of the Holy Land.⁴⁴ This is quite likely, as a commitment to Clement VII was one of the keynotes of *marmouset* external policy.⁴⁵ The idea was abandoned when English ambassadors arrived in Paris in February 1391 to resume the peace negotiations.⁴⁶ Charles and the *marmousets* were not prepared to undo the work which had been done in trying to establish peace, as this was the most essential prerequisite for a crusade.

⁴² For the text of the treaty see *Foedera* vol. 3, part 4, pp. 39-42. The truce was concluded on 18 June and was to last for three years from 15 August.

⁴³ The rendez-vous was to be 15 March 1391: Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 2, p. 177.

⁴⁴ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, pp. 280-1. Jarry felt that it was the immediate election of Boniface IX that led the French court to decide to put Clement VII on the throne: E. Jarry, 'La "Voie de fait" et l'alliance franco-milanese (1386-1395)', *BEC*, vol. 53 (1892), p. 220.

⁴⁵ Henneman, 'Who were the Marmousets?', p. 28.

⁴⁶ Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 2, p. 180; Jarry, 'La "Voie de fait,"' p. 237.

The planned invasion of Italy raises questions about how far the *marmousets* and Mézières were in agreement over the solution of the Schism. They all wanted to see the Schism ended but it is possible that the *marmousets* were more flexible than Mézières in the means by which this goal should be achieved. By the time Mézières wrote the *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, he had rejected the *via facti* as a means of ending the Schism. His proposal was rather vague, but he appears to have favoured some sort of conciliar solution. He suggested that a great council should be held in a European city to which each nation would send delegates, in the hope of settling all outstanding disputes.⁴⁷ Both popes were expected to attend this council and Mézières hoped that if the two men acted in good faith, God would bestow a blessing and would reveal the true pope.⁴⁸ Mézières was not advocating forcibly placing Clement VII on the throne in Rome and it is to be doubted whether he approved of Charles's plan to invade Italy. While Mézières was also a supporter of Clement VII, he could envisage him stepping aside to make way for someone else.⁴⁹ The plan in 1391 to establish Clement VII at Rome could be seen as the first step towards fulfilling the prophecy. If the French king was ever to become emperor, he would have to be crowned by the pope and there was unease at the fact that the pope whom France supported resided at Avignon and not Rome. It is interesting that this is how events were interpreted by at least one English chronicler of the time. Walsingham recounted that Boniface IX informed Richard II that Charles VI was going to have Clement VII crowned at Rome and then have himself crowned as emperor.⁵⁰ Although Mézières was aware of the prophecy surrounding the French king, he was not particularly influenced by it. He would certainly have agreed

⁴⁷ *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, pp. 293-4.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 295-6.

⁴⁹ Mézières did not refrain from criticising the papal court at Avignon for its pride, avarice and luxury: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, pp. 305-83.

⁵⁰ Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 201.

that it was Charles's destiny to recover the Holy Land, but this did not involve Charles becoming emperor as the first step.⁵¹ Mézières' plans for the recovery of the Holy Land also differed from the prophecy in so far as he saw that a truly international effort would be needed, whereas the prophecy suggested that the French king would become emperor and recover Jerusalem unassisted. Indeed, the prophecy even went so far as to suggest that the king of France would defeat his European enemies before going on to conquer the Holy Land, rather than reaching peace with them. The Order of the Passion was intended to be an international Order, and Mézières hoped that all of Christendom would pull together to try to recover the Holy Land. While it was doubtless influential, it was also unlikely that the *marmousets* were following the prophecy directly when they planned to install Clement VII in Rome. It is more likely that they viewed Clement's establishment in Rome as a potential way of ending the Schism in the absence of a more attractive alternative, and it is notable that when the English government expressed alarm, the plan was quickly dropped.

The *marmousets* and Mézières may have had different views on the methods to achieve a solution to the Schism, but there was agreement that its ending would pave the way for a crusade to be led by Charles VI. While crusading had never been an aspect of governmental policy when Charles V had been on the throne, the fact that he had chosen Mézières as his son's tutor suggests that Charles was prepared for crusading to become a matter of policy under his son. The *marmousets* had held posts under Charles V and so they would have been aware of his intentions. The planning of a royal crusade was an area where the *marmousets* were content to be guided by the advice of Mézières. Mézières had by far the most experience of affairs of the East at the French court and despite his idealism, he

⁵¹ In the *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, Mézières noted that the crusade had been presented to Charles VI "par visions et certaines prophécies": *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, p. 431.

knew that any expedition to try to recover the Holy Land would take an enormous amount of preparation. He had concluded that the only way to win back Jerusalem was through the combined efforts of Christendom, spearheaded by his regenerated order of knighthood, the Order of the Passion. The *passagium particulare* would be undertaken by the Order of the Passion and this would pave the way for the *passagium generale* to Egypt which would be led by Charles VI and Richard II.⁵² After the failures of the previous two hundred years, Charles and the *marmousets* accepted that such a radical approach was needed, and Mézières was given permission to start recruiting support for his Order. By 1388 Mézières had already chosen John of Blaisy, Louis of Giac and Otto of Grandson to be his “evangelists,” with the task of publicising and extracting promises of support for the Order of the Passion from the courts of Europe.⁵³ Blaisy and Giac were both chamberlains to Charles VI while Grandson was popular at the courts of France and England, so Mézières’ choice doubtless met with the approval of the French king and his ministers.⁵⁴ The exiled king of Armenia, Leo VI, had arrived at the French court after a period of imprisonment at the hands of the Mamluks, and he added his voice to the growing enthusiasm for a royal crusade to the East at the French court.⁵⁵ It is testimony to the heady crusade atmosphere at Charles VI’s court that when a French knight, Robert le Mennot, arrived in Paris from the

⁵² *Letter to Richard II*, p. 104. The Ottoman Turks were to be dealt with on the way by the forces of the kings of Hungary, Bohemia and the German territories: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, p. 434. In the *Songe*, Mézières listed thirty points which would help Charles VI undertake the crusade: *ibid.*, pp. 431-40. These points were all taken from the ideas expressed by Mézières in his redactions of the Order of the Passion. For example, see the extracts of the third redaction of 1396 which have been printed by Molinier: A. Molinier ‘Description des deux manuscrits contenant la règle de la militia passionis Jhesu Christi de Philippe de Mézières’, *Archives de l’Orient Latin*, vol. 1 (1881), p. 360.

⁵³ Palmer stated that Mézières recruited his ‘evangelists’ in 1385: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 188.

⁵⁴ For Blaisy and Giac see Molinier, ‘Description des deux manuscrits’, p. 362. Grandson was granted an annuity of 100 *marks* by Richard II in 1392 and he swore an oath of allegiance to the king in the following year: H. Braddy, ‘Messire Oton de Grandson, Chaucer’s Savoyard Friend’, *Studies in Philology*, vol. 35 (1938), pp. 515, 527.

East, he was made Mézières' fourth 'evangelist' and subsequently played a prominent role in the peace negotiations with England.⁵⁶ With Mézières recruiting support for the Order of the Passion with the approval of the French government, Charles VI and his ministers were taking the first steps to prepare for a major crusade. However, Mézières would have ensured that they were well aware that this was not something which could be achieved in the next few years. In his *Oratio Tragedica* written in 1389-90, Mézières admitted that he would not live to see the Holy Land recovered and that the preparations would have to be continued by a successor.⁵⁷ It is likely that Charles and his ministers were hoping to see the Order of the Passion established by the end of the 1390s, and to launch a major crusade to the Holy Land with the king at its head early in the fifteenth century.

Mézières' was not the only voice which was to call for the peace and the recovery of the Holy Land in the 1390s, and it would seem that his enthusiasm found an echo in the courts of France and England. In particular, the leading poets of the two courts expressed a desire to see crusading activity revived. Eustace Deschamps was known to Mézières as he was a court poet and was attached to the household of Louis of Orléans.⁵⁸ In his *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, Mézières recommended that Charles read the works of Deschamps, or

⁵⁵ Leo arrived in France in 1384 and visited England in the winter of 1385, hoping to bring about peace between the two countries: *Westminster Chronicle*, p. 155. Leo received the generous annuity of 1000 marks a year from Richard II: *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁵⁶ Jorga, *Philippe of Mézières*, p. 479, claimed that Robert the Hermit arrived in France in 1393. Froissart mentioned that Robert met John of Gaunt at Leulingham in that year, and so he must have taken part in the peace negotiations almost immediately: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 192-3. Palmer believed that Robert took part in the negotiations of the autumn of 1392: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 189. Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 188-90, provides some background information about Robert the Hermit.

⁵⁷ Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 474.

⁵⁸ Deschamps was not one of the *marmousets* and was in fact an enemy of John of Montague. This may have led him in part to voice criticism of the government after 1388. Once Louis Valois became Duke of Orléans in 1392, Deschamps became the master of his household: *Oeuvres complètes de Eustache Deschamps*, le marquis de Queux de Saint-Hilaire, éd., Société des anciens textes Français, vol. 11 (Paris, 1903), pp. 55, 66.

“Eustache Morel”, as he referred to him.⁵⁹ Although he was not one of the *marmousets*, Dechamps, like Mézières, was prepared to advocate change in governmental practices. However, Deschamps could hardly be called an idealist, and in this context it is interesting that Deschamps wrote a *balade* on the recovery of Jerusalem entitled *Exhortation à la croisade*.⁶⁰ What is particularly striking about this *balade* is that it envisaged the recovery of the Holy Land taking place in much the same way as Mézières imagined it occurring. There was no mention of the Order of the Passion, but Deschamps saw the recovery of Jerusalem coming about through the efforts of a Christendom united in peace.⁶¹

In England, Geoffrey Chaucer’s *The Canterbury Tales* can be interpreted as sending a message of peace between England and France so that crusading could take place. In the portrait of the Knight in the *Canterbury Tales*, Chaucer presented his audience with an ideal crusader who had fought for the Faith in all the major crusade theatres.⁶² It is notable that the Knight had not been present at any of the English campaigns of the Anglo-French war such as Crécy and Poitiers, even though he was old enough to have participated, as his presence at the siege of Algeçiras revealed.⁶³ The tale of Palamon and Arcite told by the Knight was concerned with violent quarrel and its successful resolution through arbitration,

⁵⁹ *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 2, p. 223.

⁶⁰ *Oeuvres complètes de Eustache Deschamps*, le marquis de Queux de Saint-Hilaire, éd., Société des anciens textes Français, vol. 1 (Paris, 1878), *balade* 49, pp. 138-9.

⁶¹ Thus Deschamps in the third verse stated (*ibid.*):

“Celle conquist; soyons donc exité
De faire autel: longues treves prenons,
Se paix n’avons a nostre voulenté.
Le Roy des Frans, d’Espagne requerons,
Cil d’Arragon, d’Angleterre; querons
Le prestre Jehan, des Genvois l’octroy,
Veniciens, Chypre, Roddes, le Roy
De Portugal; Navarre alons requerre;
Pappe, empereur, mettez vous en courroy
Pour conquerir de cuer la Sainte Terre.”

⁶² For the portrait of the Knight see *The Riverside Chaucer*, p. 24, ll. 43-78.

⁶³ The reference to the Knight having fought in his “lordes werre” would seem intentionally ambiguous, the lord could be a reference to God or a secular lord: *ibid.*, l. 47.

and the contemporary audience would have seen parallels with the struggle between France and England. Chaucer adapted Boccaccio's *Il Teseide* and converted it into a martial epic from the romance which it had been in the Italian poet's hands.⁶⁴ The Knight's description of the Temple of Mars was a memorable depiction of the horrors of war, and not the veneration of martial values which one might expect.⁶⁵ Chaucer was using the Knight to provide a picture of the harsh realities of secular warfare, in which treachery and cruelty prevailed; there was nothing chivalric about such conflict in Chaucer's eyes. It is significant that Arcite prayed to Mars to give him victory in the encounter with Palamon, and he was ultimately the loser. The wider message of the Knight's Tale is a rejection of war as a means of settling disputes and this theme is treated at length in the Tale of Melibee, which Chaucer told as one of the pilgrims.⁶⁶

It is likely that Chaucer's decision to present an ideal knight who had only fought on crusades was influenced to a large extent by the circumstances in which the Prologue was written. It is generally accepted that Chaucer wrote the Prologue in 1387, and this was a very unsettling year for the poet. Chaucer was an MP for Kent in the Parliamentary session which witnessed the Appellants calling for the impeachment of the Chancellor, Michael de la Pole, and several of Richard II's intimate counsellors.⁶⁷ Chaucer was alarmed by this attack

⁶⁴ See R.A. Pratt, 'Chaucer's Use of the *Teseida*', *PMLA*, vol. 62 (1947), pp. 598-621.

⁶⁵ Thus the Knight recounted:

"Ther saugh I first the derke ymaginyng
Of Felonye, and al the compassyng;
The crueel Ire, reed as any gleede;
The pykepurs, and eek the pale Drede;
The smylere with the knyf under the cloke;
The shepne brennyng with the blake smoke;
The tresoun of the mordryng in the bedde;
The open werre, with woundes al bibledde;
Contek, with blody knyf and sharp manace.

Al ful of chirkyng was that sory place.": *Riverside Chaucer*, p. 52, ll. 1995-2004.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-39.

⁶⁷ F.R. Scott, 'Chaucer and the Parliament of 1386', *Speculum*, vol. 18 (1943), pp. 81-4.

as he was a minor royal official, and held the comparatively conspicuous post of Controller of Customs at the time. By the end of 1386 Chaucer had resigned this post, given up his house in Aldgate, and moved to Kent.⁶⁸ He was not to hold public office again until 1389, when John of Gaunt returned to England and Richard II was in control of government.⁶⁹ In 1387, however, the Appellants were in power, and they adopted a more bellicose attitude towards France in contrast with the more conciliatory approach which Richard II and de la Pole had been developing in the previous couple of years.⁷⁰ By 1387 Chaucer was disillusioned with the struggle against France, but with Gloucester and Arundel at the helm of government there was a prospect that it would be renewed. It was in this context that Chaucer used *The Canterbury Tales* to express his hopes for an end to secular conflict and to advocate crusading as a more fitting activity for the chivalry of France and England.

This message came from Chaucer's own convictions, but it is quite likely that he was aware of Mézières' plans, which tended in the same direction. It is possible that Chaucer may have met Mézières in his capacity as a royal envoy in the 1370s, but there is no evidence that this was the case.⁷¹ However, the two men certainly had a mutual friend in Otto of Grandson. This Savoyard knight had entered the retinue of the Duke of Lancaster in the 1370s and this brought him into contact with Chaucer.⁷² Chaucer admired Grandson's poetical skill and he praised him directly in his *Complaint of Venus*, written *circa* 1385.⁷³ By this time Grandson had been chosen as one of Mézières' "Evangelists," and he spent

⁶⁸ *Riverside Chaucer*, p. xix.

⁶⁹ Scott, 'Chaucer and the Parliament of 1386', p. 84.

⁷⁰ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 88.

⁷¹ Chaucer took part in the Bruges-Montreuil negotiations of 1375-77, for example: P.A. Olson, *The Canterbury Tales and the Good Society* (Princeton, 1986), p. 51.

⁷² Grandson was retained by Gaunt in 1374: *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372-1376*, vol. 2, p. 4.

⁷³ *Riverside Chaucer*, p. 649, l. 82.

most of the period from 1385 to 1392 in England promoting the Order of the Passion.⁷⁴ When the list of those from England who had promised to join or support the Order was produced, it included a number of figures who were in Chaucer's circle, such as Sir Lewis Clifford, Sir John Harleston and Thomas West.⁷⁵ John of Gaunt and his brother Edmund Duke of York both promised their support to the Order, and they were both patrons of Chaucer.⁷⁶ It is likely that Chaucer was well aware of Mézières' aims, Grandson would have had a version of the Order of the Passion with him as he recruited in England, and the two men would almost certainly have had conversations on the subject.

Chaucer also knew Eustace Deschamps, another poet who was advocating peace and crusading. Deschamps wrote a *balade* to Chaucer in which he mentioned that he would be sending some works to the poet through Sir Lewis Clifford.⁷⁷ The fact that Clifford was acting as messenger would suggest that he was a friend of both Deschamps and Chaucer. He was a chamber knight and took part in the peace negotiations with France in the 1390s, which was presumably how he came to meet Deschamps and act as a courier for the exchanges with Chaucer.⁷⁸ Clifford was also a keen crusader, having participated on the crusade to Al-Mahdiya.⁷⁹ Sir John Clanvowe was a friend of Sir Lewis Clifford, being a fellow royal knight, peace negotiator and crusader.⁸⁰ He was a witness to Chaucer's release from all actions pertaining to the *raptus* of Cecilia Champaigne, as was Sir William Neville,

⁷⁴ H. Braddy, *Chaucer and the French Poet Graunson* (Port Washington, 1968), p. 49.

⁷⁵ Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 363. For West and Harleston see M.M. Crow, C.C. Olson, eds., *Chaucer Life-Records* (Oxford, 1966), p. 388, 226. Grandson also knew Harlestone as they had both participated in John Arundel's expedition of 1379: A. Piaget, *Oton de Grandson, sa vie et ses poésies* (Lausanne, 1941), p. 77.

⁷⁶ Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', pp. 363-4; Braddy, *Chaucer and the French Poet*, p. 77.

⁷⁷ T. Atkinson Jenkins, 'Deschamps' Ballade to Chaucer', *MLN*, vol. 33 (1918), p. 269-70.

⁷⁸ Clifford was active in the peace negotiations from 1390 to 1396: Olson, *Good Society*, p. 52.

⁷⁹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 149.

⁸⁰ Clanvowe was an envoy at the peace talks between 1385 and 1390: Olson, *Good Society*, p. 52.

another royal knight with crusading interests.⁸¹ Clanvowe and Neville were probably brothers-in-arms and they died together near Constantinople in 1391, which would explain why their names were not included in Mézières' list of English knights who promised their help to the Order of the Passion.⁸² Chaucer's circle thus included courtiers who shared his interest in crusading and ending the war with France, and who were doubtless familiar with Mézières' vision for the recovery of the Holy Land.

While Charles and his ministers had the long term aim of launching a crusade to Jerusalem, they had to deal with the fact that while France and England were not at war, the chivalry of both countries would also be turning their attention towards crusading. Mézières felt that crusades could only be successful if men at least abandoned the three sins of pride, avarice and lechery, or better still, became members of the Order of the Passion. In his third redaction of the Order of the Passion, he was critical of the crusading occurring at the time because he felt that the crusaders were mainly concerned with material goods.⁸³ It is likely that Charles and the *marmousets* agreed with Mézières and they also did not want to see French manpower and resources spent on expeditions which had no bearing on the recovery of Jerusalem.⁸⁴ It is submitted that Charles VI's actions in this period suggest that he agreed that crusading efforts should be directed towards the Holy Land, he had no interest in going on the *reysen* or on crusade anywhere else in Europe. He was in a difficult position,

⁸¹ For the Cecilia Chaumpaigne incident see *Riverside Chaucer*, pp. xvii-xviii.

⁸² S. Düll, A. Luttrell, M. Keen, 'Faithful Unto Death: The Tomb Slab of Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe, Constantinople 1391', *Antiquaries Journal*, vol. 71 (1991), pp. 178-83.

⁸³ Mézières was critical of crusades to "Barbarie", "Grenate" and "Honguerie": M. J. Anderson Brown, *Philippe de Mézières' Order of the Passion: An Annotated Edition* (unpublished dissertation submitted in partial requirement for Ph.D., University of Nebraska, 1971), p. 67. Molinier paraphrased the text in his 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 349. Unfortunately, I was not able to see the original ms. of this third redaction in the *Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal* during the periods spent researching in Paris.

⁸⁴ It is interesting to note that Bureau de la Rivière had an elder brother, John, who had been a minister of Charles V and who had died on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1365: P. Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge, études sur les armées des rois de France, 1337-1494* (Paris, 1972), p. 58.

however, as he was looked to as a sponsor of his subjects' crusading. This could result in the king feeling obliged to give his support to an expedition which he was well aware would do nothing to aid the recovery of Jerusalem. Such a crusade was launched in 1390 to Al-Mahdiya. Charles had been requested for aid by the Genoese, and as the French government was interested in ruling Genoa, the king probably felt that he could not refuse. Charles also saw that his subjects were clamouring to go on the expedition, including his uncle, the Duke of Bourbon, who was asking to lead it. He was reluctant to allow his subjects to leave for Al-Mahdiya and so while he gave his permission, he limited the number who could participate.⁸⁵ There was doubtless a practical reason for Charles's action, as he did not want to strip the realm of soldiers at a time when a truce with England had only recently been agreed. This was probably why Boucicaut in particular was not allowed to go on the crusade. However, it is also possible that Charles was thinking more in the long term, and with an eye to a much larger crusade expedition. He did not want to waste manpower and resources on a crusade which was of little strategic importance to the reconquest of Jerusalem. In this context it is interesting that the monk of St. Denis, who had suggested that Charles had been keen on the Al-Mahdiya expedition, stated that the king was not pleased about Philip of Artois' decision to go to give aid to the king of Hungary in 1393.⁸⁶

By the summer of 1392 the *marmousets* were confident that their foreign policy was taking shape. Although little progress had been made in finding a solution to the Schism, with a firm truce with England Charles and his ministers were hopeful that a way forward

⁸⁵ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 155, remarked that Charles stipulated that a magnate could not take anyone outside his retinue on the crusade. The monk of St. Denis gave no hint that Charles was not keen on the crusade. On the contrary, he attributed a speech to Charles in which the king stated that he would have liked to lead the crusade himself, but he had to work for peace with the English first: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 1, p. 651. The monk provided a very favorable account of the expedition to Al-Mahdiya, however, and he wanted to show that even the king was enthusiastic about it, even though this was probably not the case.

⁸⁶ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 123.

could be found. The response to Mézières' Order of the Passion from the chivalry of France and England had been encouraging. A crusade to Jerusalem was on the agenda, and while it was a long-term objective, it was felt that France was blessed with a young and vigorous king who would become its first crusader since Louis IX. By the autumn of 1392, however, all these hopes had been dashed. Charles VI's four-year period as the real head of government ended in dramatic fashion, and the *marmousets* consequently fell from power. A royal crusade was no longer on the government's agenda, and France no longer had a king capable of leading an expedition. The event is too well known for the details to need reiterating, but once Charles had succumbed to his first manifestation of paranoid schizophrenia in the forest of Mans, the period of *marmouset* rule was over.⁸⁷ The fact that Oliver Clisson had been put out of action a few months earlier by Peter of Craon's assassination attempt meant that he was not able to rally the *marmousets* when Charles's illness struck. Philip the Bold and John of Berry, who had grown to hate the *marmousets*, and Clisson in particular, acted quickly to reassume the reins of government in the wake of Charles's temporary incapacity. The leading *marmousets* suffered almost immediately; John le Mercier and Bureau of la Rivière had been deprived of their posts and thrown into prison by September.⁸⁸ Clisson was stripped of the office of Constable and Philip of Artois was appointed in his place.

Despite the changes in government, the external policy pursued by France in the wake of the *marmousets'* fall did not appear to have changed. The three main aims of a

⁸⁷ For the best account of the incident, see *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 19-21. Although it is difficult to diagnose Charles's condition, Famiglietti argued convincingly that the king was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia: Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 7-13.

⁸⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 56-70; *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 27-9.

peace with England, a solution to the Schism and a crusade remained as the main goals.⁸⁹ Philip the Bold had been France's main negotiator since the 1380s and he was committed to establishing peace with England, mainly to help protect his fledgling Burgundian state. He was also keen to end the Schism, but he showed that he was not especially committed to Clement VII. By the mid 1390s he had come to favour the 'way of cession' which involved both popes resigning to make way for a third, and it was the pursuit of this policy which led to the withdrawal of support for Benedict XIII in 1398. It also seemed that the plans for a crusade would be continuing despite the change in government. Mézières and his 'four evangelists' carried on recruiting support for the Order of the Passion and by the time Mézières wrote his third redaction of the rules of the Order in 1396, he could boast the support of such prominent figures as the Dukes of Orléans, York, Gloucester and Lancaster.⁹⁰ However, as far as the plans for a crusade were concerned, the situation changed completely after 1392. Philip the Bold's name was absent from the list of those who had promised their help to Mézières' Order, and while he saw no need to prevent Mézières from continuing his activities, they were taking place without the active support of the self-appointed head of government. Crusading was certainly a matter of policy for Philip the Bold, but he intended to organise a crusade which would mark the emergence of Burgundy as an international player. As a result, Jerusalem could not be the destination as he knew that this would take more resources than he had at his disposal, and Philip had no intention of organising a crusade for Charles VI. As the following chapter will reveal, Philip wanted to launch a major crusade against the Infidel, and he regarded the Balkans as its

⁸⁹ Autrand, *Charles VI*, pp. 332-3, felt that between 1393 and 1399 peace, an end to the Schism and a crusade remained the objectives of French external policy. While this is true, this policy was being directed by Philip the Bold after 1392 and largely for his own ends.

⁹⁰ For this list see Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', pp. 362-4.

most likely destination. From 1394 he saw that the conditions were right and it is striking that the resulting crusade to Nicopolis was launched before Mézières had done much more than canvass support for the Order of the Passion. There is no evidence that Mézières was consulted by Philip the Bold, and in his 1396 redaction of the Order of the Passion, Mézières was disdainful of the Nicopolis crusade.⁹¹

Charles was never the same after his first attack in 1392 and he was never again to be at the helm of government or the centre of crusading plans. He was to remain until his death some thirty years later the victim of a condition which rendered him incapable of government for prolonged periods. As his reign progressed his attacks became more frequent; in 1399 he was to lapse no fewer than six times.⁹² Even when Charles was not in the grips of his illness he was unlikely to have been taking initiatives in government, as schizophrenics rarely return to a 'premorbid' state.⁹³ Thus it is an over-simplification to believe that when Charles was not actually in the grip of an attack he was governing as he had been between 1388 and 1392. His capacity to deal with even the day-to-day affairs of government would have been permanently reduced and it is submitted that he was not responsible for French policy after 1392. This is clear from the fact that Philip the Bold dismissed Charles's leading ministers and took no account of the interests of Charles VI. When he was well enough to take some part in government the king was directed by Philip the Bold, in the face of increasing competition from Louis of Orléans. Nevertheless, there are signs that Charles retained an interest in the Holy Land. He sent chapel furnishings to the Holy Sepulchre in 1393, and he also expressed a desire to go on crusade with Richard II

⁹¹ Brown, *Philippe de Mézières' Order of the Passion*, p. 67.

⁹² *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 685. Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 308, added that between 1392 and 1422 the periods of attack were greater than the periods of respite.

⁹³ Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, p. 13.

in a letter which he wrote to the king in 1395.⁹⁴ However, this does not disguise the fact that Charles was no longer in control of government and he was no longer surrounded by a clique of ministers who were working towards the recovery of Jerusalem. Even if Philip the Bold had continued the crusade policy of the *marmousets*, it must have been clear that Charles VI would never be able to go on crusade. In such circumstances, Mézières appears as a more isolated figure after 1392, as it would seem that he failed to accept the reality of the situation. He must have known that Charles was not fit to go anywhere after 1392, yet there is no hint of this in his writings.⁹⁵ In a letter to Richard II in 1395, Mézières still expressed a desire to see Richard and Charles VI go on crusade to the Holy Land together, and this is echoed in the letter which Charles wrote to Richard, which Mézières probably had a hand in drafting.⁹⁶ From reading these epistles one is given no impression that things had changed since Mézières wrote the *Songe du vieil pèlerin* six years earlier. This has obscured the reality of the period after 1392, and historians have not been helped by the fact that two of the leading chroniclers, Froissart and the monk of St. Denis, also seem to deny that the chances of Charles going on crusade after 1392 were extremely slim. Froissart mentioned that the crusade to Nicopolis was going to be followed up by an expedition led by Charles VI and Richard II.⁹⁷ Similarly, the monk of St. Denis recorded that in 1394 Bayezid received news that the kings of England and France would be leading a crusade.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 199. For the text of Charles's letter to Richard II, dated 15 May 1395, see Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 388-90. The letter is also to be found in M.D. Legge, ed., *Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions*, Anglo-Norman Text Society (Oxford, 1941), no.172; H. Wallon, *Richard II, épisode de la rivalité de la France et de l'Angleterre*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1864), pp. 109-112.

⁹⁵ Cooplund made this point: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, p. 78.

⁹⁶ *Letter to King Richard II*. The letter from Charles VI dated 15 May was a précis of Mézières' letter of the same year, and both were brought to Richard by Robert the Hermit in May 1395: J.J.N Palmer, 'The Background to Richard II's Marriage to Isabel of France, 1396', *BIHR*, vol. 44 (1971), pp. 12-13.

⁹⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 242-3.

⁹⁸ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 387-9. The monk of St. Denis also claimed that Bayezid had retreated to Anatolia in 1393 as he believed that Charles VI was at the head of the expedition to Hungary which was in fact led by Philip of Artois: *ibid.*, pp. 123-5.

Historians have followed in the wake of such comments and have portrayed Charles as intending to go on crusade with Richard II to follow up the Nicopolis expedition.⁹⁹ It is fair to say that Froissart has to be treated with caution, especially in circumstances in which he is the only source for a particular event or opinion. He is the only chronicler who stated that the kings of France and England were planning to follow up the crusade to Nicopolis, and one wonders whether he was recording the hopes of Mézières and those around him.¹⁰⁰ The monk of St. Denis is usually quite reliable on matters pertaining to the monarchy as one might expect, but he was extremely poorly informed about events outside northern Europe.¹⁰¹ In 1393 Bayezid had withdrawn from the Balkans to concentrate on Constantinople and it is most unlikely that he retreated in that year or 1395 on the strength of a rumour that the kings of France and England were on the way. Whatever the source for this information (if indeed there was one), it represents little more than wishful thinking rather than reality.

There are two much more credible witnesses to Charles VI's condition who reveal that by the start of the fifteenth century Charles was no longer seen as the man who would fulfil the prophecy and become emperor before recovering the Holy Land. Eustace Deschamps was well-placed to write about the hopes which could be attached to Charles VI. Although he was a member of the Duke of Orléans' household, this rarely prevented him from speaking his mind and voicing criticisms of the court. Deschamps wrote a *balade*

⁹⁹ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 205; Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 342; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 297-300.

¹⁰⁰ Coopland noted that Mézières had met Froissart at Avignon in 1368 and it is likely that once he was back in France, Mézières saw much more of him: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, pp. 63-4. It is interesting that Froissart noted on more than one occasion that there were plans for the kings of France and England to go on crusade, and it is possible that he was close enough to Mézières to have shared his plans for the recovery of the Holy Land. If this is the case, however, it should be noted that Froissart said almost nothing about the Order of the Passion in his *Chroniques*.

¹⁰¹ The monk's account of the battle of Kossovo, for example, is extremely confused: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 389-91.

entitled *Prophetie en l'honneur de Charles VI*, in which he stated that Charles would fulfil the prophecy. He would defeat his enemies the English before going on to crush the Infidels, free the Holy Land and gain the “gold eagle”, a reference to the empire.¹⁰² The editor of his work suggested a date of 1400 for this *balade*, but this is arguably no more than a guess. The circumstantial evidence would suggest a much earlier date. Deschamps makes reference to the ‘fawn’ having ‘twenty-eight horns’ in one line, and it is reasonable to assume that the poet was implying that Charles would begin to subdue his enemies and fulfil the prophecy in his twenty-eighth year.¹⁰³ By 1400 Charles was in his early thirties and while he was not old, he could hardly be described as a ‘fawn.’ He had patently made no efforts to bring about the prophecy and it is clear that Deschamps must have written the *balade* some time before Charles’s twenty-eighth year, before the ‘fawn’ had reached adulthood. Deschamps was generally Anglophobic, but as a court poet it is unlikely that he would have written a poem mentioning the need to conquer England after the truce of 1389, as he would have known that it would not have pleased Charles VI. This *balade* was almost certainly written before the first truce of Leulingham, and it may well have been composed on the king’s ascension to the throne, like the anonymous prophecy mentioned earlier. It reveals that Deschamps early in the reign was echoing the hopes of many that Charles VI would be the man to recover Jerusalem. However, after 1392 it is clear that Deschamps no longer believed that this would be the case. In a later *balade* entitled *Sur ce qui doit advenir*, Deschamps identified Charles VI’s son, the dauphin Charles, as the one who would become another St. Louis, and after reforming the Church would recover Jerusalem.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² *Oeuvres complètes de Eustache Deschamps*, vol. 1, *balade* 67, pp. 164-5.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-4.

The other prominent court writer who admitted that Charles VI was not the king who would return the Holy Land to Christian rule was Christine de Pisan. As Christine's only employment was writing, she was more wary of criticising her patrons than Deschamps. In her *Livres des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roi Charles V* she wrote diplomatically about all the princes of the blood, and her portraits of them were rather flattering. In this context it is interesting that Christine stated quite plainly that Charles VI was not the king about whom the prophecy had spoken. She remarked that Charles reigned so well at first that people thought "que ce roi Charles étoit le roi promis par les prophètes", but then she stated that it was the king's illness which cut short his early promise.¹⁰⁵ The remarks of these two courtiers would suggest that it was well known at court that Charles VI was not going to be the crusader which people had at first hoped he might be.¹⁰⁶

Crusading remained at the forefront of French external policy throughout the period 1388-1396, firstly under Charles VI's government, and then under Philip the Bold. This situation was not mirrored in England. While English knights participated in the crusading which occurred in the 1390s and leading nobles gave their support to the Order of the Passion, Richard II was never to pursue the launching of a crusade as an aim of external policy. Richard has been seen as an intending crusader by historians who have asserted that he desired to go on crusade with Charles VI.¹⁰⁷ This view has been formed largely as a

¹⁰⁵ Christine de Pisan, *Le Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roi Charles V par Christine de Pisan Damoisselle*, Nouvelle collection des mémoires à l'histoire de France, Michaud, Poujoulat, éd., première série, vol. 2 (Paris, 1836), pp. 25-6.

¹⁰⁶ The prophecy continued into the fifteenth century, by which time it was thought that Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, or Charles VIII of France could be the second Charlemagne: R.J. Walsh, 'Charles the Bold and the Crusade: Politics and Propaganda', *JMH*, vol. 3 (1977), p. 63. By the sixteenth century it was being suggested that a king of England would recover Jerusalem: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 347.

¹⁰⁷ This view of Richard was presented initially by Palmer in *England, France and Christendom*, p. 205. It has been supported by subsequent historians such as Tyerman and Housley: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 294, 297-300; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 74-5. Saul has followed this line, and he implied that Richard saw peace as paving the way for a crusade against the Ottoman Turks: Saul, *Richard II*,

result of what others were writing at the time, and Richard's own interests have not been sufficiently taken into account. In particular, historians have been struck by the fact that Richard II was included in the crusade plans of Mézières and Charles VI, both of whom wrote to Richard in 1395 expressing the wish that he would go on crusade with the king of France.¹⁰⁸ The letters from Mézières and Charles to Richard only express the hope that the two kings would go on crusade, they provide no indication that the English king had given any assurances on this subject.¹⁰⁹ It is submitted that Richard never did anything to encourage the idea that he intended to go on crusade with Charles VI, and in all of his correspondence with Charles, Richard never once made reference to the possibility of the two men crusading together.¹¹⁰ One reason for this must have been the fact that by 1395 Richard would have known that Charles was not going to be leading a crusade, and that Philip the Bold was directing affairs in France. However, the main reason for Richard giving no suggestion that he would go on crusade with Charles VI was because he had no intention of doing so, even if Charles had remained in good health.

Richard II was a pious monarch, and he would almost certainly have welcomed the return of the Holy Land to Christian rule, but unlike Charles VI, he did not see himself as the man who would achieve this.¹¹¹ As king of England, Richard did not feel the same pressure

pp. 207-08. See also A. Bell, 'England and the Crusade of Nicopolis, 1396', *Medieval Life*, vol. 4 (1996), pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁸ For Mézières' hopes that Richard would go on crusade with Charles VI, see *Letter to Richard II*, pp. 97-103. Perhaps Mézières hoped that the disputes in the rest of Europe could be sorted out at a later date, but in the early 1390s he seems to have been concentrating his efforts on gaining the support of Richard II.

¹⁰⁹ Palmer had no evidence on which to make the assertion that "Richard had applauded" Charles's suggestion that the two men should go on crusade together, as this is not borne out by any of Richard's letters to Charles: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 205.

¹¹⁰ The peace negotiations generated an amount of correspondence between the two kings. Many of these letters are to be found in the holdings of the *Archives nationales*; J643 (5), for example, is a letter from Richard to Charles dated at Eltham, 5 June 1394. Some of Richard II's letters to Charles VI have been published by E. Perroy in his *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, Camden Third Series, vol. 48 (London, 1933), pp. 101-02. In none of Richard's letters to Charles VI was the matter of crusading raised.

¹¹¹ For a recent discussion of Richard's piety see Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 293-326.

to be a crusader that Charles VI felt as king of France. English monarchs did have a limited crusade heritage upon which they could draw, as several English kings had been crusaders, most notably Richard the Lionheart. More recently, Lord Edward had been on crusade at the time of France's last crusader-king, Louis IX.¹¹² However, the English crown did not exploit this crusade heritage to the extent that the kings of France exploited theirs. There was perhaps a feeling that this was a role which the French had reserved for themselves, and one which brought with it a burden of responsibility which was best avoided. The English monarchs did not think of themselves as the initiators of crusades, and it would seem that they did not automatically look back to their past crusading ancestors. Richard II felt no need to do so, and the two kings whom he chose to venerate had not been associated with crusading. The reign of Edward the Confessor had predated the crusade era, and although Edward II had taken the Cross, he had shown no enthusiasm for crusading.¹¹³

Richard II's upbringing had done little to impress upon the king a sense of duty to go on crusade. Richard had no Philip of Mézières to fire him with zeal for the recovery of Jerusalem, and under the tutelage of Sir Simon Burley he would have received the sort of courtly education common at the time. Burley had apparently taken the Cross himself in 1362 when Peter I of Cyprus had visited the Black Prince's court at Angoulême, but there is no evidence that he ever fulfilled his vow.¹¹⁴ Richard would have been aware of France and England's crusading heritage, but there is no indication that Burley had particularly

¹¹² Edward's father had died while he was away on crusade, so he was technically a prince when he set out for North Africa in 1270. Tyerman stated that Philip IV had to wait until the death of Edward I before he could try to claim that France was the home of crusading: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 233-4, 240.

¹¹³ Edward II was the last English monarch to take the Cross, doing so in 1313, but he had no intention of attempting the recovery of the Holy Land: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 244. Richard made efforts to have Edward II canonised throughout his reign. On 15 July 1391, for example, William Starteford was paid forty *marks* for pursuing the canonisation of Edward II at Rome: F. Devon, *Issues of the Exchequer, Being a Collection of Payments Made Out of His Majesty's Revenue* (London, 1837), pp. 247-8.

¹¹⁴ Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 184.

impressed upon his young charge a duty to recover Jerusalem. Under Burley, Richard developed a love of many of the prominent aspects of chivalric and courtly life, and there is no reason to suppose that crusading ranked particularly highly in Richard's interests. Like his tutor, he was fond of French romances and could read French with some skill.¹¹⁵ Richard was also interested in hunting and in the aftermath of the Merciless Parliament in 1388 Richard spent several months enjoying the chase.¹¹⁶ While his expenditure was not as heavy as that of Edward III, Richard also indulged his fondness for hawking.¹¹⁷ Richard also jousted on occasion, although he probably enjoyed this activity as much for the chance it offered to demonstrate his love of display as for the actual combat.¹¹⁸ It is significant that the White Hart first appeared as a royal device for the Smithfield tournament which the king held in 1390.¹¹⁹ When John of Gaunt was given power to treat with France in September 1383, Richard instructed him to challenge Charles VI to a duel, either between himself and Charles alone, or with their three uncles each as well.¹²⁰ This was an offer which was never repeated, and it probably owes more to the king's youth than anything else, but it is revealing that he even made such a gesture. Richard's chivalric interests extended to heraldry, he intervened personally in the Scrope v Grosvenor case and he changed his arms

¹¹⁵ Froissart noted that Richard could read French with ease when he presented the king with a richly illuminated copy of his works in 1395: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 167. The English nobility were still able to speak and write in French in this period, but Richard's tastes were particularly Francophile.

¹¹⁶ *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 343.

¹¹⁷ Given-Wilson reckoned that Richard II spent between £50 and £100 a year on falconry, whereas Edward III had spent around £200: C. Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England 1360-1413* (New Haven, 1986), p. 61.

¹¹⁸ Jousts were held at Westminster in 1382 to celebrate Richard's marriage to Anne of Bohemia, and there were two days of jousts in Smithfield in 1386: R. Barber, J. Barker, *Tournaments: Jousts, Chivalry and Pageants in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 1989), p. 36. Jousts were held at Eltham as part of the Christmas celebrations in 1383 and 1388: *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 57, 375-7. The monk of Westminster stated that Richard took the first day's honours at these jousts, while Froissart (more plausibly) credits Waleran of St. Pol and John Holland with this distinction: *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 451; Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 261.

¹¹⁹ J. Barker, *The Tournament in England 1100-1400* (Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 100, 185.

¹²⁰ P.R.O., C76/67 m 24. The entry is dated 8 September 1383.

to include those ascribed to Edward the Confessor.¹²¹ Chivalry played a part in the statecraft of Richard's reign, and if he was not the great warrior which his grandfather had been, he was certainly not out of touch with martial life.¹²² Crusading was a part of this milieu but it is notable that there is no evidence to suggest that this was an aspect of chivalric life which particularly appealed to Richard.

Like Charles VI, Richard had spent the years of his minority and several more under the rule of others, but in 1389 and possibly in imitation of Charles, Richard declared himself fit to govern. Richard's rule as the real head of government lasted for ten years and this was enough time for the outline of Richard's policies to have been revealed quite distinctly. Richard's aims of government were less ambitious than those pursued by Charles VI and the *marmousets*. There were no plans for an administrative or fiscal reform at home and Richard's external policy was a good deal more conservative than that attempted by Charles VI and his ministers. As a result of his upbringing and the humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of the Appellants, Richard's driving ambition was to strengthen his kingship and secure the loyalty of his subjects. As far as external policy was concerned this meant establishing peace with France. Richard had wanted peace from as early as 1383 as he saw that it was a drain on the country's resources, and the Peasants' Revolt had shown that the nation could not be taxed at a high level indefinitely.¹²³ Once Richard had thrown off the

¹²¹ For Richard's intervention in the Scrope vs Grosvenor case see R. Dennys, *Heraldry and the Heraldry* (London, 1982), pp. 105-06. There was apparently no precedent for Richard's decision to impale his arms with those attributed to the Confessor: *ibid.*, p. 106. By the end of Richard's reign, the king's close relatives had also been given arms which included those of the Confessor: *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹²² For a discussion of Richard's use of dubbing and appointments to the Order of the Garter to bind men to his reign see J. L. Gillespie, 'Richard II's Knights: Chivalry and Patronage', *JMH*, vol. 13 (1987), pp. 143-59.

¹²³ Mézières stated in the *Songe* that Richard II desired peace, but he was hampered by his uncles: *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, vol. 1, p. 400. Saul noted that Richard's personal desire to see an end to the war between England and France is confirmed by a number of contemporaries, such as Froissart and Mézières: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 206-07.

yoke of the Appellants, negotiations with the French commenced in earnest, and a truce was signed within a year. Richard wanted to reach a final peace with France, and so the negotiations continued in the 1390s, but he did not share Charles VI and Mézières' view of peace as the first step towards preparing a crusade. This was demonstrated by Richard's handling of the Schism. Richard did not want the Schism to continue, but he saw that negotiations to end the Schism could be separate from the peace negotiations. A compliant papacy was quite an advantage as far as his kingship was concerned. Although there was disagreement over papal provisioning, relations between Richard and Boniface IX did not deteriorate to the extent that they did between the French government and Benedict XIII.¹²⁴ It has already been noted that Richard objected most strongly to the French plan to install Clement VII at Rome, and he was never convinced of the idea that England and France should withdraw support for both popes simultaneously. Richard also knew that the way of cession was not popular in England, and so when the French eventually abandoned Benedict XIII in 1398, Richard did not do the same to Boniface. Richard was not prepared to end the Schism at all costs, and he was not concerned that its continuance was seen as hampering a major crusade initiative. Richard knew that France was keen to end the Schism, and while he was prepared to consider ways of achieving this, he was never to withdraw support for Boniface.

Peace or at least a firm truce with France was seen by Richard as allowing him to pursue other external interests, but these did not include a crusade to the Holy Land with Charles VI. Richard's concern to assert his authority over his subjects meant that Ireland was to be the focus of his attention once it had become clear that there would not be a

¹²⁴ Boniface quickly declared the Statute of Provisors of 1390 null and void, but by 1398 a compromise had been reached: Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, pp. 390-5.

renewal of the war with France in the foreseeable future. Richard had always used his hereditary title “Lord of Ireland”, but for some time this had meant little in practice as English sovereignty by the second half of the fourteenth century was only recognised by a tiny proportion of Ireland’s inhabitants. Richard had always intended to remedy this situation and in 1385 he had bestowed upon his favourite Robert de Vere the new title of Marquis of Dublin.¹²⁵ In less than a year de Vere had been promoted to the rank of duke and it seemed that Richard intended to bestow Ireland upon his favourite as a vassal kingdom.¹²⁶ De Vere never visited Ireland, and after Radcot Bridge and the subsequent judgement of the Appellants he fled the country and lived out the remaining years of his life in exile. Richard had not lost interest in Ireland, however, and by 1394, with a truce with France, he prepared to assert his authority in the province. Indeed, it is a reflection of their differing aims that in this year Philip the Bold was starting to prepare for the launching of a major crusade to the Balkans, while Richard crossed the Irish Sea at the head of a formidable force. There may have been a religious angle to Richard’s campaign in Ireland as the Irish were Clementists, but he did not launch the expedition with any crusade backing from Boniface IX.¹²⁷ Richard did specify that the chiefs would have to pay the papal camera if they broke their agreements, but if he intended to back up the oaths which he extracted from the Irish chiefs with crusade sanctions he did not make use of this power; when he returned to Ireland in 1399 once again he brought no crusade bulls from the pope.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 145.

¹²⁶ Richard granted De Vere the new title of Duke of Ireland on 13 October 1386: Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 148.

¹²⁷ Perroy claimed that the Clementists had made inroads into Ireland because the Irish were opposed to English domination: Perroy, *l’Angleterre et le grand Schisme*, p. 95. See also A. Steele, *Richard II* (Cambridge, 1941), p. 206; H.F. Hutchinson, *The Hollow Crown: A Life of Richard II* (London, 1961), p. 147.

¹²⁸ Several of the most important chiefs, such as Art MacMurrough, Brian O’Brien, Niall Og O’Niell and Turloch O’Connor, were to pay 20,000 marks to the papacy if they broke their oaths to R.E. Curtis, *Richard II in Ireland: Submissions of the Irish Chiefs* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 167, 181, 159-60, 157.

With Richard's marriage to Charles VI's daughter in 1396 and an accompanying twenty-eight year truce, Richard felt more secure than he had done at any time previously. He had achieved his external aims of peace with France and the assertion of his lordship over Ireland, and he turned his attention to domestic matters. Within a year Richard had ordered the death of his uncle, the Duke of Gloucester, executed the Earl of Arundel and exiled the Earl of Warwick.¹²⁹ This triumph over his internal enemies, following so soon after his long truce with France, must have led Richard to see 1397 as the start of a new era in his reign. He was asserting his style of authoritarian kingship and it is in this mood of self-confidence that one must set the production of the altar-piece which has become known as the Wilton Diptych. It was almost certainly Richard himself who commissioned this remarkable work and 1397 is the most likely year in which it was executed.¹³⁰ Palmer suggested that it was a crusade icon in which Richard was demonstrating his desire to go on crusade with Charles VI, and other historians have accepted this interpretation.¹³¹ As has been shown, Richard had no intention of going on crusade in these years and the Wilton Diptych is a much more introspective piece, as one would expect from a king who was obsessed with his own rule. The king is depicted as a young boy without the characteristic forked beard of his later years. The Diptych was intended to celebrate the new start to the reign, almost a second coronation, and Richard wanted himself portrayed as the child he had been on his coronation

¹²⁹ Saul suggested that Richard's actions in 1397 were not just revenge for what the Appellants had done in 1386-88, and that Richard reacted in part to increased criticism: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 367-8. There is doubtless some truth in this, but Richard never forgot what had happened to his friends, and Arundel's execution was carried out in the same place where Simon Burley had been killed, nine years previously.

¹³⁰ Gordon argued that the Diptych dated from some time after 1396-97: D. Gordon, *Making and Meaning: The Wilton Diptych* (London, 1993), p. 51.

¹³¹ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, Appendix 1 (q), pp. 242-4. Palmer argued that the brocmod motifs on Richard's robes were intended as a reference to his father-in-law Charles VI, and this, along with the assumption that the banner was a crusading one, led Palmer to see the Wilton Diptych as reflecting a desire to go on crusade with the king of France. Palmer's ingenious interpretation was accepted by Tyerman and Keen: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 297-300; Keen, 'Chaucer's Knight, the

in 1377. The eleven angels on the right-hand panel reinforce this coronation theme as they represent the king's age when he came to the throne.¹³² The angels are also closely tied to Richard as they are wearing the badge of the White Hart and broomcod collars. These were both the king's personal badges; the White Hart had been in use since 1390, while the broomcod was included on Richard's effigy which he commissioned in 1395.¹³³ The angels are also depicted wearing chaplets of red and white roses and this was again intended to demonstrate their allegiance to the king; roses had been a royal flower since the time of Henry III and red and white were Richard's colours.¹³⁴ This implication that angels were a part of Richard's retinue has a sacrilegious feel, but it underlines Richard's sense of his own importance and the belief that his reign met with divine approval.

When the Diptych was recently cleaned, the orb at the top of the banner was found to have a small green island depicted upon it, surrounded by what would have been a silver sea.¹³⁵ The island is roughly triangular in shape and there is a castle in about the place where London would be; the island is almost certainly intended to be England. As a result, the banner below the orb must be that of St. George, which had come to represent England by the fourteenth century, and not a crusade banner. The rebels who broke into the Tower during the Peasants' Revolt found banners with the arms of the king and those of St. George depicted upon them, and a large number of banners of St. George were taken on the royal

English Aristocracy and the Crusade', p. 61. Saul weighed the arguments for the interpretations, and he was quite attracted by the idea of the Diptych as a crusade icon: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 305-06.

¹³² Richard was born on 6 January 1367: *Westminster Chronicle*, p. 391, n. 2.

¹³³ For discussion of the broomcod collars see Gordon, *Making and Meaning*, pp. 51-3. If this is the case, then the broomcods in the Diptych are not necessarily a reference to Charles VI, and this removes one of the key elements of Palmer's case that the Diptych related to Richard's desire to go on crusade with Charles VI. Most recently, Saul has been tempted to see the broomcod collars as a reference to Charles VI: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 305-06.

¹³⁴ J.H. Harvey, 'The Wilton Diptych - A Re-examination', *Archaeologia*, vol. 98 (1961), p. 22.

¹³⁵ D. Gordon, 'A New Discovery in the Wilton Diptych', *Burlington Magazine*, vol. 134 (1992), pp. 662-7.

expedition to Scotland in 1385.¹³⁶ The presence of the Virgin was also intended as a reference to England as it was traditional by this period to see the island as her dowry.¹³⁷ The Christ Child in the right-hand panel is about to receive the banner with one hand and bestow a blessing with the other, while Richard is about to receive the Christ Child's foot which he would then kiss as a sign of fealty. Thus the Diptych shows Christ receiving the island of Britain under His protection, suggesting at the same time that Richard regarded himself as Christ's representative. The presence of the Crown of Thorns and the Nails in halo of the Christ Child is unusual and Palmer suggested that they were there to remind Richard II that his aim was the recovery of the Holy Land.¹³⁸ While this is plausible, there does not have to be a reference to crusading if one accepts that the presence of the Crown of Thorns and the Nails may be an indication of the king's devotion to the Passion of Christ. Indeed, Harvey suggested that the later fourteenth century was a period of increasing devotion to the Passion; the Emperor Charles IV had proposed a cult of the Crown of Thorns, for example.¹³⁹ Thus the iconography of the Diptych reflects the fact that in 1397 Richard II's thoughts were on his kingship and not crusading. As will be shown in a later chapter, he made no effort to make a contribution to the Nicopolis crusade, and he spent most of 1396 preparing for his forthcoming wedding. The only other foreign policy issue which arose before his fateful return to Ireland in 1399 was the French plan to launch an

¹³⁶ T.F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England*, vol. 4 (Manchester, 1928), p. 460. Ninety-two standards of St. George were taken on the campaign against the Scots in 1385: Harvey, 'The Wilton Diptych', p. 21.

¹³⁷ Apparently there existed until a few hundred years ago a five-panel altar-piece dating from Richard's reign showing the king and his wife Anne offering a "globe or patterne of England" to the Virgin with the motto "Dos tua, virgo pia, haec est; quare rege Maria.": Harvey, 'The Wilton Diptych', p. 20. The globe was possibly similar to the orb at the top of the banner in the Diptych. Richard also had a particular devotion to the Virgin: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 307-08.

¹³⁸ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 243.

¹³⁹ Harvey, 'The Wilton Diptych', p. 22.

attack on Visconti Milan in 1397.¹⁴⁰ This was probably a reflection of Philip the Bold's dominance of government, as opposition to the Visconti was a keynote of his policy, rather than that of Charles VI or Louis of Orléans.

In conclusion, French government between 1388 and 1392 had been driven by an extraordinary crusade idealism which resembled the enthusiasm for the recovery of the Holy Land which had last been seen at the French court in the opening decades of the fourteenth century. There seems to have been a feeling that the horrors of war, plague and Schism could be left behind and a new era could begin, in which crusading to recover Jerusalem could become a possibility. Philip of Mézières must be given some of the credit for helping to create a climate in which such goals became government policy. His success in this area was due at least in part to the fact that Mézières was not merely a crusade enthusiast in the mould of Marino Sanudo; he was a visionary who wanted to see society reform itself. While it is quite likely that in the case of Charles VI and the *marmousets* Mézières was preaching to the converted, his enthusiasm was nevertheless a spur to their efforts. It is possible that had Charles VI kept his health until the opening years of the fifteenth century, France might have had the crusading king which she longed for. However, it should not be forgotten that the chances of France launching the sort of crusade expedition which Philip of Mézières had in mind were always remote. Mézières was an idealist, and while one has to admire the clarity of his vision, it was profoundly unrealistic. This was demonstrated most clearly in his plans to form an Order of the Passion. While there would always have been people who were prepared to subscribe to the ascetic ideal of the Order, Mézières was hoping for nothing less than the moral regeneration of knighthood. In seeking to root out what he saw

¹⁴⁰ See D.M. Bueno de Mesquita, 'The Foreign Policy of Richard II in 1397: Some Italian Letters', *EHR*, vol. 56 (1941), pp. 628-36.

as sins of pride and vainglory, for example, he was attacking the very heart of chivalric self-perception. This is a subject which will be dealt with at some length in a subsequent chapter, but it is a mark of Mézières' inevitable failure that the conduct of knights like Boucicaut, Henry of Bar and Philip of Artois at Nicopolis showed the usual excesses and vainglory which were a part of the chivalric ethos, yet these men had all given their support to the Order of the Passion.¹⁴¹

It was also the case that peace, an end to the Schism and crusading could not be offered as a package to England, as Richard II and his advisers did not share the single-mindedness of their French counterparts. The impetus for the recovery of the Holy Land was lost even in France after 1392, and although it was still the subject of discussion, Philip the Bold was to lead crusading down the well-worn path of a chivalric debacle. Nicopolis dealt another bitter blow to the hopes of Mézières and while he still talked about the need for the formation of the Order of the Passion, even his optimism must have been fading. By 1400 the chance of the French government following a crusade policy was as remote as it had been in the days of Poitiers. With the deposition of Richard II, France entered into a new era of unstable relations with England, which were to bring new ruin upon her in the ensuing decades. By this time Charles was slipping into a melancholy state which the murder of his brother in 1407 only exacerbated, and when Mézières died in 1405, the period of *marmouset* rule which had promised so much seemed a lifetime away.

¹⁴¹ Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', pp. 362, 364.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE DIPLOMATIC ORIGINS OF THE CRUSADE TO NICOPOLIS

The diplomatic origins of the crusade to Nicopolis are long overdue a systematic analysis, as both the chroniclers and the historians of the period have failed to provide an accurate interpretation of events. The chronicle accounts are misleading in so far as they suggest that the crusade's origins began with the Hungarians' request for aid from Charles VI. Historians, while noting that there were diplomatic efforts on the French side which had preceded the Hungarians' arrival, deal with this aspect of the crusade perfunctorily in their impatience to move on to the battle itself.¹ One is given the impression that it was not how the crusade came about which was regarded as important, but that it came about at all. This misses the fascinating insight which the diplomacy surrounding the Nicopolis crusade allows the historian. The negotiations involved three of the most prominent figures in western Europe - Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, Louis, Duke of Orléans and John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster. All three men were interested in crusading, but their differing motivation is reflected in their unequal commitment to the project. Orléans and Gaunt were

¹ J. Pot provided a reasonably detailed coverage of the embassies sent to Hungary in 1394 in his *Histoire de Renier Pot, conseiller des ducs de Bourgogne 1362?-1432* (Paris, 1929), pp. 38-40. His work remains little known, however, and Pot did not concern himself with setting the embassies in the wider context of the dukes' crusade plans. I also disagree with Pot's assertion that Renier Pot went to Hungary for Orléans in January of 1394 and then for Philip the Bold in April of the same year (see below). For their brief discussions of the diplomacy surrounding the Nicopolis crusade see Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 229-31; Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, pp. 149-50, 240-1; Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, p. 62.

arguably most concerned about the personal fulfillment of their desire to be *crucesignati*, and for them crusading was not a matter of ducal policy. Philip the Bold's aims were far more ambitious in scope. He sought to launch a crusade which would demonstrate that the duchy of Burgundy was a power in Europe in its own right, and it was his driving desire to realise the project in the face of the Hungarian king's reluctance which ensured its success. The diplomatic exchanges of the period between April 1394 and August 1395 reveal that Philip the Bold was the driving force behind the conception of the crusade to Nicopolis, and that Louis of Orléans and to a lesser extent John of Gaunt were to play supporting roles. The meeting between Charles VI and the Hungarians in Paris in the August of 1395 emerges as a focal point after which Orléans and Lancaster turned their attention towards other matters, while Philip the Bold prepared in earnest for the launching of the first (and last) land-based Burgundian crusade. This chapter forms a necessary prelude to the one which succeeds it, in which the crusading army itself is analysed in the light of the involvement of the three dukes who, to varying extents, shaped it.

It is notable that none of the main chronicle sources for the period provide any hint of the complexity of the negotiations preceding the crusade which eventually went to Hungary. Froissart recounted that an Hungarian embassy arrived at Charles VI's court in 1395 and requested help against the Turks, whose sultan had threatened to feed his horse at the altar of St. Peter.² Juvenal des Ursins on this occasion echoed Froissart, while the monk of St. Denis recorded the same event, but claimed that the Hungarians arrived in the spring of 1396, compressing events considerably.³ The account of Boucicaut's anonymous

² Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 216-17. Ironically, with the throne of St. Peter occupied by a rival pope, France had been considering much the same thing.

³ J. Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI, Roy de France, et des choses mémorables advenues durant quarante-deux années de son règne depuis 1380 jusques à 1422*, Mémoires à l'histoire de France, Michaud, Poujoulat, éd., première série, vol. 2 (Paris, 1836), p. 408. Juvenal des Ursins tended to make more use of

biographer is characteristically perverse, claiming that the Hungarian king appealed to Philip of Artois for aid, who in turn asked Boucicaut if he would be prepared to help the Hungarians.⁴ An Hungarian delegation did of course come to France, arriving in May 1395, but the French chroniclers said nothing about the fact that this embassy only appeared as a result of the diplomatic efforts of the previous year. The embassies which set out from France in 1394 are recorded in the French archives but they escaped the notice of the French chroniclers, who appear to have been unaware of them.⁵ As a result, the chroniclers treated the origins of the Nicopolis crusade in terms which were familiar to them, as another example of a Christian power appealing to the *Rex Christianissimus* for aid against the Infidel. This was the way in which the crusade to Al-Mahdiya had been described, but in neither case was the chroniclers' interpretation accurate. In 1390 the Genoese had ulterior motives in their appeal to Charles VI, as they were just as interested in acquiring his overlordship as they were in an expedition against the Muslim pirates of North Africa. Similarly, Sigismund's embassy of 1395 was not a desperate and humble appeal to the acknowledged leader of the crusades, but a considered response to a persistent offer from

the account of the monk of St. Denis for the first half of Charles VI's reign. For the account of the monk of St. Denis see *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 425-9.

⁴ *Livre des fais*, pp. 88-9. Philip of Artois had been to Hungary in 1393, and so was known to Sigismund. Even so, it would have been remarkable if Sigismund had bypassed the usual channels of international diplomacy and written directly to France's constable, rather than to the king and the princes of the blood. The author obviously wanted to begin the account of the crusade as he continued it, with a celebration of Boucicaut's centrality to events.

⁵ The majority of the manuscripts which I have used in this chapter are to be found in the *Bibliothèque nationale* and all references are to holdings in this location unless otherwise stated. The *Collection Bourgogne* from which I will be drawing extensively in the ensuing pages is actually made up of copies of the holdings of the *Chambre des comptes* in Dijon, undertaken by the various Dominican keepers of the institution in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The originals are to be found in the *Archives départementales de la côte d'or*, Dijon. I regard the copies as reliable and Petit reached the same conclusion when he examined them in the nineteenth century: E. Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne (1363-1419), d'après les comtes de dépenses de leur hôtel*, Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France (Paris, 1888), p. xx. The trustworthiness of these copies can be verified by the fact that on many occasions the same entry occurs in the work of more than one author, showing that they were transcribing the same documents. References will be provided to second and third versions of the original archival entry where they have been discovered.

the French king's uncle, assisted by the king's brother and the Duke of Lancaster. It is with this royal uncle, Philip the Bold, that the analysis of the origins of the Nicopolis crusade must begin.

By 1389, having played a major role in the negotiation of the first reasonably firm truce between England and France, Philip could again turn his attention more fully to the task of strengthening his duchy. The 1380s had seen important steps taken towards this end with the pacification of his new acquisition of Flanders and the arrangement of strategically important marriage alliances for his children.⁶ In his quest to develop Burgundy as a recognised centre of European culture and power, Philip seized the opportunity offered by the truce of Leulingham to utilise crusading as a means of raising the international prestige of the duchy.⁷ The focus of a state was its court, and it was on the magnificence of their courts that medieval states were judged, but Philip knew that a splendid court needed more than wealth. It had to be staffed with individuals of chivalric worth, and none were more worthy than those who had been on crusade. In the 1390s Philip the Bold was the head of what could be described as an embryonic state, and he was working to establish its court as the envy of Europe. He saw that to be a great courtier one had to be a crusader, and to be a great lord one had to sponsor crusading activity. In his desire to establish the leading members of his household as crusaders, Philip at the end of the 1380s had only one theatre of crusading open to him, that of Prussia. Despite the apparent conversion of the

⁶ Flanders had become a part of Philip's territory in 1384 when his father-in-law, Louis of Mâle, died. Philip the Bold reached a treaty with Ghent at Tournai in 1385, and this really marks the beginning of the county of Flanders' integration into Philip's vast domains. In a joint marriage with the children of Albert, Count of Holland, Philip's eldest son, John of Nevers, was married to Margaret of Bavaria, while Philip's daughter, Margaret of Burgundy, was married to William of Ostrevant. As Palmer remarked, these marriages sealed the shift in the balance of power in the Low Countries in Philip the Bold's favour: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 58.

⁷ The truce was sealed on 18 June 1389 and was to last until August 1392; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 4, pp. 39-42.

Lithuanians after Jogaila's marriage to the heiress to the crown of Poland in 1386, the Teutonic Knights continued their crusading activities with the apparent approval of Christendom.

The *reysen* were well suited to Philip's purpose as the relative proximity of Prussia meant that they provided an opportunity for members of his household to crusade regularly without necessitating their being away from the duchy for years at a time. The climate and terrain dictated that engagements with the Lithuanians tended to be on a small scale, and although the fighting was often hard, deaths on the *reysen* were not common. As a result, Philip did not run a great risk of depriving himself of valued officials by sending them to Prussia. Philip exploited the opportunities presented by the *reysen* to the full, and each year from 1389 to 1394 members of the ducal household formed a sizeable contingent in Prussia.⁸ Philip subsidised the participation of his leading courtiers, and one is given the impression that he was sending them on the *reysen*, rather than assisting a voluntary undertaking.⁹ While it may be presumed that the voyages to Prussia were on the whole readily undertaken by Philip's courtiers as a way of emphasising their chivalric worth, they would have been keenly aware of the fact that they were representatives of their duke. Indeed, since Philip was paying for the crusading of his household to a large extent, and was presumably dictating when its members were to go on the *reysen*, the situation was not far from being

⁸ The *Collection Bourgogne* contains numerous entries relating to members of Philip the Bold's household being sent on the *reysen* in the late 1380s and early 1390s. William of la Trémoille, for example, was in Prussia with Philip of Bar "et plus[ie]urs chev[aliers] et ecuyers de Bourgogne" in 1391: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 47r. Paravicini has produced a list of Burgundians on the *reysen* between 1360 and 1411: *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, pp. 196-7. Burgundian participation on the *reysen* is also discussed by B. Schnerb in his article 'Le Contingent franco-bourguignon à la bataille de Nicopolis', which he kindly allowed me to read before its publication in *Annales de Bourgogne*, vol. 68 (1996), pp. 59-74.

⁹ The compilers of the *Collection Bourgogne*, when noting that a Burgundian was in Prussia in a certain year, suggested on occasion that he was specifically being sent by Philip. In 1389, for example, it is remarked of John of Savoisy "...le duc de Bourg[ogne] l'envoya avec plus[ieurs] autres chevaliers et ecuyers en Prusse...": *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 35r.

one of paid military service.¹⁰ Although no evidence has survived, it is possible that the Burgundian contingents in Prussia each year would have been provided with ducal livery and would have displayed Burgundian banners on the *reysen*. It was considered particularly honourable to have been knighted while on crusade, and Philip was also using the *reysen* to create new knights in his household. Renart of Sercus, for example, was received into the order of knighthood in Prussia in 1394.¹¹ When it was announced that a crusade to Al-Mahdiya was being organised, Philip the Bold saw another opportunity which was not to be missed. He ensured that there was a notable Burgundian presence on this expedition, including some of his most prominent courtiers, such as William of la Trémoille, his brother Guy, and Philip's nephew, Philip of Bar.¹² James of Courtiambles, another leading Burgundian courtier, carried the Duke of Bourbon's banner on the crusade.¹³ Philip took full advantage of this expedition to project an image of Burgundian courtiers as crusaders, and there was a sizeable force of Burgundians at Al-Mahdiya, all being subsidised by the duke.¹⁴

Prussia and Al-Mahdiya were useful destinations in providing crusading experience for his household and keeping them militarily active at a time of truce with England, but they only intended to be stepping stones in Philip the Bold's crusading ambitions. The

¹⁰ Renier and Palamede Pot were to spend 1389-90 in the service of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order on Philip the Bold's orders: Pot, *Histoire de Regnier Pot*, p. 31.

¹¹ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 130v.

¹² William of la Trémoille was paid 4000 gold *florins* on 17 December 1390, and this sum was in part to cover his expenses for the crusade to Al-Mahdiya: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 139v. Guy of la Trémoille was paid the same amount: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 45v. Philip of Bar was paid 2000 *livres* in an entry dated 11 March for expenses incurred in participating in the crusade: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 55r.

¹³ James of Courtiambles was paid 200 *livres* "...avoir porte honorablement l'estandar du duc de Bourbon...": *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 55v.; t. 24, f. 50r.

¹⁴ James of Maumes, knight and chamberlain to Philip the Bold, was paid 200 *livres* for his expenses on the "voyage de Barbarie", while Girard of Rigny and Guiot of Aigreville both "ecuyers trenchants" of the duke, and Philipot of Jaucourt, an "ecuyer echanson", also received sums: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 56v.; t. 65, f. 58r.; t. 24, f. 1v.; t. 26, f. 256.

participation of members of his household on the crusades of others was a useful beginning, but in Philip's eyes something more impressive was needed to demonstrate the power of the duchy of Burgundy and to signal its emergence on the international stage. He wanted to launch a major crusade on which the members of his household would form the core and which would be led by a Burgundian. By 1390 with a truce with England and the prospect of a sudden renewal of the war unlikely, Philip could see his crusade coming closer, and the events of the summer of 1392 gave him an unexpected boost. Philip acted quickly to seize the reins of French government once Charles had succumbed to the first attack of what was probably paranoid schizophrenia, and this meant that his ambitions could proceed largely unhindered.¹⁵ Philip saw that the chivalry of France and England would be keen to join a major crusading expedition: their appetites had been whetted by the crusade to Al-Mahdiya, the *reysen* remained popular, and Mézières and his Four Evangelists were busy liaising between the courts of France and England, promoting the Order of the Passion. By 1393, with a prolonged period of truce with England seemingly within reach, Philip saw that the chances of launching a major crusading expedition had not been better for thirty years, and he began to focus his attention on plans for a crusade. He would doubtless have dearly loved to have made an attempt to recover the Holy Land with a crusade led by the Burgundian household, but he knew that it was well out of his reach. The costs of such an expedition would have been astronomical, and he knew that the pooled resources of France, England and the papacy would be the minimum required. With the papacy in schism and France and England exhausted after another period of war, an expedition to Jerusalem was not feasible. A crusade against the Ottoman Turks, however, was another matter. Their

¹⁵ For a discussion of Charles VI's illness, see Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 7-13.

seemingly relentless drive into the Balkans had taken them as far as Serbia in 1389, with a costly victory in the battle of Kossovo. In 1393 part of Bulgaria was overrun, and this left Hungary as the next large Christian state blocking the Turks' further progress in the Balkans.¹⁶ Hungary's king, Sigismund, seems to have been in contact with the French court in 1392 or 1393 and France's constable, Philip of Artois, had been sent to Hungary with a small force.¹⁷ As virtual head of government at the time, Philip the Bold probably had no small part in the dispatch of this contingent, and he saw Hungary as the most suitable location for a large crusade. By the spring of 1394, Philip was preparing to approach the king of Hungary, who would be the host of this expedition.

Philip was not the only French prince who had crusading ambitions, and who saw in the opening of a period of truce with the English a chance of fulfilling them. Louis of Bourbon had satisfied his desire to follow in the footsteps of his ancestor Saint Louis in 1390, but by this date the crusade hopes of the king's brother, Louis of Valois (from 1392 the Duke of Orléans), remained unsatiated. He had wanted to lead the force which was to go to Al-Mahdiya, but his request was refused by Charles VI.¹⁸ Louis on this occasion had been forced to experience the crusade vicariously, lending large sums of money to his uncle the Duke of Bourbon, and to his trusted retainer, Enguerrand of Coucy.¹⁹ Like Philip the Bold, Louis knew that if he was to be regarded as a great prince, he would have to be seen

¹⁶ C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481* (Istanbul, 1990), p. 43.

¹⁷ Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 395, stated that Sigismund appealed to France for aid in 1393. The monk of St. Denis recorded that in 1393 Bayezid inflicted a heavy loss on Sigismund, who appealed to France for help: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 113. Delaville le Roulx remarked that Sigismund wrote to Charles VI in 1393 since his borders were threatened by the Turks, and that the defeat recorded by the monk of St. Denis reflected the rumours circulating in France: Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 223-24.

¹⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 154.

¹⁹ For Louis of Touraine (as he was until 1392) lending 20,000 *florins* to the Duke of Bourbon, see *Archives nationales*, KK 896, ff. 366v.-367r. For his loan of 10,000 *florins* to Coucy see L. Douët-d'Arcq, *Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1863), no. 55, pp. 108-09.

to be a supporter of crusading. He helped defray the expenses of members of his household who were participating on the *reysen* in the early 1390s, although it is unlikely that his expenditure matched that of Philip the Bold.²⁰ Louis spent rather more heavily for the crusade to Al-Mahdiya, and in addition to the sums lent to Bourbon and Coucy, he subsidised the crusading of a substantial number of knights and esquires, including his marshal, John of Trye.²¹ It is likely that there was a sizeable contingent of Louis' household at Al-Mahdiya, perhaps under the overall leadership of Coucy. However, Louis' interest in crusading sprang from different ambitions to those of his uncle. In the 1390s Louis was hoping to become the ruler of a realm in Italy granted by the pope, and it was only in the context of these plans that Louis may have combined territorial conquest with crusading, especially as the French crown was toying with the idea of placing Clement VII on the throne in Rome. However, in this instance the crusading would have been against Christian schismatics, while Louis' main desire was to crusade against the Infidel. Louis' enthusiasm for crusading was largely based on the fact that he wanted to be a *crucesignatus* himself, and this ran alongside his territorial ambitions. Philip the Bold was looking to the wider political benefits which crusading could bestow. Philip was attempting to forge a territory which he already possessed into a state, and he saw crusading as a useful tool to help him achieve this. Louis was a friend of Philip of Mézières and he was probably quite attracted by the latter's

²⁰ On 9 November 1392 Orléans paid 1000 *francs* to five men who were intending to go to Prussia: *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises* 3638 (165). For a list of members of his household on the *reysen* between 1389 and 1399, see Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, p. 198.

²¹ John of Trye was paid 4000 *francs d'or* on 24 April 1391 for expenses which he had incurred "...en plusieurs et grans voyages qu'il a faiz tant en Barbarie et en Pruce...": *Nouv. acq. fr.* 3638 (140). Alain Budes, one of Louis' esquires, was paid fifty *francs d'or* towards his expenses on the crusade: *Pièces originales*, 548 (Budes) (11). Jarry named other men whom Louis was subsidising on the crusade to Al-Mahdiya, but he did not provide references for this information: Jarry, *La Vie politique*, p. 55. Mirot reckoned that Louis' treasurer paid out 13,530 *francs* to knights and esquires going to Al-Mahdiya, and if this figure is accurate, then Louis' expenditure for the crusade must have rivalled that of Philip the Bold: L. Mirot, 'Une expédition française en Tunisie au XIV^e siècle: le siège de Mahdia (1390)', *Revue des études historiques*, vol. 97 (1931), p. 369.

vision of a new order of knighthood which would carve through the Infidels and triumphantly proceed to the Holy Land.²² It is possible that once it became clear that Charles VI's attack in 1392 was not an isolated incident, Mézières saw in Louis the French prince who would lead this revived chivalry at the head of the Order of the Passion.

Philip the Bold's resumption of the position as the virtual regent of France after 1392 had dismayed Louis as it stifled both his own ambitions of government and those of his friends. France's constable, Oliver Clisson, and former leading ministers Bureau of la Rivière and John Le Mercier were all friends of Louis who suffered when Philip the Bold regained control of government.²³ Relations between the two men were perhaps always bound to deteriorate as Louis chafed under the yoke imposed by his uncle, for whom control of French government and finances was vital for the nurture of his Burgundian territories. However, in the mid 1390s the mutual distrust between the two men had not yet matured into open conflict. In April 1395, Orléans and his household stayed with Philip at his capital of Dijon for a week or so before the two men travelled to Avignon together.²⁴ Philip and Louis were regularly dining together at Philip's hôtel Artois in Paris, and Philip was sending the customary presents to his nephew each year even in the later 1390s.²⁵ The gulf between Louis of Orléans and Philip the Bold as they struggled for control of an increasingly erratic

²² Jarry believed that in the spring of 1390 Louis had promised his support to Mézières' Order of the Passion: Jarry, *La Vie politique*, p. 53.

²³ John le Mercier, for example, was one of Orléans' chamberlains: *ibid.*, p. 97, n. 1. On 4 September 1389, Louis presented Bureau of la Rivière with a gift of 4000 *francs*: *Nouv. acq. fr.*, 3638 (127). Many of the former *marmousets* were to be members of Louis' anti-Burgundian faction: Henneman, 'Who Were the Marmousets?', pp. 32-3.

²⁴ Orléans and his household stayed at Dijon between 22 and 29 April 1395 at Philip the Bold's expense: Petit, *Itinéraires*, pp. 240-1. Philip left Avignon on 8 July 1394 and it is likely that Louis travelled back through France with him: *ibid.*, p. 243.

²⁵ Orléans came to dinner at Philip's residence in Paris (the hôtel Artois) with the Duke of Bourbon on three occasions in January 1396, and these two were Philip's most regular guests at this time: Petit, *Itinéraires*, p. 247. In 1396 Philip sent Louis an image of John the Baptist, in 1397 one of Saint Madeleine, and in 1398 an image of Saint Louis: H. David, *Philippe le hardi, duc de Bourgogne et co-régent de France de 1392 à 1404: le train somptuaire d'un grand Valois* (Dijon, 1947), p. 61.

Charles VI was to intensify and ultimately prepare the ground for the horrors of civil war, but in the mid 1390s the two men found that they could still work together on certain issues.²⁶ Orléans was attracted by Philip the Bold's plan to send an expedition against the Ottoman Turks, and the extent of his cooperation with his uncle is revealed in the embassies which were sent to the king of Hungary in the hope of launching a crusade in the Balkans.

Discussions between Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans on the subject of a crusade to the Balkans had probably been going on for some time when in the spring of 1394 the two men took steps to convert them into action. In April of that year the two men dispatched a joint embassy to king Sigismund. Philip the Bold's ambassadors included two of his most experienced courtiers, William of la Trémoille, his marshal, and Renier Pot, along with a third Burgundian knight and eleven esquires.²⁷ Louis of Orléans contributed an esquire and two of his heralds.²⁸ This imposing joint embassy was symbolized by the fact that Renier Pot was representing both men simultaneously, as he was a chamberlain to both Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans.²⁹ Philip the Bold's dominance of the negotiations was

²⁶ Serious problems had emerged by 1398, as Philip had blocked Louis' Italian plans, and the latter looked for alliances directed against his uncle: F.D.S. Darwin, *Louis d'Orléans (1372-1407): A Necessary Prologue to the Tragedy of la Pucelle d'Orléans* (London, 1936), pp. 47-8. By 1401 with an armed stand-off in Paris, the two men's differences had become mutually antagonistic and insoluble: M. Thibault, *Isabeau de Bavière, reine de France, la jeunesse (1370-1405)* (Paris, 1903), pp. 294-306; M. Nordberg, *Les Ducs et la royauté: études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orléans et de Bourgogne, 1392-1407* (Uppsala, 1964), pp. 66-7.

²⁷ For William of la Trémoille being sent to Hungary on 10 April 1394 see *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 47r.; t. 65, f. 59v. For Renier Pot being sent on the same embassy on the same date see *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 17r. John of Ternam and John of Foulion were two of the eleven esquires who formed part of the Burgundian contingent: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 39v.; t. 23, f. 60r. The names of the third knight and nine of the esquires have remained elusive.

²⁸ The esquire who went to Hungary with Renier Pot as part of Orléans' delegation was John Pelican, one of the duke's esquires of equerry, and the heralds were John Sper and John le Conte: *Pièces originales*, 2349/52873 (3).

²⁹ Pot was paid 500 *livres tournois* on 10 January by Louis of Orléans: *Pièces originales*, 2349/52873 (3). He was only paid by Philip the Bold on 5 December 1394, when he received 1000 *escus d'or*: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 111v. This would seem to bear out Palmer's assertion that Pot was being paid for half of 1394 by Philip the Bold and half by Louis of Orléans: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 241. Pot maintained that Renier Pot was sent on a brief visit to Hungary on behalf of Louis in January 1394, and then went again to Hungary for Philip: Pot, *Histoire de Regnier Pot*, p. 39. This is unlikely, as it would have given Renier very little time to visit Hungary on behalf of Orléans before he was sent by Philip the Bold. Such a suggestion also ignores the fact that the two men were obviously cooperating in 1394.

displayed from the outset, as he was clearly sending a greater number of men than Orléans as part of this first embassy, and they were also of higher rank. Both dukes probably thought that Sigismund would gratefully accept this proposal as soon as it was put to him, but this proved not to be the case. On 7 January 1395, William of la Trémoille was paid by Philip the Bold for the journey to Hungary which had begun in the April of the previous year, and it is clear that he had spent most of 1394 accompanying Sigismund around his territories, pressing him to offer a response.³⁰ Similarly, Renier Pot was paid at the end of 1394, and so while he probably returned before William, he must have spent at least several months in Hungary.³¹ Prosper Bauyn, an eighteenth-century *doyen* of the Dijonnaise *Chambre des comptes*, asserted that the Hungarian king immediately agreed to accept a crusade along with the suggestion that he should write to Charles VI to request further aid.³² He obviously could not explain why Sigismund hesitated before giving a response to the offer of a crusade to aid him against the Turks, and he ignored Sigismund's actions as he considered them an affront to Philip's generous offer.³³

³⁰ William was paid on 7 January 1395 (n.s.) for his voyage "...vers le Roy de hongrie, d'où il fut en Esclavonie et en Bosse et ailleurs où il fut longtems avant que le d[it] Roy voulut luy faire response au sujet de son ambassade, l'ayant enfin recuë en l'en revenam il attendit longtems à Venise certains ambassadeurs qui devaient venir avec luy vers le roy, mond[it] s[eigneu]r et le duc d'orleans,..": *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 139v. The fact that Sigismund spent most of 1394 travelling around the regions of his kingdom suggests that in the face of the Turkish withdrawal from the Balkans, the Hungarian king was attending to domestic affairs. Here the difficulty of trying to reckon an ambassador's absence by using the date that he was being paid for his journey is revealed. William was being paid in January 1395, but (as will be seen below) he was on his way to Venice at this time, and was not to return to France for at least another two months.

³¹ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 111v. Pot was paid by Philip the Bold on 5 December 1394 and as he was not mentioned as being abroad at a later date he was presumably back in France by this time. Pot felt that this was the case: Pot, *Histoire de Renier Pot*, p. 39.

³² *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 340r.-v. Bauyn stated that when the ambassadors suggested sending to Charles VI "...pour le prier qu'il lui plait l'assister contre l'ennemi commun des cretiens;..il ne fût pas difficile au Roi de Hongrie, de suivre cet avis." This is in stark contradiction to the facts, and it is notable that Bauyn was the only one of the Dominican compilers of what was to become known as the *Collection Bourgogne* who offered his own pro-Burgundian analysis along with transcriptions of the archives at Dijon. Bauyn's interjections are easily recognisable as such as they are added alongside his transcriptions.

³³ Palmer could not explain Sigismund's hesitancy either: Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 203.

It is not difficult to imagine the reasons for the Hungarian king's hesitancy.

Sigismund generally adopted a defensive strategy against the Turks, preferring to react to their movements rather than initiating offensives against them. This strategy had led him to refuse French help on two recent occasions, when Boucicaut had offered his services in 1388, and when Philip of Artois did the same in 1393. Boucicaut had arrived in Hungary with Renaud of Roye after having spent several months with the Ottoman sultan, Murad I. Sigismund was engaged in preparations against the marquis of Moravia and so the redoubtable Boucicaut's services were not required.³⁴ Philip of Artois may have been sent to Hungary in 1393 in response to an appeal from its king, but the French could not keep well enough informed of a situation which could change quite rapidly, and by the time Artois had arrived in Hungary, the Turks had moved out of the area. Sigismund did not want to provoke their return and so he persuaded Artois to attack Bohemia, on the pretext that he regarded their orthodoxy as suspect.³⁵ The Turks had been occupied with Bulgaria in 1393, but by May 1394 they were laying siege to Constantinople, and generally this city was to be the focus of their activities for the rest of the century.³⁶ Thus the embassy sent by Philip the Bold and Orléans had arrived once again at a time when the Hungarian king was not considering activity against the Turks. Sigismund was doubtless glad of the breathing space which the Turks' withdrawal from the Balkans afforded him and he wanted to evade their attention for the time being rather than provoke their return. A crusade would not only bring back the Turks, it was also bound to involve a pitched battle, and Sigismund was concerned that this would be an uncertain route to follow. Accepting a crusading army

³⁴ *Livre des fais*, p. 62.

³⁵ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 123-5. The author suggested that the Ottoman sultan retreated because he had heard that the king of France was at the head of the force, but it is more likely that he was turning his attention to Constantinople.

³⁶ Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 43-4.

would be a gamble, and as Sigismund risked nothing less than the loss of his kingdom to Turkish rule, he was not prepared to commit himself without reflection.

William of la Trémoille and Renier Pot had obviously been instructed by Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans to remain in Hungary until they had managed to persuade Sigismund to accept the offer of a crusade. Both dukes dispatched extra ambassadors to keep up the pressure on the Hungarian king. In the summer of 1394 Philip the Bold sent Guy of la Trémoille, his “premier chambellan”, to Hungary, while Louis sent Philip of Florigny, who occupied the same position in his household.³⁷ Despite his reservations, and faced with the arrival of more ambassadors, the Hungarian king eventually decided that it was worth accepting the offer. While he was wary of provoking their return, he probably realised that it was almost inevitable that the Turks would turn their attention to the Balkans once more. If England and France had reopened their war when this occurred, offers of French aid would not be so forthcoming. It must have been around the end of 1394 that Sigismund provisionally accepted the crusade proposal and it was at this point that Renier Pot, Guy of la Trémoille and the other ambassadors returned to France. William of la Trémoille also left Hungary in the winter of 1394 and travelled to Venice, where he awaited the arrival of the Hungarian ambassadors whom Sigismund had promised to dispatch. The

³⁷ For Guy of la Trémoille see *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 57v.; t. 25, f. 45v. The importance of this mission to Philip is conveyed by the text of this entry, which states that Guy was being paid “...sur les frais d’un voyage pour affaire tres importante que le duc luy ordonna de faire...lequel il avoit tres a coeur.”: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 57v. Guy was paid on 23 December 1394 but there is no record of the date of his departure for Hungary, which presumably took place in the summer. It is difficult to be more precise as only the chance survival of records of payment for voyages undertaken allows any reconstruction of embassies to be attempted, and it is not always clear whether the recipient was being paid before, during or after his period abroad. For the payment of Philip of Florigny, see *Quittances et pièces diverses*, iv. Philip received 1125 livres from Orléans’ treasurer on 26 May 1394 and acknowledged receipt of this amount on 1 June. This suggests that he was in France at the time, and had not yet set out for Hungary. It is possible that he travelled with Guy, but there is no evidence to prove this.

Hungarians were late, however, and by the time they had arrived in Venice in March 1395, William had set out for Burgundy.³⁸

By the winter of 1394 the opening stage of the negotiations for the crusade to Nicopolis had been completed, and while William of la Trémoille and the Hungarians had missed each other in Venice, Sigismund had at least committed himself to receiving a crusade. It had taken longer than anticipated, and one wonders whether the delay had dampened the enthusiasm of Louis of Orléans. The Hungarian ambassadors, having left Venice, arrived in Lyon on 8 May 1395, where Philip the Bold and Orléans were staying, *en route* to Avignon.³⁹ Until this point, what can be reconstructed of the embassies sent to Sigismund in 1394 would suggest that Louis had remained a partner in the project, even if it was Philip's embassy which had been the more imposing, and his marshal, William of la Trémoille, who had taken a leading role in the negotiations in Hungary. On the arrival of the Hungarians in France, however, Philip the Bold began to assert his dominance over proceedings. When the Hungarian delegation arrived at Lyon in May 1395, it was Philip the Bold who formally received it; his magnificent gifts to the Hungarian ambassadors revealed him acting more like an independent prince than a vassal of the French crown.⁴⁰ There is no record of Louis presenting the Hungarians with any gifts, and he had perhaps accepted at this point that it was his uncle's hand which was guiding events. As the dukes' visit to

³⁸ *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy*, R. Brown, ed., vol. 1, 1202-1509 (London, 1864), no. 115, p. 35. The decree of the Senate shows that William of la Trémoille had arrived in Venice on 24 January 1394 and he was still there on 4 February. The Venetians were being involved presumably because of their interest in the events of the East and the possible need for shipping.

³⁹ Philip the Bold's brother, John, Duke of Berry, was also at Lyons as part of the French embassy to Benedict XIII, but there is no evidence that he played any part in the crusade negotiations. There is no record of his having sent any ambassadors to the Hungarian king and it would be fair to say that Berry's interests were more in the artistic and sensual than in the martial sphere.

⁴⁰ There were four Hungarian ambassadors, and Philip gave three of them a "hanap d'or", while the lord of Fraulzban, who headed the embassy, received "...un fermail d'or a trois grosses perles, 3 saphirs et un diamant au milieu.": *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 60r.

Avignon would take some time, the Hungarians' next move should have been to go on to Paris and meet Charles VI. However, this meeting was not to take place until August, by which time both Philip the Bold and Orléans were back in Paris to receive them in the company of the king. It is submitted that it was Philip the Bold who was the instigator of this delaying of the Hungarians' journey to Paris, and this is suggested by the fact that their first call was to see Philip the Bold's wife, who was residing at Dijon.⁴¹ Their next visit was to John of Gaunt in Bordeaux, and it is likely that Gaunt's involvement was more down to Philip than Orléans, as these two men had met each other frequently at the negotiating table.⁴² Louis of Orléans could see the direction which events were taking, but his continued interest is marked by the fact that he sent his secretary, Louis of Buvot, to accompany the Hungarian ambassadors to Bordeaux on the next stage of their embassy.⁴³ Renier Pot also went with them, and he was representing the two dukes simultaneously once more.⁴⁴

It is clear that Philip did not want the Hungarians to see Charles VI without him, and this is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the diplomatic manoeuvres which lay behind the Nicopolis crusade. The most obvious explanation would be that Philip was giving Charles VI time to recover from one of his attacks, and that the king was only well enough to see the Hungarians in August. This is unconvincing, as Charles was capable of government for most of 1395, and was certainly in good health in May, when the Hungarians had arrived in

⁴¹ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 59r. The Hungarians stayed at Dijon between 17-19 May.

⁴² *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 17r. The entry states that the Hungarians were going to speak with Gaunt on the "sujet de leur ambassade."

⁴³ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 17r. *Français* 10431 (346) reveals that on 12 May 1395 Louis of Orléans was paying his secretary "Louis de Buno" two *francs d'or* per day to escort the Hungarian ambassadors. On 4 November 1395 Buvot acknowledged the receipt of nineteen *francs d'or* for the "...voyage fait a Bordeaux avec les ambassadeurs du roy de Hongrie aupres du duc de Lancastre...": *Français* 10431 (294).

⁴⁴ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 17r. *Français* 10431 (587) shows that Renier Pot was being paid five *francs d'or* per day by Orléans to escort the Hungarians. From this document (also dated 12 May) it is clear that Orléans was still acting in conjunction with Philip the Bold.

France.⁴⁵ There is also no doubt that a visit to Charles should have taken precedent over one to John of Gaunt, even if Philip was still hoping for the latter's involvement in the crusade. This deliberate stalling of the Hungarians' arrival in Paris suggests that either Charles had not been fully involved in the diplomacy surrounding the crusade, or he had not given it his full approval. In the previous chapter it was asserted that the regular recurrence of his illness and the likelihood that he was never the same after his first attack in 1392 meant that after this date Charles's role in government was greatly reduced. Charles appears to have been lucid for most of 1394, and it was probably early in the year that Philip and Louis informed the king of their decision to open negotiations with the king of Hungary.⁴⁶ Since Charles was at least not suffering from one of his attacks in 1394, it is inconceivable that he did not know about the negotiations for the crusade. The crusade would have been discussed at court, and it could not have been kept from him. Guy of la Trémoille, for example, was also one of Charles's chamberlains, and it is unlikely that the king did not know that he was in Hungary for the second half of 1394.⁴⁷ However, as the crusade project had been conceived without him, and Charles's activities in government in the spring of 1394 were probably quite limited, it is not surprising that Charles took no active part in sending the embassies which went to Sigismund. There is no evidence that the French king dispatched any ambassadors to Sigismund himself, and he was not subsidising the journeys to Hungary made by Guy and William of la Trémoille or Renier Pot. It is revealing that

⁴⁵ From the account of the monk of St. Denis, it would appear that Charles was sane for at least the first eight months of 1395. In February 1396 the king recovered from an attack which must have occurred some time after the visit of a Genoese embassy, which took place in the middle of August, not long after the Hungarians left Paris: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 407, 401.

⁴⁶ Charles apparently recovered from an attack in January 1394 which had begun in the previous June: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 304; Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue*, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁷ F.M. Graves, *Pièces relatives à la vie de Louis I^{er} duc d'Orléans et de Valentine Visconti, sa femme* (Paris, 1913), p. 57.

although Charles had almost certainly known of the planned crusade since 1394, Philip's insistence on being present when the Hungarians arrived in Paris shows that he could not be entirely sure what the king's response would be.

The delaying of the meeting between Charles VI and the Hungarians reveals the importance of this meeting to Philip. Even though Sigismund had agreed to the offer of a crusade, nothing could be done without the assent of the French king. Despite his plans for Burgundy, Philip could not forget that he and all the inhabitants of his duchy were French subjects, and only Charles could give them licence to leave the country.⁴⁸ If the king refused this consent, the painstaking negotiations in Hungary of the previous year would come to nothing. It is hard to say whether Philip feared that there was a real chance that Charles would not give his consent to his subjects' departure, but perhaps he regarded the king as too erratic to be counted on without some 'guidance.' Philip was probably concerned about the malign influence of his enemies such as Oliver Clisson, whom he feared could poison the king's mind against his project in his absence.⁴⁹ Philip was also aware that Richard II had accepted Charles's offer of his daughter's hand in marriage; he did not want the subsequent wedding preparations and celebrations to interfere with his crusade project.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Froissart stated that no-one had been allowed to leave the kingdom to go on the Al-Mahdiya expedition in 1390 without Charles VI's permission: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 155. Bauyn confirmed that Philip needed Charles VI's consent before any French subjects could go on the crusade: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 341v.

⁴⁹ On his regaining control of government, Philip had charged Clisson with extortion and when he failed to answer this charge he was stripped of his office of Constable and Philip of Artois was appointed in his place: Y. Gicquel, *Olivier de Clisson (1336-1407) connétable de France ou chef de parti breton?* (Paris, 1981), p. 136. Philip had begun raising *aides* from his territories by the end of 1394, so he was obviously quite sure that Charles would not block his plans as long as he was on hand to direct events: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, pp. 228-9, 232.

⁵⁰ The offer of the hand of Isabella had been accepted by the start of July: Saul, *Richard II*, p. 226. Froissart recounted that when Charles received the letters brought by Sigismund's ambassadors in 1395, he was too busy with the wedding preparations to involve himself in the proposed crusade: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 217.

John of Gaunt's meeting with the Hungarians in the summer of 1395 marked the high point of his involvement in the plans for the crusade. Like Orléans, Gaunt had always intended to be a crusader and his indentures with Sir Hugh Hastings in 1366 and John Lord Neville of Raby in 1370 reveal his long-standing desire to go on crusade.⁵¹ Service to the English crown in the wars against France had meant that these ambitions had been put on hold in the 1370s, while the 1380s were largely spent trying to assert his claim to the Castilian throne. The Schism had allowed the expedition which the duke led to conquer Castile in 1386 to assume the status of a crusade and Gaunt had been Urban VI's *vexilliferum crucis* or "standard bearer of the Cross" on this occasion.⁵² However, it is unlikely that Gaunt saw his crusader status as anything more than a useful tool in his attempt to become king of Castile. In the treaty of Bayonne of 1388 the duke abandoned his claims to the Castilian throne, Urban was entirely disregarded, and Gaunt had no compunction about marrying one of his daughters to the heir of a schismatic ruler. After his return to England in 1389, Gaunt once more assumed the role of England's most senior peace-maker, and he saw peace with France as opening the way to a solution to the Schism and a crusade against the Infidel.⁵³ He was financially secure in the 1390s following his treaty with the king of Castile, and he was possibly considering leading an English force on crusade.⁵⁴

Gaunt was aware of the efforts which were being made across the channel to raise

⁵¹ Goodman pointed out that the indenture with Sir Hugh Hastings made provision for Gaunt going on crusade: Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 200. For the indenture with John, Lord Neville of Raby see N.B. Lewis, 'Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, Enrolled in Chancery, 1367-1399', *Camden Miscellany*, vol. 22 (1964), p. 89.

⁵² *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, p. 264.

⁵³ Froissart, referring to events of 1392-93, recorded that Gaunt was worried about the rise of the Turks: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 80-1. Recent historians have asserted that Gaunt was an intending crusader in the 1390s. Goodman stated that in the 1390s Gaunt was advocating "...Christian unity and crusades against infidels.": Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 244; see also *ibid.*, pp. 184, 265, 355, 372. Similarly, Tyerman saw Gaunt as "...one of the prime movers in the 1390s' crusade policy.": Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 295.

enthusiasm for crusading. Even if he had not met him personally, Gaunt was familiar with the work of Philip of Mézières and he had promised his support to the planned Order of the Passion.⁵⁵ Gaunt also had links with two of Mézières's Four Evangelists: Otto of Grandson was one of Gaunt's retainers and the duke had met Robert the Hermit on at least one occasion.⁵⁶ Gaunt would have been reasonably well informed of the advance of the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans; Henry of Derby had returned from a voyage to Jerusalem in 1393 which had seen him meet Sigismund in Vienna, where the Hungarian king doubtless provided Derby with news of the situation facing his kingdom.⁵⁷

John of Gaunt and Philip the Bold may have been discussing the possibility of joint co-operation on the subject of a crusade since the peace negotiations of 1389. The two men and Louis of Orléans were present at the negotiations which opened in Leulingham in March 1393, and which by June had produced a truce which was to last until the September of the following year.⁵⁸ It was possibly at this meeting that Gaunt learned of Philip the Bold's and Orléans' agreement to send an embassy to Sigismund in the following year. Gaunt's contribution to the embassies sent to Hungary proved to be somewhat less than that of Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans. Unlike the other two men, there is no evidence that Gaunt sent an official delegation to Sigismund comprised of leading members of his household.

⁵⁴ A. Goodman, 'John of Gaunt', *England in the Fourteenth Century*, W.M. Ormrod, ed., Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 81.

⁵⁵ Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 364.

⁵⁶ Grandson was retained by Gaunt in August 1374: *John of Gaunt's Register, 1372-1376*, vol. 2, p. 4. For the duke's meeting with Robert the Hermit, which took place in 1393, see Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 192-3.

⁵⁷ Derby apparently met Sigismund in Vienna in November 1392: L. Toulmin Smith, ed., *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land Made by Henry Earl of Derby (Afterwards King Henry IV) in the Years 1390-1 and 1392-3. Being Accounts Kept by his Treasurer During Two Years*, Camden Society, new series, vol. 52 (1894), pp. lviii-lix. On 16 October 1393 John "Derby herald", was paid £13 6s. 8d. for his journey to king Sigismund, to announce the imminent arrival of his master: H. Stanford London, 'Henry IV's Heralds on his Journeys to Prussia in 1390 and to the Holy Sepulchre in 1392', *Notes and Queries*, vol. 193 (1948), p. 466.

⁵⁸ *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 515, n. 5.

When William of la Trémoille was waiting for the arrival of the Hungarian ambassadors in Venice in February 1395, the entry in the Venetian archives reveals that he was regarded as a representative of Philip the Bold, Louis of Orléans and John of Gaunt.⁵⁹ However, William was Philip the Bold's marshal, and he was presumably acting largely on his instructions. Gaunt did not contribute to the expenses of William of la Trémoille, Renier Pot, or any of the other ambassadors sent by Philip the Bold and Orléans in 1394. Indeed, while it is clear that Gaunt was interested in the idea of sending a crusade to Hungary, there is not a great deal of evidence to suggest that he was making much effort to help realise this project. His son-in-law, John Holland, went to Hungary in 1394, and Gaunt may well have had something to do with this voyage.⁶⁰

In January 1394 John Holland was given letters of protection and powers of ambassador for a voyage which would take him to Hungary.⁶¹ This had been done on Richard II's orders, and the king had also requested a safe-conduct for his half-brother from the king of France, and asked a German prince to allow Holland to pass through his lands.⁶² Richard II was the only person with the power to do all this on Holland's behalf, and this does not necessarily mean that the king was behind the embassy. Richard II has been shown to have had little interest in crusading, and while Holland was on his way to Hungary, Richard had set out for Ireland. Holland was keen on crusading, and if he was representing anyone else on his visit to Hungary, it was more likely to have been John of Gaunt than

⁵⁹ *Calendar of State Papers...of Venice*, no. 115, p. 35.

⁶⁰ Holland had become Gaunt's son-in-law after his hasty marriage to Elizabeth of Lancaster in 1386, and had acted as constable of Gaunt's crusading force in the same year.

⁶¹ Holland was granted letters of protection and powers of ambassador for his voyage to Hungary on 18 and 20 January 1394: Perroy, *The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, p. 244.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 244, records payment to John Marche, herald, who had gone to France at the end of 1393 to petition for the safe-conduct from Charles VI. For Richard II's letter to the German prince see *ibid.*, pp. 144-5.

Richard II.⁶³ Palmer believed that Holland crossed to France in 1394 and travelled to Hungary with Renier Pot and the other ambassadors sent by Philip the Bold and Orléans, and this may have been the case.⁶⁴ This would explain the delay between Orléans' payment to Pot for the embassy in January and his eventual departure in April, since he may have been waiting for Holland to arrive in France. However, even if Holland was part of the embassy which set out for Hungary in April 1394, he had a journey of his own to make. The ultimate destination of John Holland's voyage of 1394 was Jerusalem, and so unless he dispatched messengers back to England, Gaunt would have to have waited until his son-in-law's return in 1395 to hear news from Hungary.⁶⁵ There is also no evidence that Holland received payment from Gaunt for his voyage to Hungary, and he may have reached his decision to visit Sigismund independently of his father-in-law. Gaunt's interest in the planned crusade continued into 1395. John Foulion, one of the esquires who had travelled to Hungary with William of la Trémoille in April 1394, seems to have returned in January 1395, and his next journey was to Gaunt in Guyenne.⁶⁶ Foulion was presumably visiting Gaunt to communicate news of the eventual success of the embassy of which he had been a part, and to inform the duke that he could expect the arrival of the Hungarian ambassadors within the next few months. While crusading was certainly one of Gaunt's concerns, 1394

⁶³ Holland promised his support to the proposed Order of the Passion, and he received an abbreviated version of Mézières' conception of the Order around this time, presumably from either Robert the Hermit or Otto of Grandson: M.V. Clarke, 'The Wilton Diptych', *Fourteenth Century Studies*, L.S. Sutherland, M. McKisack, eds. (Oxford, 1937), p. 289.

⁶⁴ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 242.

⁶⁵ The payment made to John Marche, herald, makes it clear that Holland was going to Jerusalem: Perroy, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, p. 244. Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 138, suggested that Holland went to Jerusalem and returned via Hungary. He was back in England by the start of 1395: *Calendar of Patent Rolls, Richard II*, vol. 5, 1391-96 (London, 1905), pp. 535, 587.

⁶⁶ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 60r. Foulion was paid on 12 January 1395 and one assumes that he was back in Burgundy by this date. The entry recording the payment reveals that the trip to Guyenne was about to begin.

was a particularly busy year, and his other commitments had obviously limited the extent to which he could involve himself in the crusade plans.

Philip had doubtless appreciated the involvement of Gaunt and Orléans in his plans, but the fact that he sent an embassy to Prussia reveals that his aims were different from the other two men. Another of the seemingly ubiquitous Trémoille brothers in Philip's service, Peter, had been sent to Prussia in 1394, and he had been instructed to offer a crusade to the Teutonic Knights.⁶⁷ It is notable that Louis of Orléans and John of Gaunt played no part in this embassy and there are no archival references to their having sent any ambassadors to Prussia. This reflects the fact that neither Gaunt nor Orléans had any real interest in crusading on the *reysen*, and here the difference between the aims of Philip and the other two men is highlighted. Philip primarily wanted to launch a Burgundian crusade, in which his own participation was unlikely and not strictly necessary, whereas Louis of Orléans and Gaunt were thinking more in personal than territorial terms. Prussia was not a fitting location for either Gaunt or Orléans to fulfill their crusade ambitions as they wanted to be involved in something more impressive than one of the crusades which headed into Lithuania each year. There were precedents for dukes going on the *reysen*, but neither Gaunt nor Orléans saw it as fitting that men of their rank should take part on an expedition on which they were not in command. The offer of a crusade to Prussia was not inconsistent with Philip the Bold's plans, however. Since he could not be sure what the Hungarian response was going to be, Philip wanted to test the water for an expedition to the only other viable

⁶⁷ There are numerous references to this embassy in the *Collection Bourgogne*, see t. 20, f. 340r.; t. 23, f. 139v.; t. 25, f. 45v.; t. 25, f. 48r.; t. 65, f. 58v.; t. 65, f. 59v. Bauyn suggested that Peter had been sent to Prussia to request the aid of the Teutonic Order in the planned crusade against the Ottoman Turks: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 340r. The Grand Master's reply, however, makes it clear that Philip had offered to send a crusade to Prussia, and Bauyn's distortion may have been a genuine misunderstanding or an attempt to make the duke appear more single-minded in his pursuit of the Turks.

crusading frontier in Europe. Philip intended a crusade to be an expression of Burgundian power, and so its adversaries were arguably of secondary importance, provided they were regarded by Christendom as legitimate targets. A crusade to Prussia was probably attractive to Philip because many members of his household had experience of the *reysen*, and the distance to Prussia was far less than Hungary, which would make a crusade there cheaper and less difficult to organize. Despite these attractions, Prussia was probably only Philip's insurance policy should the Hungarian king refuse the offer of a crusade against the Turks, as he was aware that a crusade to Prussia presented several drawbacks. The most notable of these was the fact that the Teutonic Knights would want to retain a controlling influence over the crusade and insist that leadership and strategy remained in their hands. Philip would also have regarded a large Burgundian *reyse* against the Lithuanians as a less impressive undertaking than the Burgundian leadership of a large expedition to the Balkans to fight the Ottoman Turks, since this had not been attempted before.

In the event, Philip's offer was politely turned down by the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Conrad of Jungingen, who complained that the weather and the terrain were too unpredictable to support a major expedition.⁶⁸ While there was certainly something in these arguments, Conrad was probably more concerned about the problems which a large Burgundian crusade would create. He would have recognized that the issue of leadership presented difficulties. The Grand Master was concerned that Philip the Bold would want the *reyse* to be conducted according to his instructions. The Order had experienced problems of this sort before: in 1391 the margrave of Meisen had brought a large force to Prussia and proceeded to dictate how the *reyse* would be fought.⁶⁹ The

⁶⁸ *Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus*, J. Voigt, ed. (Konigsberg, 1857), no. 57, pp. 70-1.

⁶⁹ E. Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier, 1100-1525* (London, 1980), p. 151.

weather was also a problem because not only could it force the *reyse* to be cancelled, it would also mean that the crusaders would remain idle at Marienburg, and indiscipline would almost inevitably follow. The Grand Master would have remembered with a shudder the trouble caused by a handful of Scots and English only a few years previously.⁷⁰ This rebuff from Prussia helps to explain why Philip kept his ambassadors in Hungary pressing for a favorable response from Sigismund; in the autumn of 1394 it was the only option left open to him.⁷¹

By the summer of 1395 the Hungarian ambassadors had been brought to France, and all that remained to clear the path for a crusade was a meeting in Paris with Charles VI. This meeting was the point at which Froissart, Juvenal des Ursins and the monk of St. Denis had begun their accounts of the origins of the crusade, missing the fact that for Philip the Bold this was the culmination of his diplomatic achievements. The chroniclers' insistence on focusing on Charles receiving the Hungarian ambassadors distorts the reality of the situation, which was that Charles was really being presented with a *fait accompli* when the Hungarians requested his support for a crusade. The Hungarians knew that Charles VI was not the man behind the crusade preparations, and this is demonstrated by their movements once they had arrived in France. Once in Paris Philip could also count on the support of Louis of Orléans, and with the voice of one who normally opposed Philip on this occasion supporting his plans, he felt that there was little chance that Charles would refuse to allow the crusade to proceed. Even if Philip was being over-cautious, the meeting between Charles VI and the

⁷⁰ The incident had occurred in 1391, when several English knights quarrelled with a number of Scots in Marienburg and the French, under Boucicaut, had subsequently intervened: *Livre des faits*, pp. 76-7; *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 475-7.

⁷¹ Peter of la Trémoille appears to have been in Prussia from May to December 1394: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 23, f. 139v.

Hungarians was a success, and the French king duly gave his permission for his subjects to undertake the “voyage d’Hongrie”.⁷²

The diplomacy surrounding the Nicopolis crusade allows an insight into Philip the Bold’s single-minded pursuit of the crusade which would launch Burgundy on the international stage. Philip could have undertaken the necessary negotiations with Sigismund without the help of Orléans or John of Gaunt, but he probably welcomed their assistance provided that this did not alter the nature of the ensuing crusade. Orléans’s sending of ambassadors had suggested an initial enthusiasm for the project, but by the summer of 1395 Philip emerged as firmly in charge of the preparations, and the resulting crusade did not witness the participation of either Orléans or Gaunt. Philip’s courtiers had headed the negotiations with Sigismund, and they formed the core of the crusade army which suffered such a crushing defeat in 1396. In the following chapter the Burgundian, French and English contingents on the crusade will be analysed in more detail, as their differing strengths clearly reflect the dominant role which Philip the Bold played in launching the crusade, and the supporting roles played by others.

⁷² Bauyn stated that Charles promised the Hungarians that “...au printemps il consentiroit que ses suiets passassent en Hongrie;..”: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 341v.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE BURGUNDIAN, FRENCH AND ENGLISH CONTINGENTS ON THE CRUSADE TO NICOPOLIS

The accounts of the Nicopolis crusade provided by Froissart, the monk of St. Denis and the author of the *Livre des fais* focused mainly upon the activities of the leading French knights on the expedition. The centre stage in both the battle of Nicopolis and the ensuing capture of the crusaders was occupied by figures such as Coucy, Boucicaut and Philip of Artois. John of Vienne was the only prominent member of Nevers' contingent to whom any attention was paid by the chroniclers, and this was arguably because he was also admiral of France. Whether intentional or not, the impression given is of an essentially French enterprise which happened to be led by a Burgundian. These chroniclers were not Burgundians, and they all wrote accounts which reflected their attachment in varying degrees to Charles VI's court.¹ While this is only to be expected, it disguises the fact that by far the largest and most prominent contingent on the crusade was that commanded by the crusade's leader, John of Nevers, and staffed at its core by the members of his father's household. Philip the Bold and those attached to him were of course all French subjects, but in his plans for establishing his duchy as a distinct and autonomous region of France, Philip conceived and realised the crusade to Nicopolis as a Burgundian expedition. In this chapter

¹ The chronicle of the abbey St. Denis was the unofficial royal biography, and the author of the *Livre des fais* was writing about a man who as marshal of France was above all a prominent courtier. Froissart was not French by birth, but by the 1390s he was more firmly attached to the French court.

Philip the Bold's choice of Nevers as the leader of the crusade is examined and his detailed organisation of the Burgundian heart of the Nicopolis army revealed. This analysis of Philip's preparations reveals his determination to fashion a crusade which was specifically Burgundian at its core, and was intended to be recognised as such. Louis of Orléans' and John of Gaunt's decision not to participate on the crusade provides the starting point for the second and third sections of the chapter. This leads in each case to a discussion of the likelihood of the presence of an Orléanist and Lancastrian force at Nicopolis, and ultimately to a consideration of the nature of French and English participation on the crusade.

In Philip the Bold's plans to launch a crusade to oppose the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans, the issue of leadership was of prime importance. If the crusade was to be seen as a Burgundian enterprise, leadership would have to be entrusted to a Burgundian and could not be jointly held. This had always been Philip's belief, and at the meeting between the Hungarian ambassadors and Charles VI in August 1395, Philip asked whether his son could be allowed to lead the crusade. It was probably at this point that Louis of Orléans saw Philip's intentions fully revealed, but no effort was made to oppose his request, and Charles VI waved Nevers off to Hungary in the following year with his blessing and a large sum of money.² Both the chroniclers of these events and subsequent historians have failed to recognise the importance of Philip's choice of Nevers as leader, and the fact that it was the culmination of his crusade plans, and not a decision made on the spur of the moment. Froissart and the monk of St. Denis recounted that Philip happened to be in Paris with his son when the Hungarians arrived to see Charles VI, and it was only at this point in their accounts that the issue of Nevers' leadership arises. Once the Hungarians' appeal had been

² Charles VI gave Philip the Bold 116,000 *francs* towards the crusade: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, p. 228.

accepted by Charles VI, the monk of St. Denis claimed that Philip stepped forward and proposed that his son could lead the crusade, while Froissart even went so far as to suggest that it was Nevers himself who requested to be leader of the expedition.³ Since both these accounts failed to show Philip as the man largely responsible for bringing the Hungarians to France, it is unsurprising that they also failed to see Philip's continued dominance of events once they had arrived in Paris. Nevertheless, it remains the case that John of Nevers was vital to Philip's plans for the crusade, and the question of his leadership was one of the reasons why Philip wanted to be in Paris when the Hungarians arrived.

Historians have thought that Philip the Bold intended to lead the crusade which was being planned himself, perhaps in conjunction with the dukes of Orléans and Lancaster.⁴ Whatever the impression he gave, in reality Philip had no intention of sharing the leadership of the crusade, and no intention of leading it in person. Philip was certainly attracted by the prospect of commanding a major crusade, but it would have been risky for him to do so, and it made much more sense for him to send his eldest son as leader instead. If Philip was killed on the crusade, or even if he was captured, his hopes of laying the foundations for a Burgundian state would be dashed. John of Nevers was old enough to succeed to the duchy, but not experienced enough to play the dominant role in French government which was essential to advance the duchy's interests. In the event of the Philip's removal from the helm of French government, whether permanently or for a long period, power would pass into the hands of Louis of Orléans. This would almost certainly prove disastrous as far as Philip was concerned, as in such circumstances it was likely that Louis would use his position to advance his own interests and keep the duchy of Burgundy politically and

³ *Saint-Denis*, vol. 2, pp. 427-9; Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 218-19.

⁴ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 200. Vaughan stated that as late as May 1395 Philip intended to lead the crusade himself: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, p. 62.

geographically hemmed in. Philip had been making efforts to introduce John of Nevers to the French court in the hope that one day his son would be able to succeed him as the unofficial head of French government.⁵ Even by 1395, however, Philip saw the day when this occurred as being at least some years in the future.

If John of Nevers was not yet ready for government, Philip knew that his son would be much more useful to his plans for the duchy as the leader of the crusade. Nevers would eventually become the next duke of Burgundy, and to have been at the head of the largest crusade of the fourteenth century before he had even attained his dukedom would be an enormous boost to his prestige; the kings of France had not had a crusader in their ranks since the days of Louis IX. While Philip saw that there were serious political risks in leading the crusade himself, there were none in sending Nevers as its leader, and the results of such a decision could only be beneficial for the duchy of Burgundy. If the crusade was a success and John survived, he would be hailed as a hero and immortalised as the man who had inflicted the first serious defeat on the Ottoman Turks.⁶ If the crusade was a failure, Philip knew that neither he nor Nevers would become unpopular as a result; the mere fact that a crusade had been launched would be enough to ensure its fame and popularity. This proved to be the case: the usually parsimonious Burgundian estates were as willing to contribute towards Nevers's ransom as they had been to finance the crusade in the first place, and the young count was fêted on his return from captivity in 1398 as a hero.⁷ If John of Nevers

⁵ Nevers was with his father in Paris between May and July 1388 for example: Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, pp. 193-5.

⁶ Amadeus of Savoy, the Green Count, had inflicted defeats on the Turks in 1366-7, but it did nothing to slow their momentum: Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 379-97.

⁷ The Flemish estates were particularly reluctant to grant Philip money, yet in 1394 they paid 65,000 *nobles* when asked for 100,000, and in 1397 they paid 100,000 when asked for 150,000: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, pp. 178-9. Vaughan was not especially impressed with Flanders' generosity on these occasions, but it would seem that on the whole the estates were behind Philip's crusade project. Nevers returned to Dijon on 22 February 1398: *ibid.*, p. 76.

was killed on the crusade, Philip the Bold would have provided the duchy with a martyr, and this could only raise its prestige in the eyes of the rest of Europe. Nevers would be remembered as the young prince who had selflessly given his life in the service of God, and one could imagine that Philip would have exploited the opportunities offered by such a situation to the full. Philip did have another son, Anthony, and so the possibility of Nevers' death would not jeopardize the fortunes of the duchy by leaving Philip with no heir. The fact that Nevers was young would also go in his favour, as if the crusade was defeated there was a good chance that the blame would be deflected away from him. When this defeat did occur, and Nevers' leadership on the crusade to Nicopolis could be generously described as 'low profile,' none of the chroniclers laid the blame for the defeat with the young count or his father.⁸

John of Nevers was only really a good choice as leader of the Nicopolis crusade in terms of Philip's aims of glorifying the duchy of Burgundy and preparing its future duke. In more general terms, John of Nevers was far from being the best man for the job. There were more suitable candidates for the leadership of the crusade at the French court, such as Artois or Boucicaut, and this was probably why Philip insisted on asking the king in person to accept Nevers as leader. Nevers was twenty-four in 1396, and while he was not especially young in an age when military careers began early, he was singularly lacking in military experience.⁹ He was too young to have participated in the French campaigns in Flanders in 1382 and 1383, and he was not part of the army which was intended to sail for England in 1386. In 1388 at the age of seventeen, he had accompanied his father on the expedition to Guelders, but this campaign had ended without any fighting. Similarly, Nevers was also

⁸ The monk of St. Denis, who was the most vociferous critic of the conduct of French chivalry on the crusade, only went as far as to scorn Nevers for surrendering too easily: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 515.

⁹ Nevers was born on 28 May 1371: Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, p. v.

with his father on the royal expedition to Brittany in 1392, but again the force had withdrawn without engaging the enemy. Nevers had not been sent on the *reysen* by his father, which is perhaps odd considering that the count could have fought there under the watchful eye of experienced Burgundian knights who had made several journeys to Prussia, such as William of la Trémoille or John of Savoisy. In 1396, Nevers had not yet been received into the order of knighthood, and the only evidence for any sort of martial activity prior to the crusade of Nicopolis is his presence at the occasional joust.¹⁰ Even if Nevers was a physically competent fighter, he had no experience of actual combat and more importantly, no experience of commanding a force. He had even broken his shoulder rather badly in a riding accident in 1395, and so it is possible that less than a year later his fighting ability may not have been at its best.¹¹ His relative lack of military experience may be explained by the fact that Philip the Bold was more concerned about his son becoming a ruler than a fighter. Nevers needed political and administrative experience for the future roles which he would have to play as duke of Burgundy and a leading figure in French government. Nevers regularly travelled around the ducal lands with his father, and also spent time in Paris.¹² One wonders what the leading French knights of the day thought about Philip's proposal to send his inexperienced son as the leader of the crusade. They were possibly rather pleased with the idea, as they knew that this meant that effectively they could do as they liked on the expedition. If Froissart is to be believed, Coucy at least was possibly concerned about Philip the Bold's choice of leader. When the duke asked Coucy

¹⁰ Nevers was to be knighted while on the crusade to Nicopolis: *Livre des fais*, p. 94. Philip provided jousting harnesses for Nevers and some companions for the jousting organised for Charles VI in 1390: Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, pp. 533, 534, 536.

¹¹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 342r. Charles VI sent two of his doctors, Marceau Gazel and John Adam, and his surgeon, Enguerrand to attend to Nevers' injury. The surgeons of the duchess of Orléans and Philip the Bold were also involved.

whether he would be Nevers' guardian on the crusade, Coucy refused to accept sole responsibility for his son and suggested that others should be involved.¹³

Once Charles VI had given his consent to the crusade and his uncle's request that John of Nevers should be its leader, Philip began the preparations for the expedition to Hungary in earnest. He had already started to raise the necessary finances from his territories.¹⁴ Preparations continued through the winter of 1395-96, and on 28 March 1396 Philip assembled his council to finalize the organization of the Burgundian contingent.¹⁵ This council was composed of the leading figures of the duke's household, such as Guy, Peter and William of la Trémoille, Odard of Chasserons, John of Vienne and Elian of Neillac. It was decided by Philip and this council that Nevers would take a personal force of 110 knights, eighty-nine esquires, ten archers and twenty crossbowmen to Hungary.¹⁶ As Nevers did not have his own household, this force was to be provided by Philip the Bold's leading household officials, and virtually all the 110 knights and eighty-nine esquires were members of Philip's retinue.¹⁷ At the top of the list were such distinguished figures as

¹² For example, Nevers spent most of 1388 travelling around with his father: Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, pp. 192-204.

¹³ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 223-4. The story may be apocryphal, intended by Froissart to emphasise the importance (and modesty) of Coucy.

¹⁴ Negotiations had begun with the Flemish estates in 1394: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, pp. 178-9; see also *ibid.*, pp. 63-4, 74, 228-9, 232.

¹⁵ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 343r. It is fortunate that a good deal of evidence has survived relating to the contingent that Nevers was going to take to Nicopolis. In particular, Bauyn has transcribed the names of most of the 110 knights and eighty-nine esquires who were to accompany the count; all the references cited to *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20 are to Bauyn's transcriptions. This list has also been printed by Buchon, and while there is the occasional difference, it is clear that he was working from the same ms. as Bauyn. For Buchon's list see Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 394-6. The list has also been printed by Atiya in *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, pp. 144-6.

¹⁶ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 343r.-345r. Bauyn gives the names of most of the knights and esquires, and on occasion records the number of people that they were bringing with them. This would bring the total to a little over the 229 men-at-arms, archers and crossbowmen laid down by Philip the Bold. The extra men would presumably have been serving at the expense of those who brought them.

¹⁷ Most of the names of the knights and esquires who made up Nevers' contingent are to be found on a list compiled by Aubrée of all the officials who served in Philip the Bold's household from the 1360s to the 1390s, which is now to be found in *Coll Bourg.*, t. 22, ff. 20r.-27r.

William and Guy of la Trémoille, Philip of Bar, John of Vienne, John of Blaisy and Odard of Chasserons, all of whom were at least chamberlains to the duke.¹⁸ Philip imposed a strict ceremonial aspect on the contingent by stipulating who was to be a member of Nevers' train and who was to carry his banner and pennon. William of Merlo, John de Saint Croix, Elian of Neillac, William of Vienne, Geoffrey of Charny and John of Blaisy were in Nevers' train, Philip of Mussy was carrying his banner, and the lord of 'Grothuse' was carrying his pennon.¹⁹ Philip was ensuring that the most senior members of his household were in close attendance on the young count.

One can see the enormous risk that Philip the Bold was taking, as if the crusade was a disaster he stood to lose many of his best men. Philip realised this, but he knew that if Nevers' contingent was to be regarded as the most splendid on the crusade, he would have to send the highest ranking members of his household with him on the crusade. Philip also needed to provide his relatively inexperienced son with the best advice on the campaign, and so prominent figures like William of la Trémoille would have to be with him. The council laid down those with whom Nevers was to consult, and the key advisory posts were taken up by Philip's most important courtiers; Guy and William of la Trémoille, Philip of Bar, John of Vienne and Odard of Chasserons were once again among the names.²⁰ Coucy, Boucicaut and Artois were included on a further list of people whom the count could consult when he wished, but it would seem that the important decisions were being taken by Philip and his inner circle of advisors.²¹ Philip would almost certainly have briefed his leading councillors

¹⁸ William of la Trémoille was Philip's marshal and one of his counsellors, Guy of la Trémoille was a counsellor and a "premier chambellan", Chasserons was a counsellor. For the posts held by these men see *Coll Bourg.*, t. 22, ff. 20r.-v.

¹⁹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 346v.

²⁰ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 346r.

²¹ *Ibid.* This list included Burgundians such as John of Blaisy, Geoffrey of Charny and Elian of Neillac, but it also included John of Trye, who was marshal to Louis of Orléans.

men on how he wanted the crusade to be fought, and seeing as he stipulated that Nevers was to fight in the vanguard of the Christian force in the event of a battle with the Turks, the major strategic decision had been taken before the crusade set out.²² This tells a great deal about Philip's perception of the expedition; he saw its main aim as the winning of renown for Burgundy. This is emphasized by the fact that Nevers was to have so few archers in his contingent. During his military service under successive kings of France (which dated from the battle of Poitiers), Philip could hardly have been unaware of the impact of archers when used in conjunction with men-at-arms, and yet in Nevers' contingent they were to form no more than a personal guard. This was because Philip saw the crusade as a noble enterprise, in which the presence of large numbers of archers would attract attention away from the Burgundian cavalry. Philip envisaged an expedition in which the cream of Burgundian chivalry would be taking on the infidels from the front, fighting alongside the young man who would be their next duke. One would imagine that the Burgundian knights and esquires who formed Nevers' company on the crusade wanted nothing more.

As far as the payment and organization of Nevers' force were concerned, Philip the Bold left nothing to chance. Wages were fixed at a generous rate, the 110 knights were to be paid forty *livres* per month, the eighty-nine esquires twenty *livres*, while the ten archers and twenty crossbowmen were to receive twelve *livres*.²³ Wages were to be paid at Dijon for four months in advance on 20 April 1396.²⁴ Philip also made one-off payments to

²² *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 347r.; Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, p. 148.

²³ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 345v. The twenty crossbowmen were paid the same rate as the archers.

²⁴ *Ibid.* On 28 April Philip ordered Michael Boderecourt to pay the sum of 24,680 *livres* and 3000 Flemish *nobles* "...pour le payement des gages des chevaliers, escuyers, gens d'armes et arbalestiers estans en la compagnie de comte de Nevers en son voyage d'Hongrie.": *Coll Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 60r. If one works out what the wages for 110 knights for four months at forty *livres* a month comes to, and does the same for the esquires, and archers, one reaches the total figure of 26,160 *livres* and this is presumably the sum which Philip was paying out here.

favoured retainers on top of the wages which they were to receive.²⁵ Philip's nephew, Philip of Bar, received 5000 *livres* from his uncle, although this was an exceptionally high figure.²⁶ Philip the Bold's generosity was no doubt designed to demonstrate Burgundian affluence, especially since no other French contingent was receiving wages for the crusade, but it was also to ensure that Nevers' force was not reduced by poverty to desperate measures and desertion. Philip showed similar caution in the provisioning of the expedition, and his attention to detail was remarkable. There was a small team of people who were in charge of provisioning Nevers's force. This included Simon Breteau, the "maitre d'hôtel", William Breteau, an "ecquier pannetier", John of Ternany, "ecquier echanson", and Robert of la Cressonnière and Coppon Paillard, both "ecquires de la cuisine."²⁷ Philip appointed one Thomassin le Manon, "clerc des offices", to purchase provisions for Nevers and his retinue in advance.²⁸ Philip also provided all the durable goods for the crusade, such as kitchen equipment, medical supplies, tablecloths, hand towels, bedding, and the chests to carry it all in.²⁹ Once again it can be seen that the duke had a dual aim of demonstrating the affluence of the duchy and ensuring that privation and starvation did not lead to pillaging and a general breakdown in discipline, problems regularly witnessed in armies of the time. Philip regarded the maintenance of order as a key factor in the success of the expedition, and to this effect he published ordinances which were to guide the conduct of those going on the

²⁵ George of Rigny was paid an extra twenty-four *livres* for the voyage to Hungary, while Girard of Rigny was paid seventy *livres* and John of Rigny received twenty-four *livres*: *Coll Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 25r. All three men were recorded by Bauyn as members of Nevers' force and so they would all have been receiving four months' wages in advance: *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 344r.-v. Other payments include 262 *livres* to Girard of Brimon (*Coll Bourg.*, t.24, f. 25v.), fifty *livres* to Pierre of la Haye (t.24, f. 75v.), 100 *francs d'or* to John of Fontenay (t.24, f. 62v.) and 100 *livres* to Regnault, Bastard of Flanders (t. 24, f. 60v.).

²⁶ Philip of Bar's payment was described as being "...pour le mettre en estat d'accompagner le comte de Nevers en Hongrie.": *Coll Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 60v.

²⁷ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 345v.

²⁸ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 65, f. 60v. Nevers' wide array of servants on the crusade included his "fruitier", Humbert Tastepoire: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 25, f. 39v.

²⁹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 26, ff. 249r., 273r.

crusade with his son.³⁰ This list was quite brief, but it is notable that the first of these ordinances stipulated that a nobleman who spread rumours would lose his horse and harness.³¹ It is to be wondered whether this is illustrative of the fact that Philip expected problems of this nature since his inexperienced son would be in charge.

The physical appearance of Nevers and his contingent was just as important an issue for Philip as the maintenance of discipline. Philip saw Nicopolis as the first Burgundian-led crusade and he wanted it to leave an indelible impression upon those who witnessed it. Of the 110 knights from Philip's household who were accompanying Nevers, 100 were to be in the count's livery. This meant that they were to display Nevers' coat of arms and wear his colour, green.³² The displaying of Nevers' arms and the presence of green were to be ubiquitous on the crusade. Philip the Bold employed a hierarchy of colours at his court, reserving scarlet for himself, while Nevers' colour was green and Anthony's red.³³ In May 1389 Philip and Nevers had both worn green, as had the eighty knights and fifty esquires who accompanied them, when they attended the knighting ceremony of Louis of Anjou's two sons.³⁴ Nevers was also to wear green on the royal expedition to Brittany in 1392.³⁵ Nevers was thus firmly associated with this colour by 1396, when he and Philip's most

³⁰ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 346v.-347r.

³¹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 347r.

³² Here is the description of these 100 knights as given by Bauyn (*Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 348r.-v.): "...il avoit 100 hommes de livrées qui menoient en main chacun un cheval de service: y aiant douze scelles d'or, garnies de pierreries: d'autres a d'argent massif, aians des couvertures à fond d'or battu aux armes dic comte; les champs-frains et housses des chevaux estoient de toille d'argent, armoriés de fin or batu sur sandal, aux armes du comte, les autres scelles estoient d'yvoir d'or...en broderie d'or de chypre aussi aux armes du comte." While this description does not specifically mention the knights as wearing green, the fact that they were "hommes de livrées" suggests strongly that this would have been the case; Nevers' servants were in green outfits and they were described as "de livrées": *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348r. Thus it would seem that the phrase suggests that Nevers' 100 knights were also in green. This account makes it clear that it was Nevers' arms which were being displayed and not those of his father.

³³ David, *Philippe le hardi*, p. 52.

³⁴ Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, p. 536.

³⁵ David, *Philippe le hardi*, p. 19.

prominent courtiers were attired in it. This group of 100 knights comprised the cream of Burgundian chivalry, including men such as the Trémoilles, Odard of Chasserons, and John of Vienne, all of whom had been assisting Philip in preparing the crusade.³⁶

The fact that most of the knights of Philip the Bold's household were in the colours of his son and were bearing his arms on the crusade to Nicopolis deserves comment. While it was quite usual for retainers of a lord to be provided with his livery, they would not normally have worn this on campaign, even if they were serving under his banner. At Nicopolis, the 100 knights, none of whom were at this point Nevers' retainers, not only fought under his banner but also wore uniforms which visually demonstrated that they were serving the count. They may have been allowed to display their own coats of arms over their armour, but the fact that they were probably wearing green cloth and their identical saddles and horse-cloths depicted Nevers' arms would have given the dominant impression that they were members of Nevers' contingent. Philip the Bold can be seen to have been adopting an unusual practice in providing matching outfits and equipment for men, in many cases lords in their own right, to wear in time of war rather than peace. This was especially unusual because the colours and arms which they wore were not even those of their lord, but those of his son. Philip's planning for the future is clearly revealed, as he resisted the temptation to put Nevers and the 100 knights in the ducal arms, and used those of the heir to the duchy instead. This was done to exalt the status of Nevers by visually emphasising the

³⁶ Bauyn does not give a specific list of these 100 knights, but it would of course have included the majority of the 110 knights going in Nevers' company to Hungary, many of whom he names. One wonders who the ten knights were who were not provided with the count's arms and colours, and why this was done. It is possible that they could have been the leading figures of Philip the Bold's household such as the Trémoille brothers, John of Blaisy and John of Vienne, but the impact would have been greater if these men were seen in Nevers' livery. The ten knights who were not in livery were probably lesser figures in the ducal household, and they would probably have had to settle with a badge of Nevers' arms or device to indicate their association with him.

subservience of 100 of Philip's best knights to him, and Nevers' contingent would have struck observers as the only one in which its highest ranking element was arrayed in the same manner. The appearance of Nevers and his 100 knights was also intended to reflect the affluence of the duchy of Burgundy; in terms of both the quality of its personnel and the splendour of its attire, this was an extremely impressive force.

The metals which Philip specified to adorn their harness and other equipment were the finest available and Philip spared no expense in his aim of ensuring that Nevers' contingent was the most ostentatious on the crusade. There was a hierarchy of metals as well as colours at the Burgundian court, and Nevers' equipment was usually decorated in silver while his father's was in gold.³⁷ For the crusade to Nicopolis, however, Philip pulled out all the stops and Nevers and his 100 knights had the finest Cypriot gold adorning their harness and weaponry.³⁸ Of the Burgundian fighting force, the archives only mention the 100 knights as being in Nevers' livery, but one would have thought that the esquires and archers were at least wearing a device which proclaimed their membership of his contingent. Nevers' 133 servants were certainly provided with his green livery, and their clothes were worked with gold; his tents and pavilions were also in the same colour.³⁹

The real *tour de force* in Philip the Bold's efforts to assert his son's position as leader of the crusade came in his provision of the pennons and banners for the Burgundian contingent. The most important of these were the four banners of the Virgin, which also displayed the arms of France and eight small representations of Nevers' arms.⁴⁰ The

³⁷ On the expedition to Brittany in 1392, for example, Nevers' equipment had been adorned with silver, while that of his father was presumably in gold: David, *Philippe le hardi*, p. 19.

³⁸ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, ff. 348r.-v.

³⁹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348v.

⁴⁰ These banners have been recorded by Bauyn and Salazard and they were obviously working from the same original mss: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348v.; t. 21, f. 28v.

purpose of these four banners was more complex than a mere vaunting of Burgundian splendour. The Virgin was a patron of chivalry and Philip the Bold was one of a number of nobles who had a particular devotion to her.⁴¹ She was also a long-standing patron of crusading, and was regularly represented on banners taken on crusade. She appeared on a banner with a nimbus of stars on Amadeus VI's crusade of 1366, while Bourbon's banner outside his pavilion at Al-Mahdiya displayed an image of the Virgin along with the arms of France.⁴² Philip the Bold made a conscious effort to use banners of the Virgin to show that Nevers' expedition was part of this crusading tradition. He may have been doing this in the absence of a direct papal role in the crusade. It is not known whether a crusade banner or that of the Crossed Keys was carried at Nicopolis, but there is no evidence that one was carried by anyone in Nevers' contingent. Nevers does not appear to have had a papal legate or standard-bearer in his force, and so he was not entitled to carry papal banners. Philip commissioned banners representing the Virgin because She was chivalry's adopted crusade patron, and because he wanted to demonstrate that his son's crusade was a part of the French chivalric crusade tradition. In more specific terms, Philip strove to imply a relationship between the Virgin and his son. It has already been noted that Nevers' arms were on the banners depicting the Virgin, but Philip was also making a more subtle yet pointed use of colour to reinforce the association between the Virgin and his son's crusade.

⁴¹ John of Gaunt was also a "passionate Marian": Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, p. 265. The Virgin was also the patron of the Teutonic Knights, see M. Dygo, 'The Political Role of the Cult of the Virgin Mary in Teutonic Prussia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', *JMH*, vol. 15 (1989), pp. 63-81.

⁴² For Amadeus' banner see D'A.J.D. Boulton, *The Knights of the Crown: the Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 1325-1520* (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 261-2. For Bourbon's banner see Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 223. This banner also had Bourbon's arms on a shield depicted below the Virgin's feet. Thus his banner contained all the elements which were to be found on Nevers' banners six years later - a representation of the Virgin, the arms of France and the arms of the leader of the crusade. It is possible that Philip was consciously imitating Bourbon's banner.

From the invoice of cloth provided by a merchant of Lucca, Michael Mercati, the four banners of the Virgin are known to have been made from azure cloth.⁴³ Nevers was provided with two large azure banners upon which his arms alone were displayed, and these were cut from the same cloth which had been used to make the four banners of the Virgin.⁴⁴ Nevers was also supplied with six large pennons which were also made from azure cloth, along with three “cottes d’armes”, which were made from satin of the same colour.⁴⁵ These three coats of arms were presumably garments with the arms of Nevers on the front to be worn over one’s armour, and Mercati’s list confirms that these items were for Nevers’ personal use.⁴⁶ While his cloak and other items would have been in green like those of his 100 liveried knights, Nevers was the only person whose armour was covered in an azure garment.⁴⁷ This would have made Nevers easily identifiable, and Philip was using azure to emphasise Nevers’ special relationship with the Virgin as the leader of the crusade. The four banners of the Virgin were the largest which were carried in Nevers’ contingent, revealing the importance which Philip attached to them. This is reinforced by the fact that one of these banners was carried by John of Vienne, the admiral of France and one of the most

⁴³ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 53, f. 176r. The image of the Virgin was to be painted on a piece of white cendal and the work was probably carried out by Colart of Laon, who was in charge of painting all the various devices used on the crusade. For the purchase of the white cendal see *ibid.*; for Colart, see David, *Philippe le hardi*, p. 37.

⁴⁴ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 53, f. 176r.

⁴⁵ For the six pennons, see *Coll Bourg.*, t. 53, f. 176r.; *Coll Bourg.*, t. 21, f. 28v. For the three coats of arms to be worn by Nevers, see *Coll Bourg.*, t. 53, f. 176r. Two were made from azure satin which cost twenty-seven *francs* for the two coats, while the third was made from a piece of satin “fort azuré” which cost twenty-four *francs*. They were all lined with satin which cost a further twenty-six *francs*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ It is not known whether the 100 knights displayed their own coats of arms over their armour or those of Nevers. They certainly had Nevers’ arms on their horse-cloths (*Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348r.), and their cloaks would have been of Nevers’ colour, but it would have been very unusual indeed if the knights did not display their own coats of arms anywhere.

distinguished knights on the crusade. He was still clutching it when he was finally overcome by the Turks.⁴⁸

In addition to the banners of the Virgin and the azure banners and pennons on which Nevers' arms were depicted, Philip provided six silver standards and another 325 silver pennons which all bore the count's name in gold upon them.⁴⁹ These standards and pennons also featured Nevers' "devise", but it is unclear whether this refers to his motto, his device, or both.⁵⁰ It was unusual for so many pennons to have Nevers' name on with no accompanying coat of arms and their sheer number would have been quite eye-catching. There were enough banners and pennons for everyone who was being paid by Philip in Nevers' contingent to have carried one. Many of the pennons were to be placed outside Nevers' tent when the contingent camped. Philip the Bold was using every visual means to emphasise that his son was commanding the crusade, including his coat of arms, his device, and even his name. Perhaps this reflects some inner concern on the part of the duke about Nevers' leadership qualities. Whatever Philip's concerns, when the French force with the Burgundian contingent at its head departed from Dijon in April 1396, he had done more than enough to ensure that the crusade was one of the chivalric spectacles of the century. Even the expedition's disastrous defeat at Nicopolis could not erase this achievement.

It is difficult to determine when Louis of Orléans pulled out of the crusade preparations. He was almost certainly present in Paris in August 1395, when the Hungarians requested aid from Charles VI and Philip the Bold revealed that he wanted his son to be the leader of the crusade. This may have been the point at which Louis lost interest, as his

⁴⁸ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 515; Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 318.

⁴⁹ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348v.; t. 21., f. 28v.

⁵⁰ *Coll Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 348v. Nevers' device in 1396 was the vines of the hop: David, *Philippe le hardi*, p. 78.

ambitions to be a crusade leader had been foiled once again.⁵¹ It is unlikely that he would have been prepared to assume some sort of joint command with Nevers, and this was not what Philip the Bold wanted either. However, on 6 November 1395, Orléans was paying his chief of heralds, Colart Blancpain, to take letters from himself and Philip the Bold to the king of Hungary.⁵² The contents of these letters are not revealed, but they were presumably to do with the furthering of the crusade. It would seem that Louis was still interested in the crusade even after the meeting in Paris in August 1395. However, when the crusade was launched in the following year, Louis was not present. It is possible that he had never intended to go on the crusade, and had just wanted to ensure that an expedition was sent to give battle to the Ottomans, but this is unlikely. In May 1394 he had been granted the royal *aides* for his lands for a year, and in the following February he was given the proceeds from the *taille* and *gabelle* for a year.⁵³ Such an accumulation of funds suggests that Louis intended to become a *crucesignatus* in the near future, and it is difficult to imagine his cooperation with Philip the Bold being for any other reason than to lead or at least participate in a major crusading expedition. By April 1396 Louis had decided not to go on the crusade, and it is worth exploring the possible reasons for his decision.

The fact that Nevers had been chosen as the crusade's leader would have dampened Louis' desire to go on the crusade, but there were other factors involved. By far the most important was Louis' rivalry with Philip the Bold. Louis would not have been keen to leave France for a long period once he knew that Philip the Bold was not going to lead the crusade in person. Even though the two men were cooperating over the crusade, they were still rivals for the control of French government. Charles VI had recovered from an attack

⁵¹ Autrand believed that Louis withdrew his support for the crusade in 1395: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 344.

⁵² *Français* 10431 (155).

⁵³ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 201.

by the start of 1396, and Louis felt that his interests would be threatened if he was on crusade when Philip the Bold once again took control of government in the wake of a recurrence of Charles's illness.⁵⁴ Although Philip the Bold had been the virtual head of government since 1392, Louis had at least been in France to do what he could to direct affairs in his favour. Louis was concerned about being excluded further from government, and also about safeguarding his plans for a realm in Italy. Orléans longed to be a ruler in his own right as much as he desired to be a crusader, and in the 1390s he was attempting to realize both ambitions. In January 1393 instructions were given to French envoys sent to Clement VII that they should raise the issue of the creation of a realm in Italy for Orléans.⁵⁵ The realm which Louis had in mind was the kingdom of Adria which Clement had been prepared to grant Louis of Anjou in 1379. In 1394, at the same time that his ambassadors were in Hungary, Louis was trying to persuade the pope to cede the kingdom of Adria to him. Clement offered Louis a reduced territory in August 1394, but the pope's death in the following September threw these plans into disarray.⁵⁶ His successor, Benedict XIII, was less willing to grant Louis a realm than his predecessor had been. It is likely that by the autumn of 1394 Orléans had put his project for the conquest of a realm in Italy on hold while he waited to hear news of the embassies to Hungary.⁵⁷ However, he had not abandoned these plans entirely, and he knew that if he went on crusade Philip the Bold would make an effort to put a stop to them in his absence.⁵⁸ If Louis considered that his

⁵⁴ Charles recovered from an attack in February 1396: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 409.

⁵⁵ Douët-d'Arcq, *Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI*, vol. 1, no. 58, pp. 112-17.

⁵⁶ P. Durrieu, 'Le Royaume d'Adria', *Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 28 (1880), pp. 73-5. Clement was prepared to offer Orléans the march of Ancona, Ferrara, Romagna, Ravenna and Perugia, but this smaller territory was not to be called the kingdom of Adria: Darwin, *Louis d'Orléans*, p. 23.

⁵⁷ Indeed, Valois asserted that Louis had written to Clement VII in January 1394 asking for a delay of three to four years before he attempted to conquer the papal lands: Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 2, p. 198.

⁵⁸ In 1395 Philip the Bold had already been putting pressure on Charles VI to intervene in Genoa, as this would put an end to Louis' plans for the city: Durrieu, 'Le Royaume d'Adria', p. 77.

interests would best be served by not participating on the crusade, the wedding of Charles VI's daughter to Richard II would have made it virtually certain that he would not be going to Hungary. Charles doubtless insisted on his brother's attendance at this event, as he would have wanted all the princes of the blood with him when he met Richard II for the first time.

Palmer asserted that Louis of Orléans withdrew completely from the planned crusade to Hungary and that no-one deputized for him.⁵⁹ However, the surviving evidence suggests that Louis was represented on the crusade. Even though he did not go in person, he sent a force to Nicopolis made up of members of his household under the leadership of Enguerrand of Coucy. It will probably never be possible to list all the people from Orléans' household who were at Nicopolis, but one can at least catch fleeting glimpses of the force from what survives. For example, John of Tremangnon, one of Orléans' chamberlains, was at Nicopolis in the company of Coucy.⁶⁰ Tremangnon's brother-in-law, Triboillart of Sondag, was also on the crusade serving under Coucy.⁶¹ Sondag does not seem to have held a post in Orléans' household and so he was presumably brought on the crusade by Tremangnon. Geoffrey of Luyeres, esquire, the keeper of Orléans' castle of "Genville," was at Nicopolis in the company of Coucy.⁶² This is a small fragment of the Orléanist force and one can see that it would have been made up of members of the duke's household along with relatives and comrades with whom they were accustomed to fighting.⁶³ Coucy was one of the most experienced soldiers of his day and one of Louis' leading retainers, and so it is no surprise to

⁵⁹ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 204.

⁶⁰ *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises*, 3639 (332). Graves lists Tremangnon as being one of Louis of Orléans' chamberlains: Graves, *Pièces relatives à la vie de Louis*, p. 308. He died on the crusade.

⁶¹ *Nouv. acq. fr.*, 3639 (341). Sondag was also to die at Nicopolis.

⁶² *Français* 10431 (2224).

⁶³ To this list could be added the lords of Viezville and Montcavrel who wrote letters to Orléans while on the crusade. I have not been able to trace their names, but it is likely that they were also members of the duke's retinue, and were probably serving under Coucy at Nicopolis: *Pièces originales*, 2153 (221).

find that he was leading an Orléanist contingent on the crusade. Although no records have survived, Louis would have been contributing to the expenses of these men, and the company fighting under the leadership of Coucy probably displayed Louis' banner on the crusade.⁶⁴ Delaville le Roulx identified other Orléanists at Nicopolis, but it is difficult to verify whether all of those whom he records were actually on the crusade.⁶⁵ Some certainly were on the expedition, such as John of Trye, Louis's marshal, who went to Nicopolis as one of the knights with whom Nevers could consult with when he chose.⁶⁶ Trye presumably brought a small force with him which would have served under the overall leadership of Coucy.⁶⁷ Delaville le Roulx's list also included the names of several of Orléans' esquires and it would not be surprising if these men could be proven to have taken part on the crusade.⁶⁸ There were almost certainly a number of Louis' more prominent household officials at Nicopolis and it is likely that Coucy was in charge of an Orléanist force of perhaps several hundred men in total, of which maybe a third were knights. The presence of some of his household at Nicopolis meant that Louis' interest in the crusade continued for some time after its defeat. Louis sent many embassies to Venice, Hungary and Turkey to discover the

⁶⁴ It has already been noted that Orléans had given money to members of his household to help meet their expenses for crusading to Prussia and Al-Mahdiya: see chapter 4, p. 127. He was also to give money to household officials who were going on the expedition to relieve Constantinople in 1399: Jarry, *La Vie politique*, p. 218. There is no evidence that Orléans was offering wages to his household in 1396 as Philip the Bold was, but he almost certainly would have contributed to his retainers' expenses.

⁶⁵ Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 78-86. Delaville le Roulx compiled his list with the aid of the leading chronicle accounts, and only occasionally does he provide a manuscript reference. The names of several Orléanists seem to be derived from an article in the *Bulletin de la Société académique de Laon*, vol. 24, pp. 47-51, but I have not been able to trace this article.

⁶⁶ Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 85. For Trye as one of Nevers' advisors, see *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 346r.

⁶⁷ Trye was one of a number of Louis' chamberlains who had been at the head of an Orléanist contingent on the expedition to Brittany in 1392: Jarry, *La Vie politique*, p. 94.

⁶⁸ The esquires on Delaville le Roulx's list are John of Beaucouray, Philip of Bouterville, Geoffrey of Lucgères, and William Poulain: Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 78, 79, 82, 83. Geoffrey of Lucgères is probably the Geoffrey of Luyeres, esquire, noted above as going to Nicopolis in the company of Coucy.

condition of the crusaders and to arrange for their release.⁶⁹ His efforts also reveal that he was still cooperating with Philip the Bold, as on at least one occasion the two men sent joint embassies to hear news of the prisoners.⁷⁰ Louis would have been particularly anxious to establish the health of Coucy, and it was doubtless with deep sorrow that he paid Robert of Esne to bring back his body and that of Henry of Bar from Lombardy in 1397.⁷¹

The lack of surviving records makes it difficult to say much more than the chroniclers about the French knights who fought at Nicopolis. The contingent made up of members of Orléans' household and led by Enguerrand of Coucy was one of the largest coherent French forces at Nicopolis, but there would have been at least one of a similar size. Marshal Boucicaut apparently brought seventy men on crusade with him and the Constable of France, Philip of Artois, probably led a similar force.⁷² Boucicaut and Artois were close friends, and it is likely that they and their companies travelled to Hungary and fought at Nicopolis as a single unit.⁷³ The *Livre des fais* suggested that Boucicaut was paying for the men which he brought at his own expense.⁷⁴ It is possible that Boucicaut and Artois were given money towards their expenses by Charles VI, but there is no evidence that this was the case.⁷⁵ Delaville le Roulx identified William des Bordes as the bearer of the *Oriflamme* on

⁶⁹ See *Nouv. acq. fr.* 3639 (268); (269); (289); (297); (307); (308).

⁷⁰ At some time prior to 16 June 1397, William of Laigue and Betiz Prunele had been sent by Orléans and Philip the Bold to Venice, Hungary and "...autre part, pour savoir certaines nouvelles de nostre très chier et très amé cousin le conte de Nevers et des autres prisonniers estans en Turquie,...": *Nouv. acq. fr.* 3639 (289).

⁷¹ *Français* 10431 (1040). Robert of Esne was paid 200 *francs* "...pour la delivrance des corps de ses [Orléans']chers cousins, m. Henry de Bar et le sgr. de Coucy,..." The date of this entry is 18 January 1397 (n.s.), and its phrasing would suggest that Louis knew that Coucy and Bar were dead by this date.

⁷² For the size of Boucicaut's contingent, see *Le Livre des fais*, p. 91. The anonymous author claimed that fifteen of these seventy men were relatives of the marshal. Among those named were John of Barres, John of Linières, Godemart of Linières, Renaud of Chavigny, and one of Boucicaut's closest companions, Robert of Milly.

⁷³ Boucicaut had voluntarily spent four months in captivity with Artois in Egypt in 1389, and the two men became firm friends afterwards: *Le Livre des fais*, pp. 62-5.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁷⁵ Charles certainly distributed money to help defray individuals' expenses on the crusade to Al-Mahdiya: *Français* 20590 (66); 20590 (68). On 22 March 1390 the king also gave 20,630 *francs* to men going to Al-Mahdiya: Mirot, 'Une expédition française en Tunisie', p. 369. However, in 1396 Charles had the costs of

the crusade, but this remains unsubstantiated, and there is no indication that the force led by Boucicaut and Artois represented the French crown.⁷⁶ Indeed, it would seem that on the crusade to Nicopolis, Boucicaut and Artois were acting as private individuals rather than as the Marshal and Constable of France.⁷⁷ Boucicaut fought under his own banner at Nicopolis, emphasising the fact that he was fighting as a Christian knight and was not expressly representing France.⁷⁸ This ‘private’ participation had important implications on the behaviour of the crusaders at Nicopolis which will be discussed in the following chapter.

It is possible that Boucicaut’s force contained men who had a tradition of serving under the Duke of Bourbon. Boucicaut himself had fought on many campaigns under Bourbon, such as the expeditions to Flanders in 1382 and 1383, Poitou in 1385 and Spain in 1387.⁷⁹ These campaigns had brought him into contact with men such as John of Chateaufort and Regnault of Roye, to whom he was particularly close.⁸⁰ Indeed, Boucicaut and Regnault were probably brothers in arms, setting out for the Holy Land in 1387 and jousting together at St. Inglevert in 1390.⁸¹ Delaville le Roulx identified Regnault at Nicopolis and on this occasion he provided a manuscript reference.⁸² Regnault was almost certainly on the expedition to Nicopolis, and he probably led a small force which

the forthcoming wedding and in particular the 800,000 *franc* dowry to pay, and perhaps this left him with little to distribute among his courtiers who were going to Nicopolis.

⁷⁶ Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 79.

⁷⁷ Housley suggested that Boucicaut was not fulfilling his role as marshal on the crusade, since the French crown was not paying the crusaders: “Nous pouvons même suggérer que le rôle principal du maréchal à cette époque, à savoir l’entretien de la discipline par les soldats stipendiés au nom du roi, fut suspendu pendant cette expédition majeure.”: N.J. Housley, ‘Le Maréchal Boucicaut à Nicopolis’, *Annales de Bourgogne*, vol. 68 (1996), p. 91.

⁷⁸ Boucicaut’s banner was apparently carried by Hugh of Chevenon: Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 79. Delaville le Roulx provided no reference in support of this claim.

⁷⁹ D. Lalande, *Jean II Le Meingre dit Boucicaut (1366-1421) étude d’une biographie héroïque* (Genève, 1988), pp. 13-14, 19, 24.

⁸⁰ Both these men were on the 1385 campaign with Boucicaut for example: *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁸¹ Lalande described Regnault as Boucicaut’s “compagnon d’armes”: *ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸² Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 84. I have not seen the manuscript reference which Delaville le Roulx cited, but it is highly likely that Regnault was on the crusade.

travelled and fought with that of Boucicaut. Froissart mentioned that there were French knights and esquires who were asking to be in the company of the important lords, and that some of these men were successful and were “retenus”, while others had no company to join.⁸³ Boucicaut’s and Artois’ company would have been popular and the two men would have taken extra men-at-arms outside those who were friends and members of their retinues, giving them a total force of perhaps two hundred men. In the absence of the dukes of Berry and Bourbon, who were both at the wedding of Charles VI’s daughter, it is unlikely that there would have been any other sizeable French contingent at Nicopolis.⁸⁴ It is noticeable that neither the Orléanist force nor that led by Boucicaut and Artois would have been as large as Nevers’ Burgundian contingent, which in total was at least several hundred strong. Froissart’s remarks reveal that the French force was made up of the companies brought by leading figures such as Coucy, Artois and Boucicaut, and that there was no single French force under one commander. As a result, the French contingents would have been under the nominal leadership of Nevers, but there is no evidence that they took any notice of the young count.

John of Gaunt, like Louis of Orléans, had shown an interest in the negotiations for the crusade to Hungary, but failed to participate in the resulting expedition. His reasons for his decision not to go to Nicopolis can only be the subject of speculation, but some reasonable suggestions can be offered. Gaunt’s role in the diplomatic exchanges with Hungary has been shown to have been less prominent than that of Orléans or Philip the Bold, and one wonders whether his commitment was half-hearted from the outset.⁸⁵

⁸³ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 224.

⁸⁴ Berry had surprisingly offered to pay for 100 men-at-arms for a year as a contribution towards Philip of Mézières’ Order of the Passion, but there is no evidence that he made any effort to send a contingent on the Nicopolis crusade: Molinier, ‘Description des deux manuscrits’, p. 363.

⁸⁵ See above, pp. 139-42.

Sigismund's delay in providing a response to the offer of a crusade probably dampened Gaunt's enthusiasm further, and by the time the Hungarian king had agreed to the proposals and dispatched ambassadors, Gaunt's attention had been turned to other matters. Gaunt's interest in the crusade, like that of Louis of Orléans, had been more of a personal luxury than a matter of ducal policy. He had been granted the possession of the duchy of Aquitaine for life in March 1390, but he had never been accepted by his new subjects, who demanded a return to rule directly by the king or his heir. In April 1394 this discontent came to a head when the Archbishop of Bordeaux and other prominent ecclesiastical and lay figures refused to recognise Gaunt as their sovereign. The duke intervened with a force which landed in the duchy in September 1394, and he was not to return to England until late in the following year.⁸⁶ He restored order, but the situation in Aquitaine was delicate and needed a remedy. In such circumstances, Gaunt could not commit himself to a crusade which would take him away from the duchy for a prolonged period.⁸⁷ The Hungarians were sent to Bordeaux to discuss the crusade with Gaunt in May 1395, but by this time the duke had possibly already decided that he would not be crusading in the near future. This was the last occasion on which Gaunt can be linked to the crusade to Nicopolis, and it was still almost a year away from embarking for Hungary. He was probably further discouraged by the fact that by the summer of 1395 it had emerged that neither Orléans nor Philip the Bold were going to be on the crusade in person, and that it was going to be a largely Burgundian affair under the command of Philip's son. By this time there was another issue which would have to come before the crusade, and this was the planned wedding between Richard II and Charles VI's daughter, Isabelle. Gaunt was not indispensable to the preliminary negotiations, but his

⁸⁶ C.J. Philpotts, 'John of Gaunt and English Policy Towards France 1389-1395', *JMH*, vol. 16 (1990), pp. 381-2.

attendance at the wedding itself was doubtless compulsory.⁸⁸ Gaunt also had a wedding of his own to prepare in 1396, as in this year he married his long-time mistress Katherine Swynford, who became his third wife.⁸⁹

Perhaps as early as the summer of 1395 Gaunt had abandoned the idea of going on the crusade to Hungary, but it has been widely assumed that one of his sons led a force on the crusade. Henry of Derby was the most likely candidate to take his father's place, and while he was probably quite keen to go on the Nicopolis crusade, it is virtually certain that he was at Richard II's wedding in the autumn of 1396.⁹⁰ Historians have turned their attentions to Gaunt's soon-to-be-legitimized son John Beaufort, and his son-in-law John Holland, in their search for a candidate for leadership of an English contingent.⁹¹ While one could envisage Gaunt entrusting the command of a Lancastrian force to one of his sons once he had decided not to go on the crusade, there is no evidence to suggest that this is what occurred. Palmer saw Beaufort as the likely candidate and noted that his creation as Earl of Somerset in 1397 made reference to (unspecified) crusading exploits.⁹² Palmer took this as an indication that Beaufort had been on the crusade to Nicopolis, but it was probably a

⁸⁷ Autrand felt that it was actually the Gascon revolt that caused Gaunt to pull out of the crusade preparations: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 342.

⁸⁸ The wedding was scheduled for the autumn of the following year, and by this time the battle of Nicopolis had already been fought. In his first meeting with Charles VI, Richard would have insisted on Gaunt's presence as firmly as Charles would have insisted on that of Louis of Orléans.

⁸⁹ For papal ratification of Gaunt's marriage to Katherine see *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, p. 545.

⁹⁰ On 22 October 1396 Henry of Derby was at a dinner held at St. Omer at which his father and the dukes of Bourbon, Brittany and Orléans were also present: Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi*, p. 258. Froissart mistakenly placed Derby back in England with the Duke of York, guarding the kingdom while Richard was in Calais for his wedding: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 298.

⁹¹ Lettenhove suggested that one of Gaunt's sons was leading 1000 horse at Nicopolis: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 407. Atiya similarly could not decide between Holland or Beaufort as possible leaders of an English contingent on the crusade: Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 440. Tyerman also saw Beaufort as the likely leader of any English leader at Nicopolis: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 300. Goodman appears to have followed this line, and also identified John Beaufort as the leader of an English contingent: Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, pp. 203, 365.

⁹² Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, pp. 239-40.

reference to his participation on the Al-Mahdiya expedition, for which evidence exists.⁹³

There is no record of either Holland or Beaufort taking out letters of protection or general attorney in anticipation of a long voyage, and in fact their presence at Richard II's wedding was noted by a number of chroniclers.⁹⁴

If Gaunt was not leading an English contingent at Nicopolis and nor were Derby, Beaufort or Holland, it is difficult to conceive of any sort of Lancastrian force as having been on the crusade. Palmer felt that the force which Gaunt took to Aquitaine to quell his rebellious subjects at the end of 1394 was the same English contingent which was led to Nicopolis under Beaufort.⁹⁵ However, it is clear that the force which went to Aquitaine was only indentured to serve for a year, and was back in England by the autumn of 1395.⁹⁶ Even so, it might be suggested that Gaunt sent a force of retainers to Hungary, possibly led by one of the leading figures of his household. This was what Louis of Orléans had done, appointing Coucy the leader of an Orléanist contingent, but there is nothing to suggest that Gaunt followed the same line.⁹⁷ Lancastrian records make no mention of any preparations being undertaken or money being made available for an expedition in 1396.⁹⁸ One is forced to conclude that there was no large, coherent crusading force at Nicopolis which had been

⁹³ *Français* 20590 (10). Charles VI sent a sergent-at-arms, Philippon Pelourd, to accompany Beaufort to Genoa.

⁹⁴ Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 405, says that John Holland was present at the wedding of 1396. Holland's presence in Calais is also noted by the author of the *Annales Ricardi Secundi*, and by that of the *Chronographia Regum Francorum: Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti*, p. 190; *Chronographia Regum Francorum*, H. Moranvillé, éd., vol. 3, 1380-1405, Société de l'histoire de France (Paris, 1897), p. 133. Froissart mentioned that both Holland and Beaufort were at Richard's wedding: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 298.

⁹⁵ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, pp. 184-5, 239. Palmer suggested that a large portion of this force was recruited from Cheshire in the aftermath of the insurrection there in 1393: *ibid.*, p. 184.

⁹⁶ Goodman, *John of Gaunt*, pp. 202-03.

⁹⁷ See above, pp. 164-5.

⁹⁸ Admittedly this may be due to the destruction of some records, the receiver-general's accounts are no longer extant for 1396-98 and so any record of Gaunt paying retainers to go to Nicopolis has been lost. Had they survived, however, it is to be doubted whether they would have revealed that a Lancastrian force was sent on the crusade.

organized or funded by the duke. Gaunt's withdrawal from the crusade preparations in 1395 had been complete, and no trace of his former involvement in the negotiations is to be found on the expedition itself. It is also notable that Gaunt did not act in concert with Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans in trying to discover what happened to the crusaders in the battle of Nicopolis and its aftermath.

There was no discernible Lancastrian contingent at Nicopolis, and there is also no evidence that the English crown or any other leading magnates prepared a force for the crusade. Richard II's overseas interests lay in Ireland, and at no stage had he shown a desire to involve himself in the Nicopolis crusade.⁹⁹ Richard provided the safe-conducts for Holland's voyage to Hungary and Jerusalem in 1394, but as he was the only person who had the authority to issue them, this does not necessarily mean that Holland was visiting Sigismund as Richard's ambassador.¹⁰⁰ If Holland was representing anyone apart from himself in Hungary, it was more likely to have been John of Gaunt than his half-brother. It is notable that the Hungarians did not cross the Channel to see Richard II in 1395, even though the English king had returned from Ireland by this time. Presumably Philip the Bold and John of Gaunt felt that the crusade would not be furthered by a visit to Richard. While Richard did not oppose Gaunt's crusade plans, it is clear that he had no intention of participating in them himself. As one would expect, the Chancery records provide no indication that royal preparations to send some sort of contingent to Hungary were undertaken in 1395 or 1396; no supplies or shipping were being requisitioned, and no troops were being mustered.¹⁰¹ Indeed, there is not even any evidence that the crown was taking

⁹⁹ See above, pp. 108-17.

¹⁰⁰ See above, p. 140.

¹⁰¹ I have scanned the Treaty Rolls for the period (C76/79; C76/80), but to no avail. The Chancery Warrants (C81) are similarly silent, as are the Patent and Close Rolls. While some archives have been lost, one would expect at least a stray entry to provide a mention of preparations or the issue of licences. The fact that there

the sort of steps to publicize the crusade that it took for the expeditions of 1383 and 1386. There are no orders in the Patent Rolls to the sheriffs of England to proclaim Boniface IX's bulls, and the Church does not seem to have offered the usual prayers for the success of the expedition.¹⁰² The English chroniclers, such as Walsingham, Knighton, and the monk of Westminster, made no mention of any preparations for a crusade being undertaken on a national level in 1396.¹⁰³ There is not even any evidence that Richard II was granting sums of money to individuals to help defray the costs of the crusade. Even allowing for the fact that not all the records have survived, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at a governmental level, nothing was done to provide an English contingent for the Nicopolis crusade. Palmer suggested that Richard II and Charles VI were planning a *passagium generale* to follow up the Nicopolis crusade, and if this was the case it would perhaps explain why Richard was making no preparations in 1395 and early 1396.¹⁰⁴ However, there is no evidence whatsoever that the two kings were planning to follow up Nicopolis; their attention was absorbed by the wedding preparations in 1396.

If the English crown was not organizing a crusading force in 1396, there were only a handful of leading magnates in England who could have afforded to send a contingent of any size. Edmund Duke of York had promised to join the Order of the Passion, and perhaps he could be a candidate for involving himself in the crusade.¹⁰⁵ Although he was no friend of

is nothing at all for the period leading up to the Nicopolis crusade is telling, especially when compared with the relative abundance of evidence for the 1383 and 1386 crusades.

¹⁰² The Westminster Chronicler mentioned that the Earl of Devon, Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe went on the crusade, while Derby was refused a safe-conduct by Charles VI: *The Westminster Chronicle*, p. 433.

¹⁰³ Walsingham's account of the battle of Nicopolis itself is very vague and misinformed, suggesting that little was known about it. Walsingham clearly knew nothing about the leadership of the crusade, the date was recorded as 1395, the Turkish force under "Morectus" was described as being 350,000 strong, and Walsingham seems to have suggested that it was defeated: Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 217.

¹⁰⁴ Palmer claimed that the defeat at Nicopolis prevented a larger expedition which was "...envisaged by Charles VI and Richard II.": Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 205.

¹⁰⁵ Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 363.

the French, the Duke of Gloucester was keen on crusading, and he was another figure whom one might expect to show interest in the expedition to Hungary.¹⁰⁶ However, neither of these men were to go to Nicopolis, York was guarding the kingdom in Richard's absence, and Gloucester was at the wedding ceremony in Calais.¹⁰⁷ Thomas Mowbray, the Earl Marshal, was also at Richard's wedding,¹⁰⁸ and there is no evidence that either he, Gloucester or York were prepared to bear the enormous expense of sending a contingent on the crusade made up of their retainers. Indeed, virtually all Richard's leading magnates were present at his wedding in the autumn of 1396, and this meant that they did not have money to spare to distribute among any of their retainers who wanted to go on the crusade since they did not possess the resources of their French counterparts. This would have caused problems for retainers, as most would not have been able to afford the costs of crusading without help from their lords. It is likely that there were knights in England who wanted to go on the crusade, but who could not afford to participate. They were also hampered by the fact that they would have found it difficult to acquire information about the preparations which were unfolding in France. In 1390, recruitment for the Al-Mahdiya crusade had been facilitated by the jousts which took place at St. Inglevert earlier in the year. This event had been a forum for discussion of the crusade and the English had certainly benefited from this. In 1396 there was no similar occasion upon which the chivalry of the two countries could mingle and this left the English knights who wished to go on the crusade isolated. Contact with the French was limited to a fairly small group of courtiers involved in the continued

¹⁰⁶ Gloucester had set out for Prussia in 1391 in the hope of participating on a *reyse*, but his ship was caught in a storm and he was forced to land in Scotland: *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 479-85. He had also promised his support to the Order of the Passion: Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 364.

¹⁰⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 298.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

negotiations for Richard's wedding and a final peace, and these people were all expected to attend the wedding itself.

This lack of evidence for an English contingent at Nicopolis led Tipton to suggest that in fact there was no English presence on the crusade, apart from English members of the Order of the Hospital.¹⁰⁹ It is quite possible that there was no single English contingent which left the country as a unified force under the command of one man in 1396, but it is surely an overstatement to claim that there were no English knights or esquires at Nicopolis. Richard's wedding may have creamed off the upper levels of the nobility, but further down the scale there would have been lesser courtiers and provincial knights of independent means who managed to go on the crusade. The lack of an English leader recruiting men for the crusade meant that those who intended to go to Nicopolis would have travelled in small regional groups made up of kinsmen and neighbours. These people had doubtless fought together before in France and elsewhere, and while they were normally retained as part of a great lord's company, in 1396 they travelled as a small autonomous unit. Such small bands would quite easily have been lost to view as they did not merit much notice in governmental records. If these men had the status of *crucesignati*, they would not have needed to take out letters of protection and attorney and in such circumstances there is little chance that the records of Chancery recorded their passage. Although anyone leaving England for Hungary needed to take money with them and required royal letters authorising them to do so, few of the rolls recording these letters *de passagio* or *escambio* have survived.¹¹⁰ The *Inquisitions Post Mortem* are not much help in tracking down English knights who may have died at Nicopolis because they do not state the place where the person died. Thus Sir Ralph Percy

¹⁰⁹ C.L. Tipton, 'The English at Nicopolis', *Speculum*, vol. 37 (1962), pp. 528-40.

¹¹⁰ Perroy, *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, p. ix, n. 1.

died overseas in 1396, and while he may well have been on the crusade to Nicopolis, he could also have been on pilgrimage at the time of his death.¹¹¹ Percy also took out letters of attorney on 6 May 1396, but the entry does not record his destination.¹¹² If the government records are too blunt an instrument for tracking down English crusaders in 1396, their presence on the crusade is at least noted by several chroniclers.¹¹³ The fact that no individuals are named in these accounts may be witness to the fact that while these men may have been of knightly rank, they were not courtiers and hence not known abroad.¹¹⁴

It is likely that the English crusaders came from various parts of the country and set off in small groups, but by the time they reached their destination they would probably have coalesced into a recognisable contingent. The highest ranking or most experienced fighter among them would have been given the leadership of this force, and if Sir Ralph Percy was on the crusade, he would probably have been in command.¹¹⁵ Estimating the size of the

¹¹¹ Palmer felt that Percy had probably been to Nicopolis, as the *Inquisition Post Mortem* stated that he had died overseas on 15 September 1397: *England, France and Christendom*, p. 240. If Percy only left England in May then he would have been some weeks behind the main crusading army, which had set out from Montbéliard at the end of April. It is quite possible that Percy was actually going elsewhere, such as on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. In support of the contention that he was at Nicopolis, the fact that Sir Ralph had promised to become a member of the Order of the Passion suggests at least that he had an interest in crusading: Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', p. 363.

¹¹² C76/80 m. 4.

¹¹³ Atiya gave some thought to this issue and produced a list of the chroniclers who noted the presence of an English contingent at Nicopolis: Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, p. 45. Froissart mentioned that there were English knights among those who managed to escape from the battle and return to the West: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 330. The author of the *Chronographia Regum Francorum* stated that there were English knights at Nicopolis, and that some were captured in the battle, while others fled the scene: *Chronographia Regum Francorum*, vol. 3, p. 134. Mézières, in his *Epistre lamentable* of 1397, mentioned the presence of Englishmen at Nicopolis: Philip of Mézières, *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*, Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, K. de Lettenhove, éd., *Chroniques*, vol. 16 (1397-1400) (Bruxelles, 1872), p. 453. The *Chronique de Berne* and the account of Michael Ducas both mentioned the presence of English crusaders at Nicopolis: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 410, 418.

¹¹⁴ Froissart would normally provide a run-down of the more famous knights who were present on a given campaign, as he did for the Al-Mahdiya crusade, for example: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, pp. 155-6. In 1396 Froissart did not venture to give any names of Englishmen present at Nicopolis, although he stated that they were there. This could be because the people from whom he was receiving his information would not have recognized the English knights, as they were not prominent courtiers or famous veterans of the war with France.

¹¹⁵ Sir Ralph Percy was a younger son of the Earl of Northumberland and brother to Henry 'Hotspur.'

English force at Nicopolis is an almost fatuous task given the problems of identifying Englishmen on the crusade. Palmer accepted estimates which suggested that the English force was between 1000 and 1500 strong, while Tyerman favoured the lower figure, although he admitted that the evidence was weak.¹¹⁶ It is submitted that since there was almost certainly no single force under one leader, and virtually nothing has survived to record their passage, the English presence at Nicopolis could not have been more than a few hundred in total. In the battle itself, the English would have fought at the van of the attack with the French, and losses among them were doubtless heavy.¹¹⁷ It is possible that the a royal embassy of 1397 was dispatched to discover the fate of English knights at Nicopolis. Richard II wrote to Charles VI asking for a safe-conduct for a knight, named only as “R.A.,” who was going “as parties longtaignes pardela la mer” on the king’s business.¹¹⁸ Charles VI was referred to as “trescher pere” in this letter, so it must date from after the autumn of 1396 when Richard’s marriage to Isabelle made him Charles’ son-in-law. The knight being sent on the king’s business could be Sir Richard Abberbury, a chamber knight of the king and a retainer of John of Gaunt.¹¹⁹ The destination of the knight’s mission was not stated in the letter to Charles VI, but around the same time Richard was also writing to Venice to ask whether “R.A.” could pass through its territory “ad partes longinquas”.¹²⁰ A journey by land through Venice would presumably take one into the Balkans, and it is possible that Richard II was sending one of his senior knights, Sir Richard Abberbury, on a mission to Hungary

¹¹⁶ Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, p. 239; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 300. Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, p. 242, also estimated that the English force at Nicopolis was about 1,000 strong, as did Lalande: Lalande, *Jean II Le Meingre*, p. 59.

¹¹⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 316, stated that there were both English and German knights who took part in the initial attack on the Turks.

¹¹⁸ Perroy, *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, pp. 170-1.

¹¹⁹ Abberbury was a chamber knight in 1385: Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England*, vol. 4, p. 344. It is likely that he continued in this capacity until the end of the reign. For Abberbury as a retainer of Gaunt see Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 262.

¹²⁰ Perroy, *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II*, p. 171.

and then on to Turkey to bring back news of English knights who had been on the crusade. This is certainly a plausible interpretation, but there are other possible explanations of this mission. The English prior of the Hospitallers, John Raddington, had died in 1396, and Richard may have been sending someone to Rhodes to make inquiries about the selection of a new prior, although if this was the case he would surely have *sailed* from Venice.

In conclusion, the crusading force which left Montbéliard in April 1396 was a markedly heterogeneous army. At its core was a Burgundian contingent under the leadership of a young man with virtually no military experience. Clustered around it were smaller French companies commanded by experienced military figures such as Coucy, Boucicaut and Artois. In secular campaigns these men provided the leadership of the French army, but on the Nicopolis crusade they did not feel that it was their duty to provide any overall command. To this Franco-Burgundian force were appended contingents provided by other nations such as the English, Germans and Italians. If Nevers was the nominal leader of this force, its disparate nature meant that he had little chance of maintaining any discipline. It would seem that strategic planning went no further than marching to Hungary to rendezvous with Sigismund's Hungarian forces and then to give battle to the Turks. The disorderly progress of this crusade army and the decision to occupy the vanguard in the ensuing battle at Nicopolis reflects the fact that the Nicopolis crusade was conducted in a different spirit to the encounters between the royal armies of France and England. The crusaders at Nicopolis were fighting for themselves and not directly for their king, and so discipline and cautious tactical decisions were dismissed as restraints which would hamper their search for glory. John of Nevers probably offered little resistance as he wanted to win renown as much as anyone, but even if he had protested his voice would have been unheard

in the clamour to cover oneself in glory battling the Infidel. The Nicopolis expedition provides a clear insight into what motivated the chivalry of France and England to undertake crusades, and this is a theme which will be examined in detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: CHIVALRY, CRUSADE AND MILITARY DEFEAT

On 25 September 1396, the French suffered a defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks which in terms of loss of life and prestige was as crushing as those at Crécy and Poitiers. Indeed, the monk of St. Denis regarded Nicopolis as the worst French defeat of the century, remarking: “Notre siècle n’a point vu de désastre plus déplorable.”¹ The battle was lost largely through the recklessly audacious behaviour of the French knights, who insisted on occupying the vanguard of the attack against Sigismund’s more cautious suggestion that they fight nearer the rear of the force, while his Hungarian troops took the van.² The French proceeded to hack their way through the Turkish irregulars, pursuing the retreating Turks uphill until they were lured into an ambush at the top where they were too fatigued to offer much resistance to Bayezid’s elite force which had been placed out of sight. In their disregard for tactical considerations, it would appear that the French at Nicopolis had learned nothing from their previous defeats at Crécy and Poitiers, and the disaster at Agincourt would seem to confirm this. However, the French knights at Nicopolis were motivated by more than tactical considerations. In the years after Brétigny, the French had been forced to adopt cautious tactics in the face of English ascendancy which denied them

¹ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 513.

² ‘French’ here is being used as a generic term to include the Burgundians. As detailed in the previous chapter, there were almost certainly English knights at Nicopolis, but their numbers were small, and they presumably did not make any tactical decisions on the crusade.

the chance to prove themselves in battle and the opportunity to go on crusade. Even the crusades which did occur were something of a disappointment, the *reysen* and the expedition to Al-Mahdiya failing to live up to French expectations of combat. It will be contended that in these circumstances the French chivalry saw Nicopolis as a rare chance to fight as they wanted, using the cavalry charge at the front of the attack. The defeat of Nicopolis was due to a disregard for cautious tactics rather than a lack of awareness of them, as the desire to prove their valour overrode all other considerations. In this respect the behaviour at Nicopolis was part of a chivalric tradition which stretched back to the defeat at Roncevalles and beyond. This essentially timeless application of the chivalric ethos was either not recognised or not admitted as the main cause of the defeat by those who wrote about the crusade. Indeed, the opinions of the chroniclers and writers such as Mézières and Bonet reveal a failure to come to terms with the fact that the code of chivalry was always liable to bring defeat as easily as victory.

In the late fourteenth century the cult of chivalry had a pervading influence on the lives of knights, and crusading was germane to their self-image. The two essential aims of a knight were the achieving of renown in this world and salvation in the next.³ Loyalty was a central pillar of the chivalric ethos, but its emphasis on prowess meant that it was above all an introspective code, aimed at enhancing the individual's standing amongst his peers through martial achievement. This achievement could take a variety of forms, including the participation in activities which were not specifically aimed at causing the death of one's adversary. Jousting enjoyed an enduring popularity in the medieval period as it allowed the individual the opportunity to win purely personal honour amongst his peers. Since the birth of chivalry, however, crusading had been the highest goal to which a knight could aspire as

³ Keen, *Chivalry*, p. 54.

it allowed the pursuit of the twin aims of earthly renown and spiritual salvation, while engaging in the knight's preferred occupation of fighting. As Keen observed, the duty to go on crusade lay at the heart of chivalry.⁴ Crusading was central to knighthood in the fourteenth century, as it demonstrated a knight's worthiness in the eyes of his peers more clearly than any other martial activity. The appointment of Philip of Artois as the Constable of France illustrates how service on crusade could improve a knight's standing; the monk of St. Denis stated that Artois' crusade experience had been one of the factors in his appointment as Clisson's successor.⁵ Artois had been on the expedition to Al-Mahdiya and made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, suffering captivity at the hands of the Mamluks.⁶ The high regard in which crusading was held meant that it was also a means of social mobility for the nobility. Schnerb has examined the Burgundians who accompanied Nevers to Nicopolis and has concluded that those who had accompanied the count on the crusade (and survived!) rose rapidly in Nevers' service once he became duke of Burgundy.⁷ Keen's work on Gadifer of la Salle, who regarded participation on the *reysen* as a means of enhancing his prospects, also revealed the social mobility which crusading facilitated.⁸ Crusades retained an important place in initiation into the Order of Knighthood as they were regarded as the best way to establish worthiness to be dubbed. This included figures of high rank, Duke Albert III of Austria was dubbed during a *reyse* in 1377, and John of Nevers was made a knight on the crusade to Nicopolis.⁹ It has been noted in an earlier chapter that Burgundians were being knighted on the *reysen*, and Philip the Bold clearly saw that the status of his

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 31. Froissart also mentioned Artois' crusade experience and he clearly saw him as a suitable choice: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 98.

⁶ For Artois in captivity see *Livre des fais*, pp. 62-3.

⁷ Schnerb, 'Le Contingent franco-bourguignon à la croisade de Nicopolis', pp. 59-74.

⁸ Keen, 'Gadifer de la Salle: A Late Medieval Knight Errant', pp. 74-85.

⁹ For duke Albert, see Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 399; for Nevers see *Livre des fais*, p. 94.

courtiers would be enhanced if they had received their knighthood on crusade.¹⁰ New knights were also made when the crusaders landed before the town of Al-Mahdiya.¹¹

Despite Chaucer's presentation of an ideal knight as a crusader in *The Canterbury Tales*, knights had never been allowed the luxury of solely being crusaders. Their first duty was to serve in the armies of their sovereign, and in the second half of the fourteenth century an increasing amount of the knight's time was spent in the service of the crown. The lulls in the conflict allowed knights to go on crusade, and figures such as Henry of Grosmont could achieve fame through achievements both as a secular commander and a crusader.¹² The intensity of the conflict between England and France was on a scale not previously seen in Europe, and it allowed the figures involved to achieve international renown even though they had never been on crusade. The deaths of the Black Prince and Sir John Chandos were mourned in France as well as in England, such was the loss to international chivalry, and du Guesclin was claimed by the French to be the Tenth Worthy.¹³ In their exclusive service in the campaigns of secular war, these men appear to herald a new age of the great generals, looking forward to Marlborough and Wellington rather than back to Godfrey of Bouillon. While this is true to an extent, the exceptional nature of their achievement must be emphasised. Successful commanders of any age are liable to win renown, and the Black Prince and du Guesclin were their country's most successful and experienced warriors. It is also true that the middle decades of the fourteenth century formed a most remarkable period in the conflict between England and France. Loans and heavy taxation allowed the

¹⁰ See above, p. 125.

¹¹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 222.

¹² K. Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant: Henry Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster 1310-1361* (London, 1969). Fowler focused mainly on Grosmont's secular activities, but his crusade to Prussia was discussed on pp. 103-110.

¹³ Keen, *Chivalry*, p. 123.

launching of large expeditions which resulted in a series of pitched battles such as Crécy, Poitiers and Najéra, the like of which were not to be seen again until Agincourt in the next century. By the end of 1356 the kings of France and Scotland were both prisoners in the Tower of London, and the reputation of English arms had never been higher. The intensity of the Anglo-French war in this period largely satisfied the need of knights to prove themselves in combat and English knights in particular could win fame and fortune as captains in Edward III's armies. The situation could not continue indefinitely, however. By the 1370s the conduct of the conflict had changed and it was becoming a source of frustration to the knightly desire to earn renown.

Charles V brought about a decisive alteration in French military strategy. The treaty of Brétigny had seen the French forced to cede large tracts of territory to the English, and Charles saw that another heavy defeat on the field would threaten the final dismemberment of France. Realising that another Crécy or (worse still) Poitiers had to be avoided at all costs, the keynote of French military strategy from the late 1360s onwards became the strict avoidance of pitched battle with the English.¹⁴ Charles worked instead for the systematic erosion of English power in France. He utilised French superiority in mining and firepower to lay siege to the English-held fortresses and harass the English armies which were sent across the channel to goad the French into action. Thus between 1369 and 1380 Charles V, through his constable, Bertrand du Guesclin, conducted what amounted to a guerrilla war against England. When English armies launched a raid into French territory, French forces remained at a safe distance, harrassing the English supply lines and rearguard. The French found that through these tactics the English could be quite successfully contained, and the damage inflicted upon the French countryside and population could be kept to a minimum.

¹⁴ On this subject see Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, pp. 135-50.

In 1373, for example, the Duke of Lancaster swept across France with a large force, but under the close harassment of du Guesclin's army, it burned itself out without achieving anything of significance.¹⁵ Charles V's conduct of the war was a success, and by the opening of the reign of his son much land which had been ceded at Brétigny had been clawed back from the English.¹⁶ However, the Anglo-French war in the 1370s had proved frustrating for the combatants of both sides. The conduct of the English *chevauchées* demanded strict discipline if the army was to move through French territory with efficiency, and they afforded little opportunity for individual feats of valour. The French needed to be equally disciplined if their tactics of avoiding battle and harassing the English forces were to be effective. As a result, although the 1370s was an energetic phase of the war in terms of military activity, it rarely presented individuals with the opportunity to demonstrate their valour. Much of the military activity was limited to the more mundane aspects of warfare, such as the conduct of sieges and garrison duty. In such circumstances it was the captain who took the credit for the successful conduct of operations.

A further cause of frustration among the knights of France and England was that while their countries were at war, there was little time for knights to go on crusade. The period 1369-1389 witnessed only four years of truce and even in between expeditions, the kings of England and France restricted the movement of money and the knights' persons to ensure that the country was not left vulnerable.¹⁷ On 27 April 1376, Charles V, for example, had sought to regulate the number of knights leaving for Prussia by issuing an ordinance which stated that any knights or esquires wishing to leave France would have to obtain a

¹⁵ Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, pp. 105-115.

¹⁶ E. Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* (London, 1951), pp. 158-65.

¹⁷ J.W. Sherborne, 'The English Navy, Shipping and Manpower 1369-1389', *Past and Present*, vol. 37 (1967) p. 163; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 266.

licence.¹⁸ The scarcity of opportunity to demonstrate valour persisted into the reign of Charles VI, as although he adopted a more directly aggressive stance against England than his father had done, few of the campaigns undertaken in his reign resulted in pitched battles. The battle of Roosebeke in November 1382 was welcomed by the French chivalry as a long-awaited chance to prove themselves in open combat, even if they were facing a Flemish force composed mainly of common militiamen. However, this was to be the last large battle which the French fought in the service of the king until the renewal of the war against England in the early fifteenth century. A series of French campaigns, such as that to drive out the Bishop of Norwich from Flanders in 1383, the plan to invade England in 1386, the expedition to Guelders and the ill-fated campaign to Brittany in 1392, all aroused the expectations of battle, yet ended without the enemy being engaged. The situation was similar in England, Richard II's expedition to Scotland in 1385 had ended without any fighting, and his campaign in Ireland in 1394 had involved little more than skirmishing.¹⁹ Thus although the kings of England and France led large armies on campaign in the 1380s and 1390s, these forces saw very little fighting on a large scale. As the 1380s drew to a close, knights' desire to go on crusade in order to prove their valour in battle became more pronounced. The war between England and France had reached a stalemate, and as the prospects for peace improved, knights from both countries saw the opportunity to resume crusading activity. Philip of Mézières and his Four Evangelists were also helping to whip up crusade enthusiasm at the courts of France and England, and by the time the truce of Leulingham was sealed in the summer of 1389, there appears to have been something of a crusade fervour in the two countries.²⁰ The suspension of hostilities freed knights to go on

¹⁸ Pot, *Histoire de Regnier Pot*, p. 31.

¹⁹ For the expedition to Scotland see *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 127-31.

²⁰ See above, pp. 94-100.

crusade, and in the absence of secular conflict crusading was the only option for those wanting to see military action. There was talk at the French court of launching a crusade expedition under the leadership of Charles VI, but even in 1392 this was seen as being some years in the future.²¹ In the meantime, knights from France and England took the opportunity afforded by the truce to go on crusade to Prussia.²²

The popularity of the *reysen* in the 1380s and 1390s was due at least in part to their convenience. Prussia was a perennial centre of crusade activity and this was extremely useful in a period when knights had little time away from the service of their sovereign. Prussia was close enough to England and France for knights to be able to go on crusade for a few months, and a *reyse* would necessitate a crusader being away from his native land for a fraction of the time that an expedition to the Mediterranean would involve. The fact that Prussia was a closer crusade destination than the Mediterranean also meant that the costs were not as great. A knight would need fewer attendants to accompany him on a *reyse* and transport was not nearly as expensive. The accounts for Henry of Derby's two journeys to Prussia reveal that the costs of a *reyse* could be high, but it must be remembered that Derby was crusading as a lord with a retinue, and he indulged himself heavily in the expensive activities of his class, such as gambling, feasting and jousting.²³ Although the weather was unpredictable, there was a chance that *reysen* could be launched twice a year, and their regularity was an aspect of their appeal. Rulers could see that the *reysen* provided useful military training and were less hazardous than other crusading expeditions. Disease was

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²² Paravicini has traced the activities of individuals on the *reysen* and his work is essential in the study of the subject: Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, pp. 93-104, 115-35.

²³ Derby's two *reysen* cost over £4383 and £4915 respectively: Toulmin Smith, *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land Made by Henry Earl of Derby*, pp. lxxxvi, lxxxvii. Derby spent £69 on gambling on his first *reyse*: *ibid.*, p. 115.

usually the greatest danger which crusaders faced since expeditions tended to be launched in the early summer when the sea was calmer, and they were destined for hotter climates where Muslims lived. In Prussia and Lithuania, however, the climate was cooler all year round, and if a *wintereyse* was being conducted, it was positively cold.²⁴ There was little chance of an outbreak of dysentery, typhoid or cholera in such a harsh environment. While the fighting on the *reyse* could be hard and the conditions severe, it was not common for knights to die on them. Once a truce was in place between France and England, sovereigns were less reluctant to allow their subjects to go to Prussia. It was also recognised that crusaders added to the glamour of royal and ducal courts, and mention has already been made of Philip the Bold's policy of sending members of his household to Prussia every year in order to increase the reputation of his court.²⁵ These advantages meant that there had even been a steady trickle of crusaders travelling to Prussia throughout the 1370s and 1380s, since they were close enough to their native land to return when hostilities resumed between France and England.²⁶ The break in hostilities in 1360 had seen a surge in the numbers of crusaders from the two countries visiting Prussia, and this trend was repeated in 1389.²⁷ The marriage between Jogaila the prince of Lithuania and Jadwiga of Poland, and the former's promise to convert his subjects to Christianity seem to have made little impression on the knights of Europe and the *reysen* enjoyed something of an Indian summer in the later 1380s and early 1390s. There was no money to be made on the *reysen*, yet a voyage to Prussia was probably within the means of many wealthy knights, and their aim was to be employed by a

²⁴ Indeed, the temperatures needed to be low enough for the rivers which the crusaders had to cross to be frozen before a *wintereyse* could take place.

²⁵ See above, pp. 123-5.

²⁶ Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 266.

²⁷ Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, pp. 93-104, 115-35.

lord such as Henry of Derby.²⁸ This would enhance the lord's retinue, and it would result in the crusader's expenses being subsidised by the lord.

The Teutonic Knights worked hard to ensure that the *reysen* suited the tastes of the chivalry of Europe upon whose support they depended. The *reyse* was preceded by supervised chivalric pastimes such as hunting, jousting and feasting. The table of honour or *ehrentisch* was introduced, revealing the Teutonic Order's recognition of the centrality of achieving renown to chivalric perception. The table was announced before the *reyse* took place, and heralds would decide which knights coming to Prussia in that season were the most worthy to be offered a seat. The individual's reputation and exploits were considered, and so a seat at the *ehrentisch* demonstrated that a knight had been judged worthy before his peers, the very essence of chivalry. It is significant that Chaucer's Knight, offered as an ideal of his type, had been at the head of the table of honour in Prussia on several occasions:

"Ful ofte tyme he hadde the bord bigonne

Aboven alle nacions in Pruce;

In Lettow hadde he reysed and in Ruce,

No Cristen man so ofte of his degree."²⁹

Chaucer's remarks reveal that the frequency of a knight's crusading was important, since he intended his audience to be impressed by the fact that the Knight had sat at the head of the table of honour on more than one occasion. Boucicaut demonstrated this desirability for frequent crusading, having taken part in at least three *reysen* by the early 1390s.³⁰ The Teutonic Order catered for chivalry's desire to achieve renown in its practice of allowing knights who fought particularly well on the *reyse* to leave their coat of arms in the stained

²⁸ Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 270.

²⁹ *The Riverside Chaucer*, p. 24, ll. 52-5.

³⁰ *Livre des fais*, pp. 40, 42, 74-5.

glass at Königsberg. It is interesting that several of the deponents who gave testimony in the Scrope vs Grosvenor case remembered having seen the arms of Sir Stephen Scrope in Prussia, revealing that this was an effective method of ensuring lasting fame.³¹ Henry of Derby had his arms painted in the prominent places at which he stayed on his way to Jerusalem, and the purpose was the same.³² Knights desired to be venerated in the present for their exploits, to reflect the glory of their ancestry and to contribute to the future glory of their line. Thus the concept of chivalric renown was Janus-faced, looking simultaneously to the past and to the future.

The *reysen* satisfied the crusading needs of many of the knights of England and France, particularly those of limited means, and for many it was probably the only crusade on which they participated. However, Prussia was not enough for everyone. Prussia's proximity to France and England meant that while it was a convenient destination, once a knight had been on a *reyse* or two, he sought adventure further afield. The extent of a knight's travels was one of the factors taken into account for selection to the *ehrentisch*, revealing that the variety of crusading experience was as important as its frequency.³³ This was demonstrated clearly in 1390 when Boucicaut, already a *reysen* veteran, showed a preference for the crusade which was being launched to North Africa by the Duke of Bourbon. When he was prevented from going on this crusade by Charles VI, he went back to Prussia, which he clearly regarded as second best in the circumstances.³⁴ Similarly, Henry of Derby also wanted to go on the crusade to Al-Mahdiya, but he was refused a safe-

³¹ John Rither, esquire, deposed that Sir Geoffrey Scrope was buried in the cathedral at Königsberg and his arms were represented in a window there: Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry*, vol. 2, p. 353. Sir Thomas Erpingham deposed in the case of Grey vs. Hastings in 1406 that he had seen the Hastings arms in Prussia: *ibid.*, p. 195.

³² Toulmin Smith, *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land Made by Henry Earl of Derby*, p. 280.

³³ A.S. Cook, 'Beginning the Board in Prussia', *Journal of English and German Philology*, vol. 14 (1915), pp. 377, 380.

³⁴ *Livre des fais*, p. 74.

conduct by Charles VI and so he also went on the *reyse* instead.³⁵ Indeed, it is interesting that unlike Boucicaut, Derby had not been to Prussia before, and so he obviously felt that the crusade to North Africa was more prestigious. This was partly because a voyage to Prussia could be postponed as the *reysen* were regular campaigns, whereas a crusade further afield was a rare event. Al-Mahdiya was regarded as a more prestigious crusade by Derby and his contemporaries since it was more hazardous in terms of the sea crossing, the climate and the enemy. It was also being launched against Muslims who were regarded as a more virulent enemy than pagans by the end of the fourteenth century. Derby's choice may also have been influenced by the fact that there were a number of prominent English courtiers going to Al-Mahdiya, including Sir Lewis Clifford, and Derby's half-brother, John Beaumont.

The *reysen* lacked the novelty value of crusading expeditions outside northern Europe, but they also suffered from a number of other drawbacks. Most notable was the fact that the conduct of the Teutonic Order's struggle with the Lithuanians was not dissimilar to the war between England and France. The uncertain weather and the distances to be traversed before the enemy could be engaged meant that there was little chance of a pitched battle, and the Lithuanians were not keen to fight one anyway due to the military superiority of the Teutonic Knights. Although the fighting which did take place was fierce, it tended to be on a small scale and focused upon specific aims such as reducing a fortress or harrasing the enemy. This was the sort of thing which the English and French knights had been doing for some time in their war against each other, and they arguably wanted greater freedom to demonstrate their valour on a crusade. The knights were paying for the privilege

³⁵ *The Westminster Chronicle*, pp. 433-5, 441; Toulmin Smith, *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land Made by Henry Earl of Derby*, pp. xli, 15.

after all, and they probably expected a battle for their money, or at least a sizeable engagement. Another important similarity between the *reysen* and the war between England and France was that the Teutonic Knights kept firm control of the direction of the campaign. The Teutonic Order may have provided distractions for their visitors such as tournaments, hunting parties and the *ehrentisch*, but once the *reyse* commenced, they decided its objectives and conduct. This meant that once again the visiting knight had to restrain his desire to demonstrate his prowess in the interests of the Teutonic Order's plans, and his experiences of actual combat were probably quite similar to those on the campaigns in France.

When it was announced that the Duke of Bourbon would be leading a crusade to North Africa, French and English knights hoped that this expedition would present a better opportunity to demonstrate their valour in battle than the *reysen*. The crusaders apparently clamoured to attack Muslim towns as soon as they saw them from the sea, and they had to be dissuaded by the Genoese who wanted the focus to be on Al-Mahdiya.³⁶ Bourbon and his senior advisers were essentially only concerned with giving battle to Muslims, but once the crusaders had landed and started to invest the town of Al-Mahdiya, it was clear that the three Muslim kings were not prepared to offer battle to the French and had decided to wait until the Christians had run out of resources. In such circumstances the frustration of the French and English crusaders was apparent, as they had only travelled to North Africa in search of battle. The patience of the younger Geoffrey Boucicaut ran out, and without informing the Duke of Bourbon he offered combat to the enemy between set numbers of Christian knights and Muslims.³⁷ It is interesting that this sort of challenge was regularly

³⁶ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 1, p. 657.

³⁷ J. Cabaret d'Orville, *La Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon*, A.-M. Chazaud, éd. (Paris, 1876), p. 242. The offer was a fight between ten Christians and ten Muslims, or twenty Christians and twenty

offered in the Anglo-French war, particularly during sieges, when it was felt that there was not much chance of progress being made. These challenges were almost always refused, and Boucicaut's offer at Al-Mahdiya was probably not delivered to the Muslims surrounding the Christian host. It is interesting that Froissart stated that one of the reasons why the proposed combat was opposed by senior French knights was because it was felt that there was no way of telling whether the Muslims would send men of equal status to battle with the French knights.³⁸ If Froissart was correct, this incident reveals that the desire for combat was set within the chivalric concern for propriety which enemies were also expected to observe, despite their entirely different cultural background. The Duke of Bourbon also revealed this concern for preserving his honour when he consulted with the leading crusaders on whether he should accept the treaty which the Genoese had discussed with the Muslims.³⁹ It was during these discussions that Souldich of la Trau made the remark that he regarded his participation on the crusade as equivalent to three battles.⁴⁰ This could be a reference to the fact that the crusaders had faced the armies of three Muslim rulers, but it is also possible that Souldich saw the crusade as an expedition which was equivalent to three secular campaigns. In either case, it is clear that he felt that this was an enterprise of prestige in which he was pleased to have been involved. Charles VI had limited the number of those who could participate, and Souldich was aware that he was part of a select group who could count an expedition to North Africa as one of his crusade experiences.⁴¹ Indeed, the Duke of Bourbon was particularly proud of the fact that he was following in the

Muslims. This was then increased to twenty Christians against forty Muslims. Froissart suggested that it was a Muslim 'knight', 'Agadinquor', who proposed the combat, but this is most unlikely: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 242.

³⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, pp. 245-6. It was Coucy who apparently expressed these objections.

³⁹ Cabaret d'Orville, *La Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon*, pp. 248-50.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁴¹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 155.

footsteps of his ancestor Louis IX in leading a crusade to North Africa.⁴² The siege of Al-Mahdiya ended without any more than skirmishing having taken place, and the French crusaders revealed their enthusiasm for battle by attempting one last attack before they sailed away.⁴³ There was still a feeling among the knights that not enough action had occurred, and the Genoese managed to divert this frustration for their own ends. They suggested trade rivals for the French to attack on the way back from North Africa, on the flimsy premise that they were trading with the Turks.⁴⁴ The French showed no compunction about using their status as *crucesignati* to subdue towns in the Mediterranean and hand them over to the Genoese, even though the latter traded with the Turks as well.⁴⁵ The crusade had created expectations of combat among the knights of France and England and it was clearly difficult to control these desires once they had been aroused. A similar situation arose in 1393 when Philip of Artois led a force to give aid to the king of Hungary. On his arrival, Artois found that Sigismund had no need of his services since there was little chance of a campaign against the Turks that year. Sigismund suggested that Artois take his force to Bohemia, the Latin of orthodoxy of whose faith was in doubt. Artois agreed as he felt that he had not travelled all the way to the Balkans to return having seen no fighting, and he duly invaded Bohemia.⁴⁶

By 1396 the chivalry of France and England had spent seven years in a state of truce, and the *reysen* and Al-Mahdiya had failed to satisfy the desire of many knights to prove their valour in combat against the Infidel. In the light of these circumstances, the remarkably rash behaviour of the French (and English) knights at Nicopolis becomes intelligible. Unravelling

⁴² *Saint-Denys*, vol. 1 p. 653.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 667.

⁴⁴ Cabaret d'Orville, *La Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon*, pp. 251-5.

⁴⁵ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 338.

⁴⁶ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 125.

the events of the Nicopolis crusade is a difficult task since none of the French chroniclers were eyewitnesses, and they sought to explain the defeat in terms of the existing models for such an event. For example, the monk of St. Denis relied upon the familiar formula that the Turks had been used by God to chastise the crusaders for their lack of morality and haughty conduct, while the author of the *Livre des fais* preferred to blame the Hungarians for deserting the French once the battle had started.⁴⁷ Despite these difficulties, it is submitted that the outline of events is reasonably clear. In particular, there can be little doubt that the French insisted on being in the vanguard of the Christian host once it had become clear that a battle with the Ottoman Turks was inevitable. The crusaders fought their way through the Turkish irregulars and after being forced to dismount in the face of the stakes which impeded the horses, they pursued the retreating Turks uphill. Once at the top, the exhausted French knights faced Bayezid's elite cavalry, the *sipahis*, who either killed or captured the crusaders.

The main French chronicles all agreed that the French insisted on occupying the van of the force even though this was not the wisest tactical choice.⁴⁸ Indeed, the French knights had not shown any restraint throughout the campaign, and the impression given is that they plunged headlong into the Balkans in their desperation to bring the Turks to battle as quickly as possible. Froissart stated that Sigismund wanted to wait until news of the Turks' movements had been received, but Coucy, speaking on behalf of the French, declared that the crusaders should go and find Bayezid.⁴⁹ The French were clearly determined to ensure that another opportunity to engage the Infidel should not be lost, as they realised that

⁴⁷ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 497-9; *Livre des fais*, pp. 105-06.

⁴⁸ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 313-4; *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 485-91; Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI*, pp. 408-09.

⁴⁹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 243-4.

such a chance might not occur again for some time. When it became clear that a battle would be fought outside the town of Nicopolis, Sigismund suggested that the Hungarian footsoldiers should be placed at the front since they knew the Turkish tactics, and this would also ensure that they could not flee once the fighting started.⁵⁰ However, the French rejected this plan as it would mean that they would be deprived of what they regarded as the place of honour. Froissart recorded that Artois spoke for the French and insisted that they should be in the van of the attack.⁵¹ It is possible that Froissart was trying to lay the blame for the defeat on Artois and hence to exculpate Coucy from involvement in the disastrous decision to occupy the van of the army, but the accounts of a number of other chroniclers suggested that there was indeed division among the leading French knights. The monk of St. Denis stated that Boucicaut supported Artois at this meeting with Sigismund, while Juvenal des Ursins added that when Coucy agreed to Sigismund's more cautious proposal, Guy of la Trémoille accused him of cowardice.⁵² However, it remains likely that the decision to occupy the van at Nicopolis was welcomed by the majority of the French and other knights who had travelled to Hungary.

The overwhelming desire of the French crusaders at Nicopolis to bring the Turks to battle and then fight at the front of the Christian host was dictated by chivalric rather than strategic considerations. Leading knights such as Artois and Boucicaut were allowed to impose their view since it was echoed by the majority of the crusaders. John of Nevers was technically in charge of the French forces, but he offered no opposition to the plan to occupy the van of the attack, and in all likelihood he fully agreed with this approach. In the ordinances which Philip the Bold drew up in an attempt to impose some discipline on his

⁵⁰ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 487-9; Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 409.

⁵¹ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 314.

⁵² *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 489; Juvenal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI*, p. 409.

son's force, the duke insisted that his son should occupy the vanguard of any battle against the Turks.⁵³ Here the interaction between chivalry and politics is brought into sharp relief as Philip wanted to ensure that the maximum political benefit for his duchy was secured from the crusade. Philip's main concern was that Nevers was given the chance to prove his prowess and hence win renown. There was enormous prestige involved in leading the largest crusade of the century, and this was enough to ensure that Nevers was remembered as a hero despite the crusade's defeat. Philip realised that it was important that his son established a chivalric reputation before he began his political career as he himself had done, having earned his sobriquet 'the Bold' while fighting alongside his father John II as a teenager at the battle of Poitiers.

The French crusaders' decision to occupy the vanguard of the attack at Nicopolis is a reflection of renewed confidence in arms as much as a determination that the opportunity of acquiring glory in battle was not going to elude them. French military confidence had recovered since the disasters of Crécy and Poitiers, and with the defeat of the Flemings at Roosebeke in 1382 and the driving of Despenser's crusading force back across the Channel in the following autumn it was arguably at its highest for thirty years. In particular, the battle of Roosebeke had restored French faith in the shock charge of heavy cavalry, and this was the tactic which the French attempted at Nicopolis. Indeed, it is notable that the French burned Courtrai immediately after the victory of Roosebeke, suggesting that they wanted to wipe out the memory of the thwarting of the cavalry charge at the hands of civilians.⁵⁴ In the crusaders' desire to reassert the supremacy of the mounted charge, the conservatism of chivalric notions and of those who followed them is revealed. It was noted in the previous

⁵³ See above, pp. 153-4.

⁵⁴ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 10, pp. 177-8.

chapter that John of Nevers' contingent contained few archers when compared with the large contingents which the English took on their campaigns.⁵⁵ The French had witnessed the devastating effect of concentrated longbow fire in their encounters with the English, yet they seem to have made no effort to integrate these lessons into military thinking. The silence of the French chroniclers suggests that there were relatively few archers among the crusaders at Nicopolis, in contrast with the force of archers in the Turkish ranks which caused considerable damage.⁵⁶ It is submitted that the French saw the crusade to Nicopolis as an exclusively chivalric affair, and since they were not raising forces for the crown, French knights were determined to trust their own prowess rather than rely on the support of archers. The failure to bring an adequate contingent of archers was a serious blunder, but French confidence in arms led to a disregard for other necessary tactical precautions at Nicopolis. The French made little effort to discover the whereabouts of the Turks, and as a result they had little time to prepare themselves for their approach.⁵⁷ This may have had an impact on where the battle was to be fought, as the French ended up having to attack uphill with a river at their rear. The Turks occupied a good defensive position and placed spikes in the ground to hamper the French cavalry.⁵⁸ The French had committed such a fundamental error of judgement that one wonders how it could have occurred. Military treatises, such as that of Vegetius, were enduringly popular in the later fourteenth century and this was exactly the sort of situation which was warned against. It is possible that the speed of the Turkish advance on Nicopolis took the French by surprise and they did not have the chance to choose the ground on which the battle would be fought. However, it is just as likely that the

⁵⁵ See above, p. 154.

⁵⁶ *Livre des fais*, p. 105.

⁵⁷ Froissart remarked that the Ottomans managed to advance to within a short distance from Nicopolis without the crusaders' knowledge: Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 311.

⁵⁸ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 505; *Chronographia Regum Francorum*, vol. 3, p. 137.

French did not really care where the battle took place as they were confident that they would be more than a match for the Turks. The battle of Nicopolis witnessed French chivalry fighting as it wanted to fight, leading from the front with little thought except for proving their valour in the face of the Infidel. As a result, the French disregarded fundamental military principles and fought the battle as little more than a loose collection of individuals rather than as a coherent military unit.

The behaviour of Boucicaut and Philip of Artois throughout the Nicopolis campaign reveals most clearly the difference between knightly conduct on crusade compared with that in the wars between England and France. As the marshal and constable of France respectively, these men were Charles VI's most senior officers. Their service under the crown involved them exercising a certain restraint on their chivalric impulses in order to protect the interests of the king and the realm. However, their conduct on the crusade to Nicopolis demonstrates that the two men did not consider themselves to be acting as representatives of the king of France, and Boucicaut and Artois participated on the crusade as individual knights rather than as the marshal and constable of France.⁵⁹ At the same time the two men expected their status to be recognised, and their actions suggest that they acknowledged no superior on the expedition. Their insistence that the French fight in the vanguard of the attack had been preceded by an audacious night raid on the town of Rahowa, an incident which reflects their desire to win renown. Boucicaut and Artois seem to have launched the raid, presumably with the men which they had brought on the crusade, without the knowledge of John of Nevers or Sigismund.⁶⁰ The two men were probably hoping that even if the Turks were not brought to battle, they would be remembered for

⁵⁹ Housley, 'Le Maréchal Boucicaut à Nicopolis', p. 91; see above, pp. 166-7.

⁶⁰ *Livre des fais*, pp. 94-6; *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 493-5.

having led a daring raid on an Infidel fortress in the dead of night. This was just the sort of rash activity which brought praise from one's peers, and it is interesting that the raid was reminiscent of Robert of Artois's actions at Mansura, almost 150 years previously.⁶¹ On this occasion, Robert of Artois had led an unauthorised foray to the town, where he and those who accompanied him were killed in the narrow streets. If such unauthorised action had been attempted by French knights in the war against England, it would have been considered tantamount to desertion from the host and would have been punished accordingly. However, Boucicaut and Artois saw themselves as leaders of their own contingents on a crusade which had no unified command structure. They knew that no-one was going to discipline them for what they had done as they acknowledged no superiors. Nevers may have seen himself as the overall commander of the French forces, but he did not have the courage or the inclination to take any action. Although he was a king and hence the most senior figure on the crusade, Sigismund appears to have exercised no jurisdiction over the French crusaders and Boucicaut and Artois knew that he would not risk provoking a scene. Froissart recorded that Coucy was also involved in an incident which had taken place apart from the rest of the force. He was apparently involved in a skirmish with a larger Turkish force which he managed to defeat by luring the Turks into an ambush.⁶² However, it is possible that Froissart invented this episode, which was not recorded by any of the other chroniclers, as another means of distancing Coucy from the ensuing defeat in the battle. The implication was that if Coucy had been in charge, events may have turned out differently, and the Turks may have been the victims of an ambush rather than the French. Coucy's actions (if they occurred), as well as those of Artois and Boucicaut, give the impression that

⁶¹ J. of Joinville, *The Memoirs of the Lord of Joinville*, E. Wedgewood, ed. (London, 1906) pp. 103-04.

⁶² Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, pp. 264-8.

the crusade to Nicopolis was regarded by the leading French knights as a chivalric free-for-all in which they could act without the restraints imposed when fighting for their sovereign.

The defeat of the crusaders at Nicopolis was such a major event that there were few writing at the time in France who did not comment upon it. The leading chroniclers, such as Froissart, the monk of St. Denis and the author of the *Livre des fais*, all discussed the defeat and offered suggestions as to why it had occurred. Bonet also wrote on the subject, while Mézières devoted a whole work to the disaster at Nicopolis. The theories of why the French were defeated at Nicopolis expressed in these heterogeneous works included both the physical and the metaphysical, often in combination, highlighting the fact that such events were seen as an interplay of human error and divine punishment. The treatment and explanations of the defeat of Nicopolis reveal to an extent the prevailing criticisms of knighthood among literate non-combatants. That these criticisms were on the whole unoriginal is a reflection of the stasis of the terms by which crusading defeats were explained, and the ongoing similarity in crusaders' behaviour. The author of the *Livre des fais* provided the most remarkable account of the defeat of the French in terms of his blatant disregard for the truth. He blamed the defeat entirely upon the Hungarians whom he described as fleeing from the scene of the battle once the first volley of Turkish archers had fired.⁶³ He went on to suggest that under Boucicaut, the French made the best of what had become a hopeless situation and plunged into the fray.⁶⁴ The author had preceded his account of the battle with some general remarks about the inconstancies of Fortune which were obviously intended to prepare the ground for the defeat which he was about to recount. He stated that no-one could guard themselves against Fortune and that it even

⁶³ *Livre des fais*, pp. 105-06.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-13.

thwarted the good and the brave on occasion.⁶⁵ The implication was that Boucicaut and his French companions did not deserve their fate, and the author's mention of previous heroes who had been brought down by Fortune would suggest that he saw Boucicaut as a figure of similar stature.⁶⁶ The author of the *Livre des fais* was in a position which made it difficult for him to have told the truth about the defeat of Nicopolis even if he had wanted to do so. Boucicaut was still alive when the *Livre des fais* was written, and since the work was a eulogy of his life, the author could hardly denounce him as one of the knights who had effectively lost the battle of Nicopolis. He decided completely to omit the fact that the French had fought in the vanguard of the attack to avoid the difficulties of explaining Boucicaut's part in the decision. Boucicaut occupied a central role in the account of the Nicopolis crusade provided by the *Livre des fais*, and any mention of the decision to occupy the van of the attack would have to ascribe a prominent role to the marshal. He obviously decided that it was easier to ignore this aspect of the battle entirely, which suggests that the author felt that the French decision to occupy the van had been a foolish one, or at least that this was how his audience would perceive it. As a result, any pretence at factual accuracy was abandoned, and the defeat was blamed upon the flight of the Hungarians and the inconstancies of Fortune.

It is interesting that Froissart's analysis of the defeat at Nicopolis differed markedly from the version offered in the *Livre des fais*. In a sense both men approached the subject from a similar angle as Froissart sought to exonerate Coucy from any blame for the French actions, just as the author of the *Livre des fais* did for Boucicaut. Froissart claimed that Coucy had preferred the more cautious advice of Sigismund and that it was Artois who had

⁶⁵ The author remarked: "Mais si comme Fortune est souvent coustumiere de nuire aux bons et aux vaillans...Hé! qui est ce qui se puist garder de male Fortune?": *ibid.*, p. 99.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

insisted that the French occupied the van.⁶⁷ Since Artois was killed on the crusade, Froissart probably saw him as a convenient scapegoat, although it is quite possible that what he had to say about the constable was correct. Froissart generally treated those who performed chivalric deeds with sympathy, but it is striking that he was starkly critical of the French knights at Nicopolis, and stated unequivocally that they brought the defeat upon themselves.⁶⁸ Indeed, in a remark revealing particular insight into the motivation of the knights at Nicopolis, he compared the loss to that at Roncevalles:

“...par leur fole, oultre-cuidance et orgueil fut toute la perte, et le dommage que ils receurent, si grant que depuis la bataille de Ronchevauls ou les douze pers de France furent mors et desconfis, ne receurent si grant dommage.”⁶⁹

It was not Froissart's aim to analyse the causes of the defeat in detail, but he was close to the truth when he attributed it to the French desire to see battle and their proud refusal to occupy any other position than the vanguard of the attack. The comparison with Roncevalles is revealing as although Froissart used this as a passing reference to compare the scale of the defeat, he was doubtless aware of the parallels in so far as the reckless courage of the French had led to disaster on both occasions. The implication is that Froissart recognised that defeats of this nature were bound to occur from time to time when one's attitude to battle was not cautious and measured.

The emphasis in the account of the monk of St. Denys is more on sin than foolish pride, and the defeat acquired a more traditional metaphysical aspect. Like Froissart, the monk saw that the French had only thought about winning renown and he attributed a

⁶⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 314.

⁶⁸ Froissart remarked: “...les Franchois en furent cause et coulpe; car par leur orgueil et désarroiance tout se perdy.”: *ibid.*, p. 319.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-16.

speech to Boucicaut and Artois in which they told the king of Hungary that they had only come on the crusade “...pour acquérir de la gloire et pour signaler notre vaillance.”⁷⁰ The recognition that the crusaders were more concerned about glory than tactics was not the monk’s main explanation of the defeat. As might be expected of a religious, the monk’s central interpretation was set in a theological context, and he believed that sin had largely been responsible for the loss at Nicopolis, in contrast to Froissart’s emphasis on the foolishness of the knights’ behaviour. The monk prepared the reader for this version of events in a prelude to the battle in which he stated that churchmen on the crusade had requested that the knights give up their debaucheries if they wished to avoid the wrath of God.⁷¹ The monk added that the advice fell on deaf ears, a clear indication of the divine judgement which would inevitably ensue. The theme was elaborated upon when the monk recounted that the king and his nobles were offering prayers for the success of the crusade back in France, but God did not hear them since the crusaders were not worthy of His grace.⁷² The crusaders apparently abandoned themselves to vices once the town of Nicopolis was near to capitulation, and at this point the monk introduced the familiar concept that Bayezid was going to be the instrument through which God chastised the French for their immorality.⁷³ The monk claimed that Bayezid was shocked by what he had heard of the crusaders’ behaviour, and was determined to punish them.⁷⁴ The resulting victory of the sultan was described as “la vengeance du ciel” and accompanied by a comment that God’s will was irresistible.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 491.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 497.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 497-9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 511.

The monk of St. Denis had analysed the defeat at Nicopolis in traditionally theocentric terms which took little account of the practical reasons for its occurrence. In this sense the monk's condemnation was retrospective, as he looked back at the conduct of the knights in order to seek explanations for the defeat. It was a capricious explanation since one suspects that had the French had won the battle of Nicopolis, presumably the Turks would have been portrayed as vicious, immoral, and thoroughly deserving of defeat. The concept of the sinfulness of crusaders being responsible for the failure of a crusade was as old as the Second Crusade.⁷⁶ Crusaders habitually laid themselves open to this charge because their behaviour on crusade was never that of the penitential pilgrims into which the Church hoped the assumption of the Cross would transform them. Thus the monk of St. Denis' criticism of the French knights is traditional and almost trite in its reiteration of the *peccatis exigentibus* theme, but it is interesting that it has been adapted for the circumstances of the later fourteenth century. The monk clearly believed that the French at Nicopolis were responsible for their own defeat, and there was no suggestion that all Christians should assume responsibility for the defeat as a consequence of their own sinfulness. Perhaps this difference of emphasis was unintentional or subconscious, but it is notable that the defeat of the knights at Nicopolis was not identified as a blow to Christendom as a whole, but rather as a punishment for the sinful knights who had taken part. This reflects the fact crusading had become the preserve of the nobility and it was treated as another chivalric pastime such as jousting, out of the range of most people's experiences. The inexorable rise of the Turks would arguably create a renewed community of interest in the fifteenth century, but it is striking that the monk of St. Denis explained the

⁷⁶ On this subject see E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095-1274* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 69-108.

defeat of Nicopolis in terms rather different to those which would have been employed had the defeat occurred a century earlier.

It is not surprising that the Benedictine Honore Bonet wrote about the defeat of Nicopolis in similar terms to the monk of St. Denis. In his *Apparicion maistre Jehan de Meun*, which he completed in 1398, he used a Saracen to criticise the failings of French chivalry. Bonet had the crusade to Nicopolis in mind when he was writing the work: the Saracen made reference to the captivity of Nevers and was clearly intended by Bonet to be recognised as an Ottoman Turk.⁷⁷ Like the monk of St. Denis, Bonet saw the defeat of the French in terms of God chastising the crusaders for their sins; in the version dedicated to Louis of Orléans, he wrote that God had taken the light of the Church away from the people (a reference to the Schism) and allowed the advance of the Saracens.⁷⁸ However, the main criticism which Bonet raised against French chivalry through the Saracen was that they were not as hardy as the Turks. In particular, the Saracen stated that the French were too fond of dainty food in contrast with the Turks, whose meagre diet made them tougher.⁷⁹ While it was possibly true that the gastronomic excesses of the French nobility were not mirrored among the higher ranking Turks, it is fascinating that Bonet should attribute this as a cause of the French defeat. Bonet was calling into question the prowess of the French knights, and the Saracen even remarked that the blows of the French crusaders were light.⁸⁰ He added that the French knights lacked wisdom when they planned crusades such as the expedition to

⁷⁷ H. Bonet, *L'Apparicion maistre Jehan de Meun*, I. Arnold, éd., Publications de la faculté des lettres de l'université de Strasbourg (Paris, 1926), p. 22.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁹ The Saracen stated:

“Mais nous Sarrazins tout envers,
Com scet monseigneur de Nevers,
Vivons autrement, pour certain:

L'eaue clere et un pou de pain

Est grant disner d'un Sarrazin.”: *ibid.*, p. 22, ll. 435-9.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26., l. 520.

Nicopolis, implying that they did not recognise their essential weakness.⁸¹ This criticism was wide of the mark, as there seems little doubt that the French knights were competent individual fighters. Froissart admitted that even though their pride had cost them the battle, the French knights had fought well.⁸² Indeed, Bayezid was apparently dismayed when he saw the number of dead Turks left on the field at Nicopolis, and his losses were heavier than he had expected.⁸³

Bonet's criticisms appear simplistic, and since he was writing no more than a couple of years after Nicopolis, he could perhaps be expected to have accounted for the defeat of the French in more relevant and explicit terms. The Saracen made no mention of the tactical errors which had cost the crusaders the battle and the closest he came to any relevant criticism was when he suggested that the armour of the French knights was too heavy compared with that of the Turks.⁸⁴ Bonet was certainly not prepared to go to the heart of the French defeat, although the Saracen would have been a most suitable character for this purpose. The Saracen could have been used to analyse the contrasts between Turkish discipline through their identification of the struggle with the Christians as *jihad*, and the contrasting desire of the French to win personal renown above all other considerations. It is possible that Bonet simply did not see the defeat in these terms, but it must also be remembered that he was attached to the French court at this time, and to have criticised the whole notion of chivalric conduct and how it was likely to bring about a defeat of this sort is perhaps expecting too much from him. Bonet's reference to Nevers knowing well that the Turks did not eat the same dainty food as the French was as close to the wind as he was

⁸¹ "Mais que le partir soit joly,
Vous ne regardés point la fin.": *ibid.*, ll. 515-16.

⁸² Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 15, p. 319.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁸⁴ *L'Apparicion maistre Jehan de Meun*, pp. 26-7, ll. 524-35.

prepared to sail.⁸⁵ In general, Bonet stuck to criticising the French knights in the familiar terms of sinful excess. This was a theme of which he was fond and his earlier work, *The Tree of Battles*, had included a similarly harsh indictment of knightly behaviour.⁸⁶ His aim in *L'Apparicion maistre Jehan de Meun* was presumably to goad the French knights into reforming their habits, and it was with this in mind that he had the Saracen conclude his remarks with the inflammatory suggestion that the French should have peasants in their army since they were used to hard work.⁸⁷

Bonet's criticism of the French centred around the sin of gluttony, while that of Philip of Mézières was more comprehensive and identified the sins which caused battles to be lost and the virtues which needed to be present if they were to be won. Mézières wrote his *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire* in 1397. It was dedicated principally to Philip the Bold, when news of the defeat was quite fresh and Nevers and his companions were still in captivity. As a result, Mézières avoided specific criticism of individuals' behaviour and discussed the defeat in more general terms. He had been critical of the crusade since its inception as he felt that it had been launched too early.⁸⁸ Mézières had wanted the next crusade to be launched when knighthood had been regenerated through the example of the Order of the Passion, but the Nicopolis crusade had set out when plans to establish the Order were in an embryonic stage. Indeed, the Order was some years from realisation in 1396 and Mézières had proceeded no further than canvassing support from the nobility of Europe.⁸⁹ As a result, Mézières' response to the defeat at Nicopolis had a certain

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸⁶ Thus Bonet remarked: "...the man who does not know how to set places on fire, to rob churches and usurp their rights and to imprison the priests, is not fit to carry on war. And for these reasons the knights of to-day have not the glory and praise of the old champions of former times, and their deeds can never come to great perfection of virtue.": H. Bonet, *The Tree of Battles*, G.W. Coopland, trans. (Liverpool, 1949), p. 189.

⁸⁷ *L'Apparicion maistre Jehan de Meun*, p. 27.

⁸⁸ Brown, *Philippe de Mézières' Order of the Passion*, p. xvi.

⁸⁹ See the list provided by Molinier, 'Description des deux manuscrits', pp. 362-64.

inevitability about it. He began by identifying rule, discipline, obedience and justice as the moral virtues which needed to be present in a force if it was to be effective.⁹⁰ He then suggested that these virtues had been absent at Nicopolis and in their place had been the vices of pride, envy, division and inobedience, amongst others.⁹¹ Mézières saw the solution as the founding of the Order of the Passion which would create “...une nouvelle génération de combattants qui possédera ces quatre vertus morales.”⁹² He proceeded to provide a lengthy discourse on the Order which in content reiterated the message of his previous works on the subject, culminating once again in the discussion of a three-pronged attack on Jerusalem to be led by the rulers of Europe.⁹³ It was clear that Mézières at least was not shaken by what had occurred at Nicopolis and felt that the defeat only confirmed his fears.

It is interesting that Mézières attempted to place the defeat in its historical context by looking at how previous French crusading and secular campaigns had ended in defeat. Thus Mézières claimed that Philip and Richard I's campaign to the Holy Land, Louis IX's first crusade and the battles of Crécy and Poitiers were all occasions on which the four virtues had been ignored.⁹⁴ Mézières also used the voice of John of Blaisy, one of his Evangelists and a participant on the crusade to Nicopolis, to criticise behaviour on the expedition.⁹⁵ He specifically referred to the fact that the knights had feasted each other on the crusade, and he also told a parable in which the wind of pride disrupted the discipline of the force.⁹⁶ Mézières' analysis of why armies lost battles and the solution of this situation appears reasonable, but his concept of chivalry was fundamentally different to that of the knights

⁹⁰ *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*, p. 446.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 467.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 490-98.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 470-1, 471-3, 450-1 respectively.

⁹⁵ Blaisy was in fact a member of Philip the Bold's household, and travelled to Nicopolis as part of Nevers' company: *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 22, f. 21v.; *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 20, f. 346r.

⁹⁶ *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*, pp. 516-18.

themselves. For Mézières, the demands of chivalry were inevitably going to lead to what he regarded as sinful behaviour, and the four virtues were more often than not going to be absent on campaign. While Mézières believed that knights would have to change their conduct before it could become acceptable to God, the knights themselves would almost certainly have disagreed. Once the Church had sanctioned the use of violence in God's cause, knights were always liable to regard their behaviour on crusade, however excessive, as part of their service to God. If knights were going to fight on crusade, they were going to do so on their terms and not those laid down by the Church or any other group, and there was little chance that their behaviour would be changed voluntarily. There were of course expressions of doubt, such as those voiced by Henry of Grosmont, but on the whole knights were not prone to such critical self-analysis.⁹⁷ This was where Mézières' aims were hopelessly optimistic; he had little chance of persuading knights to reform their own behaviour by adopting a system of values which were essentially incompatible with it.

In conclusion, it is contended that the last third of the fourteenth century was on the whole a frustrating time for the chivalry of France. They were presented with few opportunities to express their martial energy in a way which would allow them to establish and add to their reputations as warriors. The defeats against the English in the middle years of the century had produced a period of understandable caution which proved beneficial for the French war effort as a whole, but frustrating for the majority of the combatants. French confidence in arms recovered, and the truce with England saw the desire for adventure and combat greater than ever. Their behaviour at Al-Mahdiya had shown that the French were extremely eager for open combat with the Infidel, especially since the *reysen* did not present an opportunity for this to occur. As a consequence, a major crusade such as that to

⁹⁷ See Grosmont's *Le Livre des Seyntz Medicines*, E.J.F. Arnould, ed. (Oxford, 1940).

Nicopolis was never going to be a campaign in which discipline and caution prevailed, and the lack of clear leadership allowed it to unfold according to the whims of the senior French knights. The writers of the time sought to explain the defeat in such conventional terms as the search for vainglory or the just punishment for sinful behaviour. It is likely that the knights did not see events in this way, and they were self-consciously aspiring to what they regarded as ideal behaviour. This was why even if Mézières believed that he could offer an alternative, there was little chance that it would be acceptable to chivalry. The French knights behaved in a generally disciplined way when they were led by their sovereign, but they were less inclined to regulate their behaviour when they were fighting on crusade. The search for individual renown demonstrated so clearly at Nicopolis could never be eradicated and moral censure doubtless went unheeded. Mézières was the only writer of the period who had the vision to address the contradictions of knighthood and propose a remedy for them, but it is testimony to his ultimate failure that the knights who demonstrated the most reckless and vainglorious behaviour on the crusade, such as Boucicaut and Artois, were the same men who had promised their support to Mézières' Order of the Passion.⁹⁸ Mézières saw clearly the direction in which he wanted to take knighthood, but this was no more than a dream, a fact which Mézières openly acknowledged. The Order of the Passion could never have existed in the form which Mézières envisaged, and in fact it was the growth of the nation state rather than the moral reform which would transform chivalric conduct in succeeding centuries. Men such as Edward the Black Prince and Bertrand du Guesclin were indeed the harbingers of knighthood's destiny, as the earning of renown became almost exclusively achieved through the service to one's country and less through individual acts of

⁹⁸ Molinier, 'Description de deux manuscrits', pp. 362, 364. Boucicaut had offered to join the Order of the Passion, while Artois had offered his assistance.

knight errantry. The hailing of du Guesclin as the Tenth Worthy pointed to the future in the sense that it was accepted that a national conflict was on a par with crusading. Battlefield tactics evolved and the dominance of the mounted nobility was challenged by the resurgence of infantry and developments in firearms. Knights were destined to become the officer corps of the standing armies of the state. At the same time, the opportunities to go on crusade decreased and the soldier's life and ethos were subsumed more fully within the needs of the nation state. As the countries of Europe hardened into states and fought national campaigns against their Christian enemies, crusading zeal such as that demonstrated in the 1390s ultimately paved the way for the national struggles of the early modern period.

CONCLUSION

The Great Schism witnessed the papacy's influence over crusading decline to such an extent that by the 1390s control over the launching of crusades was almost exclusively in secular hands. The papacy had suffered an erosion of power since the start of the fourteenth century when Philip IV had sought to assert the dominance of the French crown in both temporal and spiritual matters. The French king had made an attempt to usurp the papacy's role in crusading through the exposition of the concept that the kings of France were the natural leaders of the crusading movement and the French were God's chosen people.¹ The outbreak of the Anglo-French war brought a temporary halt to the posturing of the French kings in this area, allowing the papacy to recover some lost ground and reassert itself as the focus of crusade organisation. The naval leagues of the middle of the century showed that when popes worked in conjunction with secular powers, they still exerted enough influence to shape the direction of crusading. From the 1350s it had become clear that the Ottoman Turks were an enemy who demanded the attention of Christendom, and this was an issue which provided the papacy with a clear focus up to the eve of the Schism.² The outbreak of the Schism which succeeded Gregory XI's pontificate interrupted this papal revival and it was not until the fifteenth century that the papacy turned its attentions to crusading against

¹ See, for example, Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology*, pp. 172-93.

² A. Luttrell, 'Gregory XI and the Turks: 1370-1378', *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades 1291-1440* (London, 1982), pp. 391-417.

the Infidel. In the intervening decades the papacy's role in crusading was relatively slight. Clement VII's backing of the efforts of Louis of Anjou to conquer the kingdom of Naples proved that even a divided papacy had financial and spiritual muscle, and it was predictably the Schism crusades against Christians which witnessed Clement VII and Urban VI most involved in crusading. However, the papal interest in crusading during the Schism was limited to the extent to which crusades could be used to strengthen the pope's position with regard to his rival. Indeed, after the suspension of hostilities between France and England in the truce of Leulingham in 1389, neither pope paid much attention to crusading against the Infidel as this would not help oust the other claimant and unite the curia. As a result, when the chivalry of France and England turned to crusading in the 1390s, Benedict XIII and Boniface IX played an extremely limited role. This was partly a result of the popes' concentration on their own affairs, but this in turn led to the papacy being sidelined by the secular powers, into whose hands control of crusading fell exclusively. Crusading in the 1390s took an unusual direction in so far as the kings of France and England did not fill the vacuum at the head of the movement which was left by the papacy. As has been demonstrated, Richard II's overseas interests extended no further than Ireland, and the plans of Charles VI for a future crusade to Jerusalem were of a long-term nature.³ Furthermore, Charles had barely begun to implement his own policies when he suffered the attack of schizophrenia which was to limit his role at the head of French government and effectively end his crusade plans.⁴ The lack of firm royal leadership from either France or England resulted in control over crusading devolving by default largely into the hands of the princes immediately below the two monarchs. Thus the men who helped to shape the crusading

³ See above, pp. 113-14, 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-08.

movement in the 1390s were the dukes of Burgundy, Bourbon, and, to a lesser extent, Lancaster and Orléans. These men were all personally interested in crusading, but they also saw the sponsorship and leadership of crusading as a way of furthering their political interests. In particular, the role of the duke of Burgundy in launching the crusade to Nicopolis heralded the pre-eminence which the duchy would achieve in both its temporal and spiritual affairs in the fifteenth century.

This devolution of power over crusading, in the absence of firm papal or royal leadership, contributed greatly to the striking lack of direction and strategic focus which was characteristic of the crusading of the 1390s. This was signalled in the renewed popularity of the *reysen* in the years between Leulingham and Nicopolis.⁵ The voyages to Prussia provided an opportunity for knights to go on crusade without having to worry about wider strategic considerations, which evidently included ignoring the fact that the Lithuanians had been visibly converting to Christianity since the marriage of 1386. The *reysen* were “crusades in a vacuum” in the sense that they did not require the involvement of the papacy or the secular powers and had few implications for European politics as a whole. Knights with the means to do so could go on crusade to Prussia when they pleased in time of truce, with the aim of nothing more than proving themselves in battle against the Infidel. Princes could see the attraction of sending members of their household on the *reysen* as the presence of crusaders added to the splendour of the ducal court; the efforts of Philip the Bold and Louis of Orléans in this area have been discussed in an earlier chapter.⁶ It could be argued that Prussia was a traditional crusade front, and by denying the conversion of the Lithuanians, the Teutonic Knights could claim that they needed volunteers to bring it about.

⁵ Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, vol. 1, pp. 98-101, 125-7.

⁶ See above, pp. 123-5, 128.

However, the lack of direction of the crusading movement at the end of the fourteenth century was more clearly demonstrated by the expedition to Al-Mahdiya. It is remarkable that in 1390 an expedition could be launched to North Africa when in the previous year the Turks had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Serbs at Kossovo, reducing the latter to tributary status and increasing the Ottoman hold upon the Balkans. It was always possible that this situation would arise when those responsible for organising the expedition were not considering the larger issue of the advance of the Muslims and the threat which they posed to Christianity. Thus the Duke of Bourbon wanted to lead a crusade which would bring him renown in the twilight of his military career, while Charles VI was prepared to acquiesce to the project since it could help to establish firmer relations with Genoa, which in turn would provide a foothold in Italy. This campaign produced no benefit to anyone except the Genoese, and in fact it understandably increased Muslim hostility towards Christians in the region and may have led to a rise in the price of spices and other goods.⁷ The Ottoman Turks were overtly expansionist and yet there seems to have been a complacency in France which led to the threat being largely ignored. Artois was sent to Hungary in 1393, possibly as the result of an appeal by Sigismund, but his force was small and was probably sent more out of sympathy than from a recognition of the danger of the Turks. Although the crusade to Nicopolis would suggest that the threat from the Turks had been acknowledged, Philip the Bold had offered the crusade to the Teutonic Order, revealing that his main concern was to launch a Burgundian expedition against recognised enemies of the faith.⁸ If the Grand Master of the Order had accepted the offer, the crusade which effectively marked the start of the Christian struggle against the Turks may well have gone to Prussia instead.

⁷ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 14, p. 278.

⁸ See above, pp. 142-4.

The crusade to Nicopolis signalled most dramatically the temporary decline of the papal role in the crusading movement and the rise to prominence of the secular princes. Nicopolis was a remarkable expedition as it was the largest campaign against the Infidel in the fourteenth century, yet there was virtually no papal involvement at any stage. It was a testament to the power of his nascent Burgundian state that Philip the Bold was able to launch the largest crusade of the century with almost no contribution from the papacy. Since this was a Burgundian enterprise, it is unsurprising that Boniface IX did not have a role, but it is striking that Benedict XIII played almost no part in the launching of the crusade either. This was partly due to the fact that relations between the French court and the papacy were at a low ebb in the mid 1390s. Benedict was proving elusive when pressed to confirm the promise which he had made before his election that he would step down to make way for a new pope if requested to do so.⁹ The French government was running out of patience and by 1398 the king had withdrawn the obedience of his people from Benedict, who became a virtual prisoner in his palace at Avignon for the next five years.¹⁰ Indeed, it is ironic that Philip the Bold, Louis of Orléans and John of Berry were on their way to Avignon to discuss the way of cession with the pope in May 1395 when the Hungarian ambassadors arrived at Lyons.¹¹ Philip had no intention of sending the Hungarians (who recognised Boniface IX anyway) to meet the pope, and it is unlikely that the crusade to Hungary was discussed in any depth in the ensuing meeting between the French princes and the pontiff. However, it was not just the poor relations between the French court and

⁹ N. Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme d'Occident*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1901), pp. 3-67.

¹⁰ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 655-7. French policy towards the Schism and Benedict XIII were subjects in which the monk of St. Denis showed a particular interest: *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, *passim*. See also Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme*, vol. 3, pp. 69-187.

¹¹ See above, p. 134.

Benedict XIII which denied the pope a role in the Nicopolis crusade. It was an intentional decision taken by Philip the Bold.

As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, Philip wanted the crusade to be perceived as a Burgundian enterprise and this involved exercising control over all aspects of the preparation and launching of the expedition. The papacy was traditionally central to the diplomacy which necessarily preceded a crusade expedition, but in 1395 Philip the Bold allowed the pope no role, and Benedict XIII was either unable or unwilling to involve himself in the launching of the crusade. Philip conducted negotiations with the king of Hungary in much the same manner that powers discussed secular issues such as alliances or peace negotiations. No papal representatives were invited to the discussions in Hungary and there was no place for the papacy at the meeting which was due to take place in Venice in the first months of 1395.¹² Philip the Bold also sidelined the papacy in his approaches to the financing of the Nicopolis crusade. This was another area in which the papacy traditionally played an important role, but Philip saw that if the crusade was to be regarded as a Burgundian enterprise, it would have to be funded largely from Burgundian resources. Indeed, it was in the financing of the crusade to Nicopolis that Philip aimed to demonstrate the power of his fledgling state most emphatically. He asked his nobility to either accompany Nevers on the crusade or contribute towards it financially, and he negotiated with representative bodies of his territory in order to raise taxes.¹³ It is notable that in taxing his subjects, Philip included the clergy, who duly paid. For example, an order has survived in which two of Philip's officials, Jean of Vergy and Thiebaut of Rye, were authorised to

¹² The meeting was to involve William of la Trémoille (representing the dukes of Burgundy, Orléans and Lancaster), the Hungarian ambassadors and the Venetians: see above, pp. 133-4.

¹³ Philip raised 220,000 *francs* in ducal *aides* from his own territories: Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, p. 228.

collect money for the crusade from the duke's subjects, both lay and ecclesiastical.¹⁴ In presuming to tax the clergy, Philip was directly encroaching upon the power of the papacy, and this assertion of secular authority was reminiscent of the actions of the kings of France at the start of the century.

What is particularly striking about the crusade to Nicopolis is that in his desire to exercise complete control over the expedition, Philip the Bold even reduced the spiritual role of the papacy to a minimum. Philip's virtual exclusion of the papacy from the crusade to Nicopolis raises the broader issue of whether the knights who went on the crusade can be considered crusaders in the sense that they had formally taken the Cross and had been granted the status of *crucesignati*. Although Philip had the power to negotiate with Sigismund and provide most of the funds for the expedition, he did not have the spiritual authority to confer the status of a crusade upon it and to grant indulgences to those who participated. This was something which Benedict XIII alone could do, but it would seem that Nicopolis was never formally proclaimed as a crusade. There is no evidence that Benedict issued bulls for the preaching of the crusade throughout France, and there is nothing to suggest that indulgences were offered or that any French knights formally took the Cross.¹⁵ There is no indication that Boucicaut had taken the Cross, for example, and the author of the *Livre des fais* was silent on the subject. Indeed, none of the French chroniclers mentioned that the French knights took the Cross before embarking on the crusade, and it would appear that the expedition to Nicopolis was preceded by none of the usual papal machinery. Nevers was apparently sent to the Pope to receive the plenary indulgence and the right to choose a confessor, and this meeting may have secured the indulgence for the

¹⁴ *Coll. Bourg.*, t. 21, f. 27v.

¹⁵ Tyerman asserted that both popes issued crusade bulls for Nicopolis, but he does not provide evidence to back up this statement: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 297.

Burgundians who accompanied Nevers, although it is not certain that this was the case.¹⁶

There was certainly no documented papal representative in the form of a legate or a nuncio on the crusade to Nicopolis, and papal banners were not displayed. As has been shown, Philip instead used banners to suggest a direct association of the crusade with the Virgin as a means of bypassing papal involvement.¹⁷ There is also no evidence that the crusade was preached in England, since the bulls which Boniface issued in June and October 1394 authorising the preaching of a crusade against the Turks had only applied to areas of eastern Europe, Austria and Venice.¹⁸

If neither Benedict XIII nor Boniface IX issued bulls and authorised the preaching of the crusade, the prospect is raised that none of the French (or English) knights on the Nicopolis crusade were formally crusaders. It is also quite possible that the expedition to Nicopolis was not the only one in the later fourteenth century in which the majority of the combatants were not crusaders. In 1399 Boucicaut was sent by Charles VI at the head of a contingent to aid Constantinople, following the appeal by the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel II.¹⁹ There is no reference to Boucicaut or any of the other soldiers having taken the Cross on this occasion, and given the fact that the French had withdrawn their obedience from Benedict XIII in the previous year, it is extremely unlikely that they had been given the opportunity to become *crucesignati*.²⁰ Benedict almost certainly issued no papal bulls and since the French did not recognise his authority, they would probably have been ignored

¹⁶ Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, p. 238.

¹⁷ See above, pp. 158-60.

¹⁸ Boniface issued *Cogimur ex debita charitate* on 3 June which ordered crusade preaching in Bosnia Croatia and Dalmatia, and *Ad apostolatus nostri* on 13 October which extended this to Treviso, Venice and the duchy of Austria: *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. 26, pp. 554-5.

¹⁹ For details of this expedition see *Livre des faits*, pp. 132-47; *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, pp. 691-3.

²⁰ Boniface IX launched a crusade to help the Byzantine Emperor which was accompanied by an indulgence-selling campaign, but there is no evidence that Benedict XIII did the same: *Papal Letters*, vol. 4, p. 308; Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England*, vol. 2, pp. 549-57.

anyway. Thus the expedition was not a crusade and did not even have papal sanction, yet there is no evidence that this troubled Boucicaut. The authority of Charles VI was clearly the only sanction he needed and it would seem that he did not consider this expedition debased in worth because it lacked papal approval. The author of the *Livre des fais* clearly regarded this campaign as a demonstration of Boucicaut's prowess and he presumed that his audience would regard it in the same way. Similarly, there is no evidence that Philip of Artois' expedition to Hungary in 1393 was granted the status of a crusade.²¹ The Duke of Bourbon visited Clement VII before the crusade to Al-Mahdiya and his biographer remarked that he received the indulgence for himself and his men.²² There is no evidence that this expedition was preached in France, however, and while Bourbon and his household received the indulgence, the other French knights on the crusade may not have taken the Cross. There was almost certainly no crusade preaching in England in 1390, and so men like Sir Lewis Clifford and John Beaumont were not *crucesignati* when they went to Al-Mahdiya.²³

The possibility that none of the expeditions which were launched against the Infidel from France in the 1390s were formally crusades has profound implications. The presence of the papal machinery of crusading was clearly not of crucial importance to the nobility who participated on expeditions against the Infidel. Even if he had not taken the Cross, a man like Boucicaut clearly regarded himself as fighting for the defence of his faith against the Infidel when he led a contingent to Hungary in 1396, and he presumably believed that his soul would be saved if he was killed on the campaign. It is submitted that since fighting the

²¹ *Saint-Denys*, vol. 2, p. 123-5.

²² Cabaret d'Orville remarked: "...le duc de Bourbon...alla volentiers là demander congié au pape, pour aller sur les mescréans, et qu'il lui ballast absolucion de poine et de coulpe, à lui et à ses gens.": Cabaret d'Orville, *La Chronique du bon duc Loys de Bourbon*, pp. 223-4. Autrand remarked that not all those on the expedition to Al-Mahdiya were crusaders: Autrand, *Charles VI*, p. 258.

²³ Lunt's silence suggests that he had found no evidence for crusade preaching having taken place in England in 1390, and Tyerman stated that this was the case: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 280.

Infidel was regarded as the duty of the Christian knight and was fundamental to the chivalric ethos, to an extent it had developed its own justification independent of papal authority. If the papal authorisation was there it was welcomed, but if it was not, forthcoming knights were not especially concerned. Boucicaut's actions in 1399 reveal most clearly that fighting against the Infidel was not contingent upon papal approval. The circumstances of the Schism and the disempowering of the papacy which inevitably ensued meant that chivalry was starkly revealed as the driving force behind the continued interest in crusading. Crusading had outgrown the narrow walls of papal sanction, and although this did not mean that the papacy was permanently rejected, its apparatus was not strictly necessary. The fact that the papacy was to reassert its role in crusading in the fifteenth century, and the vigorous activities of legates such as Julian Cesarini could be taken as an indication that the experience of the 1390s had taught the popes a salutary lesson.

The evidence of the crusades to Flanders and Castile suggests that when the papacy did undertake to proclaim a crusade and publish bulls granting the plenary indulgence, it met with a lively response. In 1383 the preaching campaign which preceded the crusade to Flanders clearly struck a chord with the majority of the English populace, generating both large sums of money from the sale of indulgences and *crucesignati* for Despenser's army. It was the sanction of the papacy which attracted the public in 1383 and 1386 as it gave them a legitimate chance to participate in crusades from which they were normally excluded. As a result, the contrast between the crusade to Flanders and that to Nicopolis was marked; the former owed its existence to papal machinery, while the latter virtually denied it and was fuelled by noble enthusiasm for fighting the Infidel. The crusades to Flanders and Castile would appear to show that the papacy could still direct enthusiasm for crusading, but it must

be remembered that these were unusual expeditions. Both crusades were arguably more secular in nature than religious and they were really aspects of the war between England and France given a crusading gloss. The participants on the expeditions to Flanders and Castile regarded them as campaigns undertaken for the crown as much as the pope, and this is demonstrated most clearly by the letters of protection which were taken out before the expeditions set sail. The civilians and clerics on the crusades to Flanders and Castile must have taken the Cross as otherwise such large numbers of them would not have been allowed to participate. This meant that they had the protection which their status as *crucesignati* afforded them, yet they clearly did not regard this as sufficient since many of them also took out royal letters of protection, which granted similar things to what a *crucesignatus* was entitled.²⁴ This may have been due to the fact that people did not entirely trust the protection offered to a crusader as it had not been tested in England for many years. However, it is likely that royal protection was taken out by many crusaders in 1383 and 1386 because they realised that they were as much secular expeditions as crusading ones. Indeed, it is notable that even Henry Despenser showed concern for his dual role as papal nuncio and royal captain. He saw that the crown had more immediate control over him than the papacy, and he was more careful about not incurring the wrath of Richard II than that of Urban VI. Thus he attacked Ypres in an attempt to enforce the royal wish that all of Flanders be brought under its command, even though the town supported Urban VI. He also followed the laws of war governing secular campaigns with extreme care even though as a crusade expedition, no quarter had to be given. The destructive progress of the army through Flanders, burning fortresses and massacring inhabitants, would appear to be in keeping with the greater freedom which the status of a crusade allowed, in so far as a

²⁴ See Appendix 1, pp. 226-48; Appendix 2, pp. 249-67.

captain was not obliged to accept ransoms or spare any groups. However, a closer analysis of the chronicle accounts reveals that Despenser was careful to conduct his expedition to Flanders according to the rules or laws of war which governed secular campaigns. Froissart, a keen observer of the conduct of armies, noted that the town of Bourbourg surrendered to Despenser and so its inhabitants were spared, while the town of “Drinkehem” resisted and so the garrison were put to death when the town was taken by the crusaders.²⁵ Despenser also gave the people of Ypres a chance to surrender, and it was only when this request was refused that he proceeded to unfurl his banner and lay siege to the town.²⁶ Despenser was correct to identify himself as a captain of Richard II rather than a servant of Urban VI, but his caution on the campaign in Flanders did not prevent his impeachment and the temporary confiscation of his temporalities.

The eighteen years between the outbreak of the Great Schism and the defeat of Nicopolis were extremely important ones for the crusading movement. Secular power in England and particularly in France had been given a control over crusading to an unprecedented degree. In England, civilians and clergy had been allowed to take the Cross for the first time in generations, and they participated in two crusades within two years. Although it was not recognisable at the time, in this regard the crusades to Flanders and Castile heralded another step in the inexorable move towards all-out national war between states. Although the Schism came to an end without England and France having directly faced each other with crusade armies, the crusade experiences of both the nobility and the public at large were gradually leading both countries towards concepts of sanctified national struggle. Indeed, even the crusade to Nicopolis evinced this trend towards ‘nationalisation.’

²⁵ Froissart, *Chroniques*, vol. 10, p. 227.

²⁶ Despenser’s actions were recorded in several of the Flemish accounts: Lettenhove, *Istore et croniques de Flandres*, vol. 2, pp. 290, 299-301, 314-16.

Superficially it appeared to be an international pan-Christian venture, but Philip the Bold's vigorously secular management of the expedition and the virtual exclusion of the papacy pointed towards the future.

APPENDIX 1: CRUSADERS ON THE EXPEDITION TO FLANDERS, 1383

The bulk of this Appendix has been compiled using the letters of protection and general attorney which are to be found in the Treaty Rolls for 1383 (C76/67). A small number of crusaders have been added from other sources, including Walsingham's *Gesta Abbatum* and the *Rotuli Parliamentorum*. The sources for the identification of each crusader are to be found in the footnotes.

Notes.

- i) Where a person of the same name is recorded receiving letters of protection and then general attorney in separate entries, it has been assumed that this is the same person. It is possible that two people of the same name were being referred to, but the decision has been taken to err on the side of caution rather than create crusaders who did not exist. On occasion, a person of the same name received two grants of letters of protection, and in these few cases when there was no other information provided, it was decided to count these entries as two people as it is unlikely that protection would be taken out more than once. However, internal evidence does show that this did happen on occasion - a Sir Maurice Berkele, son of Thomas, for example, is recorded as having taken out protection on 14 and 25 April 1383, and this was almost certainly the same person.
- ii) In the footnotes, (p) refers to letters of protection and (g) to letters of general attorney, followed by their location in the Treaty Rolls.
- iii) The (c) after a crusader's name denotes that this man was a captain on the crusade, while (r) denotes that he was a Lancastrian retainer.
- iv) The question marks appear where extra information has been discovered about the individual, but can not be proved. For example, the question mark concerning William Asshman having been in Elmham's company on the crusade relates to the fact that although Asshman's letters of protection did not record him as being in Elmham's company, this is probably the same man who had regular dealings with Elmham, and who probably went on the crusade with him.
- v) The Christian names have been rendered into their modern equivalent where this has been possible, as have the names of places and occupations.
- vi) The "status/occupation" and "status" columns refer either to the individual's noble or ecclesiastical rank, or his trade if he was a civilian. The civilians have both headings since a trade is an occupation, whereas citizenship is a sign of status. There is no status column for the esquires since this was the only title which they held.
- vii) The "region" column refers to the area from which the individual stated that he came when taking out the letters of protection and attorney. In some cases the county was given, and in others the town or village. An effort has been made to identify the county in which the town or village was situated where this was not originally provided, or is not well-known.
- viii) The "company" column records the surname of the captain under whom the crusader was serving in Flanders. The full names of the captains whose surnames appear in the company column are as follows: John Lord Beaumont, Sir John Birmyngeham, Sir John Breaux, Sir Hugh Calveley, Sir William Chaworth, Sir John Clyfton, Sir John Contheby, Philip Lord Darcy, Sir Andrew Ekton, Sir William Elmham, Sir Richard Grene, Sir Richard Redeman and Sir Thomas Trivet.
- ix) The letters of protection and general attorney always give the date of issue, but this has not been recorded.
- x) A few of those taking out letters of protection subsequently had this protection revoked. They have been included among the crusaders as they may still have gone to Flanders, except in cases where it was specifically stated that the cause of the revocation of the protection was the individual's failure to set out on the crusade.

I. CIVILIANS

	occupation	region	company
Ankderel, Nicholas ¹	citizen, "tapicer"	London	
Aunsel, John ²	"cordewaner"	"Suthewerk", London (?)	
Baker, John ³	fishmonger	London	
Barbour, John ⁴	taverner		
Bertlot, John ⁵	tailor		
Blunham, Geoffrey ⁶	mason	"Ware", Hertfordshire (?)	
Brome, Thomas ⁷	tailor		Calveley
Brond, Robert ⁸	"hosteler"	London	
Broun, David ⁹	taverner	London	
Claworth, John ¹⁰	taverner	London	
Curteys, Hugh ¹¹	citizen, merchant	London	Trivet
Danthorp, William ¹²	citizen, woolmonger	London	
Dere, William ¹³	"cordewaner"	London	
Dyne, Simon ¹⁴	draper	London	
Everard, Thomas ¹⁵	mercier		
Fancon, John ¹⁶	citizen, apothecary	London	
Fleschhewer, Egidius ¹⁷	"armurer"		
Frothyngam, Walter ¹⁸	mercier	York	
Haliday, John ¹⁹	citizen, skinner	London	
Haselfeld, Thomas ²⁰	carpenter		
Hilles, Thomas ²¹	chandler	London	
del Ile, John ²²	merchant	York	
Ingram, John ²³	"latoner"		

¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (35).

¹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 6; (g): C76/67 m. 3.

¹² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Kent, Geoffrey ²⁴	tailor	London	
Kynston, Thomas ²⁵	"cuteller"	"Louth," Lincs.	Contheby
Logan, John ²⁶	tailor		
Lymber, John ²⁷	taverner	Newark	
Markby, John ²⁸	citizen, goldsmith	London	
Mersham, John ²⁹	skinner	"Wynschope", Cambridgeshire	
Michel, John ³⁰	dyer	"Writill"	
Michel, John ³¹	mercier, citizen	London	
Millward, John ³²	"armirer"	Exeter	
Moforde, Adam ³³	dyer		
Neuton, William ³⁴	citizen	Norwich	
Norays, Richard ³⁵	citizen	London	
Noreys, Richard ³⁶	citizen, butcher	London	
Osborne, Thomas ³⁷	"cappere"	London	
Oxundon, John ³⁸	draper	London	
Oxynden, John ³⁹	citizen, draper	London	
Palmer, William ⁴⁰	draper	Coventry	
Parson, Robert ⁴¹	taverner	London	Beaumont
Peyntour, Thomas ⁴²	woolmonger	Northampton	Trivet
Potter, William ⁴³	fisher	"Stepenhith"	
Sampson, John ⁴⁴	citizen	London	
Sapirton, Roger ⁴⁵	keeper of Fleet Prison		
Sent, Thomas ⁴⁶	"cordewaner"	London	
Stalworth, John ⁴⁷	"barbour"	Chelmsford, Essex	
Tylneye, William, junior ⁴⁸	tailor	London	
Wandesford, William ⁴⁹	travellingman		
Webber, Thomas the ⁵⁰	webber	Ludlow, Shropshire	

²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 15 March 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 242.

³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17. This could be the same man as John Oxundon above, but they could have been relatives, and only one was described as a citizen of London.

⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴¹ (p): C76/67 m. 6.

⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16, C81/1015 (14).

atte Wode, Walter ⁵¹	“lethyrseiler”	
Woderove, John ⁵²	saddler	London
Yong, John ⁵³	travellingman	Hèrefordshire

II. CLERICS

	status	region	company
Allerton, William ⁵⁴	chaplain		
Alwyne, Master Thomas ⁵⁵	archdeacon		
Asshburne, William ⁵⁶	vicar	Lincoln	
Belle, J., ⁵⁷	Benedictine		
Bokedene, John ⁵⁸	Benedictine	St. Albans	
Bouryng, John ⁵⁹	parson	“Nothill”, “Wynton”	
Bowet, Henry ⁶⁰	dean		
Clerc, John ⁶¹	parson	“Magna Craule”	
Cordray, John ⁶²	cleric		
Custance, Robert ⁶³	chaplain		
Davenport, Master Adam ⁶⁴	cleric		
Eversdon, William ⁶⁵	Benedictine prior		
Fournour, William ⁶⁶	parson	St. Olam, Chichester	
Fulmer, Master William ⁶⁷	cleric	“Ekelesfeld”	
Gote, John ⁶⁸	chaplain		
Gote, Richard ⁶⁹	cleric		
Hampstirley, John ⁷⁰	“sonnostritor” (bellringer?)	“Rotyngli”	Contheby
Hendeman, William ⁷¹	chaplain		
Hornyngton, Richard ⁷²	chaplain	“Morston”	

⁵⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (10).

⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 12 February 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 222.

⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 12 February 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 224.

⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁷ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁶⁰ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 224.

⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 3 April 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 239.

⁶³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁶⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁶⁵ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁶⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁶⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁶⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁶⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

⁷¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷² (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on March 6 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 233.

Howdon, John ⁷³	chaplain	
Langerigg, William ⁷⁴	chaplain	“Chernemuth”, Salisbury
Leght, John ⁷⁵	chaplain	Lancaster
Leme, John ⁷⁶	canon	“Michelham”
May, John ⁷⁷	chaplain	“Wilton”
Mercer, Peter ⁷⁸	cleric	
Pentetom, Thomas ⁷⁹	parson	Aston, Herts.
“Reymundus” ⁸⁰	parson	“Wistowe”, Lincolnshire
Scharpe, William ⁸¹	vicar	“Socerton”
Schepeye, William ⁸²	Benedictine	Hatfield
Spark, Richard ⁸³	vicar	“Northwalsham”
Staynton, Gregory ⁸⁴	parson	“Wrote”, Yorks (?)
Stormy, Hugh ⁸⁵	rector	“Milkstrete”, London
Stynt, Walter ⁸⁶	parson	“Wragby”, Lincolnshire
Thrykyngham, Lambertus ⁸⁷	rector	“Ploumtre”
Totonhall, Richard ⁸⁸	chaplain	
Wallesham, Thomas ⁸⁹	canon, prior	“Walsingham”
Wayte, John ⁹⁰	rector	“Tonstall”
Westwik, John ⁹¹	Benedictine	Tynemouth
Wymbernyll, John ⁹²	parson	“Westmeston”
Yernemuth, John ⁹³	canon, prior	“Walsyngham”
York, William ⁹⁴	Benedictine	“Wymundham”, Norfolk

III. KNIGHTS

	status	region	company
Assheton, John ⁹⁵	knight	Lancashire	
Baro, William ⁹⁶	knight	Hilton	
Barre, William ⁹⁷	knight		

⁷³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁷⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁷⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁷⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁷⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁸⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁸¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁸² Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁸³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁸⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (22).

⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁸⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁸⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁸⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁸⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁹¹ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁹² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁹³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁹⁴ Walsingham, *Gesta Abbatum*, vol. 2, p. 416.

⁹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

Beaumont, John (b) ⁹⁸	lord		
Beaumont, Thomas ⁹⁹	knight		
Bereford, Baldwin ¹⁰⁰	knight		
Berkele, Maurice ¹⁰¹	knight	"Iwele"	
Birmyngeham, John (c) ¹⁰²	knight		
Blount, John ¹⁰³	knight	"Beversbroke", Wiltshire	
Blount, Thomas ¹⁰⁴	knight, junior		
Breaux, John (c) ¹⁰⁵	knight	Sussex	
Brewes, John ¹⁰⁶	knight		Elmham (?)
Bruyn, Ingehamus ¹⁰⁷	knight	Suffolk (?)	Elmham
Byngham, Richard ¹⁰⁸	knight		
Calveley, Hugh (b) ¹⁰⁹	knight	Cheshire	
Calveley, Hugh, junior ¹¹⁰	knight		Calveley
Chaworth, William (c) ¹¹¹	knight		
Clyfton, John (c) ¹¹²	knight		
Contheby, John (c) ¹¹³	knight		
Copeland, John ¹¹⁴	knight		Beaumont
Courtenay, Peter (c) ¹¹⁵	knight		
Courtenay, Philip ¹¹⁶	knight		
Cressingham, John (c) ¹¹⁷	knight		
Cressy, John ¹¹⁸	knight		Darcy
Darcy, John ¹¹⁹	knight		
Darcy, Philip (c) ¹²⁰	lord		
Dispenser, Hugh ¹²¹	knight		
Drayton, John (c) ¹²²	knight		
Drayton, William ¹²³	knight		
Ekton, Andrew (c) ¹²⁴	knight		

⁹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 10; (g): C76/67 m. 17.

⁹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 1; (g): C76/67 m. 1.

⁹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 1.

¹⁰⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁰¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17, C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁰² (p): C76/67 m. 1; (g): C76/67 m. 8.

¹⁰³ (p): C76/67 m. 16; (g): C76/67 m. 2.

¹⁰⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁰⁵ See the entry for John Thornton, esquire.

¹⁰⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁰⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 8; (g): C76/67 m. 8.

¹⁰⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁰⁹ See, for example, the entry for Hugh Calveley junior.

¹¹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 11, C81/1015 (13).

¹¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16. For his status as captain, see the entries for John Haneberk and John Hamsterlay.

¹¹² See the entry for John Blundell.

¹¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 16. For Contheby as a captain, see William Irby, for example.

¹¹⁴ See entry for John Seller, junior.

¹¹⁵ Aston, *Thomas Arundel*, p. 149.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Close Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 251.

¹¹⁸ (g): C76/67 m. 3.

¹¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

¹²⁰ See, for example, the entry for Richard Segrave.

¹²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹²² (p): C76/67 m. 17; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 152.

¹²³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16. For his status as captain see the entries for Richard ap Atell and John Stistede.

Elmham, William (b) ¹²⁵	knight	Norfolk	
Fanconer, John ¹²⁶	knight		
Faryngdon, William (c) ¹²⁷	knight		
Ferrers, Henry (c) ¹²⁸	knight	Middlesex	
Fichet, Thomas (c) ¹²⁹	knight		
Fitz Eustache, Maurice ¹³⁰	knight		
Gerberge, Thomas ¹³¹	knight		Elmham?
Grene, Richard (c) ¹³²	knight		
Helwell, John ¹³³	knight		Beaumont
Littelbury, John ¹³⁴	knight		
Malberthorp, John ¹³⁵	knight		
Muschet, George ¹³⁶	knight		
Noresse, John ¹³⁷	knight		
Poyntz, Robert ¹³⁸	knight	Gloucestershire	
Redeman, Richard (c) ¹³⁹	knight	Westmorland	
Sesserun, Lewis ¹⁴⁰	knight		
Sharnesfeld, Nicholas (c?) ¹⁴¹	knight		
Shelton, Ralph ¹⁴²	knight		Elmham?
Tryvet, Thomas (b) ¹⁴³	knight		
Wake, Thomas ¹⁴⁴	knight	"Blesworth"	
de la Zouche, Hugh ¹⁴⁵	knight		

IV. ESQUIRES

		region	company
Broune, John ¹⁴⁶			
Cartere, John ¹⁴⁷		"Crippelowe"	

¹²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 16; (g): C76/67 m. 8.

¹²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17; (g): C76/67 m. 6.

¹²⁷ *Close Rolls*, 1381-85, p. 368; Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, vol. 2, p. 85.

¹²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17; (g): C76/67 m. 10. For Middlesex see *Close Rolls*, 1377-1381, p. 367; *Close Rolls*, 1381-85, p. 368.

¹²⁹ *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 306. Richard Scotard had his letters of protection revoked, but he was supposed to have served in this man's company.

¹³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹³¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹³² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³³ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

¹³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17. He is described as the son and heir of John Poyntz, knight.

¹³⁹ See the entry for William Holme.

¹⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁴¹ (g): C76/67 m. 1. Sharnesfeld was a chamber knight of Richard II and it is likely that he was a captain on the crusade.

¹⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

Cressyngham, Peter (c) ¹⁴⁸	
Dawenay, William ¹⁴⁹	
Fitz Ralph, Robert (c) (r) ¹⁵⁰	
Folde, John ¹⁵¹	
Fraunceys, John ¹⁵²	
Kyston, William ¹⁵³	Dorset
Lansant, Roger ¹⁵⁴	
Mallesore, Thomas ¹⁵⁵	
Petham, Hugh ¹⁵⁶	“Frenyngham”, Kent
Pygot, Richard ¹⁵⁷	Northumbria
Pykot, Richard ¹⁵⁸	
Shotewiche, Lowelms ¹⁵⁹	
Skelton, William ¹⁶⁰	
Sloghter, John ¹⁶¹	
Somervyle, Henry ¹⁶²	
Spykesworth, John (c) ¹⁶³	
Thornton, John ¹⁶⁴	Breaux
Trissell, William ¹⁶⁵	
Trusseley, John ¹⁶⁶	
Wedon, John ¹⁶⁷	
Whalley, Roger ¹⁶⁸	

V. OTHERS

region

company

Abse, Thomas¹⁶⁹

¹⁴⁸ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 153

¹⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁵⁰ *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, pp. 156-8; *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, pp. 405-06; *Close Rolls*, 1381-85, p. 368.

¹⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁵⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁵⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

¹⁶⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁶³ Spykesworth was charged with having given up the castle of “Drinkham” to the French as the crusading force withdrew from Flanders, hence it has been assumed that he was one of the captains on the expedition: *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol. 3, p. 153; *Close Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 251.

¹⁶⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

¹⁶⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁶⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁶⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17. His letters of protection were revoked on 11 April 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 240.

¹⁶⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17. His letters of protection were revoked on 22 April 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p. 242.

¹⁶⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Aldelyn, John ¹⁷⁰		
Alexton, Robert ¹⁷¹		
Aleyn, John ¹⁷²	Cambridgeshire	Elmham (?)
Allesley, Egidius ¹⁷³		
Amen, Richard ¹⁷⁴		
Andirton, William ¹⁷⁵		
Andreu, Richard ¹⁷⁶	Gloucs.	
Andrewe, Thomas ¹⁷⁷	“Kyngeston”	
Aversenge, Henry ¹⁷⁸	“Flyntham”, Linconshire (?)	
Appulby, John ¹⁷⁹		
Arnold, John ¹⁸⁰	Sussex	
Aspelond, William ¹⁸¹	London	
Asshman, William ¹⁸²	Norfolk (?)	Elmham (?)
Astbury, John ¹⁸³		
ap Atell, Richard ¹⁸⁴		Ekton
Athirton, Nicholas ¹⁸⁵		
Bache, John ¹⁸⁶	“Nowenton”	Calveley
Bacheman, John ¹⁸⁷	“Hanfordia”	
Bamburgh, William ¹⁸⁸	Peterborough	
Bandre, Thomas ¹⁸⁹		Birmyngeham
Banne, Thomas ¹⁹⁰	Chichester	
Barbour, John ¹⁹¹	“Smethefeld”, London (?)	
Barbour, John ¹⁹²		Contheby
Barmburgh, John ¹⁹³		
Baryngton, Richard ¹⁹⁴		
Bassard, Walter ¹⁹⁵	Dyss, Norfolk	
Bayly, Roger ¹⁹⁶		
Boys, Robert ¹⁹⁷	“Yevele”	

¹⁷⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁷⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁷⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁷⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁷⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁸⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁸¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁸² (p): C76/67 m. 9.

¹⁸³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁸⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

¹⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁸⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

¹⁸⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁸⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁸⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 1.

¹⁹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

¹⁹² (p): C76/67 m. 4.

¹⁹³ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

¹⁹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Beal, James, "lumbard" ¹⁹⁸		
Bedford, Roger ¹⁹⁹		
Bekeryng, Thomas ²⁰⁰		
Beklegh, David ²⁰¹		
Bemepeir, Richard ²⁰²		
de la Bere, Thomas ²⁰³		
Bernewelle, John ²⁰⁴		
Betele, Richard ²⁰⁵	Norfolk	
Blackwell, Robert ²⁰⁶	"Holbech"	
Blake, Walter ²⁰⁷		
Blakmore, Adam ²⁰⁸		
Blakthorn, William ²⁰⁹		
Blammyl, Robert ²¹⁰		
Blount, Richard ²¹¹	Wiltshire	
Blundell, John ²¹²		Clyfton
Bohun, John ²¹³		
Bolte, Thomas ²¹⁴	"Chaystede"	Elmham
Bolynbroke, John ²¹⁵		Darcy
Bonell, William ²¹⁶	"Wretell", Essex	Grene
Bonet, William ²¹⁷		
Bonteyn, Lewis ²¹⁸	"Haverfordia"	
Bowrer, John ²¹⁹		
Boyden, Thomas ²²⁰	Coventry	
Boynton, John ²²¹		
Braytoft, Thomas ²²²		Contheby
Braytoft, William ²²³		Contheby
Breche, Richard ²²⁴		

¹⁹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

¹⁹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

¹⁹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (32).

²⁰⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁰¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁰² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁰³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁰⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁰⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁰⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁰⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁰⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁰⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²¹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²¹² (p): C76/67 m. 8.

²¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²¹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

²¹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

²¹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

²¹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²¹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²²⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²²² (p): C76/67 m. 4.

²²³ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

²²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Bret, Ralph ²²⁵	Dorset	
Brise, Richard ²²⁶		
atte Broke Jordanus ²²⁷		
Brook, Thomas ²²⁸		Elmham
Broune, John ²²⁹		
Broun, Simon ²³⁰	London	
Brounesop, William ²³¹	Dorset	
Brun, John ²³²	Lincoln	
Brune, Ralph ²³³	Lincoln	
del Bryche, Gilbert ²³⁴		
Brys, John ²³⁵	“Ynelcestre”	Calveley
Bulyngford, Richard ²³⁶		
Bunbury, Henry ²³⁷	Cheshire (?)	Calveley
Burdeaux, Roger ²³⁸		
Burdeaux, Thomas ²³⁹		
Burgeys, John ²⁴⁰	Suffolk	
Burley, Stephen ²⁴¹	Berkshire	
Burne, John ²⁴²	Yorkshire	
Bygood, Walter ²⁴³		
Caldebroke, Robert ²⁴⁴	Hereford	
Calveley, John ²⁴⁵		
Calviage, John ²⁴⁶	“Broklem”	
Capuldyk, John ²⁴⁷		
Carneby, William ²⁴⁸		
Carter, John ²⁴⁹		
Catour, John ²⁵⁰		
Chaffare, John ²⁵¹		
Chancier, Thomas ²⁵²		

²²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²²⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 8.

²²⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²³¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²³² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²³³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

²³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²³⁷ (g): C76/67 m. 7.

²³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²³⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁴¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²⁴⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Charles, John ²⁵³		
Chatirton, John ²⁵⁴		
Chelry, Thomas ²⁵⁵		
Cheryngton, John ²⁵⁶	“Suthewerk”, London (?)	
Childe, William ²⁵⁷		
Chiresby, Adam ²⁵⁸	Lincoln	
Chymwelle, John ²⁵⁹		
Clerc, William ²⁶⁰	Cambridgeshire.	
Clicerowe, Edmund ²⁶¹		
Clyff, John ²⁶²		
Clynt, Ralph ²⁶³	Essex	
Colkyn, Thomas ²⁶⁴		
Colyn, John ²⁶⁵		
Colycote, John ²⁶⁶	Lichfield	
Constantyn, John ²⁶⁷		
Coppyng, Richard ²⁶⁸		Beaumont
Cote, Richard ²⁶⁹		
Cotill, John ²⁷⁰		Contheby
Cours, John ²⁷¹	“Bekenffeld”	
Coursaye, Nicholas ²⁷²		
Crantewyk, John ²⁷³		
Crispyng, Richard ²⁷⁴	“Catefeld”, Norfolk	
Cristian, John ²⁷⁵	Salisbury	
Crok, John ²⁷⁶	“Clueston”, Gloucs.	
Croydon, Peter ²⁷⁷	“Abyndon” Oxfordshire (?)	
Culchuth, Gilbert ²⁷⁸		
Danyel, Walter ²⁷⁹		

²⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁵⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁵⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁶⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁶³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁶⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁶⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁶⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁶⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²⁶⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

²⁶⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁷⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

²⁷¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁷² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁷³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁷⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²⁷⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 20 March 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p.

235.

²⁷⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁷⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁷⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Darcy, George ²⁸⁰		Darcy
Darsham, Robert ²⁸¹	"Osston", Norfolk (?)	Chaworth
Dayncourt, John ²⁸²		
Dayncourt, Robert ²⁸³		
Demas, Thomas ²⁸⁴		
Dene, John ²⁸⁵	"Merscham", Surrey	Grene
Denys, Gilbert ²⁸⁶		
Denys, William ²⁸⁷		
Derneford, John ²⁸⁸		
Dokes, Roger ²⁸⁹		
Donsall, Richard ²⁹⁰		
Drenchesle, John ²⁹¹		
Edmond, Richard ²⁹²		
Elys, John ²⁹³		Darcy
Ereygos, John ²⁹⁴		
Erpthorp, William ²⁹⁵		
Eton, Richard ²⁹⁶		
Everard, Geoffrey ²⁹⁷		
Everard, Thomas ²⁹⁸		
Ewelle, John ²⁹⁹	"Stokeneylond"	
del Ewere, Roger ³⁰⁰		
Excestre, John ³⁰¹		
Faireman, John ³⁰²		
Fancomberge, Roger ³⁰³		
Fasacrelegh, Thomas ³⁰⁴		
Fernam, Robert ³⁰⁵		Contheby
Ferour, Richard ³⁰⁶		

²⁷⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁸⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

²⁸¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁸² (p): C76/67 m. 5.

²⁸³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁸⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

²⁸⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁸⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17; (g): C76/67 m. 12.

²⁸⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁸⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁹² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁹³ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

²⁹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

²⁹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

²⁹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

²⁹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 8 January 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p.

211.

²⁹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁰⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁰¹ (g): C76/67 m. 2.

³⁰² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁰³ (g): C76/67 m. 3.

³⁰⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁰⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

Fetherby, Robert ³⁰⁷		
Fethirby, Robert ³⁰⁸		
Fitz Elys, John ³⁰⁹		
Fitz Herbet, William ³¹⁰	Northbury	
Folejambe, John ³¹¹		Birmyngeham
Forester, William ³¹²	"Maurdyn", Herefordshire	
Forde, Thomas ³¹³	Cornwall	
Forster, Lambertus ³¹⁴		
Foulmere, Robert (?) (c) ³¹⁵		
Frampton, John ³¹⁶	"Meresfeld"	
Frenche, Ralph ³¹⁷		
Fresthorp, Salamon ³¹⁸		
Frend, William ³¹⁹	"Wygorn"	
atte Frith, John ³²⁰		
Fryniton, John ³²¹		
Furnyn, Michael ³²²		
Fychet, Walter ³²³	"Havering atte Cour", Essex (?)	Darcy
Fynche, John ³²⁴	Cambridgeshire	
Gabion, Ralph ³²⁵		
Gaillard, Roger ³²⁶	London	
Galard, Roger ³²⁷		
Galon, Robert ³²⁸	Scarborough	
Gascoyne, Richard ³²⁹	"Wygorn"	
Gerard, Thomas ³³⁰		
Gerlay, Henry ³³¹		
Gilbert, John ³³²		
Gladwyn, Richard ³³³		

³⁰⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁰⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁰⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁰⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹⁰ (g): C76/67 m. 3.

³¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

³¹² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³¹⁵ *Close Rolls*, 1381-85, p. 251.

³¹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³²⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³²² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³²³ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

³²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³²⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³²⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³³¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³³² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Gladwyn, Robert ³³⁴	Cambridgeshire	
Gobyon, John ³³⁵	Essex	
Godhale, John ³³⁶	"Crammfeld", Bedfordshire (?)	
Godsower, Edward ³³⁷		
Goodlake, Thomas ³³⁸		Calveley
Grummundle, John ³³⁹		
Grymesby, John ³⁴⁰		
Hammyngerst, John ³⁴¹	Cambridgeshire	
Hampton, William ³⁴²		
Hamsterlay, John ³⁴³		Chaworth
Hamwode, Henry ³⁴⁴		
Haneberk, John ³⁴⁵		Chaworth
Hangham, Robert ³⁴⁶		
Hanslap, Richard ³⁴⁷		
Harald, John ³⁴⁸		
Hastynge, John ³⁴⁹	"Wycheford", Warwickshire	
Haylman, Richard ³⁵⁰		
Haymere, John ³⁵¹		
Heigham, Alan ³⁵²	"Wyntynton", Lincolnshire	Elmham
Hemyngton, Thomas ³⁵³		
Henry, Thomas ³⁵⁴		
Henry, Richard ³⁵⁵	Cambridgeshire	
Henxstworth, John ³⁵⁶		
Herbury, William ³⁵⁷	Coventry	
Heriherde, Hugh ³⁵⁸		
Heton, Robert ³⁵⁹	Middlesex	
Heton, John ³⁶⁰		Darcy

³³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

³³⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

³⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

³⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁵⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 9.

³⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁵⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁵⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17. His letters of protection were revoked on 3 May 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, pp. 270-71.

³⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁶⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

atte Hide, John ³⁶¹		
Hilton, Roger ³⁶²	Lancashire	
Hilton, William ³⁶³		
Holand, Robert ³⁶⁴		
Holande, William ³⁶⁵	"Coyley"	
Holden, Robert ³⁶⁶	"Symondston", Lancashire (?)	
Holewelle, Stephen ³⁶⁷		
Holme, William ³⁶⁸	Burton, Londesdale	Redeman
Honesdon, Henry ³⁶⁹		
Hookele, Richard ³⁷⁰		
Hore, David ³⁷¹	London	
Hoton, John ³⁷²	Yorkshire	
Huntercombe, John ³⁷³		
Huntynfyld, Henry ³⁷⁴		
Huton, John ³⁷⁵	Yorkshire	
Ingram, John ³⁷⁶	Nottingham	
Irby, William ³⁷⁷		Contheby
Jacob, Thomas ³⁷⁸	"Kermerdyn"	
Jolif, Robert ³⁷⁹	"Shuborne"	
Joly, Robert ³⁸⁰		
Jowy, John ³⁸¹	Cornwall	
Jurdan, John ³⁸²	"Oxendon"	
Karrowe, John ³⁸³		
Kendale, Philip ³⁸⁴		
Knyvet, John ³⁸⁵		
Knyvet, Richard ³⁸⁶		
Lacheford, Thomas ³⁸⁷		
Ladde, Thomas ³⁸⁸	"Burwash"	

³⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17; (g): C76/67 m. 1.

³⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁶³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁶⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁶⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁶⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁶⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁶⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

³⁶⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁷¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁷² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁷⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

³⁷⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁷⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁸⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁸¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁸² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁸³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁸⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁸⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁸⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Ladde, William ³⁸⁹	"Burwash"	
Lawes, Adam ³⁹⁰	"Corpesty"	
Legh, Thomas ³⁹¹		
Londres, Thomas ³⁹²		
Lonham, Thomas ³⁹³		
Lore, John ³⁹⁴	"Chonyngton"	
Lovell, John ³⁹⁵	"Corstewode"	
Lowe, Reginald ³⁹⁶		
Lynford, John ³⁹⁷	"Shiryngton"	
Maghlem, John ³⁹⁸		
Maison, Richard ³⁹⁹	Nottingham	
Malyn, William ⁴⁰⁰		
March, William ⁴⁰¹	Scarborough	
Mareschall, John ⁴⁰²		
Mareschall, John ⁴⁰³	"Helmsley"	
Mareschall, Robert ⁴⁰⁴	Essex	
Maresshall, John ⁴⁰⁵		Darcy
Markby, John ⁴⁰⁶		
Maundeville, Walter ⁴⁰⁷		
Mechant, William ⁴⁰⁸		
Meth, John ⁴⁰⁹		
Molynton, John ⁴¹⁰		
Morby, Henry ⁴¹¹	Yorkshire	
Atte More, Stephen ⁴¹²	Lincoln	
Morton, William ⁴¹³		
Mosbury, Thomas ⁴¹⁴		
Mott, John ⁴¹⁵		

³⁸⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁸⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

³⁹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

³⁹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

³⁹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

³⁹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁰⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁰¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁰² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁰³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁰⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁰⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴⁰⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1031 (9).

⁴⁰⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁰⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁰⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴¹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴¹² (p): C76/67 m. 1.

⁴¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁴¹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴¹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Multon, John ⁴¹⁶	
Mynyot, John ⁴¹⁷	“Bekeryng”
Nalson, John ⁴¹⁸	
Nowers, George ⁴¹⁹	
Nowers, George ⁴²⁰	
Nygthyngale, Thomas ⁴²¹	
Osmonderley, Peter ⁴²²	
Pakkere, Thomas ⁴²³	“Abbyndon”
Palmer, Thomas ⁴²⁴	
Pampilion, John ⁴²⁵	
Paryshe, John ⁴²⁶	Salisbury
Passelewe, John ⁴²⁷	
Payn, Edward ⁴²⁸	Dorset
Payn, John ⁴²⁹	
Pecche, Adam ⁴³⁰	
Peke, Adam ⁴³¹	“Bitteswel”
Pemberton, John ⁴³²	
Percy, John ⁴³³	Wiltshire
Peytefyn, John ⁴³⁴	Newcastle
Pie, John ⁴³⁵	London
Pillyng, John ⁴³⁶	Beaumont
Plot, William ⁴³⁷	“Brayneford”, Middlesex
Ploumbe, Robert ⁴³⁸	London
Plummer, John ⁴³⁹	
Polar, William ⁴⁴⁰	“Fanalore”
Ponkeston, Thomas ⁴⁴¹	“Caumpedon”
Pookeriche, John ⁴⁴²	
Popham, John ⁴⁴³	

⁴¹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴¹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴¹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16; (g): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴²⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴²² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴²³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴²⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴²⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴³¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴³² (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (2).

⁴³³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴³⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴³⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁴¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Poule, Walter ⁴⁴⁴		
Pounteney, Robert ⁴⁴⁵		
Preston, Adam ⁴⁴⁶		
Pulteney, Richard ⁴⁴⁷		
Purneys, Gilbert ⁴⁴⁸		
Pybaker, Robert ⁴⁴⁹		
Pygot, Baldwin ⁴⁵⁰		
Pykot, William ⁴⁵¹		
Pylling, John ⁴⁵²	"Graynford"	
Pynson, John ⁴⁵³		
Pynyngton, Thomas ⁴⁵⁴		Darcy
Radclyff, Richard ⁴⁵⁵		
Radeclef, John ⁴⁵⁶	"Chaterton"	
Radeclef, Ralph ⁴⁵⁷		
Randham, John ⁴⁵⁸	"Stratford", Middlesex	
Rees, Thomas ⁴⁵⁹		
Reymes, Roger ⁴⁶⁰		Beaumont
Reyner, Thomas ⁴⁶¹		
Richardson, Hugh ⁴⁶²		
Risley, Thomas ⁴⁶³	Hull	
Rocke, John ⁴⁶⁴		
Rolfi, William ⁴⁶⁵	"Abbyndon"	
Romeney, John ⁴⁶⁶		Elmham
Rotebem, Thomas ⁴⁶⁷		
Rustanok, John ⁴⁶⁸	Cornwall	
Rysceby, John ⁴⁶⁹	York	Calveley
Sadynton, Robert ⁴⁷⁰	Leicester	

⁴⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁴⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁴⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17; (g): C76/67 m. 7.

⁴⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁵⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁶⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁶³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁶⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁶⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁶⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁴⁶⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 8.

⁴⁶⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁶⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁴⁷⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Savage, John ⁴⁷¹	Warwickshire	
Scardeburgh, John ⁴⁷²		
Schocleche, Lewis ⁴⁷³		
del See, Richard ⁴⁷⁴		
Segrave, Richard ⁴⁷⁵		Darcy
Segrave, William ⁴⁷⁶		
Sekynton, John ⁴⁷⁷		Calveley
Seliers, William ⁴⁷⁸		
Seller, John, junior ⁴⁷⁹		Beaumont
Sencler, Richard ⁴⁸⁰	Buckinghamshire	
Sheffield, Thomas ⁴⁸¹		
Shepton, Thomas ⁴⁸²		
Skachelok, John ⁴⁸³	"Redenhale"	
Skelton, John ⁴⁸⁴		
Soot, Henry ⁴⁸⁵		
Sout, Geoffrey ⁴⁸⁶		
Sparhyng, Adam ⁴⁸⁷	Middlesex	
Sparowe, William ⁴⁸⁸	"Wykynby"	
Spede, William ⁴⁸⁹		
Spencer, Walter ⁴⁹⁰		
Spense, John ⁴⁹¹		
Spere, Stephen ⁴⁹²		
Spicer, Benedict ⁴⁹³	Norwich	
Spicer, Richard ⁴⁹⁴	London	
Spoode, John ⁴⁹⁵	"Wodnorton"	
Spygernell, John ⁴⁹⁶		
Scethede, William ⁴⁹⁷		

⁴⁷¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁷² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 2.

⁴⁷⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁴⁷⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁷⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 2. Seller was going to Flanders with of Sir John Copeland, who in turn was going in John Lord Beaumont's company.

⁴⁸⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18, C81/1013 (29).

⁴⁸¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁸² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁸³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁸⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁸⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁸⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 5.

⁴⁸⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁸⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁹³ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁴⁹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁴⁹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

Stafford, Ralph ⁴⁹⁸	Staffordshire	
Stafford, Thomas ⁴⁹⁹		
Stamore, William ⁵⁰⁰		
Stanley, John ⁵⁰¹		
Stistede, John ⁵⁰²		Ekton
Stodeled, Nicholas ⁵⁰³	“Wygorn”	
Stodeye, Ralph ⁵⁰⁴		Calveley
Stokes, Thomas ⁵⁰⁵		Calveley
Strother, Henry ⁵⁰⁶		
Stubbyng, Hugh ⁵⁰⁷		
Stynt, John ⁵⁰⁸	“Halestede”, Lincolnshire	
Surton, Anketillus ⁵⁰⁹		
Swale, William ⁵¹⁰	Yorkshire	Calveley
Swalowe, William ⁵¹¹		
Swan, William ⁵¹²		
Swayn, John ⁵¹³		
Swyer, Richard ⁵¹⁴		
Terry, Simon ⁵¹⁵		Calveley
Tonyngton, John ⁵¹⁶		
Torbok, Richard ⁵¹⁷		
Torbok, Thomas ⁵¹⁸		Calveley
Tregune, Richard ⁵¹⁹		
Trissell, Gilbert ⁵²⁰		
Ty, Robert ⁵²¹	Suffolk	
Tylere, John ⁵²²	Sussex	
Tylly, Walter ⁵²³		
Tyshurst, Thomas ⁵²⁴	Middlesex	
Ude, Odo ⁵²⁵	“Fowy”	

⁴⁹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁴⁹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁰⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁰¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁰² (p): C76/67 m. 4.

⁵⁰³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁰⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

⁵⁰⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁵⁰⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁰⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁰⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 5; (g): C76/67 m. 1.

⁵⁰⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵¹⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 11, C81/1015 (15).

⁵¹¹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵¹² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵¹³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵¹⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵¹⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 9.

⁵¹⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵¹⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵¹⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁵¹⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵²⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵²¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵²² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵²³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵²⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Venables, Peter ⁵²⁶		
Wakeleyn, William ⁵²⁷	“Eydon”	
Waleys, Richard ⁵²⁸		
Walkeden, John ⁵²⁹		
Walker, Thomas ⁵³⁰		
Walton, Roger ⁵³¹		
Wandesford, Stephen ⁵³²		
Wanesour, William ⁵³³		Contheby
Wanton, Andrew ⁵³⁴		
Wardale, John ⁵³⁵		
Wareyn, Thomas ⁵³⁶		
Wasteneys, Robert ⁵³⁷	“Totewyk”, Yorkshire	Beaumont
Wayte, Thomas ⁵³⁸		
Wellesburgh, Richard ⁵³⁹	Leicester	
Weston, Egidius ⁵⁴⁰		
Whitemor, John ⁵⁴¹		
Whittnyll, Thomas ⁵⁴²		
Whitton, William ⁵⁴³		
Whyte, Thomas ⁵⁴⁴		
Wilkes, John ⁵⁴⁵		
Willyn, Thomas ⁵⁴⁶	“Noneton”	
Wilton, William ⁵⁴⁷		
atte Wood, Roger ⁵⁴⁸	Kent	
Wodecok, John ⁵⁴⁹		
Wolf, Hugh ⁵⁵⁰	Oxfordshire	
Wydeson, Simon ⁵⁵¹		
Wyk, Ralph ⁵⁵²		

⁵²⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵²⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵²⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵²⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵²⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵³⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵³¹ (p): C76/67 m.17.

⁵³² (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵³³ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

⁵³⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵³⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵³⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵³⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 4.

⁵³⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵³⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁴⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁴¹ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁴² (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁴³ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁴⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁴⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁴⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁴⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁴⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁴⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 5. His letters of protection were revoked on 30 June 1383: *Patent Rolls*, 1381-1385, p.

292.

⁵⁵⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁵¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

Wylde, Robert ⁵⁵³		
Wyllesdon, Walter ⁵⁵⁴		
Wyngefeld, John ⁵⁵⁵		Elmham
Wynkefeld, Andrew ⁵⁵⁶		
Yenetton, Richard ⁵⁵⁷	"Charburgh"	Calveley
Yevelton, Robert ⁵⁵⁸		
Yngol, Adam ⁵⁵⁹		
Yong, John ⁵⁶⁰		
Yong, John ⁵⁶¹		
Ysmonger, Richard ⁵⁶²	Kent	

⁵⁵² (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁵³ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁵⁴ (p): C76/67 m. 16.

⁵⁵⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 8; (g): C76/67 m. 8.

⁵⁵⁶ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁵⁷ (p): C76/67 m. 11.

⁵⁵⁸ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁵⁹ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁶⁰ (p): C76/67 m. 18.

⁵⁶¹ (p): C76/67 m. 17.

⁵⁶² (p): C76/67 m. 18. His letters of protection were revoked on 30 March 1383: *Patent Rolls, 1381-1385*, p. 238.

APPENDIX 2: CRUSADERS TO CASTILE, 1386.

This appendix follows the same pattern as Appendix 1 above, with majority of the crusaders having been drawn from the Treaty Rolls (C76/70 for 1386). Rymer transcribed a proportion of the names of those receiving protection for the crusade and references to his *Foedera* have been included in the footnotes. The original Chancery Warrants (C81) reference has also been given where this has been discovered.

Notes.

- i) The same efforts have been made to avoid the duplication of names as outlined for Appendix 1.
 ii) The (p) and (g) in the footnotes once again refer to letters of protection and general attorney, while the (r) indicates that the person was a Lancastrian retainer. The source for this information concerning Lancastrians was usually Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, as indicated in the footnotes. The (b) refers to the person's status as a banneret.
 iii) The full names of the captains whose surnames appear in the company column are as follows: Sir Walter Blount, Walter Lord Fitz Walter, Sir John Hasting, Sir Hugh Hastings, Sir John Holland, Earl of Huntingdon, Sir John Massy, Sir Thomas Morieux, Sir Thomas Percy, Richard Lord Poynings and Sir Miles Windsor.

I. CIVILIANS

	status/occupation	region	company
Alybon, John ¹	painter		
Appulton, William (r?) ²	bailiff	Halton, Chester	
Arnald, Richard ³	goldsmith	London	
Brunne, Bartholomew ⁴	grocer	London	
Bryan, Philip ⁵	"vallettus"		
Cannon, Roger ⁶	citizen, mercer	London	
Clare, Richard ⁷	skinner		
Congelton, John ⁸	citizen	Chester	
Cornisse, William ⁹	branderer		
Cretyng, John ¹⁰	"bronderer"	London	
Dramfeld, Edward ¹¹	tailor	Coventry	
Excestre, John ¹²	"coteller"	London	

¹ (p): C76/67 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

² *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 2, p. 405.

³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 7.

¹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

Eynsworth, William ¹³	fletcher	Colchester	
atte Fen, John ¹⁴	merchant		Percy
Fisshere, Robert ¹⁵	“panchermaker”		
Franceys, John ¹⁶	draper	London	
Frothyngham, Henry ¹⁷	tailor	London	Hastings
Gifford, William ¹⁸	citizen, skinner	London	
Gray, John ¹⁹	draper		
Grene, William ²⁰	sailor	Yarmouth	
Hegham, Hugh ²¹	citizen	London	
Hygham, William ²²	citizen, draper	London	
Kukeham, Adam ²³	citizen, tailor	London	
Kyx, William ²⁴	fishmonger	London	
Loxton, John ²⁵	saddler		
Manus, Robert ²⁶	mercier	Coventry	
Melton, Walter ²⁷	draper	Great Yarmouth	
Mollesey, John ²⁸	bowyer		
Orkesle, Richard ²⁹	citizen, mercier	London	
Parpount, Thomas ³⁰	goldsmith		
Paston, William ³¹	citizen, mercier	London	
Payntour, John ³²	tailor		Percy
Robyn, William ³³	brewer	London	
Smalschar, Stephen ³⁴	tailor		
Snypston, Geoffrey ³⁵	“bronderer”		
Wilton, John ³⁶	minstral of the king		
Wye, John ³⁷	merchant	Canterbury	
Yonge, Walter ³⁸	saddler	London	

¹³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

¹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 10.

¹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194. A “pauncher” was a piece of armour which covered the lower part of the body, so this man was an armourer of sorts.

¹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 7.

¹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²¹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

²⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³² (p): C76/70 m. 10.

³³ (p): C76/70 m. 10.

³⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁸ (g): C76/70 m. 10.

II. CLERICS

	status	region	company
Crischurch, John ³⁹	archdeacon	Ely	
Davenport, Adam ⁴⁰	cleric		
Elvet, Richard ⁴¹	cleric		
Elys, John ⁴²	chaplain		
Fychet, William ⁴³	chaplain		
John [sic] ⁴⁴	vicar	"Wilcomstowe"	
Kelsey, Philip ⁴⁵	parson	"Notfold"	
Langham, John ⁴⁶	chaplain		
Levenaunt, Walter ⁴⁷	chaplain		
Tednesfore, Henry ⁴⁸	chaplain		
Thorneholm, Walter ⁴⁹	cleric		
Wele, Thomas ⁵⁰	chaplain	"Horncherch"	
Wodehalle, Thomas ⁵¹	vicar	Coventry	

III. KNIGHTS

	status	region	company
Abberbury, Richard, junior ⁵²	knight		
Asshedon, John (r) ⁵³	knight		
Asteleye, Thomas ⁵⁴	knight	Hillmoreton	
Aston, Richard (r) ⁵⁵	knight		
Bagot, John (r) ⁵⁶	knight		
Beek, Thomas (r) ⁵⁷	knight	"Dylveryn"	
Berneye, Robert ⁵⁸	knight		
Blount, Walter (r)(c) ⁵⁹	knight	Worcester	
Bondon, John ⁶⁰	knight		

³⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁴⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁴¹ (g): C76/70 m. 3.

⁴² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

⁴³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 3.

⁴⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁵⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁵¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (18).

⁵² (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁵³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1039 (25); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 263

⁵⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁵⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 263.

⁵⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/67 m. 26.

⁵⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 264.

⁵⁸ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁵⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 264.

Boseville, John (r) ⁶¹	knight	
Boys, Miles ⁶²	knight	
Boys, Thomas ⁶³	knight	
Bracebrigg, Ralph (r) ⁶⁴	knight	
Braham, John ⁶⁵	knight	
Brettevyle, William (r) ⁶⁶	knight	
Briket, Peter ⁶⁷	knight	Percy
Bulmere, Ralph ⁶⁸	knight	
Bureley, Richard ⁶⁹	knight	
Burley, Richard ⁷⁰ (r)	knight	
Camoys, Thomas ⁷¹	knight	
Clynton, Thomas ⁷²	knight	
Cornewaill, John (r) ⁷³	knight	
Croyser, John (r) ⁷⁴	knight	
Dabriggecourt, John (r) ⁷⁵	knight	
Dagot, John ⁷⁶	knight	
Despenser, Hugh ⁷⁷	knight	
Deyncourt, John (r) ⁷⁸	knight	
Dodyngsell, John (r?) ⁷⁹	knight	
Erpyngham, Thomas (r) ⁸⁰	knight	
Faukoner, John ⁸¹	knight	
Fifhide, William (r) ⁸²	knight	
Fitz Ralph, John ⁸³	knight	Poynings
Fitz Walter, Walter (c) ⁸⁴	lord	
Fogg, Thomas (r)(c) ⁸⁵	knight	

⁶⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20.

⁶¹ (p): C81/1034 (32); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 265.

⁶² (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁶³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁶⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 265.

⁶⁵ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁶⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 265.

⁶⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 10; (g): C76/70 m. 12.

⁶⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁶⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁷⁰ (p): C81/1032 (6); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 266.

⁷¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁷² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁷³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 267.

⁷⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; C81/1038 (7); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 4; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 267.

⁷⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 26; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 267.

⁷⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20.

⁷⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 21; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁷⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 268.

⁷⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 17; Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, p. 441.

⁸⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, pp. 17-18.

⁸¹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁸² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269 (Walker did not mention that he was knight).

⁸³ (p): C76/70 m. 6; (g): C76/70 m. 10.

⁸⁴ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

Fulthorp, William ⁸⁶	knight		
Fychet, Thomas (r) ⁸⁷	knight		
Fyfyhyde, William (r) ⁸⁸	knight		
Geney, Thomas ⁸⁹	knight		
Goldyngham, Alex ⁹⁰	knight		
Goys, Thomas (r) ⁹¹	knight	“Denton”	Percy
Green, Henry ⁹²	knight		
Grey, Nicholas (r) ⁹³	knight		
Gypthorp, John ⁹⁴	knight		
Hante, Richard ⁹⁵	knight		Poynings
Hasting, John (c) ⁹⁶	knight		
Hastings, Hugh (b) ⁹⁷	knight		
Hauley, John ⁹⁸	knight		
Hauley, William (r) ⁹⁹	knight		
Herford, Robert (r) ¹⁰⁰	knight		
Hercy, Thomas ¹⁰¹	knight		
Holland, John (r)(c) ¹⁰²	earl		
Hoo, Richard (r) ¹⁰³	knight	Canterbury	
Ipre, Ralph (r) ¹⁰⁴	knight		
Ipstones, John (r) ¹⁰⁵	knight		
Langford, William ¹⁰⁶	knight		
Lathbury, Alveredus ¹⁰⁷	knight		
Ledes, Thomas ¹⁰⁸	knight		

⁸⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

⁸⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁸⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

⁸⁸ (g): C76/70 m. 10; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

⁸⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 10; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 270.

⁹² (p): C76/71 m. 22; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 270.

⁹³ (g): C76/70 m. 26; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; Nicholas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, p. 198.

⁹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 10; C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 17; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

⁹⁶ See the entry for John Tuxford.

⁹⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; (g): C76/70 m. 7; C76/70 m. 10.

⁹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12.

⁹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; C81/1036 (48); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 10; *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, pp. 14-15; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 271.

¹⁰⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; C81/1032 (31); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 271.

¹⁰¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁰² (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 272.

¹⁰³ (p): C76/70 m. 28; C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, pp. 190, 194; C81/1031 (53); (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 272.

¹⁰⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; C81/1036 (7); (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 272.

¹⁰⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 26; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 273.

¹⁰⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁰⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁰⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

Lisle, William ¹⁰⁹	knight	
Littilbery, John ¹¹⁰	knight	
Loudham, John (r) ¹¹¹	knight	
Loudham, John, junior (r) ¹¹²	knight	
Lucy, William (r) ¹¹³	knight	
Manburni, John (r) ¹¹⁴	knight	
Marchyngton, Thomas (r) ¹¹⁵	knight	
Mareschall, Thomas ¹¹⁶	knight	Somerset
Marmyon, John (b)(r) ¹¹⁷	knight	
Massy, John (c) ¹¹⁸	knight	
Masty, Robert ¹¹⁹	knight	
Menyll, Ralph ¹²⁰	knight	
Mewes, Thomas (r) ¹²¹	knight	
Montgomery, Nicholas ¹²²	knight	
Morleye, Robert, junior ¹²³	knight	Norfolk
Morrieaux, Thomas (b)(r) ¹²⁴	knight	Suffolk
Moton, William ¹²⁵	knight	
Mountfort, Baldwin (r) ¹²⁶	knight	
Mungunire, Richard ¹²⁷	knight	
Northwode, Roger ¹²⁸	knight	
Nuent, Roger ¹²⁹	knight	
Okore, Philip (r) ¹³⁰	knight	
Pecche, John (r) ¹³¹	knight	

¹⁰⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹¹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹¹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 273.

¹¹² (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 273.

¹¹³ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, pp. 20-21;

Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274.

¹¹⁴ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274.

¹¹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; (g): C76/70 m. 26; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274.

¹¹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹¹⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1036 (3); (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 197; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274.

¹¹⁸ See the entry for John Wylcok, esquire.

¹¹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

¹²⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 26.

¹²¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191; C81/1033 (54); (g): C76/70 m. 26; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274.

¹²² (p): C81/1033 (47). Montgomery was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 275.

¹²³ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

¹²⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 10; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 275; Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, p. 183.

¹²⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 26. Moton indentured to serve Sir Hugh Hastings in 1380: Goodman, 'The Military Contracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 116.

¹²⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 26; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 275.

¹²⁷ (g): C76/70 m. 22.

¹²⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹²⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹³⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1033 (47); (g): C76/70 m. 26; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 276.

Pelham, John ¹³²	knight		
Percy, Thomas (r)(b) ¹³³	knight, K.G.		
Percy, Thomas, junior ¹³⁴	knight		
Peytevyn, Thomas (b) ¹³⁵	knight		
Plays, William ¹³⁶	knight		
de la Pole, John (r) ¹³⁷	knight	“Hertyngdon”	
Poynings, Richard (b) ¹³⁸	lord		
Reddeford, Henry ¹³⁹	knight		
Rondon, John (r) ¹⁴⁰	knight		
Routhe, Thomas ¹⁴¹	knight	Yorkshire	
Saint George, Baldwin ¹⁴²	knight		
Salivan, Thomas ¹⁴³	knight		Poynings
Savage, Arnold ¹⁴⁴	knight	Kent	
Scales, Roger ¹⁴⁵	lord		
Scarburgh, Richard ¹⁴⁶	knight		
Scargill, John (r) ¹⁴⁷	knight		
Seintclere, John ¹⁴⁸	knight		
Seint Johan, John ¹⁴⁹	knight		Holland
Seyton, John (r) ¹⁵⁰	knight		
Shardelowe, Thomas ¹⁵¹	knight		
Shelton, Ralph ¹⁵²	knight		
Shirley, Hugh ¹⁵³	knight		
Sotheworth, Thomas (r) ¹⁵⁴	knight		

¹³¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (43); (g): C76/70 m. 26; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 277

¹³² (p): C76/71 m. 26. Pelham was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386: Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 277.

¹³³ (p): C76/70 m. 22; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 277.

¹³⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11, *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

¹³⁵ *Patent Rolls*, 1385-1389, p. 160.

¹³⁶ (p); C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

¹³⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 26; *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, pp. 21-2; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 278.

¹³⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹³⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

¹⁴⁰ (p): C81/1034 (29); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 279.

¹⁴¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 280.

¹⁴² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁴³ (p): C76/70 m. 13.

¹⁴⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁴⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

¹⁴⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁴⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (40); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 280.

¹⁴⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 281.

¹⁴⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹⁵⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 26; C81/1034 (9); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 281.

¹⁵¹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹⁵² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

¹⁵³ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 281. Shirley was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386.

¹⁵⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (5); (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 281.

Standissh, Robert (r) ¹⁵⁵	knight	
Straunge, John (r) ¹⁵⁶	knight	
Swynerton, Robert ¹⁵⁷	knight	
Symond, Thomas ¹⁵⁸	knight	
Talbot, Gilbert (r) ¹⁵⁹	knight	
Torbok, Richard (r) ¹⁶⁰	knight	
Trailly, John ¹⁶¹	knight	
Tunstall, William (r) ¹⁶²	knight	
Ulvyston, John ¹⁶³	knight	Holland
Ursewyk, Walter (r) ¹⁶⁴	knight	
White, John (r) ¹⁶⁵	knight	
Wiltshire, John ¹⁶⁶	knight	
Windsor, Miles (c) ¹⁶⁷	knight	
Wylughby, William ¹⁶⁸	knight	
Wynerton, Robert ¹⁶⁹	knight	

IV. ESQUIRES

	region	company
Adeleine, John ¹⁷⁰		
Asshedon, Thomas (r) ¹⁷¹		
Bageley, Ralph ¹⁷²		
Barnardcastell, John ¹⁷³		
Barons, Henry ¹⁷⁴		
Beauchamp, Edward (r) ¹⁷⁵		
Blumhill, William (r?) ¹⁷⁶		

¹⁵⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (7); (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

¹⁵⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

¹⁵⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁵⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

¹⁵⁹ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

¹⁶⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (8); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 283.

¹⁶¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹⁶² (p): C76/70 m. 6; C81/1034 (27); *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, p. 19; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 283.

¹⁶³ (p): C76/70 m. 16.

¹⁶⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (61); (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 283.

¹⁶⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 284.

¹⁶⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁶⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹⁶⁸ (g): C76/70 m. 3.

¹⁶⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 26.

¹⁷⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁷¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; C81/1031 (12); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 263.

¹⁷² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁷³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁷⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

¹⁷⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 264.

¹⁷⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, p. 443.

Bolton, John (r) ¹⁷⁷	“Hoby”	
Boyton, Richard ¹⁷⁸		
Bradborn, Ralph ¹⁷⁹	Derbyshire	
Brenchesley, John (r) ¹⁸⁰		
Brigg, Geoffrey ¹⁸¹		Fitz Walter
Broke, Robert ¹⁸²		
Bromley, Thomas ¹⁸³		
Calveley, Hugh ¹⁸⁴		
Calviage, John ¹⁸⁵	Suffolk	Morieux
Carudon, Robert ¹⁸⁶	Cornwall	
Caunsfield, Robert (r) ¹⁸⁷		
Charleton, Thomas ¹⁸⁸	“Appeley”, Salisbury	
Chaucer, Thomas (r) ¹⁸⁹		
Chetewynd, William (r) ¹⁹⁰	Staffordshire	
Colville, William ¹⁹¹		
Cresswell, Edmund ¹⁹²		
Cromley, Thomas ¹⁹³		
Culver, Thomas ¹⁹⁴		
Davy, Thomas ¹⁹⁵		
Derby, Robert ¹⁹⁶	“Parva Longesdon”	
Dodyngsett, John ¹⁹⁷		
Driffeld, Thomas (r) ¹⁹⁸	Hampshire	
Dryby, Thomas (r) ¹⁹⁹		
Eyredale, Warinus ²⁰⁰		
Fitz Ralph, Robert (r) ²⁰¹		
Flemyng, John ²⁰²	Essex	

¹⁷⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; C81/1034 (4); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 264.

¹⁷⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195. Boyton was retained in Bayonne in 1389: Lewis, ‘Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt’, p. 97.

¹⁷⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17.

¹⁸⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; C81/1033 (35); *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 265.

¹⁸¹ (p): C76/70 m. 10; (g): C76/70 m. 10.

¹⁸² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁸³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁸⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

¹⁸⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 5.

¹⁸⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

¹⁸⁷ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 266.

¹⁸⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁸⁹ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 266.

¹⁹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190. Nicolas, *The Controversy Between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor*, vol. 2, p. 188.

¹⁹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹³ (p): C76/70 m. 20.

¹⁹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 26.

¹⁹⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

¹⁹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (49); (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, pp. 43, 268.

¹⁹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 263.

²⁰⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁰¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

Fodryngay, Richard (c?) ²⁰³		
Gray, John ²⁰⁴		
Groos, John ²⁰⁵		
Groos, Oliver (r) ²⁰⁶		
Gyffard, John (r) ²⁰⁷	Lechampton, Gloucestershire	
Haket, John ²⁰⁸		
Hobeldad, Robert ²⁰⁹		Holland
Holcroft, Thomas ²¹⁰	Lancaster	
Hopwell, Thomas ²¹¹		
Hull, John ²¹²		
Ives, Gilbert ²¹³		
Juster, Richard (r) ²¹⁴		
Keyche, John ²¹⁵		
Lambe, John ²¹⁶		
Lambourne, John ²¹⁷		
Ledes, William ²¹⁸		
Lynford, John ²¹⁹	Buckinghamshire	
Marchyngton, Thomas ²²⁰		
Massy, John ²²¹		
Mone, Simon ²²²		
Mounteney, Arnold ²²³		
Mynyot, John (r) ²²⁴		
Notton, William (r) ²²⁵		

²⁰² (p): C76/70 m. 17; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁰³ (g): C76/70 m. 10 On his deathbed Fodryngay paid money to people whom he had defrauded on Gaunt's crusade: McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 26-7.

²⁰⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁰⁵ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

²⁰⁶ (g): C76/70 m. 17; retained after 1386?: Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 270.

²⁰⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194. Gyffard was retained by Gaunt on 5 May 1381: *John of Gaunt's Register, 1379-1383*, vol. 1, p. 19.

²⁰⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁰⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 18.

²¹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

²¹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²¹² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194. Hull was retained in 1388; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 272.

²¹³ (g): C76/70 m. 12.

²¹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (29). Juster may have been retained after 1386: Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 273.

²¹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²¹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²¹⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²¹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 m. 12.

²¹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²²⁰ (g): C76/70 m. 26; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²²¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 274. Massy was retained by Gaunt in 1387: Lewis, 'Indentures of retinue with John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, Enrolled in Chancery', p. 95.

²²² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²²³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²²⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (24); (g): C76/70 m. 10; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 276. This is probably the same man who indentured to serve with Sir Hugh Hastings in 1380: Goodman, 'The Military Subcontacts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 116.

Oldehalle, Edmund ²²⁶	
Orell, James (r) ²²⁷	
Pauly, Richard ²²⁸	
Perrers, Richard (r) ²²⁹	
Pilkyngton, Robert (r) ²³⁰	
Preston, William ²³¹	
Pulham, Stephen (r) ²³²	
Pynnok, John ²³³	Wiltshire
Raysebek, Robert ²³⁴	
Reskynmere, John ²³⁵	Cornwall
Rixton, John ²³⁶	
Roger, John ²³⁷	
Sayndys, Richard ²³⁸	
Seccheford, Robert ²³⁹	
Sergeant, Thomas ²⁴⁰	
Seyntowen, Patrick ²⁴¹	
Sheffield, John ²⁴²	
Shunhill, William ²⁴³	
Simeon, Robert ²⁴⁴	
Southous, Richard ²⁴⁵	
Swell, John ²⁴⁶	
Syngilton, Ralph ²⁴⁷	
Teband, Peter (r) ²⁴⁸	
Torpeley, John ²⁴⁹	

²²⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (45); (g): C76/70 m. 12; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 276.

²²⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 8; (g): C76/70 m. 10.

²²⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 276.

²²⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²²⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (8); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 277.

²³⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 278. This man was steward of Halton.

²³¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 278.

²³³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²³⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1032 (5). Rixton was retained by Gaunt in 1390: Lewis, 'Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt', p. 20.

²³⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²³⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁴⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁴¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; C81/1038 (49). Seyntowen was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386: Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 280.

²⁴² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁴³ (p): C76/70 m. 28.

²⁴⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3 pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1036 (8). Simeon was retained by Gaunt in 1390: Lewis, 'Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt', p. 101.

²⁴⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁴⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194. Swell was retained by Gaunt in 1390: Lewis, 'Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt', p. 99.

²⁴⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

²⁴⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 17; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 283.

Trissell, Lawrence ²⁵⁰		
Tuxford, John ²⁵¹		Hasting
Vansour, Gilbert ²⁵²		
Walsh, Walter ²⁵³	Gloucestershire	
Wyche, John ²⁵⁴		
Wydewesone, John ²⁵⁵		
Wylcok, John ²⁵⁶	Devon	Massy

V. OTHERS

region company

Algirkirk, Robert ²⁵⁷		
Algood, John ²⁵⁸		
Alre, Nicholas ²⁵⁹		
Anntrows, William ²⁶⁰		
Assheton, William (r) ²⁶¹		
Athirton, Nicholas (r) ²⁶²		
Ayrdale, John ²⁶³	Coventry	
Barton, Henry ²⁶⁴		
Baudewyn, John ²⁶⁵		
Beeston, Thomas ²⁶⁶	"Eycote", Gloucestershire	
Belhous, John ²⁶⁷		
Beman, Abel ²⁶⁸		
Berkele, Walter ²⁶⁹	"Makefeld", Cheshire	
Bermyingham, Alex ²⁷⁰	"Lenne"	
Beston, Thomas ²⁷¹		
Bibley, Christopher ²⁷²		
Body, John ²⁷³		

²⁴⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁵⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁵¹ (p): C76/70 m. 9.

²⁵² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁵³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁵⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁵⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁵⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 10.

²⁵⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁵⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁵⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

²⁶⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁶¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195. This man was Gaunt's Chancellor in 1386.

²⁶² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

²⁶³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁶⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 16.

²⁶⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁶⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 8.

²⁶⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁶⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁶⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 9.

²⁷⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁷¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁷² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁷³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

Bok, Robert ²⁷⁴	
Bonwood, John ²⁷⁵	Bristol
Boskeselek, John ²⁷⁶	
Bray, Richard ²⁷⁷	
Bredekyrk, John ²⁷⁸	
Bret, John ²⁷⁹	
Breton, John ²⁸⁰	Surrey
Brokworth, William ²⁸¹	
Broun, John ²⁸²	“Lathum”
Burton, Philip ²⁸³	
Caramour, John ²⁸⁴	
Castre, John ²⁸⁵	“Lenne, episcopi”
Cawardyn, William ²⁸⁶	
Chanewe, John ²⁸⁷	“Lalye”
Charles, Richard ²⁸⁸	
Chatherton, John ²⁸⁹	
Chanivils, Robert ²⁹⁰	“Makesey”
Charlys, Richard ²⁹¹	Kent
Chymwell, John ²⁹²	
Claghton, Richard ²⁹³	
Claghton, William ²⁹⁴	
Clerc, Thomas ²⁹⁵	Daventry
Clynton, Hugh ²⁹⁶	
Clyve, Thomas ²⁹⁷	
Cokkusden, Walter ²⁹⁸	
Colleson, John ²⁹⁹	“Spaldyng”
Colveye, Roger ³⁰⁰	Holland
Coneryngton, Richard ³⁰¹	

²⁷⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁷⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁷⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁷⁷ (g): C76/70 m. 10.

²⁷⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁷⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁸⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁸¹ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

²⁸² (p): C76/70 m. 21; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁸³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁸⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁸⁵ (p): C76/67 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁸⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁸⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

²⁸⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 7.

²⁸⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 21; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 19.

²⁹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 18.

²⁹² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁹³ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt.3, p. 190; C81/1031 (26).

²⁹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (26).

²⁹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (54).

²⁹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

²⁹⁷ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

²⁹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

²⁹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁰⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 16.

Contier, John ³⁰²	"Hareford", Wales	
Couchere, Peter ³⁰³		
Coumbe, Roger ³⁰⁴		
Couper, Richard ³⁰⁵	"Lythyngton"	
Crane, John ³⁰⁶		
Craweford, John ³⁰⁷		
Croilboys, John (r) ³⁰⁸		
Cutbert, John ³⁰⁹		Holland
Danyle, Richard ³¹⁰		
Doget, John ³¹¹	"Montagu"	
Dondale, John (r) ³¹²	Bedfordshire	
Draper, William ³¹³	Tamworth	
Drett, John ³¹⁴	"Whityngton"	
Driby, William ³¹⁵		
Dunfoul, Richard ³¹⁶		
Dutton, Ralph ³¹⁷		
Eccleston, John ³¹⁸	Liverpool	
Eccleston, Robert (r) ³¹⁹	West Derbyshire	
Englefeld, John (r) ³²⁰		
Esteney, Gilbert ³²¹		
Estmare, John ³²²	"Hadelegh"	
Eston, John ³²³	London	
Eton, Richard (r) ³²⁴		
Excestre, John ³²⁵	London	
Ferroure, Edward ³²⁶		
Feryby, William ³²⁷	Salisbury	
Filz Richard, Richard ³²⁸	"Ceneryngton"	

³⁰¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28.

³⁰² (p): C76/70 m. 11.

³⁰³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁰⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁰⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁰⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20.

³⁰⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁰⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1032 (16); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 267.

³⁰⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 18.

³¹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³¹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³¹² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 268.

³¹³ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³¹⁴ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

³¹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³¹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³¹⁷ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 268.

³¹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³¹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 268.

³²⁰ (g): C76/70 m. 12; He was probably retained after 1386; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 268.

³²¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³²² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³²³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³²⁴ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

³²⁵ (g): C76/70 m. 17.

³²⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³²⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

Frank, Peter (r) ³²⁹		
Freton, John ³³⁰		
Gale, Finianus ³³¹	“Stokehamond”	
Galys, Owen ³³²		Percy
Gifford, John (r) ³³³		
Glamville, Robert ³³⁴	“Makesy”	
Goutier, John ³³⁵	Hereford	
Grave, John ³³⁶		
Grene, Henry (r) ³³⁷		
Gyle, John ³³⁸		
Harecourt, John ³³⁹		
Hatfeld, Nicholas ³⁴⁰		
Haydok, Henry ³⁴¹		
Haywood, Hugh (r) ³⁴²		
Herdeburgh, William ³⁴³		
Hervy, William (r) ³⁴⁴		
Heywode, Nicholas ³⁴⁵	“Congilton”, Cheshire	
Hiche, Richard ³⁴⁶	Hadelegh	
Hobildad, John ³⁴⁷		
Hoghton, John ³⁴⁸		
Hokle, John ³⁴⁹		
Holford, John (r) ³⁵⁰		
Holland, Thomas ³⁵¹		
Horsham, Geoffrey ³⁵²		
Horwode, John ³⁵³		

³²⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³²⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; C81/1038 (33); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 269.

³³⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³³¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³³² (p): C76/70 m. 10.

³³³ (p): C81/1035 (34); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 270.

³³⁴ (p): *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³³⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³³⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³³⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 6; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 270. This man was described as the Leicester Herald.

³³⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³³⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁴⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁴¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁴² (p): C81/1031 (13); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 271.

³⁴³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁴⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; C81/1034 (21); *John of Gaunt's Register*, 1379-1383, vol. 1, p. 18; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 271.

³⁴⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, pp. 191, 194.

³⁴⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁴⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁴⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁴⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 17; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁵⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (26); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 272.

³⁵¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁵² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁵³ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

Hoverland, James ³⁵⁴	Bury	
Ipres, Thomas ³⁵⁵		
Kemp, Thomas ³⁵⁶	Wye	
Kentewell, John ³⁵⁷	Ipswich	
Kenton, Robert ³⁵⁸		
Kenynghall, Roger ³⁵⁹		
Kettering, William (r) ³⁶⁰		
Kyhoo, William ³⁶¹		
Kyngeston, John ³⁶²		
Kyngeston, John ³⁶³	Essex	
Legh, John ³⁶⁴		
Lenelond, William ³⁶⁵		
Lichepole, Philip ³⁶⁶		
London, John ³⁶⁷		
Luscote, John ³⁶⁸	Devon	Percy
Lusseley, Cuthbert ³⁶⁹		
Mably, John ³⁷⁰		
Malton, William ³⁷¹	Coventry	
Marchall, John ³⁷²	Wye, Kent	
Maryot, John ³⁷³		Poynings
Maylond, John ³⁷⁴		
Mech, John ³⁷⁵		
Melton, William ³⁷⁶	York	
Monchacy, Thomas ³⁷⁷		
Del More, William ³⁷⁸	"Leylond"	
Neuton, John ³⁷⁹		
Newport, William ³⁸⁰		
Norton, John (r) ³⁸¹		

³⁵⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 5.

³⁵⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁵⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁵⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁵⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁵⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 26.

³⁶⁰ (p): C76/71 m. 22; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 273.

³⁶¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁶² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁶³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁶⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁶⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁶⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁶⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁶⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 10.

³⁶⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁷⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁷¹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁷² (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁷³ (p): C76/70 m. 8.

³⁷⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁷⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁷⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

³⁷⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁷⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 m. 26.

³⁷⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁸⁰ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 276. Newport was retained by Gaunt, probably after 1386: *ibid.*

Orby, William ³⁸²		
Orchard, John ³⁸³		
Orell, Michael ³⁸⁴		
Osteler, Henry ³⁸⁵		
Overay, Stephen ³⁸⁶		
Palmere, William ³⁸⁷	“Hadelegh”	
Pamflet, Henry ³⁸⁸	“Jernemuth”	
Paxton, John ³⁸⁹		
Pemberton, Richard ³⁹⁰		
Peyto, William ³⁹¹		
Popham, Thomas ³⁹²		
Potel, Richard ³⁹³		
Potter, William ³⁹⁴	Suffolk	Morriex
Queche, Thomas ³⁹⁵	Surrey	Poynings
Radclif, Richard (r) ³⁹⁶		
Reymes, John ³⁹⁷	Norfolk	Hastings
Richard Hugo ³⁹⁸		
Rikall, John ³⁹⁹		
Rikall, William ⁴⁰⁰		
Rixton, Richard (r) ⁴⁰¹		
Robert, son of Ralph [sic] ⁴⁰²		
Robyn, William ⁴⁰³		
Rokewod, John ⁴⁰⁴	Suffolk	
Rolfes, Henry ⁴⁰⁵	Suffolk	
Rosevyle, Hugh ⁴⁰⁶	Yorkshire	
Rosevyle, John ⁴⁰⁷	Yorkshire	

³⁸¹ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198. This man was the bailiff of the Savoy in 1386.

³⁸² (p): C76/70 m. 20.

³⁸³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁸⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁸⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁸⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁸⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁸⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁸⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

³⁹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 191.

³⁹² C81/1035 (45). Popham was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 278.

³⁹³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

³⁹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 3.

³⁹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 3.

³⁹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 278.

³⁹⁷ (p): C81/1040 (24). He served with Sir Hugh Hastings in Scotland in 1385 and Castile the following year: Raimes, ‘Reymes of Overstrand’, p. 29. Reymes was probably retained after 1386: Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 279.

³⁹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

³⁹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁰⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁰¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 279.

⁴⁰² (g): C76/70 m. 27.

⁴⁰³ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁰⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁰⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁰⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

Rous, John (r) ⁴⁰⁸		
Sampson, William ⁴⁰⁹		
Savage, John (r) ⁴¹⁰	Buckinghamshire	
Selby, Thomas ⁴¹¹		
Servyngton, Richard ⁴¹²		
Sherwynd, Robert ⁴¹³		
Skipton, John ⁴¹⁴		
Skinner, Richard ⁴¹⁵		
Slade, Gregory ⁴¹⁶		
Smale, Walter ⁴¹⁷		
Smyth, Henry ⁴¹⁸	“Barton Bakepuys”	Blount
Solers, William ⁴¹⁹		
Southous, Richard ⁴²⁰		
Spenser, John ⁴²¹		
Stanton, Alan ⁴²²	Norwich	Hastings
Stantor, John ⁴²³		
Swan William ⁴²⁴		
Swylyngton, William (r) ⁴²⁵		
Talbot, Nicholas ⁴²⁶		
Talmage, John ⁴²⁷		
Thluyt, John ⁴²⁸		
Thoresby Hugh ⁴²⁹		
Thorp, Thomas ⁴³⁰		
Tirlyngton, Richard ⁴³¹		
Trenage, Nicholas ⁴³²		
Trevanyon, Robert ⁴³³		
Trewthosa, Philip ⁴³⁴		

⁴⁰⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁰⁸ (p): C81/1048 (31); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 280.

⁴⁰⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴¹⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; C81/1036 (19); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 280.

⁴¹¹ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴¹² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴¹³ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 281. Shwerwynd was probably retained by Gaunt after 1386: *ibid.*

⁴¹⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴¹⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴¹⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴¹⁷ (p): C76/71 m. 27; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 4, p. 14.

⁴¹⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 3.

⁴¹⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴²⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴²¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴²² (p): C76/70 m. 8.

⁴²³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴²⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴²⁵ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198; Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282.

⁴²⁶ Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 282. Talbot was retained after 1387.

⁴²⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴²⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴²⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195; (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁴³⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴³¹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴³² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴³³ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

Trissell, William ⁴³⁵		
Typet, Simon (r) ⁴³⁶		
Tytllyng, Walter ⁴³⁷	Salisbury	Windsor
Valord, Peter ⁴³⁸		
Wassheman, Richard ⁴³⁹		
atte Watere, Ralph ⁴⁴⁰		
Waye, Robert ⁴⁴¹		
Westnesse, Robert ⁴⁴²		
West, Robert ⁴⁴³		
atte Wille, Richard ⁴⁴⁴		
del Wode, John ⁴⁴⁵		
del Walsall, Adam ⁴⁴⁶	Lancaster	Holland
Wranby, John ⁴⁴⁷	Barton on Humber	
Wygenale, John ⁴⁴⁸		
Wygesland, William ⁴⁴⁹		
Wynstanley, Hugh ⁴⁵⁰		
Yoxford, Thomas ⁴⁵¹	Bury	Morriex
Yvele, John ⁴⁵²	Somerset	

⁴³⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194; (g): C76/70 m. 10.

⁴³⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴³⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1033 (33); Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity*, p. 283.

⁴³⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 6.

⁴³⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 19; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴³⁹ (g): C76/70 m. 9.

⁴⁴⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁴¹ (p): C76/70 m. 20; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 194.

⁴⁴² (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁴³ (g): C76/70 m. 12; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 198.

⁴⁴⁴ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁴⁵ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴⁴⁶ (p): C76/70 m. 18.

⁴⁴⁷ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190; C81/1031 (45).

⁴⁴⁸ (p): C76/70 m. 11; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 195.

⁴⁴⁹ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴⁵⁰ (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴⁵¹ (p): C76/70 m. 5.

⁴⁵² (p): C76/70 m. 28; *Foedera*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 190.

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