BECOMING ET AL

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester

by

Arko Sen

Management Centre
University of Leicester

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis repeats a becoming of difference and Otherness. It seeks to fold, refold and unfold an Otherness of representation. Attention is given to the core process of becoming. A disrupted pattern is maintained throughout and, sometimes, this takes the form of a labyrinth produced by an assemblage of inversions and pseudonymous writings. In this way, linear and hierarchical ordering and organization is strongly contested. A textual multiplicity is affirmed, which challenges orthodox organizational thought and conventional philosophy based on the repetition of the same, similar and identity.

Experientially, immanence is made material to form an image of thought with fragments, fluctuating speeds and intensities. These folds produce four middles of thought. These arrangements of multiplicities and singularities explicate, implicate and attend to the participation of the Other. The movement is productive of inclusive Heterotopic spaces that are, at once, hospitable to the arrivante, nomads and the repetition of difference. Other theoretical developments are accommodated that address the Eternal Return, autonomy, chance, multitudes, hospitality and the folds of the inside and the outside.

The Otherness of Art and Eastern thought are brought forth within the poesis of the thesis. A paradox addressed, amongst others, concerns alterity and the manner in which the thesis has and can be presented, and / or re-presented, to make clear an immanence and socially productive image of thought, which seeks only a repetition of difference.

**Arko Sen
September 2005**

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTORATE OF
PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER

BECOMING ET AL

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'Beneath the pavement, the beach.' [1]
'I do not cancel the fact that I am of the opinion that only the will in us is the
right end of the tangle, the true entrance to the labyrinth.' [2]

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[1] This sentiment, which was sprayed by a bystander on the walls of Paris during May 1968, is noted by Michel Foucault in 'Be Cruel' : James Miller (2000) (Ed.) *The Passion of Michel Foucault* Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp.165-197. Quote found on pp. 166 & 197.

[2] Arthur Schopenhauer (2000) *Parerga and Paralipomena. Vol. 1.* tr. E.F.J. Payne. Clarendon Press: Oxford. p.68.

[3] 'Animato' meaning Animated. Taken from 'Italian Musical Terms' in Victor Stevenson (1983) (Ed.) *Words: An Illustrated History Of Western Languages* London: Book Club Associates. p.95.

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[4] 'Affrettando' or Increasing in speed and feeling. Ibid.

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[5] 'Accelerando' or Becoming faster. Ibid.
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[7] Adapted with the help of David Waldron. Ying and Yang adaptations found on the www.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would come to say to ourselves, like Artaud:
'I, Antoni Artaud, am my son, my father, my other and myself.' [8]

Possibly with the completion of this thesis and many are theses, it becomes impossible to summon the appropriate adjectives and, therefore, sentences and paragraphs, to truly express the proper gratitude due to all those who should be acknowledged. On the one hand, there are other problems like those concerned with a memory, which fails to remember every relevant incident and event that connected and contributed to the work. On the other hand, there is something left too late, the yet-to-be-completed list of all those who have helped, which evaporated with many other good intentions in the duration of writing a thesis. So for all those who have truly helped, often from the sidelines, by giving physically, emotionally and spiritually, there is now a big thank you. Now let us consider thanks to those who cannot be forgotten. They cannot be forgotten because their contributions were all so great. Very much like Antoni Artaud, there is a child of two parents, a parent of two children, a partner, a colleague to some and a friend of others that writes, acts and thinks now and through the acknowledgements and the thesis.

The genetics and thoughts of Balarka and Helena Sen biologically and consciously formed, reformed and facilitated the becoming, which now writes. A sister, named Arya, also made helpful sounds and contrary images to distort what at times might have been a too determined sibling. Thanks are extended to these people and several others, about to be mentioned, who made an assemblage known as a family. Two suns, Svar and Sura, that shone brightly since their births and illuminated the creation of thought, and still today as sons they shine strongly to remind a parent of the beauty of life. There is also a very becoming and beautiful woman, Sharon, who as partner, teacher and many other intensities adds energy to affirm the life of this author. This was done selflessly through some of the difficult times of writing a thesis.

In a territory - somewhere between Laurel and Hardy, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - there is an intellectual space full of rigour, fun and humour which Lilley and Parker have carved out. Wholehearted thanks must be extended to Simon and Martin for all their thoughts and deeds, which meant so very much during the duration that was supervision. Others at the CPPE, at the University of Leicester, are acknowledged for their intellectual work that helped condition some of the movements of thought in this thesis.

The hand of friendship for some has a limited span but it has not been so in this case: thanks go to Paul Grant, John Stewart, John Bergin and Mildred Reynolds who understood as artists, intellects, friends and thinkers some of the territory of thought and through their questioning usefully contributed to the movement. Again Sharon, Svar and Sura get a mention, since they too made strong impressions and expressions on that landscape. Sam Hicks, Josh Johnson and Janet Lavelle are several other friends that helped develop the practical application of these thoughts. Dr. Steve Brown and Dr. Stefano Harney are also thanked for the hospitality to thought demonstrated during the Viva.

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[8] Hélène Cixous (2005) *Stigmata, Escaping Text* tr. Eric Prenowitz London: Routledge. p.141.

Mamãe, Disse Ele.
(Mama, he said)

Daedalus is also *a learned artist*. He produces works which, like all works of art, contain in fact a seed of death. Ultimately, the only people able to move about in art without risk are those who are in effect strong citizens having some authority within art. Daedalus is the master of dead-ends *and* invasions. He is at a turning point, at the passageway. Author of works which lead to going astray, inventor of the labyrinth; and also inventor of the antidote, maker of wings which on the other hand give man superhuman power; and which on the other attribute to him a supplementary *genos*, a supplementary genus. Is this man who flies still and only a man? When he is a bit bird? Thus *hybrid*.

Through Daedalus, who steers from one extreme to the other, we thus have access to a passage, to the *trans*, to the crossing of borders, to the de-limitations of genuses-genders-genres and species, to construction and to deconstruction, to metamorphosis. Through Daedalus I mean a Joyce.

With the call of his name, Daedalus leads monsters, mutants, chimeras. His story is an entanglement of prison and freedom. He constructed the labyrinth under the orders of Minos, to lock up the Minotaur; this implies also the monster, half bull half man, was to be preserved. The Minotaur is very much a monster, but after all Icarus and Daedalus are other monsters, other human anomalies. Daedalus revealed the secret of the labyrinth's exit to Ariadne to help her save Theseus, who had been sent to confront the Minotaur in the labyrinth no one can leave. All it takes is not letting go of the thread.

This is also a lesson in reading, when you are in the labyrinth of a text, and a text is a labyrinth, a text which was not a labyrinth would not be a text, a labyrinth has its coherence, the rooms communicate with one another, and as a rule one cannot escape, which is a good thing, one must enter the labyrinth of a text with a thread.

But, a friend of lovers, Daedalus was punished and locked up *without thread* . His line was cut, it's the same old story of the telephone. He was thus locked up without a thread but with his son Icarus, and as always he finds the easiest way to escape what's inescapable.

BECOMING ET AL

FOREWORD
SHAPE-SHIFTING AND DISRUPTED PATTERN MATERIAL

Starting with a principle is affirmed by people of experience to be a very reasonable procedure;
Søren Kierkegaard. [1]

Tirelessly, Jarmusch speaks of how he conceives his films "from the inside out," how he starts with an actor in mind, how he draws from the collection of random notes that he is constantly jotting down, and how he lets the story and mood evolve from that[...]
'But I don't want to give a whole back story...I have one. For me, sometimes it's too condescending to have to explain'.
Jarmusch in Ludvig Hertzberg. [2]

I had gathered at least a hundred and fifty pages of quotes about fog. I must truly have taken the subject to heart. Here was Abbott's Flatland, *a country of just two dimensions, inhabited only by planar figures: triangles, squares, polygons. And how do they recognize each other if they cannot see each other from above and so perceive only lines? Thanks to fog: "Wherever there is a rich supply of Fog, objects that are at a distance, say three feet, are appreciably dimmer than those at the distance of two feet eleven inches; and the result is that by careful and constant experimental observation of comparative dimness and clearness, we are enabled to infer with great exactness the configuration of the object observed." Blessed are these triangles who wander in the midst and can see things – here a hexagon, there a parallelogram. Two dimensional, but luckier than I.*
(textual change original)
Umberto Eco. [3]

A's INTRODUCTION

A singularity known as A had a becoming. It had been anticipated by Franz Kafka as K. In their very own becomings, Bataille and Kierkegaard had also anticipated this event along with some others; their singularities were also explicated and denoted by single letters of the alphabet. They likewise anticipated the arrival of another. Perhaps, the assemblage of all four letters of the alphabets constituted another, still flowing, multiplicity.

A now considered very carefully what was to be moved. It was thought. It had to be moved to this position from, a space somewhere further away, near the bibliography. A had always felt there was a stoppage to the flow and, because of that, what was now the most proximal text, with its connected thoughts and leakages, should have been set adrift.

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[1] Søren Kierkegaard (1949) *Either / Or: A Fragment of Life. Vol. 1.* tr. David F.Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.234.
[2] Ludvig Hertzberg (2001) (Ed.) *Jim Jarmusch Interviews.* Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press: The first part of the quote is from the Introduction p. vii. And the second part of the quote is Jim Jarmusch's own words, taken from his interview with Chris Campion and entitled 'East Meets West' p.199.
[3] Umberto Eco (2005) *The Mysterious Flame of Queen Loana: An Illustrated Novel.* tr. Geoffrey Brock. London: Secker & Warburg. pp.59-60.

It should have been set adrift on a sea of thinking much earlier, carried in a series of infinite and growing waves of thought to somewhere different and very elsewhere. The text should have been set free to be read much later - at a forever unknowable time. It should have been like a message in a bottle, written on an island, which is released and left free to float across oceans, only to be picked up by someone remote who is a stranger to all things that have to do with bottles, islands and notes. It would have to have been written on a very special island so that it became a middle of thought – not an end or a beginning of thought. Quite possibly, the island would be 'an untamed island of sinister repute.' [4]

Others had felt, nay almost insisted, that these thoughts had to be presented here, in the space often denoted as a foreword, so as not to presume too much in the duration of the extended thought, which had just assembled four middles of thought. Sometimes, it might not be at all proper or respectful to stammer. This was a shame because anticipation and hesitation created different speeds to thoughts, intensities and relationships. Before writing again, A reread and reconsidered the relevance of two texts by Kierkegaard, these were:

> *In pseudonymous works there is not a single word which is mine. I have no opinion about these works except as a third person, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader, but not the remotest relation to them.* [5]

And,

> *The arranging of A's paper was not so simple. I have therefore let chance determine the order, that is to say, I have left them in the order in which I found them, without being able to decide whether this order has any chronological value or ideal significance.* [6]

These quotes were interesting on a number of fronts. Perhaps, they provided simple clues to some other movement, or assemblage, at play in the image of thought now folding and unfolding. But, then again, there might well be a series of false dawns since the extended thought was materially different to Existentialism. Given the theme of anonymity or pseudonymous authorship, was it not interesting to observe that Kierkegaard used the first person singular, 'I', when this could have been excluded from the quotes altogether?

Other things might also be noted. Like, for instance, the play upon Aristotle's Laws of Logic because the A, writing here, was not the same as Kierkegaard's A out there. Such matters had to do with Identity and Non-contradiction and these might be amusingly contested. This was a weak line of argument. It did, however, give a further clue because equivalence of being was to be contested across all the middles of thought within the thesis. This would happen through the awesome and disruptive power of becoming. So far the direction of thought and communication was mostly explicated indirectly.

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[4] Ibid., p.153.

[5] Søren Kierkegaard (1960) *Concluding Scientific Postscript* tr. David F. Swenson and Walter Lawrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 551.

[6] Søren Kierkegaard (1949) *Either /Or : A Fragment of Life. Vol 1.* tr. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.7.

Kierkegaard had developed and employed a theory of indirect communication. [7] *This also had many different corruptions, manifestations and potential uses.*

Now certain questions arose: Did the act of embolding create or signify non-equivalence? And might the two A's really be part of some larger assemblage of non-identical thought? Obviously, maybe too obviously, there was a fragmentary style in the thoughts surrounding each of these A's. Did this mean there was an emerging multiplicity - an image of thought - that was produced by the combination of the singularities?

Anyway, so it came to be that these words were placed here.

CAMOUFLAGE

At its simplest camouflage is used by animals, plants, cells and other forms of life to evade predators, so as to blend with the surroundings and subvert interventions of another's unwanted dominance. Stronger animals also use it, so that they can wait hidden from unsuspecting prey, waiting for the weaker animals to pass by, only then to pounce upon them. In a flow of life, forms use camouflage to become ever ready for more positive events and productive connections to unfold. *Camouflage* may be a matter of shape, texture and pattern.

In many flora and fauna, camouflage is a question of the visual play of different patterns of the wavelengths of light on skins, boundaries or surfaces, whilst the overall still and sometimes recognisable shape stays the same for the singularity. Obviously shape changes with growth. In other cases, the shape of the singularity transforms; certain fishes, for instance, can puff-up their shape, enlarging themselves to fearsome sizes. The human species has used camouflage, in nearly all forms, throughout their time on earth. Whether this is *mimesis* of the observed, or *alterity* to gain acceptance of the *Other*, cannot be stated with any degree of certainty.

The advancements of time, but importantly the moments of modernity, have allowed humans to utilise what they have learnt from observing camouflage generally in nature; they have also learnt, specifically, by themselves and through animals and plants; they have designed and invented newer and more relevant survival aids; and, they have now sought wider application to what they have learnt.

Military personnel in combative environments often wear clothing that disguises the wearer from standing out from the fore and background of surroundings. *Camouflage* is important for the evader and obviously for evasion. Here are some helpful definitions and perspectives.

> **26-2 Definitions:**
> a. **Evader.** An 'evader'... is 'a person who through training, preparation, and application of natural intelligence avoids contact with, and capture by, hostiles, both military and civilian.'
> b. **Evasion.** Evasion means all the processes involved in living off the land and, at the same time, avoiding capture while returning to friendly control.

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[7] See, for instance, J. Rée and J. Chamberlain (1998) *Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 6, 15, 42, 61-62, 68, 82 & 89.

As used here, it includes all the techniques of evasion employed by those on foot in enemy territory. [8]

Recognition is the determination (through appearance, behaviour, or movement of the hostile or friendly nature) of objects or persons. One objective of camouflage concealment is to prevent recognition. Another is to deceive or induce false recognition. This implies camouflage is not always designed to be 'the cloak of invisibility.' In some instances, camouflage is used to allow deception. The camouflaged object or person is then seen as a natural feature of the landscape. [9]

DISRUPTED PATTERN MATERIAL

The proper term for camouflage-clothing is *Disrupted Pattern Material* or *DPM*. Where colour vision is available, the changing disrupted pattern of colour patches allows the wearer to blend into the background as it is presented to the viewer. However, at night, colour is not the critical issue and material may be coated with a chemical to prevent infrared sighting. Coated *DPM* can, therefore, disrupt technology.

In addition, combatants may add to the clothing pieces of netting and flora to change their shape. Since snipers have to hide from detection for extended durations, they often go to the greatest lengths to ensure their shape disguises their form. There are, however, certain paradoxes that arise, such as the fact that *DPM* designed for rural environments makes the wearer all too obvious in urban settings.

Also *DPM* as uniform may represent other things. It can show, for instance, that the wearer is disciplined and in conformity to the values of military institutions. But when, say, a *DPM* jacket is worn with jeans by a youth, it could be seen as an attempt to draw attention to an attitude of non-conformance. Likewise, should a rambler be congratulated for wearing *DPM*, as opposed to fluorescent colours, because of a desire to blend 'naturally' with the environment? Camouflage can be a matter of survival but it isn't normally wanted when, for example, someone is wounded or injured and they need bright and visually prominent clothing or attachments, so that they can be spotted quickly by Search and Rescue Teams.

There is difference in military wear. Camouflage patterns vary to match the nature of the environment where a State, or other hostile force, anticipates its next confrontation is going to take place. *DPM* is also a uniform that allows different troops to be distinguished from one another; for example, one neighbouring country will have a different pattern of camouflage from another.

By and large, the clothing of corporate business men and politicians is a different type of uniform which often speaks volumes of their own values and those of the institutions they represent. Such clothing gives fairly clear messages (although, of course, in such cases a revolutionary may disguise him or herself as the *bourgeois*). Uniformity is not just a

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[8] Department of the Air Force (2002) *U.S. Air Force Search & Rescue Handbook*. Connecticut: The Lyons Press. p.482. Originally, Air Force Regulations 64-4. Vol. 1. 15 July 1985.
[9] Ibid., p.292.

matter of clothing; it is also conformist behaviour as in the writing of text which performs well for peer review

Others may have previously inhabited middle or transgressed grounds of territory and thought, through quite different means, than through either the clothing or uniforms they wear, perhaps, as a consequence of the disrupted pattern of their attitudes and aspects;

> For example, these nineteenth-century types (flâneur, collector, and gambler head the list) generally constitute figures in the middle – that is, figures residing within as well as outside the marketplace, between the worlds of money and magic-figures on a threshold. [10]

DISRUPTED SCRIPT

There is uniformity in many forms of radical discourse and amongst some of the most radical of thinkers. Even amongst them the body, however, sometimes conforms too easily to disciplines, habits and uniformity of behaviour which can be seen. Did, for example, Michel Foucault, or Gilles Deleuze, or Felix Guattari when they delivered lectures lie on the floor and look at the ceiling? Might they have considered looking away from an observing and listening audience? Might the audience have chosen to hang from the ceiling? Apparently, it was the habit of Walter Benjamin to deliver his lectures whilst staring at a far corner of the ceiling.[11] Textual presentation also takes on a uniform pattern and layout, although disrupted patterns can be discerned once in a while.

> What is distinctive about *The Arcade Project* – in Benjamin's mind, is always dwelt apart – is the working of quotations into the framework of montage, so much so that they eventually far outnumber the commentaries. If we now were to regard this ostensible patchwork as, de facto, a determinate literary form, one that has extensively constructed itself (that is, fragmented itself), like the *Journaux intimes* of Baudelaire, then surely there would be significant repercussions for the direction and tempo of its reading, to say the least. The transcendence of the conventional book form would go altogether, in this case, with the blasting apart of pragmatic historicism – grounded, as this always is, on the premise of a continuous and homogenous temporality. Citation and commentary might then be perceived as intersecting at a thousand different angles, setting up vibrations across the epochs of recent history, so as to effect "the cracking open of natural teleology." And all this would *unfold* through the medium of hints or "blinks" – a discontinuous presentation deliberately opposed to traditional modes of argument. (third *italic* added) [12]

The uniformity of our behaviour belies the power of the scripts that have been impregnated into our basic operating system as a wanted or unwanted skill or habit. Collectively these scripts condition many things lying camouflaged within us. But then, surely, if it is the non-disrupted nature of re-presentation that best informs the world of our conformance - ought a freer text to have disrupted patterns?

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[10] Translators' foreword to Walter Benjamin (2004) *The Arcade Project*. tr. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. London: Harvard University Press. p. xii.
[11] See, for instance, Gershom Scholem (2001) *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship* tr. Harry Zohn. New York: New York Review Books. p.13.
[12] Translators' foreword to Walter Benjamin (2004). Op.cit., p. xi.

Fragments are re-presented, here and elsewhere, as one event or as a series of events. As a manifestation of a world, fragments cannot ever be considered to ever have a meta-narrative. They may not have always been presented as a critical component in a *Strategy of Disrupted Patterns*. Such a fashion might well present the first visual clue to challenge conformance or *dressage*.

NECROMANCY AND IMMANENCE

Shape-shifting is transformational and demonstrates transmutation. And transmutation may be seen as the very heart of alchemy and the many acts of necromancer or nigromancer. [13] The alchemist sought to transmute lead to gold. This desired event is much more than it seems. For example, there is *immanence* in such practices (since gold is already present in the base metals and has to be induced):

> Behold all who from the beginning of the world have written on the transformation of metals and their stones, and you will surely find they all agree...that the very first metal and last metal are *one*. For the first metal has already inherited and acquired in its metallic character the progressing metallic seed, which then progresses unceasingly in metallic procreation...Many indeed have called lead gold, and many gold lead.
> (*italics* original) [14]

Shape-shifting is a *Dark Art* that figures in many forms of mysticism. It can easily inspire fear in children and animals. It has many applications, for instance, *shamans* use the outlines or shapes of animals to enter their spirits or impersonate their attitudes. Some surfaces and attitudes are much more amenable to this type of art. A *Body Without Organs*, or a surface without installations, is much more amenable to shape shifting than anything governed by hierarchies.

It is a lack of fear - or complete abandonment to becoming - that allows a singularity or multiplicity to freely *attend* to shape-shifting and disrupted patterns. This requires hospitality to the thought of *Otherness* and the thoughts of *Others*.

Let's think or remember a little bit of the *Other* as it can manifest itself: consider, for example, a singularity that awakes from sleep but, who for a moment, then enjoys that special series of events which are the transitory twilight-phase just between dreaming and consciousness. Here a singularity can savour the immanence, emanations, meanings and

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[13] Hans Christopher Biswanger writes about the negromancer, or the alchemist, who uses 'chymical wedding' to turn lead to gold, or gold to paper money. This is the great capitalist trick foreseen by Goethe. In this thesis, interest is shown towards a more radicalised alchemy of the necromancer. 'Faust, then, was a nigromancer (or necromancer), a master of the black art (Lat. *Niger*: black). The black art that appears here as a result of a pact with the devil is none other than alchemy.' See Hans Christopher Biswanger (1994) *Money and Magic: A Critique of the Modern Economy in the Light of Goethe's Faust*. tr. J.E. Harrison. London: The University of Chicago Press. Originally, Gold und Magie: Deutung und Kritik der mordernen Wirtschaft anhand von Goethes (1985). p.2. There is surely a newer, stronger and more radical dark art, which now seeks a transmutation to a more autonomous and heterotopic space? There ought be an anticipation and preparation for more forms of Dark Arts that realise a material way forward, in textual construction and presentation, which performs a radical strategy.

[14] Basilius Valentinus cited in Biswanger (1994) Ibid., p. 8.

signs, which transcend that space in time. It is the moment of difference between two things or thought, that are differences of kind, sharing the just-about-gone and just-about-to-arrive.

From the twilight zone having, then, abruptly moved to the business of the day and planned his or her agenda, he or she opens the door to put the cat out, or let it into the house. Then a barrage of visuals assaults the singularity - like those conjured by the mischievous animal played by Mike Myers in the film *Dr. Seuss's The Cat in the Hat.* [15] All manner of unfamiliar objects invade the house and decorate the walls whilst true difference becomes manifest, in all the dimensions available, within that home under invasion.

Alternatively, the owner of the house could be assaulted by shape-shifting as in the rooms of Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland.* In either of the cases, some might experience these things as only confrontations to the senses, although each is a horrendous incident and brings moments of terror. Others may have more tools for survival; perhaps, they may even gain a very positive experience through fully *attending to* both these changing events and incidents, whilst drawing what is needed to *affirm* their own becoming. In other words, the clearer one is about one's own becoming - or ethic of becoming - the more easily disrupted patterns and dis-ordering arrangements can be accepted, since these create productive assemblages. Perhaps, within this *attending to*, there is something about arbitrariness to consider.

> The whole secret lies in arbitrariness. People usually think it is easy to be arbitrary, but it requires much study to succeed in being arbitrary so as not to lose oneself in it, but so as to drive satisfaction from it. One does not enjoy the immediate, but something quite different which he can arbitrarily control. You go to see the middle of a play, you read the third part of a book. By this means, you insure yourself a very different kind of enjoyment from which the author has been so kind as to plan for you. You enjoy something accidental; you consider the whole of existence from this standpoint; let its reality be stranded thereon. [16]

REPETITION OF DIFFERENCE

In all these things - ranging from camouflage, disrupted patterns and shape-shifting - the distinguishing features of identity are reduced, eliminated, ignored, made-over or placed under erasure. And in these acts, the viewer or sense-maker must attend much more carefully to the *repetition of differences* and *Otherness*, as the events conspire to make the habit of seeking the same and similar totally redundant. If not redundant then, at the very least, the habit of orthodoxy and doxa should become retarded in application. No same and similar means no identity, to be traded or made equivalent, in oppressive or exploitative practices.

The unavailability of 'finger prints for identity', or 'signature features', might well create a tendency to a kind of open-minded attitude, or inclination, characterised by the sentiment of a *Body Without Organs*. And, the *altered attitude* or state of seeing, for

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[15] *Dr. Seuss' The Cat in The Hat* (2004) Universal Studio and Dreamworks LLC. DVD video. PGC. 30081/ST/G1 V2/ RO.
[16] Søren Kierkegaard (1949) *Either /Or : A Fragment of Life. Vol 1.* tr. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 245-246.

example, an *uncarved block* in anything in itself, has powerful features and material consequences. It is, surely, the sense-making of *poesis*, which disorders to the unknown vanishing point of organization, where there is only the *repetition of difference*. The dangers to hierarchical philosophy, organization and ordering of an altered sense-making process, that denies the same and similar, is really material in its movement. And as Charles Baudelaire notes:

> That which is created by the Mind is more living than Matter. [17]

But, then, surely the question becomes: isn't all thought disrupted patterns, matter and material?

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[17] Charles, Baudelaire (1989) *Intimate Journals. Charles Baudelaire.* tr. Christopher Isherwood. With an introduction by T.S.Elliot. London: Black Spring Press Ltd. p. 3.

BECOMING ET AL

ANIMATO

A FRENCH OUTING

If the reader is financially secure and enjoys the comforts of life, he must step out of himself and see how others live. If he is poor, he will not be reading this story because what I have to say is superfluous for anyone who often feels the pangs of hunger.
Clarice Lispector. [i] [1]

'To the bank?' K. asked 'I thought I was under arrest.'
K. said this with a certain amount of defiance, for, although his offer to shake hands had not been accepted, he did feel (particularly since the Inspector had stood up) more and more independent of all these people. He was playing with them. If they went away, he intended to run after them to the gate and offer to be arrested.
So he repeated :
'How can I go to the bank, since I'm under arrest?'
Franz Kafka. [ii]

B. and A. live alone, rather willingly. A. in a religious order, B. with her family – however insidious their relations may be with that order, that family.
Georges Bataille. [iii]

Or else is it the disappearing of his gaze that suddenly catches me unprepared?
Pierre Klossowski. [iv]

APOTHEOSIS

An *apotheosis* can occur grandly, otherworldly, spiritually or simply. Perhaps, it can also occur suddenly and without deification, the fracture or dislocation happening by accident, all of a sudden without any planning, preparation or precautions being put in place. But it ought not to be too easy to accept since voluntary accommodation and gay abandonment might well bring terrible consequences. As a sound image or pattern, the word *apotheosis* resonates with self-importance and grandeur. But as a visual image for the current purposes of this text it lacks something, a particular consonant, an 'r' is demanded because then like a textual hermaphrodite it would be capable of giving birth without any external coupling. It could give birth in its centre or middle, not at its extremes, to the word *'Other'* (consider, ap(other)osis). And with that simple addition, that magical touch, the text reveals it all, just like a statement out of *Genesis*: 'in the middle there was a word and the word was *Other'*. But the *Middle, Other* and *Fracture* are all so easily achieved.

An introduction to the middle space of thought, that some might call a chapter, now becomes unnecessary. Yes, the permutations are endless. For those who enjoy

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[1] Taken from a book entitled *The Hour of the Star*. The hour of the star is a reference to death ' No one would teach her how to die one day: yet one day she would surely die as if she had already learnt by heart how to play the starring role. For at the hour of death you become a celebrated film star, it is a moment of glory for everyone, when the choral music scales the top notes.' (1992: 28).

lexiographics – take the first three letters of the word *'apotheosis'*, add an 'r' and an 'i' then another 'a' and *'aporia'* could be found giving further meaning to the start. And so it goes. Further permutations are resisted because the signifying seed has been prematurely spilt on the ground, just like *Onan's,* and the signified awaits within the *labyrinth.* But as *Umberto Eco* notes:

> [T]here are three kinds of labyrinth. One is the Greek, the labyrinth of Theseus. This kind does not allow anyone to get lost: you go in, arrive at the center, and then from the center you reach the exit...But if you unravel the classical labyrinth, you find a thread in your hand, the thread of Ariadne. The classical labyrinth is the Ariadne's thread of itself.

> Then there is the mannerist maze: if you unravel it, you find in your hands a kind of tree, a structure with roots, with many blind alleys. There is only one exit, but you can get it wrong... This labyrinth is a model of the trial-and-error process.

> And finally there is the net, or, rather, what Deleuze and Guattari call "rhizome". The rhizome is so constructed that every path can be connected with every other one. It has no center, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially infinite. [v]

A asked the question:" Which **Labyrinth** *is Jorge Luis Borges'* [vi]*?" but then continued, perhaps rhizomatically and productively, by including that question with the text which accompanied the quotes. The different forms and differences claiming their own ontological status in the process of becoming what was constitutive of the thesis. A understood the joy of constituting and the burden of being constituted through a fixed identity that demanded, always the same and similar. Only through that burden was labour allowed an easy exploitation through the evil of equivalence of time and money. There was, however, risk in the venture at hand. Recalling Greek mythology meant some caution might temper the becoming. Since like Dedalus [2], the inventor of labyrinths, A might become imprisoned in the one now being produced. But it was also helpful to remember that Dedalus escaped the labyrinth of his own design with flight on wings of his own design. A couldn't really and materially lose with this sort of constitutive gambit, what fabulous and possibly immanent options, produce a rhizomatic labyrinth, a line of flight or both.*

In usage, *apotheosis* has a meaning that conveys ascension to glory, departure or release from earthly life. It also means deification, glorification or exaltation of a principle or practice so that there is a deified ideal, a transformation into a god through a deification story. One could, for example, glorify or exalt the principle of *Otherness* or set to a life affirming a commitment to *poiesis* that shows itself, almost always, as a strong *process.* This would be a process of *Otherness* that brings together *theory, praxis* and *poiesis.*

> Unlike intellectual reflection, action is public, geared to exteriorization, to contingency, to the hustle and bustle of the multitude. This is what the long tradition teaches. But we cannot necessarily go along with this definition any

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[2] See, David Norris and Carl Flint (1997) *Introducing Joyce* Cambridge: Icon Books. p.79.

longer. The customary frontiers separating Intellect, Work, and Action (or, if you prefer, theory, poiesis, and praxis) have given way, and everywhere we see the signs of incursion and crossovers...I will then advance two hypotheses. The first is that the public and worldly character of the *nous* – or the material potentiality *(potenza)* of general intellect – has to be our starting point for a redefinition of political praxis and its salient problems: power, government, democracy, violence, and so on. To put it briefly, a coalition between Intellect and Action is counterposed to the coalition between Intellect and Work. Second, whereas the symbiosis of knowledge and production produces an extreme, anomalous, but nonetheless flourishing legitimation for a pact of obedience to the State, the intermeshing between general and political Action enables us to glimpse the possibility of a non-State public sphere. [vii]

One could also glorify that which was *Other* than how it had been. It could then become the *apotheosis*.

When such a grand word as *apotheosis* is too easily used care ought to be exercised because fractures or dislocations may be very painful: These may have troublesome consequences. Rather too obviously there is the *apotheosis* which cascades in knowledge, the fractures that created Psychology from Philosophy, and fragments from each that lay the ground for Organizational Studies.

This can be contrasted with the fractures between epistemes that are never quite so easily seen. And, then there is the fracture which uses fiction to regain ground lost from these fields of studies like the *'minor literature'* of *Deleuze and Guattari*. [3]

Some are stricken with terror at this *apotheosis*. These are seen as far too paradigmatic and challenging to the *doxa* and technologies of power. Offensive because such acts imply there has been a covert redraft of the territorial divisions of knowledge outside the established speed limits and ceremony of peer reviewers. For them the horror is magnified, as unseen but grave consequence threaten the domesticity of their studies. They are the pets of their subjects or their subjects become their pets – what Deleuze and Guattari might call 'State Philosophy' – and against such orthodox movement might be placed their unorthodox affirmation of *apprenticeships* and *friendship*.

> Like Nietzsche, who employs a whole cast of personae in order to work through the consequence of the death of God, Deleuze invokes a variety of conceptual personae throughout his work. These include, in *Difference and Repetition,* the apprentice who learns how to deal with problems (Deleuze 1994:164-6), and in *A Thousand Plateus,* the nomad thinker who is aligned to a singular race or tribe rather than a universal thinking subject. Nietzsche's account of Kierkegaard as a 'private thinker' rather than a philosopher in the service of the State, as well as Nietzsche himself, provides the model for this personae (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 376-9). In *What is Philosophy?,* Deleuze and Guattari appear in the role of friends of the concept, where

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[3] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2000) *Kafka Toward a Minor Literature.* tr. Dana Poland. London: University of Minnesota. See also; Pippa Carter and Norman Jackson 'Deleuze and Guattari: 'A Minor Contribution to Organization Theory' in Stephen Linstead (2000) (Ed.) *Postmodern Organizational Theory* London: Sage.

'friend' is a complex concept which draws upon Nietzsche and Blanchot as well as the Greek conception of friendship (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:1-12)
viii

So the private and friendly apprentice is privileged in the above quote [4] but the emphasis here is on the *private thinker* who works for and towards the *Other*, while elsewhere in this thesis, aspects of the friend find a more expansive and discursive moment.

> The conception of theory as a relay of practice stands in marked contrast to the idea that the intellectual represents the vanguard of a proletariat movement that embodies the forces of social change. It is closer to the ideal expressed by Nietzsche in 'Schopenhauer as Educator' when he draws a distinction between academic philosophers in the service of the State and true philosophers who must remain 'private thinkers' (Nietzsche 1983:essay 3, 'Schopenhauer as Educator', sections 7 and 8)...Such thinkers, Deleuze wrote, seek to align themselves with unrepresentable forces that introduce disorder and a dose of permanent revolution into political and social life (Deleuze 1985:83-4). 'Private' is perhaps not the best term to describe such thinkers, since it suggests isolation from social forces and movements when, for Deleuze, these are the essential conditions of the activity of thinking. [ix]

In cases where there are grave consequences following an *apotheosis*, the wise, or at least the cautious, should use what they have learnt and gained from a good State-education, a private-education-for-the-state or an education-for-the-status quo. They ought to use that modern wisdom to tame their impulses and set about the fracture in civilized manner. They could go about creating fractures in a planned way and this might be overwhelmingly attractive to some.

The fractures being for the *State* or its elites might, however, result in a release or departure from the norms of nature like the way many women in China kept their daughter's feet constantly bandaged. [5] Feet bound every day for a number of years with some occasional release. The feet were reformed for the good of the child. Alternative perspectives and judgments might conclude, correctly speaking, this was not reformation but an act of deformation. The feet being deformed into smaller and what were, considered by the ruling elites and influence-makers, beautifully shaped entities. This was done so as to increase the daughter's future prospects for marriage. In the same way and in some places, thought might have been deformed over Aeons for the perceived benefit of a few. But in the case of thought something strange has happened throughout the constant deformation - perhaps by what *Michel Tournier* has termed *'malignant inversion'*, [6] perhaps as a simple irony - it has avoided an *apotheosis*.

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[4] As is often the case, people write or quote 'Deleuze' when they usually mean to say 'Deleuze and Guattari'. Thus they inadvertently give prominence to the former and sometimes altogether disregard the latter's contribution.

[5] Jung Chang (1993) *Wild Swans Three Daughters of China* London: Harper Collins Publishers. pp.30-31.

[6] See, for example, Mairi Maclean (2003) *Michel Tournier Exploring Human Relations* Bristol: Bristol Academic Press. pp. 194-201.

Obviously having natural feet was a risky business for well bred Chinese women. Releasing thought from the prison which is 'State Philosophy' is risky business. Other things are risky like, for example, getting married, ignoring science and writing a thesis or making observations about another culture on the basis of one book. There are risks in almost everything that is planned and undertaken by man.

Few ignore risk and there are, therefore, endless moments when the *Apollonian* or *Apollonian-in-us* overcomes the chance-taking of the *Dionysian* - or more specifically the *Dionysian-in-us*. The *Apollonian* takes the chance to reduce chance. This reduction can be done through applying a strict intellectual discipline, bringing forward a calculation and objectivity by using a ratio for life, before deciding upon undertaking something one way rather than another. Hesitate long enough to measure - even when this disrupts the moment and movement. Hesitate, use instructed thought and do not act immediately, then create a temporal space in which to measure the proposed action. Do the metrification - or science - through a risk assessment or another, more positively constructed, evaluation of the probability of obtaining a particular outcome. What is it to be? An *algorithm* or *apotheosis*? Which is it *to be* or *become*? Choose from amongst the *fracture* or *fractures* or *fragments* that could make thought become a spiritual sputnik.

Or, is it to be the *apotheosis of science* which breaks the endless algorithm of *being*? The choices are infinite: consider the others, like the *apotheosis* from structuralism to its post. What about the *apotheosis* that gave man the ancient spiritual or ethical hospitality, after he named and paid due homage to the Sun, light and other life forces of the world? If life was forever, perhaps, the *Apollonian* triumph would not succeed so often and become an outcome in itself. If life was forever, well that brings too many *Others* to be considered. Certainly there would be no need to learn from one's lessons.

An endless lifetime, to be squandered eternally on chances with no regard for future costs; this would counter the *Apollonian* victory through the magnitude and ease of accomplishing the excesses of the *Dionysian*. Only then, would the spirit of Friedrich Nietzsche arise joyfully satisfied with both the rightful overcoming and the universal accuracies of his prophecies. Such a victory would be so premature. The *Apollonian* reigns forcefully and freer, acknowledged and stronger; because there has been an overturning of wisdom. The old wisdom of Silenus was overturned. His words and wisdom contained in the text of Friedrich Nietzsche, which speak to us in pessimistic tones:

> Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do ye compel me to tell you what it were most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is beyond your reach forever; not to be born, not to *be*, to be *nothing*. But the second best for you – is quickly to die.
> (*italics* original)

But then within a page, Nietzsche gives grace and space to the newer wisdom which provides a tragic blueprint to mark our endeavors:

> [T]o die early is worst of all for them, the next worst – some day to die at all. [x]

Many a man orders, organizes and enacts the daily, monthly and annual plans of his life consciously, or with at least partial awareness of the finitude, reflected and resident in his being. But in truth, can one really speak with complete certainty about the death of men, perhaps even of the death of man? Slightly differently, at another angle to our discussions are thoughts such as those of Jacques Derrida [7] and Maurice Blanchot [8] which asserts that the act of death is certainly not known by the one who dies. (Why is it that many writers of *Difference, Otherness* and *Becoming* had a careless attitude to their own lives, an obsession with writing about death or a positive view of suicide? Consider, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Walter Benjamin, Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille and Michel Tournier. Perhaps, those who appear indifferent to glances of death regularly face their days with a mediation or meditation of its presence.)

Many plans begin, like mankind's constant search for knowledge, with a diagnosis of the problem or a patterning of the symptoms. One has confidence when there is a diagram to be seen, or heard, that shows or tells of the algorithm from symptoms to a diagnosis. Confidence with reassurance grows when time has been taken to recognize and translate a pattern or cluster of symptoms. In this way, the risk of faulty diagnosis is felt to be reduced adequately and other extraneous affects may be ignored, as priority is given to remedial outcomes. Remedial action such as the prescription of drugs or surgery then takes place. This is all very tidy, rational and logical. There is perhaps a case, like life-itself, where the initial symptoms generate - or give birth to - an infinite series of other additional symptoms. Thus these create an unmanageable sequence with each subsequent symptom definition. Or put another way, like health warnings on a prescribed drug packet, the treatment following diagnosis endlessly creates contraindications which become the new symptom.

Now let us take and extend this trope of a metaphor or metonymy further for a certain post-structural discourse. It might also be the case that there is never a prescription or treatment but, like homeopathy, relief comes with a delivery or administration of something that has the known affect which mirrors the initial symptom. The danger here is that we are writing *similarity,* or *sameness,* and falling into the *Apollonian* snare. Dealing with a problem this way is conceptually very risky and does not lead to *apotheosis.* All this presumes a cure and a prescription for life, but the material aspect of reality to be disturbed, in this thesis, is found in the spaces of proscribed thought.

There are reminders that other philosophers have given thought a particular velocity to produce, give or mark the different forms of order and organization in the world; and through those acts draw attention to particular forces and vitalities:

> There is a fairly neat match between Schopenhauer's realm of individuated phenomena and Apollo (the god of order and measure, of knowledge and morality) on the one hand, and between Schopenhauer's raging depths of

[7] See, for example, Jacques Derrida (1993) *Aporia* tr. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: University of Stanford. pp. 23-25 & 59-60. Originally, Apories: Mourir-s'attendre aux limites de la vérité. (1993)
[8] See, for example, Maurice Blanchot (1989) *The Space of Literature* tr. Ann Smock. London: University of Nebraska Press. pp. 87-159. Originally, L'Espace littéraire. Editions Gallimard. 1955 and Maurice Blanchot (1995) *The Work of Fire* tr. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 244-255 & 300-344. Originally, La Parr de feu (1949) Editions Gallimard.

urgent reality and Dionysus (whose intoxications break down all distinctions and overwhelm all rules) on the other hand. Apollo is the deity who governs the world of appearance. Dionysus expresses the will. [xi]

Most acts undertaken by man, such as his works to accomplish tasks and worthy projects, have the efficiency and effectiveness of performance conditioned by the levels of awareness of uncertainty. This awareness may be held consciously or unconsciously by the practitioner. Following a consciousness of the self, somewhere in the myriad streams of consciousness that follow, uncertainty is addressed through ordering and organization.

Risk reduction requires a particular form of organization. It requires the careful management of parts of the whole, often using a model or representation, whether of practice or reality, to be replicated in the mind, on paper or in discussion. These actions are undertaken to gain a better chance of understanding the paths, phases and particular linkages of parts to the goal whilst achieving the desired outcome. Thought becomes a simple exercise. Gain the knowledge first, consider its relevance and then apply this to the task-at-hand. All this to be done while taking the time, at each critical stage, to look out for those things that can go wrong and where possible evaluate the risks of failure associated with them.

A risk-averse person has many models, equipment, techniques and tools to call upon but in these there is an inherent prevalence of *reductionism* and *mimicry*. Do these tools also have charm for anyone other than the mechanical producer or author of *Western* linear thought? Why might it sustain a hold on someone considering undertaking a higher degree of thought? The answers revolve around the power of education to service the *Apollonian* at the expense of the *Dionysian*.

Education having become the objective driver of life and work, but not life and action, this makes it unlikely that chance is ever knowingly and completely handed back to the *Dionysian*. Can chance be reduced, through risk management, when one seeks an *apotheosis* that is to be the *Other* of a modern Western thought, which is committed to the *repetition of fixed identities, the same and similar*? The educated have become thought mechanics and society socializes to reduce the risk of thought straying too far from the educational norm. For these reasons and others, perhaps, there would seem to be a case for misanthropy.[9] Anyway education is, quite simply, for employment, *dressage* and the management of ordering and organization. Then the only creative act that follows such an education is the creation of muppets for employment and the enhancement of the productive capability of an empire. All very nice if the prevailing wind favours capitalist realms of world-making.

In his novel and autobiography, Michel Tournier writes a simple equation which is *Education = Initiation + Instruction*.

Of course these two components of education assume many guises, and their importance varies. My view is quite simply that, historically, the relative

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[9] See Ruud Kaulingfreks (forthcoming) *Aidez les Misanthropes.* Reference is made to that text shortly, see pp.10-11.

importance of initiation has been diminishing compared with that of instruction and that for some time this has passed the point of being harmful.[xii]

He notes that those societies with a primitive aspect place great store on *initiation*, which has a magical procedure, whereby new members become part of a group. In modern Western societies, broadly speaking, the emphasis is primarily on *instruction* and much, as a result, is lost. His novels seem to demonstrate the *power of initiation* over the already instructed, especially when undertaken by the *Other* of educated *Western man.* [10]

In scholarly endeavours, like gaining a doctorate, is it not the initiations that provide the most important aspects, these being greater in worth than the instruction (despite the programming sought by governments)? Does thought have its best becomings following initiation rather than instruction? Consider, for example, Carlos Casteneda, his five year apprenticeship and the teachings of a Yaqui brujo named Don Juan. This was a initiation into the world of a 'non-ordinary' reality. [11] Learning then can be vital and generative, facilitating the *ontological power of thoughts* which materially participate in the becoming of the body, mind and spirit, and the unique movement of 'teacher' and taught; thoughts are capable of determining becoming, being or beingness – knowing is ontological (see page 225).

In most academic endeavors, *Apollonian* virtue masters the territories of discourse; it dominates through the endorsement of methods to reduce chance. At many levels, the prescription of the model then creates a momentum for further *mimicry* in form or *representation*. But, at one level there remains legislation against the mimicry of copying. In scholarship and academia, to plagiarize and copy is to undertake an act that is very strongly proscribed - it is the Cardinal Sin (definitely, the point made here seeks to show there is no universal principle and, certainly, not to endorse the copying of academic work).

Copying word for word is acceptable of course when it is done openly and with purpose, such as if this text where to repeat literally see, for example, Martin Parker [xiii] writing Jorge Luis Borges writing Pierre Mendes, Author of Quixote.[xiv] Such forms of encasement have an importance of which more later. Replication and copying are not universal principles applied generally in academia. Nor are they likely to be found as a particular practice in any academic school which deals with a specific form of knowledge. Rather, there is a constraining principle to discovery, linked to knowledge production and punctuation, which often comes in the form of an underlying principle formed by peer group pressure for proper instruction. (Someone might ask the question: How do you know your peers until they have read what you have written and you have written what they have read in your text? Can you find peers that are *Other* and difference? Can peers and author become socially productive realizing a yet-to-be-discovered potential if they are the same?)

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[10] No becoming women here. Deleuze and Guattari's point is that there is no need to speak of 'becoming man' since that is the oppressive world as it stands but 'becoming-women' or 'becoming-animal' are the movements to a freer and radical Otherness. For a separate viewpoint, see Elisabeth Haich (1979) *Initiation* London: Unwin Press, for an interesting story of a woman's spiritual and physical becoming over two life-times.

[11] Carlos Castenda (1973) *A Separate Reality. Further Conversations with Don Juan* Toronto: The Bodley Head.

And this, sometimes unspoken and unwritten, principle seeks to reduce, eliminate or overcome the *Dionysian*. The principle, directly or indirectly, devalues *becoming a difference* or an *Otherness*. The *Otherness* found in art, music and drunkenness. Yet for many it is this *difference, Otherness* and *becoming* that is the reality. This is an *Otherness* with less, little or no social construction. Let us think a thought to create spaces where we might see, feel, hear or otherwise sense an empiric reality and becoming and poetic thought of living. A constitutive reality fulsome in its power and creativity is a material compass point that can serve as a means to navigate text. As Friedrich Nietzsche writes:

> For the more clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art impulses, and in them an ardent longing for release, the more I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the Truly-Existent and primal Unity, eternally suffering and divided against itself, has need of the rapturous vision, the joyful appearance, for its continuous salvation: which appearance we, completely wrapped up in it and composed of it, are compelled to apprehend as the True Non-Being, - *i.e., as a perpetual becoming in time, space and causality* – in other words, as empiric reality.
> (*italics* added) [xv]

Music, painting, dancing, chanting and protesting might give access to *multiple becomings*. For some, the *becoming* is through an art form whether this be popular or Baroque music. Art has many forms that range from the crude to rude to the sublime. Herman Broch [12] writing the consciousness that is Virgil's considers that;

> (H)e had prematurely broken away from each one, unable to find peace in any, either in the calling of a medical man, a mathematician, astrologer, philosophical scholar or teacher: the demanding but unrealized vision of knowledge, the grave recognizable image of death had stood perpetually before his eyes, and no vocation measured up to that, as none exists that is not exclusively subserviated to the knowledge of life, none with the exception of poetry, the strangest of all human occupations, the only one dedicated to the knowledge of death. [xvi]

For Friedrich Nietzsche and Herman Broch 'true' knowledge of reality comes from *Art* and *Poetry*. These provide an *apotheosis*. Broch seems to consider the knowledge of medical doctors and academics unworthy and unable to address the aporia. *Art* and *Poetry* are not always available and relevant, never present to threaten all that is represented in the organization borne of a politicized, or anaestheticized society, or normalized institution. Can Art, even outside of media-guarded prize-gathering, be considered art when real risk has been lost?

Art can take so many forms from the mundane to the sublime. In almost all cases, it is largely a question of relative appreciation although, of course, cultural variables have significance. Some Art performs an *apotheosis* and others may not. The expressive component is important – how does it work and what does it do?

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[12] Herman Broch was one of *Foucault's* favourite authors according to James Miller (2000) *The Passion of Michel Foucault* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p.84

Reflect on an event where a sealed bottle reaches the water's surface from the ocean's depths where it had rested, for hundreds of lifetimes, on the sea bed. It has all manner of dead oceanic flora and fauna on its once clear glass surface. These are individually and collectively beautiful and different. It is for that reason, when it is found on a beach, the encrusted bottle is examined with much interest by an inhabitant of the island. Overtime the bottle is examined frequently and then, out of curiosity, it is broken open. A small message is revealed from someone's lover, 'I have travelled across the oceans of time to be with you.'[13] Imagine what part, or parts, of this story could have real images that would be considered Art for you. Which of these - the bottle, the shells encrusted on the bottle's surface, the island, or the beach - might be considered as an expression of Art for you? Is Art, the material difference in expression for you caused by something like the quote from a film, or is it some of the things found in the films outlined in Appendix 1. Moving picture stories told on film, sculpture and paint on canvass – Art takes many forms.

Whatever it is, it must be remembered Art can take so many different forms : it is expressed through many very different mediums; it can be expressed in the jungle, on the sky or through a gallery performance; there is Art which is common, uncommon and, then, there is street performance such as proscribed graffiti on municipal walls or break dancing in shopping centres; there is Art which stretches from opera to skin colours and shapes tattooed across the body; there is Art that is dull to the observer, critique and artist; and, there is Art that takes risks, expresses and forms new singularities. [14] Risk is, perhaps, the colour to be found on the unfettered *Dionysian*

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[13] Dracula speaks this line in the film **Bram Stoker's Dracula** (1992). A Transylvanian Prince, played by Gary Oldman, moves from Eastern Europe to London in search of Elisabeta. She is his long lost love, when he finds her and reveals himself, Dracula speak this line. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola. Columbia Pictures. VHS CVR24590

[14] On reading a draft of the thesis, Professor Martin Parker commented: 'Relatedly, I notice in you (like Bob Cooper, Adorno, Lyotard and lots of others) have this strange thing about 'art'. Its usually the same trick. Art, through its transcendence of the everyday, changes time, space, duration, logic, sense and even commerce. Well, this may or may not be the case, but as usual its an argument that ends up fetishing certain forms of culture and dismissing others (by omission or plain rudeness). At base, I think this is a middle class snobbery that is shared by so many thinkers that they don't even think about it anymore. So, the question is (obviously) what is art? Now we could solve that one by having a generous definition of art, which would include the transcendence achieved in Kylie's 'I believe in You'. (Though you do use M&M, that white trash darling of the stupid white man.)'.[Reader, please see later middles of thought for M&M quotation.] 'But a genuine hospitality to a wide definition of art needs to be said, not assumed. One of the advantages of saying this **loudly** is that there are then many more openings to the other, to ecstasy, to flow revealed in everyday life, not just those oddities so beloved of philosophers. Why Kafka but not Komix? When Stoke City score a goal, or Tournier writes a sentence, or a Persian admires a rug. Its all the same to me. And if you want to be respectful to others, you need to let their culture in too. So, say something about Kylie please, and stop sounding like [name deleted] wandering around the Tate in Liverpool being impressed by cultural capital.' And Dr. Simon Lilley on reading that response commented so: ' The point is absolutely critical given some of the moves you are trying to achieve. And I don't think it will take a lot to make it loud and proud. Just attention to the point, and a suitable incisions and insertions on your next read through.' The points are undoubtedly valid but these must not, in repetition, collude to alter the speed, or movement, of a becoming that seeks, by all means, to create an expression which is material and affirmative. Only the freest movements and images of thought can subvert the cultural capital that, both indirectly and directly, orders and controls. However, the genuine hospitality to a wide definition of Art that is now configured must be eroded immediately. So that new images are formed through the freshest and most socially productive assemblage of Art and thought. At the time they wrote these comments, neither supervisor had seen the references to the Dark Art made in the foreword.

artist's pallet: the colours of *van Gogh* matching the twisted, distressed figures and screams of *Munch*.

Many might say so 'Art is *apotheosis*'. What are the considerations for non-artists attempting breaks and fractures? What is there for the one or many seeking an *apotheosis of Otherness* and a break from the thought of the powerful cultural elites of the *Western* hemisphere? What are the means of organizing a fracture from the powerfully organized or the organizations of the powerful? There is, for example, always a risk wherever and at whatever level, particularly in a hierarchical arrangement, of attempting a constant movement from the prevailing paradigm.

John Hughes questions the Deleuzian and Guattarian aspect towards Art:

> How, though, more exactly do Deleuze and Guattari describe the details of how sensation is at work in art? The work of art preserves a being of sensation as 'a compound of precepts and affects' independent, it has been said, of the lived perceptions and affections of the artist or his viewer or reader. Once again, not the perception, that which one sees, but the percept as the virtual event of a becoming by which newly constituted relations of things and self are given to be seen. Similarly, not the affection as a transitory state of feeling, or the affect as a transition itself merely, but the affect as a reference to the virtuality that insists in the partings and combinations of pre-individual elements and intensities which exist as what is expressed, given to feeling.[xvii]

And, in *Aidez les Misanthropes*,[xviii] Ruud Kaulingfreks writes of Deleuze's thoughts on the paintings of Francis Bacon;

> According to Deleuze Bacon paints the invisible forces of sensation (1984:40). He does not paint the effect of sensations but the sensation itself, as it is present in the body. He shows the pain, despair, anger and agony of the body itself. Bacon is a painter of pity for humanity. He shows humanity in the corps itself. And from this he takes everything off in order to get to the essence: the meat (la viande). There is no difference between the flesh and emotions. It is in meat that we see the emotion.

But then Kaulingfreks continues;

> Misanthropy as we learn from Molière and Bacon among others, has a certain point by making us aware that maybe things are not as good as we think. But that unsettles us.

> Aesthetics and art are by no means beautiful. Art disrupts and makes us uneasy...Are we really waiting for disruption, uneasiness, critique, shock, uncannines, unfounding, and convulsiveness?

This then is the material disruption to patterns of habits and thought. However, a perpetual movement against the *doxa* or faculty of identity, same and similar can waste much energy. Art can release such energy in expression so as to overcome those constrains.

There is the energy in dealing with containment and then there is the energy spent in trying to get out of the silos of ordered and prescribed thought. Often, what is left after the escape is diminished and small. In such cases, there can be little time or energy for a *becoming* which can maintain a separation. A fracture maybe difficult from the primordial identity that follows things and constantly privileges *being* rather than *becoming*. And here *normality* is endorsed and comfort prevails. Normality provides a comfort blanket for thought, life and living. It is different from the colder chill of nomadic loneliness. Moving from secure and sanctioned environments often requires a harder determination, a philosophical resolve and a creative antibiotic to life in the herd. It is here that misanthropy through art can provide a productive release.

> Although misanthropy is hate and mistrust of mankind, it is, in a paradoxical way the result of care for what mankind should be. Therefore misanthropy is a *via negativa* of concern with humanity. Misanthropy shows us a strange reversion. Group behaviour is seen as resentment, as imposing power to others, while misanthropy the result of pity. Misanthropy thus becomes a critique of conformist and an engagement with authenticity...art unsettles us and opens up an insight into our selves. [xix]

There are possibly two or more questions to be considered: Firstly, misanthropy or survival? And secondly, is it to be survival through misanthropy, Art or both? For some, the critical bit of knowledge for survival is, simply, that it is good to contain, to boldly go where man has gone before. One strays too far and there is an invitation to jeopardy, so for many beings it is better to live shackled in Plato's Cave, never questioning the reality outside. There are *Other* caves. These are caves for becomings. There are the caves of Tournier's making (or Bataille's archive) where the outside is not always excluded to allow shelter and domesticity (away from natures vital and unpredictable ways). Caves are material, dissimilar and heterogeneous but some other things are not.

There are no explicit statements in the academic orders, the regulations, which require a repetition in, or for the advancement of, knowledge. No law demands that knowledge be *a repetition of the same or similar*. But, in comparison to the *Other* kind of *repetition*, that of *difference*, there is understandably, illogically and certainly, an inequality in the applications of measure, of rank. There is no balance in the scales between the disciplines of thought that have a movement around *same, similar and identity*, and those assemblages of thought which maintain a speed around *becoming, repetition of difference* and *Otherness*. Such is the mass of commitments to the former, that it creates its own immense field, its own gravity which forms an almost universal 'organization'; a well-protected and vigorously guarded territory, which makes the *repetition of difference* so hard to pursue.

So a risk-averse subject would not pursue an academic career formulated or designed around the study and *pursuit of difference*. There is risk in such an *apotheosis*. Given some thought to the matter, one can see certain tensions developing which are contrary to the *Dionysian*. There are possibly healthier academic jaunts than studying the *repetition of difference* and *Otherness,* when and where the reduction of risk cannot readily be sought in any easily available pragmatics since they are, by and large, contrary to the spirit of difference, seemingly always married to the object of

identity, same and similar. The risk appears greatest when methodological considerations predominate in the scholarly pursuit of *Otherness*, *becoming* and *difference*. But some like Spinoza for instance, did not write thoughts so much about experiments - he experimented with both thought and excommunication,

> If one is willing to consider the *Political Treatise* not as the execution of a pre-established, perfectly coherent plan, already certain of its conclusions, but as an experiment in thought, or better yet, a theoretical experiment fraught with its own difficulties. [xx]

Given the statements so far, there is relief to be achieved in the certainty attached to the statement that, in this world, there are risk-takers who are quite repeatedly different from the risk-averse. At one level, pursing scholarship is a risky business, especially, if consideration is given to the necessity of peer group support and refereed papers *together* with thoughts of real difference and divergence. Writing a thesis is a risky business but remember the quote from Clarice Lispector? She helps to place a perspective that is insightful, pertinent and material; it is not so risky as starving.

Risk-averse writers contemplating the start of a thesis probably should, or would, choose a set of 'road-tested' mimetic devices or techniques to ensure a greater chance of future success. In the spectrum of knowledge accumulation and production there might be the possibility, if due care were to be exercised within this vast universe, to make any work productive of difference although that alone would not be sufficient. [15] The one unknowable, where paradigm shifts arise, requires work to be like a factory of thought. The other, which is knowable, has the stage or theatre set on a platform of probabilities and forecasts (but no predictions). Are these poles the *Dionysian* and *Apollonian*? On the stage, reductionists can entertain their audiences with various acts of repetition of the same to advance knowledge (and gain doctorates).

Possibly, in the supposedly stable-self there is always a person who is a little less risk-averse and a bit risk-taker who prefers stages to act out a series of knowables. Because you are what you eat, the self is stabilized in diet and sex. But different diets of thought are known and there is thought of different forms of sexuality that can erode the self. [16]

But even in a factory some concessions have to be made. It is with some reluctance that a concession is made here. Now, to type for an audience that might, most probably, be made up of communities with risk-averse attitudes and behaviours and with only a few risk-takers amongst them. Are the former more likely to be found amongst Structuralists as opposed to say Post structuralists? This text takes the form of providing a brief explanation of what is to follow; this is to placate those who are either one of two. On the one hand, the type who has an intuition which immediately grasps thought as unmodelable. On the other hand, it is to address those with strong tendencies to see thought as a model and oppose those who have an inclination that seeks to show otherwise. The former place thought as an initiation rather than as an instruction.

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[15] Care must be exercised here because already the power of the dialectic creeps through.

[16] Francois Peraldi (1981) (Ed.) in *Polysexuality* New York: Semiotext(e) provides a full blend of subjects dissolved by various forms of sexuality.

So much is now becoming like Kafka's *K*, his experiences and his actions. Who on the one hand,

> [E]xperiences the city as a tragicomic scenario of stage tableaux, actor-like inhabitants, and grotesquely exaggerated situations, a strangely performative territory that he gazes at without being able to attain understanding or acceptance.[xxi]

Yet he which is *K*, on the other hand, as the quote at the beginning of the this text indicates, stands aside but then cries for attention, like a child requesting a 'catch me' response, so as not to be independent, but to be included even if it is at a cost to his independent play. In some sense, the same game is being played out now. Those with a predilection for becomings, *Otherness* and difference follow their own germinate acts with a call for inclusion in the sets organized by those who arrest thought. The cry for attention and inclusion results in caution and consideration for *Others*, which demands a consideration of certain hygiene factors amongst words and text. The same consideration informs many aspects of learning and writing or organizing thought.

Consider a lecturer, or teacher, who might choose to open a lesson with a 'chalk and talk' didactic exercise. Equally, consider another who (out of respect for professionalism and the students) might adopt a model of learning that takes account of different learning styles and preferences. There are also others who intuitively apprehend and respond to the needs and demands of those in their learning set without learning the 'how to learn'. Likewise in opening a thesis, a writer might just adopt, through design or intuition, an extremely sympathetic approach to the needs of the reader. Alternatively, there is the choice to adopt the conventions or fashion of a small scholarly cluster, from schools housing fairly orthodox disciplinary pursuits and constructs, that pursue knowledge in a particular way, for example, the rigid, logical and logos of Logical Positivists. Then there is the chance to change it all, by writing intuitively, automatically like the Surrealists.

More broadly, consciously or unconsciously presenting arguments and discourse in modes that acknowledge different ways of knowing catches different segments of the wider set, which makes up the audience. Art, Music and Drama cannot always be used to evince an apprehension of the unknowable, just-knowable and the unsayable, and for the pleasure of, in so doing appease, the *Dionysian*. The needs of five senses or common sense cannot be met in (say) the written text, although attempts can be made to write what is sayable or seeable of different senses. Let us consider, Michel Tourniers' observations, in *Friday or the Other Island*, where Robinson Crusoe reflects on his childhood experience, his fascination with baking and his learning preferences. The character records from his journal the event of watching a baker's apprentice at work:

> I have always preferred the feel of things to their look. The senses of touch and smell are to me more moving and instructive than those of sight and hearing. I do not think this speaks highly for my spiritual nature, but I humbly confess it. For me colour is but a promise of hardness or softness, and shape the token of a suppleness or rigidity that I can explore with my hands. I could conceive of nothing more pliable or yielding than the headless body of

warm and sensuous matter submitting to the plunging caresses of a half-naked man. I know it now, there lurked in my mind the thought of a strange marriage between the dough and the baker and I even dreamed of a new kind of yeast which would give a musky savour, like a breath of spring. [xxii]

This Robinson Crusoe is not Daniel Defoes', and has a series of becomings away from the Western Colonialists' thought, so it is not surprising that he has an awareness of many ways of knowing and apprehending. Although, like other more orthodox narrators, the narration has stuck to a *beingness* which appears at times to be wholly Western. Let us move from such a specific referencing to a broader canvas.

Broad referencing can match the needs of those that intuitively assess learning, from their memory banks, playing especially to their scholarly memories. But in a slightly more reduced form of knowledge - or from a *learning frame* - it is possible to take account of those who are described as global learners by providing an outline or broad scope of all that follows. For those people, a map is given to guide a mind that is wired or has been well educated to learn a particular way. Then there must also be some concession given to the opposite type of learner. *Time* and *Space* in the lesson or text must be given over to people who have preferences for logic et cetera.

Already, it should be obvious that the repetition of thought is re-presented to endorse *the same, the similar and identity*. So it is goes, an endless repetition of the formulaic representation of the same. Yet formal knowledge productions - like science - have only been around for a short time in the span that is covered by the millenniums assigned to mankind, womankind or humankind. And *Western* sciences, and their like, have been around a short time compared to *Eastern*. Even if a slice could be made of the totality of thought's movement by cutting across and recording all those who populate the world, including the starving, the probability that this would form into a cluster labeled, for instance, Science or Western would be incredibly, probably infinitesimally, small. Surely, the collective patterns of thought across the world would be characterized by its *difference* and *indifference to classification*? So given this small probability, it ought to be more of a surprise that a text, or more specifically this text, now proceeds with a broad scoping of what follows.

This initial middle of thought proceeds after concessions to provide or release the *Otherness of thought, difference* and *becoming*. The *apotheosis* begins. It pays homage to the position of a number of French writers who have created and utilized certain processes ('*methods*') to write the difference that is *becoming, thought* and *Otherness*. Some sharp readers may already have made a jump to question a limitation to a geographical homeland or Continental domicile. Some may suggest that to re-present thought to be repeated, in this case, mostly but not exclusively, French writers of thought, hardly supports repetition that seeks to avoid the same. This middle of thought uses certain writers as rites of initiation or rites of passage to prepare the reader. Remember Michel Tournier's simple formula *Education = Initiation + Instruction*.

In some ways this justification can be seen as a gutless compromise to avoid accusations of being obscurest. In later middles of thought there are extended observations around academic obscurist or writing to avoid transparency. Such reasoning as now presented is insurance to try to invalidate against future claims that

Epistemological assumptions about own explanations (vertical axis label, with arrow)

	Representational	Non-representational
	knowledge	knowledge
	Consistent: (1)	Inconsistent: (2)
	Mainstream organization theories	Organization meta-theories
Representational explanations	- Denies significance of reflexivity - Dogmatic scientism - Accepts both organization theory and own explanations as attempts to "mirror" reality - Methodological relativism	- Acknowledges problematic status of representational knowledge in organizational theorising - Does not acknowledge problematical nature of own representational explanations - Self privileging - Epistemological relativism - 1st order reflexitivity - Problem representation
	Inconsistent: (4)	Consistent: (3)
Non-representational explanations	- Conservative and epistemologically naïve - Insignificant posture in organization studies	Acknowledges "constructiveness" of both own accounts and organization theories - Meta-reflexitivity - Ontological relativism - Problem of reality - Danger of becoming sterile

the production has been opaque.[17] The middle writes the 'infrastructure' as fragments – let us make up a word and call it an *'infragmenture'*. This is broken lines and lines of *'method'* alongside symptomology. It is an experiential methodology that does not deny difference, *Otherness* or becoming. The structure of the middle of thought has a pattern that guides the whole doctoral thesis - both within and between four middles of thought. It might be visualized simply now as the *marriage of two pear drops* or two different coloured *tear drops* or *twins in a 69 position* – in either case one inverted and the other not – which could re-present *Apollonian* and *Dionysian* sweets or tears or a germinal cell (see untitled Taoist diagram, the circle of *Ying* and *Yang* symbols, located between pages 13-14). At first sight, this may be taken as the bringing together of opposites, perhaps for a dialectic formation but it is not here to bring forth such a mechanical formation, or formulation, since flow is in opposition to a simple dialectic.

Consider the slightly adapted diagram, entitled 'Strategic Responses to the Problems of Reflexivity in Organizational Theory (placed between pages 15-16), which has been taken from Robert Chia's book, ***Organizational Analysis as Deconstructive Practice.*** [xxiii] This seeks to represent two images of thought – representational and non-representational – each in neat oppositional boxes. Even the light and dark shading, which has been added, does nothing to really upset the orthodox symmetry. And, just like some other paradigmatic analysis – like for instance, the two by two quadrants of Gibson and Burrell[18] and following on from their work that used by Hassard[19] - it largely and unconsciously uses the tools of one paradigm to analyse another quite different paradigm. However, the paradigm with the tendency to be without boundary, the one favouring transgression or the one which seeks to avoid representation is always shown closed – enclosed within a tidy straight sided square box. Now using forms, like those taken from Art, a further adaptation to this schema – located between pages 16-17 - now shows the openness of the non-representational boundary. It is a break, on far right hand side, from the Apollonian to the flux of Dionysian that allows *Otherness* and folds to take hold.

> Apollo is associated with visible form, comprehensible knowledge and moderation, Dionysus is linked with formless flux, mystical intuition and excess. [xxiv]

Clearly, if this openness were to be reflected in an architecture applied here, then the very idea of a chapter is contested – thus there is only a middle of thought. The boundaries could be so contested easily, as could authorship and commentary, by a massive invasion of citations. In this process where quotes, especially at the boundary of a middle of thought, give way to the *Hospitality to Otherness*, then the singularities which are the author and commentator become quite a different multiplicity. They become much more productive. Such disrupting representational methods and

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[17] The nature of conformity that seeks to normalise all thought and perform the technologies of power so that the academic is ever disciplined – the perfect Panoptican – results in friendly advice and caution on the scope for experimentation in doctorates (authors conversations with Dr. John Bergin about the nature of doctorates).

[18] Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgon (1979) *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis* London: Heinemann.

[19] John Hassard (1993) *Sociology and Organization. Positivism, Paradigms and Postmodernity* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

	Representational	Non-representational
	knowledge	knowledge
	Consistent: (1)	Inconsistent (2)
	Mainstream organization theories	Organization meta-theories
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Epistemological assumptions about own explanations	Inconsistent: (4)	Consistent: (3)
Non-representational explanations	- Conservative and epistemologically naive - Insignificant posture in organization studies	Acknowledges "construction" of both own accounts and organization theories - Meta-reflexivity - Ontological - Problem - Danger of relativism

[2] Further adaption of figure entitled
'Strategic Responses to the Problem of Reflexivity in Organization Theory' in Chia, R (1996)
Organizational Analysis as Deconstructive Practice - New York: Walter de Gruyter. p88.

techniques, that seek radical expressions, are more often found where paint meets canvas - than where text and type face are printed on paper.

A flow is *desired,* to at the very least dissimulate the same, identity and similar, within a 'manageable' and *writable movement of thought.* One that is *a 'singularity' or 'infragmenture' for the processural thought of becomings.* This is a *'body without organs'* (*Artaud, then* Deleuze, also Deleuze and Guattari) which provides a carriage for *Otherness* aimed, either directly or indirectly, against structures of thought that personify the Western world. This is also the *'uncarved block' of Lao Tzu* [xxv] . A *Lachryma Christi* to dissolve a physical representation of the *Western thought* to create a poetic effect that supports its *Other* which is not then its opposite as co-ordinate in time and space. As Eco notes,

> I define the poetic effect as the capacity that a text displays to generate different readings, without ever being completely consumed. [xxvi]

The unlimited *Other* avoids definition and is, in some ways, always what is left after the definition in time and space has been made of the non-other (imagine a cut out), after what Schopenhauer termed *'principium individuationis'* or 'the principle of individuation',[xxvii] whether that is applied to the subject or object (more of this later); it is not the *negative stereo-isomorph* of a something, subject or object.

The becoming is like the notion of the child, and not the stagnant and structured thought as represented by a very elderly being. Since the child,

> represents a quality, in Gascoigne's words, 'an Ideal of Becoming rather than just Being'. [xxviii]

The text of Tournier's novels shows an obsession with the child or children as carriers of difference. It is worth thinking about children when considering becomings. Their difference is, perhaps, the unfettered pacing and movement of intuition. Is it the play that avoids capture? It would seem that children have flows and processes that are their own (that is until they become educated) which are meant for their own enjoyment.

Likewise within this thesis, where possible an attempt is made to capture the non-linear movement of thought through non-linear *flows* and *Folds.* The location of the middles of thought is not intended as a linear logical sequence of an evenly paced text. Rather these have different velocities, symmetries and less, although slightly connected with, changing trajectories. The house style gives *hospitality* to space and timing which dissimulates and *'stutters'* in the manner of *'minor literature'* [xxix]. The difficulties of writing or conveying difference, becoming, *Otherness* and non-traditional thought should be evident to the reader. The engagement with difference has resulted in, unwittingly, finding what may only be similarity and sameness in the exemplars like *'stutter'* and *'minor literature'*: (And you too can write differences like Deleuze and Guattari). In this *process* discourse is made much more permeable to *flows* that disrupt the containments and apparatus that structure the Cartesian knowing being. Other middles and centres of thought within this thesis, which follow and connect, disrupt, *dissimulate* that which contains and legislates for a subject or being.

Dissimulation occurs with a movement that is forwards and becoming. The middle is made real and material in a play, or trope, which refuses the beginning. It displaces any origin as pre-condition or emphasis. This, or that, middle of thought then makes parts of this middle the illegitimate or *untimely* child of the thesis. There follows other middles which speak to the folds that have arisen in each assemblage of text. Thereafter, the arrangements more fully address the *Other*. Together, the formation creates the assemblage which is the thesis. The architecture of these assemblages of centres and middles of thought has a shape, pattern and connectivity. It has an image of fit that moves at the points of connection like the 'pear shapes' or 'tear drops' of the *Ying* and *Yang* symbol (see – the untitled diagram between pages 13-14).

ENCASEMENT

Encasements can form *silos* and they are dangerous things. Encasements can slow things down so that identity, equivalence, same and similar can be patterned to order and organize. The appearance of subjects can be put down to encasements. Speed and forces escaping encasement allow for *intersubjectivity* at least.

Umberto Eco notes:

> Another problem: *the encasement* of voices, or, rather, the narrative points of view. I knew that I was narrating a story with words of another person, having declared in the preface that this person's words had been filtered through at least two other narrative points of views...I was also doubling a series of interstices, of screens, set between me as a biographical personality, me as a narrating author, the first person narrator, and the characters narrated, including the narrative voice. I felt more and more shielded, and the whole experience recalled to me (I mean physically, with the clarity of Madeline dipped in lime-flower tea) certain childish games in which I pretended I was in a submarine under blankets and from it sent messages to my sister, under the blanket of the next bed, both of us cut off from the outside world and perfectly free to travel like a pair of ragged claws scuttling across the floor of silent seas.
> (*italics* added) [xxx]

Encasements can happen through, but these can also be contested by, things like quotes, digressions and, especially, through tropes or changes of the narrative perspective. Existence is encasement of experience and memories. And what germinates from connections of different lives are series of events that are junctures for the exposed part of a singularity that has a becoming from an encasement. The outside creeps into any encasement and affects existence.

> I have always thought that with the coming of evening every man and woman experiences a great weariness of existence (to exist = sistere ex, to sit outside), of being born, and to console themselves for all those noisy, drafty hours they set about reversing their births, becoming unborn. [xxxi]

There are many encasements, those of time and space allow determinant statements but there are also indeterminant encasements.

Having typed the quote, A reflected on its sense. In many ways it was astonishing how Michel Tournier developed a poststructural perspective against the background of signs, inversions and turns, presented in a conventional form, certainly within paragraphs, whilst providing an Oeuvre of philosophy rather than fiction. A remembered bookshops which placed Tournier's works on the shelves dealing with fiction, following the recommendation for cataloging. The quote was a good one. The rules of writing / grammar now allowed one to split infinities but how else could you consider and conceptualize infinity other than through giving thought to its parts? One important part for everyone was existence. But the etymology of exist was to sit outside. Not stand? Sit or stand, it really didn't matter. Outside was the key word. Outside of yourself? Outside of the world? Outside! Thought from the Outside, how few the people who understood this sentiment? Despite Foucault's thoughts on thought from the Outside it was not understood by many. [20]

Tournier and Blanchot understood the Folds of thought. Both writers creating attentiveness to its movement and paradoxes. Tournier's writing style would, for many publishers, appear attractive to a broad readership because it retained certain levels of transparency.

> *Tournier has always sought to reach a wide audience...He is a messenger. He is also, first and foremost, a philosopher...he was to see the potential for a far wider dissemination of philosophical ideas and arguments in the form of fictional narratives than could be achieved, even in France, through conventional channels of philosophical discourse.*
> *(italics added)* [xxii]

On the other hand Blanchot's writing style remains far more enigmatic, refusing transparency. Could A ever develop a style with such power and authority to produce the Other, the Outside and becomings?

A looked at the quote again and stared at the first word, the individual first person 'I'. It was funny how in speech when a speaker used the word too frequently people often became tired of the assertions made, tired of the attachments of words, tired of thoughts and actions made to the personage. Yet wasn't it the case that people who read similar statements found them more acceptable, admissible and agreeable? Was this a matter to do with the listener, knowing other listeners, hearing the utterances acknowledging that, in the act of hearing, they all were inactive and not accomplishing? Whilst in the privacy of writing (and, yes reading) all knew that they might make such statements only to be witnessed by one other and, therefore, less likely to be interrogated. This was the type of thought Derrida could write so pithily and lucidly about. 'I' was an illegitimate stroke of the keyboard, especially, when used in a thesis, because who was writing? It was, perhaps, one of a series or all of the series of singularities or people that were supposed to be mentioned in the acknowledgements: – A; the supervisors whose voices left echoes; the authors read; the people who provided other relevant sound images; and, the familial banter and expression that gave comfort around the hours of scholarly endeavours. If you had to use 'I' then perhaps use it like the Rastafarians in the mode 'I and I'. A thought more

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[20] Professor Martin Parker (2005) wrote on the draft of this thesis 'But the outside is made by the inside!'

of those cultures that had no equivalent for the word 'I'. Oh yes and there was the awful manager who spoke "there is no I in team" but unfortunately for them there are two A's in manager.

A started to change the direction of the thought and writing following the trajectory and productivity of desire. Many of the drafts and reminders of the thesis proved the power of thought from the Outside. The power to germinate Otherness.

A was born or at least materialized and assembled, as everyone and everything, through an event. Whoever might wish to make a representation of the event would or should find the task impossible. The few remaining traditionalists- who, of course, are another Other - whispered amongst themselves, wanting to find comfort in a stabilized image of A and summarize the thought that followed a reading of what A wrote about. They felt that an Escher drawing might well create the right visual image, something that approximated, or captured the nature and form of it all; it could be the sketch that showed a hand holding a pencil drawing a hand with a pencil drawing a hand. Or, then perhaps, it was the other drawing, the one that graphically outlined a staircase rising to meet a staircase rising to meet the bottom of the first staircase. Then there was the one of the aqua ducts. This kind of talk humiliated A since the birth was not a repetition and there was no stable being. Others scribbled SW, on a pad in reference to Sinister Writings written by the left-hand of a normally right-handed person that wrote of abnormal things. In relation to this A was just short of euphoric, recognizing the reference to Michel Tournier's **The Ogre**.

A looked at another quote wanting to link Birth, Thought, Outside and Folds. Amongst the notes a search revealed Fold and Outside:

> The outside comes into thought, as into language, as the necessary torsion to which these activities submit in order to come into existence, in order to create; here Deleuze uses Nietzsche's categories for tragedy, formless Dionysiac uses and formal Apollonian representation, to enact this point. Thus the asymmetrical relation of thought and its outside run together like two merging streams, though they do not from a resolvable dialectic, and together create the self-differenciation. This is style, but a style that never returns to the Same.
> (italics added) [xxxiii]

A felt a coupling, or more properly speaking a meeting, represented one axis of the set of dimensions that constituted the Birth Event as a moment in time. The Other necessary variable for defining purposes in some people's world was space. In time A gave thought to this equation, making sense of what was non-sense, but then arrived at non-sense for the sense of the birth within eternity and infinity. A considered the split infinity of the time -the infinity of time before A's birth and the infinity of time after death.

To think of existence one had to bracket infinity into at least two encasements. The unidirectionality given to some conceptualisations of time was interesting. No one worried about the time before their birth in the same way and manner they worried about their death. People did not place equal emphasis on the spaces before their birth and the spaces after their birth. Other conclusions followed. There was the

possibility that this thought was either the space between, beyond or other than thought. Someone had said it was the space which was between, beyond and Other than thought.

A had known Western thought was happiest with some personage, something tangible or an object to split infinity and, until fairly recently, a knowing subject. But this was really a tiresome requirement, remaining a throw back to the period before the thought wars of some had eliminated the subject. Those early thought wars had been fascinating to read and write about, even though they had not yet been fully formulated, and it was truly haunting how Jorge Luis Borges, in the **Labyrinths** *but especially in* **Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius** [xxiv], *had predicted the nature of the weaponry. Those Continentals had built the war machines of thought openly, in front of everyone, well before the bombing of Iraq.*

And the engine of Eastern thought had finally connected to form a magnificent assemblage. Who could have predicted it all? But predict was the wrong word. Properly speaking, it should no longer exist, as a word, since it had died with the death of old forms of science that had focused on material products. Even at this point in the narrative things remain hazy and the contradictions of old persist. Whoever reads the manuscript must be warned of the cruelty of a mobile time almost like time-travel.

A time, or one might say A's time, where the paradoxes are caught and offered as meal from the menu instead of historians' (or should that be historists') diet of resolution. It is and was hard to be in this place which was proximal and distant from where Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari had folded thought. A considered two quotes which felt important and relevant for the moments after birth. The first conjured the phoric aspect and came from **The Ogre**. *The words 'euphoric' and 'Christopher' both showing how phoric or carrier - the carrier of joy or Christ - could be used, but Tournier always inverted the carrier and the carried. Sometimes quickly, as the quote below shows, and at other times over the length of the novel.*

Jesus carried the cross for many hours, then the cross carried him [xxv]

The power of inversions, and an explication, interrupts the space where the second quote should go. Jorge Luis Borges, as another instantiation of inversion, noted:

> *Why does it disturb us that the map be included in the map and the thousand and one nights in the book of the* Thousand and One Nights? *Why does it disturb us that Don Quixote be a reader of the* Quixote *and Hamlet a spectator of* Hamlet? *I believe I have found the reason: these* **inversions** *suggest that if the characters of the fictional work can be readers or spectators, we, its readers or spectators, can be fictitious. In 1833, Carlyle observed that the history of the universe is an infinite sacred book that all men write and read and try to understand, and in which they are also written. (bold added and italic and normal alphabetical letter 'inverted')* [xxvi] [21]

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[21] A notable inversion, now available, is the film star's voice-over for a cartoon animation. In the moving picture cartoon, the lead actor or personality is billed as star attraction. He or she is never seen in the animations. The star attraction is, however, evidenced both in the film's credits and advertisements. The cartoon character takes on the characteristics of the film star. The transgression

Once again before A wrote the second quote a memory emerged of Tournier's separate reference to the carrying of Christ, in his book **Gemini**, *when a young homosexual is observed by another under what should be an upright, but is now a surpine statue of Christ. The supporter shows clear signs of joy and spent relief. Christ truly carried the sins of man. Everybody seemed to be carrying something. Manuel Delanda carried the message of Deleuze, in the guise of new science, in* **Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy**.

> *In accordance to Chronos, only the present exists in time. Past, present and future are not three dimensions of time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time. In other words, whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a certain extension or duration) belongs to a more vast present which has greater extension or duration. There is always a more vast present which absorbs the past and future.*
>
> *Thus, the relativity of past and future to the present entails a relativity of presents themselves in relation to each other ...Chronos is an encasement, a coiling up of relative presents...*[xxxvii]

A was caught in a dilemma, because in the quote from Delanda's book, the bulk of the paragraph had been typed in normal script. The italics, therefore, stood out to make an emphasis. A didn't know which was the best way to show that the emphasis of Chronos is 'an encasement, a coiling up of relative presents' which had been, and now was, in italics.

All too clearly the text carries and carried (is the sequence disruptive?) throughout. And typographic and chirographic conventions can and should be inverted to change the rhythm and speed of transportation.

In any event, the coupling and meeting that resulted in the foldings and unfoldings of birth, which had been between a psychologist and organizational theorist, and this resulted in discussions about many subjects and things, that ranged in breadth from symbolism arising out of Jungian thought to social constructionism. The initial focus of their processes of discussions had warmed slowly from the banal but in a very short time, with some intimacy, had grown a something much more fruitful. The movement had been musical and, quite wrongly, some archivists had later related their thought to the structures of thought that Herman Hesse had narrated, in **The Glass Bead Game**, [xxxviii] *which seemed to link science and music together in the game. The interesting thing was how many authors had been described as musical in their thoughts and writings. Schopenhauer had argued how music gave access to the noumenal. Music can gain access to the Will, which was the great Other of Arthur Schopenhauer's representation.*[xxxix]

In Robert A. Heinlein's **Stranger in a Strange Land** [xl], *A had found an unusual term Grok (was this how it was spelt?) which conveyed what really felt, looked, smelt,*

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goes beyond being a superordinary radio star / voice but a being beyond the human and advanced upon the Cyborg. Consider, as examples, the films *Shrek 2* and *The Shark's Tale*.

tasted and sounded like knowledge. In the totality of the sense impression accompanying the experience of the word there lay the feeling that around it there was a discipline - yet to be discovered. This sentiment was perhaps what Heinlein was placing before the reader when he described an alien from outer space who Groked the language of the host's environment and world view; then Groked their needs and then even became the champion of all lovers Groking the women. If only A could combine this understanding of non-reductionist ways of living, doing and thinking knowledge with the scholarship of Robert Burton's **Anatomy of Melancholy** [xli], *then there would be something worthwhile to contemplate. Zarathrusta had been another influential work that acted as a guiding principle to arrive at thinking and doing knowledge which was not wholly reactionary.*

It was true (Oh dear! another word that was, even more, questionable after the thought wars) that they had discussed the nature of old and new science and why a doctorate was literally misrepresented because doctoral candidates were still encouraged to use a methodology of the old science and not really encouraged to create a doctorate of philosophy. The supervisory pair were not equally happy to see the (supposed) demise of the old sciences, secretly one of them had developed a fetish about whipping his or her students into submitting their thoughts to the shackles of science and employability. But the other one suspected as much and, at one level, was ok about it; after all you got off on what you could and didn't Klossowski, Bataille and Foucault tell, say and do as much?

At some point in their discussions they discovered they shared a dream which was about A. The dream was not the same because that would not have been the repetition of difference which was their shared dream. In discussing with A this dream, Simon Lilley had suggested that what really occurred was different. The psychologist had been a psychotherapist whose client was an organizational therapist and the therapeutic encounter had revealed the dream. A felt this might also have occurred but would have created a bifurcating series of A2 or perhaps the counter working of Sinister Writings *(Tournier) by the right hand. Simon on finding more about the dream concluded differently and voiced doubts about his own observations on the basis that organizational theorists were not that creative.*

Recalling Deleuze and Guattari, A was not sure whether the success of the game of Go had bettered the territories and forces in play. Or, had the striated state philosophy of chess maintained the spaces and excluded folds? A was unsure now whether there had been a birth, a dream or was it the film **Being John Malkovitch** *where a person and then small group discover that by entering a special small room in an office block they could, for a short time, experience things as if they were the mind and eyes of John Malkovitch. But then he finds out and wants to be inside himself. A wasn't sure whether being inside yourself was better than being outside your head or being in John's head. Intextuality and intersubjectivity were also difficult things to understand. Jefferson Airplane's* **White Rabbit** *comes across from the CD player and interrupts A's thoughts which are about the writing of rhizomatic text, a dream and writers who make very evident streams of consciousness:*

>*One pill makes you larger*
>*And one pill makes you small,*
>*And the one that mother gives you*

Don't do anything at all
Go ask Alice
When she's ten feet tall.
And if you go chasing rabbits
And you know you're going to fall,
Tell 'em hookah smoking catepillar
Has given you the call.
Call Alice
When she was just small.
When the men on the chessboard
Get up and tell you where to go
And you've just had some kind of mushroom
And your mind is moving low.
Go ask Alice
I think she'll know.
When logic and proportion
Have fallen sloppy dead,
And the White Knight is talking backwards
And the red Queen's "off with her head!"
Remember the dormouse said:
"Feed your head. Feed your head. Feed your head."[xlii]

The sound disrupted the visual image and involuntary memory merged appearing as a montage from a previous life or perhaps the moment of birth – an articulation of the Critical Becoming (the Psychologist and Organizational Studies Theorist discussed it seriously afterwards, as if they had shared the dream simultaneously but the latter questioned the desire for such dissimulation and how this had been satisfied by this act of serendipity).

Having gazed at the two quotes, A looked, down from the rooftop, at the massive surface that was the dancing collective shadows. It was the shadow cast by the new academics now emerging on the scene. It seemed to walk or move in a peculiar way, backwards like a film on a video machine which had been set to play and shows fast rewind. The figures who danced erotically about each Other were masked. At first they appeared to be silently and carefully spray-painting graffiti on the walls of the old industrial cottages and outhouses now in ruins. These acts were socially productive, devoted to learning and scholarship emerging from sources which evaded State censorship. They evaded all the disciplines and unproductive forces that surrounded people living outside the internal quadrant and gardens. But a close inspection of what they were doing revealed they were, in fact, dancing so as to mirror the movement of letters which were self-erasing sub-titles, set to create a visual explosion of different sizes, here and there. Then came a lightning flash and each silhouette revealed a face through the slits of their masks. Somehow from a distance it was clear that each self-determined individual had turned their eyes upwards towards a darkened sky. Those who had read about the sign, knew that act was made in the hope of continual (or, should that be continuous?) transgression. For those in the know, Bataille's becoming seemed to be signaled by such eye movements. But then...

A women rushes out after a young boy, seizes him and takes him into her house. The horseman is swathed in a large cloak, which floats around the horse. With a loud beating of hooves he crosses the castle drawbridge. He is now standing, motionless, legs apart, at the entrance to the armoury. The lord's voice is heard.

'Well?'

The horseman opens his cloak. A young boy is clinging to him. He falls, then tries to rise clumsily.

'Well done!' says the voice.[xliii]

The horseman's cloak is all that is left floating amongst the silhouettes. It turns in the wind revealing an inside with words that are copied by A. The label on the inside pocket of the cloak is gold and does not say arrivant but reads ASYLUM. Each letter on the lining has smaller letters written on it, and the style varies as if written by different authors using different keyboards - one QWERTY, the others different, but the pages of the thesis are clear and A now carefully transcribes each letter and sign for you to read...

The compromise extended so far to hygiene and education as instruction is now partnered with other factors, like the bed fellow which goes under the name rationale. And all these factors would seem to belong to the fellowship of the *Apollonian*. An epigram, or a set of quotes, as an adjunct to an outline would not suffice for very long, since at least in a doctoral chapter the *Apollonian* always requires a rationale. The production of a rationale always comes swiftly because it is expected. It is the weapon of choice for combat with the *Dionysian*. It would be a lie, an untruth, to say everyone expects a rationale.

As Clarice Lispector points out, in the opening lines of this arrangement, certain people should or would not be bothered with a rationale. People suffering from hunger have other much more immediate cares than tidy lines of thought. There is, however, an untidy and nasty paradox. Those who often knowingly create the environments, economies and circumstances - out of which there arises hunger, starvation, famines and war appear – are always swift to provide the rationale. Providing the rationale, especially in forms of *'instrumental rationality'* (Bauman), seems to mean you can literally get away with murder; some forms of writing allow far too easily the murder of people and murder of thoughts.

The *Ethics of Writing Otherness* or the *Ethics of thinking the Other* or the *Ethics of becoming* are not de-territorialized by rational, reasoned encasements. But such Ethics are affirmative and ontological for their own sake and just happen to be a strategic alternative to, say, Hardt and Negri's Empire. [22] The point being manufactured here is not to launch a moral counter to the prevailing rationale of the militaristic tendencies of those certain states, which result in starvation, famine and war.

Simply, the point is that there are at least two notions that feed the movement of thought, which seek to draw attention to the *Other*. Somewhat incomprehensibly, one

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[22] However, these representations and repetitions should have surprised none, not one who had kept a close eye on the manifestations emitted from the *Western Military Industrial Complex* (or what Negri and Guattari (1990) might call *Integrated World Capitalism* or what Hardt and Negri (2000) might have named as the *Empire*).

seeks to question *Western Orthodoxy* by using the orthodox strategies, tools and techniques of thought to present counter arguments. The *Other* one is concerned with bringing the *Other of Western Orthodoxy* out for consideration - but *not* by speaking more of the same - albeit from a counter viewpoint.

This vital, productive and affirmative, authentic, alternative *Other* has altogether different strategies. The virile, virulent and virtual *Otherness of Difference* uses whatever is productive and immanent and has no examples, although silence and voids speak and always, but not exclusively, for them. *Otherness* are shadow, stealth strategies to contest, subvert and erode occupied territories that do not only have a regard for the *non-Western*.

The *Other* of *Western* needs velocity, connections, production and constitution or explication before it receives a physical and untimely burial. In a number of places, like an endangered species the possibility of extinction is ever evident. Two are particularly relevant emergencies: Firstly, the emerging which occurs in the restricted wastelands abutting inner cities where mountains of shredded paper from the books now discarded from Civic University libraries create territories of lost knowledge. Such things are not a new occurrence, as Michel Tournier writes in a section entitled 'The Quarry's Quarry' in his story *Gemini,* when the owner of a refuse tip notes of people meeting on such a site:

> my town councillors' indignation becomes altogether righteous when confronted by a heap of books, a whole library of them thrown out higgledy-piggledy. Soon every one of us is deep in one of the poor stained and tattered volumes. Not for long, though, because they turn out to be works of chemistry in Latin, come by what devious paths to end their scholarly lives here? Books sought after by rag and bone men, are not common on garbage dumps and I must say this was my first discovery of the kind. Now the funny thing was that my companions were incensed at the barbarism of people who could simply throw away books, the noblest of things. [xliv]

And then a few pages later in the same narration on the tip;

> Even the old books – come here, surely, not through wrongful eccentricity but as the result of a logical process – are where they belong. They are the inevitable flora of this intelligent midden, these ciphers; they have grown on it like mushrooms, they are sublimated emanations. [xlv]

Now modern times are upon us, new and modern things are still happening. And many can relate to things Tournier writes about like, the fact that the tip is being considered as a space for a New Town: A territory for new hospitals and homes. In the same way, since then and in other countries, New Towns have been built on the burials grounds of old knowledge. So that new people can have a modern education gleaned from new schools and modern libraries. Perhaps it is interesting to note here, not in a footnote, that the quotes were taken from a singularity – a book which had on its cover page a statement acknowledging its withdrawal from stock from an educational establishment. The book was found from an Internet search on Michel Tournier in a secondhand book shop. Possibly when its unpopularity or sales potential

reached a threshold the book would become part of the logical process and would then become a mushroom.

The abandoned shelves and cleared library spaces now manufacture a different discourse, or perhaps the one of the oldest spaces for learning that are concerned with knowledge linked to employability, or more specifically Capitalism. Perhaps, the oldest spaces on the shelves, and unfortunately the areas where dust does not collect, are really those that help drive oppression and exploitation.

There is also extinction in the lands where Western dominance has yet to peak, on the peaks, and in the lost video clips from the mountain regions of Afghanistan. Then another notion arises when thought is examined and considered much more closely. The age of innocence cannot be restored, but the age of the guilty will be reinvented if there is solely a counter rationale for open consideration. If the dialectic works then perhaps it only recreates a noise that drowns difference. For difference and *Otherness* to mark, remove or replace the station of identity, normality and sameness, there must be a process suspicious of those tools that directly and indirectly perpetuate the latter.

Reducing this endeavor, from a consideration of those who rationalize for war, still leaves those who remain content and constant in their desire for an academic rationale. In the paragraphs so far some allowance and a compromise has already been granted to their demands. Remember, there has been a repetition and mimicry of Kafka's *K*. Who are they that demand a rationale to service need and perform for the institutions of academia? They are many. These include legislators of thought, administrators of academic decorum, writers of byelaws (that constrain the by-passes of thought), validators and editorial judges of peers. Why a rationale? A rationale helps define or contain thought whilst decelerating its movement - setting impediments, parameters or boundaries, but giving a transparency to the railed lines of thought. An untimely interruption is required, a fragmentation (or, 'infragmentation') implosive or explosive device to at least bifurcate, or multifurcate, the speed of lines of logic.

So that it is not forgotten, or in case it remains unknown, have the reminder that is the counter to the requests for further rationales: The reminders and counters can be found in Bataille's [xlvi] and Blanchot's [xlvii] oeuvres. These speak respectively to some with the evocation that boundaries are to be transgressed. They remind us there is always 'the step not yet beyond' *(les pas au-dela)*.[23]

Before fragments arise, like a meteor storm with a velocity which sets to break the unnatural re-presentation of thought, let us steady the unfolding and expanding body of text for a moment longer. Reading through a checklist to progress thought, after the provision of a rationale comes the requirements for tests of gravitas which hinge upon whether others can assess - or better still evaluate - the gravity of scholarship, giving due weight to the ink on the pages of the thesis and lack of *alterity*. Quoting popularist writers subtracts from the equation, since the academically known must become more knowable with every excitation of the Citation Index.

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[23] *The Step Not Beyond* or 'Les Pas Au-Dela': The beyond is always illusive because if it was available and defined there would not be the continuous step of beyond to be taken. In another way it has been argued that boundaries are set to be transgressed. Death being either 'the possibility of the impossibility' or 'the impossibility of the possibility' that presents the beyond.

Providing performance indicators for those pursuant of an academic career is a sign of the times and, like 'value for money' an ill-thought out utilitarian utopia that reflects no scales that can be ascribed as nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio. Are we all like Kafka's K? Those who require a reminder of what has been lost with the checklists of academic thought can read how 'We are all colleagues in impotence'.[24] After that, somewhere in an appropriate sequence of things, comes the methodological correctness of it all, where any one of the scientific methods seems always to be the high point of correctness. This scientific correctness has demands to be satisfied, where the organization, or order of things, requires that a pointer reading be found – this then represents the concept to be measured or ranked. So the Citation Index indicates the validity, performability and rightness of thought. Might popularist writer be recognized on equal terms if one were to take citations in the press?

Measurement brings problems. For instance, the diligent scientific researcher has to make allowances for spurious concepts, which might mask the place of the desired indicator. Yet in all this there is an expectation that the philosophy of thought remains pollutant free, with no additives, and certainly no free radicals. The Doctorate of Philosophy can claim the proper positions of signs, words and identities.

> For consciousness, these *abbreviations of signs* (words) are in effect the *sole* vestiges of its continuity, that is to say, they are invented in a sphere where the 'true' and the 'false' necessitate the erroneous representation that something can *endure* or remain *identical* (and thus, that there can be an *agreement* between the *invented signs* and what they are supposed to designate).
> (*italics* original)[xlviii]

The preference for tidiness and transparency requires the setting up of a hypothesis for testing and now, after Popper, one must seek to falsify one's own thoughts. Interesting, because they were true at the time the author thought them. Were thoughts ever his, hers or your own? The '*echo of intertextuality*' [xlix] and inter-subjectivity are apparent to the keen eye, sometimes they are made more obvious. Along with other tests of conformance, it is important that the scholastic order of thought, or the academic orders for thought, be maintained – this seems to be the only real sustainable development of our times. Sustaining the basis of *Western thought*, with its proscribed methodology for theory construction, could become an end in itself.

There are choices. Broadly, the prescribed choices are two in number. Become, or more properly speaking embody, either the being of rationalism or empiricism. There are other couplets that were nearly forgotten. Perhaps, they could be simply conflated so as not to further confuse the matter, in this way it could become sensibly Deduction and Induction, rather than deduction or induction. They could possibly be the two

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[24] Boris Kirchoff cited in Russell Jacoby 'Intellectuals: Inside and Outside the University' in Anthony Smith and Frank Webster, (1997) *The Postmodern University? Contested Visions of Higher Education in Society*. Buckingham: Open University Press. p.67. The whole book gives a further dimension to what has been lost and yet to be regained or gained. Other perspectives take an equally non-orthodox position, see, for instance, the review of the book by Mary Evan (2005) *Killing Thinking: The Death of the Universities* Continuum, where June Edmunds draws attention to how aspects of market culture, audits and assessments are stifling creativity. See 'In the grip of a hostile takeover' in *The Times Higher Education Supplement* 27 May 2005. No. 1,693. p.29.

sides of a coin, rather than two different coins, a *Janus* coin (or a coin and another object in assemblage) since they share the genus *Western Thought.*

> Western thought and theory-building are based upon two types of thinking which the American philosopher William James (1909/96) identified as 'empiricism' and 'rationalism'. Empiricism, in its broadest sense, is the habit of explaining universalities from particulars of experience whilst rationalism is the tendency to explain particulars in terms of universalistic and idealized categories. Knowledge is thus created either by extrapolating from concrete experience or derived from the logical verification of immutable laws and principles. [1]

They are strange creations these subjects who traverse the temporal space of their own life-line reminding themselves that they are, and act, as rationalists or empiricists. Imagine a scene of personalities to be captured on live television: "How dare you, do you know who I am? I am an empiricist and you have affronted me with your representation of my world." How wonderful opposites are to simplify our order, world and life (consider, for instance, how opposites, unintentionally, happen to be used in this thesis). A question arises: How then to attend to becoming or attend to the *Other*?

> The romantic Coleridge is often quoted as saying that everyone is born either a platonist or aristotelian. By Aristotelian he meant the empiricist tendency to rely on personal experience and observations whilst the Platonist is a rationalist who relies on logic and reason to arrive at truth. Logic and reason drives one mode of knowing, experience the other. For James the theoretical knowledge derived from rationalism is knowledge *about* things as distinguished from a 'living or sympathetic acquaintance with them' (1909/96:249). Rational thought deals solely with symbols and concepts and is unable to penetrate the thickness and depth of reality. On the other hand the empiricists repeatedly fail to provide an adequate account of perceived regularities of nature [...] (R)ationalism is thought to be a superior mode of knowing since it appears to provide for a seeming regularity of events by postulating transcendental and immutable causal agencies external to the observed phenomenon under investigation.
> (compression original) [lii]

Should one have been described and compared like so - 'No one ever worked harder to offend a desire for silence.' [liii] - then one is probably hung up about which opposite end of thought to elect. There is no end to the protocol of thought but one must remember to begin with the *raison d'être*. A signifier to police thought/s. Perhaps the real issue was and is not the police but the nature of the signified – thought. Words like the indicators of science are just so many pointer readings. How can one write thought? The movement here is too fast since the writing of thought ought to come later. The legitimate space for text requires necessary and sufficient decorum, linear sequencing; and a recognizable connectedness of the pieces of thought to provide a continuity across the spaces between fragments of thought.

The proper place in the space and time requires that the *raison d'être* be performed. A play of words now might relieve the tension created and oppression felt by such

extraordinary compliance to the formalities of *'Becoming Doctorate'* [25]. A word play on *raison d'être* could become any number of things, but in some ways it is a reason of debt or a reason until death for most in academia. A debt forwarded to the next generation and the next, after an academic's own efforts and performance to conformance sustains the appropriate momentum until death. And in this way, *"Everything human serves as trap for man".* [liii] The reason of their own toils entombed in the care with which they help your travels on the same journey.

It should be remembered that some had asked for the death of reason, or pointed to the invalidity of retaining reason after the manner in which it had been so awfully applied. The *raison d'être* was all. There are different *'strategies of thought'* (Chia). And with these different strategies surely came different *'re-presentations'*, *'techniques'*, *'methods'* or *'processes'* of 'performing' such thought? Well, not really, because for some there are alternative thought strategies that are always only performed in the old, almost timeless, traditional manner because they all rightly know and must obey the demands of a logic, linearity and proper learning.

> What is needed is an expanded perspective which recognizes the significance of organization as a generic process of 'world-making' (Goodman, 1984). Within this expanded understanding, the analyses of the organization of vision and representation, of accepted objects of knowledge, of modes of thought, of language and its effects, of meaning and social practices, of geographical space and time as well as of historical traditions and frames of reference, are recognized as being more appropriate theoretical avenues for extending our understanding of subtle immanence of organizing in all aspects of modernity.[liv]

And with transgressions from orthodox world-making and associated perspectives there can be movement to, and away, from institutional territories. Real, proper material movement that is creative and affirming thought, and probably a *poesis* of the common and uncommon, that is the multiple, or multiples, or legions of desire. The simple and slight oscillation around the aging skeleton of thought, contained within the strata of intra disciplinary performance, and occasional play so easily becomes productive. Transgression gives thought transport:

> No more movement or trajectory, no more *trans* (transport, transposition, transgression, translation, and even transcendence). There would not even be any space for the aporia because of a lack of topographical conditions or, more radically, because of a lack of topographical condition. [lv]

Even those who really had drawn attention to *difference* as the repeating variable opposed to the *repetition of sameness* had, at times, encased, contained or restructured themselves unnecessarily in their *oeuvres*. Clearly, it is presumptuous, and perhaps wrong or bad, to be so easily critical or judgmental of those whose transgressions go beyond the boundaries of the norm, especially those who have created novel and imaginative bodies of affective thought. Although, it must be said, certain things

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[25] Arising from deep conversations with Doctorate Supervisor who conceptualised the method, process, architecture or experiment of thought to be demonstrated as 'Becoming Doctorate' which in hindsight might be connected to the Apprenticeship of Thought of Deleuze and Guattari. See, for example, Michel Hardt (1993) *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship of Thought* London: UCL Press.

could, and can, be seen that remain of a common representative form in the texts of the radical and revolutionary writers. In that sense, this text is no different.

Gibson Burrell [lvi] had written of strategies of thought and then created textual bypasses to oscillate two viewpoints in a contra-flow upon a page. And Jacques Derrida[lvii] has also played with different representations of text on a page. But within each flow a knowable order and representation persisted. Deleuze had, with Guattari, transgressed well in four texts but then had entrapped himself in things like making their rhizomatics in encasements, or looser containers with boundaries – for instance, their thoughts were a 'transcendental materialism' and never a 'transcendental idealism'. But, it has been observed that,

> Deleuze did not regard Kant's move as an error of theoretical judgement. His objection to Kant was primarily political: he regarded Kant's idea of a transcendental and legislative subject as a historical construct derived from the institution of the State, for it is here that conventions of unity, transcendence, and legislation emerge. The human subject interiorizes a court of pure Reason, or conventions and values abstracted from an institutional setting. [lviii]

Surely the *rhizomatics* of thought went where they went, being forever nomadic and capable of forming endless assemblages of thought, transporting themselves from material to ideal horizons, to material territories, thereby making such categories or classifications immaterial, irrelevant or facile?. Many knew the answer to the question: Why was it so difficult to be forever different in thought? There is already a seepage in this text, which has the *Eternal Return* as *repetition of difference,* and this is especially well represented by Pierre Klossowski. [lix] [26]

Let us remember Maurice Blanchot (1992:42)

> Dissymmetry is at work in repetition itself.

There is an intellectualism that pervades most frames of thought and this is no surprise given the constitutions of academic discourse. And there in lies a loss.

> In fact, the unnecessary complexity of the doctrine of analysis (i.e., intellectualism) is only the result of an underlying incommensurability between our simple intuition and the means placed at our disposal for expressing it. We know more than we can tell. But, once we arrive at this intuition and become acquainted with it in its *simple* and pure form we will feels (sic) constrained to change our views about reality. We will see that seemingly intractable problems of philosophy have arisen through our uncritical overreliance on established conceptual notions, such as that of commonsense time and space, to analyse the nature of experience. In this regard the poets and artists have shown us how to think more along these lines. [lx]

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[26] Some like the Doctoral Supervisors knew or suspected as much. Much of this the supervisors understood yet they had requested, albeit slightly apologetically some feel for the 'overall architecture' and 'an irrational need for symmetry'. One had asked, 'Would a stream of consciousness do the work you want to do?'

The *Other* of thought, unfettered thought from the outside - *Dionysian free play*; *Art*; *Poetry*; and, counter-analytic movements - needs to find free expression in form. In short, alternative spaces need to be created to that thought made available from practitioners of *State Philosophy*. Thereby immanence manifests itself, through *becoming a process* which releases from itself and its important connections the possibility of imprisonment and containment. It would seem that in the territories of the *heterotopic* and *hospitable* there are no encasements. Perhaps, there is always only the labyrinth. Some, like Henri Bergson, have sought to address this incommensurablitiy with State Philosophy and 'overreliance on established notions through duration and intuition'.

> What is the aim of art if not to show us, in nature and in the mind, outside and within us, things which did not explicitly strike our senses and our consciousness? The poet and the novelist who express a mood certainly do not create it out of nothing: they would not be understood by us if we did not observe within ourselves, up to a certain point, what they say about others. As they speak, shades of emotion and thought appear to us which might long since have been brought out in us but which remained invisible [...] it is because we had already perceived something of what they show us.
> Bergson quoted in Chia [lxi]

So, in the uncritical movement of thought, there is always easy adherence to those established guiding principles, which avoid first the slight transgression. These are the principles produced, controlled and surveyed from the structurally confined encasements and environments of educational establishments and institutions. Such structures, in themselves, are axiomatically and pragmatically preventative of non-hierarchical thought, which can only ever become a movement or tendency towards becoming flat, processural and connecting.

This structural territory, or terrain, is where the provision and instruction of guidance to manufacture both the profitable and the uncommon - socially unproductive thought - is a diet of the *Western doxa*. The becoming of the *common* and *multitude* being uncommon, where being, same and similar are common and repeated. These inhospitable and disciplined territories are never public spaces and, self-evidently, there is little space for *intuition, initiation or duration* to have their becomings. That much Henri Bergson, Michel Tournier and others understood well.

The *Other* remains hostage unless, of course, writing or other activities effect a release and affirm hospitality to the common and multiple. The *Other* becomes hostage to another's conditions, play, steps, demands, desires or needs et cetera, in the roll out of the *Western doxa* of oppressive, hierarchical thought. But there are helpful strategies to avoid imprisonment and encasements. Tournier has taught the careful and reflective reader to be ever-aware of the opportunity or possibility for *inversion*. His *inversions* are mani*fold*. His texts explicate a range of these folds from *inversions* of a sign, within a paragraph, to the *inversion* of an established myth or story. This strategy has as its thought that rather than hostage, the movement will be one of inversion - from hostage to host to hospitality - as Jacques Derrida exemplifies.

Let us recall Levinas's formulations, which we shall come back to another register: "The subject is a host; then, some years later, "The subject is hostage." [27] [lxii]

Then later in relation to a *Greek Tragedy*, Derrida notes;

So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the hostage – and who really always has been. And the guest, the invited hostage, becomes the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The guest becomes the host's host. The guest (*hôte*) becomes the host (*hôte*) of the host (*hôte*).

These substitutions make everyone into everyone else's hostage. Such are the laws of hospitality. [lxiii]

On this page and in this text, presented before the current active reader, who is host? And who is hostage? Who affords hospitality to whom? The mind of the reader is hospitable to the thoughts of the writer, who in turn accommodates thoughts of the reader. But does an inhospitable or uncharitable thought make the hostage? What inversions or folds make for participation and inclusion? And collectively can reader, writer and bystander be hospitable to each other? They can if they remember *Thou art That*.[28] The writer, reader and bystander, or non-active participant, are affectively and productively creators of a site or sites – a common territory with no property rights – which is first hospitable to the *Other* and, then, or simultaneously, to thought from the East (and South and North). Hospitality which is ever-inclusive and embraces what Hélène Cixous, following Genet, addresses in *Birds, Women and Writing*, as thought from the '*nether realms*':

Writing is not put there, it does not happen out there, it does not come from outside. On the contrary it comes from deep inside. It comes from what Genet calls the 'nether realms', the inferior realms (*domains inferieurs*). We will try to go there for a time since this is where the treasure of writing lies, where it is formed, where it has stayed since the beginning of creation: down below. The name of the place changes according to our writers. Some call it hell: it is of course a good, desirable hell. This is what Clarice calls it: *inferno*. She does not always use the word hell but all kinds of parallel denominations ('*the other side*' cited in *The Stream of Life* is Tsvetaeva's abyss). It is deep in my body, further down behind thought. Thought comes in front of it and closes it like a door. This does not mean it does not think, but it thinks differently from our thinking and speech. Somewhere in the depths of my heart, which is deeper than I think. Somewhere in my stomach, my womb, and if you have not got a womb – there is somewhere 'else'.
(*italics* original) [lxiv]

An interesting and fascinating place these 'nether realms' - some territory that, perhaps, up to now we haven't really known about, although one of the three

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[27] The book is presented so that on the left-hand page Doufourmantelle's commentary is made against the right-hand page of Derrida's pronouncements. These are indeed Sinister Writings.

[28] '**Thou art That**' (Tat Tvam Asi). It is one of the four great Upanishad sayings. Karl Werner (1994) *A Popular Dictionary of Hinduism.* Surrey: Curzon Press Ltd. p.157.

labyrinths have been understood as a directive tool to that place. Certainly, the place does not have the feel of something hierarchical and overly masculine. It is not the place of structures, lines and ownership. It is *heterotopic* and a place with a healthy and abundant dose of *Ying*, But how do we get there? Hélène Cixous continues,

> You must climb down in order to go in the direction of that place. But as I said yesterday, this sort of descent is much more difficult to achieve, much more tiring, much more physically exacting (*physically* because the soul is the body), than climbing up. It is a climb, but it requires the whole strength of everything that is you – which I don't want to call 'the body', since it is more complex than the body – to go through doors, obstacles, walls and distances we have forged to make a life. I know besides that what also prevents us in our society from going there is not our inability – because *all of us* are able – but our cowardice and fear. Our fear, since we know perfectly well that we will reach that dangerous point where those who are excluded live – and we hate exclusion. This is our emotional, our personal, and political problem, the fact that we can't bear exclusion. We are afraid of it, we hate to be separated, that is why we commit all kinds of small crimes, self-denials, and treachery. [lxv]

Certainly, many women could find something that resonates well with them amongst the observations of these female authors. Deleuze and Guattari have stated there is little need to speak of 'becoming male' because the world is already dominated, organized and ordered from that standpoint. Using terms like *'becoming female'* and *'becoming animal'* are not to privilege a gender or *animalness* but the total *Other* which is never afforded to females or animals. So, in some sense, we really should be beyond gender considerations at this point. Hopefully, such things having now dissolved into a greater becoming unencumbered with masculine hang ups and embracing all *Others* but certainly the most obvious *Others*. But let us for the sake of equanimity consider things from a masculine perspective. So for instance, in the quotation there is something insulting, stated far too strongly to be ignored, and certainly something that cannot be ignored by the brace of brave masculine hearts that read and write organizational theory and studies. More widely, few could possibly hold that male academics allow fear of peer rejection, or exclusion generally, to condition the paths that might and should be traveled. Perhaps, too much is being made of the gender thing [29] and it will be shown shortly that *Other* can also resource sentiments about depths. For a moment, let us continue where we were prior to the quotations, in relation to the movement of thought round host and hostage.

This play and reversal of host and guest and hostage is not just a theme taken up by the Greeks but has been strongly exemplified in the works of Pierre Klossowski, but especially in either of his roman à these [30], *Roberte Ce Soir & The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes*. [lxvi]

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[29] Although, not dealt with fully here, this is not a rapid disposal or dismissal of the subjectivity of gender. Some further considerations are, both directly and indirectly, provided in other parts of the thesis. The inclusion of certain feminist writers also gives another voice - as a counter point to who speaks now.

[30] '[roh-mah a tez] the French term for a 'thesis novel' that is, a didactic novel that puts forward an argument or proposes a solution to some politics, morality, or philosophy.' Chris Baldick (1996) *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Literary Terms* Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.191

A makes an attempt to go beyond the working notes for the thesis. The notes indicate that it is to Klossowski's text that Derrida's makes a direct reference (2000: pp. 83, 85, 129 & 131) which states the Laws of Hospitality. There is the reminder to quote from p.83 but this does not happen because the text hosts another thought. For the moment, A thinks what the true multiplicity of A looks like, perhaps A1, A2 et cetera should just become x[As]. This looks too asymmetrical, so with a slight adjustment the hard triangle of A, added to the wonderfully curved and folded letter of S, gives the symmetry of AS. And in this play A is happy and understands the becomings of children that fascinates Tournier. The adult in A is also happy because of the possibilities afforded by the encasement include Arthur Schopenhauer, Asylum Seekers, Anarchists; and then there are the A's from arriviste, arrivant and ASTYLUM. Should there be an ASZERT, to emphasise the general loyal thrust to assert the Other that becomes from the keys of the French type-writer that had the keyboard layout AZERT

> Each of us was thus, in any event, diminished through the fault of the other, and we each inevitably felt that the other, being the cause of that diminution, was *hostile.*
> (*italics* added) [lxvii]

As if this wasn't enough, there were all manner of other things to contend with, like a bringing together of the use of some very important non-representational techniques discovered, recovered or learnt from the writers of *difference*. For example, the use of voids, space, folds and fragments. Within, or outside, all this the letters, marks and words upon the page - without emulating traditional representational being – become, or trace, the flights of thought that provides difference to the hierarchical order, or instruction, placed upon thought, '*seeability*' and '*sayability*'.

> As a matter of fact there is, in principle, nothing hopeless about us, unless it is the utterances to which we are bound by dishonesty. That is why sanity is the lot of those who are most obtuse, *for lucidity destroys one's equilibrium*: it is unhealthy to honestly endure the labours of the mind which incessantly contradict what they have just established. A judgment about life has no meaning except the truth of the one who speaks last, and the mind is at ease only at the moment when everyone is shouting at once and no one can hear a thing because, at that point, the measure of 'what is' has been taken.
> (*italics added*) [lxviii]

But under certain circumstances lucidity is to be enjoined and enjoyed,

> He doesn't know yet that happiness demands lucidity in vice. (143)[lxix]

Or:

> This apparent conformity to a goal is *simply subsequent to this will to power unfolding in every event*; - the becoming-strongest brings with itself organizations that have a certain resemblance to a plan of finality: - the apparent goals are not intentional, but once the supremacy over a lesser power is attained, and the latter is made to work on behalf of the greatest, a

hierarchical order of organization must take on the appearance of an order of means and ends.
(Italics original) [lxx]

So, Bataille reminds us of that which comes with lucidity, whilst Klossowski reminds us that power is all. There is the power to establish order and organization of thoughts possibly, and not exclusively, through oppressive hierarchical arrangements that support, and are supported by, culture. This, then, is the power to discipline and organize thoughts of an individual to conform, indeed, in this way to create his or her subjectivity. Such power establishes and sustains an operating system, hard-wired for conformity which is, sometimes, given a virus to corrupt stabilities that are no longer profitable. Order and organize the identity of another, then organize and order the community's and communities, and so it goes. In such encasements, that are world-making, there cannot be any room for singularities and multiplicities. But fortunately, in the events of multiplicities and singularities, such world-making cannot produce its product.

However, whatever the form of organization and ordering, it always seems to fail.

> Perhaps there is order*ing*, but there is certainly nor order. This is because, as Zygmunt Bauman implies, orders are never complete. Instead they are more or less precarious and partial accomplishments, that may be overturned. They are, in short, better seen as verbs rather than nouns. So it is that the first term is reshaped.

> Second, the idea that there is a *single* order ('the' social order) goes. This is the dream, or the nightmare, of modernity. But there never was a root order, so we have to replace aspirations by concern with plural and incomplete processes of social ordering.

> And, finally, the notion that social ordering is, indeed, simply social also disappears. Rather, I argue, what we call the social is *materially heterogeneous*: talk, bodies, texts, machines, architecture, all of these and many more are <u>implicated</u> in and perform the 'social'. So it is that the question is reshaped. The problem of social order is replaced by a concern with plural processes of socio-technical ordering.
> (*italics* original and underlining added) [lxxi]

The streets of dangerous world-makers have houses with signs: 'no rooms for rhizomes'. So, unproductive power can build houses with no rooms for hospitality. Surely, a singularity maintaining the momentum of productive connectivity provides the becomings of public open spaces, where thoughts can breathe and play? Common territories, where the *becoming-women* and *becoming-animal* never share a concern about the fears which might accompany the reality, and possibility, of a ghetto for the multitude of *Others* that appears. But have no fears this is a very *becoming* street.

There is a compounding difficulty which is how to ensure a speed, connectivity and free-coding, or an assemblage around, at least, several *becomings* : firstly, a becoming post-doctorate. Secondly, a becoming that allows an indeterminate *Other*, who is the

author and commentator that produces and affirms assemblages, which acknowledges thought from the *outside* (see below).

A *trope* is needed, or has to be uncovered, which might appear an unnecessary artifice to accomplish or manufacture, to have any real chance of ensuring an assemblage of these becomings. In some ways, such a *trope* may be no more unnecessary than writing in the first person, or using the creation of the infill substitution, for the fixed identity of the self, in the guise of 'the author". This practice then serves the purpose of representation of objectivity as, in the case, 'the author wishes now to consider'.

On many occasions but especially in one text, Foucault [lxxii] has taught us to be very cautious about stabilizing the author in a fixed identity with borders. [31] So, in place of the author comes the *arrivant*. But one cannot anticipate the event or person of the *arrivant*. And, it is not the opposite of the author, as in the negative of a fixed identity, but defies identification. It could be the *Absolute Other* of the author, or any other, as supposed in the undefined becoming of space and temporality that is not all that is represented as author in time and space. Perhaps, it is the *eternal return of difference* (Klossowski [lxxiii], Deleuze [lxxiv] after Nietzsche [lxxv]).

> The new *arrivant,* this word can, indeed, mean the neutrality of *that which* arrives, but also the singularity of *who* arrives, he or she who comes, coming to be where s/he was not expected, where one was awaiting him or her, without expecting *it* ['*s'y* attendre], without knowing what or whom to expect, what or whom I am waiting for - and such is hospitality itself, hospitality toward the event. One does not expect the event of whatever, of whatever comes, arrives, and crosses the threshold – the immigrant, the emigrant, the guest, or the stranger. But if the new *arrivant* who arrives is new, one must expect – without waiting for him or her, without expecting it – that he does not simply cross the threshold, whose possibility he brings to light before one even knows whether there has been an invitation, a nomination, or a promise[...]
> (*italics* original) [lxxvi]

This *arrivant* should be welcomed. Unfettered *hospitality* abounds in the openness of public and common territories. It flourishes where desire and participation have overcome the barriers that might normally restrict minds, texts and space. There is no, or little, need of the mental hospital or hospice in the boundless and borderless voids available for hospitality. It is in those nether realms that the 'uncarved block' (see Appendices) or / and the *arrivant* are always welcomed and exclusion as a term is washed away. The asylum seeker never has need of asylum, nor seeks it, in that place.

Lispector writes about a typist, an *antiheroine* from the backstreets, but her story is narrated by a man. Throughout the story various tropes and devices are used to dissimulate:

> She had no idea how to cope with life and she was only vaguely aware of her own inner emptiness. Were she capable of explaining herself, she might

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[31] And Roland Barthes (1968) has written about *The Death of the Author* where the author's privileges as the purveyor of meaning has also lost its currency.

confide: the world stands outside me. I stand outside myself. (it's going to be difficult to tell this story. Even though I have nothing to do with the girl, I shall have to write everything through her, trapped as I am by my own fears. The facts are sonorous but *among the facts there is a murmuring. It is the murmuring that frightens me)*
(*italics* added) [lxxvii]

She believed in everything that existed and in everything non-existent as well. But she didn't know how to embellish reality. For her, reality was too enormous to grasp. Besides the word *reality* meant nothing to her. Nor to me, dear God.
(*italics* original) [lxxviii]

Perhaps I could enhance this story if I were to introduce some difficult technical terms? But that is the problem: *this story has no technique, not even in matters of style.* It has been written at random. Nothing would persuade me to contaminate with brilliant, mendacious words, a life as frugal as that of my typist. During the day, like everyone else, I make gestures that are unobserved even by me. One of my most unobserved gestures is this story, which comes out as it will, independent of me.
(*italics* added) [lxxix]

I am about to begin in the middle. [lxxx]

So, in the middle, one can embrace an *arrivant* that is *Other* than oneself, indeed *Other* than yourself and his and herself. Then performing a movement the *Sanskrit* '*Thou art that*' becomes '*Thou art the arrivant*'. And Rimbaud has already stated 'I am another.' The arrival of the *arrivant* may make him or herself felt, first, by a murmur. The reality of the *arrivant* is difference and difference is forever different. The will and desire, that comes then, are productive of a friendship of thought of difference but it cannot be replicable to a technique. The *arrivant* and the space of hospitality are always the process of the 'uncarved block' that changes. It, however, never becomes other than itself and through itself though, somewhat paradoxically, it is always the *Other* and thus escapes definition and the assignment of easily assigned attributes. The *arrivant*, forever singular and multiple, always there and not yet arrived and always going but not yet gone. An *Aporia,* but never a contradiction. Always *Ying* becoming *Yang* in one event, with a flow towards the *North, South, West* and *East,* whilst the *Yang* becomes *Ying* in the *Other* remaining dimensions of space and time - fore and aft to complete an occupation of all dimensions. There is no easy physics to be applied here since the particle waves good bye and becomes by the way a wave - in the disharmony of the harmonics of a productive wave becoming material.

NOCTURNAL SPACE

Lispector begins in the middle, which is the rightful place to start, and a later centrality of a middle of thought, which is no longer a chapter, will deal with this matter in much more detail. But let the multiplicity, which is now an event of text being written and read, give some more immediate consideration to a certain type of space.

"It's a kind of negative space – a space of 'negative capability' – which seems to deny the world of fact or reason, of specific answers, and which even resists representation (Scott,1969). It's a space that is *negative* in a special sense – a space of uncertainty, mystery, doubt, where human *being* is that process of *unfinished becoming* highlighted by Deleuze (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987). It's a space that Foucault termed the 'outside' of thought, or the 'unthought', which lies hauntingly beyond and between the representations that modern knowledge has constructed to reassure us that we exist in a secure and dependable world – those representations constructed by modern human sciences (sociology, psychology, psychiatry, etc.) that persuade us there *are* the *facts* of 'society', 'individuals', 'organizations', 'human minds', 'mental health', etc."
(*italics* original)[lxxxi]

Can becoming finish? The reality of becoming is productive and never terminates as such, finding a new flow of becomings. Robert Cooper continues, showing the related genealogy of space to another French writer of difference, Maurice Blanchot.

It is the space that Foucault borrowed from Maurice Blanchot's (1982) 'space of literature' – a space that is always *lateral* to the divided, disciplined spaces of conventional representation, a negative space of pure deferral, a bottomless, infinite void that human work continually attempts to fill in. For Blanchot, it was a space where, strangely, science and literature came together, or, perhaps more accurately, where there was no difference. A sacred space. Blanchot distinguished his negative space from the positive spaces of everyday life, employing two fundamentally different interpretations of the concept of 'work'.
(*italics* original) [lxxxii]

Felix Guattari has helpfully made much of the term *'transversal'* as an *ontological* vehicle (see, for instance, Genosko [lxxxiii]). This is the diagonal movements between spaces creating productive assemblages which go beyond labour. Likewise, there is a similar sounding word to bring attention to other connected and disconnected aspects.

The work of the conventional world, the work of modern organizations, he called *le travail* by which he meant labour, purposeful action, productive organization, all with their senses of getting somewhere, of accomplishing goals. The work of negative space he called *l'oeuvre*, a form of work which leads nowhere, in which the human agent gives itself up to the void of 'unthought', to a space that resists purpose and production. [lxxxiv]

Michel Foucault writes about Maurice Blanchot's work and states;

Attraction is no doubt for Blanchot what desire is for Sade, force for Nietzsche, the materiality of thought for Artaud, and transgression for Bataille: the pure, most naked, experience of the outside. It is necessary to be clear about what the word designates: attraction, as Blanchot means it, does not depend on any charm. Nor does it break one's solitude, or found any positive communication. To be attracted is not to be beckoned by the allure of the outside; rather, it is to experience in emptiness and destitution the presence of

the outside and, tied to that presence, the fact that one is irremediably outside the outside. Far from calling on one interiority to draw close to another, attraction makes it imperiously manifest that the outside is there, open, without intimacy, without protection or retention(how could it have any when it has no interiority, and instead, infinitely unfolds outside any enclosure?), but that one cannot gain access to that opening because the outside never yields its essence. [lxxxv]

The *'outside is there without intimacy'*. It is an outside that stretches to - and beyond - its extreme limits. A *transgression of hospitality* arrives at the point of the reality of hospitality where the *arrivant, the Eternal Return* and *'Thou art that'* resonate and grow, in a series of waves that amplify an affirmation of each other and the *Other* socially, in an uncommon common plateau of residence – *Absolute Hospitality*. This is a space or factory where Artaud's *Theatre of Cruelty* shows, or is produced, every day and night.

Blanchot has night, death and indeterminancy as motives of an *Otherness* that remain, forever, incapable of being written or being said. It is not visible. Yet in some ways Blanchot's use of space and text conveys aspects of it. Many of these things are dealt with by Hill who notes, in contrasting **Thomas the Obscure** to another of Blanchot's novels, that it:

> [M]ade only minimal concessions to the demands for either plot or character. But despite the profound differences between them, *La Nausee* and *Thomas l'Obscur* share a similar objective, which is that of pursuing within fiction a project that has all the signs of a foundational philosophical enterprise. [lxxxvi]

Here, then, is another example of a roman à these.

> What Blanchot's novel suggests is that , if the attempt is made in language of fiction to grasp being itself, so to speak, then being turns out necessarily to be always inhabited – and thereby dissolved – by alterity, loss of origin, infinite repetition, absence, nothingness, the impossibility both beginning and ending. By a dizzying and outrageous paradox, being comes to function like an instantiation of its own groundless absence. [lxxxvii]

So an infinite repetition dissolves 'by alterity, loss of origin, infinite repetition, absence, nothingness, the impossibility both beginning and ending'. And, so a finite repetition 'by alterity, loss of origin, infinite repetition, absence, nothingness, the impossibility both beginning and ending'. The middle is then established 'by alterity, loss of origin, infinite repetition, absence, nothingness, the impossibility both beginning and ending'. Much like a gramophone record which has the sound pickup needle stuck in a groove, the repetition disrupts and usurps the habits of existence that repeat less powerfully, lacking real *Otherness*. Groundlessness can be repeated and respected elsewhere, outside the novel, and there massiveness can invade spaces of philosophy and other organizations of thought.

Likewise, Georges Bataille writes,

I understood then that I was entering, that I had entered, the region that silence alone (since it is possible, in silence, to introduce a momentary suspension) has ridiculous power to evoke.[lxxxviii]

Hill argues "*Thomas l'Obscur* is a novel of the impenetrability of night 'itself.'" And taking an extract from the English translation (Hill always prefers the original French which makes it difficult for those who don't read French) the weight of the night can be felt and the resonances between nocturnal night and absolute night are suggested. [lxxxix] And, in Blanchot there is;

> Absolute night where there were no longer any contradictory terms, where those who suffered were happy, where white found common substance with black. And yet, night without confusion, without monsters, before which, without closing her eyes, she found her personal night, the one which her eyelids habitually created for her as they closed. Fully conscious, full of clarity, she felt her night join the core of her being, no longer needing to pass before a bitter and tormented soul to arrive at peace. [xc]

Maurice Blanchot's night is 'without monsters'. It is the night that cannot feed the monsters of capitalism, equivalence, identity, oppression and exploitation. It is for that reason the night should be welcomed, but more so, if the social is to ever become productive and multitudinal.

Later in his text, Blanchot makes silence vocal:

> At the moment everything was being destroyed she created that which was most difficult; she had not drawn something out of nothing (a meaningless act), but given to nothing, in its form of nothing, a form of something. The act of not seeing had now its integral eye. The silence, the real silence, the one which is not composed of silenced words, of possible thoughts, had a voice. Her face, more beautiful from one instant to the next, was constructing her absence. There was not a single part of her which was still the prop of any sort of reality. It was then, when her story and the story of her death had faded together and there was no one left in the world to name Anne, that she attained the moment of immortality in nothingness, in which what has ceased to be enters into a thoughtless dream. It was truly night. [xci]

The real silence attracts the *Other*, the *arrivant,* the multiplicity of difference and the totality of the *Otherness* which is replicated in the *Eternal Return*, dissolving any semblance of identity, sameness or similarity. However many words or letters are written, or thought, they cannot express the *Otherness* so available through silence.

In Paul de Man's phrase, allegory supplies here only the story of an 'impossibility of reading'; it operates not as a trope of self-reflexive interiorisation or self-representation but as a figure of exposure to what Foucault, glossing one of Blanchot's later essays on Kafka, terms the outside, that alterity that can never be included within conceptual thought because, like the night before night of *Thomas l'Obscur*, it is what constitutes the unspeakable condition of thought. [xcii]

If the alterity can never be included within conceptual thought then, at a stroke, any such other thought is revealed naked and lacking. But desire and will know no lack, however, for Bataille:

> The fascination of sleep, which pits the lure of the void against the obstinacy of an impotent will, is an added obstacle that life has never surmounted. [xciii]

Poesis and *vitality* make the night emerge. In the spaces on and between pages, in the spaces between discussions, others have given thought to the night. The absolute *Otherness* of the alterity ought not to frighten, too easily, because certain agitations of thought can, at least, be welcomed to shatter the non-speeds and habits of normality.

> *What is this "night" from whose depths a philosophical utterance is outlined? In his very fine book,* The Heretical Essays *, published secretly in Prague, Jan Patocka put night, which should here be understood as an ontological figure, in opposition to the values of the day. "Man is meant to let grow in him what provokes anxiety, what is unreconciled, what is enigmatic, what ordinary life turns away from so as to get to the present agenda." Patocka interpreted the crisis of the modern world and the decline of Europe in terms of the totalitarianism of everyday knowledge. To reason on the basis of the values of the day is to be prompted by the wish to define and subjugate in order to attain a quantifiable knowledge pledged to technological values. If we separate darkness from clarity, we will suffer its ravages, Patocka predicted; what we should rather be doing is taking our attention right up to the edge of darkness. Interpreting clarity in terms of its belonging to night as well is also, I think, one of the paths that Derrida's reflections have opened up.*
> (*italics* original) [xciv]

So Czechoslovakian writers add weight to the French Thinkers' discourse on night. For the historian, it should be remembered that Prague, East of France, was, for a number of years, the middle ground, or centre of politics and intrigue, because many émigrés and nomads met there. It was a territory of *Otherness*. A singularity where a nation, or sometimes State, gave hospitality to the nomads and asylum seekers.

PHORIA

Michel Tournier, in almost all of his texts, makes specific and frequent reference to the term *'Phoria'* or *'Phoric'*. For him, *phoria* is the essential part of a novel.[xcv] Throughout his novels, Tournier, explicitly and implicitly, brings the concept to the fore, for the reader to consider; for example, through the movement of the whole narrative, the encasements of stories within the story and the emergence of names and other signs. The multiple and singular metaphors add to this set, which seeks to

transport thought to an elsewhere which is, more often than not, associated with the *Other*. The movement is very frequently from West to East. In his autobiography, Tournier writes of *phoria,*

> The word comes from the Greek *phoreo* (to carry), a root that can be found in such words as doryphorus (spear carrier), euphoric (literally bearing well), and Christopher (bearer of Christ).
> *(italic* original) [xcvi]

He then considers the deed of heroism as *phoric*. He digresses to illuminate the equivocal nature of the *phoric* which is described as;

> [S]ecretly possessed by the inversion of malign and benign, a mysterious operation which, without causing any apparent change in the nature of a person or thing, alters its *value*, putting less where there was more and more where there was less. Thus the good giant who becomes a beast in order to save a small child is not so far from the predatory hunter who devours children.
> (*italics* original) [xcvii]

Out of the movement and shape-shifting of this inverting flow there comes a chance for some dualities or binaries to be played out and considered: Is it not dissimilar to the difference expressed in the pear or tear drops which have been already been considered in this text? In fact, the inversion parallels the movement made productive in the temporary or putative architecture of *Ying* and *Yang* which has governed this middle of thought and governs the whole rhizomatics of connected middles of thought within the thesis. Tournier continues;

> All the mystery and profundity of phoria lies in this ambiguity. Serve and subjugate, love and kill. Such is the terrifying dialect which governs the lives of so many couples: the kept women, the pimp, the gigolo, the mother who abuses her stunted child...

In a section of the book, **Michel Tournier and the Metaphor of Fiction**, entitled 'Phorie and Meta-phorie', Platten makes some important observations:

> A feeling of euphoria accompanies the phoric act.

> The phoric act necessarily involves an object which is carried, 'porté' in the most physical sense of the word, and at the same time taken away 'emporté'.

> at its root it is a brute concept imbibing the warmth of human contact. As such *la phorie* connotes the close proximity of author and reader, each of whom is grappling with the same set of rules, structures and meanings articulated through the single organ of the text

> *La phorie* signifies the carriage of something, *la méta-phorie* the carriage of meaning.
> (*italics* original) [xcviii]

This rhizome, middle, thesis, plateau or aggregation of thought has, therefore, as one singularity - or several singularities of the multiplicity of becomings - the act of carrying a something in order to transport *Otherness*. Hopefully, in that movement, the *phoric* might yield, or produce, an inversion of some dualities, which then create or release forces to germinate other things. Does the thesis carry *Otherness* and difference? Or, is the transport to *Otherness* through an assortment of acts like encasements? Or, is it through a *process* which has the *arrivant* as either subject, or object, or both? Perhaps, the *apotheosis* sought is through a carriage and thus it becomes '*apotheophoric*'. It will be shown, shortly, that the bearer carries hospitality to allow the ubiquity of the difference which is the *arrivant*.

In the *phoric* of this thesis, rhizome or centre of thought, there is an architecture and symmetry. Architecture is, often, about considerations of bearing/ carrying capacities, textures and bringing together fragments. As one of its earliest features, it had to be necessary and sufficient to ensure that man could create night when it was day and now, this is inverted, the home is well-lighted and warm at night. The inversion to night is seen in the day of man's existence.

Symmetry is frequently outlined and questioned by Tournier through the articulation of his text around twins, no more so than in *Gemini*. In that text, Tournier sympathetically brings out the germinal nature of twinship. He makes reference to this in the manner of how the two characters sleep in the form of 69. But other aspects bring out the almost opposite characteristics of the twins – one wishing to remain a twin and the other not. This is their true symmetry and the one shared in this text.

DER PROZEZZ

The Trial written by Kafka, prior to translation, has the title *Der Prozezz*. And process working and philosophy, broadly a *processural* emphasis, are important. It becomes a fairly adequate counterpoise and material viewpoint to those structural and hierarchical forces that seek to dominate discourse. It is a very different viewpoint. It can, sometimes, capture the flow that is life and thought. Although the structures of text, grammar and language often create unnecessary hurdles that have to be transgressed in order to allow the flow of productive processes. Within the introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's *Kafka A Minor Literature*, the translator, Dana Polan, notes;

> For example, while Deleuze and Guattari initially seem to be getting at something systematic, that is, fixed and rationalized, in a distinction between *procés* (which we might want to translate not only as "process" but also as "trial", as in the French title for Kafka's *The Trial*, a kind of processing) and *processus* (which we might translate as "procedures"), the boundaries between the two give way.

This emphasis is very important and should not to be forgotten, since it is so very to easy to revert to the disciplines, which follow a life that has been over-determined, educated and trained to respect structures and territories.

> But a kind of sliding contagion occurs, and through the course of the book,

each term comes to refer to elements within the original territorial space of the other term. So, to a large extent, the translation lets the words slide – *procés* and *processus* interpenetrate, each engaging in unsystematic war-machine attacks on the other.

(*italics* original) [xcix]

HOSPITALITY

In his roman à these Pierre Klossowski, fairly consistently deals with conceptual manoeuvres around the thinking, actions and events associated with hospitality. Jacques Derrida, in his text, make much of the concept of hospitality in relation to 'cosmopolitan rights' and this is how a place, a home, a text could be considered.

Derrida writes, in the notes to accompany the text of *Aporias*, and taking his theme from Kant:

> The *hospitalitas* should give the foreigner the right not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives on the other's territory. But if one has the right to send the foreigner back, it is on the condition that this expulsion not rush him toward his ruin. And as long as he "stays quietly in his place,"one should not treat him as an enemy. But if the foreigner only has, to be sure, the *right to visit* and not that of *residence*, the right to visit is to be extended to all mankind. [c]

Then Derrida poses the question "Why?" and makes an extremely strong point which might have a particular resonance in the duration of this thesis.

A wished to digress for a moment, before writing the consideration that Derrida gave as his own answer to the question. A number of viewpoints need to be shared to re-inforce critical aspects of the Derrida quotations.

Firstly, hospitality can be seen as a current ethical dilemma for the East and West. In one sense the behaviour of a small nation offering hospitality to alleged terrorists is, for those who still care to judge, an ethical and moral counterpoint to the swift reprisals, war-mongering and imperialism of the West for the same nation's failure to hand over the alleged terrorists. For this failure the hosts suffered collateral damage.

Secondly and quite interestingly, this showed the difference in the conceptualization of host and hospitality, where a country suffered the ravages of war rather than surrendering its guest. In contrast the West, especially in Europe, has taken the threat of terrorism as a suitable reason to rekindle the bogeymen of the asylum seeker, who more than ever have become the unwanted guest.

Both of these points have an exteriority to this thesis. These have been made to highlight the problematics of hospitality when consideration is made of the third point. Care is needed both in designing, writing and submitting a thesis on the one hand, or on the other hand in pursing any other form of academic endeavour, where standing before one's peers is an important part of the process. All too often the 'product' becomes part of a reductionist knowledge process, simply because meaning-shapers or formers are unable to act as a host in their discipline and

hospitality is, therefore, denied. Look at the words 'Playing host to ideas' and consider this epistemological space, as well as physical space, now in Derrida's answer. The Western conceptualization of all territories ranging from the spaces for thought and the spaces for living, is anathema to many.

A continued with the thesis and Derrida's response to his or her own question.

> Because this right is based upon the 'right of communal possession of the surface of the earth." The earth being spherical, infinite dispersion is excluded as a possibility. No one has originally more right to occupy territory than anyone else, and people must indeed live alongside one another. [ci]

Dufourmantelle in her invitation for a response from Derrida comments;

> *Now hospitality can only be offered here and now, someplace. Hospitality gives as unthought, in its "night," this difficult, ambivalent relation to place. As though the place in question in hospitality were a place originally belonging to neither host nor guest, but to the gesture by which one of them* welcomes the other – *even and above all if he is himself without a dwelling from which this welcome could be conceived.*
> (*italics* original and normal text added) [cii] [32]

No one has the right of ownership. Who owns Luther Blissett? But Luther Blisset [ciii] thinks and writes:

> While they were carrying him away on the cart you could still hear him shouting, '*Omnia sunt communia*!'
> 'And what the fuck does that mean?'
> 'Everything belongs to everyone.'
> 'Shit. What a man! And you know Latin?'
> He sneers. I lower my eyes.

Ann Dourourmantelle promulgates a nomadic line of thought.

> I would like to salute the audacity that leads utterances to make us desert those dwellings of the mind where reason lives as master, when for an instance astonishment makes reason a guest.[civ]

Tournier reminds us, in his novel *The Ogre*, of the nomad when his key character Abel Tiffauges, considers his first name.

> I came across the lines in the Bible telling of the first murder in human history. Abel was a keeper of sheep, Cain a tiller of ground. That is, the first was a nomad. And the second a sedentary. The quarrel of Cain and Abel has gone on from generation to generation, from the beginning of time down to our own day, as the atavistic opposition between nomads and sedentaries, or more exactly the persistent persecution of the first by the second. And this

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[32] The book is presented to the reader, so that on the left-hand page Doufourmantelle's commentary is made in italics, against the right-hand page of Derrida's pronouncements.

hatred is far from extinct. It survives in the infamous and degrading regulations imposed on gypsies, treated as if they were criminals, and flaunts itself on the outskirts of villages with the sign telling them to 'move on.' [cv]

Tournier highlights the problem of finding hospitality for Abel when there are Cains all about and this type of theme crops up in many of his novels.

There are some differences in hospitality.

[T]he difference, one of subtle and sometimes ungraspable differences between the foreigner and the absolute other is that the latter cannot have a name or family name; the absolute or unconditional hospitality I would like to offer him or her presupposes a break with hospitality in the ordinary sense, with conditional hospitality, with the right or pact of hospitality...To put it in different terms, absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. [cvi]

Returning now to the concept of the *arrivant* or, more precisely, what Derrida has termed the *absolute arrivant*.

He surprises the host – who is not yet the host or an inviting power – enough to call into question, to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate, all distinctive signs of prior identity, beginning with the border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language, nations, families and genealogies. The absolute *arrivant* does not yet have a name or an identity. It is not an invader or an occupier, nor is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one. [cvii]

It is not even a foreigner identified as a member of a foreign, determined community. Since *arrivant* does not have an identity yet, its place of arrival is also de-identified: one does not yet know or one no longer knows which is the country, the place, the nation, the family, the language, and the home in general which welcomes the absolute *arrivant*. This absolute *arrivant* as such is, however, not an intruder, or a colonizer, because invasion presupposes some self-identity for the aggressor and for the victim. Nor is the *arrivant* a legislator or the discoverer of a promised land. As disarmed as a newly born child, it no more commands than is commanded by the memory of some originary event [...] [cviii]

There is no knowledge that can stabilize the singularity of the materializing person, or event, that is the shadow of the *arrivant*. There is always only the escape, the line of flight, the not-yet and all the other movements that evade any capture for the sake of identity and identification. There is only the certainty of the impossibility of the possibility of the *arrivant*. And there is much more to this thought, there in the shadows cast by the shadow – that might very well be the purest act of reflexivity – there is the revealed the singularity that is not the *Other* but *Thou*. This can be

understood as an impossibility of the possibility of knowing the thing that is our self. Others, including Blanchot have understood this becoming, and he puts it well when he refuses the first person singular and Cartesian Subject,

I do not know; there is no "I" to know. [cix]

Lispector similarly writes an opposition to the all powerful 'I';

> The typist lived in a kind of limbo, *hovering* between heaven and hell. She had never given any thought to the concept: 'I am, therefore, I am.' I suspect that she felt she had no right to do so, being a mere accident of nature. A foetus wrapped up in newspaper and on to a rubbish dump.
> (*italics* added) [cx]

PARRHESIA

Remember much earlier in this middle of thought, Hélène Cixous drew attention to the 'nether realms' and suggested that it was a place avoided by those with fear. Likewise, Michel Foucault by his erudition commands attention to *Fearless Speech*, which is text around frankness of speaking the truth, which in Greek is known as *Parrhesia*. Foucault takes various angles around the word and details insights around its development, particularly in relation to frankness, truth, duty, danger and criticism. Most times, however, there is implicit a risk of sorts to the speaker.

> *[P]arrhesia* is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain relationship to himself or other people through criticism of other people (self-criticism or criticism of other people) and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, *parrhesia* is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In *parrhesia*, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.
> (*italics* original) [cxi]

It would, then, seem that there is a tremendous affinity in the infinite combinations which bring together *parrhesia*, access to secret or other places, *arrivant* and hospitality. The unreal world-making, organization or ordering, can be disrupted through *parrhesia* to allow the singular and combined *becoming of hospitality and arrivant* into the minds, hearts, homes, streets, localities, universities, continents, worlds and universes. These become spaces for the multitude who are never and can never be the same. Incapable of solidification around a definition they are the event or *hacceity*.

A fold, folding or unfolding of hospitality creates a positive relationship with the *arrivant* when the speed, phasing and viscosity of the encounter are sympathetic. In these instances, they become commonly productive. Then there is an accommodation

of any directional change of one to the other or *Others*. All this cannot occur where an organization has set values; so no institution can ever accommodate the positive and affirmative relationships of hospitality to *arrivant* (so, the question: can universities accept the *arrivant*?) There can be no *Ethic or Principle of Hospitality* or *Arrivant*, although Klossowski and Derrida have provided some *Laws of Hospitality*. The *poesis* of the ethic of the *arrivant* or hospitality is *parrhesia* of the *Other*.

The obvious dangers for monsters who shouldn't be fed is the material disruption, which comes from these considerations. The disruption is material to the pattern, delivery and production of their diet of identity, same, similar and equivalence. They will starve without the simplified carbohydrates and proteins of the habitual eruption of identity, same, similar and equivalent. The equivalence of money is obvious, but not so obvious is the equivalence of time. Clearly, the equivalence of labour time for capitalism is evident, but there is also the equivalence of the spaces and paces in text which disciplines sometimes slowly, often quickly and completely. Phases and constancy of the velocity of textual reading and writing require disruption if difference is to breathe. Avoidance of totalities and celebration of fragmentation then starts to form the science of the multiple.

For these reasons, strategies of writing and reading are needed. Nietzsche learnt from his discipline of Philology certain methods of movement.

> More than anything it is an art that teaches one to read well, which consists in reading slowly and deeply, and with the aid of which one looks and sees in a certain and specific manner: cautiously, observantly, 'with doors left open' and 'with delicate eyes and fingers'. Nietzsche believes that reading should be an art, for which rumination is required. [cxii]

Reading carefully in this manner ought to release more radical perspectives but, if in doubt, remember the monsters. Speak about the monsters. There are, for instance, the monsters of the *Empire*.

> On one face, Empire spreads globally its networks of hierarchies and divisions that maintain order through new mechanisms of control and conflict. [cxiii]

How or who can stop this spread? It seems it is the master or mistress of *bricolage* and the juggler of fragments.

> *The political times and modes of production have changed. We have to construct a new figure of the David, the multitude as champion of asymmetrical combat, immaterial workers who become new combatants, cosmopolitan bricoleurs*[33] *of resistance and cooperation. These are the ones who can throw the surplus of their knowledge and skills into the construction of a common struggle against imperial power. This is the real patriotism of those with no nations. More than ever this patriotism takes shape in the conspiracy of the many, moving towards decisions through the common desire of the multitude. (italics original)* [cxiv]

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[33] Their footnote reference, 'A bricoleur is someone who constructs by piecing things together ad hoc, something like a handyman' Hardt and Negri (2004:50)

So 'cosmopolitan bricoleurs of resistance and cooperation' who 'construct by piecing things together ad hoc' might help with the common struggle. So too might the immaterial worker. Surely, the exemplar is the 'organic intellectual' of the academic? Who, through *parrhesia*, might make the common potential constitutionally democratic and participative (remember in Western democracies there is, more often than not, only the roll out of indirect or representational democracy). Are then the sciences or strategies of the *bricoleur*, the processes of a knowledgeable multitude? The 'parts' are, perhaps, always the 'uncarved block' and always fragmentary.

FRAGMENTS

There are many fragments. There are far too many fragments to make sensible. In all senses, they make themselves, by their numbers and divisions and multiplications. They are incapable of being coherently commented upon. There are an infinite myriad of fragments, and in their multiplicity they are always defeating, or at least avoiding, any capture by the senses or ordering through definition.

Simple fragments abound, like the space found first in any of the three, or more, horizontal lines that represents the *Ying*. This is can be contrasted or compared to what appears, at first sight, to be the solidity of the solid line of *Yang* but even here there are spaces between the horizontal lines. Those who really understand these things, know there is both a space and tightness between the *Ying* and the *Yang*. Consider their other representational forms, where there is always the very tiny circle of *Ying* within the 'pear drop' of *Yang*. And, quite differently, the tiny circle of *Yang* sits in the 'tear' of *Ying*. There are also the fragments of difference, which were not present initially, that have a repetition in the Eternal Return. There are also the fragments between *Thou and That*. There are endless repetitions of difference, sometimes recognized in an event within the continuous flow of fragments and disrupted patterns. There are the fragments that comprise a singularity in the event and, then, the fragments that make up the multiplicity. Everywhere, fragments owned by none, despite the whole artificially constructed patterns to own everyone.

> The fragmentary expresses itself best, perhaps, in a language that does not recognize it. Fragmentary: meaning neither the fragment, part of a whole, nor fragmentary in itself. The aphorism, the proverb, maxim, citation, thoughts, themes - verbal cells in being further removed than the infinitely continuous discourse whose content is "its own continuity", continuity that is assured of itself only in giving itself as circular and, by this turn, submitting itself to the preliminary of return whose law is outside, which outside is outside the law. [cxv]

In a book that often deals with fragments, written in a fragmentary style, captured by words on a page on fragments, there is a large fragment on the fragmentary:

> Writing is not destined to leave traces, *but to erase*, by traces, all traces, to disappear in fragmentary spaces of writing, more definitely than one disappears in the tomb, or again, *to destroy, to destroy invisibly, without uproar of destruction.*
> (*italics* added) [cxvi]

Writing according to the fragmentary invisibly destroys surface and depth, real and possible, above and below, manifest and hidden. There is no hidden disclosure that the apparent discourse would preserve, not even an open plurality of significations awaiting interpretative reading. To write at the level of incessant murmur is to expose oneself to the decision of lack that marks itself only by a surplus without place, impossible to put in place, to distribute in the thoughts, words and books. [cxvii]

The fragmentary not being experience, not being form or subject of writing, not being another order in comparison to the order of the book, even as a passage to disorder; still, obscure demand under the attraction of which the space of writing gives place to marks or points of singularity through which pass multiple (irregular) lines that make the points disappear as unique even in maintaining them in a position of singularity, so that a quasi-infinite multiplicity of crossings can repeat itself in it, without the repetition suppressing the mark of singularity nor dissolving this in identity. [cxviii]

The fragmentary makes movement across the surfaces of territories and the travel or transport, which involves depths, is not a likely point for any journey. Yet, depths are the territory of Western being and through their exploration mostly prevent, by freezing thought within the structures created, any becomings. As Michel Tournier's Robinson Crusoe notes of surfaces and depths:

> [T]he notion of *depth*, which I never troubled to scrutinize when using it in such expressions as 'a deep thinker' or 'a deep love'. It is a strange prejudice which sets a higher value on depth than on breadth, and which accepts 'superficial' as meaning, not 'of wide extent' but 'of little depth', whereas 'deep', on the other hand, signifies 'of great depth' and not 'of small surface'. Yet it seems to me that a feeling such as love is better measured, if it can be measured at all, by the extent of its surface than by its degree of depth...

> A similar process of thought...prefers the inward to the outward being. Men are to be regarded as riches enclosed in a worthless shell, and the more deeply we penetrate within them, the greater is the treasure we discover. But what if there were no treasure?...I think the soul only acquires any notable content from beyond that barrier of skin which separates the inner from the outer world, and that it enriches itself only inasmuch as it flows out in widening circles from that central point that is Me. [cxix]

There are other reasons why the fragment finds space, positions and priority:

> Deleuze points to the emergence of a new conception of the relationships between theory and practice in his work with Guattari as well as in Foucault's writings: a conception that understands these relationships in a partial and fragmentary manner, not as determinate relationships between 'theory' understood as a totality and 'practice' understood as an equally unified process of the application or implementation of theory, but as 'a system of relays within...a multiplicity of parts that are 'both theoretical and practical' [cxx]

A FRENCH OUTING

The title of this middle of thought could have meaning, a fixed meaning, but it is certainly used here as a broad appellative. Consider, for a moment, the words and what they might signify. Possibly, if seen elsewhere, they might conjure a scene of say a trip along the River Seine or, more generally, it could be construed as suggesting a trip to France, Paris or Lyon. Equally there is the possible explication of the three words as a trip organized by the French, or carrying a French thematic (to be inverted?), bringing certain Continental sensibilities to the participants. If read on a calling card in a telephone kiosk then the ambiguity could be deliberate in design, using *'French'* to concoct a sexual or erotic implication, as in the terms *'French letter'*, *'French massage'* or *'French kiss'*; none of these referring to activities or objects that are wholly for the people of *France* or 'outing' the French.

In reflection of the text, a reader might recall that some, but not all, of the writers, thinkers and organizers quoted are French, or wrote largely in the idiom of French. Consider, the names of Bataille, Bergson, Blanchot, Cixous, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Klossowski and Tournier, who all published first in France.   Another common feature is that of their genealogy of thought, which can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche (who isn't considered French). Indeed, many of the French writers who have been quoted wrote on the philosopher and his thoughts. Clearly, the names, Hardt, Lispector, Negri and Nishitani (shortly to be considered) are not French and, probably, none wrote originally in French. However, a desire is apparent and productive in all their writings. It will be seen to what degree they can only be seen to be a *becoming*, which is really an *Outing from West to East*, or just a simple trip to Paris to collect a different and maybe fashionable cultural exchange. But perhaps their becomings demonstrate, to different degrees or as a difference in kind, a form of desire that might be captured in a quote from Michel Tournier's Robinson Crusoe's remembrance of passion, with the Island he named Speranza:

> With the social structure which during the years has crumbled to ruins within me, there has also perished the frameworks of institutions and myths which permits desire to become *embodied* , in the twofold sense of the word – that is to say, to assume a positive form and to expand itself in the body of a woman. To say that my sexual desire is no longer directed to perpetuation of the species is not enough. It no longer knows what its purpose is!…Instead of flowing submissively along the course set for it by society, it floods out in all directions like the rays of a star, as though in search of a channel.
> (*italic* original). [cxxi]

For some, the becomings, assemblages, multiplicities and unfettered desire, or desires, that resulted from Robinson's abandonment of the constraints of Western society might be far too much.

> He was in that *other island*, the one he had glimpsed but had never seen again. He felt a never before that he was lying on Speranza as though on a living being, that the island's body was beneath him…The almost carnal pressure of the island against his flesh warmed and excited him. She was naked, this earth that enveloped him, and he stripped off his own clothes.
> (*italics* original) [cxxii]

And then less physically or materially (remember this repetition?),

> To exist – what do the words mean? It means to be outside – *sistere ex*. That which is outside exists. That which is within does not exist. My thoughts, images and dreams do not exist...And I myself exist only in so far as I escape from myself to join others...That which does not *ex-sist in-sists*. It insists upon existing. All the small world contained within me is knocking at the door of the great, real world. And it is others, those who are outside, who hold the key. (*italics* original) [cxxiii]

There is, perhaps, a repetition of a something that cannot be represented, which is unspeakable elsewhere, that arrived earlier on a different continent. As Chia cites Nishitani;

> The awareness of the incompetence of language and analysis in the important matters of life is deeply entrenched in the collective psyche of East. As Nishitani Keiji, a leading contemporary Japanese philosopher puts it, there is a deep seated 'awareness of the incompetence of utterance as the mode of man's being in regard to that which remains unspoken, and the insight that utterances and human thinking can return to and rest in its own nature only when that awareness of incompetence is truly gained, have been, I think, common tenets throughout Indian Brahaminism, Chinese Taoism and Japanese Shinto [cxxiv]

Then he notes,

> [T]here is a general Eastern antipathy to overtly direct and assertive language in everyday discourse. Thus, in place of the kind of aggressive 'trumpeting of opinion in terms that the listener should not be able to disregard' (van Bragt, in Nishitani, 1982:xl) and the insistence on straight-line clarity and distinctiveness in logical argumentation, the Eastern mind prefers to circumnavigate an issue, tossing out subtle hints that permit only a careful listener to surmise where the unspoken core of the question lies [cxxv]

Now the middle of thought refuses any capture maintaining its becoming, *Otherness* and multiplicity through a disrupted pattern by welcoming citations that refuse a closure. The disrupted pattern is not *undertaken*, for example, as a task, technique or equipment, it can only be an immanence from a becoming which fragments and collects relationships with other fragments of compatible speeds. A middle of thought shows it difference, especially to a chapter, in the manner that the singularity moves beyond the authorship and commentary to become the *Other*.

> *In writing this story, I shall yield to the emotion and I know perfectly well that every day is one more day stolen from death.*
> *Lispector* [cxxvi]

> *There would thus seem to be, in every life, a moment when the unjustifiable prevails and the incomprehensible is given its due.*
> *Blanchot cited in Hill* [cxxvii]

APPENDIX 1

CINEMATIC EXPRESSION, GROTESQUE REALISM, CARNIVALS AND TEXT

One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics (which will continue to increase in our life our century) is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside...And when natural life is wholly included in the polis – *and this much has, by now, already happened – these thresholds pass, as we will see, beyond the dark boundaries separating life from death in order to identify a new living dead man, a sacred man. (textual difference original)*
Giorgio Agamben [cxxviii]

The following is taken from the film *The Seven Samurai* (1954)

> *Big close-up of* GISAKU, *facing camera.*
> GISAKU: Years ago, when all of you were babies, our village was burned out by the bandits. When I was running away I saw something. There was one village left unburned. It had hired samurai.
> Kurosawa (1970:29) [cxxix]

This quote is an enunciation, which comes from a character Gisaku, in a story which has unfolded in motion pictures on celluloid but it is, now here, captured in the freeze frame of text - copied from a videotape and typed on this page. In both cases, it makes sense to the eye because the stimulus of black against a white background affects the body of the reader or viewer through the eyes. Sense-making and world-ordering from stillness of the text, to the movement of parts of the body, as the eyes scan the page. Flow of text and stillness of the body, or should that be reversed some how? The important point is this - there is a body and there is a flow.

In the story, Gisaku is the aged patriarch of a farming village. Within the story, told on film, his body is portrayed as aged, this is affected for the viewer, through such visual characterizations as a very bent spine but this is exaggerated by his slow crippling and deliberate locomotion, as he crosses parts of the screen. Through the dialogue, between him and the other villagers, we learn of his wisdom: although we cannot see it in the film, or see it in the text, this speaks something of his mind. This wisdom, or the other knowledge contents of his mind, is why his advice is sought, especially when the farmers collectively wish to consider which of the various thoughts, or yet-to-be-thought strategies, they will adopt to thwart future attacks from marauding robbers. In the body of the film, the bodies of farmers are easily recognized from robbers and others, by their physiques, demeanor and dress. They are sparsely clothed, have a mental and physical condition which reflects a lifetime of hardship in the field.

The body may seem a self-evident fact - being the evident self for most people. For some, the body is very evident. Perhaps you are, and he or she is, something physically and materially defined with an identity, existing in time and space, having both causes and effects. The evident self-contained encasement of tissues and organs

covered by the surface of the skin – which is only a healthy relationship of forces in balance - allows the whole or parts of the body to be named. These are located in a mind skillfully scripted to understand and acknowledge these bits. However, the mind cannot be located so easily. The singularity of yours, or Gisaku's body, is evident but much less so than the singularities of either's thoughts.

You can usually be recognized by your mother, father or friend. And by another once they have seen and identified you either in the flesh or from, say, a passport photograph. You, or more properly speaking your body, can be more consistently recognized than your mind or thoughts. Excepting the head and some of its parts, the whole of your body is generally recognized more easily than the parts: Could your brain be recognized by your parents? Not yet! For those who share the sense of vision and a memory, once the body has been labeled, and it becomes recognizable, the denotation of a name - such as Gisaku - allows aspects of a character to be portrayed, traded and discussed. Bodies can, then, be further labeled when additional attributes are attached. These things may be culturally specific, for example, *Samurai* were a class of people allowed to carry a sword and they had another body, their lord liege to whom they owed a duty. It was to him they would sacrifice the services of their swordmanship and, possibly, even their own body or limbs. This was the *biopolitics* of Feudal Japan and it required the demonstration of certain roles which had then to be performed.

So the distinctions of mind, body and sight can be drawn out from this simple film extract, just like they could from any similar film clip. Is this not like any *fragment* of life that gains attention and consideration? But one must, or at least ought to, attend to the *fragment* and, perhaps, philosophize on its relationship to other things. As Michel Foucault notes of the role of the philosopher;

> For a long time one has known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we do not perceive it. Whereas the role of science is to reveal what we do not see, the role of philosophy is to let us see what we see.
> cxxx

There were several 'samurai' that protected the spaces, or territories, on the still bigger plane where A's thoughts were freely assembled. It seemed that they had been invited but, perhaps, they were always there. Properly speaking, they were not 'samurai' as such because like the Seven, in the Japanese film, they, by convention of the period, should have been called Ronin. *This being the name given to samurai who had lost their lord or retainer. These* Ronin *wandered across territories in the 'way of nomads' but they retained one uncommon skill that of the 'way of the double-handed sword'.*

Generally, the modern Western intellect has been suspicious of what might be considered unnecessary spiritual inferences and 'Eastern Fetishisms'. They have been and remain reluctant to embrace such things. It seems too obvious to ponder an almost tautological sequence but, by and large, the Western mind prefers and preferred *the Western – the Magnificent Seven* rather than *the Seven Samurai*.

For Hollywood, and now Bollywood, it was a jolly, or holly or bolly, good idea to produce and distribute a film on the sole factor of a personality, or celebrity, that was a box office draw – the body rather than the body of thoughts. Was it really true that an Actors body was more important than the content or processural thought movements within a film?

Interrogating for any hint of simple binary opposition of East versus West, A thought 'The way of...' could be banally represented within a Western reframing, perhaps as a trite binary 'the journey not the destination'(who said that first?) but this really marginalized the all of it. 'The way of...' in actuality was a pseudonym for 'becoming'or, even A.

A.N.Whitehead, Cooper, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari understood 'process' as opposed to structure. Each having a slightly different thing to say about 'the process'. The continuity of connections and the avoidance of containment sharing a common path of repetition and difference with **'the way of...'**

A was weary of common representation but he was only a little cautious in the use of certain tropes. Who spoke when the spaces for making thought were furiously fought over by the band of philosophical Ronins - *whether* Italian, *or* French, *or* Mexican - *and did they speak at all? Certainly it was sometimes unclear what they defined or defended. And was it the same container, or territory of space and time, they protected against the advancement of the oppressor?*

When A visualized or tried to make uncommon sense of this emerging empirical mass of thought, the aura was married to that evoked from an immersion, which arose and sustained itself when full attention was given to the reading of one of Blanchot's recit. Yes, like **Jude the Obscure**, *more night than night, certainly not day. It was also Kafkasque.*

The inference was becoming clear that life was really Blanchotean or Kafkasque. No this was limiting, the Other was Blanchotean, or Kafkasque. It was either one strategy or another. It either affirmed a space that gave no co-ordinates, with none the space and time of an Empire could not flourish, or it was part of the tool kit that was productive of that strategy.

The continual reference to cinematic films has been used as a device to celebrate a form of difference. The utterances on celluloid having been de-territorialized from one screen to another, so the journey moves to utterances onto the screen of a *work* processor or word processor; then onto a computer disc; finally, it is re-territorialized onto this paper. Is film just another plane of expression, or are there special events of time and space which can be seen to be combining and displacing others? The use and value of film/s in relation to text conjures support, indifference and opposition; in relation to this Rosenburn notes:

> It's a bias inflected with a sense of unfair competition or outright usurpment, whether this comes from English professors resenting the popularity of movies with their students or from novelists who have seen favourite works (including some of their own) diluted and vulgarised by film adaptations. The degree to which these adaptations often serve as some viewers' reductive

substitute for the original books...makes this somewhat understandable...But at the same time it often regrettably rules out the very possibility of other kinds of literary films – informed and enhanced by literary qualities that are original works rather than adaptations. (...within French culture it's easier to think of film-making as 'literature by other means'). [cxxxi]

Later, it will be shown that Rosenbaum has some fairly strong sentiments about one film's capacity to enunciate other things, for instance, though not the most important to him, is its capacity to place 'under erasure' certain premises. For now, let use be made of certain other viewpoints: Firstly, those who wish to reconfigure the spaces to be occupied by the events in space and time of film. Secondly, those who wish to remonstrate about the moving images on celluloid. The latter aligns to Deleuzian conceptualisations but, in short, two commentaries may now help:

Firstly, as Rajchman observes;

> Deleuze declares there is no great plot in the sequence of philosophies – no "intrinsic narrative." It is more as in cinema a matter of juxtaposing or superimposing many different layers in a montage; for, instead of narrative – before narration – philosophies have a kind of "stratigraphic time". [cxxxii]

Secondly, Patton notes that film and concept are similar:

> In terms of the definition given in *What is Philosophy?*, a philosophical concept has more in common with a film or a piece of music than it does with a demonstrative statement. A film does not exist apart from its components (its shots, sequences, assemblages of sound and image), and like a concept it changes nature if one of the components is altered. A film also creates its own universe: it has a plane of consistency, characters and a style of composition which are like so many intensive multiplicities which do not represent anything. Deleuze and Guattari could as well be describing a film or a piece of music when they say that a concept is the intensive and variable unity of all its components, or that it is like 'the point of coincidence, condensation or accumulation of its own components'.
> (embold original)[cxxxiii]

Differently, somewhat at odds to the Deleuzian prospect for film, there is Lodge [cxxxiv] who notes;

> On the other hand, if the writers persists in seeking to do justice to the common phenomenal world he finds himself, today in competition with new media, such as tape and motion picture, which can claim to do this more effectively.

Then Lodge notes;

> I am not convinced either, that the camera is, in human hands, any more neutral than language, or that it renders literary realism redundant.

Subsequently to the above quote Lodge cites from Scholts:

This cannot solve the problem, because all language is a human product and thus must humanize everything it touches. The writer must either acknowledge this and accept it as one of the terms of his work or turn to a wordless art like cinema.

WHICH ROAD THEN?

Which is it to be: Text or film as a subset of text? Should there be a consideration of text as extensive in range and inclusive of expression? Perhaps Film should be seen as a useful addition to text, or as separate and engaging form of philosophy? Questions open, close or remain unanswered. Strategically, the question should be about *what works* for the motion in hand: Which road allows the most degrees of freedom for lines of flight? But then life could be seen only as a journey to be replaced by becoming lines of flight. And now we find films which depict travel on the road as a line of flight or expression of freedoms.

In discussing Road Movies, Eyerman and Lofgren discuss major and minor transport, or more properly speaking movement for Americans, they observe;

> The freedom to move upwards and outward, is one of the central and persistent images America has of itself, helped along of course by the representation of Europeans and others. If you don't like it here, go somewhere else, was a cry heard very early on in American history; the phrase always contained the sense of possibility, the positive, within its negative instruction. [cxxxv]

But they note for the minorities of America there was another transport;

> The old slave song, 'Many thousands gone', referred not only to those sold on the trading blocks, but also those thousands, soon to be millions, who had abandoned rural southern poverty for a new start in the north...it was the train that symbolised both hope of a new life down the road and the means of escaping restrictions and pain of the present, not he automobile. [cxxxvi]

Different was the white majority's form of transport, they conclude:

> For the white majority, it was the car not the train, that came to symbolize the modern dream of mobility, and it was not the rhythm of rails, but the sound of rubber on asphalt that sent the mind to hummin' freedoms song. This is why essential elements in what has been called the American dream are captured as a part of the history of the road. [cxxxvii]

These major and minor forms of transport may be contrasted with the major and minor languages for the Deleuzian and Guattarian - the thought uttered in the previous middle of thought. These may also be contrasted with the use Michel Tournier makes of transport or the *phoric* (see previous middle of thought). The easy ride in language is no more. Congestion and violence, amongst other things, makes travel on the road either the wrong or the right metaphor for life's journey.

The easy ride of the film, *Easy Rider*, is no more and yet many seek the easy ride. The only easy rides left are the fearsome and fluid migration of the transatlantic corporate media mogul's aspirations, their agent's endeavours and the movement of their vehicles of profit. That easy ride is much supported in the press by,

> journalists eager to promote film as a business over film as an art, and therefore ready to place the future of cinema in the hands of agents and producers rather than artists – the popular model for so-called American independence has in effect passed from Jarmausch's freedom to Tarantino's servitude. [cxxxviii]

Those North American roads and highways, either real or symbolic, major or minor, have been blocked and like ailing transportation systems in the body they may end up killing the being, unless, of course, there is recognition of the need for an unblocking. The blockages and stoppages are real - as Mandel-Campbell notes;

> Drivers face poor roads, bad drivers, corrupt police, hijackers – and a ban on driving in the US. [cxxxix]

Easy travel and movement of thought, across the physical and mental planes of America, has become inhibited or disallowed as a consequence of policing, stoppages and blockages on the roads. And, the same fate awaits the public philosopher who amides by the regulations that create conformance and performance to a prescribed agenda.

Today, the journeymen can, however, be satisfied with the shorter journey to the nearby multiplex cinema, forever accommodating, with their massive and easy parking lots. The movie drive-in has been superseded. Walk right into a multiplex and savour choice, choose your meal and take your position by the flight deck [34] and place your popcorn in the dedicated holders abutting your arm rest. You have made your choice from a variety of block busters. Is the block buster a film, your life, or a metaphor, for the roads untravelled? Dead or dying men can live their lives, viewed by the audience on the seats of the cinema, as an acceptable and commercial icon.

Consider, for instance, the cigarette smoking Marlboro man on the saddle of his horse, or someone else's, sniffing horse wearing Ralph Lauren facsimiles of cowboy clothes. Then other films (or music videos) popularise gangsta raps, shooting drugs and designer guns (Art?). The revolution of those films is only to a constituted power of another higher form of capitalism; the enrolment and inspired aspirations to death row through luxury drugs and crimes of community but never to constituting power and social productivity. Fluctuations in genre and choice are allowed. You can desire to be those beings or something older like the character played by Marlon Brando in *The Wild Ones*. The latter, now, no more challenging on roads policed with speed bumps and cameras to discipline the rider and capture his or her thoughts in a sterile territory of helmeted Deptford bikers.

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[34] Flight decks everywhere to deceive people to think they are in control – there is the flight deck arrangement at some cinemas and there is the flight deck at the gym written about in another middle of thought.

Across the Atlantic, in a crazed situation, metaphors are reversed around rail and road. Here, the Independent Cinema of England uses **Trainspotting** *to present another* Other *which transforms the being of a trainspotter to a becoming of difference. This is a situation where the order of the organised and the recorded – of what one might presume is constituting one set of thoughts - the trainspotter's psychology – is disrupted in a frenzy that accompanies a relocation of wild ones of Scotland to England. Drugs are not so much glamorised as presented as a fairly damaging alternative to the poverty of existence for those deprived of wealth and social productivity. But this is not a moral tale.*

DEAD MEN DYING AND SPEAKING

The dying road is perhaps a metaphor for the dying spirit of North America which has recently become immortalised as the dying man. But the dying body of Western man takes various forms. Two Northern American pictorials are presented below. These are supplemented by a third which relates a story depicting Western man, though not an American. In each case the men are dying, but not in the way we are all dying from birth as described, for instance, by the quote:

> They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it is night once more. [cxl] [35]

Rather their story is told in the knowledge of their death. In each case, an author or auteur has found it easier to demonstrate inter-subjectivity from the viewpoint of the dead. Perhaps this is because it is easier than using the living to make the same case. A *proper distance* (remember Maai Oh Ma in another Appendix) is needed to demonstrate the case. The speaking seems easier as death approaches. And, at various points, one might remember the Deleuzian question *"Who speaks?* Or, as is noted by Wittgenstein;

> If someone says 'I have a body', he can be asked who is speaking here with his mouth [cxli]

In these cases, there is a set of institutions, or an organization, that has acted to confine but not confirm the individuals as an affirmative utterance. Each dead man's story may be thought to reflect a period or episteme. Rosenbaum records,

> Just as the 40s, 50s and 60s of the just-completed century were largely informed by the political divisions that took shape in society in relation to ferment and challenges of the 30s, one might argue that the 70s, 80s, and 90s were no less affected by the divisions formed in relation to the 60s. From this standpoint, *Dead Men* may have been even more to do with the 60s than it does with either the decade in which it's set or the decade in which it was made. (Perhaps to the same degree, the more recent American Beauty [1999] offers a quintessential expression of the values of the 70s) [cxlii]

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[35] The Director of *Trainspotting* and *The Beach*, Danny Boyle, introduced this author to *Beckett's Waiting For Godot.* Initially, his room within a university's halls of residence had walls covered and decorated with tasteful and thoughtful posters, but the walls were stripped of all and replaced with the quote from the play "We will hang ourselves tomorrow unless Godot comes." From that connection the author read the play.

AMERICAN BEAUTY

In the film *American Beauty*, the sterility of life within a non-native American family unfolds and the tensions of individual pursuit of selfish outcomes of all of its members is presented in moving pictures. The movie is about Lester Burnham and his family and neighbours. He starts to become sexually obsessed with his daughter's high school friend.

> The beauty in American culture is in its dysfunctionality. That's the message in American Beauty....there is a great deal of suspense in this story line: we know the ending right at the beginning, that Lester will be dead in a year's time. How and why isn't revealed until the very last, and then too with a bit of a twist. The movie tries to tell us that conforming to a lifestyle dictated by society leads to dysfunctionality. But finding 'freedom' as illustrated in the film isn't great either. [cxliii]

These lifestyles are compared and contrasted whilst the film presents further film-within- film coverage - like Russian dolls, a larger doll opening to reveal a smaller one which in turn reveals one yet smaller – as occasionally captured on video footage by a voyeuristic and entrepreneurial young man, Ricky Fits, living in the house next door to the family. His video library is immense. He captures the attention and affections of the girl next door through a constant and 'in your face' video-filming of her and her family. After they have become close, Ricky shows her his collection of videos, he then comments on his favourite bit of footage - as the screen changes from colour to black and white - it shows a grey-walled, concrete-paved environment, which might be considered typical of many an inner city area. A *plastic transparent bag* floats across the screen and is clearly the object of focus. The Ricky Fits monologue begins;

> It was one of those days. It's a minute away from snowing.
> *There's this electricity in the air; you can almost hear it*
> *This bag was just* (pause) *dancing* (pause) *with me.*
> Like a little kid, begging me to play with it.

> **For fifteen minutes**
> (Yesterday) I realised that there was this *(pause)* entire life behind things.
> And this incredibly benevolent force wanted me to know that there was no reason to be afraid. Ever
> The video is a poor excuse I know.
> But it helps me remember.
> I need to remember."
> Sometimes there is so much *(pause)* beauty in the world *(pause)* I feel like I can't take it"
> Taken from American Beauty (2003) with the assistance of web site [cxliv]

Lester Burnham's rebellion, against the institutions that surround his every day life, is on the one hand attempted through the possibility of an erotic adventure - or properly speaking through pursuit of *the chance* - of a possible sexual transgression. The younger Ricky has a better sense of the life space lost and to be recovered. And he pursues his search for something beyond the beingness of this life and he knows of its

existence through the becomingness of a plastic bag. This something might also be the substance of after life. Georges Battaile, in *Eroticism*, considers death, sensuality, language, taboo, transgression and sacrifice. He investigates desire prior to sexuality and he, for example, suggests that,

> [B]eyond the intoxication of youth, we achieve the power to look death in the face and to perceive in death the pathway into unknowable and incomprehensible continuity – that pathway is the secret of eroticism and eroticism alone can reveal it. [cxlv]

And we can see these things, as James suggests;

> According to my view, experience as a whole, is a *process in time*, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive and conjunctive in content, are themselves, and must in general be accounted for as real as the terms they relate. What the nature of the event called 'superseding' signifies, depends altogether on the kind of transition obtains. Some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way.
> (*italics* added) [cxlvi]

DEAD MEN

In the film *Dead Men*, directed by Jim Jarmusch (who also wrote the screen play) the experiences and eroticism of an accountant named *William Blake* from Cleveland (USA) are traced. He travels west on a train to a town called Machine (Deleuzian and Guatarrian?). The film is set in the 1800s. During his early journey on the train, Blake keeps waking up and each time he is surrounded by different fellow travelers. Some shoot at buffalo from the train. Having disembarked from the train at the end of the line, Blake seeks out to meet his prospective employer – the owner of the Dickinson Metalworks. Along the journey to his employer - which takes place in daytime - he passes scenes that are atypical of western characters (for instance, a cowboy is shown, fairly graphically, receiving oral favours in the alleyway between buildings). The prospective employer informs him that the position has been filled by another, some time previous. After a spell in the saloon, William takes up with a prostitute but his time with her is interrupted by her former lover, who we later find out is the son of the would-be employer. During the shoot out with the lover, who is killed, William receives a bullet in the chest which stays there throughout the film. He escapes from the town only to be pursued by bounty hunters hired by the murdered victim's father.

Blake then makes it to the woods, where he collapses and awakes to find a Native American Indian before him trying to remove the bullet from his chest. The Indian is from mixed parentage *(Blood and Blackfoot)* and goes by the name of *Nobody* (also known as *'He Who Talks Loud Saying Nothing'*). He can speak a number of Native American languages and American-English. The Indian has been to England and shows how conversant he is with the works of the poet William Blake. Nobody is convinced that the two William Blakes are the same persons. And Nobody notes that because William is lying with a bullet that cannot be removed, Blake is already dead. Here is the relevant extract from the film.

Nobody:	"Did you kill the white man who killed you?"
[pause]	
Blake:	"I'm not dead!"
[pause]	
Nobody:	"What name were you given at birth stupid white man?"
Blake:	"Blake, William Blake"
Nobody:	"Is this a lie or a white mans trick?"
Blake:	"No I'm William Blake!"
Nobody:	"Then you are a dead man!"
Blake:	"I'm sorry, I don't understand"
Nobody:	"Is your name really William Blake?"
Blake:	"Yes"
[pause]	
Nobody:	"Every night and every morne
	Some to misery are born
	Every morne and every night
	Some are born to sweet delight
	Some are born to sweet delight
	Some are born to endless night"
Blake:	"I really don't understand"
Nobody:	"But I understand William Blake
	"You are a poet and a painter
	Now you are a killer of white men" [36]

Blake the White Man doesn't understand many things. William Blake doesn't understand himself or doesn't understand his own poetry. Nobody understands many things including poetry, languages, life's journeys, and William Blake. The artist and the poet must kill White men, their spirit, or at least their being, to allow for a becoming Native North American Indian.

The three bounty hunters attempt to kill Blake but two are themselves killed. Further adventures included trappers and a racist missionary. Finally, in their travels north-west, they arrive at a Makah village situated on the pacific coast. Here Nobody arranges for a canoe to take Blake to the 'other side'. Nobody is killed in a shoot out with the remaining trapper, who he also kills.

But as Newton [cxlvii] notes more generally;

> For it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which the places and motions of others may be referred.

At one level, the film can be summed up in the sentiment repeated in the film by the Native American Indian Nobody. The same sentiment is repeated in the book about the film by Rosenbaum entitled *Dead Men*. [cxlviii] These set of words are repeated in a more recent film by the white Hungarian director (now presumably following his successes – the American-Hungarian director). These words are:

Stupid fucking white man

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[36] *Dead Man* film by Jim Jarmusch (2003) on Medusa DVD: Lucky Red Home Video.

It is evident, from Rosenbaum's account, that this film would seem to be both a statement of the various obscenities heaped upon the Native North-American Indians, and the ignorance of the White Man in their journey through life in most common place westerns. The obscenities portrayed or alluded to in the film range from; the killing of a million buffaloes; the genocide of tens of millions of aboriginal peoples; and finally, to the constant racist depictions of the North American Indians as people without their own ownership of land, culture and history.

Jarmusch and Rosenbaum offer authoritative support to these claims:

> There was a period in the mid-1870s. I think in 1875 well over a million were shot and the government was very supportive of this being done, because, no buffalo, no Indians'. They were trying to get the railroad through and having lots of problems with Lakota and different tribes. [cxlix]

And,

> [I]t will be recalled that in 1500 the world population is approximately 400 million of whom 80 million inhabit the Americas. By the middle of the sixteenth century, out of these 80 million, there remains ten...If the word genocide has ever been applied to a situation with some accuracy, this is here the case...None of the great massacres of the twentieth century can be compared to this hactatomb. 2000[cl]

And these strategies continue to be worked, consider, for instance, the application of the defoliant Agent Orange (2-4-5T) in North Vietnam by the Americans in the 1960s which would seem to have the hollow echo,

> No trees, no Vietcong

This is a simple emulation of the successful strategy of 'no buffalo no Indians'.

As Chomsky notes;

> North Vietnam, while never conquered, was left in ruins. [cli]

So it might be rightly proper to keep saying ;

> Stupid fucking white man. [clii]

Rosenbaum points out that Rickman sees *Dead Man* as a film which places traditional Western cinema under erasure and he quotes him " 'western under erasure' in which everything is 'ultimately...cancelled by something else', making dead men a 'nihilistic statement of protest' that offers 'no viable alternative to Machine civilisation'." and Rosenbaum then explains:

> The term 'under erasure', is derived from Martin Heidigger by way of Jacques Derrida, is used to describe a form of self-cancelling writing, the strategy of using the only language that one has at one's disposal without subscribing to

its premises, yielding certain work's that are crossed out but still read. As Gayari Chakravorty Spivak puts it parenthetically in her preface to Derrida's *Of Grammalogy*, "Since the work is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible." [cliii]

It would seem to this author that *Dead Men* epitomises what a film, with direction and a written screen play by Deleuze, might look and feel like. Rosenbaum does not seem to be familiar with Deleuze, he certainly does not make any reference to him or, perhaps, he does. Consider, how the terms 'deterritorialized' and 'reterritorialized' might be substituted with 'decontextualised' and 'recontextualised' in the quotation below.

> The process by which Blake the poet of the late eighteenth century is made to speak for another tribe a century later also enables him to become a shaman for all of us yet another century after the action of *Dead Men*: radically decontextualised and then just as radically recontextualised, the words of a great writer continue to speak after traversing continents as well as several lifetimes, reappearing as the English translation of an otherwise lost language, an ignored and forgotten tongue. As Jarmusch sees it, that may be the only way that some kinds of literature can survive in the present- by finding a new kind of use value. [cliv]

In addition, might 'becoming shaman' be an appropriate cry to arms for those Deleuzians and Guattarians wishing to transgress the 'Stupid fucking white man' mentality. Certainly, Jim Jarmusch has worked and teased the literature of Blake in a way Gilles Deleuze frequently works literature.

A considered that A never stands for Anglo-American, although a multiplicity of breeds seems evident, and the genetic mix of Italian, French, Mexican, Indian, Japanese, Chinese infers a DNA capable of moving Eastwards. Then again that can't be true because there was some Dutch genes in the pool. But consider also bleached jeans have given way to the fashion of camouflage fatigues.

In the first of the trilogy of dead men dying, the homicide of a father illustrated the death of the American dream. From the second, the narration picked up on genocide and the lies of the American dream. Soon the focus will be on parricide.

GROTESQUE REALISM

Both cinema and carnivals can bring grotesque realism into play to make an image of thought material. In *Rabelais and His World*, Mikhail Bakhtin comments on the 'rehabilitation of the flesh' found in *Rabelais* and, to a lesser extent, other Renaissance writers, such as Shakespeare and Cervantes. It has an early heritage from folk humour.

> They are the heritage of that peculiar type of imagery and, more broadly speaking, of that peculiar aesthetic concept that is characteristic of this folk culture and which differs sharply from the aesthetic concept of the following ages. We call it conditionally the concept of grotesque realism. [clv]

Then, later, Bakhtin defines,

> The essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity.

Bakhtin explores further this relation to realism of the grotesque, through reference to Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, where a bipolar opposition is driven against an encounter with Idealism.

> The fundamental trend of Cervantes' parodies is a 'coming down to earth,' a contact with the reproductive and generating power of the earth and of the body. This is a continuation of the grotesque tradition...In Cervantes' images of food and drink there is still a spirit of popular banquets. Sancho's materialism, his pot belly, appetite, his abundant defecation, are on the absolute lower level of grotesque realism of the gay bodily grave (belly, bowels, earth) which has been dug for Don Quixote's abstract and deadened idealism. [clvi]

In films around Japanese folk culture, within periods more recent than those of *Rabelais*, Sato notes;

> With *Rashomon* and *Seven Samurai (Shichinin no Samurai*, 1954), Kurosawa waived beauty of form and had his actors assume gauche but realistic poses, or had them rushing wildly, cleaving the air with their swords. This certainly added a vivid touch, but the slightly comical effect never quite convinces us of the cruelty involved in man killing man. [clvii]

Here there is a forceful set of expressions released on a moving picture made up of many still frames. This is as thought a series of movements and not something that captures stillness. The body is all-important in this expressive moment.

Gilles Deleuze makes reference to the schizophrenic's powerful transformation of the body's passions:

> For the schizophrenic, then, it is less a question of recovering meaning than of destroying the word, of conjuring up the affect, and of transforming the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, obedience into command, always depth beneath the fissured surface. [clviii]

He continues,

> To these values a glorious body corresponds, being a new dimension of the schizophrenic body, an organism without parts which operates entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission (the superior body or body without organs of Antonin Artaud). [clix]

Now this can be compared to the recommendation of a Buddhist Master noted by Kornfield:

> The meditator should endeavour to be continually mindful. He accomplishes this by being mindful of the sense of touch. At no moment of the day will his body not be in contact with an object. If he is sitting, his body will be in touch with the chair. If he is lying his head will be in touch with the pillow. If he is walking, his feet will touch the ground on each step. If he is handling a tool or an object, his fingers will touch it. The head against the pillow, of feet against ground, of fingers against tool or object. He should, if possible, be mindful of touch of visual object against the eye, of sound against the ear, of taste against the tongue, of smell against nose. 'Be rigorously mindful of the awareness of touch,' said Sunlun Sayadaw. [clx]

The materiality, brutality and grotesque aspects of the body are made evident, in one of Sarah Kane's plays: both in the realm of sexual politics and within the trivia of every day living, these material manifestations invade and surround the life of a prince regent named Hippolytus.

> "Scene One.
>
> *A royal palace.*
>
> **Hippolytus** *sits in a darkened room watching television.*
> *He is sprawled on a sofa surrounded by expensive toys, empty crisp and sweet packets, and a scattering of used socks and underwear.*
> *He is eating a hamburger, his eyes fixed on a flickering light of a Hollywood film.*
> *He sniffs.*
> *He feels a sneeze coming on and rubs his nose to stop it.*
> *It still irritates him.*
> *He looks around the room and picks up a sock.*
> *He examines the sock carefully then blows his nose on it.*
> *He throws the sock back on the floor and continues to eat the hamburger.*
> *The film becomes particularly violent.*
> **Hippolytus** *watches impassively.*
> *He picks up another sock, examines it and discards it.*
> *He picks up another, examines it and decides it's fine.*
> *He puts his penis into the sock and masturbates until he comes without a flicker of pleasure.*
> *He takes off the sock and throws it on the floor.*
> *He begins another hamburger.* [clxi]

Cinema and carnivals can bring a grotesque realism to bear upon a viewer but so can text and, especially, when it has been coolly recorded.

FRENCH FAMILY DYING

In the last of the trilogy of dead men dying, our attention is drawn to the transgressions committed by Pierre Riviere, who on the 3rd June 1835 sought to free himself and his father from the tyranny of others; but principally from his mother.

In *I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother... a case of parricide in the 19th century*, Michel Foucault [clxii] and others deliberate on and record Rivierre's account of how he cut to death mother, sister and brother. In the foreword, Foucault outlines why he and others had committed themselves to the task of recording and unearthing various utterances regarding this case. He makes references to the various professionals, actors and representatives of the different institutions involved. These range from doctors, villagers, priests to judges.

> All of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same thing; at any rate the burden of all these discourses is the occurrence on June 3. But in their totality and their variety they neither form a composite work nor an exemplary test, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle along discourses and thorough discourses. And yet, it cannot simply be described as a single battle; for several separate combats were being fought out at the same time and intersected each other: The doctors were engaged in a combat, among themselves with judges and prosecution, and with Riviere himself... [clxiii]

Foucault [clxiv] then outlines the fact that the discourses where not interpreted by him and his co-workers; so they, therefore, avoided falling into the 'reductive effect' of the power relations of professional institutions like the judiciary. The reader being taken through the accounts, cannot but be impressed by the intelligence of Pierre, whose main source of reading was what could be easily picked up – from things like almanacs. He observes for instance that Adam could not have fathered all the people in all the lands. [clxv]

Self-evidently, Rivierre is from a generation both geographically and historically distant from those Dead men featured earlier in this Appendix. The evisceration of the critical components that have sought to discipline, control, order and organize his and his father's existence takes the most brutish form of expression. The factual account and reality, told through his manuscript, being so much more like fiction than the fiction portrayed as real within the stories told within the American films. The domestic and other scripting which occurs, as a son and member of a family dominated by a mother and her allies, is altogether too powerful and negative for Rivierre to live through. Yet his story has an innocence and longevity that leaves echoes for readers and officers in those caring professions, which developed as a response to matters like modernity and biopolitics.

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BECOMING ET AL

AFFRETTANDO

BEING AN INTRODUCTION AND BECOMING HETEROTOPIC

Thus "the beginning", belonging as often to myth as to logic, conceived of as a place in time, and treated as a root as well as an objective, remains a kind of gift inside language.
Edward Said [i]

Camus paraphrases Descartes and says:
'I rebel, therefore *we* are'.
His conclusion is:
'Although apparently negative because it creates nothing, revolt is positive in a profound way since it reveals those elements in man which must be defended'.
Cruickshank [ii]

all periods of time are at an equal distance from eternity
Robertson Davies [iii]

A body in motion or at rest must be determined for motion or rest by some other body, which, likewise, was determined for motion or rest by some other body, and this by a third, and so on to infinity.
Benedictus Spinoza [iv]

O young academic politician...I shall take it that you are in the first flush of ambition, yourself disagreeable. You think to state a reasonable case, and act upon it at once. It is just this conviction that makes you so unpleasant.

Has it occurred to you that nothing is ever done until everyone is convinced that it ought to be done, and has been convinced for so long that it is now time to do something else? And are you aware that conviction has never yet produced by an appeal to reason, which only makes people uncomfortable?
Conford [v]

ONCE UPON A TIME

Ab initio or *ab ovo*: translating from the *Latin* to *English* these become 'from the beginning' or 'from the very beginning'.[vi] These words so simple in their construction but, in the English translation, these hide many things and exclude many others. They hide the fallen trajectory or becoming of a movement of thought, an

event and a singularity. They hide the fall that occurs at the first liberating step of the other, which could be the radicalised *flâneur.*[1]

With the fall, there is neither progressive movement nor the immediacy or anticipation of a productive, creative arising yet to come. In short, there is no common and momentous change to *normalized thought.* There is no fracture, disruption or displacement to text or thought. And it is shameful, that the socially productive multiplicity which was to be amicably formed, through a hospitable embrace between the reader and the writer, is betrayed. The beginnings of the formation of a creative rapport are prevented by the very use of a beginning. The reader is denied both the history of the events, that is the singularity now reading, and connections to a new assemblage, which is the singularity which writes. The warm mingling of *intersubjectivites* and *intertextualities* has to be suspended - until another time and space. And anyway, how would we know if such intimacy were ever addressed?

With a beginning, this or any other thesis is *ontologically* and *epistemologically* problematic before either begins. The event of a *singularity* is quite wrongly conceived as a birth, sometime and somewhere between eternity and infinity, whilst thought and text must follow suit to show coherence. In such acts, death can be momentarily and satisfactorily denied with the hope of some sort of short-lived sense of immortality. How, then, does one begin an introduction from the beginning? Or: How does one begin an introduction from the very beginning? Clearly, these concepts are – or at least once were - important because these *Latin* terms are, and were, waiting to be summoned and applied, again and again, thus preserving the space of the individual and his thoughts. But what none sense or nonsense those words mischievously convey.

'Once upon a time' seems to be a far more honest set of words. Those words seem to be immediately understood by every child that hears them said as a story unfolds. Something in education, then, makes the adult unable to share and understand the obvious, generative beauty and commonness of the *uncoded* or *recoded* middle, which arises with the enunciation of 'once upon a time'. And, we know in a Foucaultain or Deleuzian sense who speaks.

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[1] John Lechte (1996:103) notes: 'The *flâneur* is still on the threshold, of the city as of the bourgeois class. Neither has yet enugulfed him; in neither is he at home. He seeks refuge in the crowd' (Benjamin 1986:156) What Baudelaire actually says is the *flâneur* is at home when he is not at home (in the crowd). The *flaneur,* indeed, is 'an ego athirst for the non-ego' (Baudelaire 1972: 400). The *flâneur* searches out the ephemeral, the transitory and the contingent. The *flâneur's* trajectory leads nowhere and comes from nowhere. It is a trajectory without fixed spatial coordinates; there, is in short, no reference point from which to make predictions about the *flâneur's* future. For the *flâneur* is an entity without past or future, without identity: an entity of contingency and indeterminacy.' p.103 Taken from John Lecte ' (Not) Belonging in Postmodern Space' in Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (1996) *Postmodern Cities and Spaces* Oxford: Blackwell. pp 99-111. See also, Elizabeth Wilson 'The Invisible *Flâneur'* in the same volume. The *flâneur* as a conceptual device is radicalized and problematiced further through usage in this thesis.

In the event of the 'first instance'- or in the event of the first instance - it must be known which *sense* made sense of the arrival and determination of the event, subsequently and partially perceived. Then, from a thorough examination of what transpires, conclusions are formed. From these conclusions, it can be deduced which singular, couple or multiple of the five known senses were used to record, order and pattern the events putative formation. Then, enunciation and articulation can be made about what was perceived as the solidification of an event as a beginning.

Moving, from one singularity's perception to another's set of perceptions of beginnings, requires a kind of consensus from singularities within or around any *multiplicity* (which for recording and recoding purposes is hardly ever democratic); perhaps, agreement is needed about the fact that one individual's recorded beginning actually preceded another's and these have to be confirmed - as points in time and space. Thus there arrives a need for ordering.

With ordering there is the beginning of ordering-words. Then, comes the organization of knowledge, as ordering becomes common or uncommonly ordered by others (who are usually, part and parcel of the hierarchical elites, or establishments, and are far too interested in organizations and organizing). Further usage results in classification of sets. All this is fabulous stuff. It is surely also somehow reminiscent of Foucault reading and writing of Jorge Luis Borges' *The Analytical Language of John Wilkins* (see, for instance Benjamin Genocchio. [vii])

The intent here is not to write, as an act of mischief, but to play with the sites, spaces and folds of the text, so any movement to physical or textual utopias is denied, but then neither is there a velocity of that text towards sites of *dystopia*. The space, landscape or territory curved and carved out by the journey of the text is progressively folded and unfolded to the events that allow the *Other*.

HETEROTOPIA

This territory, never there or here and always just-there and yet-to-come, is undecideable and indeterminate. It cannot be represented but remains a too common-place, where the *Other* finds hospitality and - to coin *Bob Dylan's* phase - 'shelter from the storm'. This place of the *Other* is known as *Heterotopia*.

> In 'Of Other Spaces', a lecture given in1967, Foucault outlined his explicit views on space. Here he introduced a space he called *Heterotopia,* or places which are 'outside all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality', places are 'absolutely different from all sites they reflect and speak about' (1986:42). [viii]

In Martin Parker's *Utopia and Organization* there are comprehensive discussions on *utopia* and *dystopia*. Whilst in a paper from that volume by Roy Stager Jacques entitled 'What is a crypto-utopia and why does it matter?' there are keen sentiments expressed on space known as *Heterotopia*:

If we retain the cynicism of dystopia, but remove the weight of despair, we create the context from which the *heterotopia* emerges ...Culturally, hetertopic vision is firmly tied to the unraveling of Western modernity. Hetertopic thought relinquishes the ideal of synoptic perfection and floats in a polydimensional reality, a world where all the pieces do not and, necessarily, *can* not, fit into the same puzzle.

After a discussion of Magritte and his paintings, Jacques unwraps the script further;

It is not surprising that Foucault was fascinated by heterotopic thinking. Heterotopia in representational art and the *bricolage* of Foucault's Paris clique are two emergences of the same phenomenon.

In the next paragraph of that paper there is an important statement that could be so easily, overlooked, especially when a reader cannot fully anticipate the chance becomings of this thesis; [2]

Heterotopic thought arises with the belief that the scattered *fragments* cannot be put into a coherent whole.
(embolded *italics* added) [ix]

It is important for the reader to reflect on this, for a moment longer, to remember the *bricoleur* [3] in order to anticipate flows that are commensurate to a yet-to-come, but already-there, chorus of critically significant writers of fragments.

In **Hereotopologies** [x] , Soja outlines some of the *more material or topological* aspects of *heterotopia*. He writes about some of the principles [4] outlined in Foucault's new field of knowledge and, then, explicates an important quote from Michel Foucault:

1) 'heterotopias are found in all cultures, every human group, although they take varied form and no single one is ever universal'
2) 'heterotopias can change in function and meaning over time, according to the particular 'synchrony of the culture' in which they occur'
3) 'the heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in one real place several different spaces, 'several sites that are in themselves incompatible' or foreign to one another'

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[2] With this statement a certain paradox has been created here between the reader and writer of this thesis, revolving around chance, becoming and anticipation.

[3] 'When Claude Levi-Strauss defines *bricolage* , he does so in terms of a set of closely related characteristics: the possession of a stock of materials or rules of thumb that are fairly extensive, though more or less hodge-podge – multiple and at the same time limited: the ability to rearrange fragments continually in new and different configurations; and , as a consequence an indifference toward the act of producing and toward a product, toward the set of instruments to be used and toward the over-all result to be achieved.' Deleuze and Guattari (1984:7)

[4] For examples which compliment these principles see pp. 15-16 from this paper by E. W. Soja (1996)

4) 'heterotopias are typically linked to slices of time, termed *heterochronies* 'for the sake of symmetry''

5) 'heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that simultaneously make them both isolated and penetrable'.

6) 'heterotopias have a function in relation to all space that remains, an 'external' almost wraparound function that 'unfolds' between two extreme poles;'

> *Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory (perhaps that is the role that was played by those famous brothels of which we are now deprived). Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled. This latter type would be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation, and I wonder if certain colonies have not functioned somewhat in this manner. In certain cases, they played on the level of the general organization of terrestrial space, the role of heterotopias.*
> *(Foucault 1986:27)*
> (*italics* original)

In this thesis, the physicality of this field of knowledge is not the main field of interest. It is much more about the connections and relevance to the geography of text and textual sites. *Heterotopic* thinking and material manifestations in the text also allow for the *becomings of singularities and multiplicities*. It is the device of inclusion. It is hard to exclude the *Other* in, on and around, a *heterotopic site*.

Elements of Sciences like Chemistry could be thought to have developed out of the practice of alchemy which sought to convert base into gold. An investment and effort, in an academic alchemy, to subvert base representational thinking that excludes the *Other* could be creative of a new economy of thought, where wealth is largely social production (remember the foreword).

A SIMPLE ETHICS OF WRITING

All these words may not fall, so neatly, into phase to deliver the structured, linear and logical but doesn't someone question, shout or state; 'in the beginning there was the word and the word was God ?'. At our leisure, or at some point in the future, let us become totally relaxed about these things since there can be loads of different beginnings. Loads of separate, disrupted and dissimilar interpretations to be made, designed and recalled.

There must not be this banality of thought, or tedious habitual flippancy of action, to progress uninterestingly and unproductively forward (unless, in an uncoded authenticity, the vortices of the flows so determine). Since 'the beginning' disguises many misfortunes for the unsuspecting, an *Ethic of Writing* must be drawn out - to

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explicate movement and aid the speed of thought. The yet-to-be implicated ethic, perhaps, demands that the movement must not be or become banal because of two good reasons.

Firstly, on the one hand, Hannah Arendt [5] observes, this banality is a characteristic of many forms of evil and never habitual.

> I spoke of 'the banality of evil' [...]it was not stupidity but *thoughtlessness*...It was this absence of thinking - which is so ordinary an experience in everyday life, where we hardly have the time, let alone the inclination, to *stop* and think – that awakened my interest. [xi]

Evil, so ordinary creeps so readily into the life of the everyday. If that be so, then is it not inexcusable for those vocationally engaged in thinking to allow its' banal progress into their images of thought? The absence of reflexivity is one of the greatest dangers, since thoughtlessness allows 'the banality of evil' space and time to invade and infect the lives of everyone.

Secondly, on the other hand, Fernando Pessao writes of its pervasiveness in surrendering to the uncharitable.

> I asked for very little from life, and even this was denied me. A nearby field, a ray of sunlight, a little calm along with a bit of bread, not to feel oppressed by the knowledge that I exist, not to demand anything of others – this was denied me, like the spare change we might deny the beggar not because we are mean-hearted but because we don't feel like unbuttoning our coat. [xii]

Pessao reminds us, through this quote, to combine a thinking with the challenge of an effort for *Others*. Not for him, such effortless acts as the unchallenging and truly uncharitable banker's order, with its payment of two pound a month to a charity, to appease our conscience. Such acts, by their routine, must always fail to become instruments that alleviate the pressing, yet undecidable, sorrows of the *Other*. His demands show the possibility of the infrequent and unregularised; the non-proceduralised effort that is needed to 'unbutton our coats': In the same dismissal of a chance response, the joy of a *productive communion* with the *Other* is denied from our lives and our becoming. What are left are the *habits* of the lifetime which alienate us from yet-to-be known social formations and becomings that arise from those collective productive engagements – those putative, though often proximal, unions, fraternities, sisterhoods et cetera.

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[5] The use of first names, or *prenoms,* as well as surnames when referencing quotes, at the end of each middle of thought, is a convention adopted here in this thesis to help to highlight those artists, poets, organizers or writers of thought that allow very sympathetic organizations, synthesis or connections. They are the singularities who without reservation or hesitation can be mobilized as friends in a productive process of affirmative multiplicity. Gilles Deleuze speaks of writing and philosophizing for friends.

The quote fronting this piece, at the top of the first page of this middle of thought, comes from Edward Said's book on the topic – *Beginnings Intentions and Methods*. [xiii] The questions that follow also come from that book:

> What sort of action, therefore, transpires at the beginning? How can we, while necessarily submitting to the incessant flux of experience, insert (as we do) our reflections on the beginning(s) into that flux? Is the beginning simply an artifice, a disguise that defies the perpetual trap of forced continuity? Or does it admit of a meaning and a possibility that are genuinely capable of realization? [xiv]

In each and every moment, there are countless other questions to be asked in the plethora of experiences imbibed by us; those that are implicated in each and every second; nested and enfolded in each and every day; explicated within each and every lifetime. With unimaginable frequency are we able to somehow create the duration, to allow ourselves to reflect, and name the beginnings in these moments? It could be that the beginning might just be a construct that forces a manageable framework to organize our realities. Would these be *repetitions of the same and similar?* Thinking beginnings might also stop us going mad. Or: Do we think 'beginnings' because we are mad? The latter seems most likely. Given these thoughts, a *Heterotopia* has to realise a presence which allows the *singularities and multiplicities their flow and flux* into relationships that never begin, but which move, unhindered, in free association and connectivity.

A *Heterotopia* is desired, one that provides *hospitality* to the *flaneur* and possibly to all other species or tribes. This site, in some occurrences, includes asylum seekers and *arrivants*. It allows them to combine together in social processes of a different productivity that are only realized through *poesis*. This they chance, against the odds of a broadly inhospitable set of sometimes tragic histories, that haunt them, with a remembrance of exclusion (more of this much later).

> The processes of the formation and socialization of the individual now unfold outside the productive cycle, in direct contact with the extreme fragility of every order and as training for confronting the most diverse possibilities, for the habit of having no habits, for a responsiveness to a continual change, to change without end or goal. [xv]

It is possible that things are done with the sole purpose of distracting us from both thinking the unthinkable, or hurting ourselves in the effort of trying to grapple with the reality that could be known to us. The reality that is hinted at through Virno's quote is not a desirable prospect for all:

> 'We are all mad, Inspector, for the simple reason that we don't know why we exist and this...' he waved his hand at the tissue of existence before him, 'this

life is how we distract ourselves so that we don't have to think about things too difficult for us to comprehend.' [xvi]

The problem, posed by Spinoza and Reich, may be directly concocted and moved into this flux of thought, specifically as a counterpoise to the laziness of thinking – in short, why do people vote for their own enslavement and oppression? The answers are multitude. Perhaps, it is because - to use two computer metaphors - their overall operating system has been so strongly scripted through the family, school and State, so that they can no longer easily arrive at another default position. Perhaps, it is because they have lost the spaces, places and duration to creatively develop their becomings. They no longer know the joys of a wider range of socially productive engagements. Perhaps, it is because their identities are so firmly fixed that they know only the same and similar.

In his book, Said writes about philosophy and literature; and, how each has used beginnings differently and for different purposes. He concludes that, to some extent, beginnings are linked to the need for 'origins' coming out of *religious necessity*. He looks at how beginnings can create a sense of loss. [xvii] There is, too, a fitness for purpose that beginnings provide in the history or histories required by certain discourses. These lines of thought aim to ensure discipline and enrolment to the prevailing paradigms of opaque elites. These are the elites who are constantly shaping and/or ordering knowledge and power formations. Said discusses those writers, such as Michel Foucault, who inform such critical and post structural debates. Beginnings are fundamental to a partnership, twinning representation and repetition to particular civilizing, socialization or educational purposes.

From such readings, one can see that beginnings are a necessary part of a world that becomes *socially constructed* and *hierarchical*. These thereby provide a particularly useful utility for a Western framework for colonization, expansion and globalization of empires of thought. This seeks to support a particular mode of thought, which places above the becoming of multiplicity and, perhaps all else, the profitable distribution of resources through global networks of production. This can only be done through material exploitation and domination.

Material domination and exploitation require force and, more often than not, a philosophical or other form of submission. A submission of doctorates that perform conformance in the pursuit of education, avoids the *learning that would generate joy* for the apprentice through a becoming shared with the *Other*. The only beginning is the beginning that supports one line of thought.

The beginning is someone's and, therefore, does not belong to someone else. The author's beginning cannot normally be the reader's beginning, not even at the point that interfaces the reading with the written. It is first a beginning for the dominant whilst other things are being determined by it. But the *Other* is never determined from it. The beginning negates the *Other*.

Beginnings form *a representation*. And for some, representations are almost the all of what can be obtained from reality. Some readers can nod their heads in the full knowledge that there can be no comprehensive knowledge of reality. But for the vast majority of people, living comfortably in the West, the real is what they sense. They have no questions about reality and the unreal, other than through encounters with God and death. No thought is given by them to representations. For the lazy or exhausted, giving time to thought is not part of the human condition. It could be simply argued that this predicament is the 'fault' of education.

Those who wish to have a world where alternative perspectives or world-views are productive, creative, generative and discursive could, say, point to France and those texts arising from seeds born of its soil. There – 'here' if you are French or reading in France or its colonies – philosophy is still taught as part of a State-supported curriculum, whilst in, say, England it is hard to find support for such organization of thoughts - even in the universities. And is not philosophy, the backbone subject of a university? Representation and the part it plays in our lives is an important component of our knowing. It directs the thinking that can be done about our lives.

SPACES OUTSIDE REPRESENTATIONS

Despite the critical mass of minority Writers, Artists and (dis)Organizers of thought, who have made a field of dissonance around representation a key note of their endeavours, there fails to be any major change to the majoriticism of representation. The majorities - or properly and, objectively speaking, the elite who are minorities - have ensured a "Macdonaldisation" of thought. It succeeds, in maintaining a foothold on thinking and knowing. And the importance of understanding representation has been played before us, for some centuries, from the fertile thoughts of writers from other lands.

Some centuries past, Arthur Schopenhauer opened his opus with the words;

> 'The world is my representation': this is the truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself. [xviii]

Despite such clear and categorical statements, much of Western thought has chosen not to struggle, grapple or madden itself with disclosures, or purposeful efforts, to open the spaces between representation and its *Other* ; comfort and laziness prevail, taking smug acceptance to a rigid form. To be of this culture means to accept, all too literally, what can be said. This remains more real than other things. The importance

of the word adds choice. It diminishes, or solidifies, any reality or event. It seeks to give preeminence to data arising from the senses concerned with touch, taste and smell. The logical positivists, and their like, rallying to the sentiment;

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. [xix]

But even for all those who wish to traverse the spaces, sites or voids enclosing, enveloping, reflecting or inflecting representation, some may be unable to comprehend the possibility or potentiality of the *Other* ; they remain enclosed in the territories of the non-*Other*. One must be careful not to become the being for whom it is all too easy to say: 'Let us only speak of representations' when one wishes to speak to the *Others* - to whom representation does not speak at all.

Anyway, they're talking about things they don't understand at all. It's only their stupidity that makes them so sure. A few words with someone of my own intellectual class would make everything incomparably clearer than talking for hours to these fellows. [xx]

Now here lies another difficulty. How does one speak? A perspective, on the quote from Wittegenstein, might well be that words cannot disclose what might be revealed or sensed from Music, Art or Theatre. Unless, of course, you chose to be an all round misanthrope. But, if we are choosing words, sentences or paragraphs – the text – does the style and form, with calculated omissions, disallow more to be said? In many instances, silence and the spaces it creates gives much more than the word or sound-image.

The one looked like a liar. But he wasn't. He was an elider, an omitter, an excluder, an editer, but he wasn't guarding his own secrets. That was the difference. [xxi]

Now a space is created which might not be quite the *Heterotopia* envisaged. It is a space that should slide from a *'middle'* - or a *'multiple of middles'* - to *'another middle'*; and so, ad infinitum. It should in this way, therefore, forever evade the capture and confinement of the *'beginning'*. It is a space where *and, and, and another, another and another, and another and* et cetera assemble, together in a stream that flows, but which then denies a beginning. This last statement is incorrect. There is never the duration of denial in such movements. They are *not-yet, about-to-become* and, always naturally, remain a *Nietzschean* affirmation. There is an erasure of the beginning which is not reactive. It is in a sense, the erasure which is the affirmative act of the *Other* so that its *Other* - which is always denied within the negativity of the presence of the beginning, and the presence by the insertion of the word – finds its singularity and multiplicities. It becomes its *becomings*.

There is also an erasure to a beginning text - a logical space of given dimension fitting comfortably in a locomotion of a particular image of thought. The beginning text is a linear engine linked to other subsequent compartments of thought - without

drive or desire but of similar length - which gives the train of being the thesis, and a nicely measured thought. There cannot be a beginning, even if it is produced as text, since our time and space are not themselves at the beginning but forever in the middle (this much is even true in the 'world' view of a scientist). Stretching and folding this thought, and text, then creates a becoming which is *'Endlessly' in the middle of the space, which is infinity, and the time, which is eternity.*

The effort and velocity to create spaces for the rhizomatic middle will probably fail, or falter, because of language. But then the escape or flight lines have trajectories that are truly never at moments proximal to the beginning. Paradoxically, they are endlessly never ever nearer an ending and this extends to a series, up to infinity and eternity: Explicated further they are not-yet-there; there; or, almost about to arrive.

The quote, by Robertson Davies, at the top of the first page – yes, reader not the beginning of the chapter - adds to two below that give mood, tone or space to the middle of thought, or to thought that is becoming rhizomatic. So 'all periods of time are at an equal distance from eternity' conflates and inflates with the next couple of quotes:

> 'Behold this gateway, dwarf!' I went on: 'it has two aspects. Two paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end.
> 'This long lane behind us: it goes to eternity. And that long lane ahead of us – another eternity. [6]
> 'They are in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is written above it: "Moment".
> 'But if one were to follow them further and even further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?'
> 'Everything straight lies,' murmured the dwarf disdainfully.
> 'All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.' [xxii]

And, another addition and another quote of the eternal and infinite:

> The void of the future: there death has our future. The void of the past; there death has its tomb. [xxiii]

PLEASE ALLOW ME TO INTRODUCE MYSELF

There are many different sets of problems and challenges - facing a ' *Writer'*, *'Thinker'*, *'Author'*, *'Commentator'* or *'Organizer'* - when preparing, drafting, amending and then finally agreeing, the completion of a text through production from a singularity to submission to a multiplicity of *Others*.

There is, then, quite another matter, relating to a particular set of problems which hinge around the assemblage of singularities of words and sentences. This is the

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[6] Sic, no end quotation mark

problem of an assemblage into a multiplicity on a visual display unit, or piece of paper, known or signified under the sign of the *"Introduction"*.

For both sets of problems there are common ones, such as the problem that the text can only partially represent. This might be said to be true, since it holds, whether this is as an unconnected image of thought or an inadequate aspect of whatever is deemed to be real.

At this stage, it might be wise to consider a simple question: What is normally done to address the problems associated with writing the *"Introduction"*? In response, it might be said that powers like education and science act as the Western States' civilizing forces and continually take effect.

So great are the effects of these constructions and scripts, that the normalized amongst society have been provided with a psychological and reactive menu. This makes available a *habitual* response for them when they are facing such sets of difficulties, as writing an introduction and thesis. Is it uninteresting that the response does not need to be guessed, abducted, hypothecated, induced or deduced, since it is already self-evident?   The *habit* has no need to be recovered, discovered or uncovered. The *habit* has no need of *archaeology or genealogy* because it was revealed in the first sentence of this paragraph. It is the *habit* that seeks, but usually looks for, the *same and the similar then replicates and represents.* The at-handedness and efficiency of the habits can too easily make for a smooth, effortless and lazy thought progression, which disingenuously makes over a convincing resemblance to the logical.

It is a *habit* that is representative of a type of thinking that is unable to think *difference* as *difference*.   For the vast majority, difference can only be *repeated, reproduced or re-produced*, as something to be assimilated in the *same or similar.* Order, universities, education, authority, science [7] and scientism are defended through such productions. More often than not, the only critiques produced are inauthentic ones that ensure the preservation – perhaps with slight amendments – of these *Institutions* and their *re*maining mechanisms for *re*pression and control, *re*forming conformance.

> Deleuze calls such thinking the 'philosophy of representation'. The authority which it obeys is the principle of identity, whose mark is found in the iterative prefix RE – of the word 'representation'. Every present must be re-presented, in order that it may be re-discovered as the same; it follows that in this philosophy the unknown is only ever a not-yet-recognised known, that to learn is to remember, that to encounter is to meet again, that to leave is to return, etc. What eludes this rationalism, then, is difference as such. The difference between *discovery* and *rediscovery* is the gap which separates an experience from its reiteration – whence the problem of *repetition.*

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[7] But as Professor Martin Parker noted, when reading this thesis, 'science very often challenges institutions too!'

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(*italics* original) [xxiv]

The strategically significant RE-word is of course *reactive*. Now let us move to affirmations becoming conscious of the dangers and implications of reactive responses. The risk is that being conscious of such factors might in-itself dissuade a proper becoming. In order, or in disorder, to *think difference*, it must be produced so that the *identical is disallowed*. And, repetition is then used to refer to the production of difference and not 'as the return of the same through the reiteration of the identical'.[xxv]

A SINGULAR PRESENTATION OF REPRESENTATION

It may be permissible, desired or prudential to commit so early on - in this introduction, which is so far from infinity and eternity - to a choice between the two alternative images of thought. On the one hand, there is an image of thought which seeks to produce difference. On the other hand, there is a grounding thought and text in the philosophy, order or organization, of representation. The choice must be determined from an affirmation. The affirmation of the becoming that escapes capture and confinement is the one chosen.

Presumably, the pre-individual sensibilities that meet in the event, which is creative of an assemblage some know as the self (albeit for others a fractured self), is that which perceives difference. For the stabilized self, the habits which become president, ever resident, stubbornly ensure that faculties have difficulty in easily perceiving difference. So how can we know or produce difference now?

One must *attend to* these matters somehow, possibly very bravely - but perhaps not carefully. When difference has occurred, in the very action of re-tracing our path to monitor, there arises with speed a series of barriers to the processes productive of the common, or social, and this corrupts or destroys the flows of desire. Monitoring of repetition is mundanely and banally dangerous and unhealthy to becomings. The looking back, against the flow of becomings, may help us understand what is mirrored and reflected, but our reading of Orpheus should only affirm becomings without reflections. [8]

The conscious activity of reflexivity on difference looks for the dissimilar. It only knows the dissimilar by scanning for the same and similar. This reactive action nullifies the flows of thought and desire. It corrupts the connections of fluxes of singularities and prevents their free association in multiplicities or say in a different series - what Badiou has called elements – multiple of multiples.[xxvi]

> [O]nce one strips identity from multiplicity there is nothing to prevent multiplicity from belonging to any other multiplicities.

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[8] Both Derrida and Blanchot have written on Orpheus; see, as an instance, Maurice Blanchot (1989) Op cit. pp.171-176.

It has been a specific train of thought which leads us here to this middle within a middle of thought. Some more free flow of chance deliberations are needed between the stimulus of starting a thesis, or discourse, and the activity of generating a forward response – this procedure usually results in the habit of copying the same and similar. But, before more thought is given to this habit, let there be a brief moment to consider the generality of a habit.

Samuel Beckett reminds us that;

> The laws of memory are subject to more general laws of habit. Habit is a compromise effected between the individual and his environment, or between the individual and his own organic eccentricities, the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning-conductor of his existence. Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. Breathing is a habit. Life is a habit. Or rather life is a succession of habits, since the individual is a succession of individuals; the world being a projection of the individual's consciousness (an objectivation of the individual's will, Schopenhauer would say), the pact must be continually renewed, the letter of safe conduct brought up to date. The creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but takes place every day. Habit is then the generic term for the countless treatises concluded between countless subjects that constitute the individual and their countless correlative objects. [xxvii]

And, then, there is this quote:

> I am Zarathrustra the Godless: I still cook every chance in my pot.

This is considered by Luke Rhinehart [xxviii] in his opening list of quotes to his book. The one above, comes by way of Friedrich Nietzsche, and this is then complemented by another from *Chuang-Tzu* which is given below;

> The torch of chaos and doubt – this is what the sage steers by.

The book is about living one's life by the roll of a dice/die. Let's chance a chance. Before throwing the die, the numbers on each of its sides are assigned an alternative choice of action. There is now an action, or alternative assignment, for each side to the numbers one to six. In this case, a roll and reveal of the number one generates text about a Deleuzian interpretation of Cinema.

Other rolls and reveals give four quite different alternatives for the numbers two to five. It is fortunate for some that the roll of the die revealed six. Had it displayed one, then the bifurcation would have picked up the theme of vomit from the above quote by Samuel Beckett. This would have then allowed, or 'forced', the text to consider a viewpoint of the book and film *Crash*. Body and technology, united and assembled in a conceptualization of Cyborgization et cetera, would have found space here and now, it would have included texts such as Bell and Kennedy. [xxix]

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But the hand of fate determined another difference.

At this juncture, further effort and attention is required. A pattern is being established and care must be exercised to ensure a particular habit does not gain its full measure. The orthodox, linear, rational, Western, male, heterosexual practices of discourse have a habit. It is one of re-presenting a unidirectional trajectory. This is not only around the historic but, also, on the images of thought produced by those gaining their apprenticeships in universities. So far, a desire has been *implicated* in the bold quotations at the 'beginning' of this middle of thought. Desire which also has an *explication*, or unfolding, gained immanence in the momentum and velocity of the body of thought and written text, that immediately followed. A *movement* has been tried. A viscosity has been altered, disrupted and interrupted between the usual flows of ink on paper. But so easily this flux, flow or *process* of the introduction can be halted by the very being of an introduction.

Taking time out now for a rest, from what Robert Chia [xxx] calls *'Upstream Thinking'*, to replenish so as not suffer the fatigue that exhausts efforts against the mainstream, rather like the salmon swimming upstream (see, how easily metaphor and metonyms displace difference). In this case the might, current and weight is not the river but hierarchical organization that requires Sisyphean will to overcome the reactive – such effort marks endeavours to create processes and spaces for emancipators of lines of thought.

In this textual break, consideration is given over to the familiar, a recognized structure that confines thought around a historical interpretation. This image of thought renders itself as being and, by this fact, it stands as the very antithesis of the fragmentary. More often than not, it gathers together in whole series, plausible causes to create volumes of argument, with ossified categories and definitions, for stabilizing the self, selves and any number of established schools of thought. No, it is all too much! This is both an inauthentic and disingenuous sleight of hand. It undermines the thought that has developed and matured during the duration of the doctorate thus far. Even this is incorrect. The apprenticeship, thus far, has removed those striations that usually mark and manage the becomingness of thought.

Perhaps a preferred orientation would be around a process that adopts a genealogical approach. [9] This might be tidier. It does not, however, become indicative of the velocity and critical mass of the energies, released in streams of consciousness and unfolded beyond structural confinements, whose contents might well be radical, but nonetheless perform a disrupted line dancing of thought.

The next movement - in mind but not yet in sight - is to quote Nietzsche again and, by that act, draw a fine genealogical line that has its *becoming/s* re-vitalized. But

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[9] See, for example, Michel Foucault 'Nietzsche, Genealogy and History' in Paul Rabinow (1984) (Ed.) *The Foucault Reader* Middlesex: Penguin Books. pp. 76-100.and Friedrich Nietzsche (1967) *On the Genealogy of Morals* tr. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage.

interestingly, by such a chance occurrence, the possibility and potential of an infinite and eternal repetition of alternatives emerging is glimpsed. It is from the once thought but now discarded. Here you have it, the flow of a process where the singularity of an event speaks loudly. It speaks that there are various potential capacities and capabilities yet to arise. They hover around, and within, a volcanic larval flow of thought in virtual spaces that can become any diagonal or circular relationship with an *Other*. It can become any number of possibilities, multiplicities or actualities.

So consider for a moment, the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of body of the text up to now. Quite simply, consider the workers who have been named to this point; Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Samuel Beckett (1906-1989), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Is there any commonality around the organization of their thoughts? Trapped, once again, at looking for the same or similar, a quick turn is required, but unfortunately a sameness and similarity sprouts forward, in that, they appeared to valorize difference. If this is not true, then there is a perspective that places them as post-Kantian. They each allow disorganization from the hierarchical wisdom and religion of Western Representation.

A genealogy is now in the making, for instance, certainly in his earliest writings, Friedrich Nietzsche was influenced and then took his influence from Arthur Schopenhauer. [10] It might be said that Friedrich reinterpreted conceptual artifacts like the *Will* from Arthur. Samuel Beckett acknowledged his debts to both. Then Michel Foucault mediated a discourse around *Power*, which has had a line of flight from Nietzsche's milieu or plateau. And, then, quite separately Gilles Deleuze, singularly and in the mutliplicity with Felix Guattari (1930-1992), re/mis-interprets from Nietzsche to create a powerful series of arguments using *Desire*, which could be interpreted very much akin to Schopenhauer's *Will*. Has this gone full circle? Or, are there lots of singularities, each participating in a multiplicity to denounce the anthem of Western representational thought? Looking at each, can easily end up as an exercise of representing the same and similar. But looking at the collective - not as a whole - but in the fragments and spaces of their thought, is creative of an *'in-betweeness'* of difference.

This digression sought to create an anticipation, a hint, an unfolding or simply a crack within the linear crawl of the text. It was a welcoming, or an opening, for the *"ideal reader"*. Lechte reminds us of what Umberto Eco has, in his mind, when he refers to the ideal reader:

> Eco is fond of quoting from *Finnegans Wake* which refers to 'that ideal reader suffering from insomnia'...The ideal reader is not so much a perfect reader as one who represents the range of possible readings justified in the terms of the structure of the text itself – the reader who is *awake* to these possibilities.

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[10] See, for instance, Friedrich Nietzsche (1997) 'Schopenhauer the Educator' in *Untimely Meditations* Daniel Breazeale (Ed.) tr. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 125-194. and Bryan Magee (1997) *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.290-293.

(*italics* original) ^{xxxi}

This, then, is a reader that has singularities that are capable of easily becoming a multiplicity or multiplicities. Unfolding from this slight digression and returning now to the prior enfoldment of the text: These movements and flows around the *Will, Will to Power and Desire* are unlikely to be examined in a later middle of thought but, of course, this case depends on the chance becoming/s of thought. As an act of unnecessary transparency, it is true to say, at the first visioning of text - before reading Deleuze, Guattari and their becomings - it was fully considered that such an assemblage of *Will, Will to Power and Desire* was desired. It was discussed as a possible outcome. But just in time, the self of the author fragmented with the reading of Deleuze and Guattari; and, then the untimely singularity of *A* emerged, easily countering any barriers to the flow of thought arriving from the disciplines and *dressage* of representative culture.[11]

For this moment, the flow continues on its course, or through what might only be now seen as a series of hair-line cracks, to displace any re-terroritialising tendencies formed through habit (or forced by over-determined caution). For the moment, let us consider in slightly more depth the nature of *habits* or, at least, Nietzsche's pronouncements on them. Nehemas shows that in looking at Nietzsche.

> Dominant habits and character-traits, while they are dominant, assume the role of the subject; in terms of a metaphor, they assume the role of the leadership. It is such traits that speak the voice of the self when they are manifested in action. Their own unity is what allows them to become the subject that, at least for a time, says "I". In the situation we are discussing, however, the leadership is not stable. Since different and often incompatible traits coexist in one body, different patterns assume the 'regent's' role at different times.[xxxii]

It was noted earlier, prior to the throw of a die, that activities to represent models and copies are the consequence of a particular *habit*. This often overwhelming, all-consuming, fetish for the same and similar is no less apparent when consideration is made of the class of people known as academics than when comparison is made to, say, managers outside academia. There are regulators everywhere. For the brotherhood and sisterhood of doctoral candidates, or the long-serving apprentice learning the art of crafting introductions, there are models and copies of peer-validated theses and introductions to emulate (but not copy). These can be found in scholastic archives. They multiply unproductively, unable to achieve the productivity of the multiple. They form an over abundance of paper mass on the shelves of most libraries of higher education. They reflect a scarcity of thought that never allows the

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[11] In discussions with John Stewart, the Irish Pastels and Acrylic Painter, he told of his life-long endeavours to move absolutely away from any form of representation, in the activities known as painting, to then proceed to expression that was the Noumena. He immediately grasped the word 'becoming' in the discussions about philosophy and the difficulties facing a candidate for a doctorate who sought to express the difference of Noumena.

peoples, or masses, to become the multiplicities that reflect singular *becomings*. The weight of these texts cannot give measure to a common abundance which upsets the restrictive practices, almost solely, determined for the needs of markets.

> In the wake of significant 'revolutionary' breaks insulated micro-communities rapidly emerge to practice 'normal science' (Kuhn, 1960) that unfolds the logic of an emergent, overarching 'paradigm' to simply add qualification and footnote to debates that never fail to find ever finer grains of empirical and minor theoretical differences and distinctions. Doctoral theses and research apprenticeships simply become sites within which training and discipline is exercised to form an apprenticeship into ever more narrowly defined and highly specialized fields of enquiry.[xxxiii]

As a form of good practice, and as a way to familiarize postgraduates and doctoral candidates about what might be rightly expected, during their apprenticeship, supervisors frequently recommend that they review several successful theses. Serres argues and complains;-

> Much as they detest each other, the press and academia have this repetitiveness in common. Theses and popular magazines – the same duplication. [xxxiv]

There seems, then, to be a need for some *autonomy*. It is needed to express the *Other* of duplication. This is as true of academics as it is other people. But the word *autonomy* has connotations. For example, Autonomous Academics need not necessarily be associated with Autonomous Marxists, who may explicate their thought through mediums associated with Anarchist Academics, who may themselves, in the first instance, somewhat surprisingly and commonly, find *difference* on sites where magazines are more popular than academic papers. There in the streets can be found the 'most lively intellectuals' capable of delivering a proper education (perhaps that should be learning).

> The newsstand functioned as a meeting point for émigrés and dissidents, and attending late-night discussions was one of the highlights of Chomsky's youth. 'That's where I got my political education.' The great moments of my life in those days were when I could work at the newsstand at night and listen to all this. 'They were the most lively intellectuals I've ever met. On the other hand, there are plenty of people who teach in elite universities whose work could be done by a well-trained clerk.' [xxxv]

Another statement, mobilized by Chomsky, is useful because it reminds us what a university, and therefore what its apprenticeships, ought to be about achieving. That which should be valorized is something around a 'spiritual life' for those concerned with learning and research.

Wihelm von Humoldt, the linguist and Enlightenment thinker, who defined the university as 'nothing other than the spiritual life of those human beings who are moved by external leisure or internal pressures toward learning and research'.[xxxvi]

But let us fold back, for a moment, to the autonomy of other writers of autonomy, who remind us of the conditions that place disciplinary aspects upon us.

One is always still in the family, always still in the school, always still in the prison, and so forth. [xxxvii]

They usefully and productively provide the conceptual link for the reader to a practice, or process, that is the hand-maiden of constitutive enterprises, which subverts the constituted power of those concerned with exploitation and oppression. They point to the immanence of thought, brought to our attention through a *constitutive* flow of power, that moves through the thoughts of Deleuze (although strictly speaking this should be Deleuze and Guattari) to those of Baruch Spinoza.

The constitutive practice of the multitude is not the means to anything but its own power. This practice is not performance; it does not look to its representation of effects, nor focus its energies on sending a message. This alternative practice operates on an entirely different plane than that of representation. (Constitutive practice thus gives us the tools for the most powerful and adequate critique of the performance of terrorism, and of the entire plane of representational politics.) Deleuze would say that this constitutive practice poses a power not separated from but internal to what it can do; means and ends are posed in an internal relationship of efficient causality. The only logic constituent practice follows is the expansive rhythm of the power of the multitude. This practice is divine in the Spinozian sense that its savage action destroys and constitutes being. It is unalloyed and unrepresentable, affirming its own power. [xxxviii]

Collectives, formed in becomings, whether the trinity of Indian Hindu Gods known as Shiva, Brahma and Vishnu, or any other multiplicity explicated from a set of singularities, have the power within themselves to destroy, sustain and create. They have the power of being productive. [12]

Having made the point about immanence and constitutive power, Negri and Hardt immediately continue with words that outline a heritage or political genealogy

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[12] This is not just to privilege an Eastern movement. One speed and velocity of thought speaks of the nature and flow of an order and organization, which includes destructive forces or violence to things, which are beyond, elsewhere or without any possibility of an application of a moral or transcendental position. A scientist can also create other velocities of thought; readers could, for example, refer to David Bohm (1995) *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* London: Routledge, to see how quantum physics can explicate a different order. The chapter 'Fragmentation and Wholeness' is also relevant to this thesis. pp. 1-18. Dr. Simon Lilley felt there could be a useful footnote to 'Schumpeter *'Creative Gales of Destruction'* or indeed, the fascism of the Positivists.'

founded, to an extent, in historical materialism. Importantly for this thesis, they draw forth, for our attention, the critical and strategic concept of *self-valorisation*. Thought properly, and to its' own conclusion, this should have a colossal and affirmative resonance. This is especially so for those seeking a material apprenticeship that is productive of academic autonomy, and which, therefore, transgresses far beyond the thresholds that contain the murmurs of the regulations and habits of peer-review.

> Constitutive practice is precisely what we earlier saw emerging in the prerequisites of communism. The exodus of the multitude from the strictures of State order is the march of an unrepresentable community. The productive cooperation of the social worker, through techno-scientific, immaterial, and affective labor, creates the networks of self-valorisation that animate constituent power. (We will return to develop this theme in terms of the genealogy of the constituent subject.) [xxxix]

The affirmation of a certain kind of thought can always be considered 'untimely'. Deleuze and Guattari [xl] agree with Nietzsche that the creation of new concepts is an inherently political activity. Its goal should not be just the recognition of existing states of affairs or the justification of the present in thought. For this reason, they describe it as an 'untimely' mode of thinking that calls for 'a new earth, a new people'

So, to the mode of untimely must be added an authenticity which releases flows: Bhabha notes authenticity is often fed by very inauthentic responses which must be seen as counter productive to releasing a free and authentic flow. The journey without limits carries those within its flow and escapes to a territory outside the boundaries of representation.

> The desire to emerge as 'authentic' through mimicry – through a process of writing and repetition – is the final irony of partial representation. [xli]

PARTIAL REPRESENTATIONS AT THEIR BEST

'Partial representation', as a universal proposition for all things, is paradoxically something proximal to reality and there are a number of examples, in fact, an endless stream of partial representations, but a constant and personal one will now be shared. It relates to a perspective in relation to drawing and painting.

Consider a child, either a boy or a girl, who knows little about classic forms, one who wishes to paint as he or she sees things. Think about the type and style of representation either one of them might want any number of viewers to confront, when viewing their drawings or paintings.

And now, you readers are asked to confront your own viewpoints. Also, consider that for the child this is the first paradox, or dilemma, that he or she has had to grapple with - one which, in their mind, did not seem at all appropriate for discussions with

others but, especially, not with adults. This child spends many days and nights in thought, thinking about the paradox. New thoughts start to arise with every praxis and these then cause further reflection. The paradox is situated in the activity of painting or drawing of what is seen and apprehended. Should it be 'recreated', 'created' or 'invented'? Its result is the painting that the knowledgeable child would have expected only great artist-polymaths like Leonardo Da Vinci to paint.

The paradox arises from what we properly see but immediately un-remember; it cannot be forgetting because that activity is far too active and sporadic in nature and application. Without moving your head, keeping your stare as it is on the paper, relax your focus on this text, make yourself aware of the peripheral points and boundaries of your vision. You know there is no straight-line frame or boundary, to what you see, other than the frame of the screen or boundaries of the paper. If you are wearing glasses then you ought to be conscious of the frames. In any case, you can now 'see' parts of your body. Your hands, if they are in front of a hypothetical vertical plumb line or axis falling from your eyes, may be 'seen'. Now try to gain a visual awareness of those parts of your face that protrude forward of your eye sockets. Is there a something without distinct form, which you know only from memory is your nose, and can you see your eyebrows? Knowing it is your nose comes from seeing your face in a mirror or photograph?

For most *re*aders, complying with the above *re*quest, it should be apparent that we do not see things as if they were captured in a visual *re*ctangular frame. It should, therefore, be wondrous and extremely surprising that almost all paintings and photographs are 'framed' and are the *re*ctangular *re*presentations of *re*ality, which exclude these large chunks of what could be seen, at least, by this *re*viewer, author and commentator.

Perhaps, a schizoid would see what is to be seen and not *re*spond with a telling that *re*frames a partial *re*presentation of the visual. It is hard to *re*fresh, or start afresh, without memory and instruction as guide. But fresh fluxes of vitality and new productive moments would proliferate in the case of a surface from which frames and *re*frames of *re*ference never found mark, script, foundation or root.

Spontaneous and vital chance eruptions, from such a space without territory and a time without measure, might be creative of a repetition that is the absolute *Other* of the same and similar. This would then be the untimely duration and space without territory. It and its connection would thus be the *milieu*, site or *plateau* of repetition of difference – it would be *heterotopic and hospitable*. This surface or body has a sound image. It exists without functions or repeatable and equivalent utility. It is, therefore, incapable of definition. It is an *uncarved block*.

BwO

In *Anti-Capitalism and Schizophrenia* [xlii], *Deleuze and Guattari* acknowledge the closeness of the prospect of another event - that of a *breakdown*. The event is the

failure of failing attempts to breakthrough barriers, and other things, which restrict the limits, directions and velocity of movements of *Desire*. And of 'schizo': they pose the rhetorical question:

> Why the same word, schizo, to designate both the process insofar as it goes to the limit, and the result of the process insofar as it runs against the limit and pounds endlessly away there? Why the same word to designate both the eventual breakthrough and the possible breakdown, and all the transitions, the intrications of the two extremes? [xliii]

They [xliv] point to Antonin Artaud as a *schizophrenic* because of his affirmations and his breaking down of the *signifier*. Literature and particularly 'Strange Anglo-American literature' [xlv] together with Art are important to them to help develop style and live a nomadic lifestyle beyond limits.

> The full body without organs is produced as antiproduction, that is to say it intervenes within the process as such for the sole purpose of rejecting any attempt to impose on it any sort of triangulation implying that it was produced by parents. How could it be produced by its parents, when by its very nature it is such an eloquent witness of its own self-production, of its own engendering of itself? And it is precisely here on this body, right where it is, that the Numen is distributed and disjunctions are established, independent of any projection. *Yes, I have been my father and I have been my son.* "I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and my self." [xlvi]

Felix and Gilles make much of a *'body without organs'* or *'BwO'*, which conveys many number of things. But, for now, it might simply be considered and summarized by Massumi like this;

> Imagine the body in suspended animation: intensity = 0...Think of the body without organs as the body outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory; this is the body from the point of view of its potential or virtual. [xlvii]

Now the *BwO* becomes inscribed and its surfaces become *striated* by various processes and encounters. Through various syntheses with other energies and events, the potential for desire-production becomes limited. Often these limitations take the form of *habits* and these, then, *reduce the potential of virtual and actual chance encounters* to become productive and affirmative.

From cradle to grave, through family to school, from job or career to redundancy or retirement, inscriptions pollute the smooth surfaces of the body without organs - so that the *BwO* fulfills not itself but society's agenda. The *BwO* becomes a *'baby'* with *'mummy'* and *'daddy'*. Then in the case of England, a stifling or stultifying ordering of the English of Education insists those appellations give way to the nomenclature of 'Year 1 or Year 2' et cetera. Such absurdities persist through the Education structures

and programmes, although these are never present in the process of learning that is life, and so repetition of representation continues, whilst the repetition of difference has no stimulus.

This introduction starts as a *BwO*. The 'extent' to which the introduction and thesis remain as a singular *BwO*, or several or multiple *BwOs*, is 'determined' by the openness of channels of relationships, connections and communications. It has happened when a transgressive, torrential, free flow of thought, ever more expansive and voluminous, exceeds any coding and allows no exclusion from the outside. Then externalities are *enfolded* through *chance*, when certain *speeds* of *multiplicities, singularities* and *becomings* give *Desire* the freest and most autonomous reign.

This image of productive and common synthesis is the *Heterotopia* rather than the formulaic of forced, or compliant, practice that is utopian for the capitalist or his state agent. The thesis then is the space and time of *Heterotopia*. And here, the *flâneur and bricoleur* seek to go to the breaking point and not the braking point.

Now it would seem that, at times, Art is a process by which the *BwO* is itself affirmed. It provides some sort of blanket surface against inscriptions from the outside classes of hierarchical arrangements, ordering and disciplines. Massumi uses the *trope* of larvae to describe the various energies and intensities that are active on the *BwO* . This is prior to and before they conform to habits or order-words. He says of those larvae struggling to be released:

> Sometimes the tension grows to the breaking point, and a crisis ensues. Recuperative mechanisms usually ensure that the larval breakout is a breakdown leading back to the grid. The categories reactivate. The leash tightens. In rare instances, breakdown veers into breakaway, a line of escape back to the nonlimitative body without organs and the increased potential residing there. That is called "art" (whether or not a painting or poem is produced). [xlviii]

FOLDINGS

Art comes, or at least is often defined, by periods and styles: The Baroque is particularly interesting to Gilles Deleuze [xlix], as he explains in *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque.* From the title it is self-evident that both Gottfried Wilheim Leibniz and the folding of things provide some interest to the French Philosopher. They produce machines for movement. Deleuze often uses a number of (dis)organizers of thought to escape limitations and, thereby, think thinking or thought as a breakout activity. [13] Why Baroque one might ask? The term Baroque came to apply to a form and period

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[13] Coincidently, most of these philosophers he write about have z in their names - Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergzon (the latter a joke shared between Gilles Deleuze during an interview with Claire Parnet where she puts a whole series of questions for Deleuze to consider about words from A to Z, see the http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/D-G/ABC1.html.

which followed the breach of the rules, limitations and prohibitions imposed on Art and Literature. These limitations were those set by the Church.

> The new style came as a release and a fulfillment, and led to an exuberance and splendour of artistic production [...] 'Baroque' was originally a term of abuse, apparently derived from the Portuguese word 'barroco', meaning a large, irregular shaped pearl, which by extension came to mean anything contorted or eccentric.[1]

Likewise, the word rude originally meant without form. During this period, different aspects of form and representation came to be accepted: Certainly, the curve and the fold are noticeable in the paintings of artists like Velasquez, Caravaggio and Vanmeer. And although the latter, more so than some, was interested in space, line and simplicity, he did not capture the essence of the unframed totality available to these eyes. However, it is the fold and foldings which starts to deliver a movement, which breaks the capacity to represent, through say a simple frame, whilst also making the envelopment of the outside within the inside and vice versa.

For them, and most other painters, the visual image remained the two-dimensional frame, recoding and recording the three-dimensions, which then affected the way thought became available and known to others through re-presentation. But sculptures and architecture started to have pronounced enfoldments.

Despite all this, the extent of displacements of religious restrictions, in these Baroque instances, was not enough to enable Western Man to break through as a schizo. It would appear that their singular or collective desires did not amount to much. Certainly, not as much as might be needed to assemble critical thresholds of intensities which affirmed difference and *Otherness* and, therefore, did not re-present. The lower thresholds of intensities or barriers also limited the life of the multiple and multiplicity.

In later centuries, the relaxation of territories, both to becomings and unrestrictive flows, found a place through the Theatre: Antonin Artaud recognized both the fulfillment that could be had and those who had broken through or broken down. He recognized the painters of difference.

> Artaud the Schizo. From the depths of his suffering and his glory, he has the right to denounce what society makes of the psychotic in the process of decoding the flows of desire (*Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society*). (*italics* original)[li]

DOMAINS OF SENSES

It is truly uncommon to find any female painter that is universally famous (or just very well known) in any of the historical periods that predate the modern. Certainly, none are forthcoming from the Baroque and here lies the reason for the persistence. It

would seem that within the dominant forms of representations their features of exclusiveness remain uncommonly perfect.

In Literature and History rather than Art, the female gender achieves relatively high levels of public acknowledgement and reputation when considered against the dominance of the male: achieving sometimes noticeable densities, or mapping, of their contributions within some epistemes but even then the domineering Western male establishment remains unhappy (however, it ought not to be forgotten that patriarchy remains global).

Constance Classen, in *The Color of Angels*, investigates and interprets the symbolism of sense, through various periods of Western Culture, tracing the *aesthetics of senses*. She reveals the gender politics surrounding the senses and notes:

> Women who read and wrote instead of sewing and spinning often faced wrath and ridicule for transgressing the limits of their gender domain. The intensity of such attacks in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries indicates that after the Enlightenment, the literary women replaced the witch in some ways as a focus for male anxiety over disruptive femininity. While women tried to emulate the literary "vision" of men, the argument went, their work was inevitably impregnated with the animalistic reek of femininity.[lii]

In the first half of her book, entitled *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*[liii], Dorothea Olkowski considers at length a Deleuzian perspective. Then, as the title implies, she seeks to ruin the repetition of representation with its male, hierarchical, organizational and ordering consequences.

In the book, there is a wonderful sense of movement and a challenging facilitation of Deleuzian thought, leading progressively towards the creation of new modes of thought and life. And, like other feminist writers using Deleuzian machines to assemble, recode or regroup around new milieaux, she does so with a panache that matches the pace, dynamics and style of Deleuze and Guattari.

More importantly, the radical or revolutionary fractures created, reflect the deflection and disruption of the ordering demanded from the outside and subvert its dominance. At the heart of the issue is the *embodiment of thought* and the insistence placed upon certain senses in discourse. [14]

Barbara Kennedy, in *Deleuze and Cinema* [liv], interestingly uses a Deleuzian perspective on Cinema not to explore it, but to advance a feminist advocacy of thought. She shows how this Art form can be applied to rethink more liberating

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[14] For examples of other feminist working and affirming themselves through *Deleuze* , see a general collection of works in Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (2000) *Deleuze and Feminist Theory* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, and Elizabeth Grosz (1994) *Volatile Bodies Toward a Corporeal Feminism*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, which is more specific in using an argument centred around the body to create a difference.

alternatives to current perspectives. There are others who have also sought to emancipate.

Recent paragraphs, in this thesis, started with a reference to Olkowski to whom it now returns. She has used the work of a feminist artist to fracture the images of representation. In her discussion, she raises questions about the rectangular and conforming frames of paintings. These are not the same as those made, in certain preceding paragraphs written here, but they, nonetheless, raise questions about *re*considering formats, structures and other formulae applied as much to this text as to paintings.

> Consider the norm for all visual representation, single perspective. In his treatise "On Painting," Alberti laid out the rules of representation in painting. The image must appear within boundaries of a rectangle or framed window that maintains the image of distance from the viewer who views it as through a window. The canvas itself is divided geometrically so that the illusion of three dimensions can be produced on the canvas by establishing an infinitely receding horizon in the center of the flat surface. The ordering of the canvas constitutes hierarchy in terms of the proportionate sizes of the objects that appear within the grid. [lv]

SIMULTANEOUSLY PRACTICE AND CONCEPT, SOCIALLY ACTUAL AND THEORETICALLY REAL

Having made a number of points about the traditions which developed from 'Aristotle, who articulated the demand for coherence and hierarchy in all the organic representation' [lvi], Oklowski then advances a discussion around the artist, Mary Kelly, whose art in her opinion;

> [I]s simultaneously practice and concept, socially actual and theoretically real. [lvii]

That quote, in a nutshell, pretty much describes what this thesis seeks to become. It may prove easier to become the former part of the quote than the latter. In the process of the becoming doctorate desired, production seeks a connective synthesis [lviii] that is 'simultaneously practice and concept'.

Rosen notes of Walter Benjamin that he felt there was no role for the critic of Art because the criticism was immanent to Art.

> It is only from within a work that one could derive the principle by which it was to be judged. Criticism was, therefore immanent in the work itself. Essentially this was, with one stroke, to turn criticism from an act of judgment into an act of understanding. Although the theoretical problems it provoked are not to be underestimated, this new approach guaranteed both the individuality of the artist and the integrity of the work. But by making works

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of art incommensurable one with another, it also seemed to destroy the possibility of a history of art. [lix]

Quite contrarily to the Feminist perspective [15] laid out so far, some criticism may be leveled at the author for what might be the becomings of future pages, which might appear to be overtly militaristic in their tendencies. But this is done in the spirit of a Deleuzian and Guattarian *'waring machine'* or as an affirmative *'nomad'*: Perhaps, it is not done for the sole purpose of male gender posturing, but more out of a need to consider strategies of thought sympathetic to perspectives of the excluded. This being undertaken to produce counterpoints to dominant forms of representation. These are acts to do with *heterotopic* excavations.

Socially actualising work and writing is fundamentally and materially grounded in becomings. These are creative of life for singularities, multiples and multiplicities. The immediate relationships and connectivities demonstrate their common productivity of singularities, especially in matters concerned with survival. In the spaces, between war zones and normalized society, different forms of creativity and productivity regularly provide evidence of both reactive and affirmative survival becomings.

Common to all, but especially the *nomad, flâneur, arrivant* and *bricoleur,* is the ability to navigate to an elsewhere; they have, at the very least, the skills and knowledge of how to use spaces fundamentally and materially. For the unbecomes of academia, *heterotopic* navigation is hardly, or not, so important since habits drive large parts of their lives. But they always seem to remain concerned with the easy navigations across scripts; they can, for instance, make evaluations and assessments of other people's lines of thought through recognition of tracks often traveled - searching for the same and similar: This speaks much of their conformance to dominant structures and hierarchical arrangements.

The reader will see that future assemblages seek a synthesis of mobilities concerned with something, which is *Other* than Imperialism and Colonialism; although, it is usually in the erasure of the inscriptions of the Western male economy that Desire finds its potential and actuality. Its possibility to create different modes of becoming might well be used, in what may be considered as gross acts of moral turpitude, but an Ethic runs free. It is the Ethic of a singularity desiring creative and multiple connections that affirm the events of *common* and uncoded production. As Chomsky has already reminded us there is much to be learnt from listening on the streets. And the repetition of difference is truly nomadic in movement and can never be found in those territories that are representative of the empirist (not empiricist).

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[15] Although the paragraphs above have made reference to Feminist breakouts from the prevailing paradigm of *Western*, male, heterosexual representation, the thesis is unlikely to deal extensively with these topics at any further point, however interesting it may be to both the author and reader. Where appropriate, further *Feminist* references might occur, such thoughts as collected and *re*peated become used primarily as assemblages to arrest the dominance of the prevailing power and knowledge configurations.

MUSICAL SENSE

Arthur Schopenhauer made much of the importance of Music, being that which can realize the unknowable *Will* – his Idealist term for the Materialists basic conceptual investment *BwO*. His thought on this matter was to influence a large number of organizers of thought ranging from Friedrich Nietzsche, Wagner, Thomas Hardy and Samuel Beckett. Today, the critical mass of the music industries together with the relevance that music continues to hold - especially for the younger, partially scripted, *BwOs* - highlights the importance of *this Art form.*

> In *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer had argued that music was a unique art because of its non-representational character. Music can bypass the superficial and apparent world (a world of representation) and provide us with access to the world in its essence, the world as will.[lx]

On the smooth surfaces of the movement emerging as a thesis, the possibility of using Music, rather than Literature or descriptions of painting, is not without problems.

Now music is important for many reasons, amongst these, there are its broad accessibility and inclusiveness. No education is required to listen although its content has highly emotive affects that can sometimes subvert. Yes, it could be argued that there is certain exclusivity, since we can't all go to the opera, but unless you are deaf you can listen to the radio, records, tapes and recordings through other non-live formats. The magnetism of music lies somewhere, in a region, between its 'unconscious' affects and the fundamental difference it can make, either to a sense or singularity which are over accustomed to logos. The disruptive and disordering affects of music cannot be easily denied. For many, listening to music allows them to lose their identity for a moment or two.

Jephcott draws out other aspects in *Proust and Rilke. The Literature of Expanded Consciousness :*

> In talking of a 'musical' quality in the experience, Valery introduces an important new concept into the discussion. The interrelatedness of all parts of awareness during a privileged moment gives a sense of musical harmony, and this harmony not only involves the relation between inner and outer worlds. The self becomes immersed and lost in the scene contemplated, as in Bauldelaire's prose-poem 'The Artist's Confiteor': 'All these things' – the sea, the sky, a distant sail, the sound of waves – 'are thinking through me or I through them(for in the vastness of reverie the 'self' is quickly lost); they are thinking, I say, but musically, picturesquely, without quibbles, syllogisms or deductions.'
> (1972:20) [lxi]

In *I the CDi*, Arko Sen [lxii] uses the metaphor of an *interactive computer disc (CDi)* to play with the concept of identity, by exaggerating or re-presenting the indeterminancy

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and undecidability associated with it, during the formation and passage of our lives. This is done through a decoupling of the lines of conceptual determination. The 'interactive' reader is (mis)directed through each facing page in order to be constantly compromised, by what has arisen out of the chance selection of numerous artifacts, including photographs from identity cards, poems, magazine cuttings et cetera; these were used to provide more qualitative counterpoints to the running text on the opposing page. The whole paper was to be read whilst listening to a collection of musical tracks from a dedicated audio tape: this contained recordings from various gramophone albums. In this way, as people are perhaps read, or known, or better understood, by the music they play, the reader had many senses engaged in considering the singularity of the 'I' and the events that are its identity. [16]

To repeat this technique, method or style here would be to repeat the same and similar and, therefore, it would not make or manifest the *repetition of difference*. The sterility of the paper was compromised by the possible evocative moments generated from listening to the musical tracks.

Others have attempted different re-presentations. For example, Gibson Burrell, in *Pandemonium - Towards a Retro-Organization Theory*,[lxiii] used an anti-orthodox method and trope of a traffic by pass which physically split each page of his book so that the two lanes produced routes with counter flows of argument. This could be re-presented by having the text played on an audio tape with a musical background to the voice over and then the sensing would have been (dys)organized differently.

The use of music is referenced to create awareness. Modes of re-presentation which show an easy and mundane allegiance to dominant and, overly determined, ordering habits should be attended to only with a great deal of suspicion. A duty of care for the 'self' is especially important, if that habit makes for lazy thinking and unproductive commonalities. However, the use of both the indeterminancy and undecidability of difference affords inclusion through hospitality to the *Other*. This generates tough thinking and something less ordinary and therefore rude.

Priority is, undoubtedly, given to the visual sense in the rendering of the 'product' known as a thesis.[17] But the mutual productivity is, surely, in the connectivity of the singularities coming together, in the becoming of thought, which is the common sharing arising out of a synchronicity of reading and writing: this may be helped or achieved by an appropriate dissonance that is generative of stutters, fragments and voids. It is done, perhaps, through a refusal to conform to the established ordering of the visual sense with a fractured - or transgressive - movement away from the repetition of representation. It is allowed or facilitated by playing with the plasticity of what forms the topology of text on a page, that is, by the mingling of layers upon

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[16] Dr. John Bergin still has the master audio tape and there are no copies. It needs to be returned if the authenticity and identity of the original paper are to be protected. But then being true to the spirit of this becoming almost any other tape perhaps made by another would service the connectivity of a sensible reading of the paper.

[17] Of course there are some exceptions which are allowed in different academic subject areas.

uncertain folds, texts and quotes. It might also come about through the use of poetry and other creative eruptions or labyrinths. But in a sense, or properly speaking, in relation to our four other known senses, much is lost by not giving them mutual connections in the events or lines of flights developed here and elsewhere.[18]

Marcel Proust [lxiv], within the million and half words[19] of *In Search of Lost Time*, famously, uses a description of the affects on the senses of the presence of Madeline cake whilst drinking tea – the reader is then made to consider the smell and taste – whilst Proust evokes a r*emembrance*, which is not at all the same as using memory, to access things past. But for the less able, it is much more difficult to evoke the awesome sense of *remembrance*, or to engage the other senses, through writing. Not to freely engage, these other senses, is to allow training and education to over-determine the nature and content of memory. [20]

LEARNING SENSE AND EDUCATION ONE SENSE

If one were to distinguish, between learning and education, then possibly it could be done by acknowledging the differences. For instance, the former uses all the available senses and the latter only a few. This is, perhaps, why those who seek to advance the process for learning, in an inclusive fashion, for everyone often attempt to re-present things in a process that continually engages as many senses of singularities within the audience as possible. [21]

But there are other points to be made, for instance, Constance Classen notes,

> [M]en have traditionally been associated with 'higher', 'spiritual' senses of sight and hearing, while women have been associated with the 'lower', 'animal' senses of taste, touch and smell. Speech – sometimes accorded the status of a sense – had ambivalent gender status. While the active character made speech intrinsically male, its supposed widespread appropriation by domineering women made speech female. [lxv]

So the genderisation of senses was an important consideration and still it is, especially in relation, to a text which seeks *inclusivity*. There are more considerations in relation to making a thesis available and accessible to common senses. Amongst a number of important Feminist considerations, such as those in relation to the body and writers like Gilles Deleuze. These Elizabeth Grosz investigates, in *Volatile Bodies: Towards*

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[18] The multiplicities of Dr. Martin Parker, Dr. Simon Lilley and the author reviewed the institutions regulations in relation to Doctoral submissions and presentations using music. This was only allowed in relation to Music candidates and apprentices.

[19] See Terence Kilmartin's *Notes on Translations* in that edition.

[20] Gilles Deleuze (2000), in *Proust and Signs. The Complete Text*. London: The Athlone Press. tr. Richard Howard, considers the types of signs used and addresses matters such as apprenticeship and the secondary role of memory.

[21] This type of thinking in relation to learning stretches across many writers ranging from Gaardner, Rose, Vos and De Bono who deal with Multiple Intelligences, Accelerated Learning, unorthodox and Lateral Thinking.

a Corporeal Feminism, whilst also making further explorations connected to the senses.

In her exploration, Grosz makes some fiercely fundamental, but often largely unrecognized, statements about the importance of senses in informing us about different aspects of reality.

> Just as sight is usually regarded as a spatial sense, dominated by a field more than an object, hearing is usually understood as a temporal sense, in which duration is a major characteristic. In this opposition between sight and hearing, it is believed that sound discloses not an object but the region or location of an object [...] Touch shares with hearing the successiveness of its impressions, their momentary impact...Touch is regarded as a contact sense...it provides contiguous access...touch may produce (along with vision) the notion of shape or form, but (unlike vision, which gives shape its simultaneity or synchronicity) touch only yields successive or additive, diachronic notions of shape. [lxvi]

Hearing aids the understanding of *duration*. Now *duration* is an important concept that allows a reconsideration of the dominant representation of time, which is most often defined primarily in relation to space or spatial co-ordinates. Consider, for example, the derivation of the calendar from the movements of the earth and other planets in our solar system. [22]

There are people who have little interest in the time, or in the world of signs, like the poet who can transcend the mundane to reveal another separate reality. Their worth is not just in the poetry but in the art of making; in the *poesis* of what occurs. It seems true, to say, that fewer workers every year are likely to have the opportunity to grow, develop or become, through work that involves the art of making. The world for people denied that aspect of their lives must be, forever so many moments, more mundane and tedious than those events needed to be. Without the autonomy and connected opportunity, this might be true also for the academic who cannot make and practice his or her art, before or after an apprenticeship. Let us remember the poet's worth.

> Paul Valery 'He falls abruptly out of a world made up almost entirely of *signs*, into another world entirely formed of *significances*.' quoted in Jephcott [lxvii]

Jephcott summarises the magic for those whose viewpoint of the world is so different, that objects become so much more:

> The knowledge of its name and function makes it unnecessary to give the object itself, as a particular thing, further attention; it recedes into the neutral

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[22] If man where not so dominant and neither Anthropocentric nor Eurocentric then the question would arise: what universal measures of time would we have that tilts time to properly reconsider the earth's relationship in the universe so that it is placed equidistant from infinity and eternity?

background of everyday awareness, Valery calls this faculty whereby objects are identified and then expelled from awareness 'our great-power of ordered forgetting'.

But if the power of recognising and naming things, that is, the faculty of conceptual thought, were suspended, the creative activity of the mind during perception would continue indefinitely. The intensity of awareness, the degree of significance seen in objects, would be limited only by the power of the imagination itself. Valery describes what would then be experienced, for example, in contemplating things in a room:

> the objects are *active* like a flame of the lamp: the armchair consumes itself where it stands, the table describes itself so quickly that it remains motionless, the curtains flow without end, continuously. (*italics* original) [lxviii]

And, furthermore, taking account of another poet:

> During a privileged moment these everyday functional relationships disappear, and are replaced by a far more complex and intense system of analogies not normally perceived. Now all parts of the visual field are seen to form a pattern, and in addition there are 'correspondences', to use Baudelaire's term, between impressions taken in by different senses, Baudelaire treats these analogies as an integral part of the privileged moment: 'who has not known those admirable hours...when senses, more attentive, perceive more reverberant sensations...when sounds have a musical timbre, when colours speak, and perfume tells of worlds of ideas. [lxix]

So people with imagination - like poets - have the sense to make sense of events and *privileged moments*, extracting from them the qualitatively abnormal - but world-making - perspectives that alter time and states for us all. Not for them, the exceedingly dumb mechanics of quantifications and world-making mathematics, which give a measure to the false identity and equivalence, when applied to nearly every moment.

There are other perspectives of time. For example, such as that developed by Henri Bergson in his book, **Duration and Simultaneity Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe.** [lxx] There is also the interpretation of the philosopher and his books provided by Deleuze in **Bergsonism.** [lxxi] They both discuss aspects of memory and the continuity of past, present and future. They observe these to be fundamental components of *becoming*. And, it is that becoming which is *desired* in this assemblage. For the moment, it should be reiterated that for some the sense of duration is linked to hearing. There is, therefore, a limitation of this text-based, sense-forming exercise, known as a thesis-being, which is unable to create sense-dependent lines of flights around 'duration'.

Now consider or imagine: the hearing and listening that takes place during a stretch of a calendar, which is bounded by three to eight orbits of the earth around the sun, and which speaks more of a period, and, therefore, not of a duration. This is then regulated by the authorities to be the proper compass, or pointer readings, allowed for any singularity seeking a full-time or part-time apprenticeship through writing a doctoral thesis. This, then, is the peerless beingness that authenticates, constitutes and qualifies thought in the modernist university – the thought that is so many orbits round the sun. Special dispensation is needed, if the candidate's thought is so fast as to be considered ready for a viva prior to the prescribed cycle of orbits. Creating a bounded territory for thinking and writing the doctorate text has some inauthentic possibilities. When compared to territoralization of sense inputs, there is the impossibility of the possibility of writing, or recording, all that is heard and thought-heard during the three to eight year time span allowed for the production of a doctorate.

Friedrich Engels wrote

> [E]verything I wrote was based on proven data which I have from eye-witness and ear-witness [lxxii]

Visual and sound images, probably made sensible as words on a paper, provide the testament of the facts on which to base and, then, structure an image of thought grounded in materialism. Powerful as this maybe it cannot, however, capture the exploitation and oppression apprehended, or comprehended, by three other senses and, if it does so at all, it is only ever so partial. Consider the smells of poverty like, for example, the smell images of the muskiness of damp walls; or the smell that hangs and clings, all about a room, that tells of extensive decomposition of rotten food; or the burning, acrid human smell-images of urine; or the stench of a herd of people near to death combining with, the slightly more fortunate, flock with failing health and illness.

Likewise, there is the kinesthetic image of torture, for example, as faced by Jesus Christ on the cross, and the countless other foreign martyrs claiming an earth for learning and *Other* men or women; these cannot be sensibly conveyed to another who has not experienced that fateful hell. These are all the sites were the possibility of writing is revealed and fails. And here is a paradox. It is all too simple to mimic the ease with which we can torture others, see for example, the Milgram experiments. Copying the techniques of exploitation, if there is a willing subject, is one of the easiest of things to be educated to do but the thought, or will, that exercises itself into the appropriate behaviour remains banal and mundane.

COPYING THE SAME EXPLOITATION

Some while ago, the text made reference to *habits*. There is now a return to a specific example not unconnected to what has just been discussed. This habit of representation colonizes many territories. It binds many to appropriate behaviour in appropriated territories – on the sites and spaces of the colonized worlds, conquered lands and private estates. There are exemplars of exploitation, those of missionaries, mercenaries and murdering imperialists copying and modeling native aboriginals, whilst physically displacing these peoples from their homes and annihilating their culture and codes. Before moving further, let us consider one of these exemplars and the many points well made in the story of a man, transported across the world from England, who then becomes an Australasian Aboriginal leader. He confronts his European past as told in a story written by Garner;

> 'There is game, and we have sown crops,' said Batman.
> 'And what's us lot supposed to do? said Murrangurk, nodding towards the elders.
> 'The niggers shall move,' said Batman. 'They are few, the country is large, and there is room for all. And we cannot have them worrying the sheep.'...

And then a few lines later;

> 'Matter, I'll tell you what it matters,' said Murrangurk. 'If we're shifted, we'll not thole. And if we don't thole, land dies. It needs walking, and it's us must walk it. Do you not see? We're all one, and have been since I don't know when, since Beginning. It's same as, like, whatsitsname, what-d'ye-call-em Church! Yah! If you flit any of us, we'll not live; and just you see; neither will land. We must have each other-'
> 'This is sentimental nonsense.'
> '-same as Mami-ngata said! Same as Bible!'
> 'The man's deranged and blasphemous.'

Then on the next page:

> 'Nevertheless,' said Batman, 'this document shows and proves that I have bought one hundred thousand acres of this land for twenty pairs of blankets, thirty knives, twelve tomahawks, ten looking glasses, twelve pair of scissors, fifty handker chiefs, twelve red shirts, four flannel jackets, four suits of clothes and fifty pounds of flour. The land is mine. I own it.'
> 'Nay, youth,' said Murrangurk. 'The land owns us: every mortal one. But you! Coming here! You've pissed chalice and shitten church!'
> Murrangurk walked away and sat at the fire with the elders.
> 'The creature could threaten our venture,' said Batman. 'We must remove him'

'But, sir, he prevented massacre,' said William Todd. 'We are greatly indebted to him. And the people hold him in high repute. It would be a madness to meddle with him.'

'Allow me credit for a little wit, friend Todd,' said Batman.

'Without his good offices, we should indeed be at risk. No. His fortune must become our special care.' [lxxiii]

Man so easily copies theft, dishonesty, exploitation, colonization and oppression. He then has models and copies of apes aping man and man mimicking apes to draw from in order to re-make, make and manipulate worlds. Representations of these kind can be found in Taussig's *Mimesis and Alterity*, [lxxiv] which, as the title implies, is a study of the ideas of imitation and difference. The author of the book shows that these are complex interwoven concepts that shape and make histories, but he concludes in the last few pages of his book:

> Mimetic excess provides access to understanding unbearable truths of make-believe as foundations of an all-too-seriously serious reality, manipulated and manipulatable...How we all in our different ways and different walks of life are used by this mimetic excess is perhaps, now, to some significant degree going to be a matter of choice and not the monopoly of mediums and media. [lxxv]

Writing and explaining the logic and connections of conceptual moves helps create a text which ought, for some, to be transparent and readable. Ensuring linearity - through devices that make literal, logical handshakes or bridges between textual and intertextual parts - most likely pleases those who value such and particular things. Like, for instance, any of the following things, or constructs, such as a whole, science, causality, determinism or structure. But, this is not the construction used in this machine of words. The reader may ask: What is the point so far? What is the hint to be grasped? Take a deep breath and relax. Use a psychological anchor, if needs be, to create an altered state to gain the rewards that connect text and associations to the reader of the *heterotopic*. Since a more relaxed reader ought to be party to a flow or flight. Just be happy with an interim escape from signification. Does the reader see just a frustrated engagement rather than something stronger? Or, should it be the duration of difference, which is the time of a more appropriate set of sensations, a time to sense something stronger rather than what can be seen?

Can there be a stretching, a teasing or tearing from *the langue and the parole* (the former Saussure considered analogous to the rules of chess and the latter the totality of the games of chess played). Can the reader accommodate a mingling with *Otherness* whilst rules and games interactively reform the productivity of masses and communities of thoughts? This activity and connections, given a bit of time, produces a multiple, or performs multiple connections, to repeat difference. The paradoxes and *aporia* multiply when multiplicities move, nomadically, across images of thought and text.

There are many examples of the tensions even between those who only wish to make radical philosophy through a conformance to the orthodox organization of language. Then, there are those wishing to radicalize thought thoroughly through disruption and *dys*organization of familiar constructs and ordering. These are revolutionary and *heterodoxic* tensions which lead to splits between the beings and becomings who were thought to have common goals.

For a moment let us pause to briefly make a simple point about style and method, using Sartre to make that point, although any number of other writers could fit the bill. At separate times, Sartre was outspoken in his attacks on both Georges Bataille and Albert Camus. He seemed to consider their approach to liberating peoples from particular forms of servitude to be lacking. He wrote in a particular style that betrayed erudition and conveyed the picture of a man in command of his grammar and form. Such a style as is common place in the common rooms of academia. Perhaps, he should have written 'Being an Academic, Nothing Less' rather than 'Being and Nothingness'. It is the contention, made here, that such strictness and discipline of delivery and design remains inhospitable. It does not really give the *Other*, space and time to find voice or sensibility – such textual presentations and methods will, perhaps, remain inauthentic to approaches and movements of the *flâneur, bricoleur and arrivante* across its pages. Certainly the style, play and way of Jacques Derrida can be seen to be much more hospitable to the approaches of those singularities and multiplicities.

It is the contention strongly, energetically and vitally held here that the authentic mode of expression of becomings, singularities, *Otherness* and multiplicities can only desire and affirm the fracturing of order - through their collective and common movements and velocities. And, therefore, the *fragmentary* aids or facilitates the lateral or transversal navigation of the nomad and its becomings. It is the critical survival tool, creating its own topology and compass for wandering away from, or transgressing, Western representational and hierarchical images of thought. But it is not just movement that is critical. *Random and chance tempos* create changes and difference which upset regular pedestrian textual phasing and, in a totally disrupted or chaotic fashion, jettison thoughtlessness and habituality of action (remember Arendt and Pessao). Changing tempos and random folds of the *Other's* foldings are naturally part of the singularity's survival kit. This is the kit to be carried everywhere, just in case there is need, to escape to a place of sanctuary, to avoid the *dressage, equipment, dispotifs* and the confinements of the land surveyor creating new territories to be placed in a land or thought registry held in academia.

Perhaps, more honestly there is an authenticity that is not the one thought by Sartre but which is the writing from the *BwO*. [23]

Through considering and partaking in a game one can try playfully to make the appropriate expression. Consider a pair of children playing that ancient game which

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[23] Professor Martin Parker noted, on reading this paragraph, that 'Sartre's existentialism did take choice and absurdity seriously, it is an ethic of action, of creating.'

has their one active hand ever ready to become a rock, paper or scissors. The hand in play respectively represents those items through three signs or gestures - the fairly tightly clenched fist becomes a rock; the flat open hand held horizontal to the ground *becomes* a sheet of paper; and the open hand held vertically, with second and third fingers apart, *becomes* a pair of scissors [24]. On the count of three each child simultaneously takes their hand from behind their back, where it has been held in anticipation, and chooses to reveal the appropriate becoming. The hand becomes one of the three - paper, rock or scissors. There is no hierarchy in this game. It can be played by young and old alike. At precise moments, there is no more powerful tool, toy or assemblage for the child. The children playing the game become formidable through *processes* which flow differently for each chance event – scissors cuts paper, paper wraps rock, rock blunts scissors. The coding is, however, temporarily important. It is decoded and recoded through the various changes of gesture made by each child. The event is everything and no language or language translation is required.   The 'inbetweeness' or hospitality of the spaces between the players is a common site and the actions are productive only through their interdependence. Independent play would, it seems, only give up to a loss or lack. The *process* is all. Hierarchy is not evident in this decoding and recoding game. [25]

The coding, descriptors or terminology of the text thus far have not overtly demonstrated a primary source or singular influence. The text has been common enough to *re*present *re*searchers, or workers, studying Organizational Studies or Philosophy. Let us pose some questions: Might a 'mainstream Sociologist or Radical Geographer feel familiar within the boundary, typology and topology of the text as laid out so far? Is there a need now to 'fly the colours', wear the coat of arms, or just declare an affinity to a cell of workers who, in this case, would be struggling to make uncommon sense of a world which is best understood by the *schizoid*? Or does the reader wait, astride a chair, anticipating the anthem to be sung of revolutions to come? Hesitation, anticipation or trepidation are the thoughts of a being but are not those of a becoming, singularity or multiplicity.

In any event certain signifiers, scattered about the text, might allow a reader to form a perspective on what is deemed to be signified (place the word '*signified*' under erasure and place in its space the word '*desire*'). The constellation of star words, '*capitalism*', '*oppression*' and '*working class*' (these words have not yet been used together and one not at all), might lead to conjecture about a yet to become *re*visionist Marxist writer, so that set will not be used. 'Cutting to the chase', the reader's

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[24] Not one of the pair given earlier by *Batman* to the aboriginal.

[25] This note is largely from Toby Manhire. 'Rock, paper, scissors players make a good fist of business' in Trendspotting *The Guardian* Wednesday June 15 2005.p. 24. In the article Manhire writes: 'This game has more names than it does moves. Whether having a round of farkling, roshambo, jan ken pon, shnik shnak shnuk or ching chang chow, the options to competitiors number only three: scissors, paper, stone. Or, if you prefer, rock, paper, scissors (RPS).' The game originated in Asia and came to Europe in 18th century. It hit the headlines recently when a business requested that Sotheby's and Christie's play the game to decide who would auction his £11 millions art collection. He cites Jennifer Cricks 'RPS is one of the oldest decision-making devices known to man.'

attention and concentration should be harnessed on the following line of flight to *deterritorialization* from the *reterritorialized* spaces.

> On the one hand, it was "deterritorialization" (an uprooting of the individual) and "decoding" (a change in the pattern of actions affecting it). And on the other, a "reterritorialization"...and (re)coding (the imposition of new patterns of connections with itself and its surroundings). [lxxvi]

And, from another source:

> The idea of deterritorialization, which runs through Deleuze and Guattari's work, is directly related to the thought of machines. Because a machine has no subjectivity or organizing centre it *is* nothing more than the connections and productions it makes; it is what it does. It therefore has no home or ground; it is a constant process of deterritorialization, or becoming other than itself. (italic original) [lxxvii]

Being all too explicit, at the juncture of this becoming, can mean 'becoming' a *being* or an individual or I, rather than becoming a *becoming* or *singularity* - especially if the candid behaviour persists, in the next paragraph or two, that whispers or speaks to the *reterritorializer* or *territorializer*. It is interesting to see or consider how letters can be deterritoriaized and reterritorialized: consider the letters b,e,c,o,m,i,n,g of 'becoming' which with a reduction has a territory within the word 'being' but once again with a fresh connection there is be(com)ing.

Notwithstanding the above then, there are other sets of dilemmas surrounding, submerging or servicing the singularity. The singularity may be gendered as the he or she but it seeks, or they seek, to become together productive through thought and the writing of thought.

Bergson has provided a reminder of the spaces between the singularity and the *Other*.

> In this coming and going of our mind between the without and the within, there is a point, at equal distance from both, in which it seems to us that we no longer perceive the one, and that we do not yet perceive the other: it is there that the image of 'Nothing' is formed. [lxxviii]

It seems that, for Bergson like many other French writers and thinkers, singularities are incapable of confronting the other, *Other*, void or absence.

> A being unendowed with memory or prevision would not use the words 'void' or 'nought'; he would express only what is and what is perceived; now, what is, and what is perceived, is the *presence* of one thing or of another, never the *absence* of anything. [lxxix]

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The ability to know the *Other*, or sense the void in spaces is limited, or fully comprehend disappearance requires an evolution of creativity for singularities:

> But we add that the representation of a disappearance is that of a phenomenon that is produced in space or at least in time, that consequently it still implies the calling up of an image, and that is precisely here that we have to free ourselves from imagination in order to appeal to the pure understanding. [lxxx]

A looked and considered the list of quotations, the marginalia and the draft thesis. There really were ways of affirming faculties and production which could deal with disappearance, certainly there was an act of autonomy that could prove creative. One was to insert this quote- as a disruption to the pattern and styles now becoming part of a doxa.

> *To represent the object A non-existent can only consist, therefore, in adding something to the idea of this object: we add to it, in fact, the idea of an* exclusion *of this particular object by actual reality in general.*
> (italics and normal text inverted, bold original) [lxxxi]

The thought - or events-around-the-thought - may be manifest or manifold as an assemblage or multiplicity. They, in lines of flight, speak multiple occurrences, potential, virtual and actual. They speak of events breaking free of State determined spaces. They enunciate through other machines, *Others*, and processes of writing an introduction starting *nomadically*, on a smooth surface.

Massumi reminds us that;

> State space is 'striated,' or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to preset paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad space is 'smooth,' or open-ended. One can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its mode of distribution is the *nomos:* arraying oneself in an open space (holding the street), as opposed to the *logos* of entrenching oneself in a closed space (hold the fort).
> (*italics* original) [lxxxii]

For this multiple assemblage, coded as a thesis, one primary problem constantly faced in the flow of things is:

> [H]ow to invent spaces and times in which our "preindividual" and "presocial" singularities might come out, and merge with one another. [lxxxiii]

Assemblages can be *molecular and local* or *molar and ordering*, but this is not about differences of scale since *molecular* things can be *molar*, with a change in connectivity and, likewise, *molar* can become *molecular*. *Molar* assemblages are

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unstable. When appearing to be stable they are in a metastable state. And metastable states or structures have variations within their limits.

A structure is defined by what escapes it. [lxxxiv]

So the structures of thought are defined by what escapes or, put another way, dystopia would be the places where everyone seeks to escape from. The configuration and formative conceptualization of *Heterotopia* might be the place, or site, without structure. It may be the *intermezzo*, or space of volcanic fluxes of free 'processes', where no one seeks to escape. So let us have the *remembrance* that the *flâneur* escapes from the city. It may be shown, a little later, that the *arrivant* escapes to sites of *hospitality* and these cannot be places with structures, for there can never be an anticipation, for this in itself would be inhospitable to that singularity. The *bricoleur* also escapes from the structures of representation.

All those are the singularities, multiple or the multiplicities which are *nomadic* and *rhizomatic*. Deleuze and Guattari [lxxxv] describe their *Nomadology; The War Machine*. They place great faith in the nomad - who is someone that always takes their own space with them. Nomads never allow others to reterritorialise themselves; for they are always deterritorialising. And this middle of thought, or process, or process and connected middles of thought, always seeks a becoming which is nomadic and commonly productive.

Michel Serres speaks of his own nomads:

> New ideas come from the desert, from hermits, from solitary beings, from those who live in retreat and are not plunged into the sound and fury of repetitive discussion. The latter always make too much noise to enable one to think easily. All the money that is scandalously wasted nowadays on colloquia should be spent on building retreat houses, with vows of reserve and silence. We have more than enough debates; what we need are some taciturn people. Perhaps science needs ongoing public discussion; philosophy would surely perish from them. [lxxxvi]

But, earlier in the same text, he had warned:

> All my life I have had the distressful feeling of wandering in the desert or on the high seas. And when you are lost and it is stormy, you quickly feel the need to build a raft or a boat or an ark – even an island - solid and consistent, and to supply it with tools, with objects, with shelters, and to people it with characters...doesn't philosophy consist of a series of domestic improvements? Later, whoever wants can seek shelter here. [lxxxvii]

There is a tension to be resolved for the restrained and constrained amongst us. A freeing up of the nomadic may be continually, strongly and actively opposed by constraints, habits or by structural devices, like literary and other barriers, which seek

control, discipline, conformance and dominion both over ourselves and *Others*. The rules continuously apply in all adventures and exercises of order. But the chance to escape to become productive multiples or multiplicities would be a fine thing.

CHANCE WOULD BE A FINE THING

The advancement and insistence of common and open textual, physical or otherwise spaces requires a constant disruption and movement of a critical mass. It requires a life-style commitment to a continuous series of maneuvers across terrains, topologies and territories. In this way, becomings and multiplicities generate the possibility of escape from confinement and conformance. And chance flights offer the greatest potential for productive relationships, and generative assemblages, and territorial decodings.

Massumi reminds us, like Pessao, that habits are to be opposed as hostile;

> The closest thing there is to order is the approximate, and always temporary, prevention of disorder. The closest thing there is to determinacy is the relative containment of chance. The opposite of chance is not determinacy. It is habit. [lxxxviii]

How to break from habits so engrained as to limit creative flights? How to avoid stifling any potential or possibility of the text to elide, escape, evade, stretch or pass from the certainty of the all too human condition? Human conditions, as such, need alterity.

> [T]he natural bent of the human intellect, which produces a mechanistic and spatial account of the real is...to think beyond the human condition...opening up the human experience to a field of alterity. [lxxxix]

The ideas of the *Other – Alterity* - can be opened up by the *aleatory*. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms* provides the following definition:

> **aleatory [ayl – eer –tri]** or **aleatoric** , dependent on chance. Aleatory writing involves an element of randomness either in composition, as in automatic writing and the cut-up, or in the reader's selection and ordering of written fragments. [xc]

It will be recalled how Rhinehart, in *The Dice Man*,[xci] uses die to choose and chance destiny. In his story, he outlined how an individual, with the same name, faces the complexities of his life through assigning six choices against a given decision point in his day; each of which is numbered from one to six. He chooses the alternative which corresponds to a throw of a die. In this way, he brings chance into his life and, thereby, overcomes the selection of habitual responses from preconditioned menus.

In ancient *Chinese* text, *I Ching – The Book of Changes*,[xcii] there are ideograms that depict the flows of changes. Each ideogram is initially made up of three lines or dashes which are complete or incomplete. Incomplete lines are shown as a dash with a gap in the middle, the horizontal definition is broken for a moment. The trigrams are combined with another and the pair, now of six lines, is the thought image which is in *synchronicity* [26] with an event occurring in the process of life and living. In knowing about the event, or events, unfolding there are techniques to make them manifest, say through the throw and fall of similar sized coloured sticks, or through a throw of a coin with, say, heads representing broken line and tails unbroken line. In this way singularities can –like *the Dice Man* – randomly choose a path to pursue.

Georges Bataille writes in the poem *The Orestia*

> Chance o pale deity
> laugh at lightning
> invisible sun
> thundering in the heart
> naked chance
>
> chance in long white stockings
> chance in a lace dress.[xciii]

In this poem, on the page in the third part of a book authored by Georges Bataille, with its chance or determined organization of thoughts, unfolding in the organization of paragraphs, the male erotic emerges as desire and it is given free flow. On that page it emerges, perhaps, as a counterpoint to a discussion which was about to, predictably, surface. Certain words of the poem providing a brief flow, or becoming, which releases 'unconscious' desire from the mundane economy of thought. This is not, simply, the conscious and determined pursuit of dialogue. This is erotic flux as freedom from the organized. But the denial of the erotic in organizations has been noted elsewhere. Herbert Marcuse, for instance, in *Eros and Civilization* [xciv], tries to marry Freudian thinking with Marxian in an attempt to retrieve a society which is lost, or deliberately excluded. But others bring forth something else.

> [C]hance is more than a concept in his writing; it is also part of a practice. Thus Bataille's text on Nietzsche is also an analogue of chance, in the same way that Surrealism often aimed to be an analogue to madness. The element of chance has to be included in any analysis of Bataille's writings; for it is as a practice that chance fully assumes its place on the *horizontal axis* . To appreciate chance in Bataille's theoretical writings, we recall that, since Laplace, chance has often been thought of as a symptom of the limitedness of human knowledge.[xcv]

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[26] C.J. Jung (1991) devotes a whole volume to the concept of synchronicity in *Synchronicity an Acausal Principle*. Reading: Ark Paperback

Bearing in mind the *valorization or self-valorization* [27] *of chance, alterity and aleatoric writing or reading*, let us now return to some of the singular problems from the set, first written about, in the early part of this middle of thought. They are those relating to writing introductions. They have something to do with matters concerned with, amongst other things, movement that escapes and includes changes of tempo, sequencing or ordering of signs and symbols. This is flight from some determined and externally contrived agenda. This is dysfunctional and disorganizing of, for example, those who relate to, and treasure, the placing of words on paper, primarily, to give an appearance of logical form; where such logical form pretends much. This pretence is not strictly about bringing forth truth, or the acceptance of logic per se, as the valid disciplinary form determined, often, only as an act of internal state security and *dressage*. It is about denying chance, *indeterminancy* and *undecideability*, so that an over-determined man, with his organization, can organize and order without question (but order is always incomplete and this type of totalisation never quite happens). And so broadly in those circumstances, chance and *Otherness* are denied an audience. In any case, the logic is often illusory, defying simple rules of syllogism in their performance.

Other, organizing and organizational, contrivances might be required to give satisfaction to diachronic expectations of Western representations through, say, ensuring the historical development of the object of analysis or study. [28] In such cases this should be self-evident, from the start, if it is to be valued at all. It is not proposed to outline all the problems of writing an introduction, for now just a few will be placed before the reader. Perhaps a few more will be dealt with, in more detail, later: But for now and for example, there is the paradox that introductions are, more often than not, written after the finalization of the greater text that follows in subsequent pages. Equally, they are often written at some point near to completion of the body of work that is being introduced.

A CHANGING ACADEMIC APPRENTICSHIP

Other problems of crafting an introduction relate to matters of style rather than logic. Some are more subtle. These could, quite unfortunately, be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient, for successful completion of the progression of study or movement of thought. Consider, as an instance, something quite proximal: consider the scoop, or density, of *gravitas* that may need to be thrown up, created and sustained to add undue weight and formal necessity to a body of thought. And, through such material additions, achieving that which validates the precision, strength or internal cohesion of the thought process, which might be called – becoming doctorate. [29]

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[27] The reader should recall that self-valorisation is a mark of the autonomous academic which then begs a questions as to why one would do a doctorate unless, of course, value is placed on the connected becomings that are afforded by such an endeavour.

[28] The diachronic (historical development of the object of analysis) obviously counter posed to any synchronic (current state of object of analysis) movements.

[29] Doctorate supervisor Dr. Simon Lilley's first suggestion of an appropriate title to the process initiated by this author when Simon read a draft textual product two years into the doctoral procedure, process or programme.

For some sets of readers, it may be that, at all times, care must be mustered, or manufactured, to ensure humour does not interfere with what is academically important and carried [30] in the exchanges between writer, author, reader and text. And we already know to be cautious about such things as the death of the author and inter-subjectivity (see, for instance, Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Roland Barthes and Maurice Blanchot). Due respect must also be shown to the two words 'academic subject' which is a slippery set of signifiers that slides so easily across the page. They then play innocuously between the spaces or conceptualizations of the author, as an apprentice in academia. They mingle with the area of study so defined by the scholarly peers who are acting only as proper custodians and guardians of the originating boundaries of being.

The weight of academic *Others* can be a heavy burden leading to preventative, rather than liberating, light and, at least, a productive thought processes. Academic imperialism can stifle, for example, as Serres writes:

> Obviously, imperialism concerns not only content or method but also the institution: this or that academic department or campus follows this or that school, at the exclusion of all others. Academia is not a place in which freedom of thought really flourishes.[xcvi]

Who is to judge? The question remains legitimate, at one level, as contrary perspectives about endeavors in academia abound. But, in Nietzsche, there is a more powerful warning to us all about the worthiness of academic engagements:

> Observe the ages in the history of peoples when the scholar steps into the foreground: they are the ages of exhaustion, often of evening and decline.[xcvii]

Thus for the doctoral candidate, or apprentice, the perpetual student and the performative writer of academic papers, some things ought to be self-evident or noteworthy: For example, be warned about the dangers of both over-reading and too much citation of quotations - taking heed from Serres;

> The more one writes, the less one reads – it's a question of time. But I stress: an authentically philosophical book is often distinguishable from a learned book. The latter, loaded with quotes and footnotes, struts its erudition; it flourishes its credentials in the academic milieu, brandishes its armor and its lances before its adversaries. It is a social artifact. How many philosophies are dictated solely by the preoccupation with being invulnerable to criticism? They present themselves as fortresses, usually sheltering a lobbying support group. In the wide open spaces of fear, only trepidation reigns.

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[30] Earlier in another middle of thought, through the reading of Michel Tournier, the power of *phoric* and its relevance to 'being carried' is examined.

He continues,

> I have come to believe that a work achieves more excellence when it cites fewer proper names. It is naked, defenseless, not lacking knowledge but saturated with secondary naivete; not intent on being right but ardently reaching new intuitions.
>
> A university thesis aims at the imitable; a plain and simple work seeks the inimitable. [xcviii]

A thesis displaying 'secondary naivete' sounds like a good prescription for a young becoming.

And choosing to quote from a primary source or using the same quote from a secondary source are different things (see, for example, Martin Parker [xcix] and Michel Foucault [c] separately writing on Jorge Luis Borge reading and writing another). But in the latter the text is "enfolded" in a labyrinth of thought.

From the supposed founder of an as yet not mentioned school of thought, and representing a history emerging from a separate continent, strangely unfamiliar to most of those organizers of thought previously mentioned, there is another warning about being known as the 'myopic' ant. This ant is quite clearly opposed to any form of learning:

> It was characteristic of James that he considered it impossible to understand or criticize an author without putting oneself at the center of his vision by an act of imaginative insight. He was impatient of what he called 'the whole of PhD industry' of scoring debating points against a writer by convicting him of verbal inconsistency. Such criticism he described as 'crawling over the thing like a myopic ant over a building, tumbling into every microscopic crack or fissure, finding nothing but inconsistencies and never suspecting a center exists'. [ci]

Or perhaps there is more to consider, as Auerbach states, something in a line of thought which might be considered a continental drift. Not a drift as radical as nomadology, which seeks de-territorialization from the re-territorialized spaces of academia that, willingly, remain representative of the interests of State. But another drift is considered, one much more to do with prudential movement, from the limits for professional reasons. The advice is simply to avoid becoming, or more appropriately being, the academic specialist in the manner of the specialisms of the Philosopher, the Sociologist or the Organizational Theorist. But what is advised is, perhaps, the antinomy of becoming something between, or encompassing, all those knowledge fields.

> The scholar who does not consistently limit himself to a narrow field of specialization and to a world of concepts held common with a small circle of

like-minded colleagues, lives in the midst of a tumult of impressions and claims on him: for the scholar to do justice to these is almost impossible. Still, it is becoming increasingly unsatisfactory to limit oneself to only one field of specialization. To be a Provencal specialist in our day and age, for example, and to command only the immediately relevant linguistic, paleological, and historical facts is hardly enough to be a good specialist. On the other hand, there are fields of specialization that have become so widely various that their mastery has become a task of a lifetime. [cii]

WARRIOR ACADEMICS

Such limit-busting, as encouraged by Auerbach, remains confined to cautious massaging and muddling through rather than full-on acts of boundary-breaking, or continuous acts of territorial bastardization or buggery (see page 136). And as such it feels dependent, inconsequential, tame and coward-like. Those sentiments most certainly do not reflect the actions of an affirmative, 'warrior' scholar. It would not be, with any sort of frequency, that one heard the challenge to have 'the courage of your convictions' in academia. Conviction-academics - now there's a fine thought! The jailers of thought survive while the *Others* of thought are jailed (for instance, Antonio Negri, Antoni Artaud and Antonio Gramsci).

Can we revisit the 1960s, 1970s and perhaps even the 1980s, and not feel that the brave heart of academia has given way to the quiet bleat of sheep, or the joyful moo of cows: Nietzsche's 'one herd no shepherd' comes to mind. Some, bravely, take a much longer historical perspective to inform their thought and actions. We have, for instance;

> *Here is a strong novelty of militancy today: it repeats the virtues of insurrectional action of two hundred years of subversive experience, but at the same time it is linked to a new world, a world that knows no outside. It knows only an inside, a vital and ineluctable participation in the set of social structures, with no possibility of transcending them. The inside is the productive cooperation of mass intellectuality and affective networks, the productivity of postmodern biopolitics.*
> (*italics* original) [ciii]

Let's find some encouragement. Trungpa, in a self-help book, provides some encouragement by promoting the 'warrior' in us all.

> Here the word 'warrior' is taken from the Tibetan *pawo*, which literally means 'one who is brave'. Warriorship in this context is the tradition of fearlessness. The North American Indians had such a tradition, and it also existed in South American Indian societies. The Japanese ideal of the samurai also represented a warrior tradition of wisdom. [civ]

The Christians had their Knights Templar. They were the warrior knights of old, who generated any number of myths, that grew beyond the simple acts of protection they afforded those Christians traveling the paths to and from Jerusalem. The Chinese had Shaolin monks who learnt martial arts so that they could go about their travels unmolested. There is, perhaps, a need for a warrior academic, who learns some dark arts, to allow *Others* and nomadic thought to roam unmolested. By this means they could travel freely across the open plains of the universe - that can, and ought to then be, hospitable to all thought (even without a 'keep off the grass' sign – few (or should that be none?) would easily choose such paths, yet this seems to be the only form of space travel not permitted). A territory is desired, where such (dark) arts may no longer be needed, because the following questions have become no longer relevant in those territories, lands and spaces. This is not a quest since that would imply a transcendence to be applied or acknowledged. Maybe there will come a time and place for the *Other*: where a movement, or series of movements, through the thoughts of singularities and multiplicities, could of itself, be so productive and creative that a space is excavated and, there, the following questions would no longer be found:

> That is why the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: "Why do men fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?" How can people possibly reach the point of shouting "More taxes! Less bread!"? As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually on strike; after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they *actually want* humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? (*italics* original 1984:29) [cv]

By now it should be evident that there is the desire away from there to re-territorialized, over-coded, striated or confined spaces. The desire is away from the sustained representative images of thought, found and manufactured in many training and education establishments, which mindfully or unmindfully represent the interests of the establishment. These have themselves been re-territorialized over time in order to service the schizoid capitalist machine through the, now transparent, movement from providing just education to the provision education, largely or solely, for employment and employability. It should be evident to the reader that the re-territorialized includes academia.

There are multiple lines of flights and ever more 'multiples of multiplicities' (Badiou) that resist easy colonization because of their intermezzo, or *inbetweeness*, movement and foldings. This is achieved by the velocity and unfolding of thought that creates a universal avoidance of copy, replication or straight-forward representation. This avoidance is incidental, since it is not an act to avoid, but results as the consequence of primary affirmation. So this author or commentator gives way to the flux. The singularity gives way to a chance relationship with another sympathetic and

synchronic event, on a common plateau of thought, where compatible resonances are creative of multiples. The folds and unfolding of singularities, on a common plateau, form thought into productive actualities, like the chapters of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's *One Thousand Plateaus*.[cvi]

One of the biggest horizontal movements, or chance folds to needs, has been anticipated in this becoming of thought. It derives from the materialism of politics. As though part of some putative Marxist determinism, it could be seen or felt as an event, when there is an explication from the great landed estate or latifundia. It is a *heterotopic* singularity, which is hospitable to almost everything, but axiomatically can no long provide comfort or home for imperialism, exploitation and oppression led by the elites of the Western land masses.

The revolutionary movement of capitalism, not yet outlived, has been outlined by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, in their *Empire*. [cvii] The vitality behind a generation of a socially productive alternatives is not easily found, say, in the discourses of post structuralism, but it becomes generative in the energies of their *Multiple*.

Let us examine briefly aspects of their text. Within a section entitled *'There is No More Outside'*, Negri and Hardt note some very important distinctions. These are especially important for this thesis because of the relationship to aspects of folds; the internality or externality of singularities; and, multiplicities: they suggest;

> The domains conceived as inside and outside and the relationship between them are configured differently in a variety of modern discourses. The spatial configuration of inside and outside itself, however, seems to us a general and foundational characteristic of modern thought. In the passage from modern to postmodern and from imperialism to Empire there is progressively less distinction between the inside and the outside. [cviii]

The changing and recent aspect of inside and outside might be contestable, if consideration is given to the Baroque. They might also be both historically and culturally inaccurate when Sanskrit observations like 'Thou Art That' are considered. Their sentiment about the of the erosion of the distinctions is, however, important. It holds now for the image of thought that finds its chance becoming in these pages which are being written or read. They continue:

> [T]he theorists of modern psychology understood drives, passions, instincts, and the unconscious metaphorically in spatial terms as an outside within the human mind, a continuation of nature deep within us...The process of modernization, in all these varied contexts, is the internalisation of the outside, that is the civilization of nature...but we have no nature in the sense that these forces and phenomena are no longer understood as outside, that is, they are not seen as original and independent of the artifice of the civil order. [cix]

And then, a page later, in connection they explicate;

> The outside is the place proper to politics, where the action of the individual is exposed in the presence of others and there seeks recognition. In the process of postmodernization, however, such public spaces are increasingly becoming privatised. The urban landscape is shifting from the modern focus on the common square and the public encounter to the closed spaces of malls, freeways, and gated communities.

The nomad's 'temporary home; impermanent homes; caravan; shifting encampments; education, feeding or training camps; or, putative settlements' are not confined to territories in the West: They have been re-territoralized and de-territoralized many times over on both sides of the Atlantic Drift. The movements and escapes have occurred, sometimes, because of the colonialist actions, that emanate mostly from the West, but ripple continuously onwards and towards the compass points that are to the East, North and South.

Yet despite everything he or she has been taught, by Western writers and thinkers, about materiality, in modalities, that replicate the same and similar from virtuality to actuality, the nomad thinks himself and herself into additional activity in both hostile and hospitable spaces or territories. The nomad never has much need of economy since it is *oikonomia* ('the management of family and households'). The chance connections of swirling forces and events, can capture the building of other, ever-different, relationships. Escape allows the actuality or the virtuality of the nomad. This then has implications. With the fullness of an explication, it will be sensed whether the flâneur, arrivant or bricoleur becomes productive as a singularity or multiplicity. Definitely the former two, and possibly the latter, have no need of politics ('the government of *polis'*) because they have no *polis* ('city-state, body of citizen') [31]

The nomad is not a totally spontaneous repetition but probably was caused by another event. The reader will recall Lemma 111 from Spinoza's *Ethics*, which was the third quote on the first page of this middle of thought.

> A body in motion or at rest must be determined for motion or rest by some other body, which likewise, was determined from motion or rest by some other body, and this by a third, and so on to infinity.

Antonio Negri has something, fairly useful, to say about Spinoza in the context of new economics and politics.

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[31] The definitions in brackets have been taken from Virtanen, Akseli (2004) 'General Economy: The Entrance of the Multitude into Production' in a special edition of *Ephemera* entitled Theory of the Multitude. vol. 4(3) 209-232. access www.ephemeraweb.org. Virtanen uses these and other terms to interestingly rethink economy.

There is only the militant, in other words, the one who succeeds in experiencing the poverty of the world completely and identifying the new forms of exploitation, the new forms of suffering, and organizing around this the processes of liberation, but also participating in them.

But for now there are things that should be noted.

Today there is simply this "direct" ontological and constituent construction, which each of us has to experience completely. There can be parentheses in a life, one can be more or less alone in different ways, but it's nonetheless true that then the real solitude that counts is Spinoza's solitude, that is, that solitude that is a constitutive act of being around oneself, the construction of community that passes through the concrete analysis of every atom of reality and that recognizes, within that atom of reality, the disjunction, the break, the antagonism, and acts on these in order to push forward the process.

Negri then continues and states his expectations of a certain kind of militancy to arrive and dawn upon us, as both material and immaterial are set to become challenge to one another. Furthermore, he suggests that the prophet and intellect are made almost redundant. He continues:

It's through their travels that this communication of struggles, of desires, of utopias took place. And on the other hand we have to be like Saint Francis of Assisi, that is, truly poor, poor because only at that level of solitude can we rediscover the real paradigm, the key to exploitation today. This "biopolitical" paradigm invests both work and life, along with the relationships among people. And therefore it is "full" of cognitive facts, of organizational, social, and political facts, and emotional, affective facts. [cx]

In *The New Spinoza*, edited by Warren Montag and Ted Stolze [cxi], there are a number of radically different interpretations on the *Other* of Spinoza's work. But for the moment, Lucy Irigaray's contribution from that volume, entitled 'The Envelope: A Reading of Spinoza, Ethics, "Of God"', is examined to help facilitate a sentiment around the indeterminate becoming for the nomad. For Irigaray, with the image of a thought of a nomad, who has no *polis* or *oikos,* there arises an explication in relation to a need for a God to fill the solitude. And there lies the ethic:

[T]hat which is its own place for itself, that which turns itself inside out and thus constitutes a dwelling.
(*italics* original) [cxii]

And, here, there is something a little more special than the *biopolitics* of Foucault. See it now explicated, becoming and repeated in an assemblage of difference;

"By CAUSE of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing" (Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, p. 335). This definition of God could be translated as: *that which is its*

There is only the militant, in other words, the one who succeeds in experiencing the poverty of the world completely and identifying the new forms of exploitation, the new forms of suffering, and organizing around this the processes of liberation, but also participating in them.

But, for now, there are things that should be noted.

Today there is simply this "direct" ontological and constituent construction, which each of us has to experience completely. There can be parentheses in a life, one can be more or less alone in different ways, but it's nonetheless true that then the real solitude that counts is Spinoza's solitude, that is, that solitude that is a constitutive act of being around oneself, the construction of community that passes through the concrete analysis of every atom of reality and that recognizes, within that atom of reality, the disjunction, the break, the antagonism, and acts on these in order to push forward the process.

Negri continues and states his expectations of a certain kind of militancy to arrive and dawn upon us, as both material and immaterial are set to become challenges to one another. Furthermore, he suggests, within the text that links the quotation above and below, that the prophet and intellect are almost made redundant. He continues:

It's through their travels that this communication of struggles, of desires, of utopias took place. And on the other hand we have to be like Saint Francis of Assisi, that is, truly poor, poor because only at that level of solitude can we rediscover the real paradigm, the key to exploitation today. This "biopolitical" paradigm invests both work and life, along with the relationships among people. And therefore it is "full" of cognitive facts, of organizational, social, and political facts, and emotional, affective facts. [cx]

In *The New Spinoza*, edited by Warren Montag and Ted Stolze [cxi], there are a number of radically different interpretations on the *Other* of Spinoza's work. But for the moment, Luce Irigaray's contribution from that volume, entitled 'The Envelope: A Reading of Spinoza, Ethics, "Of God"', is examined to help facilitate a sentiment around the indeterminate becoming for the nomad. For Irigaray, with the image of a thought of a nomad, who has no *polis* or *oikos,* there arises an explication in relation to a need for a God to fill the solitude. And there lies the ethic:

[T]hat which is its own place for itself, that which turns itself inside out and thus constitutes a dwelling.
(*italics* original) [cxii]

And, here, there is something a little more special than the *biopolitics* of Foucault. See it now explicated, becoming and repeated in an assemblage of difference;

"By CAUSE of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing" (Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, p. 335). This definition of God could be translated as: *that which is its*

own place for itself, that which turns itself inside out and thus constitutes a dwelling (for) itself. Unique and necessary. Solitary. But in itself. Sufficient. Needing no other in its reception of "space-time." Men may, perhaps, contemplate or seek to contemplate God in his place; men do not give God his place.

Here is the point where materiality meets its infinite extension - the point that is both next to, and so very far from, the eternity of spirituality. The fold, unfolding or folding, becomes the ultimate ethic, ethos or character of the new economy, devoted to *oikos of the singularity.*

At this point, the thesis might have reached a sufficiency in its becoming since there is little else to say. But the materiality of the spiritual needs a demonstration through an immanence that thinks itself.

The sacred power of this ethic is realized not through a crass technique or application but only through a *poesis* that lives itself in the *spaces between fragments.*

These spaces or territories, for such a material and spiritual *poesis*, are forever indeterminant, and undecidable. This cannot be understood. It can only be lived and experienced. The *inbetweeness* of everything gives up to the ultimate productivity. This is where Maurice Blanchot moves with such seriousness and persistence. Here, or there, or some elsewhere, he is ever careful and responsible for *Others*. It would be wrong for the unreceptive reader to feel teased with the enigmatic writing and equivocation. This is not the intention of the authorship, becoming or commentary. Here, the effort to write requires all and more; and, can never be the simple production of yet another academic paper.

The inbetweeness requires participation from a singularity, to itself, to another and from them to the multiplicities of singularities that may be either - or neither - proximal and / or connected. Maurice Blanchot requires much and Lechte [cxiii] helps us here;

> Blanchot's *oeuvre* have prompted the description of them swirling in indeterminancy...Blanchot is opposed to any easy appropriation of the authentically literary text. This frequently happens, however, with few critics actually reading what they claim to have read. Rather they prefer to write their commentaries on the basis of readings which set new works in pre-existing categories: when the critic does happen to see that a work cannot be thus interpreted, it is too late for reading; for the critic is already an author, and thus unable to become the reader.

And also,

> [W]e note that any literary or artistic work is for him anonymous. This does not mean the author is simply trying to hide in the work; rather it means the creative force of the work itself effaces the author.

In Blanchot's own words:

> '[T]he essence of literature is to escape any essential determination, or any affirmation which stablises or even realizes it; it is never already there; it is always to be found or re-invented.' [cxiv]

And then some further observations from Lechte who possibly by Blanchot's own ethic, ought not to rewrite or interpret the latter.

> Blanchot speaks about the work as being the way that writer's silences take shape.
>
> Every work being a re-invention of the practice of writing.
>
> To understand a work in its singularity it is necessary to grasp the movement that produced it. [cxv]

The author then may be considered as relevant as, for instance, a guarantor of authenticity and affirmation;

> One word on that word *author*, which comes to us from Roman law and means "the guarantor of authenticity, of loyalty, of an affirmation, of an oath," but primitively it means "he who augments" – not he who borrows, summarizes, or condenses, but only he who makes grow. *Author, augmenter*...everything else is a cheat. A work evolves by growing, like a tree or an animal. [cxvi]

Clearly, Deleuze and Guattari might correct the last sentence and say instead, 'A work evolves by growing like a rhizome or an animal.' But, the author can be the author of many things, as Foucault reminds (remember, Appendix 1 Dead Men Dying and particularly French Family Dying, page 69):

> Foucault, in *I, Pierre Riviere*, examines the case history of a nineteenth century Norman peasant who wrote a forty-page confession entitled '*I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother...*' and *then* determined to commit the deed: author of the crime and author of the text. Burke (1992:31)[cxvii]

In the spaces and text, just above and immediately below, it would seem there is the violence of a crime which could be viewed as a counterpoint to the violence of authorship, which, in turn, could be represented as the violence of things that create, maintain and sustain the author and not the *Other*.

WHEN WORDS CANNOT SAY - HURDY GURDY HE SANG

Winter [cxviii] writes in the first person singular in the thriller **Run**. In the scene, quoted below, he describes a group of criminals who are waiting. In the scene, besides the author or hero, there is CK, one of the chief villains who is a very violent person, and quite highly rated in a certain syndicate; and there is also Mackie. The radio is playing a song.

Hurdy gurdy he sang, and CK's actually trying to sing along and it's a good thing the volume's topped out because I do not want to hear him sing.
Faggot music, Mackie says, but CK just keeps going.
I said –
Heard you, CK tells Mackie. He rolls down the sound a little and he stares over at me and he says:
You know who's playing lead guitar?
I say – What?
And he says: Do you know who played lead guitar on this song?
I say: No, who played the lead guitar? Which right about now is growling down, real fuzzy, and starting to make me think we're going someplace I don't want to go.
CK drops his boots from the table and looks at me like he's won the lottery.
Jimmy Page, he says.
I decide it's best to look suitably impressed. Huh, I say.
But Mackie leans in. Who the fuck is Jimmy Page?
I don't believe you, CK says. I don't fucking believe you.
Then CK turns right back to me and says, So?
And I say, So?
Which is a mistake, because then he says:
All right, so do you know who's playing drums? On this song? Who put sticks right onto the pads on this song?
CK, I tell him, you got me, you know? This time you really got me, man, because I don't know who played the lead guitar and I don't know the guy who's singing and I sure as hell don't know who's playing the drums.
The airy-fairy guy's singing something about Roly Poly Man now.
And I tell CK: Okay, was it like Ringo Starr or what?
CK moves his lips nice and slow, like he's the teacher and I'm the retard, and he says: John Bonham.
Mackie burps out the kind of mad laugh at CK that only a guy's partner can make and stay standing. Me, I walk the line.
Roly poly roly poly roly poly he sang
So I say: Uh, CK, help me out on this one, okay? Like, who is John Bonham?
You guys. That's all he says, shaking his head and closing his eyes. You fucking guys. His hand rubs at his temple, *hurdy gurdy he sang,* and sooner or later the song ends, and CK reaches over and spins down the volume on a Pepsi commercial all the way to off."

Several pages later - after a graphic description of gross acts of violence performed on an informer, Mickey, which involve kicking, beating and stabbing with a screwdriver - the following is described:

> "CK wipes off the screwdriver and looks at Mickey. Mackie smokes his cigarette and looks at Mickey. Me, I'm just looking at Mickey, and when CK sticks the screwdriver into Mickey's ear, there's this scream, a scream that goes on and on and it won't stop, it's like a song, it is a song, the words are loud and the words are clear:
> *Hurdy gurdy hurdy gurdy hurdy gurdy gurdy he sang.*"
> (*italics* original) [cxix]

Might an enlightened therapist suggest that the violence, just described, represents a manifestation of an event - where a singularity's painful struggle to become a multiplicity seeks release? The only sense, which makes any sense to the singularity is the sound of the *Other* ...*Hurdy gurdy hurdy gurdy hudy gurdy gurdy gurdy*. Surely, this last set of words has the resonance of the sounds that might well have been written by Samuel Beckett? Well, consider:

> On Say on. Be said on. Somehow. Till nohow on. Said nohow on.
> Say for be said. Missaid. From now say be missaid.
> Say a body. Where none. No mind. Where none. [cxx]

> But with a face upturned for good labour in vain at your fable. Till finally you hear how words are coming to an end. With every inane word a little nearer to the last. And how the fable too. The fable of one with you in the dark. The fable of one fabling with you in the dark. And how better in the end labour lost and silence.
> And you as you always were.
> Alone. [cxxi]

There is much more for the psychologist, therapist and analysis to make of these texts but how much of it can be restorative of an intensity of becoming and facilitates the socially productive of the event? Is there anything really material to be learnt other than in the text of the *Other*?

There is a question to be asked in reading the quote given below, taken from *Psychoanalytic-marxism Groundwork* [cxxii], which is in itself a quote from someone else and begins 'I don't believe in father': Does Wolfenstein substitute the same or different? A psychotherapist or psychoanalyst probably would claim it is the same, with his *Hurdy Gurdy* being or becoming writing instead of the maiming or killing, and through this he exorcizes his Oedipial demons. Or, should that be Oedipial daimon? [32] But it is this very sameness, the conspiracy to re-present Oedipus for, and

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[32] Pearson whilst making reference to a quote from Nietzsche's *The Gay Science* writes 'The words come from the strange voice of a demon who 'steals' into our life at a particular hour, that of our

within, the capitalist regime that seeks its surplus value from repression and domination, through the familial *re*-petition that is challenged both by Deleuze and Guattari (and, previously with Antonin Artaud). They assemble to form the words and activities like desire, and design lines of flight, and scream and summon cries for the *repetition of difference.*

Such repetitions convey a reality - where the reader cannot always expect a smooth journey that matches the scripts, carried in a head, ever ready to impose order and organization where none exists. [33] Difference has spaces and gaps that have to be filled - by autonomous work through the full participation, enrolment and engagement of a reader - and not by the eagerness of a writer to provide polymorphic fillers to create a worldview, which then makes the author appear rational and sensible. Such an act is unethical and would make the author a liar. The world is already over scripted and gaps and fragments can bring forth voids, like Beckett's, to repeat difference and *Otherness.* [34]

One must remove *Oedipus*, altogether, if one wishes to see the reality of desiring production. Hence, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (and some *Others*) vote for Antonin Artaud instead of Freud:

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loneliness, and speaks to us as specks of dust.' Isn't this what therapists do? He then provides some further relevant information 'The Greek term *daimon* means divider or allotter, and from Homer onwards it refers to the operator of unanticipated and intrusive events in life; the adjective *daimonios* means strange and uncanny...In Plato the *daimon* operates as an intermediary between god and human beings and this coneption was taken up by all subsequent demonologies.' Keith Ansell Pearson (2005) *How to Read Nietzsche* London: Granta Books. p.77.

[33] In reading this paragraph, Professor Martin Parker commented that there was 'no such space, I think there is always order, just a different one.'

[34] In the cartoon animated film, *Boo, Zino and the Snurks* (DVD video: Cert U. ERD 40462.2005), Otherness and viewer engagement are challenged as certain scenes invite, explicate and implicate participation. In its middle, the story is quite Deleuzian and Guattarian in style. It goes like this: The evil Professor N. Icely, having had his programme dropped by a television network, seeks to confront and contest both the failings of the viewers and the network managers who rely on ratings figures rather than importance of message. The challenge requires certain catalysts which come with the transportation of characters from another world, or story, into his own world. They are needed because they bring with them an important mineral to help transmutation of matter (surely, the Philosophers Stone?). The professor needs this for transmutation of other worlds into the homes of viewers. He seeks to use television channels as the means. Interestingly, the world of flowing larva is what the Professor wishes to introduce into homes of those who have not appreciated his work. By the by, the characters from another world have the opportunity to confront the author of their story, Albert Drollinger. In the confrontation, one of the characters Boo, who is exceedingly clever, picks up on Albert's statement that Boo only thinks he is real: Boo, "I think, therefore, I am." To which Arthur replies: "I write therefore you are." Boo likes the new world because he has free will, which is outside the world authored by another. He wants to stay in that place. He realises a bit later that he has free will, outside of the wishes of the author, in his own world. Another character realizes she has free will outside the will of her father. Collectively, the characters understand, when they return to their own world, that they have autonomy outside the will of the State. The characters, then by extrapolation must also have autonomy outside the authorship of the film. And, this text provides autonomy for the reader outside the play of the author.

I don't believe in Father
                in Mother
        got no
        papamummy" (italics original)[cxxiii]

Rhinehart anticipates the criticism of psychotherapy and its allegiance to the cry and call of Western Capitalism. He writes a scene where a reformed – or, more properly speaking, reinvented - therapist discovers the joy and value of living a life based on chance through the throw of the dice. He then becomes the being 'Jesus' because of the role demanded by the roll of the die. This causes the person undergoing therapy to respond differently to the therapeutic encounter.

> 'You don't suffer, you don't care enough, you don't have the fire to be a Christ actually living on the earth.'
> 'And you, my son?'
> 'And I do. I've had a fire burning in my gut every moment of my life to wake this world up, to lash the fucking bastards out of the temple, to bringing a sword to their peace-plagued souls.'
> 'But what of love?'
> 'Love?' he barked at me, his body now straight and tense in the chair. 'Love...' he said more quietly. 'Yeah, love. I feel love for those who suffer, those on the rack of the machine, but not for the guys at the controls, not for the torturers, not for them.'
> 'Who are they?'
> 'You, buddy, and every guy in a position to change the machine or bust it or quit working on it who doesn't.'
> 'I'm part of the machine?'
> 'Every moment you play along with this farce of therapy in this nurse-infested prison, you're driving your nail into the old cross.' [cxxiv]

Rhinehart does not make use of the *aleatory* form, in the style of his writing *the Dice Man*, although the foursome Artaud, Deleuze, Guattari and Deleuze and Guattari do seem to frequently (but not always). *Aleatory* writing has already been referred to but, to repeat not the same but difference, another definition is brought forward.

> 'Aleatory' means depending on the throw of a die, and it here refers to writing (as well as to the composition of music, sculpture and painting) achieved by some random means, by leaving things to chance or accident...one might go so far as to say that it may be a fundamental part of the process of inspiration and invention. [cxxv]

WRITING LIMITS

Bataille considers reporting a dialogue that his character, written in the first person, had with an intimate, in the erotic narrative *The Impossible*, and then he concludes it would disrupt the pursuit of desire and notes;

It must also be said: life is more mobile than language – even mad language – when most strained is not the most mobile [...] If I spoke of war, of torture...: seeing that war and torture, today, are situated at points which ordinary language has determined, I would stray from my object – which draws me beyond the accepted limits.
(first three dots and disjuncture mine, subsequent in the original) [cxxvi]

A perfect reader [35] would understand that - like Eva, a character from Wilson's *A Small Death in Lisbon* - there remains for all who care to think about it, in some aspect of our lives, a territory where the *'sayable'* is left unsaid and where meaning is conveyed other than through words.

She left the sayable unsaid and said what she meant without saying it. [cxxvii]

And, there again there is the repetition of difference in Samuel Beckett's books.

In his essay on Proust he seemed to argue that conversation was impossible, with an always-changing subject confronting an externally shifting object. [cxxviii]

INTIMACY

At the same end of the spectrum, or perhaps at the multipolar opposites, there remains another problem of writing introductions. It is one that has both general and particular interest. This concerns the level of intimacy to be achieved. To speak of this intimacy is to travel beyond a flatness of text and paper. It is to raise and acknowledge contours, that have hierarchical planes, and break these to embrace what may be considered its antonym - the rhizomatic.

Personally, there is the intimacy between the self, or selves, that centres the being, who is becoming, in undertaking the form of dressage, in the discipline of study, which is constitutive of the doctorate. So the first confessional, to the reader priest, is this one: the author had and has need to find a subject of study. One in which the author was prepared to develop extraordinary degrees of intimacy. It then became apparent that there was a need to find modes of thinking and display where the fruits of those thoughts could find voice and expression, to allow for transgressions beyond sterile norms.

There is, then, an altogether different kind of intimacy. There is the proper relationship which necessitates productivity, only through an intimacy, between a connected series. The almost sequential series of intimacy between the supervisor/s and the supervised; the 'examiner' and the 'examined'; the 'reader' and the 'writer', which can be sought and cultivated. But their intimacy is deepest and most productive not in the text but in the silences, spaces and gaps between texts. What *tropes* can

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[35] Remember Umberto Eco's description of the perfect reader made earlier.

assist such a process that, also ethically and productively, seeks a machine to create a propagation and proliferation of multiplicities?

Other things need to be acknowledged. A reader becoming a writer, reads many things in a text, and brings many singularities forth in laying down thought. One must, for instance, properly acknowledge the creations that exist in any relationship around a text. Sherman observes, from a reading of *Marginalia - Readers Writing in Books* by Jackson,

> Marginalia have played a more central and consequential role in the history of reading than most librarians would care to admit, but what Coleridge quaintly referred to as "bepenned" or "bepencilled" books have aroused a strong set of anxieties that we are only beginning to understand. While leading libraries helped spread literacy and democracy to new groups of readers, they also deprived them of one of their most powerful tools for conversing with authors and readers by equating writing in books with defacing public property.[cxxix]

There is the marginalia that accompanies a text, which ranges from the supervisors scribbles on a draft thesis to the scribbles of events that somehow remain attached to the final draft, but which are never said or explained. The intimacy of some marginalia is too private, and requires an outward bound pursuit, but it must be transgressed as an act of transgression, and not as an act of honesty or therapy. There are things to be dealt with in a quiet manner. For instance, there is the chance statement made in marginalia and not placed under erasure because it is an act of erasure.

For these reasons, certain key comments made as marginalia, by the supervisors on drafts, have been placed as footnotes. These have not been included in the text when it was felt these would corrupt a primary affirmation. These are, however, very much part of the flow of the becoming and multiplicity which is this thesis. In a rhizomatic fashion other commentaries should be added, if they are not reactive, to become more socially productive and repeat difference.

The representation of thought images can emulate a lucid or opaque formulation. The orthodox always requires and leads to a desire for the clear and logical. It disrupts intimacy. The law demands clear and logical thoughts, written in a clear and logical format, represented by the philosopher, or organizer of thoughts, working for the Capitalist (or Communist) and its collaborative State, to ensure clear govermentality and logical citizenship. However, rules are rules and even radicals opposed to the State and Capitalism may insist on the performance of their own games. In somewhat of a contradiction, there has been an orthodoxy of certain post structuralists to make reading difficult for the reader. Intimacy can be shared in the sharing of the difficult. Belsey observes of 'Post-Saussarean theory';

> Partly as a consequence of this theory, the language used by its practitioners is usually far from transparent. The effect of this is to alert the reader to the

opacity of a language, and to avoid the 'tyranny of lucidity', the impression that is what is being said must be true because it is obvious, clear and familiar. The discourses of post-Saussarean writers like Louis Althusser, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, though different from each other in very important ways, share this property of difficulty, and not simply from a perverse desire to obscure. To challenge the familiar assumptions and familiar values in a discourse, in order to be easily readable, is to be compelled to reproduce these assumptions and values, is an impossibility. New concepts, new theories, necessitate new, unfamiliar and therefore initially difficult discourses. [cxxx]

Likewise, in response to Magee's statements about the Frankfurt School being 'difficult to read and usually turgid and sometime unintelligible', Marcuse replies in justification;

> Well, to some extent I agree with you: I confess there are many passages of Adorno I don't understand. But I want at least to say a word about the justification he put forward for this. It was that ordinary language, ordinary prose, even a sophisticated one, has been so permeated by the Establishment, expresses so much of the control and manipulation of the individual by the power structure, that in order to counteract this process you have to indicate already in the language you use the necessary rupture with conformity. Hence the attempt to convey this rupture in syntax, the grammar, the vocabulary, even the punctuation. Now whether this is acceptable or not I don't know. The only thing I would say is that there lies an equally great danger in any premature popularizing of the terribly complex problems we face today. [cxxxi]

There are a number of other ways to disrupt patterns and create ruptures with conformity - to make a reader aware of difference. And, in this way, create multiplicity through intimacy and newer intensities. The difficulty is, by so doing, to ensure that existing styles are compromised. And literature may perform the task of reminding us of *Others* who are guilty of creating hernias in the muscle structure of conformity. These people are also becoming more than cautious. Never for them is there the seeking of an engagement, with more representations through further copying of models. Noting that Nietzsche seemed to show interest "in thinking of his ideal life on the model of a story", Nehamas recommends that that we ought to do likewise

> [I]n terms of Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. In this fictional autobiography the narrator relates in enormous detail all the silly, insignificant, pointless, accidental, sometimes awful things he did in his rambling efforts to become a writer...I am not suggesting that Marcel's actual life would have been Nietzsche's own ideal. But it does seem to me that the frame supplied by the perfect novel, which relates what becomes and is seen to be a perfect life, and which keeps turning back on itself endlessly, is the best possible model for the eternal recurrence. To achieve such a life involves

the reinterpretation of what is in a sense already there, since the whole self is implicit in every action. [cxxxii]

WELL I'LL BE BUGGERED

Gilles Deleuze, by his own admission, has 'buggered' the organized thoughts of other philosophers and, by that very act, invites others to do the same to him together with his expressions of flight. Although, it is unclear whether his sometime partner Felix Guattari gives consent to such unlawful acts. Through a multiplicity of such actions, but with an *Apollian* reserve, and a *Dionysian* excess other plateaus shall be assembled. As the various rhizomes generate and grow there shall be a further lubrication to the flow to ensure the necessary damage to the folds of the body of Deleuzian thought, to create a flight East through similar actions to Schopenhauer.

VIV LA REVOLUTION AND DIFFERENCE

In surviving an aftermath of Millennium fever, with post hoc justification that Marx and other alternatives to Capitalism have failed, it is important to remember some observations made a couple of decades prior to the *fin de siecle*. For instance, when responding to Magee's observations and statements, that the revisionist movement known as the Frankfurt School - that started in the 1920s and grew to greater influence in the 1960s - came about because Marxism 'had to be both re-examined and reconstructed', Marcuse notes that;

> In the development of Marxian theory – not in Marx himself, but in the development of his theory – the concept of Socialism has become increasingly focused on a more rational, larger development of the productive forces; on an ever higher productivity of labour; on a more rational distribution of the product – instead of stressing that a Socialist society as Marx envisaged it (at least the younger Marx) would be a society *qualitatively different* from all the proceeding societies.
> (*italics* added)[cxxxiii]

So the molar emphasis is shown rather than placing desire on more local intensities and productivity. Marcuse continues to then recall the often forgotten point:

> Now, in what way qualitatively different? The main point, I would say, is that in a Socialist society *life itself* would be essentially different: men and women would in solidarity determine their existence – an existence without fear (Adorno). Labour would no longer be the measure of wealth and value, and human beings would not have to spend their life in full-time alienated performance. This point has been obscured, and the result has been some kind of frightening continuity of image between advanced Capitalism and so-called 'real Socialism'.
> Marcuse in Magee (1978 italics original)[cxxxiv]

Then Marcuse reminds all that the Frankfurt School attempted certain marriages between bodies of thought because:

> What has taken place is a large-scale integration of perhaps even the majority of the population into the existing Capitalist system. The organized working class no longer has nothing to lose but their chains, but a lot more, and this change has taken place not only on a material but also on the psychological level. The consciousness of the dependent population has changed. It is more striking, the extent to which the ruling power can manipulate, manage and control not only consciousness but also the subconscious and unconscious of the individual. This was why my friends at the Frankfurt School considered psychology one of the main branches of knowledge that had to be integrated with Marxian theory – but by no means replacing Marxian theory, but taken into account. [cxxxv]

Gilles Deleuze - in "one of two theses submitted in order to become eligible for a professorial chair in the old French university system" (translator Joughin in Deleuze) [cxxxvi], which was later entitled *Difference and Repetition* - argues 'we' must be careful not to be "led away from the most important task, that of determining problems and realising them in our power of creation and decision." This he notes in relation to the 'false genesis of affirmation' that takes the form of 'negation of the negation'. He is adamant that affirmation of difference occurs and writes;

> [A]s Nietzsche says, affirmation is primary; it affirms difference, while negative is only a consequence or reflection in which affirmation is doubled. That is why revolutions have the atmosphere of fêtes. Contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat but, rather the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and preserves itself, the shadow maintains its claim to decide what the problems are. Contradictions are not 'resolved', they are dissipated by capturing the problem of which they reflect only the shadow. The negative is always a conscious reaction, a distortion of the true agent or actor. As a result, as long as it remains within limits of representation, philosophy is prey to the theoretical antinomies of consciousness. The choice whether difference is understood as a qualitative opposition is no less devoid of sense than that between the Small and the Large. [cxxxvii] [36]

RECORDING AND REPETITING THE NON-LINEAR

Massumi reminds us that in *Dialogues*,

> Deleuze recommends that you read *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* as you would listen to a record. You don't approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. There are always cuts that leave you cold. So skip them. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You

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[36] Professor Martin Parker notes on reading this text 'And this, I think, is a ghost that still haunts your text. Too many negations, too many enemies.'

find yourself humming them under your breadth as you go about your daily business. [cxxxviii]

Whilst Nehamas, in *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, discusses style, which he feels involves dependences, interconnections and organization. Firstly, he suggests Nietzsche might be characterized as being without an overall style and, secondly, he cites Danto's writings. Then, firstly we have...

> Nietzsche's books give the impression of having been assembled rather than composed. They are made up, in the main, of short, pointed aphorisms, and essays seldom more than a few pages long...And any given aphorisms or essay might easily be placed in one volume as in another without affecting the structure of either.

Secondly, in reference to Danto we find the similar commentary to that given by Deleuze about his own co-authored book being read as a record which is listened to.

> Ultimately, according to his view, Nietzsche's works can be read in almost any order without making a great deal of difference to what one learns from them. [cxxxix]

Wolfenstein, in *Psychoanalytic-marxism Groundwork*, [cxl] having given serious considerations to three people who had tried to bring together the one and the many, the individual and society, through a conjunction around the theories of Freud and Marx, looks beyond. In his post Freudian-Marxism explorations, he considers 'De-Stalinization and De-Colonialisation' discussing Fanon and Sartre. Habermas and others are then interpreted under the heading 'Revising Critical Theory' whilst under 'Doubling the Discourse', 'The Mourning After' and 'Psychoanalytic-Marxism' even more people are discussed. But it is under the heading 'Exploding Freudian-Marxism' that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are given a hearing and critical perspective. It is principally *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* that is reviewed. After that Wolfenstein, goes on to discuss his own topology of thoughts. In the folds of his quotes and observations, he writes of Woody Guthrie's guitar that it had inscribed on it the words *'this machine kills fascists'*. He continues by saying that 'Deleuze and Guattari offer us a different machine' and he notes that Foucault, in his forward to *Anti-Oedipus*, noted the latter's machine had seven moving parts:

- "Free political action from unitary and totalizing paranoia
- Develop action, thought and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization.
- Withdraw allegiance from old categories of Negative (law, castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic.

- Do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force.
- Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action.
- Do not demand of politics that it restores the "rights" of individuals, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individuatlization.
- Do not become enamored of power." [cxli]

The quotation would seem to be as good a *credo* for a thesis, discourse, desire-production or assemblage as any other or *Other*. In itself, there is the problem of how to make this virtual become actual. And formations, such as those, require a means to upset the molar formulations of institutions, and the *dressage* that comes from the institution of writing in a particular way: Perhaps, the material disruption to those patterns can be done through means already achieved, like Blanchot's fragmentation of text.

The other of this molar is not its negative and, in this case, the method cannot be the dialectic because primary affirmation is sought. An affirmation, that responds to a Deleuzian interpretation of Nietzsche's word image, 'the Eternal Return', will be produced. This will be stretched in the spirit he might have intended and then, by Deleuze's invitation, it will be 'buggered'. Difference will be affirmed in this thesis. Then the process, processes, events, thought images and unfettered desire lines - produced in this multiplicity - will be those that, if eternity were to repeat itself endlessly, would be the ones a singularity would not have wished, again, if the multiplicity could also be repeated continuously. Before we forget - and forget we must because to re-member (not in the Proustian sense) is to represent - the lines of flight are away from an organization of thought of *re*presentation. It is an affirmation of the *Other* of a philosophy of representation. The order that materializes from that plateau or milieu is productive and disruptive. It is an affirmation that speaks one way and produces action but not as the negative of reaction. Massumi notes,

> There are two kinds of action. *Reaction* : gravity is active, but can only *re*act to the presence of a body; quarrying is active, but involves disjunctive synthesis which *re*duces a number of individuals to their shared properties, *re*cognizes a given individual as belonging to a type, and judges that individual on how well it *re*peats a model; husbands are active but only in order to *re*produce; a judge actively transforms individuals but only insofar as

he is *re*presentative of the law. Reaction, reduction, recognition, repetition, reproduction, representation. Re: habit. *Affirmation* is nonreactive action. (*italics* original)[cxlii]

Then from another source, there is this:

> Discipline is no longer imposed on the body through the formal action of the law - it is printed in the collective brain through the dissemination of techno-linguistic Interfaces inducing a cognitive mutation. [cxliii]

Berardi, also writes to state;

> I'm not a masochist who would try to go through some kind of deprivation in order to construct something. I think that really there is no substantial difference between prison and the rest of life. I think that life is a prison when one doesn't make something of it or when the time of life is not grasped freely. One can be free in prison or outside prison. Prison is not a lack of freedom, just as life itself is not freedom - the life of workers. The problem, then, is not that one must go through prison and the problem is not to make a philosophy out of this. There is no need to go through any deprivation. This is not a condition of philosophy. The fact is that one must make live the positive passions. The positive passions are the ones that construct, whether one is in prison or outside. And the positive passions are the ones that construct community, that liberate relationships, that create joy. And this is completely determined by the capacity to grasp the movement of time and translate it into an ethical process, in other words, into a process of the construction of personal joy, community, and the free enjoyment of divine love. [cxliv]

Negri then produces another component and connection to an assemblage which starts to dissolve the authorship and commentary of a singularity. This disruption is material and the blurring of a boundary is not deliberate since it is a becoming *Other*. As an unexpected consequence it refuses an expectation for proper and tidy closure. Like the final adaptation to Chia's representation of two images of thought (see the right hand side of the diagram between pages 16-17), the boundary is not transgressed because it never existed.

> Labor is still considered as employment, that is, still considered as variable capital, as labor "employed" by capital. Employed by capital through structures that link it immediately to fixed capital. Today this connection, which is an old Marxian connection, but before being Marxian it was a connection established by classical political economy, today this connection has been broken. Today the worker no longer needs the instruments of labor, that is, the fixed capital that capital furnishes. Fixed capital is something that is at this point in the brain of those who work; at this point it is the tool that everyone carries with him - or herself. This is the absolutely essential new element of productive life today...

A single life becomes productive, and intensely productive, only to the extent that it communicates with other bodies and other embodied tools. But then, if this is true, language, the fundamental form of cooperation and production of productive ideas, becomes central in this process. [cxiv]

APPENDIX 2

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND EASTERN GEOGRAPHY

NON-DUALITY

Before making a final, whole-scale movement to address the *Other*, folds and other material aspects, let us address another image of thought, that is non-Western, since it seeks a *re*-presentation that is circular or, at least, not linear. This is an image that is not so much presented to be solidly oppositional but to be the undecidable of the virtual, altogether and forever, continuously hesitant to any easy dialectic resolution.

The dialectic is avoided because at primary and middle stages, it does not organise to include but orders and organizes to antithesis from a position of exclusion. Some time back, in the earlier part of this thesis, reference was made to the symbols for Ying and Yang, and now there is a return to the circle of two halves. It has often been established, in a representational form on paper, as a set of interconnected pears or tear drops; often shown as one being white and the other being black - with each having a just visible centralised point obtaining the other or 'opposite' colour within it. So always within the mass of black there resides a white spot and within the mass of white colour can be found a black spot or centre.

From an anthropocentric viewpoint this, then, could be the *Other* within ourselves or, at least, the *Other* ever present and connected to us. It reflects the change from one to another.

> The principle behind the I Ching is change: the inevitable change of a Yin force into a Yang force and vice versa. These changes are represented by the moving lines. [cxlvi]

The whole symbol never quite static but somehow – or, perhaps, only to some – conveying a movement, a flow or a process of change, transmutation or metamorphosis. Is it, then, the Eastern symbol of the Philosopher's Stone? In the ancient Chinese text, *I Ching or The Book of Changes,* the symbols for *Ying* and *Yang* are often depicted, slightly, differently through the use of lines.

> Originally, the *Book of Changes* contained a collection of linear signs meant to be used as oracles. In the most rudimentary sense, these oracles confined themselves to be answers 'yes' and 'no'. Thus 'yes' was symbolised by a single unbroken *yang* line (–), and 'no' by a single broken (- -). Time brought a need for differentiation and amplification, which required amplification. [cxlvii]

DIFFERENTIATION

With the differentiation and amplification of these movements came trigrams - a set of three lines. *Yang* at its strongest – waxing – was three single unbroken lines decked one upon another. Whilst fullest *Ying* has three broken stacked as one upon another above and that set is placed upon itself. There were eight different trigrams, in the *I Ching*, which represented all the combinations of line and unbroken line. Consider, a movement of broken line from the ground displacing one unbroken line whilst moving upwards. Then add another broken line. These combinations are then placed within a circle, having positions that are equidistant from each other.

A movement or flow is then shown which is then the movement of Ying or the movement of Yang. Each movement both strongly anticipating a change towards the *Other*. There is a very powerful hesitancy in leaving the event that was a different *Other*. There are other forces which welcomes as a series. It appreciates, anticipates, hesitates, incorporates and acknowledges difference and the *repetition of difference*. Later in the development of these symbols and usage, the combined couple of trigrams where presented in the various pairings to give 64 combinations, acknowledging further differences. Likewise, these combinations often are found placed within a circle equidistant from each other. [37]

VOIDS BETWEEN FRAGMENTS

It is in the spaces between each line *within* a trigram and the void *between* each trigram that possibility and potentiality can be recognised as *Otherness* - or the *repetition of difference*. In both figure and foreground, it is the unaccounted void which has the probability of re-presenting the greatest potential by showing intensities, multitudes, becomings or change as difference; [38] it is the void space where there is the greatest chance of the *complete repetition of difference* (remember, the Eternal Return). In the space, the event of another eternity or infinity can unfold or occur as the void; or, as *Blanchot's night*. This is an oscillation between a completely different that or an altogether other this – chance - aspect of change.

Between the paragraphs obtained in the middles of thoughts and between those middles - in the spaces made by the voids – much is implicated and explicated. The connections and material associations of fragments of texts and rhizomes of quotes works to deny completion and prediction. In this way, these become altogether productive to a multitude of thought, through a refusal to allow an anticipation that

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[37] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari briefly discuss Tao, Ying and Yang as forms of intensities in *One Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* tr. Brian Massumi. London: The Athlone Press. p.157. They also note: 'Among types of civilizations, the Orient has many more individuations by haecceity than by subjectivity or substantiality: the haiku, for example, must include indicators as so many floating lines constituting a complex individual.' p. 261.

[38] Not surprisingly since it should be remembered that these symbols come from a text entitled *I CHING or the Book of Change*

could provide an absolute certainty.[39] Alternatively, the excavation of the spaces on the page by words, other than those used for performing ordering and organization for the same and similar, creates the expansive crater for thought of difference...

Text, then, can have the facility of making *the process* that de-territorializes planes and angles of thought, away from the structures of hierarchy. Are the voids, between each I Ching trigam, best problematized as spaces of *hospitality*? Or: are the lines of the trigrams the friendly sites where one uses re-terrorialization and deterrorialization as strategies?

> Deleuze described the act of thought as a dice-throw, by which he meant thinking is a form of experimentation, the success or failure of which lies outside the control of the thinker. [cxlviii]

PROCESSES

The book *Pa Kau* brings harmony to the divide of mind and body, by its use of the *I Ching trigrams,* to perform movements that fulfill a process of recovery and discovery for the practitioner. This could be configured as Idealism and Materialism brought together but this binary opposition should be avoided anyway; since there is no wish for a dialectic here. The art of making 'images of thoughts' could use the attitude and principals of Pa Kau to bring more than just parisomony and coherence. The making process of a thesis should be more than the writing of the methodology and such things. The form of re-presentation should be radical when the thought demands it. Can unorthodox thought be 'legitimately and authentically' re-presented in an orthodox manner? The use of spaces, fragments and voids is important for some images of thought. Brewerton writing, amongst other things, about *poesis* or the making process, notes that from chapter 11 of the *Laozi,* or *Dao te jing* [40]

> Thirty spokes share one hub
> Adapt the emptiness within...and you will have the use of a wheel.
> Knead clay in order to make a vessel.
> Adapt the emptiness within...and you will have the use of a vessel.
> Cut out doors and windows in order to make a room.
> Adapt the emptiness within...and you will have the use of a room.
> Thus what we gain is Something, yet it is by virtue of Nothing that this can be put to use. [cxlix]

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[39] This is like particle / wave duality in science where matter and radiation seem to oscillate between becoming and being wave and matter. McEvoy and Zarate ask the question: '[I]s the fundamental nature of radiation and matter better described by a wave or a particle representation? Or do we need both?' McEvoy and Zarate (1998) *Quantum Theory for Beginners* London: Icon Books. p. 105.

[40] This early Chinese Daoist classic was written according to Brewerton somewhere between the 4th-3rd century BC (Warring State Period).

A colonising of these symbols of line and unbroken line, or groupings, for the process at hand, could stretch to a substitution for the movement from *Ying* and *Yang* to another from *One* to an *Other*, from singularity to multiplicity. It also might easily be suggestive of a short-hand for say, different images of thought; science and art; *Western* and *non-Western*; or structural and *processural* viewpoints. The broken and unbroken lines could represent the *Inside* and the *Outside* of thought. Equally it might be your quote and a quote of another.

Now let us think upon the formula (n-1) - used by Deleuze and Guattari which is dealt with in more detail in a later middle of thought - to move away from simple dualities to move towards a becoming of the non-dualities of thought. The whole and the fragment are here to be represented by the line and the unbroken line but, together, these form a productive or potentially productive multiplicity. Perhaps as parts of middles of thought these are stylistically different. Whole and incomplete middles of thought together, with other text not yet written, provide the material flow of a becoming.

And now using (n-1), perhaps, the whole with some incompleteness could be included in the schema. At the heart of this play of thought is something more than the simple contestation for prominence between Being and Nothingness, or Figure and Ground. Rather this, image of thought, seeks to release a productive connectivity of the singularity of becoming and its *Other* – the multiplicity; or, the void or nothingness; or, change or the repetition of difference.

A further simplification, or amplification, to some of the patterning which has occurred might be seen through an interchange of symbols. Consider, an interchange between the Greek alphabet to broken and unbroken lines of Yang and Ying. For example, the letter Alpha exchanged for a particular combination of broken line and unbroken line. These lines then transmuted to act interchangeably for all the other Greek symbols up to, and including, Omega. There are other plays. Perhaps, then an *A* brought together with single or multiple combinations like lower case b; *c, d; E,F,G; h, I ,j ,k, l; M,N,O,P,Q,R; and then also u, v, w, x ,y & z*. Now a rhythm is disrupted, in the typing of the alphabet by the simple use of upper and lower case, to an appropriation of a mathematical sequence or pattern. Or perhaps, then, there is the *A* found in the sequence of qwert, Asdfg, zxcvb, yuiop, hjkl and nm but the sequence might begin AZARD [41]. This all becomes disruptive when ordering but so it is when things become unfamiliar.

The unfamiliarity-making may be what is the 'natural' becoming of the virtuosity of a *poeisis*. Perhaps, the familiar can never be part or parcel of the *bricoleur's* art or image of thought. Making it sayeable, writeable or printable, creates a disapora for one or many of the letters or *hieroglyphics*. *Taoist symbols* can be used unpurposefully; or with a reason; or to betray reason. Anything at hand, ought to be

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[41] QWERT the left sequence of symbols on an English and AZERT the sequence on French typewriters.

used to break, disrupt or even divert the linear rational and dogmatic style of Western State Philosophers and, thereby, impede their progressive gains in territories and reterritorialization. But at one level, it might be suggested that not only is this re-presentational but it is also a tendency to Idealism.

Deleuze has made reference to Taoism, however within his own philosophy there is something else that can be applied to problematize the paragraph above. Even in the examples cited, immediately above, there is a dangerous mistake of substitution which has occurred.

> Deleuze insist that repetition excludes substitution, and that in fact repetition concerns what is irreplaceable. Repetition occurs only in relation to that which is singular and without equivalent. Repetition does not refer to the equivalence of successive individuations of an original identity, but to the full difference that each thing possesses in itself as the first immediately carried to the 'nth' power. This reveals a certain paradox of repetition, namely, that repetition repeats the 'unrepeatable'. Repetition is the displacement of difference and not the reappearance of the identical; it is the internal animation of the singular that prevents it from being equivalent to any other. Thus it is because of repetition that we can speak of the 'universality of the singularity' without confusing it with the generality of the particular. [cl]

And then it is noted that;

> The displacement enacted by repetition is that which also *disguises* it, complicating the order of signs and the ideal of representation. Repetition can thus be positively described as the singularity of presentations, rather than negatively described as the generality of re-presentation.
> (*italics* added) [cli]

EASTERN MOVEMENT

Aspects of Eastern thought are respected in the flow, through the middles of thought, although the movement has been tempered by a stopover and build up of another network of thought. Up to now, the first series of movements of thought followed an Easterly and, sometimes, 'cinematic transport' [42] from the orthodox spaces of North America and England to a territory which is home to a largely, French set of thinkers.

Now it should be evident, from several of the opening quotes of a middle of thought, that the movement of the text has been much more Easterly in direction. It has a trajectory to other places, beyond the easterly territory of a spectrum of Italian thinkers. [43] Although many have avoided the suffocation of thought endemic amongst

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[42] See Appendix 1. for cinematic movements. Also consider the word 'transport' as Michel Tournier uses it in his text, and also the connected interpretations in application, for example, to the word *phoric* - see the previous middle of thought.
[43] This has all or much to do with an American, Michel Hardt.

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those easily persuaded by the *dressage* of academic administrators. The last opening quote to this middle of thought completes the Easterly circle being from the Americas.

Also in this middle of thought, an author gives less emphasis to the quotes of others, no more having to demonstrate, amongst other things, the famous *Sanskrit* saying *Thou art That*. Equally the 'architecture of the thesis' moves from the simplicity but expansiveness of the Chinese maxim of greatness – the *uncarved block*.

The egoism of writing, as if the utterances are really only produced by myself (the wise reader must always ask: *'Who speaks?'*), is given a freer play shortly, although this author or singularity would argue this is a tendency to the inauthentic. For a moment, the architecture of thought produced around the Taoist symbol of Ying and Yang is abandoned. If the Ying has been quotes and the other is the author's own thoughts then in this middle of thought the Yang is given space.

MULTI DIMENSIONAL DIFFERENCE

Now let us confront a paradox of several-dimensions in relation to these symbols - there is a left-handedness to the Yang (or Ying) that is only ever in a synchronistic relationship with the right-handedness of Ying (or Yang). However, the two-dimensional symmetry of the conjoined symbols is pleasing to the eye, and implies harmony. Now consider, the possible and virtual manifestation of these emblematics outside of a two-dimensional plane. Consider now, the three or four dimensional aspects of rotation and the representations which follow movement in large degree to expose the differences of the sphere. What is seen on the surface of such a 3-D sphere, after the balanced aspect of the white tear drop with a black dot and black tear drop with the white spot is first rotated 360 degrees East or West, and then rotated 360 degrees North and South?

The harmony would not be so easily sighted, in any slice made available to view, and there would be an aspect - where the sphere in its two-dimensional plane, shown and simplified as a circle - is all most completely black (not a tear drop) with a very small white spot and another point which cannot be 180 degrees away - because that implies a surrender to equivalence - that was completely white with a black dot. And perhaps, one of the points in rotation would echo the visual of the Sanskrit sound image **OM** [clii] which is representative of the opening and the closing of the universe (make the sound and note the opening and closing of the mouth).

Now these 360 degree rotations are near to becoming the geometry and architecture of the multitude, where symmetry is not easily found, and the *Other* is always present. This is the architecture that the thesis seeks to re-present as difference. And, of course, the three-dimensional Ying / Yang sphere in motion is, forever, hostage to internal pulls. It has at least one point on its surface, so different from the rest, that it is the most productive and hospitable de-territorialized space for the *arrivant,* however different. It also has a seepage to the exteriority of its boundaries such that

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the sphere, like the Sun, has no clear boundaries only the ever-changing, relationships of energy to things in contact at different points.

LINGERING APPENDICES

Rather than looking to affirm a series of events, or create a potential around a single aspect, such as employability, ought higher education to become the universities of difference, in order to safeguard what they were supposed to be about? For instance: what of an assemblage styled on Bataille's College of Sociology or Acephale?

Richardson [cliii] reports that just prior to the Second World War, from 1937 to 1939, Bataille - in collaboration with others such as Roger Caillois, Michel Leiris and Jules Monnerot - founded and sustained the College of Sociology. It had no affiliations to any higher education establishment and it took,

> [A] position against scholarship based on disinterested knowledge, and expressly called for exploration of a realm that committed its members to the pursuit of interested knowledge...The perspective put forward took up Marx's challenge...that 'Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world; the point, however, is to *change* it.' For the College of Sociology, the 'activism' of their sociology would gain a contagious aspect and ally, in good surrealist fashion, the desire to 'change life' with that towards the 'transformation of the world'.
> (*italics* original) [cliv]

The other association formed by Bataille was a secret society named *Acephale*. Its secrets have been well kept and little is known about its activities. It is interesting to note that there should have been a need for such things / organizations given the milieu around Paris at that time. Maybe the need is as much felt now as then.

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BECOMING ET AL

ACCELERANDO

FOLDINGS AND REFOLDINGS AFTER UNFOLDINGS, FOLD UPON FOLD

Thus in each person, apparently as their own possession, there moves an intensity,
its flux and reflux forming significant or insignificant fluctuations of a thought
that in fact belongs to no one, with neither beginnings nor end.
Pierre Klossowski [i]

Let's say very briefly that through studying madness and psychiatry, crime and
punishment, I have tried to show how we have indirectly constituted ourselves
through the exclusion of some others: criminals and people.
Michel Foucault [ii]

My vision of the island is reduced to that of my own eyes, and what I do not see of it
is to me a total unknown. Everywhere I am not total darkness reigns.
Michel Tournier cited in Deleuze [iii]

No, sir, it is not there that an honest women is taken, everywhere else as much as
you please, but as for that, certainly not.
Sade cited in Gallop [iv]

[T]hey loved no one, although they knew no solidarity save the spurious solidarity
of the mob, in which lacking a common perception, none loves the other, none
helps the other, none comprehends the other, none trusts the other, none hears the
other's voice, their being the non-solidarity of those who lack common speech, the
speech-robbed non-solidarity of unrelated beings;
Herman Broch [v]

APORIA, APOPHASIS, ARABESQUE AND ALÊTHEIA

Intensities, indirect constitutions, the unseen, the unacceptable embodiments of desire,
non-solidarity and unrelatedness, these are elements and aspects of quotations. They
arise in the arenas where *aporia* manifests itself in the unfolding of thought that seeks
to make concrete the spaces between the possible and impossible. The *Online*
Oxford English Dictionary has the word *'Aporia'* as a 'perplexing difficulty'. This is
in line with *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* that has as its entry the following
sentences: 'A serious perplexity. The Socratic method of raising problems without
providing solutions is sometimes called the aporetic method." [vi] The former gives an
apt quote ' Aporia is a figure whereby the Speaker sheweth that he doubteth, either
where to begin for the *multitude* of matters, or what to do or say in some strange or
ambiguous thing." (*italic* added).

There are any number of *aporia*. Some are ready at hand and others not. There is, as an instance, the movement of a singularity from the multitude in a way that allows both to exist - so that the multitude contains a plethora or infinite series of singularities whilst affirming itself as something else - that Spinoza considered, and Deleuze contains simply within the formula $(n-1)$. This *aporia* will be examined later, in another middle of thought (pp.248-255), as material aspects gain ground and space.

The online quotation for '*Apophasis*' is 'a kind of Irony, whereby we deny that we say or doe that which we especially say or doe' and 'whereby we rally say or advise a thing under feigned show of a passing over, or dissuading it." Like it or not, both these sets of words imply a fold of thought, or a multitude of folds of thought. The first suggests a fold of magnitude, the clear hesitation or turning away from the orthodox, a detour from the simple and steady track or trail of a line of thought. The stutter or stammer arises because of a perplexity awaiting. This perplexity is of such immensity that it forces us to only, partially, confront the matter at hand.

Alternatively, one can raise the problem slightly and erase, or avoid, effort on the solution. It may, then, be the case that raising the problem, to its 'true' dimensions, gives breath in-itself to its own immanent productive trajectory, but this becomes such a weighty task that, with the nearness of the memory of the Myth of the Sisyphus, it results in cowardice and withdrawal. The result of which is, then, a turning and walking away from the awesome task of thinking difficult thought, seeking comfort and shelter from the initially isolated middle and lonely enterprise at hand. Certainly, in confronting the writing of the 'fold, folds or folding' one cannot doubt the serious perplexity of the putative purpose or task. This is not made any easier by a cursory reading of those who fold well or write directly about the fold.

Maurice Blanchot and Pierre Klossowski, both masterful in the folding and unfolding of text to conjure, cleave, hide and, subsequently, reveal the fold and its impossibility. Their enigmatic styles appear purposeless whilst paradoxically attempting to reveal both what cannot be said together with the *exteriority of thought*. Blanchot's fearless and tireless enigmatic pursuit to, almost continuously, say as much as can be said by not saying much at all; a problematization, paradox and possibility played in lines, paragraphs, personae and pages. In some cases, a denial and speaking off of that which he will, in the end, say and convey. Is this an *Apophasis*?

The first quotation which begins this middle of thought, from Pierre Klossowski, conveys the singularity of intensity, which may be the materiality or energy of thought. It has a becoming that is a fold because it seemingly cannot truly be time-specific (no beginning and no end). Yet lacking a space, or location, it is that *aporia* that is truly ours - yet never possessed. This can be contrasted with the quote by Michel Foucault, which speaks of his Opus that has undertaken to explore how the disciplines and discourses have made objects of us and others through the exclusions of some. The actuality of this can be considered; so that, for example, with the drawing and completion of the simple circular lines of a Venn Diagram that action can, perhaps, so simply exclude those who someone wishes to define as 'mad' or

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'criminal' or *'Other'*. In some cases, lines become the folds of exclusion, as flocks and herds obey the State and accept how they are to be defined. And our smallest truths can be affected by such power, as Deleuze notes:

> Foucault finds himself in an impasse, this is not because of his conception of power but rather because he found impasse to be where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths. [vii]

There are many other ways to look at folds. Perhaps at first sight some are more obvious than others or *Others*. Consider the putative Origamist, someone interested in folds, lines and paper, but in this instant someone with a liking for geometry and balance. She or he looks at the single sheet of paper, available to her or him, and picks up the perfect shape - the sheet which, by chance, is a square rather than another, more common, rectangular sheet of paper, normally available to typists, academics or office workers. She, or he considers, how the Western mind might consider their own form of Origami. There is little or no need of the Eastern intervention or instruction here. [1]

She or he remembers her or his rules about triangles, learnt at school, and folds the square diagonally in half, creating two triangles. Now, there are two triangles and the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the aggregate of the square of the other two sides of the triangle. She or he is fascinated with the movement of meaning between, at least, two uses of the word 'square'. One of the meanings being a multiplicand multiplied by itself and, another, signifying a quadrilateral with sides of equal length. The latter was, perhaps, more fearsome because it was one of the primary workings of equality of identity, when the beginning of a measurement was venerated, and utilized, not in the labours of love but in the labours of labour. She or he opens up the sheet to form the original whole square – the major square - and now folds the paper using the opposing corners thus forming similar triangles to that ones made before. The centre point of the square is created by the bisections of the two creases which form a cross.

Folding each corner to meet at the centre, she or he creates a smaller square than the major one. Turning the sheet over, she or he, more or less, repeats the whole procedure to form an even smaller square. So, on one side there are folds, or what look like envelopes, which are recognizable as triangles; whilst the other side has part envelopes, in the shape of a square. Did she or he do this as a child? He did and she didn't. Then being in proper conformity with his or her sense of balance, control, proportion and order, he or she gives over to his or her impulses to write something on the upper side of his or her folded object that has square flaps. He writes the words *'State'*, *'education'*, *'family'* and *'therapist'* once on each 'lesser' square formed by folds; one word on each separate square flap. He then turns the object over and lifts

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[1] She or he even remembers the unpleasant character in the film ***Blade Runner*** who forever is found leaving, all over the places he investigates, sexually graphic artifacts made from folded or manipulated matchsticks.

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the large triangular flaps formed by the folds of two right-angled triangles. Lifting them all up reveals eight separate spaces. On each space he writes a descriptor of himself like the *'child within'*, *'citizen'*, *'son'*, *'dad'* and a few that will remain secret to the reader. She, who had no need of *logos*, had unfolded much and recreated something that could not so easily be remembered or repeated.

Folding everything back in place, with a deft movement, he places his thumb and forefinger under the square flaps and creates what looks like four pyramidal beaks. This technique is hard to describe but, once seen, it is easy to emulate. Now, with a bringing together and separation of thumb and forefinger, he gradually settles into, or arrives at, some sort of rhythm that pleases his inner-self. He calls his son into the room and asks the son to choose a number, anyone between 1 and 8. Then he moves his finger to the count, opens up the corresponding flap, to reveal an aspect of himself which he discusses with his son. This, perhaps, represents and repeats an aspect of the folds in *Western* thought. It is also contains the conditioning variables that constrain thought – *the State, the parent, the rigid gender et cetera*. These are not the folds sought in this middle of thought, which are unconcerned with the stable self. The velocity of thought unfolding here exposes, by its movement, a process without the normalized harness, which then submits such interiority to a critique that radically ruptures the captured, over-coded or striated self, and that which is also and otherwise territorialized by the *State* and its agents.

Outside of text on a page, or the folds of the paper, the visual re-presentation of the folds can best be simulated, or perhaps it is dissimulated, through a consideration of the more radicalized genres of cinema. For example, these can be considered through viewing and considering films like *the Matrix, Memento, Vanilla Sky and Magnolia*. But first a digression from this becoming which might possibly be worth the re-routing. Even here, in the viewing of cinematic film copies, discipline is close at hand. For example, at the beginning of a DVD video, yet to be seen completely, the striations of the State are all too apparent, as they help reproduce the social factors, that aid a particular and prescribed context [2].

Consider a familiar, leisurely pursuit: watching a film in the confines of ones home. Despite the fact that the purchase of a DVD video is for personal use (and having the necessary, industry-sponsored, audio-visual technological improvements, which have furiously matched commercial demands, in the movement from video cassette to DVD video) there is now no longer a facility to fast-forward from the very first opening shots to the beginning of the film's story line. A simple movement that allows a passover, from the statements around copywriting and pirating, is denied to all. Any other aspect of a disc can be seen, or bridged, but not that relating to the breaking of copy writing regulations (One wonders if the wonder of technological discipline is found on obscene or pornographic DVDs, or are the statements

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[2] As, Ronald E. Day notes, in *Social capital, value, and measure: Antonio Negri's challenge to capitalism*.(http//www.lisp.wayne.edu/~2398/socialcapial.html. accessed on 19/01/2004), "Marx noted how capital first and foremost reproduces its social context for production so as to extend and preserve its own economic values and dominance."

themselves obscene). But disciplinary power makes its mark here, your social space, even at home, is not yours solely for leisure. Not yours because of the factors of reproduction of the social that remind you of the productive capabilities ever present. The State or Empire imprints and disciplines the surfaces of the conscious mind, well before any imprint can be made through the cinematographic mind and skills of the film director or auteur.

Putting this mild digression aside consider the film, **Being John Malkovitch** [viii], which captures the duration of a time when an unsuccessful puppeteer, named Craig Schwartz, takes up a position of a filing clerk. His office is rather strangely located on the seventh and half floor of an office block. He discovers that there is an unusual passageway after accidentally slamming a filing cabinet. The passage way gives access to the singularity, which is the well known actor John Malkovich, who also stars in the film as himself. Whoever enters this passage sees and experiences the world through the eyes of Malkovich.

An important question arises, which is who is himself (or herself) when someone else is experiencing his (or her) being? After a number of people have experienced his John Malkovich self, seeing things through his eyes, he then struggles to gain the experience of himself. A variety of paradoxes are raised in this series of events. Who is the viewer viewing and might someone else be watching the film through their eyes et cetera?

An Escher-like sequence can be established: where each participating viewer, seeing a world view from Malkovich, enters a loop of experience which begins at a point that rises from personae, or the bottom of a 'stairway'; which has, at its highest point, a connection to another stairway or singularity; which, at its highest point, connects to another; which then connects to the base of the first. This is a multitude in the making. It is a *poesis* of multiplicity or multiplicities. The film or story shows *intertextuality and intersubjectivity* of a folded narrative demonstrated on screen. But, then, there is also **The Matrix** – a very folded story which implicates and explicates redemption and transcendence.

> But what is this other that forms the *outside* in relation to this *inside* we
> believe ourselves to be? Everything is led back to a single discourse, namely,
> to fluctuations of intensity that correspond to the thought of everyone and no
> one.
> (*italics* original) [ix]

At one level, this intricacy of curved thought might be considered just Arabesque. This will be true, if it is not in itself a fold, folding and unfolding. If it has some of the moves and curves, but those are insufficient to make it productive of the repetition of difference, then the fold has not become manifest. Intensity and primary affirmation need to come to the fore if the curved thought is to achieve the status of a fold. The same sentiments will be true of any other curve, or intertwining, which does not generate space which is hospitable and heterotopic to: *Otherness*; difference;

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becomings; creative transactions; and, relationships which form connections rhizomatically. Folds, foldings and unfoldings have a constancy of movement which is constituting and creative of deterritorization.

Arabesque according to **The Collins English Dictionary**, but in relation to arts, means 'a type of curvilinear decoration in painting, metal work, etc., with intricate intertwining designs.' [x] The movement between text, description of films and between turns in text could be described as arabesque. And it might continue in this way throughout the thesis. Certainly it is something to be valued, if only for the fact that it, possibly, defeats the traces of straight lines on territories and landscapes. It must not, however, be confused with the fold which always seems to bring the outside inside and explicate the inside to an exterior.

The experiential nature of the text, or its becoming, may be arabesque in this middle of thought but that is insufficient, since this is writing of the fold, or the production of an image of thought that materially disrupts through folding. In this middle of thought and within Appendix 1, the fold is explicated through text which makes possible the invaginations of cinematic text and expression, so that the outside impregnates any interior with an exterior. Cinema text, as a singularity, combines with written text to form a machine. Then, hopefully, the multiplicity formed connecting thought images with cinematic, now combines in an expression with its own ontological immanence.

There has been enough consideration of films; now to the complicated folds of life. There must be easier ways to explicate the fold? Perhaps, a summary would help. Lilley, Lightfoot and Amaral note:

> Cooper (1993) conceives of the reproduction of uncertainty in modern technology representation, following Heidegger (1977), Derrida (1972, trans.1981*a*), Deleuze (1988, trans.1993), and particularly Deleuze's reading of Foucault (1986), in terms of spatial logic of the fold. For Derrida (1981*b*:227) the fold is a gathering that is at the same time a dissemination, a joining that keeps apart, but never presents itself as such. And, for Deleuze (1988, trans. 1993), the fold is that which mediates between virtuality and actuality. It is not just a question of representation – organizing matter into visible form – but also the virtual relationship of forces that act to destabilize the determinable and bring forward what can be articulated. [xi]

This summary cannot, and does not, convey the depth of the exercise of folding since there is much more to explicate. Yet the difficulty of expressing, or explicating the fold cannot be made easier by a simple reading and re-presentation of authoritative texts, such as the two of those written by Gilles Deleuze.

Those two texts by Deleuze being **Foucault** [xii] and **The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque** [xiii]; but especially important in this context is the chapter entitled '*Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation)*', which can be found in the latter. A re-presentation of parts of these texts, as shall be shown, creates an *intertextuality* and a

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demonstration of a desire for intellectual comradeship. But the repetition of the *'same and similar'* acts, whether undertaken with the best of ethical intentions, to a large degree, acts as a betrayal to the reality which is the *repetition of difference*.

Deleuze notes of a labyrinth - and the detective might well sense and make sense of the philosopher's historical investigations, that play with the multitude, singularities and multiples -

> A labyrinth is said, etymologically, to be multiple because it folds. The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways. [xiv]

Rather than referencing a film, Gilles Deleuze uses an illustration to perform a 'Being John Malkovitch'. Or more properly speaking, to do a 'Being Leibniz'. And there is, in an early chapter of *The Fold*, a diagram of a Baroque House - something which Leibniz used as an allegory and Deleuze describes its two floors. The upper floor has no windows, it is a closed with a private room with 'drapery diversified by folds'. The lower floor has common rooms with several small apertures – the five senses. These are two labyrinths between 'pleats of matter' and 'folds in the soul';

> It is the upper floor that has no windows. It is a dark room or chamber decorated only with a stretched canvas 'diversified by folds', as if it were living dermis. Placed on the opaque canvas, these folds, cords, or springs represent an innate form of knowledge, but when solicited by matter they move into action. Matter triggers 'vibrations or oscillations' at the lower extremity of cords, through the intermediary of 'some little openings' that exist on the lower levels. [xv]

This is a labyrinth that folds 'as if it were living dermis'. From a reading and consideration of the text and thoughts of Antonin Artaud, Russell notes, that Antonin considers it is the site of the skin that has great importance as an event of a fold. It is on the surface where the *Dionysian* is privileged over the *Apollonian* in the *Theatre of Cruelty*. But here representation is truly sacrificed in 'a radical transformation and reappropriation of one's own body'. The theatre is compared to the plague.

> The plague is a catastrophic social phenomenon, and a total disorganization of not only individual bodies, but the body politic, out of which a new social order and physicality emerge.

And,
> Artaud describes how volcanic eruptions on the surface of the flesh violate the inside / outside borders which preserve corporeal integrity, as social, psychological and ethical structures implode. 'Civilized man' disintegrates in an elemental force field that seems to be reversing the process of creation and the more determined his strategies for self preservation, the more directly they contribute to the process of his destruction (Goodall 529). [xvi]

The body and mind are fields for folds. But between the bodies and thoughts of intellects there are folds or, at least, discretions made apparent - or even an inconvenience caused, to a straight forward relationship, which should have been all too transparent to all to comprehend.

Within foldings, matters arise that sometimes need consideration so as to learn from what happens. There are matters of pedagogy that arise in these considerations of an outside.

> The crux of the matter is that pedagogy is not restricted to a set of operations aimed at facilitating access to a pre-existing object, nor, conversely, is it divining practices that coaxes, from a subject of teaching, some latent cognitive content. Following upon Spinoza's treatment of common notions, Deleuze, in *Difference and Repetition*, subtracts apprenticeship, or *learning*, from representational logic of instruction, making it into a matter of the sub-representational contemplation or, better *contraction*, of singularities, into the ability to extract a material schematism, or spatio-temporal dynamism, out of one's encounter with what he elsewhere terms, following Blanchot, the outside of thought.
> (*italics* original) [xvii]

Learning can take many forms. It can come through friendships. For a group of French Intellectuals, friendship for one another is demonstrated, or confirmed, by a refusal to say certain things about their friends or their works. This friendship is both explicitly and implicitly stated by a manner or style of address. For instance, in Blanchot's writings on Bataille, Gallop notes;

> After Bataille's actual death, Blanchot explicitly confronts the violence of such an appropriation in an article (about the impossibility of an article) about Georges Bataille, entitled 'L'Amitié.' 'Friendship...submits to the recognition of the common strangeness which does not allow us to speak of our friends, but only speak to them, not to make them the theme of conversations (or articles)...In this, discretion is not the simple refusal to disclose confidences...but is...the pure interval...the interruption of being which never authorizes me to dispose of him, nor of my knowledge of him (even were it to praise him).' [xviii]

Can avoidance be creative of folds? Blanchot's writings on Foucault, *Michel Foucault as I imagine Him* [xix], and Foucault's Blanchot, *Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from the Outside* [xx], also make similar (or different) references on what remains exclusive and inclusive in their thoughts and non-revelations of another's thought. These might well be called the 'pure interval'. A 'pure' interval' because of silence and voids, or what cannot be said, or should not be said? A purity as in the

'pure intensity', such as found within Klossowski's opening quotes to this middle of thought. [3]

Back now to the folds of Michel Foucault, written by his friend Gilles Deleuze, who notes that;

> Foucault continually submits interiority to a radical critique. But is there *an inside that lies deeper than any internal world*, just as the outside is farther away than any external world? The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside *of* the outside...the unthought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside...Either it is the fold of the infinite, or constant folds [*replies*] of finitude which curve the outside and constitute the inside...The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were folding the sea in his boat, Foucault wrote:

>> he is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely[...] a prisoner in the midst of what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger *par excellence*: that is, the prisoner of the passage.

> (*italics* original) [xxi]

From a viewpoint or place of advantage, in the last few middles of thought assembled in this thesis, which gave space and duration for a text of the flow of becoming, the movement or velocity now goes to a territory which creates or deterritorializes a plateau for one massive fold, several divergent folds and / or an enormous continuous folding. So learning from and in the fashion of Klossowski writing on Sade, there is a territory that can be explicated through reading:

> The distinction text /exterior has been turned inside-out. The reader who thinks they know who Sade is, who thinks they are Sade, become Sade's character. [xxii]

Furthermore, Gallop notes with such movements textual devices can play there part (but these will not, in the instance of this thesis, be replicated in quite the way Klossowski has devised).

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[3] See, for more general examples about the family of friendly folder's felicitous writing of each other, Eleanor Kaufman (2001) *The Delirium of Praise. Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault and Klossowski.* London; The John Hopkins University Press.

The interplay between footnote and text causes a splitting of Klossowski into Klossowski the accuser (= Patri) and Klossowski the guilty (= unbelieving friends).

Other middles of thought, in this thesis, have included folds of texts and thoughts whilst discussing, or furthering, other aspects of thought such as, for example, *the repetition of difference and fragments.* This middle of thought deals almost exclusively with folds. But, in any becoming, there can be little or nothing that truly is exclusive because of its singularity's connections together with the seepages that occur at all points along the boundaries.

There are paradoxes and *aporia* that arise in the unfolding, or folding out, of the singularity of the multitude. Differently there are fresh considerations in the multitude, enfolding singularities and territories. They are all becomings and this is their similitude. The folds in this middle of thought are intended to be ones that are smooth and, therefore, without too many sharp edges. They are assembled as a continuity, or continuous process, of folds - where any sharpness of an edge is due more to a question of competences, or an inability to see and / or express the true velocity of invagination or explication. For this reason, within this middle of thought, there is no intention to provide any strong definitions, or boundaries or other limits. It feels that in moving from flows to folds there is an implicit change in velocity, or maybe a deceleration. Can we fold without a change in velocity?

Folds are very important because they embrace the *Other*;

And if the Other has always been what represents evil, its place or its spirit, will we not perceive, through a discovery that will shake us, that the Other is other only insofar as it is the Same, although non-identical, insofar, therefore, as the Other being the same, denounces in this way the non-Identity of the Same? From which the infinite consequences, not only as for the declaration of 'last questions' and what one calls the spiritual domain, but as far as in our logic, in which the calm principle of identity, suddenly finds itself disparaged, without, however, surrendering its place to the no less calm principle of contrariety, such as invoked by the dialectic. For the negative (let us call it the 'spiritual power of malice') no longer consists in what is opposed to the same, but in pure similitude, in minute distance and imperceptible separation, not even in the deception of imitation (which always pays homage to the portrait), but in this strange principle, namely, that there, where there are likenesses, there are an infinity of likenesses and, where infinity glitters in the plurality of distinct indiscernibles, the image must cease to be second in relation to a would-be first object and must lay claim to a certain primacy, just as original, then the origin, will lose their privileges as initial powers. [xxiii]

Quite possibly, sense-ordering faculties have been trained or disciplined so very well, in a subtle and not so subtle fashion - through life long learning and education. The scripts gaining their purchase on a singularity or multiplicity, through the prescribed

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programmes of education at school. This roll out is aided by State Philosophy, in all its guises, so that the operating systems of the mind have only one mega virus to worry about. But just in case, healing is at hand, the manifestations of the media take hold. This is so powerful and pervasive that most, or all, in the Western world are addicted; or have need of an apprehension of sense datum streams that constantly bring forth distinctions and identities that nullify difference. These are *Convenient fictions* as Weber might say (comment from Robert Cooper). Then, in consequence, there apparently follow indirectly, a need to find a pattern-recognition form - an order or an organization - that articulates edges and boundaries.

Despite this there remains hope that those with innocence, faith or heterodox convictions, will recognize something else. Could this be multitudes, singularities, chance and the repetition of difference? The something else must be folds that, at a glance, have the appearance of sustaining an inside and outside, but then appear to be without boundary. The folding is continuous, having no beginning and no end. The connected unfoldings have no physical beginning and no physical end..

Endings are available for some, such as those who cannot but practice *majoritism* . [xxiv] These are like the dominant discourse of the scientist that takes hold of the fold, engages in the politics and reproduces methods of reductionism. No temporal beginnings and no temporal endings are available other than through the work of the reductionist. The chapter as a device almost certainly fails to limit. This is because alternative assemblages continue the fold, folds and folding through the silences, the voids and chances attendant to the multiple that is the text, reader, translator and scribe. Contact from milieu is maintained but not always shown. As Bogue reminds us:

> A milieu is a coded block of space-time, a code being defined by 'periodic repetition' (MP384;313). Every milieu is in contact with other milieus, however, and 'each code is in a state of perpetual transcoding or transduction.
> [xxv] 4

At the risk of sounding dramatic here, something important needs to be noted. In its simplest form there needs to be an awareness, which is necessary but not sufficient, to go beyond the desire to *only acknowledge the Other in one form*. And to do this there must also be added a healthy dose of the true spirit inherent in the *becoming*, which is this journey. This requires a shepherding away from the rules of the flock or herd. The event demands an unsharpened set of senses. An *uncarved block* can be sensibly apprehended when being falls away to becoming. If the sense cannot be so unremembered then, at least, a different reframing to the set of senses ought to be adopted, to figure a more empathetic disposition to folds and folding.

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[4] In the quote, MP refers to Mille Plateaux , Vol. 2 of Capitlalisme a Schizophrénie 1980. Editions de Minuit, Paris which is better known in English as the text - Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1999) *A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* tr.Brian Massumi. London: The Athlone Press.

It becomes important that stuttered movement, and crossings in the folds, are misunderstood as a Westerner (remember the middle *fragmentary territory* or space, which offers *hospitality* for the becoming of the other, is *Heterotopia* and cannot, therefore, be either utopia or dystopia). The movements and crossings need to be understood with an election and sensibility for some sort of Eastern fetishism, whether it be a question of style, attitude or something else. These are to be misunderstood in a particularly, non-scientific and anti-reductionist manner.

This improperly constituted, constituting altered attitude, should always seek a stuttered, arhythmic diagonal or circular crossing of spaces, which ignores certain efficiencies, like the measurements of linear time and the cartographer's desire for the straight line and recordable directions. The latter set, more often than not, is or represents the tools of *dressage*, used by another to constitute a being, sameness or beingness. This conforming and performing individual is measured by the shortest route, between two points, in the performance of identity. Someone said, 'nature has no straight lines'. From a cursory glance over any natural expanse this appears to be so very true. Yet despite this apparent fact, the straight line is highly valued in some societies but what is a straight line? It is the shortest distance between two points. Does it, therefore, follow that some societies value shortness? And here is another question: Do some societies value crooked lines?

ORDERED FORGETTING

Interrupted, stuttered or Arhythmic diagonal crossings, however, traverse disciplinary, functional or otherwise territories. These provide an ethos or compass for navigation across this middle of thought. And, indeed, this holds true across the whole of this thesis. A *way* is sought here. This is the *way* of doing diagonal, and sometimes – folds - circular, movements and moves, which break with the linear habits commensurate with the *'functional silo'* that is represented by the vast majority of text which is known as Western Philosophy. A type of 'ordered forgetting' needs to be negated. The fold, folds and unfoldings bringing out, or withdrawing within, the disrupted pattern is the material reality, briefly sensed, in an event, but only through proper forgetting. Jephcott writes, perhaps, of a the *forgotten uncarved block;*

> Recognition involves abstract thought. When an object is recognised, it is grouped by the mind in a general category of similar objects. The knowledge of its name and function makes it unnecessary to give the object itself, as a particular thing, further attention; it recedes into the neutral background of everyday awareness. Valery calls this faculty whereby objects are identified and then expelled from awareness 'our power of ordered forgetting'…But if the power of recognizing and naming things, that is, the faculty of conceptual thought, were suspended, the creative activity of the mind during perception would   continue indefinitely. The intensity of awareness, the degree of significance seen in objects would be limited only by the power of the imagination itself. Valery describes what would then be experienced, for example, in contemplating the things in a room:

> 'the objects are *active* like the   flame of   the lamp: the armchair consumes itself where it stands, the table describes itself so quickly that it remains motionless, the curtains flow without end, continuously' (*italics* original) [xxvi]

Perhaps this recognition and the hindrance to true   contemplation, causes Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze together with Felix Guattari to adopt a particular *Baroque style* of writing and presentation. But this is, in some sense, true of another of philosopher who is counted as one of Deleuze's friends [5]. As Bogue notes of Deleuze's style:

> Deleuze is a profound and original analyst of the arts, I believe, but there are formidable obstacles to a ready assimilation of his thought. He is an inveterate neologizer and inventor of concepts, whose works at times read like one extended definition of terms. His arguments are often dense, and they always proceed by means of paradox. Although carefully structured and gracefully crafted, his chapters frequently challenge reader's abilities to follow the *arabesques* of the general line of reasoning. He is scrupulous in his citations of sources, but his texts often require a thorough familiarity with cited works in order to be completely intelligible. He offers copious analogies and examples to illustrate his points, yet seldom does he engage in prolonged discussions of any one analogy or example. Finally, he advocates and practices an unorthodox 'nomadic thought', whereby concepts are at times modified and transformed from work to work, and even from section to section of the same work.
> (*italics* added) [xxvii]

It should be noted Deleuze uses 'arabesques of the general line of reasoning.' Stivale, in *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari*, arrives at the statement that there is a 'way' of being Deleuzian;

> These different *'ways'* of reading require of us an effort to understand Deleuze's project as simultaneously making his texts 'monstrous' and yet doing so through 'loving' depersonalization. I believe that this admittedly confusing formulation informs the 'two-fold' thought in fundamental ways. For not only does the creative thought *process* entail modes of 'thinking otherwise,' as an Outside thought, perhaps monstrous in its daring, or even its simplicity. This *process* also situates the 'person' along, or in relation to, the 'line Outside,' 'something more distant than any external world. But it's also something closer than any inner world'. Deleuze considers this no easy *process*, but one of 'manag[ing] to fold the line and establish an endurable zone in which to install ourselves, confront things, take hold, breathe — in short, think. Bending the line so we manage to live upon it, with it: a matter of life and death'. (*italics* added) [xxviii]

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[5] For a commentary on friendship see Gallop (1981), Hill (2001) and Blanchot / Foucault (1987).

Also, and by way of remembrance of those things that are reactive and disciplinary to such processes of thought.

> One of the fundamental tasks of the State, say Deleuze and Guttari, is 'to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth surfaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space.' [xxix]

Why is it then, with such an influential and creative philosopher boldly becoming, do so few others wish to share a similar platform, or plateau, for critical representation? Perhaps the answer lies in the ends and means to be achieved in the writing of thought. Bauman, in *Modernity and the Holocaust*, reminds us how instrumental rationality played such an important part in the terrors that were the Holocaust. Then (as now) bureaucrats, scientists and technocrats justify and sanction their own actions in terms of management or efficiency drives. These are undertaken to further a particular segment of a greater set of procedures, or authorize alternatives to the agreed system or plan. In so doing, they can forget or ignore the ultimate ends that arise or become manifest. The partial or full consequences of actions can be ignored.

Bauman also reminds us what science and modernity are about:

> Modern science is a gigantic and complex institution. Research costs dear, as it requires huge buildings, expensive equipment and large teams of highly paid experts. Thus science depends on a constant flow of money and non-monetary resources, which only equally large institutions are able to offer and to guarantee…Science is about truth, and scientists are about pursuing it…It is just a coincidence, and preferably a minor irritant, that curiosity cannot be sated, and truth found, without ever-growing funds, ever-more costly laboratories, ever-larger salary bills. [xxx]

So there are no cheap truths and,

> Modernity, as we remember, is an age of artificial order and grand societal design, the era of planners, visionaries, and – more generally – 'gardeners' who treat society as a virgin plot of and to be expertly designed and then cultivated and *doctored* to keep to designed form.
> (*italics* added) [xxxi]

Without due care, perhaps, doctorates can become just another expensive truth that ensures thought is 'cultivated and doctored to keep to designed form'.

Bauman also, helpfully, reflects on the findings of the Milgram experiments, that in particular demonstrate how inhumanity can be seen 'as a function of social distance',

and *'the inverse ratio of readiness to cruelty and proximity to its victim'* (*italics original*). [xxxii 6]

Bauman understands and knows the needs of men and man. This is the need to have order, agreed patterns and institutions. To achieve this end requires the performance of all manner of atrocities, yet this is what happens so that men can have their ideal or utopia. Order and organization must ensure the cultivation of citizenship to the dictates and aesthetics of the common 'rose garden' on the public common. The gardens must be clean, clinically so, arranged only to exactly match their wishes, normalizing nature in the manner they deem fit for their own purposes. Such a rose garden, whether at the rear of the suburban home or abutting a Saharan desert, provides sanctuary from the chaos that is life, risk, chance and the cosmos unordered. This is the cosmos which has no time or space for the anthropocentricisms of organizing man. [7]

But a wonderland of equivalence is desired by many; equivalence assigned to time, providing a required utility for the capitalist.[8] Likewise equivalence for the measurement and understanding of space; then equivalence through things like doctorates can be traded as knowledge packaged as a sameness; and, finally in this list, there is similarity for the purposes of employment and exploitation. There is *dressage* for the capitalist, through the compliance of local agents of control of thought in universities. These agents consciously and unconsciously, and with a certain regularity, perform a refusal of the fold and, thereby, reinforce a value to be placed on thought that folds. Money finds identity in itself and elsewhere very accommodating to the needs of the market for knowledge and folds do otherwise.

Doctorates can be copied by others and such plagiarism must be guarded against at all cost, and yet, this is within a system that supports procedures that allow for ease of duplication and replication for the purposes of experiment and verification. This is world view that wants creativity for the market and its development but encourages endless replication of the same and similar in science, representation and oppression.

Let's look, for moment, at the operations and thinking behind a replicable experiment. If the world changes every moment by a measure equivalent to say a formulae of the type (time + t) and, if the geographical, topological or other mapping variables to do with location alter indicators and measurement, so that a space formulae must also be considered (like geographical navigation points + dx of distance) then questions arise: How can you ever replicate an experiment? And which variable in the all of it stayed the same? Can there be any one variable that has not changed?

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[6] This might be contrasted with the difference of proper distance or MAAI OH MA described in Appendix 4.

[7] The same cosmos contains the uncontainable natural forces that unleash the tsunami, which has shown total disregard for man and makes the writing of any thought something of a pointless and futile exercise

[8] See, for instance, Alliez, Éric (1996) *Capital Times.* tr. Georges Van Den Abbeele. With a foreword by Gilles Deleuze. London: University of Minnesota Press. Theory Out of Bounds. Vol. 6.

Furthermore, by the time the experimenter has written, the observations and findings of latest replicated experiment, he too is changed by not being able to forget additional representations. Oh relativity! But such a world given to equivalence cannot easily, if at all, support and promote thought which has no equivalence. A thought, once written, if copied would so obviously be a copy. This cannot be said to be true of imaginative and original thought, creative and without an orthodoxy, it upsets the rose gardens of those policing academia. *Heterotopia* has no place in the utopia of State Philosophers.

But what are the subjectivities that are allowed? What struggles are the legitimate and illegitimate birthings of a thought radicalized by an academic's becomings? Much is at stake here.

> What are the new types of struggle, which are transversal and immediate rather than centralized and mediatized? What are the 'intellectual's' new functions, which are specific or 'particular' rather than universal? What are the new modes of subjectivation, which tend to have no identity? This is the present triple root of the question: What can I do, What do I know, What am I ? ...What is our light and what is our language, that is to say, our 'truth' today? What powers must we confront, and what is our capacity for resistance, today when we can no longer be content to say that the old struggles are no longer worth anything? And do we not perhaps above all bear witness to and even participate in the 'production of a new subjectivity'? Do not the changes in capitalism find an unexpected 'encounter' in the slow emergence of a new Self as a centre of resistance? Each time there is social change, is there not a movement of subjective reconversion, with its ambiguities but also its potential? [xxxiii]

To participate in the 'production of a new subjectivity', now there's a fine thought. *What can A do? What does A know? What is A?* Is the singularity's capacity for resistance, to anything which prevents a becoming, encouraged, facilitated and affirmed by fellow academics and intellects? Or are they the party of beings, so constituted, that the constituting powers and velocities of the struggles and resistance become spent, or too quickly dissipated, when contact is made with them?

Deleuze's long time partner knows all about this type of relationship and remains notable in his refusal to accept, or adhere, to the orthodoxy. As Genoska notes of Felix Guattari's concept of 'Transversality':

> [I]t may be said that transversality belongs to the processual subject's engendering of an existential territory and self-transportation beyond it. The key concepts involved are: *mobility* (traversing domains, levels, dimensions, the ability to carry and be carried beyond), *creativity* (productivity, adventurousness, aspirations, laying down lines of flight), *self-engendering* (autoproduction, self-positing subjectivity), territories from which one can really take off into new universes of reference. [xxxiv]

He also notes that it;

> [I]s a creature of the middle where it tends to accelerate. xxxv

And it,

> [B]ecame for Guattari closer and closer aligned with ontology. xxxvi

But then:

> Transversality is not merely a representational device, a biography by other means. Rather it is productively presentational and transdisciplinary. xxxvii

So, like *Tournier's phoric*, we have transport and to be carried as an important sign.

> According to Deleuze, like the surfers, 'we never stop inserting ourselves in the folds of nature, the most mobile folds of waves, living in the folds of waves' ('C as in Culture'). This 'getting out or beyond' philosophy corresponds to a kind of transversal jump, intersecting with other modes of thought and experience, what he calls 'percepts' and 'affects' in art, music. For, throughout *L'Abecedaire,* Deleuze insists that all great philosophers and writers – from Nietzsche and Spinoza to T.E.Lawrence and Antonin Artaud – engaged philosophy as a mode of 'becoming' that exceeds the strength of those experiencing it, causing them to 'see' as visionaries ('I as in Idea'). (*italics* original) xxxviii 9

In **Friday or The Other Island**, Tournier describes a scene. In it Robinson Crusoe, having come to terms with various aspects of solitary living, on an uninhabited island, now embarks on a singular event, as part of a series of adventures. Each adventure had created fundamental challenges for the Englishmen - who had previously lived a civilized existence. Many of the previous activities had, already, affected the ordering that he had chosen and undertaken to use to organize his life and activities both before, and immediately after, he became shipwrecked and isolated. In this instance, what appears to be the campologist in him takes over. At the beginning of this transformation, at the entrance to a cave's tunnel, he realized;

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9 The reference to capital letters, in brackets, is to ABC (1996), or its French equivalent, which is an alphabetical sequence of terms or concepts emerging from a conversation between *Gilles Deleuze and Charles Parnet* and can be found online at http://www.langlab. Wayne.edu/romance/FreDeluze.html. It is interesting to note that, whilst in the period of typing, this last sentence - the http address is active on the computer. It is almost immediately rhizomatic because of the connections it affords all who read to the world wide web. But then in the hard copy, paper copy form, the text in its becoming lays inert: the sequence of the alphabetical images sleeps, having lost a vitality or virtuality. There is no more the potential actuality waiting to be activated by the reader and text. The loss of vitality moves from thought to text on a word processor to hard copy text, which simulates a process of striations or limits marking a *Body Without Organs.*

He must go beyond the state of light-or-darkness in which man normally lives, into the true world of the blind...The tunnel must either be longer or less straight than he thought. But what did this matter? The two eyes had met, the gaze of light and the gaze of darkness...The next day the same thing happened. Time passes...He stayed where he was for another twenty-four hours, then he got to his feet and, without hesitation or fear, but filled with a profound sense of the solemnity of the occasion, started towards the end of the tunnel. He had not gone far before he found what he was seeking, the mouth of a narrow vertical chimney. He made several unsuccessful attempts to slide down it. Although the walls were smooth as human flesh the opening was so small that his hips would not pass. Accordingly he stripped, and after rubbing his body with the remains of the milk, went headfirst into the bottleneck, and this time slid down slowly but steadily like food down a human gullet.

Traveling further along a crypt, Robinson finds:

[A] cavity or recess five feet deep which he found in the furthest corner of the crypt. Its walls were perfectly smooth but curiously shaped, like the interior of a mould designed to fashion some very complex body. The object, Robinson suspected, was his own body, and after a number of attempts he succeeded in finding a posture – knees drawn up to his chin, shins crossed, hands resting on his feet – which enabled him to fit so exactly into the recess that he forgot the limitations of his body directly he adopted it. [xxxix]

What has happened here? The body of the 'man' and the body of the cave accelerate to separate and mutual becomings, moving towards different intensities and relationships through the multitude of events. These singularities in movement and speed were constantly and randomly dissolving identities. There he stayed and perhaps he slept - he did not know.

In the state of non-existence in which he found himself the difference between waking and sleeping was scarcely to be perceived.

The space, distance and distinction between sleep and consciousness dissolved and became indistinct. And during that time he recalled a childhood memory but

Robinson knew that he must break the spell if he was to see daylight again. Life and death were so close to one another in this shining place that it needed only a moment of inattention, a relaxing of the will to live, for him to slip *from one to the other*.
(*italics* added).[xl]

Deleuze, in *The Logic of Sense*, devotes considerable thought to 'Michel Tournier and the World Without Others' and here he makes many references to the *Other* and, in the text below he considers the possible folding world.

It implicates it, it envelops it as something else, in a kind of torsion which situates what is expressed in the expressing. When I, in turn and for my part, grasp the reality of what the Other was expressing, I do nothing but explicate the Other, as I develop and realize the corresponding possible world. It is true that the Other already bestows a certain reality on the possibilities which he encompasses – especially by speaking. The other is the existence of the encompassed possible. Language is the reality of the possible as such. [xli]

Furthermore, he makes the following observations about the lead character, in Tournier's story, who has undergone a reinvention, a cathartic regeneration and a becoming non-Western, on a possible *Heterotopic* (this is not the word used by Deleuze) site.

> The thesis – the Robinson hypothesis – has a great advantage: the disappearance of the structure-Other is presented as the result of circumstances on the desert isle...Robinson knows that he can no longer restore men to their function as Others, since the structure they would thereby fill has itself disappeared...Is not this progression through irreversible dissolution of the structure what the pervert, on his interior 'isle', attains by other means? [xlii]

Now there are folds about difference - and not sameness, similarity or identity - so to avoid the latter, a different form of movement is encouraged, or, perhaps, it is just enough, to accelerate the speeds of change to cause a reframing of pattern recognition, in order to now make a linkage between Tournier and another author.

Bataille, in *The Tears of Eros*, dedicates three sections of two chapters and a considerable number of pages to *caves*. The first of these chapters, entitled 'Prehistoric Man and The Painted Caves', briefly describes the development of man and eroticism; it makes cursory reference to tools, knowledge ('knowing how to') and signs. The movement, in the chapter, is about man gaining a consciousness of death and culminates, in the second section devoted to caves, which then describes what its name implies: 'Death at the Bottom of The 'Pit' in Lascaux Cave'. This is about the enigma of certain paintings that include a man, a bird, bison and a rhinoceros. The next of those chapters deals with work and play, and in the section, 'Doubly Magical Caves', Bataille writes more about the Lascaux cave;

> In the deepest crevice of this cave, the deepest and also the most inaccessible (today, however, a vertical iron ladder allows access to a small number of people at a time, so most of the visitors do not know about it, or at best know it through photographic reproductions), at the bottom of a crevice so awkward to get to that it now goes under the name of the 'pit', we find ourselves before the most striking and the most strange evocations. [xliii]

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,fter describing the picture he continues:

> Its truth no doubt continues to assert itself. However, no matter how it asserts itself, it still remains hidden. Such is the nature of both death and eroticism. The one and the other in fact conceal themselves; they conceal themselves at the very moment they reveal themselves.

> We cannot imagine a more obscure contradiction nor one better contrived to *guarantee disorder in our thinking.*

> Can we, moreover, *imagine a place more conducive to disorder* – the lost depth of this cave, which must never have been inhabited, which must even have been abandoned in the earliest times of human life. (sic) (*italics* added) [xliv]

Is this truth asserted whilst remaining hidden? Importantly, it appears that the cave functions to ensure an affirmative, productive and creative manifestation of disorder, in a sort of middling space. It is perhaps a space without obvious hierarchy or linear structures, maybe even a place made for rhizomatic movement. It may even be a model for the psyche or a place to be mad to be free. Lambert, in *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, makes a number of references to *Crypts*, including the one below;

> Returning to the question 'What are crypts for? – moreover, against the usual notion that crypts are used for hidings, for repression or exclusion Deleuze often defines the crypt by the special type of reading that occurs within the monad. The crypt designates both the place of reading in the monad (the reading room sealed up in light, or the book) and *operatio*, that is, the 'act' of reading itself (the art of cryptography). In short, it is at once crypt and cipher, secret passage and 'the shortest path through the labyrinth'. [xlv]

This is then one dimension giving over to multidimensionality. The straight line, once the *shortest distance* between two points, therefore, *gives way to the crypt*, which becomes the shortest path through the labyrinth.[10] He continues;

> This movement creates what the poet Yves Bonnefoy once described as the integral 'movement of interiority' within the Baroque, and signals a point of light that is both infinitely divided shadow and light rising up from an obscure background within the monad itself, a light defined by its damp luminosity, like the glow of large animal hides or the skins which drape the walls of a crypt and whatever light there is for reading. At the same time, we should recall that the crypt accounts for the creation of the concept in Leibniz's philosophy as an extreme movement of scission by which he encrypts all perception, that is, the force engendering the subject of perception along with

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[10] If you wanted, or needed, to have a form of efficiency that went beyond the shortest distance between two points – this, then, could become a sort of test of efficiency for the reader of explication and implication, get yourself to the pit, or crypt, as quickly as possible!

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the unity of perceived, within the monad in order to follow its principle 'fold after fold, fold upon fold'. [xlvi]

Deleuze explains, and quotes in relation to both the logic of uncommon senses and the bodies as a point of emphasis, something very important, to be noted, that helps give integrity to the locomotion of thought generated here.

> Everything is a mixture of bodies, and inside the body, interlocking and penetration. Artaud said that everything is physical: 'We have in our back full vertebrae, transfixed by the nail of pain, which through walking, the effort of lifting weights, and the resistance to letting go, become canisters by being nested in one another.' [xlvii]

And Deleuze continues:

> A tree, a column, a flower, or a cane grow inside the body; other bodies always penetrate our body and coexist with its parts. Everything is really a can – canned food and excrement. As there is no surface, the inside and outside, the container and the contained, no longer have a precise limit; they plunge into a universal depth or turn in the circle of a present which gets to be more contracted as it is filled. Hence the schizophrenic manner of living the contradiction: either in the deep fissure which traverses the body, or in the fragmented parts which encase one another and spin about. Body-sieve, fragmented body, and dissociated body – these are the three primary dimensions of the schizophrenic body. [xlviii]

Bodies are, then, in a proper relationship to the concept of the *'uncarved block'* and like becoming thought, or thought that is a productive becoming, these are associations of fragments. These things are singularities, which in conjunction with others singularities, form and perform as a multitude that is difference, which is neither that, nor this, but always the unfolding event and the *Other*.

How *Heterotopic* can the space of text, the body and other things become? Pefanis writes;

> Bataille is not content to remain in the analytic stage of the heterogeneous and the limits which restrict experience access to its mysteries. On the contrary, in postulating the identity between sexuality and death, certainly demonstrable in psychoanalysis, Bataille takes a decidedly Nietzschean turn by linking experience of the loss of subjectivity in ecstasy and sexual rapture with the philosophical loss of sovereignty in the death of God. With this death so disappears the transcendental guarantee of individual sovereignty, and what also disappears is that limit condition in thought that God represented; there is no exteriority of being.

This leads in Bataille's thoughts;

> [T]o a strategy and a method (as opposed to a project) of going to the limits, of thoughts, notions, beliefs, and morals – and then transgressing those very limits in order to delimit the operation and the sovereign authority needed to exceed them by transgression. This Nietzschean turn also places Bataille within the problematic of writing and death as addressed by the 'philosophers of death,' Maurice Blanchot and Pierre Klossowski. [xlix]

In the end note to the paragraph just quoted, Pefanis apprises us of the fact that:

> There is a continent of thought just beyond the horizon; the matrix formed by Blanchot, Bataille, and Klossowski. This continent is the territory of an aesthetic of anti- or post-surrealism, its critique and its critical moment. The discourse on the relationship between death, sexuality, and writing is another means of describing the triad. In effect it is a Nietzschean aesthetic. [l]

Pierre Klossowski - artist, writer and private scholar - was best known for his works that mixed considerations of philosophy and religion with eroticism. In this aspect there can be seen, as a series of often very engaging and stimulating folds, an endeavour that affirms an obstinacy which prevents any easy categorization - or limitation - of any one field. His written work on philosophy includes *Sade My Neighbour* [li] and *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* [lii] [11]. Foucault frames laudatory commentary that draws forth connections with other assemblages:

> As far as I'm concerned, the most important authors who have, I won't say formed me, but who have enabled me to move away from my original education are Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski. [liii]

Foucault elaborates upon this point.

> Bataille in a way, Blanchot in his own manner, Klossowski too also shattered, in my view, this founding self-evidence of the subject and created forms of experience in which the shattering and annihilation of the subject, the reaching of its limits, its spillage beyond its limits plainly showed that it did not have the original, self-sufficient form philosophy classically attributed to it. [liv]

Interestingly, each of these workers developed an original style of representing their thoughts. All wrote using *fragmentary representations* for some of their critical pieces. All wrote fiction as well as texts devoted exclusively to philosophy. Is this a case of the proper folding of thought, where fiction and non-fiction are the hand maidens of each others movement? Remember their *roman à thèse*. Such were the foldings of their individual assemblages of thought that these are not easily penetrated

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[11] The latter text being considered by Michel Foucault as 'The greatest book of philosophy I have ever read, on a par with Nietzsche himself." Michel Foucault letter to Pierre Klossowski, 3rd July 1969 cited by Daniel W. Smith in Klossowski (1997) Ibid., see, pp. vii & 263.

and, often, appear to be presented to avoid transparency in favour of polyvocal and ambivalent enunciations.

Yet, all these writers have also showed some respect for the writings of Sade, maybe because he demonstrates aspects of the folding of thought and loss of subjectivity, through what might, loosely, be called a method or techniques. This is the folding technique, which through a certain form of reiteration of the same or similar, draws out difference. [12]

> The parallelism between the apathetic reiteration of acts and Sade's descriptive reiteration again establishes that the image of the act to be done is re-presented each time not only as though it had never been performed but also as though it had never been described. This reversibility of the same process inscribes the presence of *nonlanguage* in language; it inscribes a foreclosure by language.
> (*italics* original) [lv]

From this description of aspects of Sade's working it is possible to draw out, from the assemblage of words, an enfolding or unfolding of Nietzschean thought – that of the Eternal Return of difference. The processural form of the activity is referenced. Immediately, following on from the above quote, Klossowski mentions another fold.

> 'Foreclosure' means that something remains outside. That which remains outside is, once again, the act to be done. The less it is perpetrated the more it raps on the door – the door of literary vacuity. The blows struck on the door are Sade's words, which, if they are now reverberated within literature, remain nonetheless blows struck from without. The outside is what of itself dispenses with any commentary. What gives Sade's text its disturbing originality is that through him this outside comes to be commented on as something produced within thought. [lvi]

Continuing on from this commentary there is a turn.

> But if, contrary to this undulating element, each of us forms a closed and apparently delimited whole, it is by virtue of these traces of signifying fluctuations: that is to say, a system of signs that I will here call a code of everyday signs. As to where our own fluctuations start or stop (so that the signs can permit us to signify, to speak to ourselves and others) , we know nothing – except that there is *one* sign in the degree of intensity: namely, the *self* ,the *I, the subject of our propositions.* It is thanks to this sign, which nonetheless is nothing but an always-variable trace of a fluctuation, that we constitute ourselves as *thinking,* that a thought as such occurs to us – even though we are never quite sure if it is not others who are thinking and continue to think in us. But what is this other that forms the *outside* in relation to this

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[12] For a more modern approach to this technique see also Martin Parker's writing on Jorge Luis Borges and Mendes. Op cit.

inside we believe ourselves to be? Everything is led back to a single discourse, namely, to fluctuations of intensity that correspond to the thought of everyone and no one.

(*italics* original) [lvii] [13]

No longer can there be the singularity of a thought which manifests images of dissimulation and disruption, of fractures between the inside and the outside. The multitude gains a much stronger stage, the *one* is denied but the *many* create a polyvocal presence in the separate singularity of an event. Deleuze, in discussing and quoting Klossowski, writes:

> For we are so sure of living again (without resurrection) only because so many beings and things think in us: because 'we still do not know exactly if it is not others who continue to think within us (but who are these others who form the outside in relation to the inside which we believe ourselves to be?) – everything is brought back to a single discourse, to fluctuations of intensity, for instance, which correspond to the thought of everyone and no one. [lviii]

Is the similarity, or difference, between the two quotations given above a matter of translation? The first one stated is 'directly' from Klossowski, having been taken from the source in its English translation. Does the second, from Deleuze, repeat the same or a different text than the first, already quoted? Translations always seem to create more folds and manifold interpretations.

To engage fully with the thought machine of Klossowski, it is fairly important to embrace and engage with his art, both fictional and non-fictional work. For there is a symbiotic and visionary connection between these worlds; where philosophy and fiction are mixed in fictional texts, that are then contained by, or contain, the suggestive art drawn of Roberte, who is a key and recurring character, modeled after his wife, Denise. The character Roberte helps throughout the collection of novels to outline *"The Laws of Hospitality"*. This is done through an exploration of the connections between religion and philosophy; mind and body; and, the dissolution of identity with generous sexuality. Klossowski's novels are more properly termed roman à thèse, because they put forward, or perform, an instructive function in relation to Philosophy. Whose truth or space for everyone and their truths?

> Hospitality too has a similarly paradoxical and inconsistent logic. It requires as a matter of general law that I welcome the other who crosses my threshold as a guest, even if the person turns out to be my most bitter enemy. But if hospitality demands unconditionally that I welcome everyone to my home, I am also required to treat my guest as a singular individual who may just be anybody, but is precisely *not* just anybody. What kind of host would I be if I treated my guest not as a guest but purely as manifestation of a concept? But if I cannot apply the concept of a guest to a guest, how might I treat my guest

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[13] Part of the quote has been used earlier in this middle of thought but in repetition, subtraction and forgetting difference is revealed. Likewise quotes have been repeated cf. pp. 106-107 & 168-169.

as a guest at all? And is a correct host, who scrupulously observes to the letter all relevant customs, a properly hospitable host, or just someone applying the laws of hospitality mechanically, thereby compromising the welcome imparted to my guest, not to say insulting the guest? To satisfy the laws of hospitality, it seems, I have to welcome my guest as a *guest,* but not *as* guest (or a mere example of a guest), rather as *a* guest who is anything but a guest, yet who exists in relation to me precisely *as* the guest *as such.*
(*italics* original) [lix]

About Klossowski's Laws and his text, Maurice Blanchot writes the following;

> [T]he complexity of the intrigue, a complexity that seems to be the secret law of Klossowski's narrative, is the inverse of the simplicity of the sign that cannot be called simple, but pure intensity that demands to be expressed only in a reversed way (through the vicissitudes of the detour), pillaging memory, certainly, but in order to devastate it, devastating it, but in order to create a void in it, and bring complexity to it, because destroying all identity, all unity, but perhaps through the constraint that exerts an always unidentifiable unity. [lx]

What is here? What can the event, the thing-in-itself, be named or called? Is it a detour, or fold, or a folding detour? There are some further observations. Blanchot notes of the more notorious laws that traverse several of Klossowski's philosophical books of fiction:

> The 'laws of hospitality', which provide at present the general title for the trilogy, are not in the least susceptible to a simple, even singular meaning. If the strange theologian, after having failed to become a priest, now married, intends to give Roberte to the host each time, it is because the saintliness of the sacrament of marriage demands the gift; the wife is the sacred itself, the unique, the inexchangeable singularity. To give one's wife to others is the gift *par excellence,* the renewed act of the consecrator who has received the power to share the undivided 'real presence'. A high power indeed, in which the temptation of malefic spiritual pride is reflected – but it is still a power? In the same way, isn't the husband who gives up his wife, pushing the guest into adultery, content to yield to the temptation to do evil without doing it, having it more comfortably accomplished by another? [lxi]

To understand or comprehend - the act *of hospitality* - is then to miss the *gift of the sacred* act alluded to by these words. There might be something far from mundane which remains beyond comprehension. [14] Just as the guest has access to the folds of Octave's wife Roberte, and in rising to the opportunities afforded, allows her to become a pure intensity, a singularity, so too can text be *hospitable to a reader.* It can give access through folds to vitality, an unreplicable singularity, that exceeds and transgresses a limit of organization, or order, to give privileged moments and

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[14] It is here, and perhaps in all events, that the reductionist comes unstuck. The reductionist is lost without sciences' own deities of definition, measurement and reproducibility.

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underprivileged becomings. But let us not forget the importance of 'her' singular becoming or 'her' multitude of possible becomings. She then has a becoming – perhaps a becoming women, a becoming child and / or a becoming animal.

> Why a becoming –*women, -child, -animal?* Social coding operates by way of asymmetrical binary oppositions, in Western societies through an implicit privileging of male over female, adult over child, rational over animal, white over colored, etc. A becoming deterritorializes such codes and in operations necessarily engages the underprivileged term of each of binary opposition. Hence, 'There is no becoming-man, for man is the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular' (MP358;292). A becoming-women, a becoming-child, or a becoming-animal, however, does not involve the imitation of women, children, or animals – an action that would merely reinforce social codes – but an unspecifiable, unpredictable disruption of codes that takes place alongside women, children, and animals, in a metamorphic zone between fixed identities.[lxii]

Here Bogue speaks of the engagement of 'the underprivileged term of the binary opposition', but thought of difference gives strength to the eternal, and eternity of *Otherness*, that exceeds and transgresses any simple binary opposition. Klossowski gives space to such a movement, which allows a wife to become *'the uncarved block'*, or the series of events which are not capable of being defined – the multitudes of difference. The point is not the movement to the opposite of a binary but the virtuality that allows any actuality. This could be in any possible direction, to any compass point, in the universe of potential and actual things and events.

Moving from some quotes, to Blanchot and back to some of the others, there is a change of velocity, perhaps, even a separate vector of the annunciations. A complexity, there, exceeds the differences of poets and philosophers, with their own struggles in time, who become through wrestling and cuddling the uncommunicatable. There is a harshness or roughness, a rude tonality, which both implies a limit and exterior, within an interior in the movements as yet unattached to Blanchot, Klossowski and Tournier. For instance, from the extended quotation below, it can be seen that Blanchot captures the *sacred sentiments* which go, well beyond, expressing and expression at the limits of communication. It is something that goes slightly beyond, or easily exceeds, even the radical thought and viewpoint, which is Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's, that grounds becomings in a materialism:

> The stranger to whom this gift with no return should be made is, according to ancient modes of thought, the unknown and, as such, the very presence of god (as if the sacred, through an act of repetition, could be given only to the sacred, which confirms the gift is sacred twice over). The unknown to whom the wife is consecrated without reserve is therefore what must reveal the unknowable within her, her secret, the part that familiarity, intimacy, and the customary knowledge of memory dissimulate, this divine part that belongs to *oblivion* and that Octave, the perverse theologian, can only know indirectly

through the gift without reciprocity, from which he himself is excluded, although participating in it fully if he is its initiator. But is he the initiator or the plaything or at most a mediocre, cunning director? And this incommunicable identity that communication must render visible, revealing to us what is Roberte's true face and what is her naked being – her large and beautiful ungloved hands, her austere, unsheathed body – is communication's effect not to multiply her, that is to multiply the identical, to repeat Roberte, to such a degree that we must live henceforth like Theodore, in the midst of an intrigue doubling and expanding, in which every sudden change is nonetheless bound to the centre – a centre always decentred – by a rigorous relationship? All the more so that Roberte, for her part, constantly disrupts the theological experiment by substituting, through the healthiness of her atheism and temperament for the exigency of the gift, the principle of an economy of exchange. The institution of the Hotel de Longchamp, borrowed directly from Sade, reveals to us how this economy might lead to the profane sharing of men and women – she disrupts the experiment, not by opposing it, but precisely by doubling it with another that stimulates it, dissimulates it, and is completely like it in every way, although non-identical.[lxiii]

This quote is pregnant and enigmatic with some discernable or putative meanings; becomings, difference, *Otherness*, singularities and a certain spiritual or mystical movement. The latter is important but there remains more earthly sets of questions to be dealt with in the first instance. Is ownership an issue here? A body belonging to any number of individuals ranging, for example: from she who occupies it permanently until death; to the spiritual entity as guest; to the husband; or, to another who is the last lover? Whatever the case, hospitality is afforded to a guest and, in the process, a uniqueness of a sign triumphs over social coding and a concept is unbounded. But cannot the process be applied, to another body, say to the more mundane body of thought that is organizational studies? Or, perhaps even to philosophy, as Deleuze buggers those philosophers of interest that are presented before him – perhaps, because they are all Western men, and have fewer or no material folds?

The uniqueness, which is thought, must allow a hospitality, and with it a transgressiveness, to become forever generative, constituting and productive.

Here there is difficulty because one can easily relate to a set of feelings and thoughts (like jealousy), which go with, or attach to, the 'laws of hospitality' when applied to one's partner. One cannot, however, so easily relate, with or without such strong emotions, to the penetration of a body of thought, which is one's academic discipline. But, there again, some of these thinkers write as though an assault to their partner could be accepted more easily than an affront to their thoughts. Some many paradoxes arise here. Why is that? Maybe it has to do with something that has been learnt already. It has to do with *ontology and affirmation.*

The crucial lesson of *What is Philosophy?* then, as 'repeated' by Alliez, is precisely that any separation of ontological from expressive (and sensible) content, any surrendering of philosophical 'statements' from their conditions of production, from the experience of construction, freezes philosophy into easily manipulated, but ultimately lifeless, collection of propositions. [lxiv]

There are other crucial lessons to bear in mind. There is a nearness that can come from reading, that is not to be forgotten.

And let us not forget that the experience that these surprising books relate is not a pure game of the mind, but entertains a relationship with coherence of the *unique sign*, whose silent constraint, behind the name Roberte and her mad stories, must always be grasped. [lxv]

Still there are other lessons to be learnt to do with the falling away of guarantors.

A challenge to the principle of identity and the identical I, the moment that belief in God, guarantor of personal identity, falls away (profane atheism), or else when, with 'an impiety of divine inspiration', the thought of a single divinity is replaced by the foreboding that the Other is still present even in God or in the pleroma of the divine space inhabited by the simulacrum; this other who is but the distance from the Same to itself, a distance that, in its difference, makes it like the Same, though non-identical. Such a doubling, which sets before every being and at odds with every being an infinity of likenesses, - without our having the right to identify the original or the image, the unique sign and the equivalents in which it divulges itself - is translated existentially, by a renunciation of personal primacy (others will say by madness, fragmentation of personality), theologically, by divinity conceived in some manner as plural, metaphysically, by the idea of the eternal rebeginning. [lxvi]

There are other aspects to the becomings. For example, *the becoming-women* is to be made much more evident as the repetition of difference especially when it confronts hegemonic practices. There are other becomings as writers of literature convey a something else. It is a thing, often, denied in the other readers and writers of philosophy, even when they are writing about art or music. Let us put a little effort into unearthing or hunting for this thing.

Tournier often wrote of the child or children, and clearly for him they reveal rather than obscure, aspects of reality. Whilst Jephcott [lxvii] notes of Rilke, [15] that he had a conviction, which was "that men are not fulfilled by the lives they lead", and Rilke's intuition was, " that their lives are lived elsewhere". Jephcott observes that:

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[15] Rilke was both the personal secretary to the sculptor and artist Rodin and a figure hugely influential on Pierre Klossowski.

This theme is restated early in 'The Book of Pilgrimage'; everyone is imprisoned in himself as in a cell 'that hates and holds him', and is struggling to escape. And yet, says the poet, there is a miracle: 'I feel: *all lives are being lived.*'...The poet must abandon all intellectual questioning for an attitude of simplicity and patient openness; he must become like a thing. The notion of the 'Thing' takes on a strongly positive meaning for Rilke, contrasting with the inadequacy of normal human attitudes.
(*italics* original) [lxviii]

In approaching God through things the poet is returning to the attitude of children who, says Rilke, have not yet 'gone away' from God. The theme of the child's instinctive closeness of God recurs...But childhood is fated to pass away, and its ending is marked by a moment of choice. As he crosses the threshold of adult world of sensuality and self-consciousness, the child is suddenly divided against himself, torn by conflicting impulses: 'All at once I have so many sense, / and each one has a different thirst.' This is the voice of a 'young brother' expressing shock of the child's first conscious exposure to his own sensuality, when 'suddenly all arms are naked'. [lxix]

The issue, then, is much more than awakening the child within us. It is a movement of thought, which affirms aspects of the 'uncarved block', as a constant play of velocities in the inbetween spaces of singularities and multiplicities. The child lives heterotopically.

TEXT AS A GUEST?

Bakhtin when writing about Rabelais and the experiences of medieval carnival notes:

> We find here a characteristic logic, the peculiar logic of the 'inside out' (*a l'envers*), of the 'turnabout', of a continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, humiliations, profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings. A second life, a second world of folk culture is thus constructed; it is to a certain extent a parody of the extracarnival life, a 'world inside out'.
> (*italics* original) [lxx]

A transcendental fold may be thought to have occurred when thought invades or colonizes an unoccupied space, which is the other side of a life: the space which is without mass or form and is the duration, and volume, that is before birth and after death. In other words, the ever available fold, for men and women, to become more than themselves is the thought that interferes with infinity and eternity - and this is most easily understood as an aporia that is thought left as text. But without text can that very dark space, and any number of infinities of time, be invaded by pure thought-in- itself?

Hill notes that both Sade and Nietzsche sought erasure and effacement, thereby, drawing out the paradox;

> For they are themselves an instance of precisely what they aim to denounce. At the very moment they challenge the possibility of textual transmission, they seek to utilize it for their own purposes. To deny a legacy to those who follow is in itself to leave a legacy; and to require that all future memory be effaced is to demand that the act of effacement itself be remembered.

And, he makes the conclusion:

> Language becomes perpetually and irreducibly double; it affirms the need for discourse, but it also bears witness to that which, within words themselves, remains unspoken, unspeakable, absolutely other. [lxxi]

Perhaps it is easier to think of thought as the invasive becoming that invaginates, invigorates, or invigilates, a duration between the points of some indicator that marks out a birth and a death. Can thought be life? Or, is the life to be treasured one which is most accommodating or hospitable? Sometime, at the beginning of his chapter, so amply entitled *'In the beginning was death'*; Surya quotes Bataille, making a commentary about the space of existence:

> Considering my "conception" – the loss from which *I exist* (*I exist*, which does not simply mean that my being exists, but that it is clearly distinct), I notice the *precariousness* of the being within me. Not that classical precariousness founded in the necessity of dying, but a new and more profound one, founded on the small possibility I had of existing (that there was only my originating being and not some other).
> (*italics* original) [lxxii]

The fold between literature and philosophy speaks volumes once heard. Hill notes of Blanchot's arguments:

> The whole thrust of the argument is that literature has no ontological consistency or no self-identity to obey. Literature is essentially nameless; and if at times in dealings with philosophy it assumes the name of literature, it is only in so far as the name, literature, remains an assumed name, whose paradoxical function is as a residual memory of literature's anonymity. If there is incompatibility between literature and philosophy, then, it is not because the two speak different languages, or that one is more serious than the other, or less rigorous, or that the one serves the cause of truth while the other is flummery, it is because philosophy and literature relate differently to what lies at the borders. Both are constituted, necessarily, within and by certain given limits; but in the two the limit maintains a different relationship to the limitlessness it habours within it.
> (2001:19) [lxxiii]

And then he makes other considerations from his readings:

> Divergences arise, then, because literature and philosophy treat limits that constitute them in radically different ways. It is not that philosophy and literature are diametrically opposed spheres of linguistic activity. The relationship between them is complex and dissymmetrical. It is philosophy, first of all, that gives literature its name, its conceptual frontiers, its hidden order. But literature does not always obey, and pays scant attention to philosophy's edicts...Philosophy is not always able to control its borders, since these are liable to be infiltrated by what goes under the – assumed – name of literature. [lxxiv]

> So if Bataille, Klossowski and Blanchot may be found at times to substitute literary fiction for philosophical discourse, it is not to abandon philosophy. Nor is it to abandon philosophy to itself. On the contrary, it is to pursue a philosophical project, albeit one that is incompatible with philosophy's own image of itself as an authoritative telling of universal truths; and by pursuing the question of literature – the question asked *by* literature - to the limit, it is to begin to question philosophy from a place that is at one and the same time within its boundaries and yet beyond them.
> (*italics* original) [lxxv]

> Literature too, then, thinks. But the existence of literature, Blanchot reminds his reader, can never be taken for granted. For it is only when it resists its inherited name and responds to the essential namelessness that traverse it as a demand that literature may be said to occur at all. [lxxvi]

Watt, writing on *Sufi Mysticism*, quotes a women ascetic who in her sayings speaks of a selfless love for *God*:

> O God, if I worship thee in fear of Hell, burn me in Hell; and if I worship thee in hope of Paradise, exclude me from Paradise; but if I worship thee for thine own sake, withhold not thine everlasting Beauty. [lxxvii]

Now this might represent an infusion of a spirit, an entity or a thought, into thinking which pervades the whole being of an individual. This speaks of an occupation, or envelopment, of the mind and body by such a thought, entity or spirit. The implication of the quote is that only when the body, and mind, is given up, or fully resigned from any outcome-based strategy, can an entity fully grasp the beauty of another being, which in this instance is God. And God is seen as the ultimate *Other*. The mind must, therefore, abandon itself to the proper attendance to the hospitality of the *Other* or God.

Bataille has also sought an experience that requires an abandonment of purpose and, through that, to make way for another much more important way of being. Surya

describes this abandonment - in his reference to the last of Bataille's narratives, *My Mother* - wherein he notes of that character's strategy of engaging her son.

> It is not enough for this women that her son knows. Her cruelty requires him to make himself the equal of such knowledge. In order to equal her it is necessary for him to set out on the discovery of what is ignominiously pure in debasing himself to the utmost state of bestiality. Thus will she initiate him...For it is not happiness that should be sought in debauchery, not even pleasure: it is a filthy bonding together in evils and terrors; it is necessary to go to the point of no longer being able to respond to one's desires; one should not be able to recoil before any of them, they should all be welcomed and push abjection as far as can be imagined: so far that it is no longer possible to recoil, so that death alone would be the filthy conclusion...An orgy would only really find meaning if it has no future. Only death would remain at the level of such spending; only death would have this character of an abandoned release. [lxxviii]

A looked from the ten television screens to the wall of mirrors which provided a bank of images. In some parts of the gym, you could see yourself as you exercised. Whilst in other parts, because of the visual angles, it was impossible to be so narcissistic. But the advantage was you could look, at others, without it being noticeable to them (those with hyped-up-senses probably knew of the voyeurism).

There was now a room in the Fitness Club where women could exercise, in their own space, without fear of the predatory male eye falling upon them. All the same, some women exercised in both rooms, whilst others stayed in one room or the other. A enjoyed looking at certain specimens of the opposite sex. A was convinced that some of the opposite gendered enjoyed their exercise, all the more, because they knew they were being watched. A looked at the mirrors and made a mental note to make some reference to Pefanis's observations to Jorge Luis Borges and others on mirrors.

Much later, A did in fact get round to writing down the quote which was;

> *The power which is exercised over mirror people is not simply coercive or violent but disciplinary – since the task of the imprisoned is "to repeat the actions of men," to exercise a mimetic control of the body. What is more, and the metaphor of the mirror serves to emphasize this, the actions and movements of the incarcerated are subject to a gaze, to a surveillance by a paranoiac and narcissistic state apparatus. But the transition is nonetheless there, a movement from brutal suppression to self-control, to the minute regulation of the body in the name of normality.* [lxxix]

At the same time, A wrote another quote from the book, before it was returned to the university library (which was now called a learning resource centre) uncertain whether to use the quote then, or later.

In Foucault's terms anthropology (and psychology in another context) projected a region toward which the human advanced, inexorably converting the 'different' (the other) into the 'same' in the name of humanism, in the universalizing progress of Western expansion. [lxxx]

When A got back, A would also look up Hutton's reference to Foucault and mirrors:

For Foucault, the psyche is not an archive but a mirror. To search the psyche for the truth about ourselves is a futile task because the psyche can only reflect the images we have conjured up to describe ourselves. Looking into the psyche is, therefore, like looking into the mirror image of the mirror. Our gaze is led not toward the substance of our beginnings but rather the meaningless of previously discarded images of the self. In the end, the meaning of the self for Foucault is less important than the methods we employ to understand it. [lxxxi]

Whilst, promptly, changing from one piece of exercise equipment to another, A reflected upon the state of the fatiguing body and considered the current recovery rate of the exercised heart. These ought to be assessed and balanced against the mental mood swings that accompanied changing states. Other considerations included the ambience and nearness of a trance-like state, sometimes induced by music. Whilst, at other times, this state was produced through conscious playing around with the noises and sound images in the mind, that could sometimes be silenced, so as to stop the talking or chattering: 'give up', 'rest', 'slow down' and 'rest'.

Which physically demanding machine was free? A concluded, at this moment, the body and mind should be pushed harder despite some of the chatter – the session was in its infancy – there was another hour or so to go, possibly a further 300 calories to burn. Besides, the track being played on the A's personal stereo system was good and refreshing. The audio image was copied from an Eminem CD and the song was 'The Way I Am.' An endless copying from mind, sound image, to song and music script and sound studios to mastertape, to CD, to audio cassette tape.

> *And I am*
> *Whatever you say I am*
> *If I wasn't then why would I say I am*
> *In the papers, the news, everyday I am*
> *I don't know it's just the way I am [...]*
>
> *When a dude's getting bullied and shoots up your school*
> *And they blame it on Marilyn – and the heroin*
> *W here were the parents at?*
> *And look at where it's at middle America*
> *Now it's a tragedy*
> *Now it's so sad to see[...]*

And I just do not have the patience
To deal with this cocky Caucasians
Who think I'm some wigga who just tries to be black
Cause I talk with an accent and grab my balls
So they always asking the same fucking questions
 What school did I go to?
The why? The who, what?
 When and where and how the how?
Till I'm grabbing my hair and I'm tearing it out [lxxxii]

*A fast-forwarded and rewound the audio cassette tape, skipping from track to track –
the way Deleuze recommended that his books be read. This was a very useful habit
and a very simple process to be applied to Cds, DVDs and books. It seemed clear that
M&M really disliked the interpretations, placed on him, as a white boy wanting to be
black. 'Wigga'. Perhaps, white nigga? Kipling's questions: who, what, why, when et
cetera? There is something ironical or paradoxical here, in the contrasts between
Rudyard Kipling - that writer so beloved of many who fought for the captured niceties
of imperial England, or Britain's, rule of India - and Eminem's counter to the
paralysis of being boy from a low income group in USA.?*

> *Dear Slim*
> *I wrote you but you still ain't callin'*
> *I left my cell, my pager, and my home phone at the bottom*
> *I sent two letters back in Autumn*
> *You must not have got 'em*
> *There probably was a problem at the post office or somethin'.*

*It's interesting that in the song Dido - Stan, the singer/song writer reflects, or
imagines, an attempt to contact someone who is held to be emotionally close, yet
geographically far away. There are other differences, both minor and major. There
are, for example, the differences that arise through the comparison of the forces
acting and resonating in rich and poor environments. The void between two spaces
ever apparent but, paradoxically, some other spaces only available through the
nuances of the text and a focus on forces at intersections. There was firstly the, all too
obvious, voids across the geography of America – spaces and differences between the
residential and educational environments. These to be noted in the shootings of
middle America and elsewhere, just sung in this song, the failure to ensure reciprocal
communication, resulting in the void between an assemblage of singularities.
Secondly, the space where the forces at play ensure that discipline and order objectify
the subject. Forces that create a dualism to be opposed through singularities and
multiplicities, these are referenced in the song. As Deleuze says*

> *States of things are neither unities or totalities, but* multiplicities...*In a
> multiplicity what counts are not the terms or elements, but what there is
> 'between', the between, a set of relations which are not separable from each
> other. (emphasis on multiplicity original)* [lxxxiii]

In poorer America, access to mobile phones, pagers and those telephones with land lines, whilst perhaps importantly defining an individual's domain space, potential connectivity, territory and credibility, still fail to help their becomings or deterritorilization.

Enimem, too much the multiplicist for middle America, intuitively escaping the dualist traps, that create as Deleuze- faithful to the disjunctive intersection of forces that is rap music- writes is 'this most hypocritical submission'. And;

> *[Y]ou will accede to the commandment to the degree that you submit yourself to an order, which we are not subject to without also being its legislator. This is the famous order of democracy...This always refers us to the division of the subject into a subject of the statement and a subject of enunciation: you will obey as the subject of the statement, but because it is you who command as the subject of enunciation, and we are led to grasp this great split identity - as barred identity, whatever you like – between the legislator and the subject. (textual change added)* [lxxxiv]

The words from Enimem's lyrics, from another of his songs, come through the headphones.

> *Hi ! My name is..(what?) My name is..(who?)*
> *My name is..{scratches} Slim Shady*
> *Hi! My name is..(huh?) My name is..(what?)*
> *My name is..{scratches} Slim S hady*
>
> *Ahh emn..excuse me! [...]*
>
> *My English teacher wanted to flunk me in junior high*
> *Thanks a lot, next semester I'll be 35*
> *I smacked him in his face with an eraser, chased him with a stapler*
> *And stapled his nuts to a stack of paper (Owwwwwww!)*
> *Walked in the strip club, had my jacket zipped up*
> *Flashed the bartender, then stuck my dick in the tip cup[...]*
>
> *I just found out my mom does more dope than I do(Damn!)*
> *I told her I'd grow up to be a famous rapper*
> *Make a record about doin drugs and name it after her (oh thank you!)*[lxxxv]

After climbing the first four stairs of the climbing frame, A viewed the 'flight deck' (Or should it be called a 'cardio theatre'? [16]) and inserted the walkman into the left-

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[16] 'One of the UK's largest gym chains has responded by introducing and refining their 'cardio theatre' TV screens for members who like to whistle while they work'. Jonathan Thompson (2003) Good Gear

hand space, allocated for such things. In the right-hand space, A dropped the water bottle and the tissue that was to be used either to wipe sweat off the body, or to clean the sweat off from where it dropped on the machine. It was easy to reflect on how disciplined the whole process of getting fit was; a supposed leisure activity.

A's weight, age, desired period of exercise, potential level of engagement and preferred choice of mode of exercise (aerobic, cardio, cross training et cetera) were punched into the machine's computer. The first input was 85 kilograms; then 15minutes; then, A's age which was always a lie and younger, by at least, 10 years; finally, the keys for ' level 10' and Fat Burner were pushed. All inputs entered were accepted by the machine's onboard computer. Touching the pulse-sensitive spaces on the handles confirmed that A's heart rate was 165 beats per minute. This would soon rise to 185 bpm. A's age was always an under-estimate, to achieve a harder work out, higher levels of fitness and avoid conformity. A knew that the rough calculation for maximum heart beats per minute was 220 minus your age.[17] The pace of the machine was picking up and, after 1 minute, already 10 calories had been burnt. Inadequate rest since the last exercise session and additional within-the-week training, meant A's muscle glycogen levels were low, so the routine felt harder than usual (this was interesting because the muscles and tendons 'spoke' to the brain of the fatigue experienced).

At first A concentrated on reading the monitors and even checked the personal heart rate (per minute) monitor on the right wrist, which roughly corresponded to the intermittent reading on the machine's flight deck. A wondered whether it would be possible to pull off the arrangement to have higher education modules presented on the TV screens, certainly it would help in improving participation into the concept of lifelong learning, it would also link well to arguments around kinesthetic learning and anchoring remembrance around movement and touch. A reflected on many things when exercising and formulated, or questioned, the different strategies to be incorporated in writing a thesis. The tension was, more often than not, about nondisclosure in the body of text and pacing revelations to an unsmooth tempo. This could, possibly, be described as the aerobic and unaerobic aspects of text making. A's reluctance to make everything transparent was very often countered by external demands.

A remembered fragments 14,15 and 51 of Heraclitus, cited in Geldard [lxxxvi]

A hidden connection is stronger than an apparent one; Nature prefers to hide.

and

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in *The Independent on Sunday.*9th March 2003. p.12 of Sport Supplement. This article deals with the range of stereo headphones designed for those wishing to listen to music whilst they exercise.

[17] From some of this data, someone might be able to suppose a gendered definition of a being known as *A* but this would really be nonsense for the becoming which was *A*. In any event, the captured metrics assigned to any 'living' being are always in a state of flux since these are themselves 'snapshots' of an event just about to change. As the people within a nation or state become more healthy the normalized biometrics are re-defined.

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The divine one whose oracle is in Delphi speaks neither directly or obscurely, but rather gives signs.

It was time to eye-up the talent. There was none about. Ok. Let's watch others prat about - the muscle-heads or headless muscle men, preening themselves between exercise sets, remained a funny sight however often you saw them. There was always another ritual to behold. Why did they have to drop the weights on the floor after completing an exercise set? Surely they knew this implied they were too knackered to continue rather than being an effective way to draw attention to themselves and the heavy weights that only they could lift?

Eminem interrupted A's train of thought. A looked at the television screens, chose not to insert the headphones input socket into the gym's sound system, and, then, follow through with the habit of adjusting the sound settings to the particular televisuals - from the television channels pumped out from one of the many television sets mounted on the facing wall. In any event, A could estimate some of the story lines being played out without listening. The demonstrations against the IRAQ war were probably more interesting and impressive than the imperialist, capitalist, lackie reporters cared to show.

A considered the doctorate. How could the stream of consciousness and body / mind assemblage be conveyed as it was now experienced? The exercise machine's computer was the perfect form of self surveillance, or dressage, as were the floor to ceiling mirrors, covering three walls surrounding the exercise spaces (the fourth wall presented information on timetables and exercise types and programmes). A found that the easiest way to do very hard exercise was to have the mind hospitable to the eternal visual and auditory streams, especially when they had been manipulated by A to be discordant.

A recalled a piece from Michel Tournier's **Friday or The Other Island** *about knowing. A knew that once home the text would be found, and it was:*

> *Thus there are two problems of knowledge, or rather two kinds of knowledge, between which a sharp distinction must be made, but which I should doubtless have gone on confusing had not my present fate induced in me an entirely new view of things: there is knowledge* through others *and knowledge* through oneself. To confound the two on *the assumption that 'the other' is* another self, *is to get nowhere. Yet this is what we do when we depict the knower as any individual entering a room and seeing, touching, smelling – in a word, knowing – the objects he finds there. That individual is 'the other', but the things he sees are known to* me, *the observer of the scene. If therefore the problem is to be correctly stated I must depict the situation, not of another person entering the room, but of myself, speaking and seeing.*
> *(in the original, italics normal, and vice versa)* [lxxxvii]

Tournier continues,

> *A first point that must be noted, in attempting to depict the* self *unrelated to others, is that it exists only intermittently and, when all is said, comparatively seldom. Its presence corresponds to a secondary and as it were reflexive mode of knowledge. What happens in the primary, direct mode? Well, the objects are all there, shining in the sun or buried in the shade, rough or smooth, light or heavy; they are known, tested, touched, even cooked, carved, folded and so on; whereas I who do the knowing, the tasting, touching and cooking, have no separate existence except when I perform the act of reflection which causes* me *to emerge – a thing which in fact rarely happens. In the primary state of knowledge my awareness of an object is the object itself, the thing known and perceived without any person knowing and perceiving it.* [lxxxviii]

Tournier continues: he writes about the narrator who often, and with some regularity, writes his own journals which show, much later - than the time being recorded now - in the narrative, that Robinson Crusoe becomes more conscious of himself with the appearance of Friday. In this instance, it is in the stir of the objects on the island that consciousness reaches a particular zenith when something happens.

> *Then suddenly there is a click. The subject breaks away from the object, divesting it of a part of its colour and substance. There is a rift in the scheme of things and a whole range of objects crumbles in becoming* me, *each object transferring its quality to an appropriate subject. The light becomes the eye and as such no longer exists: it is simply the simulation of the retina. The smell becomes the nostril – and the world declares itself odourless. The song of the wind in the trees is disavowed: it is nothing but a quivering of the tympani...An upheaval has taken place. Object has been roughly degraded to the subject...The click represents a process which is the rationalization of the world. The world seeks its own reason and in doing so casts off that irrelevance, the subject.)* [lxxxix]

A loved looking at both the men and women, as a 'species of becomings'. But A especially liked the women. This was about a purely aesthetic consideration since they had a lot more folds and curves.

A liked the anonymity that the assignment of the first letter in the English alphabet gave. Someone reading A's text would not, or at least should not, be able to assign a gender to the author. A is and was multiple - a fluctuating self or A's fluctuating self?

Obviously, certain biological facts such as resting heart beats per minute might give the game away, as might the wandering eye? But readers ought to be cautious. Steroid bound athletes played with orthodox gender recognition and amphetamines could alter physiological and psychological states. AC/DC sexual preferences were also quite the norm. A wondered when the letter 'A' could be substituted for the

singular pronoun 'I' in all text, so that, for instance, 'I love you' was written as 'A love you.' Beckett and Joyce understood this type of thing and so did M&M. The Swedes used ' han', to mean and displace such a convention as both 'he' or 'she'. This was to be commended as movement away from fixed identities. Although it often created complications for the poor, sincere Swede conversing in English as they selected 'he', as a means to translate their Swedish thought 'han' when an Englishman would have quite clearly expected 'she' to refer to the female signified.

This text was a war machine. As Stivale notes;

> [D]eploying both a thought and a desire fundamentally at odds with the State apparatus, the war machine is an assemblage of creative force that 'in no way has war as its object'. [xc]

And having quoted them earlier there is a clue by which type, or means, this can be achieved,

> Artaud puts it well: all writing is so much pig shit – that is to say, any literature that takes itself as an end or sets ends for itself, instead of being a process that 'ploughs the crap of being and its language,' transports the weak, the aphasiacs, the illiterate...The only literature is that which places an explosive device in its package, fabricating a counterfeit currency, causing the superego and its form of expression to explode, as well as the market value of its form of content.
> (Deleuze and Guattari quoted in Stivale) [xci]

In ***Diana at her Bath The Women of Rome***, Pierre Klossowski notes of Actaeon, in the Greek myth, as he secretly watches as Diane bathes;

> [H]e divides the universe into three realms: that of the gods, who he claims are impassable and immortal; that of his own immortal and passable counterparts; and that of mortals. His own immortality, being for him only time without end, becomes an object of experience; in this way he projects into the space of myth, which for him is the outside, in interior or 'mental' space, and in his role as mediator between the two worlds – that of the gods and that of the mortals, still united in absolute mythic space before his mediation – he asks himself what is 'exterior' and 'interior', and finally concludes in favor of the nothingness of pure appearance: thought. [xcii]

In a fashion and manner reminiscent of Georges Bataille's view of a sovereignty of expenditure, where the socially useful action is disavowed or avoided, Klossowski likewise notes:

> Procreation is useful to the temporal prosperity of the state, but the deities that preside over it and assure fecundity demand sacrifices and, more precisely, the stage shows through which they reveal that not only are they identifiable with

procreation but, as its principle, they embody an existence that is inexhaustible because it is eternal, eternal because it is aimless and hence *useless*. This aspect terrifying to the state which can exist only through the aims it proposes in time and space, must therefore remain hidden in the form of images ambiguous enough to shield humanity from the vertigo of the uselessness of existence. The appeal of vertigo lies in the sexual act and infinitely transcends it, to the point of assuming the forms of divinity; this equilibrium and this compensation gives rise to a twofold manner of behavior with regard to the deity that both dispenses life and threatens to take it away again if it is not wasted. [xciii]

TERGIVERSATIONS

Gallop observes at length Klossowski's perpetration of *tergiversations*. This will be defined shortly. As a term it has some importance, both in a wider philosophical milieu and, more pertinently, to the speed and directionality of this middle of thought. Throughout this middle, there has been a vacillation in spirit and tone around a number of readings and quotations concerning, either directly or indirectly, folds. In the use of poets and writers of literature, a becoming of the souls and spirits drives part of the text to find its potential, productivity, release and expression. This is done so something other than the body or mind might make itself manifest. Its immanence is allowed time and space.

The thing or assemblage of this middle of thought should have its own vitality and immanence, which might be unnamable and remain so, but it might be knowable to some. It can, then, show its immanence even as an *immaterial trace* or *shadow*. It is, after all, part of a dark art that, both indirectly and directly, opposes the light of Apollo. As importantly to the effort devoted to such revelations, the body and skin have been referred to in order to draw attention to the limits of self containment, and the need to address an undressing of the exteriority which remains interior.

Unequally, a materiality has been given voice, here in the text, albeit as a polyvocal and inequivocal one. There is, however, too much simplicity in seeing, or announcing, a world that is seen, or heard, as a simple binary - either material or transcendental - since in aggregate this multiplicity is, in itself, a site for inward, outward, forward and backward *heterotopic* folds. There is, also, a penetration of one by the *Other*. The material is buggered by the transcendental and vice versa. It has been noted, slightly earlier, that Deleuze buggered his most favoured philosopher's thoughts. He took and takes them from behind. He has invited others to do the same to him. And this thesis does bugger about his thoughts. The physicality of the gesture and movement makes for a materiality of images of thought from the ephemeral. It would seem that Klossowski shares this peccadillo.

> According to *Le Petit Robert*, 'tergiverser' means 'use detours, evasions, to avoid giving clear answer, to retard the moment of decision.' Tergiversation, thus, has the same function as modesty in the libertine context: ' lustful

refinement: people were very willing to desire for a longer time so as to be more excited.' The tergiversator seductively leads the suitor on, avoiding a yes-or-no answer to the proposition, prolonging itching doubt. Klossowski's tergiversations in regard to his friend Bataille recall Noirceuil, who 'only controverted so as to make his friend shine.' 'Controverser' (turn against) is closely akin to 'tergiverser' (*tergumvertere,* turn one's back). The physical image is more striking in 'tergiveser', making explicit the fact that the positive concomitant to the act of turning away is the exposure of the back, has made its highly sexual entry into the domain of modern French and English in the expression 'coi(tus) à tergo' – intercourse from behind.
(*italics* original) [xciv]

Now Klossowski, in a discussion about his friend Georges Bataille, takes an evasive approach, 'Klossowski in his flirtatious resistance to Bataille is offering his friend his behind.'

> The two friends engage ('as it were') in what Klossowski (in 'Le Philosophe scélérat') finds to be the central Sadian libertine act, sodomy. Sodomy could be considered a tergiversation inasmuch as the anus would detour in relation to the 'normal' central sexual goal – penetration of the vagina. The 'proper' place for the sexual tergiversation is foreplay. In that context, perverse sexual play is teleologically subordinate to the sexual goal – vagino-penile intercourse. The act is constituted as *telos* through anticipation of its consequences – that is, pregnancy. In *La Philosophie dans le boudoir,* Eugenie asks her instructors for guidance in how to avoid those very consequences. Mme de Saint-Ange replies: ' A girl never exposes herself to having babies except inasmuch as she lets it be put in her cunt. Let her *avoid with care* this mode of pleasure; let her indiscriminately *offer in its place* her hand, her mouth, her tits, or her asshole [3:413,my italics]. The lesson is clear – tergivesate{'use detours'}.
> (*italics* orginal) [xcv]

The use of detours, not simply from body to mind but body to thought, and from a singularity other than the body, to another fold, to yet another multiplicity, goes beyond a motion that reflects a technique or a viewpoint. It allows access and a fairly unhindered communication and connection to the *Other.* These are events and moments to be realized as a treasured service to others and becomings. Jephcott, in *Proust and Rilke The Literature of Expanded Consciousness,* writes about 'Privileged Moments in Literature'.[xcvi]

> In talking of a 'musical' quality in the experience, Valery introduces an important new concept into this discussion. The interrelatedness of all parts of awareness during a privileged moment gives a sense of musical harmony, and this harmony not only involves the relations perceived in the outside world: it extends to include the relation between the inner and outer worlds. The self becomes immersed and lost in the scene contemplated, as in Baudelaire's

prose-poem "The Artist's Confiteor': 'All these things' – the sea, the sky, a distant sail, the sound of waves – 'are thinking through me or I through them (for in the vastness of reverie the 'self' is quickly lost): they are thinking, I say, but musically, picturesquely, without quibbles, syllogisms or deductions'.[xcvii]

In one of his trilogies on Deleuze, entitled *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*, Bogue draws attention to the use and ways of assembling music to gain access to becomings. He reminds us that;

> All musical invention proceeds via such a becoming-other, since music is the deterritorialization of the refrain and deterritorialization is itself fundamentally a process of becoming. Becoming entails an unfixing of commonsense coordinates of time and identity. Drawing on the Stoic opposition of Chronos and Aion, Deleuze and Guattari contrast the measured time of regulated succession of past, present and future (Chronos) with an unmeasured and unregulated time that obscures the lines between past, present and future (Aion), at once an always-already and an always-about to be, " a simultaneous too late and too-soon" (MP 320; 262)"... "It is 'time out of joint' (or, in the French translation of Hamlet's words, time *'hors de ses gonds'*, 'off its hinges') and the time of infinitive – to walk, to sleep, to dream, to die – rather than any specific tense.
> (*italics* original)[18] [xcviii]

It is difficult for some to comprehend *'time out of joint'*. Music and film can be creative of disruptions, and durations, for becomings and / or dis-simulation, and disorganization of organized, striated spaces.

Let us, for a moment, be reactive and slave-like, refusing to be Nietzchean and always affirmative in a becoming: the affirmation must fold out, or incorporate, other beings that arrest becomings. Rowlands seeks to explain (modernist) philosophy through the cinema of science fiction. [19] He observes, amongst other things, from philosophers, that death is the limit that allows mankind to have a reference point that gives meaning to life. He quotes the renegade Cyborg or replicant, known as Roy, from the film *Blade Runner*:

> 'I have seen things you people wouldn't believe. I've entered attack ships off the shoulder of Orion. I've watched sea-beams dance by the Tannhauser gate. Now all these moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. Time to die.' [xcix]

From the immediately preceding quote, taken from Bogue, there is a movement that arrives at a reference to Hamlet's quote, which draws out the time of the infinitive,

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[18] MP in the quote refers to *A Thousand Plateus; Schizophrenia and Capitalism* by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1999). London: The Athlone Press.
[19] This takes quite a different stance from the post-structural series of becomings in Bell and Kennedy (2000) (Eds.) *The Cyberculture Reader.* London: Routledge.

like the time 'to dream, to die'. The replicant Roy ends his soliloquy with the words a 'Time to die'. But Rowlands appears to have missed a certain becoming and trajectory, since it seems that he has not understood, or fully comprehended, what has been stated. He then goes onto make a reference to a German philosopher who has concerned himself with being and time.

> Death. As the horizon that allows us to stand out from being as a whole, is what gives our life meaning. Death may be that which takes away our life, and so takes whatever value that life had for us. But it is also that which gives meaning to life in the first place. The source of the harm of death and the value of life is the same, and it is this: we are essentially *beings-towards-death*. When we die, all these moments will indeed be lost in time, like tears in rain. But that these moments were found at all, indeed existed at all, is only because we are death-bound beings. Time to die. [c]

This, surely, is at odds with a Deleuzian focus on effects away from bodies? Not really at odds, but a difference of viewpoint. In taking positions, on the geography of a page, a countermeasure has to be at hand, to corrupt the training and discipline of the States hold on thought, especially through an avoidance of a duality. There is a special comfort in seeking *Heterotopia*, making movements to a void. The milieu or void, where affirmative singularities can avoid making judgments (like the one made about Rowlands), working always the middle and & and &...and the constancy - when lost - of refocusing on a multiplicity. How easy it is to make a fold unnecessarily hard, and too transparently obvious, when, with some care, softer flows create an opportunity to form a *minority language*. Minorities et al always there. Together with a minority thought that avoids order-words and creates a nomadic travel across texts. They, thereby, enjoy creativity and productivity that comes through that intertextuality, which avoids lines of forces that disrupt an intersubjective becoming.

> And yet there are such things as effects, though they do not belong to the world of bodies. They are surface phenomena that have no real being, but simply 'insist', 'persist' or 'subsist'. They are incorporeals *(asomata)*. The Stoics start from the commonsense observation that when a dog walks across the road, the walking adds nothing to the body of the dog...Everywhere, bodies produce effects, surface emanations that play over bodies like fogs or auras. Such incorporeal effects are events with their own temporality...they are manifest in the time of the event, which Deleuze labels *Aion*. [ci]

Then elsewhere Bogue notes;

> In virtually every regard, Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of music is the antithesis of the traditional, Platonic approach to the subject. In their view, the cosmos with which music is intertwined is not a circumscribed totality but an open whole whose dimensions can never be given as such. The essence of music is to be found not in the macroscopic order of celestial cycles but in the

molecular domain of transverse becomings. The pulsations that play through music and the world are not measured recurrences of the same but ametrical rhythms of the incommensurable and the unequal. And the time disclosed in music is less that of *chronos* than *aion*, the floating time of haecceities and becoming.
(*italics* original) [cii]

And,

> Deleuza and Guattari call for a music that puts 'in continuous variation all components,' that forms a 'rhizomatic instead of a tree, and enters the service of a virtual cosmic continuum, in which even the holes, silences, ruptures and cuts have a part'(MP 121;95). In this regard, Messiaen's music is exemplary. [ciii]

Bogue [civ] describes how Messiaen experimented with regular musical composition and re-presentation of bird's songs to create different and new time relationships, by chopping up common linear sequences, with rhythms which 'undermine all metrical regularity'.

> Deleuze and Guattari describe music as 'the active, creative operation which consists of deterritorializing the refrain [*la ritournelle*]' (MP 369; 300), a definition that obviously depends for its coherence on a full understanding of the concepts of refrain and (de)territorialisation.

And they: [20]

> [E]xtend the notion of refrain to refer to any kind of rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory. Three examples will suffice to indicate the basic ways in which this process takes place:
>
> (1) A child afraid in the dark sings a song to reassure herself, and in so doing establishes a stable point in the midst of chaos, a locus of order in a non-dimensional space;
> (2) [A] cat sprays the corners of his house and the trees and bushes in his yard and thereby marks out a dimensional area he claims as his possession;
> (3) [A] bird sings an impromptu aria at the break of day, and thus opens its territory to other milieus and the cosmos at large.
>
> A point of stability, a circle of property, and an opening to the outside – these are three aspects of the refrain. Although the three may be differentiated from one another, they do not represent different successive moments in an evolutionary or developmental sequence, but 'three aspects of a single and

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[20] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1999), cover the idea of the *refrain* in chapter 11 - entitled '1837: Of the Refrain' - of their text, *A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Brian Massumi. London. The Athlone Press. pp. 310-350.

same thing' (MP 383;312), which manifests itself now in one form, now in another. [cv]

Further clarification is offered by Bogue:

> Territorialization, then, is a complex process of decoding and recoding (deterritorialization and reterritorialization), which transforms milieus and rhythms by creating expressive qualities and autonomous rhythms (both territorial motifs and territorial counterpoints) that induce a reorganization of functions and a regrouping of forces. Thus we can elaborate on our initial classification of refrains by saying that they may (1) mark or assemble a territory; (2) connect a territory with internal impulses and/or external circumstances; (3) identify specialized functions; (4) or collect forces in order to centralize the territory or go outside it. [cvi]

The duration of space has to be extended to include its own partial, badly constructed referent and component - time.

TIME

Blanchot notes of Klossowski's proposal, following his reading of Nietzsche;

> The strange thought that everything returns, begins again, is the strangest affirmation of modern atheism. Why? Because it replaces infinite unity with infinite plurality, replaces linear time, the time of salvation and progress, with the time of spherical space, a malediction that reverses itself as joy, because it challenges the identity of being and the unique character of the *hic et nunc*, and thus of the *ego*, thus of the One God. And perhaps more: because this notion places us definitively in a universe in which the image ceases to be second in relationship to the model, where imposture lays claim to truth, where finally there is no longer an original, but an eternal scintillation in which absence of origin disperses itself in the flash of the detour and return. [cvii]

He continues;

> A thought which certainly has its traps, but thought that is powerful in its impossibility, preventing us from withdrawing within human limits – a threat to all atheism – and, far from delivering us complacency to the insurrection of dark forces, images and tenebrous phantasms, invites us to call on the inexhaustible capacity of metamorphoses in which to appear and disappear testify equally to the favour and disfavour of being.

Klossowski puts forth an *'infinite plurality'*, as a folding out of linear time, and in this space lies the time, where movement is like the snake biting its tail [21] and the circular finds a putative dominance. Jephcott [cviii] observes, in one of Rilke's poems;

> [A] new dimension in which, in Rilke's words, 'time, taken up by the great simultaneity of space, shows its full circle and goes back into itself.'"

And he notes of Rilke's that this:

> "[I]s represented symbolically, even allegorically, above all in 'L'Ange du Meriden' where the angel is asked whether he does not see how the hours we live slip from the sun-dial he holds, 'on which the day's whole sum at once, / each as real as each, stands deeply balancing, / as if all hours were ripe and full'. The two orders of time-as-succession and 'total' time are clearly opposed here, and the latter is symbolized by the full circle of the sun-dial. The image of the full circle is used elsewhere in contexts where 'total' time is contrasted to normal time. The 'round face' of a child is 'clear and whole like an abundant hour / starting and striking to an end'; but the child's time is alien to the everyday world:' others do not count the strokes.' [cix]

There is also the motif of the mirror associated with the circle of time;

> [T]he mirror and circle images are not associated by accident: the mirror is by its nature the source of circular movement...One feature of the mirror must, however, be noted here. The world it reflects, while recognizably like that outside it, is at the same time strange and unfamiliar...The reflected world, for Rilke, is more 'real' than the real world. [cx]

Jephcott, in noting the creative processes of Rilke and Proust, considers certain key passages and states of them:

> Both passages contain evidence that they originated in a state of contemplation involving the suspension of the normal sense of time and place. In Proust's description the present is indissolubly fused with the past, and for Rilke the roses seem to embody an almost infinite sphere of time and space contained 'in a hand full of inside'...In both cases the state of contemplation began with a sense of delight caused by sensation. [cxi]

Now it should be noted here that Klossowski is also careful and conscious of the use of hands. In his painting and texts he, almost always, seeks to position his wife's or

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[21] The snake biting its tail is found as a symbol in many mythologies and it might have indeterminate meanings. On the one hand, it could suggest wholeness. It was the image that allowed a chemist from his dreams to resolve the benzene ring in organic chemistry. On the other, it could suggest destruction followed by birth. This thesis begins and ends with quotations from the same text and this brings together an opening and a closure like the mantra OM. This middle of thought started with a header including a reference to aletheia which never found measure in the main body of the text but does at the very end.

Roberte's hands in a particular gesture. But Bogue writes about the use of the concept of *lekta* from Deleuze, these are;

> '[E]xpressibles' that emanate from the surfaces of bodies and make possible the delineation of words and things. The words express a meaning but that which is expressed is an attribute of things, an event. The *lekta* is simultaneously the surface of the sonic body of the word and the surface attribute of the thing. It is a surface between words and things, a single surface attribute of meaning events. The surface-body between words and things 'does not mix them, nor does it unite them (it is no more a monism than a dualism), it is rather like the articulation of their difference: body / language' (LS 37;24) [cxii]

Deleuze makes reference to the zones of contact between Lewis Carroll and Artaud like when;

> Artaud's linguistic inventions remain on the surface of sense.

But then the contact changes when:

> [T]he surface of sense dissolves and collapses as words become sonic bodies interacting with other bodies in a physical domain of profligate and unregulated mixtures, interminglings and interpentrations. Schizophrenics, Deleuze observes, often experience words as lacerating, persecuting objects that rip into the flesh. These 'passion-words', shards that mix with the schizophrenic body, which itself does not exist as a coherent organism but as a *body-sieve* of permeable holes, *a fragmented body* of heterogeneous scraps and pieces, a *dissociated body* with no barrier between inside and outside (LS 107; 87). Passion-words commingle in a terrifying realm of ceaseless cannibalistic dismemberment, dissolution, absorption and expulsion. However, there are moments in which the schizophrenic body attains a perfect totality, not as an organism but as a body 'without parts, which does everything through insufflations, inspiration, evaporation, fluid transmission (the superior body, the body without organs of Artaud)'(LS 108;88) (*italics* original) [cxiii]

What there is, then, becomes a form of expression that pushes language to its exteriority, in the manner of Blanchot, and through that act disrupts any boundary by releasing movements to become endlessly connected - because they are never contained and are, forever, left with an open and public space of *heterotopic* majesty.

> Deleuze elaborates on the concepts of vision and auditions, suggesting finally that literature's vocation is always to push language to its outside, and in the process to open words to the world. [cxiv]

The philosopher makes comparison to some scientific disciplines:

Deleuze observes that, unlike 'etiology, or research into causes' and 'therapeutics, or research into and application of treatment', which are integral components of medicine, symptomatology occupies a sort of neutral point, a limit point, pre-medical and sub-medical, belonging more to art as to medicine.' It is situated 'almost on the exterior of medicine, at a neutral point, a zero point, where artists and philosophers and physicians and patients can meet one another.' [cxv]

SPIRITUAL POWER

The text, which is this middle of thought, hovers near the extremities of its limit. At the moment of complete transgression, or at the crease of the ultimate fold, the *Other* arrives – repeating the difference of a full on invasion from outer space. Wave after wave of *otherness* invaginates and explicates territories. At first sight or sense, this is the wave of quotations that comes from the *Other*. With the flood of quotations, the author and commentator fully surrender the text. The *Other* then takes hold with immanence, in the interiority of the space / time event, that must productively and creatively give up its singularity to the multiple. Is this then the moment of spiritual power?

> Where is the sacred, where is the sacrilege, if they are not only indissociable but indifferent, even in the intensity of their difference? Should we, like Sade, exhaust language in a linear fashion, should we say everything, nullifying the interdict, in order to resuscitate it in this inter-diction – the rupture of interruption – which only the one who never stops speaking has access? Or else must we understand that transgression – the exceeding of the inexceedable limit – is not only a possibility more difficult than others, but points to that which, being radically outside our reach, is open to man only when the personal power to mastery in him (be they raised to the highest degree) cease to be the ultimate dimension?
> (*italics* original) [cxvi]

And there are other matters to consider, which add to the affects of transgression and determine other impossibilities for us, once identity and ego have given over to possible processes which are other than normal. Attention must be paid to the eternal return:

> Whence the great burst of laughter that is the shudder of the universe, the opening of space in its seriousness, and divine humour *par excellence*. Because the eternal return even in oblivion in which its revelation as law culminates, - this eternal return in which the infinite absence of the gods is affirmed and in some way proved – must also come to desire the return of the gods, that is, the gods return.

This is the clever formula which Pierre Klossowski expounds for us all to consider and reconsider as he stretches the figure of Nietzsche's imaginative development. Then something is formed which bring Nietzsche and Klossowski closer together:

> And thus it appears that the doctrine of eternal return is conceived yet again as a *simulacrum of doctrine* whose very parodic character accounts for *hilarity* as an attribute of existence sufficient unto itself, when laughter bursts from the depths of the whole truth, either because truth explodes in the laughter of the gods, or because the gods themselves die from uncontrollable laughter. When a god wanted to be the only God, all other gods were seized by uncontrollable laughter, until they *died* from laughter.
> (*italics* original) [cxvii]

In the notes that accompany Blanchot's analysis of Pierre Klossowski's writings, and with reference to the story **Le Baphomet**, an interesting and important observation is made.

> By transforming the legend of the Templars into myth, *Le Baphomet* translates with baroque sumptuousness this experience of the eternal return – assimilated here to the cycles of metempsychosis and rendered thus more comic than tragic (in the manner of certain oriental tales). Everything takes place in a swirling beyond – a realm of spirits – where it is natural, that in, a light of invisibility, all truths lose their brilliance, where God is no longer anything but a far-off and much diminished sphere, where death especially has lost its omnipotence and even powers of decision. [cxviii]

There are some critical words to note. Firstly, the 'Templars', which some would have as valiant knights who were engaged, just prior to and including the Crusades, in the assimilation of Western and Oriental spiritual learning, as opposed to religion with its institutions. Secondly, the 'Baroque' needs to be considered because it comes to us as the physicality of curves and folds – like the arabesque. Thirdly, *'Oriental'* again, placing the *Other* of Western thought within the current movement of thought. Fourthly, the 'realm of spirits', again announcing the velocity of thought, which states a *spiritual becoming, perhaps in this sense,* a spiritual as opposed to a overly rational train of thought. Blanchot continues:

> The 'breaths', spirit words or writer's words, like the figures and the works formed by these words are neither immortals nor mortals, given over to perpetual change that repeats them, absent from themselves in the movement of intensity that is their only substance and makes a game of their identical being, a resemblance without anything to resemble, an inimitable imitation. [cxix]

The ultimate power of the fold is given here, in the quotation, the event which reveals the inside and outside of thought – the fold that both merges and separates the mortals and immortals – the point of ambiguity between the words of spirit and the words of the author.

Very easily, a slip can be made through the wrong interruption. This is because of the separate and combined power of religion, State and structure to immortalize their thoughts with a simple statement, which like their constant desire for representation, reveals the imprisonment of the arboreal or majority; 'a Gospel statement to be rehearsed such as the spirit spoke through me'. But really at the same time, there is no Gospel to be remembered, because there is no similarity to be found as identity collapses - or at least fails to be structured - by others against the *Other*. The quote extends without break so:

> There remains the inexplicable desire to return to the day, under the pretext of honouring the dogma of final resurrection, the desire to be incarnated, be it as several, in the same body, a desire less to be purified than to be with a movement of return, of a rising toward the above, which would require little to be transformed into an eternal return. It makes room for oblivion that appears as a more profound memory: here suddenly God learns – he had forgotten – that he is not the first God, that here is, above him, a God more silent still, more ungraspable (and it would be tempting to add: and so on). It is essentially a narrative, a cosmic narrative ruled by complexity, an immobile narrative in which truths are engendered by being recounted through an infinite multiplication. It is true that it lacks, as the Gospel lack, the 'supreme manifestation of divine', laughter that 'Bursts from the depths of the whole truth' and that is the gift of Klossowski's work. [cxx]

There is the laughter that ends a text at a maximal point or event. Here the multiplicities of authors write only where there is a *heterotopic* oscilliation, open to a vortex that cannot be repeated. Their text is always and exhaustively repeated again, differently and immediately. In those becomings, which quite obviously are more than the singularity of what has been said, or sensed, the social arises as a productive fold. This vector of thought is always forwards, backwards, sideways, upwards and downwards, but then again it is never any of those since there is no real fixed reference point – from which to start or finish. Perhaps, there are only ever middles of thought, left to emerge and disappear - if no creative relationship with another happens by way of an assemblage. But then in the series of events there is always and & and... The event is moving, never captured or defined. It moves into the future of yesterday, ever closer and further away from infinity, and then immediately journeys backwards, to the future distance of an infinite infinities. Lewis Carroll understood this folding of text and thought. Others do too, who also understand its productive capabilities.

APPENDIX 3

TOO PRIVATE A MOMENT

GONE FOR A BURTON

The signifier R. Burton (Richard or Robert) signifies three fairly famous people. To some, the actor is better known, more popular, than the names of two writers of academic works. It is the latter couple that are of interest here (albeit, that the former was an actor and artist who reinvented himself, for the cinematic screen, through a series of assemblages with the same person). One Richard Burton became a traveller. Then he went onto become an explorer or investigator of *Otherness* - especially that concerned with the spiritual and sexual well-being of the Asian *Other*; he translated the *Perfume Garden / Karma Sutra*. The other Robert Burton wrote a text, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, which was first published in 1621, and as the notes on the dust cover state:

> He has tried to retain not only the more essential subject matter of *Anatomy*
> but also the image which it presents of the author; a scholar of wide learning
> who proudly conscious of the dignity of scholarship, a tolerant observer with a
> sharp realistic vision, a man of clear understanding whose sympathies were
> deeply stirred by the spectacle of the follies and self-created miseries of man.
> [cxxi]

Now, this certainly is a fitting statement for any academic or scholar. The work is a wonderful study and a very serious attempt to bring to the fore some deep considerations of the state of man. The scholarly endeavour is plain for all to see. The image of thought is one untainted by any policing by State Philosophers. The strangeness of the text remains. And there have been other strange texts, so strange that they have been written under pseudonyms, to disguise the true authorship, by Kierkegaard, Spinoza and Schopenhauer.

Now in a free society, one would expect that thought, if it is to be judged at all, ought to be judged, first, on its scholarship and not at all by how well it confines itself to a public space, which is clearly defined and demarcated. Such policing of territory has a purpose. It has the direct, or indirect, intent to uphold constituted power. In that very act, it thereby denies constituting power any movement. With this action, there is the prevention of the emergence of the strangeness of thought that is the *Other* and / or the multitude. But it is only the strangeland or the strangeland of thought, whether it be Robert Heinleins',[cxxii] or anothers, that is the space occupied by the multitude.

In some cases, a name or signifier – consider, as an example, the signs and symbols attached to the name Richard or Robert and the surname Burton - can be taken together with the personal histories, or collective narratives, and given a makeover to create a dis-identity. A new character can be made manifest to replace the old one. In this way, the individual can be replaced (see below). This is just like a police

protection programme given to criminals: who are presented with papers and documents confirming the adopted histories.

Quite differently there is what Franco Berardi, who often goes under the pseudonym Bifo, considers a more relevant and fertile dis-identity (his reference to LB marks the community and multitude of like-minded people who individually and collectively write under the name Luther Blisset).[22] [23]

> LB's dis-identity is awareness of the language's becoming, mutation of roles, becoming community, bodies meeting up with one another, *desertion and going adrift*. (*italics* added)[cxxiii]

The relevance of dis-identity - or disruption of identity - accounted for here to this text, is a matter of difference. The difference between 'desertion and going adrift' and 'dissertation and going adrift' is a difference - and difference is a repetition that behoves or becomes us well.

Davidson Loehr, in *To Care without Judging*, tells of his experiences during, and after, the Vietnam War (along with others in the compelling and upsetting *The Vietnam Reader* edited by Walter Capps) and he notes a story about Richard Burton.

> And yet this is a hard thing to talk or write about, and I want to offer what may seem like a very strange analogy to illustrate how I feel about sharing these long-guarded memories. The analogy comes from a movie called *The Sandpiper*, made about twenty years ago. It stars Richard Burton as the very proper headmaster of an exclusive Episcopal boys' school, Eva Marie Saint as his saintly wife, and Elizabeth Taylor as Elizabeth Taylor. Burton and Taylor have an illicit affair, and Burton eventually tries to regain his sense of integrity by telling his wife of it. She leaves him. Then he goes to see Liz Taylor, and tells her he has told his wife of their affair *[sic]*. Taylor is furious. 'How could you! How could you tell her? It was too *private*!' [cxxiv]

There has been a drafting, dancing and prancing Easterly movement of the image of thought from the earliest middle of thought in this thesis. This movement has been both *within* the middles and *between* the middles. A de-territorialization from the containment of Western territorialized and re-territorialized spaces, places and landscapes has undoubtedly occurred.

CONFESSIONAL BECOMINGS

Originally, a fairly linear plan of campaign incorporating some Eastern fetishisms was outlined and applied to the process of a purposeful and studious pursuit of a

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[22] See, for instance, Luther Blissett (2004) *Q*. Arrow Books. This novel tells the story of revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries in and around 1500s.

[23] Professor Martin Parker notes that 'this is an old Situationist trick, they used to use 'Helen Eliot' too.'

Doctorate. But this was in a faintly arborescent period. This was a time just before a fresher geographical typology and indefinite duration arose, easily displacing traditional organization and ordering.

The middles, the associated rhizomatic connections, the assemblages of concepts and problems, fortuitously found application within the thesis. The application of this image of thought followed a purely chance encounter with the text of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. And this was through the work and generosity of Norman Jackson and Pippa Carter. [24]

The previous proposal and putative outcome of the hypothesis to be realized was the linkage, coherence and validity of a movement that showed the roots of postmodernism lying within Eastern thought.

This academically serious proposal, or philosophical 'hand-shaking' exercise, was to link the 'hands' of one writer to another through a reversal of a historical chronology, using Foucaultian-like archaeology and excavation as techniques. This in a simple form went along a trajectory, something like, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) to Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) to the Upanishads of India. But that would have given birth to a tragedy.

There was even a plan to digress by way of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), who was both a Sanskrit scholar and an admirer of Arthur Schopenhauer, to include Freud (1856-1939) who had anticipated Arthur Schopenhauer. Interestingly, Freud claimed,

> I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper...The large extent to which psycho-analysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer – not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the mechanisms of repression – is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in life. [cxxv]

So in the early parts of this study there was some healthy and enjoyable reading of Arthur Schopenhauer [25]. Even then, in such a set piece, there was a fundamental question of how to represent, or re-present, the Eastern, in its own terms, without recourse to Western disciplinary practices.

The problem was how to re-present non-Western thoughts without having recourse to a simple, orthodox, enforcement of the institutional and textual styles of Western academic discourse. Obviously, there are already exceptions in existence, which have

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[24] *A* made a telephone call to Pippa Carter enquiring about some of her collaborative work with Norman Jackson. And shortly after that conversation a large parcel arrived at *A's* home with a number of their papers. Unfortunately (perhaps, that should read fortunately?) and sadly, many other academics approached were not at all generous with their time or efforts to facilitate and help *A's* research and becoming.

[25] Whose initials are the same as this authors and both could be conceptualised as AS to signify As which mean a series of different As thus AS is the function of A1, A2...A3 et cetera.

been made evident, in the previous middle of thought, but at the 'beginning' these were unknown.

The thesis was to explore the movement, or process, from Arthur Schopenhauer's *Will and Representation* to Fredrich Nietizsche's Will to Power to Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of Power. Similarly, reference was to be made - from the same starting point - to consider Freud's addressing of desire and post structuralist's assimilation of desire and related thematics into their own accounts. In some sense, the 'conclusion/s' to be demonstrated and made here are of a hovering co-incidence in the nature of things in themselves: the power of a fold, chance and hospitality to thought cannot be overlooked, within this reflex turn. There is a strong enough relationship between them to make a process and form a common plateau. Either of the movements precipitates, encourages, or de-territorializes, an assemblage that shows due concern for the Sanskrit concept of Maya. This holds that the world is one of illusions. This is the representation principal as outlined by Arthur Schopenhauer. He also realised that the Will escapes easy capture as a concept but it captures and corrupts the free movement of *Others*. Whatever the textual arrangements that have so far transpired, they have not shaken off the Eastern fetish. (But, in any event, others have created connections to Friedrich Nietzsche and the East, although they are not always liberationist in ethos, and there is, likewise, the connectivity to post structuralism).

This confessional enunciation as an event - or 'moment of truth' - is presented not to fulfill some requirement for reflexivity of thought, but with some respect for that now rare Western tradition of 'authenticity' of deed (not in a necessarily existentialist sense). It is an act of reciprocity. As should be easily realized, to someone who has both read and considered the previous middles of thought, the thesis takes many different trails but every attempt has been made to capture – albeit as 're-presentation' - the flow of the becoming which is the singularity of thought, and accommodate the multiplicity of utterances and events that are its rhizome.

Even now, as the text is being written, the 'final middle of thought' has undergone a massive and 'strategic remodeling' from what appeared to be the putative textual deposit to be labeled (or numbered) the 'final chapter'. To have 'ended' differently, would have betrayed a becoming and asphyxiated thought. The difference follows the repetition of thought that became a knowable part of the rhizome. Metaphorically, one might suggest a scented trail or an unforeseen branching arose. This followed chance utterances and connected readings, which then became a broader path, or branch, that in turn became a major channel or a strongly not-to-be-disregarded network. All this connectivity and production, materialised after an attendance at a Doctoral seminar. The aletheia mentioned, with three other words, within the first paragraph's header has been dealt with, but indirectly, throughout the movements of the text; the original paragraphs got folded out, but much has been said in the silences. The reader has 'spoken' quietly in his or her head, thoughts as criticisms or connections. Yet another may, through the silences, connect subconsciously to a place elsewhere and all the words that could have been said leave a trace.

The switch in movement amongst the network/s places an emphasis, which reflects a different multiplicity, one which is more concerned with the multitude of folds and singularities - from what was to be an almost wholly but disguised spiritual, idealist, mystical or uncanny encounter with the East - to a more 'political' streaming to the flow of thought.

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lviii   Deleuze, Gilles (1990) op cit.,pp.298-299.

lix   Hill, L. (2001) *Bataille, Klossowski, Blanchot Writing at the Limit* Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.115.

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lxi   Ibid., pp.179-180.

lxii   Bogue. Ronald (2003b) *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* London: Routledge. pp. 34-35.

lxiii   Blanchot, Maurice (2002) in Klossowski, Pierre (2002) *Decadence of the Nude*. London: Black Dog Publishings Ltd. Originally La Decadence du Nu 1967. pp. 180 & 183. pp. 181 & 182 carrying, what some might improperly say, are sexually explicit, or possibly only slightly more properly speaking, erotic illustrations drawn by Pierre Klossowski. His wife was used as the model both for his stories and

to illustrate events from the stories in that way further doubling the becoming which was Roberte. Or was the doubling always his wife Denise Klossowski?

[lxiv]   Toscano in Alliez (2004) op cit., p.xvii-xviii.

[lxv]   Blanchot, Maurice (2002) op cit., p.184.

[lxvi]   Ibid., p. 185.

[lxvii]   Jephcott, E.F.N. (1970) *Proust and Rilke: The Literature of Expanded Consciousness* London: Chatto and Windus . p. 57.

[lxviii]   Ibid.

[lxix]   Ibid., pp. 57&58

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[lxxiii]   Hill, L. (2001) op cit., p.19.

[lxxiv]   Ibid., p.20.

[lxxv]   Ibid., p.20-21.

[lxxvi]   Ibid., p.21.

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[lxxxix] Ibid., p. 81-82.

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[c] Ibid., p.258.

[ci] Bogue, Ronald (2003a) *Deleuze on Literature* London: Routledge. p.23.

[cii] Bogue. Ronald (2003b) *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* London: Routledge. p.16.

[ciii] Ibid., p.24.

[civ] Ibid., pp. 24-31.

[cv] Bogue, Ronald (2003b) op cit., pp.16-17.

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[cxv] Ibid., p.16.

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BECOMING ET AL

AGITATO (*n*-1)
BECOMING MATERIAL

On this picture, either philosophy is the logic of truth in general (genderless), or it is one interested and delimited claim to truth (masculine). Deleuze's task was to liberate philosophy from both these notions. Philosophy ought neither be a question of fidelity to some pre-philosophical truth, nor ought philosophy be located within the point of view of an interested subject. Both definitions of philosophy, according to Deleuze, rely on the question of "Who Speaks?" (1990b:107). Concepts are returned to a 'good subject' in general or located within an intending subject. But this would assume that there are subjects – male or female – who then speak or think, whereas Deleuze will insist that thinking and speaking are trans-individual possibilities of becoming. ALL SPEAKING IS ALREADY A COLLECTIVE UTTERANCE, AND ALL THINKING IS AN ASSEMBLAGE.
Clare Colebrook (upper-case emphasis added) [i]

Nobody is as poor as those who see their own relation to the presence of others, that is to say, their own communicative faculty, their own possession of language, reduced to wage-labor.
Paolo Virno [ii]

[E]ven a lonely periscope can make a difference at a time when differences themselves are being cultivated in a Petri dish.
Sylvere Lotringer [iii]

The 'multitude' is the kind of subjective *configuration that this radical change is liberating, raising the political question of what we are capable of.*
(textual change original)
Sylvere Lortinger [iv]

'Decisive here is the idea of an *inessential* commonality, a solidarity that in no way concerns an essence. *Taking-place, the communication of singularities in the attribute of extension, does not unite them in essence, but scatters them in existence.'*
(textual change original)
Giorgio Agamben [v]

'Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos has written, it is 'a world, where there is room for many worlds, a world that can be one and diverse,' a world, I might add myself, that for all people and all times declares untouchable the right of everyone to be a 'Persian' at any time he wants or she wants to and without obeying anything but one's own roots.
Jose Saramago [vi]

The important point made previously, that folk humor is ambivalent, is usually ignored.
Mikhail Bakhtin [vii]

Having found middles, rhizomatic chapters as middles of thought, and becomingness, a singularity comes to terms with the materiality of folds and the unreality of boundaries. Once the habit of holding tight to a differentiation of inside and outside is seen to be no longer useful and becomes, therefore, totally abandoned, finally exorcised, a new productivity, creativity and freedom ought to materialise.

The difficulty that once existed of attempting a becoming - beyond same, similar, beingness and identity defined, unhelpfully, by others - assumes its rightful place within, what is now, an easier affirmation of life. The freshest freedoms afforded through the fold, quickly move to a plane where others can be realised, by and through another fold; and possibly, whilst a thorough and proper question becomes powerfully ontological: What then is left for the singularity? A singularity has need of relationships that increase its affirmative potentials and help the virtual become manifest.

The singularity has a positive, 'goal-directed' force, or desire, to engage in social productivity. Multiplicities allow singularities greater affirmative performance, but there may not be public spaces available for such common desires, and here contestation might have to take place before becomings freely connect. Barriers need to be removed and, in some cases, barricades might need to be erected (although this always feels like a reactive action and not, therefore, an act of primary affirmation).

There is much to be contested in-life, within-text and within-a-chapter-representing–putative-closure of a very open thesis or territory. Yet so many things go uncontested. Sleepiness, sloppiness, exhaustion and surrender can so easily, separately and collectively, conspire to the failure to contest that which, in order and organization, allows only the supposed free competition of the market.

The *becoming of the assemblage*, seen in the connectivity of a series of singularities, middles of thought and fragments, together with a multitude of quotes, may be seen and sensed as a test of strength, stamina, immanence, creativity and productivity in this assemblage-making process. For others, the meaning may be something else.

The joint productivity of the becoming through conceptalisation and problematization of the images of thought – the *Heterotopic* - arose to be conceived, at least, as a class or set that provided a counterpoise. This was to counter an indifferent more traditional aspect, or set of deep features, which constituted the more accepted or orthodox placement of thought. Its orthodoxy was that of a *beingness* as a test of the beingness of being: these were, and are, organised and ordered - through organization and within the organizations of words, sentences, texts, places, spaces, peoples and things.

The overly prescribed pieces of beingness of a text were linearity, local performance to hierarchical conformance, and re-territorialized spaces of non-transgression. These, together with corrupted views of time, prevailed and remained, to be challenged or reframed in text that disrupted the pattern of that

order and organization. The material disruptions of pattern, sometimes, camouflaged the political. The efforts of petty subversion, re-organisation and dis-organising were re-presented in the stereo surround of words staged around becoming.

Elements of the East have been introduced - as movement and as thought made more material through a different re-presentation. This was done to rebalance the realities of the Western male and the domain-ness, or dominance, he has constructed. The new movements and speeds were and are meant to challenge existing land-surveying and map-making.

> Writing has nothing to do with signifying, but with land-surveying and map-making, even of countries yet to come. [viii]

Here it is noted, there is a need for a text to attempt to break from rigid and dogmatic practices, which hinder future research, through connectivity to a more open plane of thought.

> I love institutions and I spent a lot of time participating in new institutions, which sometimes do not work. At the same time, I try to dismantle not institutions, but some structures in given institutions which are too rigid or are dogmatic or which work as an obstacle to future research. [ix]

Connectivity, on an open plane or plateau to concepts and 'lines of flight', has been shown to be valid. If nothing else and on the one hand, it can be valued as a useful foil, and philosophical alternative, to the confinements and containment arising from Western white male's thinking, organizations, organisations, and his ordering of these records and disciplines (See Appendix 1 for two references that personify aspects of Western White Males through the Cinema).

On the other hand, the flight has also been against their prescriptions and proscriptions on the proper currency for thought – whether this is philosophy, dressage of psychology, or the disciplines enacted upon academic endeavour. These are often pre-scribed and over-determined, prior to any *becoming* that can be given birth or flight. It is an untimely birth.

The affirmation of a certain kind of thought can always be considered 'untimely',

> They agree with Nietzsche that the creation of new concepts is an inherently political activity. Its goal should not just be the recognition of existing state of affairs or the justification of the present in thought. For this reason, they describe it as an 'untimely' mode of thinking that calls for 'a new earth, a new people' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 99) [x]

The Eastern thematic, that already exists and which strongly re-emerged in this middle of thought (only to be moved to an Appendix) should not ever be seen singularly - as a simple bipolar opposition to the Western perspective – although this is further challenged in the forthcoming multiplicity of utterances. Rather, it is part of a massive opening of the aperture, or vortex, to a much larger universal

plane of conceptualisation of becoming, and an image of thought, which is constantly not forgetting the body.

The body is a site and, as Foucault reminded readers, it is a site where *the dispotifs* of disciplinary power get played out. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have a very important body of reference, which is Antonin Artaud's *Body Without Organs* where desire acts in the factory to produce, amongst other things, new concepts. They have no time for a mind that is scripted, as a theatre, by psychiatrists.[1]

In relation to the body as a recording instrument, Deleuze has this observation, in 'Desire and Pleasure', [xi] he suggests that,

> The body is also a device for receiving sense data. It has the facility to record such data but is it not more than just a recording instrument? For some people and theorists the answer is 'No'.

The point about the body being a device for sensing data has already been explored. Is there more to consider? The Surrealists certainly wanted much more to be considered than could be available to them.

> The Surrealists wanted to expand man's conception of reality, to make it express or reflect the totality of the universe. To accomplish this, man must commit himself to his unconscious world, he must allow that inner realm to speak, unhampered by preconceived thoughts and judgements concerning time, space and motion. [xii]

And,

> While the Surrealists rejected everything that was fixed or regulated, they did lay groundwork for something constructive. They wanted to become 'the deaf receptacles of so many echoes, modest RECORDING INSTRUMENTS' of another world. The unconscious was as real for them as the material world was for the average person.
> (textual change original) [xiii]

Nehemas remarks of Nietzsche, that he is consistent in holding that, like all unity, the unity of the body is not an absolute fact:

> The evidence of the body reveals a tremendous multiplicity.

This multiplicity is, in most circumstances, organized coherently: the needs and goals are usually not in conflict with one another:

> The body and physiology is the starting point: why? – we gain the correct idea of our subject-unity, namely as regent head of a communality (not as 'souls' or 'life forces'), also of the dependence of these regents upon the

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[1] Gilles Deleuze has explained how his factory works with Foucault's genealogical conceptions of power.

ruled and of an order of rank and division of labour as the condition that makes possible the whole and its parts.

Zarathustra, I think makes the same point when he says of the body that it is a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd. Thus, the coherence of the body's organization provides the common ground that allows conflicting mental states to be grouped together as belonging to a single subject. [xiv]

The body is the site of many things including joy, repetition, sufferance, starvation and absurdity. Cybulska seems to recognize a link between the Sisyphean hero and the Eternal Return of Nietzsche because the philosopher;

'[K]new that what matters is not the eternal truth, but the eternal drama. It all happened before and will all happen again'.

Cybulska reminds us that Camus' hero, in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, is absurd.

The greatest moment comes to him as he walks down the mountain after the rock has fallen...Sisyphus marches down the mountain, seizes the rock, pushes it to the top, the rock falls down of its own weight and it does not crush him, but changes him as he transcends himself, his fate, his existence. And then he starts his meaningful existence, as it carries with it the consciousness of futility. [xv]

For some beings, thinkers and writers, the body is the site of the self whilst others can remain much more radically open about the need for a self, its actuality or its alternative. Nehemas also comments,

Amelie Rorty, too, finds a political metaphor for self illuminating. She urges that we think of the self as a medieval city, with many semi-independent neighbourhoods and no strong central administration. She suggests that we "can regard the agent self as a loose configuration of habits, habits of thought and perception and motivation and action, acquired at different stages, in the service of different ends." The unity of the self, which thus constitutes its identity, is not something given, but something acquired; not a beginning but a goal. [xvi]

The body is the easy site for selecting features for recognition, or identity, but it does not so easily engender itself to the concept of becoming, although certain Eastern practices seek this as a route to attaining both higher becomings and altered attitudes in the mind. Are being and becoming opposites? Similarly, *becoming-in-itself* should not be considered solely as the opposite of being, since it is always, and continuously-without-break, much more than that, reflecting the *middleness of infinity and eternity*. It evades description and is always the absolute *Other of difference*, which is without repetition, other than in its difference to being.

An earlier quote, from and about Gilles Deleuze, at the head of this middle of thought, identified one schema, or need, which was for thought to be genderless and, therefore, in such cases, clearly body recognition of types, like male and

female, ought not to be paramount in thought-making processes. Consider, the quote below by Colebrook, in the context where Western man was reflected, for instance, in relation to Deleuzian usage of the term becoming, and in relation to feminism;

> Any assertion of women as a subject must not double or simply oppose man, but must affirm itself as an event in the *process of becoming*. This is why 'all becomings begin and pass through becoming women' (277). Because man has been taken as the universal ground of reason and good thinking, becoming must begin with his opposite 'women'. But this becoming must go beyond the binary opposition and pass through to other becomings, so that man and woman can be seen as events within field of singularities, events, atoms and particles...because the girl must become a woman, she is invoked as the becoming of becoming. Man traditionally defined as being: as the self-evident ground of a politics of identity and recognition. Woman, as his other, offers the opening of becoming; and the girl thus functions as a way of thinking woman, not as a complimentary being, but as the instability that surrounds any being. For a being – an entity, identity or subject – is always the effect of a universal becoming. What makes this becoming girl-like? Its radical relation to man: not as his other or opposite (women) but the very becoming of man's other.
> (*italics added*) [xvii]

There are many things to be mindful about so as to evade or avoid the entrapment of oneself, or one's selves, in an arena that is artificially constructed, to either discipline becoming or limit its 'lines of flight'. The entrapments and snares of the Western male doxa are strong and, sometimes, very persuasive.

Several ways, or 'lines of flight', fly in strong opposition to the prospect of capture and create an impossibility for those seeking to ground flight - through the exaggerated demographics and habits of identification, sameness and similarity. Another example is through the materiality and performance that follows the actualisation of the virtual 'becoming animal'.

> In conclusion, it is important to note that, beyond attempting to identify the conceptual content and comprehend the meaning of the above texts. Deleuze and Guattari's writing have a decidedly 'performative' character. 'Becoming animal' is entirely an affective affair, a matter of desire, a process of 'contagion' (TP.239). Far more important than understanding *what* is being said in the texts above, it is crucial to feel oneself drawn, on a libidinal and affective level, into the processes that are not merely being described in them but are actually taking place by way of them.

> If, upon completion, the reader remains none the wiser concerning the content of the extracts included here but feels oddly feral, perhaps inclined to whinny, bark, or howl joyously, then an understanding more profound than that which can be conceptualised will have been gained.
> (*italic* original) [xviii]

In this middle of thought, there are further disjunctives, fractures or disruptive patterns constructed to create gaps, slippages, points or moments of elision. These help to deterritorialize any becoming to a space more accommodating of difference. This is a heterotopic space for the core becomings that assembles and connects, with a particular image of thought, this singularity has a movement towards or a relationship with the thought of the materiality of starving mouths to be fed. It is a body to be acknowledged by its new, soon to be, singularity (or multiplicity) which by chance is a inherently political singularity (multitude or multitudes of multiplicites). There are still, however, some practical and ontological conditions to be reminded of:

> In *practice*, the question is that of a theory of thought capable of diagnosing in our becomings the ontological conditions for the real experience of thought.
> (*italics* orginal) [xix]

Other questions arise to problematicize the image of thought further: How does one avoid the dressage of the disciplinarian organization? Can the image of thought which seeks the *Other* move freely in the spaces, or territories, where the *Other* is already, and forever, condemned and kept physically and metaphorically imprisoned without trial, for being nothing more than the *Other*? And, is not the *Other* always other than the other who ends Kafka's trial or process?

> But the hands of one of the men closed round his throat, just as the *other* drove the knife into his heart and turned it twice.
> (*italic* added) [xx]

This other is known, both by the man that holds the throat and the victim, but the *Other*, which is K, remains unknown and, for that very reason, forever persecuted.

If there is an attitude and affirmative strategy to writing, with regard to these things, there is also a different positive and productive attitude and strategy to reading, commensurate with, say, a Body Without Organs (or, a reader without a hierarchical operating system) that can often make reading primarily an act that defeats dressage. This in fullness is, then, about autonomy and autopoesis.

> [F]rom the perspective of autonomy and autopoiesis, system and world emerge at the same time: 'the subject and the object are each other's reciprocal and simultaneous prerequisites and precondition. In philosophical terms, knowing is ontological.' [xxi]

The *Other* should always know itself, its ontology, its time for connecting to kindred spirit and the auspicious signs of true hospitality. It is only ever a pattern that is disrupted. Klossowski's text, and description of gestures, disrupts those unwarranted patterns and disciplines associated with domesticity, State and regal order. He also disrupts the self and identity.

> Mr. Klossowski said that the death of God, the dead God, deprives the self of its guarantee of identity, its susbstantial basis of unity: with God dead, the self dissolves or evaporates, but in a certain way, opens itself up to all

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the other selves, roles, and characters which must be run through a series like so many fortuitous events. [xxii]

Deleuze captures other fortuitous connections, thoughts and perspectives, between Friedrich Nietzsche and Pierre Klossowski, which show both the singularity and multiplicity of their writings, about certain auspicious moments and events:

> It is in this sense that Mr. Klossowski wanted to show us a world of intense fluctuations in the Will to Power, where identities are loss, and where each one cannot want itself without wanting all the other possibilities, without becoming innumerable 'others,' without apprehending itself as a fortuitous moment, whose very chance implies the necessity of the whole series. In Mr. Klossowski's formulation, it is a world of signs and sense; the signs are established in a difference of intensity, and become 'sense' insofar as they aim at other differences included in the first difference, coming back at themselves through these others. It is Mr. Klossowski's particular strength to have uncovered the links that exist in Nietzsche between the death of God and the dissolution of the self, the loss of personal identity. God is the only guarantee of the self; the first cannot perish without the second evaporating. And the will to power follows from this, as the principle of these fluctuations or intensities that interpenetrate and flow into another. And the eternal return also follows from this, as the principle of these fluctuations or intensities that come back and flow back through all these modifications. In short, the world of the eternal return is a world of difference, an intensive world, which presupposes neither the One nor the Same, but whose edifice is built both on the tomb of the one God and on the ruin of the identical self. The eternal return is itself the only unity of this world, which has none at all except as it comes back; it is only the identity of a world which has no 'same' at all except through repetition. [xxiii]

And, there ought to be a slight remembrance of the other important writers of *Otherness*, together with what can be, and has been, made possible from their writings. Batailles' transgression must surely, and ultimately, lead to a vanishing point where there is no boundary to exceed but only multifarious patterns, that in a kaleidoscopic excess, refuse completely an internal and external geography, land-surveying and map-making. This is the ultimate fold.

Blanchot's speed is hidden in the smooth flow of words that, enigmatically, draws a reader to a totally disrupted pattern of the impossibility of the possibility, and the *Other* of life in death. (Enigmatic surely is a short hand for disrupted pattern or, perhaps, it is a pattern that is not known, which remains to be de-coded?)

The expressions, colours and architecture of *heterotopia* are the ultimate potential and possibility of disrupted patterns. When disrupted patterns are brought forward, as a strategy of multiplicity and becoming, these create territories to escape the socially unproductive spaces of capitalism, might it be called *Disruptive Pattern Materialism* (see Foreword - for an extended conceptualisation of Disrupted Pattern and Camouflage)? In any case, a pattern understood is one to be copied and patented, then normalised by a State or corporation for the purposes of exploitation. Don't pattern, in any way, that which can be sensed as similar, or the

same, and you don't feed the monsters who looks for a dialectic or minor difference to be oppressed, profitably assimilated or exploited. Alliez draws out some key considerations.

> Dialectic cannot evade that alternative, since the forms of the negative can account for actual terms and real relationships between state of affairs only *insofar as they have been cut off from virtuality they actualise and the movement of their actualization*, which does *not* resemble the virtuality that is incorporated and materialised by this movement. This is an extremely important point that governs the entirety of Deleuzean philosophy, to the extent that the latter opens itself up to Bergson's injunction as a *philosophy of difference*: far from realizing itself through resemblance, the virtual actualizes itself through differentiating itself, such that in the play of a difference without negation, actualization is the creation of the new, it is individuation. [xxiv]

This is a significant point because it manifests the other important aspects of a philosophy of difference – which has no spaces for the dialectic [2] – because of the continuity of flow that becomes its material expression. The pattern is too disrupted to be captured, or easily opposed, by an antithesis without a patterned form that itself cannot be captured.

> It is a continuous creation of difference, or a production of divergences, in accordance with a model which is no longer mathematical but rather biological, that is, *ontobiological* and *vitalist*, insofar as it implies an intense, pre-individual field of singularities, tantamount to a genuine *introduction to(the)matter* of philosophy in its *pre-immanence*. In other words we are dealing with the opposite of an abstract universal (the virtual is neither a 'category' nor a 'principle').
> (*italics* original) [xxv]

This model or image of thought and life has a pedigree:

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[2] After reading a draft of the thesis Professor Parker made a similar point to the other doctoral supervisor, Dr. Simon Lilley. Both wanted due regard to be given to the dialectic. It is now made with due respect to them both but in the flow of becoming. The very mention of either one of their comments makes actual a new multiplicity. Their thoughts play upon the virtual within the text and spaces of this middle of thought. Professor Martin Parker's comment is now made (in conversation afterwards he stated that he suspected that his commentary might be used in this way.) 'Now, you are keen to disavow any simple version of dialectics. Fair enough, and I am not going to accuse you of a dull performative contradiction here. However, I think you need to open a space where you reflect on the impossibility of really escaping dialectics. In order to make a space (in sound, on the page) you need to use a boundary. Sometimes these boundaries can be rapid and temporary, apologising reflexively as they do their work, but they are still boundaries. I know, I think I know, that you will say that you know, and that your text takes account of this in its flow and its disruptions. Fair enough. But I felt that, at times, your tone became strident when you roundly condemned the baddies and celebrated the goodies. Such language has a traction all of its own, but it doesn't seem to be coherent with the thing that I think you want to do, nor is it respectful to those who you suggest are scared robots locked in prisons of their own making. Tin men, with no heart. When you do your final revisions, I'd like you to think about the tin men. They have feelings too, Dorothy.' Now just for the record, it is stated, without equivocation, that the author has respect for all Tin men and wishes for that Other to be embraced, just as it has, in a new socially productive multiplicity of the footnote.

This model is that of an *élan vital* or 'creative evolution' (Bergson), an 'individuation' and an 'onotgenesis' (Simondon), or a 'heterogenesis' (Deleuze), which makes *ontological difference* – a theme that here acquires a rigorously non-Heideggerrian meaning – pass between the virtual-material from which one begins and the actual-individuals to which one arrives.
(*italics* original) [xxvi]

But, consider;

It is indeed intensity, through the essential process of intensive quantities (in other words 'dynamic quanta', *forces* understood as 'relations between relations', according to Bergson's formulation – i.e., *multiplicities*) which determines the actualisation of differential relations into quantities and extensions it creates through individuation.
(*italics* original) [xxvii]

Heterogenosis, or the genesis of creative difference, has an ontological significance for thought on the move; such that the affects caused by middles of thought become one of the productive flows to re-arrange virtuality to a new actuality. It is always other. It is *Otherness* in every direction and conceptualisation. Other creations (*heterogenosis*) combining in other spaces or spaces for the other (heterotopia) for and because of the *Other*. It is, then, just so many multiple multiplicities shifting-shapes, which once formed alter, and through the process of becoming sustain refusals to fully form through disrupted patterns of movement.

Creative and productive shape-shifting (the Foreword has dealt with shift-shaping) and disrupted patterns can only ever be a minority language, or a dark art, full of anarchistic intent and singular responsibility. It seeks to feed no other monster than the *Other* or itself-affirmed. Only something truly *immanent* can continuously disrupt patterns and, seamlessly, make connections to form multitudes of singularities. The uncarved block is the crumbling metaphorical expression of a disrupted pattern (see Appendix 4).

The forward folding and disrupted pattern of this textural device (the thesis) is an elected strategy to enable a breaking from majoritism, a disrupted rupture and rapture from the prevailing Western conceptualisation of time, text and space. It allows the becoming reader to fully participate in alternative formations of assemblages. Even the very cautious reader can participate, in a less than positive fashion, to the extent that he directs energy to create the linear and / or whole from fragments, thus seeking an integrity that does not exist.

Linear pursuits are not truly 'contested' in the re-presentations between, and within, centres of thought and Appendices, and the straight line of majoritism discourse is not deliberately broken in a *reactive* act. Rather the immanence of becomings, and multiplicities, have a primary affirmation of themselves through the expression of their own rude image of thought. Becoming-assemblages are productive and disruptive. These demonstrate productivity and disruption through a series of undulations, or elisions, between and within middles of thought and

Appendices. These explications and implications affirm themselves on the surfaces of the pages.

The earlier, constant speed of the endeavour of becoming is being slowed momentarily. Only so that the tempo evades a capture, the dissonance of a changing and erratic velocity of words can be accelerated sooner, as it might be later, through chance connections and fluctuating connectivity. The rites of this passage honour a vortex, on the other side of this middle of thought, where the flow of foldings, or image of thought, can pursue its nature - or natural unimpeded becoming.

The multiple, disrupted patterning, within and between middles of thought and Appendices, should be all too apparent to the reader as the conjunctive and massive becoming – but it is not the *'grand' or 'meta'*, description of hierarchical organisations. It is a massive becoming of the multitude of writers, philosophers and non-hierarchical becomings. It alternates against the mild 'backlash' of utterances, concepts or plateaus, which are given to the reader, with respect, but as untimely and disruptive unfoldings.

So in a sense, and sometimes through sensibilities, the connections of the becomings of Antonin Artaud, Marcel Proust, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Arthur Schopenhauer and others have been given hospitality, sometimes within heterotopic spaces, to allow a fairly unhindered creative and disruptive flow to a materiality that, as yet, has not found a totally uncontested voice, speed and flow. The immanence has not been completely released.

Even here, there are spaces - out of consideration and respect for the reader, the *Other* and singularities - with opportune pauses for reactive reflection through conforming textural plays. These are convenient and conventional stopovers for thought, created unintentionally, because text arrives on time rather than out-of-time and, thus, creates a far too steady series of velocities of speed, flow and folds. Some spaces have more affirmative purposes.

CHIRALITY

In previous middles of thought - within this thesis - cinematic, poetic, timely and untimely historical references, quotations, linear sequencing, major and minor language were all used. Now these will be re/considered, as part of the deliberate disruption patterning, to create a slight 'reflexive' moment, or turn, which must avoid, at almost any cost any overly reactive and compromising feature. Primary affirmation is all.

Dialogues about wavelengths are part of some great modernist tradition of science but they are found, especially, within the sacred reductionist's tombs, as epitomised by physics. This science demonstrates, that if, several wavelengths in phase come together, then there is an incredibly high probability that a new single wave will be created; now having a greater combined wave height.

From a forgotten source, the author remembers and wishes to remind readers, that it is supposedly for this scientific reason that a car being (not becoming) driven

over a particular surface (with a materially similar harmonic) suddenly, at a given speed, becomes much noisier than before. At that moment, the harmonies of the body mass of the vehicle, tyre and wheel together with the properties of road, above and just below, surface conjoin and reinforce one another's wavelengths. Just before and after that specific speed, the noise is less.

Conversely, at a particular out-of-sequence phasing of wavelengths, the heights of the waves are diminished as they merge in a moment of mutual cancellation of each other's energy. In relation to this middle of thought and with regard to the last, the phasing of the two wavelengths is similar but slightly out-of-phase, such that the viewer, or anyone else, can see the other middle better through an admiration of the respective subtleties of difference. The same is not, however, looked for through amplification or cancellation. So the 'reflexive' turn is not critical in opposition or self-congratulatory in flavour.

An asymmetry is maintained, not just as a tactic of a larger disruptive strategy but to critically bring to bear aspects of dis-symmetry, through encouraging thought never to be dialectic in disposition. Difference can only have the repetition that is its own if the nuisances of *left-handedness* and *right-handedness* are exaggerated. The *Oxford English Dictionary Online* defines Chiral so,

> Of a crystal or three-dimensional form: not superposable on its mirror image. Hence **chirality**...**Chiroid**...a chiral object or process. (embold original) [xxviii 3]

There is a real danger that rules, such as chirality, are being introduced or implicated here; care must be taken to avoid such an unwanted organization of the disrupted patterns of thought. The image of thought may be incapable, in its repetition, of being considered the same and similar, if it has a tendency to become three-dimensionally chiroid. A process that avoids a dialectic would have an image, or re-presentation, that was chiroid, so that no thesis could be opposed to it. Chirality is a beautiful manifestation of difference in nature. It is materially attractive because of its indifference to the habits of seeking, in nature, similarity and sameness when seeing or otherwise sensing two images.

The quotes, at the beginning of this middle of thought, remind us of some contestables such as writing as an activity of asignification. There are others like the obstacles of structures that impose and imprison. For this reason, before proceeding with further becomings, let us take another reflexive fold and view what has proceeded in the rear view mirror, agitating some settlements and sanctuaries that are so easily arrived at through writing.

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[3] Clive Cookson (2005) notes, in 'Swastika perfect of twisting light', that 'The swastika turns out to have the perfect geometry for 'twisting light' in a way to encode information. He then quotes Dr. Bagnall who said 'The swastika was a powerful symbol in several cultures for thousand of years before it was adopted by the Nazis'. And, 'We are using it because the shape has special features for fundamental physics. It is entirely made up of vertical and horizontal straight lines and it is square, but it can still provide the feeling of left-handed rotation or right-handed rotation known as chirality – which causes our swastikas to twist light.' *Financial Times* 25th February 2005. p.7.

Collectively there should be some cautiousness of our various selves and the intersubjectivity that falls upon us as writers and readers. Clegg teaches us to be cautious;

> Our own reflexive gaze takes over the disciplining role as we take on the accounts and vocabularies of meaning and motive that are available to us as certain other forms of account are marginalised or simply eased out of currency [xxix]

And then later,

> Rules can never provide for their own interpretation. Issues of interpretation always implicate the process whereby agencies instantiate and signify rules. 'Ruling' is an activity. Some agency does it as a constitutive sense-making process that fixes meaning. Both rules and games necessarily tend to the subject of contested interpretation, with some players having not only play-moves but also refereeing of these as power resources. Consequently, where we invoke rules there must be discretion. Thus, it is not only embodiment, labour power, which is the source of resistance. It is not only the gap between the capacity to labour and its realisation that implicates power and the organisation of control; it is also inherent in the regulation of meaning. [xxx]

In this reflexive turn, a deconstructive technique is not necessarily sought. Norris notes of deconstruction that it;

> [P]reserves the critical sprit of Enlightenment thought while questioning its more dogmatic and complacent habits of belief. It does so through the close reading of philosophical and other texts and by drawing attention to the moments of 'aporia' (unresolved tension or conflict) that tend to be ignored by mainstream exegetes. [xxxi][4]

Issues around meaning abound and the Saussarian Structuralist perspectives are brought forth; to oscillate around the importance of the signifier and the signified within a number of postmodern, post-modern and post structuralist discourses. And similarly, Caputo reminds us that for him even deconstruction has certain plays with ambiguity of meaning, even in its own definition.

> The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things – texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need – do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always to come. Every time you try to stabilise the meaning of a thing, to fix it in its missionary position, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away. [xxxii]

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[4] This is part of a definition of 'Deconstruction' found in *the Concise Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge. p.196.

Even in texts specifically dealing with these 'unresolved tensions or conflicts' – see for instance such texts as Ross [xxxiii] – there remains something accepted that ought not to be so easily assimilated. There is something prior, pre-word or pre-conscious, or foreword / forward of unconscious, that needs to be revealed. In order to do so, some further disorganising is required, or some organisation needs to be fractured.

> The consequences of such a stance are considerable, since the *localization in abstracto* of the function will be opposed, in Deleuze and Guattari, by the *animation in concerto* of the functives. The 'crisis of foundations' can now be regarded as nothing but the symptom of the failure of ambition: that of discovering, in the fantasy of a knowledge severed from its roots, the transparency of a thoroughly rational world. This so-called crisis of foundations is answered by the reaffirmation of the privilege of living, of a world alive from top to bottom, where the pressure of the virtual ceaselessly expresses the 'lived experience' of things, a world where all is force, interaction and prehension, affection and perception, sensibility and sensibility to - composition of forces and affects.
> (*italics* original) [xxxiv]

SEQUENCING THE LINEAR?

This middle of thought could have been the 'ultimo', preceded by a 'penultimo', that had two other middles laid out before it, in a document that had pages bound together, which constituted a thesis. Instead, and at the latest moment, these signifiers that displaced chapter sequencing where replaced with musical terms, which had to do with speed. There are reasons for these manoeuvres. The middles of thought are of the same immanence, however, they were never meant to be read in a linear sequence because they are only different middles of an assemblage, made by a desire to write. These middles should connect with one another if the relationships and speeds between each are compatible and mutually productive. The differences within the thesis are folded and unfolded through variations in the speed of thought. Clearly, there cannot be an ultimo to an image of thought that is becoming since there is no boundary and only seepage and fresher connections until the text can no longer be primary a movement of affirmation.

The layout of paper text, that more often than not displays a discipline and logic, is questionable from so many angles. For example, in the 'Introduction' to Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, the translator Spivak notes ;

> It is clear as is commonly understood, the preface harbours a lie. "Prae-fatico" is " a saying before-hand" (Oxford English Dictionary – OED). Yet it is accepted as natural by Hyppolite, as indeed by all of us, that "Hegel reflected retrospectively on his philosophic enterprise and wrote his 'Preface' ". We may see this as no more that the tacit acceptance of a fiction. We think of the Preface, however, not as a literary, but as an expository exercise. It "involves a norm of the truth", although it might well be the insertion of an obvious fiction into an ostensibly "true" discourse. (of course, when the preface is being written by someone other than the author, the situation is yet further complicated. A pretence at

writing *before* the preface can be written. Writing a postface would not really be different – but that argument can only be grasped at the end of this preface)...

Humankind's common desire is for a stable centre, and for the assurance of mastery – through knowing or possessing. And a book, with its ponderable shape and its beginning, middle, and end, stands to satisfy that desire. But what sovereign subject is the origin of the book?
(*italics* original) [xxxv]

Some of this thinking has been dealt with, in another middle of thought, but the repetition here points to a difference, which is not obviously about writing a preface. It is really about writing what would normally be considered a closing middle of thought, where the reader might anticipate a series of conclusions and observations. There is here, the impossibility to the possibility of such writing. There can be no material substance where there is only ever a middle, and / or connection/s, to another image of thought that has an immediate movement to a traversal relationship with another image of thought; et cetera. This reference and documentation is a reactive act that partially betrays a primary affirmation of becoming.

QUOTATIONS

There are always others. There are other people, other groups, other things and other texts. There are always other quotes to bring forth to affirm the *Other*. There are good and bad quotes. Good quotes better the movement of thought in the text making process - through the *autopoeisis* and the *autonomous* movement - whilst adding to the surface both a certain play of intextuality. They also bring *Otherness* closer to a creation of a middle hereabouts. In this way, through affirming energies and intensities from different middles, the togetherness produces more creative intersubjectivity and different socially productive material.

It would seem, all good quotes make the text more hospitable to the sympathetic reader's speed and sensibilities. Perhaps they are not really better quotes, since this seems to imply transcendental values to be applied upon them and, in that reactive act, there is a reinforcement or enforcement of the world view of hierarchy and structure. Rather they are good quotes because they always resonate very well with the newest arrival to the text – the *Other* reader, or the reader of *Others*.

Equally, there must be quotes, elsewhere, that immediately perform exclusion, no different in affect than the exclusions that applies to the *Other* who is not wanted, who is hated and suffers always in a duration that is wrongfully called life. Then there are other concepts and how we deal with them, for instance,

Deleuze and Guattari present their own concepts of rhizomatic conceptual assemblages, the purpose of which is precisely to 'function' in relation to *other* concepts and practices outside of themselves to make them function in new contexts.
(*italics added*) [xxxvi]

Life must affirm, and must connect socially, if it is to be lived ethically. Thought must materially affirm life - if is not to be used as a tool of oppression, submission and exploitation. To affirm life completely is to embrace the *Other* in movements that are productive and, forever, different. Affirmation of difference naturally attends to the *Other*. This ethic is to recognise, and participate, with a series of *Others* that are never the same. There are *Others* that are manifest as night, as death, or as the bogey man that haunts your current living. They are the *Other* because they are not you, he or she or us. This then perhaps becomes a politics and a justification (to quote the suffragettes) for 'deeds not words' on and with the *Other*. Let us remember and quote Bergson to emphasis process and difference;

Life is the process of difference [xxxvii]

There are other quotes, or the quotes of *Others*, which compose a space of speed and slowness for thought which affirms through the use of voids and silences. Moving always with some dissonances, it makes the movement more productive, because the changing pace and variances of the text corrupt orthodox structures. A dark art of speeds and connections makes so many intensities that it might be envied by science. There is then:

[A] principle which is no longer that of sufficient reason but rather of resonance and correspondence. To the relationships of speed and slowness of *non-formed elements* that compose and decompose 'bodies' there now correspond the intensities of an *anonymous force* affecting them at each and every instant and expressed by partial observers. 'Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds' bring science infinitely closer to the very chaos it intended to organise.
(*italics* original) [xxxviii]

The disequilbrium and dissonance of textual tone, becoming apparent not through a contrived method of writing but as an honest experiment of thought, which moves experientially with an ethic of hospitality towards and for the *Other*. Too much haste and the *Other* is seen and understood in a subjective near-sighted way but with too much prevarication and examination the *Other* is the objectified of the far-sighted. What is needed is something middle-sighted or, as anticipated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, middle-sited. But one of the furthest *Others* to be brought closer is the Eastern, though not as the Victorian **Orientalism** described by Edward W. Said. [xxxix]

A thought that allows seepage from *Other* middles of endeavour, both common and uncommon, is one that can become multiple and form a productive multiplicity. A thought that goes with *the flow* is, however, forever disrespectful of order and organization. Never intentionally disrespectful to the reader, but almost always disrespectful of structures and hierarchies, which work mainly to normalise and, thereby, displace or discipline the *Other*.

There are other reasons for ensuring a flow and fragmentary play of text. It becomes the production that affirms the 'natural' unfettered pace and displacement of thought, from the territories that are held and designed by the hierarchical others, who order and organise for discipline and not for transport. Primary

affirmation and production through fragments also respects an *Other* that cannot be written but, simply and more pertinently, now respects the reader.

Said notes generally that a number of greats have their works enlivened by other writings. His list includes Shakespeare and Beckett. He then describes how Coleridge and Swift differ but might be considered similar in their addiction to quotations. He concludes:

> [Q]uotation is a constant reminder that writing is a form of displacement. For although quotations can take many forms, in every one the quoted passage symbolises other writing as encroachment, as a disturbing force moving potentially to take over what is presently written. As a rhetorical device, quotations can serve to accommodate, to incorporate, to falsify (when wrongly or even rightly paraphrased), to accumulate, to defend, or to conquer – but always, even when in the form of passing allusion, it is a reminder that other writings serve to displace present writings, to a greater or lesser extent, from its absolute, central, proper place. [xl]

And, furthermore, Said suggests that,

> The greater the anxiety, the more writing appears to be quotations, the more writing thinks of itself as, in some cases even proclaims itself, rewriting. The utterance sounds like – perhaps even is – a borrowing from someone else. Prophecy is a type of language around which this issue of originality perpetually lurks in many forms: Is the prophecy absolutely authentic and original? Does it speak *to* all men at a common level, or only *for* one, too original (i.e. alienated) man (the "prophet")? (*italics* original) [xli]

So there must now be an acknowledgement that there has already been so much rewriting and borrowing [5] but the reader should be more aware of 'Who speaks?' when one writes now. Important also is Michel Callon's caution:

> To speak for others is to first silence those in whose name we speak.[xlii]

The selections of thoughts borrowed and rewritten create, somewhat unintentionally, counter to the attitude sought, their own divisions. Lilley notes a tradition and concern for the construction of divisions;

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[5] Hart (1998:181) in examining and explaining the ins and outs of a literature review cautions the keen researcher and advises around the theme of legitimacy and academic style. He obviously doesn't give advice on how a dissertation can be written without a literature review, or written as an experiential review that creates difference as image of thought. He however advises: 'To avoid criticism of your review you must use sources properly. You will be expected not to violate the standards and values of academic work. There are a range of actions you might take that throw your work into question. Here are some of them; *falsification* - misrepresenting the works of others; *fabrication*-presenting speculations as if they were facts; *sloppiness*-not providing correct citations; *nepotism*-citing references of colleagues that are not directly related to your work; *plagiarism*-the act of knowingly using another person's work and passing it off as your own.'[15] It is hard to know how buggering a philosophical text fits into any of these categories although it does seem to exceed and transgress falsification. In a strategy of disruptive patterns is misrepresenting the key to subverting a world full of misrepresentations of the oppressed and exploited?

Critique, certainly within the modernist tradition seems to function around and across some form of antagonistic / agnostic division. Indeed, the construction and mobilisation of seemingly natural divisions, and forgetting / effacing of the work involved in creating those divisions, may be seen to be the very basis of modernity's power (Latour, 1993; Cooper, 1993; Chia forthcoming) and its ability to regenerate itself. [xliii]

With care and imagination, in the choice of material and architectural design, the silos could be made with boundaries that ensured so much permeability, as to nullify the structures constructed. Hopefully, the material in the quotes and the architecture of use does just that in this image of thought.

Quoting and referencing can be both strategic and tactical matters. In the book entitled *The Delirium of Praise*, Kaufman gives attention to a number of Continental writers and notes, through a cross-referencing and pairing from this set of five, the praise and affirmations one philosopher has for another. A number of chains are formed from each pairing by using one of the pair to form another couple. Using these exchanges certain areas of focus are drawn out. For instance: in considering both Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Klossowski, the sick body is given consideration; through a reading of their separate texts on Friedrich Nietzsche, their reflections on 'corporalising thought' are drawn out; and, this is then linked, through the chain of other writer pairings.

> This concept of 'corporealising thought' is central not only to the engagement between Deleuze and Klossowski that takes place over the body of Nietzsche, but more generally to the dynamic between Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault and Klossowski as a whole. By drawing on such pathological states as chatter, sickness, and absence of work, these thinkers create a corporealizing or material form of thought that draws on the bodily affects in order to build a new cohesion of thought that constitutes its own materiality of thought. [xliv] [6]

Kaufman continues this paragraph, placing emphasis on the energetic and becoming aspect of thought. Perhaps, in a fashion, this is the repetition of difference that is the plateau of *poesis* that is valorized and sought in this thesis. This is the difference evident in Art, Music and Poetry, when singularities and multiplicities use energy, force, assemblage or writing machines to will themselves in a material becoming. This displaces and transgresses the spaces occupied, now fully colonized, by hierarchical order and organization. This is an *immanent* energy with a vitality and speed which displaces the law. The law is what prevents this energy from making and becoming unfettered connections, transgressive locomotion and social production. It is the law that Kafka escapes from in its familial setting (see Kafka's letters to his father). It is the law as described by Deleuze. It is the antithesis of *poesis*. And let there be a reminder of that term's meaning:

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[6] This quote will be repeated differently later.

poesis (Gk poiesis, from poiein, 'to make') Thus poesis denotes 'making' in general, but in particular the making of poetry.
(embolding original) [xlv]

Perhaps, it is in the singularities of those writers within their sometimes shared-becomings, or in their laudatory acknowledgement of their chosen pairing, that they realise through that friendship the social productivity of the multiple and multiplicity. This, then, demonstrates a powerful materiality and vitality. This is the energy to be sought, as a commonality, for the uncommon singularities that comprise the event of any multiplicity.

> This is a form of disembodied materiality that is a pure energy of thought. In this sense, the laudatory exchanges are of unique importance, not so much for what they say, but for what they do or enact in the realm of energized thought: they push form to its limits so that this formal excess returns to reinflect the content. In other words, as with the pathological and normal, the form is pathology that inflects and determines the content. [xlvi]

The *poesis* of thought, the autopoesis of the body, the making process of a thesis of difference, the productivity of desire, and the intensity of common foldings and unfoldings of an affirmative life are not easily lost in truly creative and commonly shared acts or endeavours. Although, this vitality and virtuality can be so easily lost, or reduced, through the stagnation of territorilization, re-territorialization, reductionism, oppressions, *dispositifs*,[7] captures, exploitations, dressage or the unthinking application of science. This intensity is the important materiality and wavelength of *poesis* which can be found in text written by a number of writers - which others have found in the poetry written by Mallarme, Novalis and Peguy. For instance, Arnold comments:

> Our religion has materialized itself in the fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything; the rest is a world of divine illusion. Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea *is* the fact. The strongest part of our religion today is its unconscious poetry. [xlvii]

The pace to such idealistic heights is perhaps too rapid and uncompromising for some. A movement more material and immediate, and far less ephemeral, can still provide noises of motion - like a train going through a tunnel. Before then, however, remembrance must be remembered and memory must be forgotten, since it is a means to anticipate an awakening to multiplicity; and, in that way pre-define it.

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[7] 'Governmentality relates to the management of a population, at an aggregate level (the state) and also at a micro level. These levels are embedded in a matrix of apparatuses, logics, techniques, and so forth, of control – what Foucault calls the *dispositifs*.' Pippa Carter and Norman Jackson 'Labour as Dressage' in Alan McKinlay and Ken Starkey (1998) (Eds.) *Foucault, Management and Organization Theory*. London: Sage. p.49.

THINGS PAST NOW PRESENT

The last text, or the first centre or middle of thought read, is but a memory. There is a twofold view of memory which historically, culturally and traditionally valorises the one just suggested against another. Marcel Proust reminded us all, that memory can be a cherished and sought after commodity, but not in the way it is, often, conceived and certainly, not in the way it is aligned for the past and not for the present. Memory has a long tradition. As Brown notes, in relation to the past, Proust brings other things to the forefront of our thinking especially with the movement from orality to literacy;

> Proust's treatment of memory is part of a Western tradition of thought that links *memoria* to *techne*. In *The Republic*, Plato speaks of how the technology of writing allows for a general forgetting of what is past. We might interpret this to mean that technology acts to displace memory. In an oral tradition, the past must necessarily be brought to the presence through repeating of traditional stories and narratives – in short, through myth. Such myths are not the sole property of the storyteller, they are communal accomplishments, and the right to narrate myth – the past – may fall to any number of individual speakers or indeed be done on entirely communal basis. The advent of writing disturbs this tradition (Ong 1988). It now suffices to record the past in written inscriptions. This makes it possible to think of writing as a means of storing up the past, of stockpiling memory. Henceforth questions of power enter into the equation, since access to and comprehension of this stockpiling past may be limited.(*italics* original) [xlviii]

So if this is put another way it could be said that the victor writes the history books. The who writes is sometimes key in the valorisation of thoughts and disciplines. Somewhat ironically, Foucault has considered the entrance of power around literature through universities. Presumably, the valorisation described and which still occurs has been applied to Proust?

> In the 19th century the university was the medium at the center of which a literature said to be classical was constituted. This literature, by definition, was not a contemporary literature, and was valorised simultaneously as both the only base for contemporary literature and as it critique. Hence a very curious play in the 19th century between literature and the university, between the writer and the academic.

> And then, little by little, the two institutions, which underneath their petty squabbles were in fact profoundly akin, tended to become completely indistinguishable...We know perfectly well today that the literature said to be avant-garde is only ever read by academics: that a writer over thirty has students around him doing theses on his work: and that writers live for the most part by giving courses and by being academics. Thus the truth about something is already evident there, in the fact that literature functions thanks to a play of selection, sacralization, and institutional valorisation of which the university is at once the operator and the receiver. [xlix]

Having made a slight digression from the body or sense of Proust, it is time to return to his epic in the general flow towards the multitude. As Hopkins notes, firstly of the translator of *A La Recherché du Temps Perdu* [8], and then of the text itself;

> Mr Scott-Moncrieff, as a rule so sensitive to words, so intelligently alive to subtleties, gave regrettable currency to a false phrase. *Memory of Things Past* is precisely what Proust's vast and undulating composition is *not*. He used the term *Recherché* with deliberate, and highly romantic intention. Memory he always stigmatised as a rational activity which, where more than fact was involved must be sterile. What he set himself to do was to seek something that was not past but the eternal present. What he wanted was not to remember things forgotten but to recreate things living, but, for the moment, lost and for its purpose he made use of certain stimuli which had the power of bringing from the regions of the subconscious the whole panorama of an indestructible reality. Memory recalls only what has been objective. *Recherché*, as he meant the word to be understood laid bare subjective truth.
> (*italics* original) [1]

Singularities cannot anticipate where they will be most socially productive, nor can they judge to whom they must make a connection, to generate an assemblage or series of multiplicities. Much is left to chance. They cannot use their memory to try to define what it is like to become-at-one with others in social productivity. Neither, however, can they use their remembrance, since that has no definition, identification or training to apply and would, in that act of application, destroy what was sought through the hazard and jeopardy of recognition.

> Memory is thereby displaced, no longer a cognitive event. In its place Proust reveals remembering to be a practical activity that is based around our everyday engagement with things. [li]

Collective subjectivities have a remembrance that can be brought forth as territories and other things from the ancient, mystical or spiritual pasts. For instance, Felix Guattari has written about the tread mills of life that prevent the march to change and through which,

> [O]ne is snatched up, thrown up against remote-controlled apparatuses

And, in a paragraph using a reference to Marcel Proust's *oeuvre*, he observes;

> It is obvious that we are all suspended over the same abyss, even if we use different means in order not to see it. We are all at the mercy of the same stupor that can take us by the throat and literally suffocate you. We are all like Swann, half crazy after his separation from Odette and fleeing, like the plague, any mention that could evoke, even indirectly, her existence. [lii]

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[8] Now, perhaps, more usefully translated as 'In Search Of Lost Time', see, for instance, Marcel Proust (1996) *In Search Of Lost Time* London: Vintage. 6 Vols. tr. C.K. Moncrieff and Terence Kilmarti. Revised by D.J.Enright.

And then, on the facing page, he writes of the collective dimensions to be considered;

> The answer of course is at the same time both personal and collective. In life, one can only hold on to momentum. Subjectivity needs movement, directional vectors, *ritournelles*, rhythms and refrains that beat time to carry it along. The most singular and personal factors have to do with social and collective dimensions. [liii]

Later he notes,

> A territory is the ensemble of projects or representations where a whole series of behaviours and investments can pragmatically emerge, in time and in social, cultural, esthetic and cognitive space. [liv]

Shortly, the territories of the East will be remembered in relation to a formula which is (n -1).

DO WHAT?

In this and the former middles of thought, a style of becoming has been attempted, with little or no regard for an exteriority. A within-text-drive, or desire, has been facilitated, or unleashed, or, at least, allowed reduced hindrance in its movement. Immanence has been sought. This is so that there is a release of energy which drives the folding and unfolding, with such intensity and viscosity, that barriers, creative of divisions and hierarchies, are overrun or displaced. This is done without hesitation and with only the slightest of stutters to ensure and encourage minor languages. Clearly, there has to be standards and certain minimum thresholds have to be maintained.

Immanence is linked to certain philosophers and especially Baruch Spinoza.

> An immanent cause, finally, is a cause that not only remains within itself in order to produce, but one whose effects remain within it. This is the conception of causality developed by Spinoza. [lv]

For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari there is a Plane of Immanence to protect, develop, facilitate, visit and think.

> 'The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather an image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, *to find one's bearings in thought*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37)
> (*italics* added) [lvi]

Through a form of politics, or materialisation of thought, the Plane of Immanence can gain a greater materiality, or solidity, on sites and spaces. To become heterotopic, for more than a moment through a further extension, which involves a political and spiritual field favourable to singularities and multiplicities. Then

within the de-territorialized the explication or implication of heterogeneity can be anticipated or precipitated.

> In effect, 'the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a *heterogenesis*,'. [lvii]

Now perpetual heterogeneity sounds a very fine things but what can it do? Many, including Negri and Hardt, have indirectly considered this equation and the things that prevent its manifestation.

> The right of capital to intervene at a world level, after having demonstrated through the power of international economic organisms and *camouflaged* behind the humanitarian interests of governmental and non-governmental programs (such as the Alliance of Progress), can now be posed as a juridical power. (*italics* added) [lviii]

> The sites delegated to popular representation and continuous production of constitutional ordering are impiously permeated by constricting logics of command, and what remains of them is only an empty carcass that the communicative stimulation of the 'democratic media' tries to camouflage in aesthetic garb. [lix]

It would seem that camouflage can be used, on the one hand, to subvert. Whilst, on the other hand, in the instance just quoted, it is used as a means to illicit compliance, order and the constituted. There is then camouflage for the constituted or for the constituting. The local disruption of patterns must become constituting as –

> [A] demonstration that this power is all the more stronger as the number of individuals that we imagine engaged in the process is increased. [lx]

When certain forms of State act out the laws of suppression and servitude, it becomes all the more of an imperative to affirm the power of social productivity, irrespective of any movements and manipulations by transcendental forces. The ultimate primary affirmation comes from the free reign of immanence - in mind, body or any other state. Colebrook notes the strength of the Deleuzean conviction to affirm outside of any transcendence.

> It is in his attempt to think affirmatively that Deleuze sets himself the task of a philosophy of immanence, a philosophy also defined as radical empiricism or a transcendental empiricism. Philosophy will be immanent or radically empiricist if it does not subordinate itself to some outside ground or (as Deleuze describes it) some plane of transcendence. Philosophy strives for immanence by continually affirming its acts of thought as *acts*, and by producing concepts in terms of what they do and effect. Such a philosophy is also therefore a radical or transcendental empiricism: it asserts that there is nothing beyond the given – no law or real that pre-exists and governs becoming. (*italic* original) [lxi]

And, furthermore:

> Deleuze's superior irony is not a style to be found, a position to be lived, but a challenge to our relation to style. Once a style is 'ours' it is not longer *style*. Perhaps all those texts of post-modernity – texts that wander through machines, simulacra, phrases and voices – are best read not as the voice of the inhuman but as instances of the eternal challenge of style. The inhuman, then, is not a style we can discover, so much as the perpetual (and eternal) challenge or writing anew.
> (*italics* original) [lxii]

Others add to the Spinozean assemblage of thoughts, for instance, Althusser understands Spinoza in relation to his own theories and, places before the reader, the importance of honouring and respecting the effects of philosophy upon spaces.

> [A]s the activity of positing of theses to be demarcated from existing theses. I noted the truth of a philosophy lies entirely in its *effects,* while in fact it acts only at a distance from real objects, therefore, in the space of freedom that it opens up to research and action and not in its form of exposition alone. This form could be systematic or not, but in any event it was itself 'dogmatic' to the extent that every philosophy *posits,* not without reason, but without any possible empirical *verification,* apparently arbitrary theses, which in reality are not arbitrary, since they are a function of the space (or servitude) that the philosophy intends by *its effects* to open up at the heart of the spaces of theses already posed by existing philosophies within a given theoretical conjecture. (*italics* original) [lxiii]

NO SPACES FOR SERVITUDE

There are to be no spaces for servitude only territories for powerful, primary affirmation. The strength of the immanence is personified in Spinoza's *Ethics*, where he seeks to create a philosophy - with some precision - through a movement that has its own architecture and geometry. It can also be felt in a number of books by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.

> Then, I had paid off my debts, Nietzsche and Spinoza had released me. And I wrote yet more books on my account, I believe that what concerned me, in any case, was to describe this exercise of thought, whether in a writer, or for itself, in so far as it opposed to the traditional image which philosophy has projected, has erected in thought in order to subjugate it and prevent it functioning. [lxiv]

Ironically, most of the writers involved with sciences that seek to unleash, through research within-becoming-energies of matter and waves, fail miserably, through poor architecture and spirit, to capture this within their writings. However there is a very real physics of immanence that is problematicized and given birth in Spinoza's main work.

Spinozist ethics is a *physics*; " a [physical] relation cannot be separated from a power of affection: this is so much the case that Spinoza is able to treat two fundamental questions as equivalent: *what is the structure* {fabrica} *of a body? What is the body capable of?* The structure of the body is the relations that compose it. What a body is capable of is governed by the nature and limits of its power to be affected." (8) " All individuals exist in Nature as on a plane of consistence whose entire figure, variable at each moment, they go to compose. They affect one another in so far as the relation that constitutes each individual forms a degree of *puissance*, a power of being affected. Everything in the universe is encounters, happy or unhappy encounters...Hence Spinoza's question: *what is a body capable of?* What affects is it capable of ? Affects are becomings: sometimes they weaken us to the extent they diminish our strength of action and decompose our relations (sadness), sometimes they make us stronger through augmenting our force, and make us enter a vaster and higher individual (joy). Spinoza never ceases to be astonished at the body; not having a body, but what the body is capable of. Bodies are not defined by their genus and species, nor by their organs and functions, but by what they do, the affects they are capable of, in passion as in action. You haven't defined an animal until you have made a list of its affects."(9)
9 lxv

This thesis is a body, together with the thoughts it contains and encounters, but what is it capable of? What affects is this text capable of? Maybe much depends on what is desired by the reader - and at times the writer - in their conjoined significations of the images of thought. Much depends, in these acts of immanence, on the inherent species and set of desires unleashed to perform thought and deeds. It must be remembered that all other assemblages formed from singularities and multiplicities are also made up of desires.

> Assemblages remain, before all else, arrangements of *desire*, though one should not be misled by the word. Deleuze and Guattari subject the notion of desire to a transformation in meaning and extension, analogous to the way in which Foucault treats the notion of power. For them, desire is not necessarily a matter of pleasure, not even of sexuality. It is a notion which in their hands owes more to Spinoza and Nietzsche than to Freud or Lacan.
> lxvi

Deleuze makes much of the energies that arise from the artistic expressions of Francis Bacon. The act of painting and the paintings themselves are speeds and energies that make virtual and actual the immanence of art. In *Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze writes;

> The entire series of spasms in Bacon is of this type: sense of love, of vomiting and excreting [73], in which the body attempts to escape from itself *through* one of its organs in order to rejoin the field or material structure. Bacon has often said that, in the domain of Figures, the shadow acquires this presence only because it escapes the body: the shadow which

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9 The quote referenced as 8 is taken from Deleuze (1967) 'Spinoza et le probleme de expression' and quote reference 9 comes from Deleuze and Parnet 'Dialogues'

escapes from itself through some localised point in the contour [63]. And the scream, Bacon's scream is the operation through which the entire body escapes through the mouth [6]. All the pressures of the body. [10]

And then Deleuze continues, on the next page, linking the efforts to escape in painting to some forms of literature, which explicate, perform or produce their own lines of flight,

> In literature, it is William Burroughs who has best evoked this effort of the body to escape through a point or through a hole that forms a part of itself or its surroundings: "Johnny's body begins to contract, pulling up toward his chin. Each time the contraction is longer. 'Wheeeeeeee!' the boy yell, every muscle tense, his whole body strain to empty through his cock." In much the same way, Bacon's *Lying Figure with Hypodermic Syringe* (1963) [31] is less a nailed-down body (though this is how Bacon describes it) than a body attempting to pass through the syringe and to escape through the hole or vanishing point functioning as a prosthesis-organ. (*italics* original) [lxvii]

There is much to think about in these two quotes. For instance, the immanence of paint on canvas and ink print on paper might be a starting point for important considerations. There is also the *event of the escape* from containment through the disruption of order, organisation or pattern - which might excite the reader and viewer to recognise the *Other* and embrace the *Outside*. Surely, in that event, there is a very sensational aspect for the reader or viewer? There are so many more things to consider but, especially, the fluctuating relational aspects of the flows and materiality of the body, text and the *Outside*.

Shields writes about the characteristics of flows:

> They have a tempo and rhythm as well as a direction. The significance of the material quality of flows is that they have content, beyond mere being processes. They have the advantage of recasting the idealist notion of processual change into the changing material itself. Processes generally indicate the transformative 'gap' between states or dispositions. Process thus is strongly defined on the basis of origin and terminus as a definite line or path between two points or waystations in a further process. (Sheilds 1997:3) [lxviii]

There is of course the body of this thesis that has an immanence which is driven to an *Outside*. The desire, obtained in that movement, brings forth the materiality of an *Otherness* which would seem to be unavailable in the orthodox speed and uni-directionality of disciplined text. Through the escape and 'passing through' the body can find a line of flight, in the performance and productivity of text, and, within a constancy of the flow, the text can escape itself to explicate and implicate the possibility of the impossibility and the impossibility of the possibility.

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[10] Bracketed numbers points to an index of references of Francis Bacon's paintings in that volume. pp. 162-172.

A world of physical interconnections and combinations, of associations and dissociations, fluctuations and concretizations, according to a completely horizontal logic, constituting the paradoxical intersection of causal and fortuitous dimensions between tendency and possibility: here is the original dimension of the *multitude*.
(*italics* original) [lxix]

WHAT TO MAKE OF YOUR BODY

A meditated on the points but realized language was really restricting, as it was often clumsy and full of traps. A spoke, 'No, not points. Almost any other thing now, to avoid a fixity of reference, let go and allow the free flow or pattern.' A breathed deeply, using the outward and inward motion of the diaphragm to capture breath, rather than the orthodox rise and fall of lungs. This breathing helped to create a more relaxed and altered state. A chanted a mantra and said to no one in particular; 'centre mind and body' but this changed to 'in the middle between mind and body.' From what appeared to be a high point, A ended up looking upon a disused, vacant plot, full of garbage and surrounded by dereliction. A imagined being situated on top of a gas tower, which might have deep symbolic meaning to someone, since it represented a sign or intensity connected to teenage sexual fantasies. It was night and very dark but all could be seen.

A number of silhouettes appeared, like the skeletons arising from dragon's teeth in the film **Jason and the Argonauts.** *These bodies were clothed head-to-toe in black. They danced and danced some more. They were all the same from a particular viewpoint but, no, not at all the same from another. Every time A tried to create an identity for one dancer, as opposed to another - by comparison of the same and similar - difference emerged. Perhaps, you could say perpetual heterogeneity. Yes, perhaps you could? Then something stranger still happened. All of a sudden two or more of the dancers merged. A was sure, that prior to the merger, there was a pairing or coupling. Then the newly formed singularity coupled with another. With each joining, the dance form changed. The music arose from their movement, not of itself from somewhere else.*

Subtly, almost totally undetected, the dancers erased the graffiti that had been plastered over all the vertical visible surfaces. No contact was ever made between the dancers and the walls. It appeared to be a case of disconnection and separation; the walls first lost their identification with a particular graffiti-artist when the music changed tempo. It seemed that nothing now was as it seemed, not one thing was owned by anyone. Yet everything seemed to be there for the taking. This was a scene of extreme hospitality. The little light left, before the full darkness of night, only created an endless repetition of difference and some sort of unknown, but seemingly friendly, Otherness.

At the same time and velocity as the erasure of graffiti, the dereliction speedily returned to a body of bricks, stones and mortar that became ruins of great beauty. The dancers now sung as the little hint of mist disappeared. The physical mass no longer had dimensions, or fixity, only the glow of some unknown wavelength. The mess of capitalism, or colonialism, was in someone else's backyard and it

returned to another smaller yard when its image faded, in the shortest reflections of memories, in minds not yet given over to remembrance. But an awesome sexuality and surreal aesthetic came with the new feedoms. The left and right-handness of Michel Tournier's **The Mirror of Ideas** [lxx] came to mind.

> Traditionally, good is on the right side, evil on the left...What is political right? What is political left?..Cerebral physiology distinguishes the right and left hemispheres...The excellent right hand depends upon the left hand side of the brain.

The noise of a car horn brought **A's** senses and thoughts into a habitual, sharpish focus common to normalized life. **A** completed the car journey to the health club and then parked the car.

In the gym, whilst changing from street to performance or aerobic activity-wear, **A** recollected what was remembered, from the reading, prior to the start of the journey. Changing from an external appearance consisting of jeans, jumper and shirt, to regulatory uniform of sports socks, running shoes and tight lycra vest and pants, allowed roles to be changed. Some of the clothes had the technical properties of being able to wick sweat away from the body, just to the surface of the material. Sometimes evaporation occurred and the clothes ended up being not too wet. Science made things work.

A change of identity and persona was nearly complete. **A** different rôle could now be assumed in the mind of the being known as **A**, at least this is what some psychologists and organisationalists might say had happened. Potentza, constituent power, desire, lines of flight, common production and a democracy of movement arose, obliterating everything in their path. There was no real understanding of organizations when rôles were put at the forefront of thinking about such things. The mind changed but the body still performed as it could have, moments before the rôle change.

Prior to leaving the changing room of the health club, **A** checked the small bag which contained two bottles of mineral water and the audio cassette tape recording machine. During this period, a remembrance of the most immediate reading occurred.

> On both occasions what proves decisive for Marcel is the act of engaging with a particular object, with a piece of raw matter. The effect of this engagement is not to activate some dense cognitive operation, but instead the apprehension of a deeply rooted affect – 'all anxiety about the future, all intellectual doubts disappeared...I had followed no new train of reasoning, discovered no new decisive argument.'(Proust,1981:899) [lxxi]

This fragment of memory was, somehow, connected to **A's** thoughts about dancers and buildings. Pairings and multiplicity were nearest to a watermark of the senses on the mind, as conjured up in the thoughts and reflections on Samurai. Yes, it was Kaufman's Delirium of Praise that had created an assemblage. Later, after the gym, when the piece was read again, its importance was as evident.

Canguilhem writes that 'a norm draws its meaning, function, and value from the fact of the existence, outside itself, of what does not meet the requirements its serves'. This other realm outside norm, what Canguilhem terms 'pathological,' can, when considered seriously, present a new instructive framework from which to view the normal. With such a reversal, the unquestioned superiority of normality is called into question. The groupings Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault, and Klossowski enacts such a pathology in the realm of literary and philosophical criticism. Not only does the content of their exchanges revalue highly pathologized forms of communications and states of being (chatter and silence for Bataille and Blanchot, impersonality for Blanchot and Foucault, madness and absence of work for Foucault and Deleuze, the sick body for Deleuze and Klossowski, imbalanced and excessive expenditure for Klossowski and Bataille), but the very form of these exchanges revalues the notion of what constitutes a proper critical work.
(italics added)[lxxii]

UNFOLDING THE MULTIPLICITY OF THOUGHT, OR OPENING THE SPACES FOR PERSIAN THOUGHT

The exercises in the gym were wrong. They re-enforced the bad habits inherited from some influences unhelpful to life. They scripted a bipolar aspect to movement and diminished the frequency of rotational movements to the back and sides of a body. The omnidirectionality of the sound image of hearing was not frequently emulated kinaesthetically. Through normal gym exercises, however, the cardio-vascular system, or pump of the body, became stronger so that an individual could work even harder at home, work and play. Thought pumping mechanisms or machines also needed to be exercised in this way – so they too could become healthier, faster and stronger.

The television screens placed in front of the gym machines and person exercising re-enforced a dressage of forwardness and unidirectionality. This was due to the focus of attention on the screens - this dressage then conditioned a being to be, forever, like a caged-animal in a zoo looking out at the monsters looking in.

A concluded that the movements to practice were those of cranes, locusts and dolphins but, especially, the latter and former since these, in sea and sky, understood the virtual and actual multi-directionality of movement.

Thinking of the bowl of excavated craters, the blossoming domes of clouds, the rising and falling wavelengths of dolphins swimming, the movements of tai chi, echoes of acoustic chambers, or just forward or backward 180 degree rotations, created the appropriate attitude. This was a tendency of body and mind to hospitality. A hospitality that welcomed and folded a calculus and differentiation of the other spaces and times found between infinity and eternity.

This spherical persuasion may be better assembled and helped by certain exercises. Like those that brought closeness between body and mind. These could establish a set of things, which would make the sense of touch aware of the centre

or middle. And through that altered attitude to centres there might be a growth of awareness of the Otherness - which was the sanctuary of surrounding spaces.

'Old constricting habits of movement needed to be questioned and challenged,' A said to no one in particular. 'Excavate multidimensional space not for the purposes of extending directionality but more to occasion the sense of movement and potential degrees of freedom available'.

The cat sat on the mat or The Cat with the Hat? The former predictable and habitual; just like an academic, seated in front of a visual display unit, typing a thesis on the multiple. Yet typing was one of a set of habits which could so easily further the cause of uni-directionality. Some of the set were truly well scripted. At the earliest times, these started to fundamentally influence a child's operating system, as in the classroom script of childhood, were the injunction 'face forward and listen to teacher' eroded a child's ability to do otherwise.

The disciplinary instructions continued through to adulthood 'now forward face and type', or look forward to surfing across your visual display unit screens, in order to capture rectangular frames coming from the world wide web. For most sighted people, the key educational learning movements originated through the eyes and the locomotion of the body which was forward facing - the habits of a lifetime exaggerated and repeated in the institutions of life.

A somehow knew these were bad habits that would affect the general propensity to ill health or no health. The latter Cat with the Hat, however, does not have such a predisposition and, like the exaggerated walking style of the comedian John Cleese, confronts and assaults the habits that require movement to perform dressage.

(*n*-1)

This middle, now within a middle of thought of a thesis, deals with the serious and productive relationships between singularities and multiplicities. This is about the one and the many, never disconnected, always together and constituting. It is about the collection of singularities that are never the same but are legion. It is about the collectives of differences and otherness. But before proceeding further it is useful to reflect on Alliez's observations [lxxiii] on Deleuze and Bergson:

> We will limit ourselves here to recalling that Deleuze's entire philosophy is developed *within* the rigorous articulation between 'philosophy of the univocity of being' and 'theory of multiplicities. That is, in an *ontology of the virtual.*
> (*italics* original)

The fairly certain concept of the physicality or materiality of one and many oscillates, greatly, when reconsidered in a frame that plays with the concept of time. Now the one and many have to find different reference points, if these can be recovered, discovered or uncovered at all. The stillness of it all is upset and flow claims the spaces and durations with the different image of thought.

[P]ure duration is what differs from itself in coexistence with itself through non-chronological time, since what differs from itself is *immediately* a coexistence of the past with the present, the *contemporaneous* unity of being with becoming, substance with subject, in *élan vital* which raises up difference to the absolute of a potential or a virtual, and forces thought *to being with the materiality of difference* insofar as this materiality designates *the new in the making*. A *permanent individuation* by means of the first 'transductiveness', that of time implicating in its Open the *virtual* dimension composed by the concrete totality of the past.
(*italics* original) [lxxiv]

In both of these quotes there is a process of connectivity. This is, therefore, an image of thought that materialise through movement. It seems, however, very difficult to fully comprehend any of the series of movements, implied or made actual, from those such as, for example: a singularity to a multiplicity: or, from a multiplicity to singularity; or, from virtuality through to the potential of the equation of a rhizome explicated through and within a formula. These are all subjects of interest in themselves but become folded, within a fold, which is never whole and substantial only disrupted, transitory, partial and momentarily sensed in an event.

Yet, the event of a formula captures all the flows of character, connectivity and potential of these movements and it is, quite possibly, one of the most important signs in the Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari oeuvre. It is synchronistic with the Tao and Ying and Yang (See Appendix). It escapes easy comprehension and, even for the initiates, it remains mysterious. It is simply (n-1). It is a mandela to be contemplated.

Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible to neither the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added (n+1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle *(milieu)* from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted *(n-1)*. When a multiple of this kind changes dimension, it necessarily changes in nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. [lxxv]

And then, why not consider;

To arrive at the magic formula we all seek, PLURALISM = MONISM. By passing through all dualisms which are the enemy, the altogether necessary enemy. [lxxvi]

Also,

> A strange mystification – the book that is all the more total the more it is fragmented. The book is the reality of the world – what a jaded idea anyway! In reality, it is not sufficient to say 'Long live the multiple', even though this cry is difficult enough to utter. Not typographical, lexical or even syntactic trick will suffice to make it audible. The multiple *must be made*, not by always adding a further dimension but, on the contrary, in the simplest way possible, by forcing moderation, at the level of dimensions at our disposal, always n minus one (it is only in this manner that the one forms part of the multiple, through being always subtracted). Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write to the power of n-1.[lxxvii]

Now the real spiritual insight to be gained from this formulation - one that can make madness arrive quickly, like lightening, at anyone's doorstep - is when it is applied to Friedrich Neitzsche's Eternal Return. Pierre Klossowski implicitly understood the positive mystery of formula through his re-writing of Nietzsche and when he explicated the singularity of his wife in novels and paintings.

The Eternal Return is not, as badly or inauthentically willed by many, the rationale and sentiment to live any and every moment in your life only so that is was prized above all other possible manifestations and, for that reason, you would endlessly accept the return of that moment in its similitude. It is not the repetition of the same (or, extremely similar).

At any moment, to live your life as if everything unknown to you were to return endlessly is the challenging Eternal Return of Klossowski, Deleuze, Guattari and many others. In that event, you would not be your life as the return would be of a singularity which is the other of you. The only sort of 'unity' (as in the number between zero and two) is the singularity, intensity or bundle of relationships faced with the return. This is the return of the 'impossible and infinite' remainder of the equation (n-1).

How does the thought of the Eternal Return present itself in dimensions and durations? Well, consider the total sum of what remains, once all that a singularity knows, or understands, is subtracted from the unthinkable collective colossus of the unfolding of all the real and potential other singularities and multiplicities available in eternity and infinity. This equation's remainder is then the *Repetition of Difference*. The infinity of spatial points and eternity of durations minus the singularity provides a definable set of indices for a multiplicity. Therefore, by simple mathematics, the singularity can be found through a subtraction of the multiple multiplicities of *Otherness* from the infinite spatial points and eternity of durations.[11] So, here in a few paragraphs, all is given away to the reader and this is the hospitality of Pierre Klossowski and *A*.

Now clearly, this formula is too hard to visualise. As a manageable visual representation, one could consider the Uncarved Block of Tao as (n-1). Such an unformed block has a materiality and potential to be turned into any number of

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[11] There is a caveat: this, of course, only holds for a world of a few dimensions – three dimensions.

unknown sculptures. As a form it oscillates in an infinite space. It can never be considered as the defined unity 1 recognised as the same by the many. Nor can it be the last part of the block, that part which is no longer there, because it has been chiselled, reduced, lost or taken away. There is never the unity of the sculptured representation (see the Appendix for further references to the Uncarved Block).

The Sanskrit statement 'Thou art That' might also be seen in the illumination of that multiplicity or singularity (n-1). *Thou* is paradoxically both putatively revealed and cancelled by the singularity of the numeral figure 1. It has no meaning or materiality unless conjoined in a *relationship* with the other symbol in the bracketed formula. These movements and assemblages around an *nth* *Otherness* can, by a generous extension, be applied to feature in Arthur Schopenhauer's **The World as Will and Representation**, where the singularity of the *'Representation'* is the number symbol of 1 and the *'Will'* is the manifestation of the *Return of Difference or the Eternal Return of every Other*.

Now the sceptical, or cynical, reader may simply suggest any duality or bipolar opposite can be the metaphorical of n or 1, but then there would be a total misunderstanding of the *calculus of difference* of those two mathematical signs. The formula denies a duality. The non-duality and potential of the material universe is revealed as it unfolds. The non-duality defies an easy order and organisation and for this reason (n-1) is always a disrupted pattern.

For those without any 'Eastern fetishism' [12], the reference to Sanskrit and Tao may be irritating but herein lies the paradox. The paradox of *Otherness* and *difference* arises fully, when the movement is at the furthermost point from - but just connected - to the comfortable containers designed by organization and ordering operating systems. This *aporia* is sensed in what seems to be uncomfortable movements, from the encoded scripts, within the mind and body. Those scripts are formed through the powerful trinities like parent, school and State / therapist.

More materially, the multiplicity of thought that is the text here is the *nth* paragraph minus the paragraphs placed under erasure. It is that which is left, after one has subtracted the meaning conveyed in the voids between the fragments. But then it is also the reverse and something quite different. This is the multiplicity of thought in a becoming which folds and produces, through rhizomatic movement, a space for the heterotopic.

To truly embrace the autonomous freedom, which is an offering of the social productivity of connecting to *Otherness*, means to realize the *Other* and this is more than can been considered within any text. It explicates its own reasoning which raises material problems, for instance, the other of an academic working as an autonomous Marxist cannot be known - since to know is not to have met the multiplicity of the *Other* as in (n-1). Here is another problem, the 'emancipating academic' seeking to work with the supposedly known 'working class', does not respect the *Other's Otherness* since it is defined already. The re-writer of the text, at the beginning of another middle of thought, which quoted Clarice Lispector is guilty by the same token.

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[12] There are, of course, Northern and Southern fetishisms to be considered.

The other of the *Other* that is a constituent of this text might be the orthodox. For that reason, it might need some space to gain expression. Once this is expressed the writer can avoid unhelpful and, perhaps, unjust claims of exclusion. That other, however, finds its equivalence in the other-is-not-a-becoming and has little, or no, inclination to freely and immediately associate, connect or embrace with a becoming singularity. Neither is there a potential or real relationship of a multitude for socially productive activities which can be rendered as 1 in $(n-1)$. For this reason, concerns about a certain type or manifestation of exclusion are considered here as slightly ill-founded. [13]

Deleuze [lxxviii] has reminded readers, that a reading of Nietzsche, can alert one to the constant need to be other than reactive in our ethics. In order, therefore, never to fulfil the slave mentality, commonly found in a master and slave relationship, one must adopt an ethic that affirms 'oneself' through thoughts, utterances and actions. [14] Surely, there can be no less an ethic, either for an academic or for any other uncommon man who wishes not be the slave to people, places and things? This, if one cares enough about such things as an 'essence', this could be what is made actual, through the affirmation from the virtual in the essential movements made here and throughout this text.

Certainly other Nietzchean vectors, factors about difference and repetition, are readily applied in this thesis. Please, never let it be read or presented here, the inessential thought found in the reactivity of a herd mentality which shepherds the unaware to their servitude. Affirmations arise out of the differences that are repeated in the Eternal Return of things and thoughts. For these reasons, the Eternal Return is a hard concept to comprehend; it is especially hard for creatures of habit.

> The eternal return is the simultaneous being of a dynamic becoming which continuously repeats the production of difference. Conventional conception of difference and repetition fall under a schema of representation which orders space and time according to a grid-like coordinates, but the notion of difference and repetition Deleuze is after defy representational thought. Deleuze insists that Nietzsche's notion of eternal return must be understood as synthesis. What returns is not things that are identical to the earlier thing but 'the fact of returning for that which differs...This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis, a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which it affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation' (NP) 48). [lxxix]

Deleuze strives to ensure the affirmation of a particular mode of thought which a philosopher, or academic, ought to address as another very important ethos. It has to do with a whole series of efforts 'to problematize'. Only through the

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[13] However there is, perhaps, a future research proposal to excavate why others out of fear, or material considerations, do not move from their servitude (this feels as though someone from the Frankfurt School could take up the challenge).

[14] In today's fashionable management speak this is 'to be proactive' see, for instance, Stephen Covey (1992) *The Seven Habits of Effective Managers*. London: Simon and Schuster.

problematisation of thought can there be an avoidance of the suffocation of thought. This too has been given constancy in this thesis.

Hitherto there has been much of *becoming* and *Otherness* but not so much about addressing a collection of *Others* – the multitude, multitudes, multiple and multiplicities. The loose co-ordinates above of the text dealing with (*n*-1) sought to particularly problematize the navigations forward of thought beyond those paragraphs. A minority language always stutters. And the openness of this process is characterised by the difference in magnitude and speed of folds and flows.

> Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratifications as its dimensions, and the lines of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimensions after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature. [lxxx]

In some sense, the attempts to bring forward a fairly diverse collection of quotes and lines of thought from academics, writers and thinkers, whilst allowing permeability to more popular set of symbols, or classes of texts, did honour, address and acknowledge the concept of these multiples. It paid tribute to a multiplicity through writing the *Otherness* of Western images of thought.

Textual space has been structured within *a process* to validate a philosophy connected to *Otherness*. It was not just given over only to a people, or community of academics, prescribing to a particular line of flight but, once, the unnecessary aspects of a structure were eroded, *a process* was nurtured that created openings and explicated the interiority with the exteriority of thought. There is a *process of thought* that reaches the multiple, as a immanence it evades categorisation, but there appears to be an almost tangible event - which is the becoming of a singularity or multiple - that then forms a relationship with other multiples or singularities.

It may be self-evident to some why bringing together people and communities is a good thing. Often people are organized, or ordered, together to ensure a substantial increase in a desired qualitative or quantitative output or outcome. For instance, managers may organise a situation so that two or more individuals, who work separately, are brought together to generate a totality of results, which in aggregate is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. So there is an expectation of additionality. For example, it is this, that A doing work on his own produces x but when teamed up with B who usually produces x on her own; and, then, in their collective working together, results in combination produce 3x or more. [15] [16]

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[15] In today's management speak this is known as 'synergy'. See, for example, S. Covey (1992) Ibid.

[16] Simple stuff really and, then, when placed in the hands of people considering equality there are, of course, immeasurable gains in the qualitative benefits of diversity and valuing one another within a modern organisation. Even simpler stuff can be made available for those who are slaves to a particular mind set.

Somehow this type of simple management thought doesn't get to the magnificence of a multitude because it is about a particular mass, which is a population that through division can produce labour. Nor does it ever really make any valid conceptualisation of the singularities that cannot be adequately and seriously treated as an individual, identity B unable to be classified or fitted into category or class {B}, whose population constantly produces the same product.

The carnival has already been briefly discussed earlier. It is that event which gives something of the measure that is magnificence, intensity, energy and potential of the multitude in its becomings. The remaining textual fragments of this middle of thought now move, to a greater degree, to deal somewhat exclusively with Material Becomings and Multitudes.

Fortunately, Patrick Hayden, in *Multiplicity and Becomings The Plural Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze* [lxxxi], makes a splendid coverage of the topic as it relates to the particular philosopher. Reference from this text will be found very shortly. Few thinkers of *otherness* have, like Deleuze, taken up the mantle to rewrite, interpret and reinterpret Baruch Spinoza's conceptualisation of the multitude. This middle of thought will look to these writers and particularly Antoni Negri (a sometimes collaborator of Felix Guattari) [17]. In *Deleuze and the Political*, Paul Patton draws out the salient aspects of the *oeuvre* .

Of Gilles Deleuze's thought and 'ontological commitment', Hayden writes:

> Deleuze's empiricism, then, is a philosophy of experiences, provided that we understand this to mean not that Deleuze offers an abstract definition of experience *per se,* but rather that his philosophy is an exploration exercise directed towards expanding and enriching the diversity of potential and actual experiences. For Deleuze, empiricism holds affinity for life since it strives to be attuned to the becoming of experience. One of the most important ways that this is accomplished is by emphasizing that relations can be viewed as practical and transformative 'tools' or means for the improvement and appreciation of the quality of life. Deleuze's constructive philosophy of experience can therefore be regarded as a kind of experimentalism that seeks to invest 'new immanent modes of existence'.
> (*italics* original) [lxxxii]

There is a need to be ever mindful of the *ontological differences* that arise with each becoming and ponder the problems that become manifest from that incarnation, or a slightly different re-incarnation.

> In terms of Deleuze's differential ontology, everything that exists incarnates a problem of some kind, and there will be as many kinds of problems as there are distinct species of matter and thought, including physical, biological and psychic problems. [lxxxiii]

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[17] See for instance, Felix Guattari and Toni Negri (1990) *Communists Like Us: New Spaces of Liberty New Lines of Alliance.* tr. Michael Ryan. Postscript by Negri. New York and Brooklyn: Semiotext(e). Originally, Nouvelles espaces de liberal (1985)

STOP FEEDING THE MONSTERS [18]

Other things need to be borne in mind to avoid servitude. There is a need to remember that the process of making the image of thought is not entirely free of goals. The need for a primary affirmation of life is always taken as understood, despite certain reactive moments and indiscretions that upset the flow and folds during the making. Albeit as a slightly reactive gesture, the statement to 'stop feeding the monster' is meant to be like the small print found on the sides of old packets of cigarettes – a health warning. It cautions against saying too much since strategies of oppression and exploitation could be adapted from what is said. Paradoxically and importantly for a becoming, it reminds us to be affirmative.

> Deleuze attributes to Nietzsche an ideal of thought which could equally be considered the goal of his own philosophy, a 'thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life...Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life'. [lxxxiv]

In itself affirmation is not however enough, since unfreedoms and barriers can hinder. There may well be a need for political, or some other, interventions, to ensure autonomy and autopoeisis.

> A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress...Independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition are being deprived of their critical function...The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and directed towards the satisfaction of vital needs, its control might well be centralized; such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render it possible. [lxxxv]

AUTONOMOUS WORKING

Let us explicate via Kant a movement towards autonomy. Wood opens the first chapter of his book with this reference:

> Kant begins the essay 'What is Enlightenment?' by posing the question of enlightenment as *'man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity'*..., this immaturity being defined as 'the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another' [...] Kant suggests two grounds which render the individual's achievement of maturity problematic. Firstly, he states that laziness and cowardice result in the majority of individuals taking the path of immaturity...and, moreover, it is this laziness and cowardice on the part of the mass of individuals that enables the few to constitute themselves as guardians of humanity. The role of these self-appointed guardians is the focus of the second ground Kant presents; he argues that these guardians intentionally perpetuate the lack of resolve and courage that characterises the public: (*italics* original) [lxxxvi]

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[18] This sentiment was formed during conversations with Sharon Nanan-Sen. She questioned and problematized how an ill considered and too speedy show of generosity of spirit in working life might well lead to greater servitude.

Then several pages later because of a Kantian movement around autonomy - admittedly in relation to Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault - Wood requests that:

> [W]e are attentive to the relationship between ethics and politics in their texts, that is the relationship between their ethical thinking of autonomy and their political thinking of the conditions of realising autonomy in modernity. [lxxxvii]

Now it seems these perspectives has been further disrupted only to be progressed to accommodate more immediate needs. This has been done as either an act of the oppressor or as the liberator seeking liberation through thought and action of the radical: On the one hand, some would have it, the disruption occurred through the success of the free market. For instance, in the preface to a paper undertaken by World Bank Research and written by David Ellerman, entitled *Helping People Help themselves: Toward a Theory of Autonomy-Compatible Help*, it is noted that:

> If development is seen basically as autonomous self-development, then there is a subtle paradox in the whole notion of development assistance: How can an outside party ('helper') assist those undertaking autonomous activities (the 'doers') without overriding or undercutting their autonomy? This conundrum is the challenge facing a theory of autonomy-compatible development assistance- that is, helping theory.

Starting from a simple model of nondistortionary aid, Ellerman explores several themes of a broader helping theory and shows how theses themes arise in the work of 'gurus' in different fields – John Dewey in pedagogy and social philosophy, Douglas McGregor in management theory, Carl Rogers in psychotherapy, Soren Kierkegaard in spiritual counselling, Saul Alinsky in community organizing, Paulo Freire in community education, and Albert Hirschman and E.F. Schaumacher in economic development. That such diverse thinkers in such different fields arrive at similar conclusions increases confidence in common principles. The points of commonality are summarized as follows:

- Help must start from the present situation of the doer.
- Helpers must see the situation through the eyes of the doers.
- Help cannot be imposed on the doers, as that directly violates their autonomy.
- Nor can doers receive help as a benevolent gift, as that creates dependency.
- Doers must be in the drivers seat. [lxxxviii]

Undoubtedly, there are helpful aspects to be found in Ellerman's paper. If nothing else, there are two aspects to note. Firstly and tactically, there are some practical pointers for movement and facilitation on the ground, when working with people, to consider. Secondly, note can be made of the fact that the multiplicity of thought and thinking around autonomy can, sometimes, be useful to those who seek to pursue the progression of free market movements; whilst ensuring capitalisation and colonisation of the least developed parts of the world. Many of these places

are relatively remote to markets. Often these are territories where people are very poor and / or just starving.

On the other hand, as certain workers would alternatively suggest, thinking on autonomy became recently manifest. It was repeated in different forms as appropriated and radicalised by a minority of thinkers using minority language. They sought to match and counter the requirements of those unacceptable conditions that have surfaced following Fordism and other establishment paradigmatics; such as the those normally promulgated by the World Bank. In this context there are several things it could said to be like, for example, that:

> [I]t is a constitutive, dynamic, democratic point of view. [lxxxix]

A number of writers have recorded fairly recent events and clusters of actions that took place in Italy. This was a reaction against many other things including; both the growing exploitation and the failure of representative agencies to respond positively to protect the rights of workers, their families and their communities.

The writers pointed to the inadequacies of existing agencies to advance, for instance, the agendas of unpaid-women whose surplus labour was critical to the profitability and interests of commercial enterprises. Attention was also drawn to those happenings which were about youth seeking their own unregulated expressions and affirmations. At and after that time, these arrangements of protest and dissent became noted under the affirmative banner of *Autonomy*.

A review of those multiplicities, assemblages and events can be found in, for example, Steve Wright's *Storming Heaven Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. [xc] He has written about the tradition, competing discourses and declarations that inform the development of this group. There are other informative texts such as Harry Cleaver's *Reading Capital Politically*: [xci] Paolo Virno's *A Grammar of the Multitude* [xcii] plus Paulo Virno and Michael Hardt (Eds.) *Radical Thought In Italy A Potential Politics* [xciii] and a number of other texts in the volumes of *Theory Out of Bounds*. Mostly they all draw out several critical perspectives that are key to the understanding of the theoretical position and nature of Autonomists.

Autonomous Marxism have *become* one vanguard of a movement that brings material actions forth from a body of thought.

OPERAISMO

One form of this radicialized thought from the Italian Autonomist Marxists (who are sometimes held to include, positively, the writing and thoughts of Antoni or Tony Negri) is that concerned with *operaismo* (which means 'workerism') Both for an example and instance, Sylvere Lortinger writes there are some points of difference to other forms of radicalising political thought,

> Operaismo (workerism) has a paradoxical relation to traditional Marxism and to the official labor movement because it refuses to consider work as the defining factor of human life. Marxist analysis assumes that what

makes work alienating is capitalist exploitation, but operaists realized that it is rather the reduction of life to work. Paradoxically, 'workerists' are against work, against the socialist ethics that used to exalt its dignity. They don't want to re-appropriate work ('take over the means of production') but reduce it. [xciv]

This is not to say people cannot love their work. Many forms of work bring joy to he or she who labours - even though it may be exploitation of the worker. It is less clear whether under oppressive conditions, the worker could find, at some moment during the working day, something which brings a positive element into the equation which is life. Work according to the workerists is not the defining principal of life.

The doxa of capitalism and State philosophy promulgates a number of changing rationales including the couplet below, which make work the defining component of life, there are then plenty of alternative reasons to resist such orthodox imperatives and sympathise with the workerists. The first of the couplet is the philosophy that the life to be lived is only fully realised through work; many institutions, helpfully for the State and capitalism, link education to employment in this trajectory. The second reduces the spaces, durations and times for any form of becoming, productive or otherwise, through the appropriate and constant build up of governmentality and dispositifs: the sustained acts of dressage reduce life to being and not becoming.

Wright usefully suggests a non-linear trajectory to be explicated:

> [O]peraismo, emphasised the tendential process of proletarianisation unfolding within modern capitalist society. [xcv]

WORKING FOR YOU OR IS IT YOU OR YOU, WHO THEN?

Now from other related Marxian perspectives there arises an echo of a Hobbesian perspective, these are warnings for some:

> My thesis, in extremely concise form, is this: if the publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of a public sphere, of a political space in which many can tend to common affairs, then it produces terrifying effects. *A publicness without a public sphere*: here is the negative side - the evil, if you wish – of the experience of the multitude.
> (*italics* original) [xcvi]

Virno [xcvii] also observed how Max Weber's viewpoint of politics as a profession might, now equally, be applied to workers of today. For example, workers may seem collectively as having a sense of purpose, as putting into action a balanced agenda of risk-taking, influencing whilst acknowledging some responsibility. Academics have studied professionals; they have studied politicians and workers. Now, perhaps, they should study how workers have become the politicians of old. What more should they study? Before this question can be answered there is a matter of taking some responsibility for decisions about making relationships between images of thought and politics.

Stefano Harney [19] was quizzed about the ontological validity and stance of Negri's derivations from Spinoza, together with its connectivity to the Italians work on the relationships of autonomous workers and multiples. He replied, something along the lines, it is really for us each to decide the validity of bringing these things together. Now this is not a novel statement but it is refreshing to be reminded of the autonomy that academics, and others, have in any relationship to emergent and evolving thoughts. Academic freedom with a particular affirmative and immanent slant is autonomous. In its application, it can then drive forth an excavation of a territory which is much more conducive to autonomy for others.

Now there is something special in a supreme act, one suitable for an autonomous academic, which might be to examine and consider how he or she can arrive at a becoming, as the worker of old, through opposing the oppression of institutions. If this is too much then perhaps, or at the very least, they could give consideration to the question of: How to ensure that research methodologies and thought itself does not assume the oppressing agenda that sustains or leads to servitude? Such considerations have been made.

Day, in *Social Capital, Value, and Measure: Antoni's Negri's Challenge to Capitalism*, writes about the emergence of Italian Workerists and Autonomist Marxists. He is particularly focused on Negri's contribution to those movements. He writes about the foremost changes in production following post-Fordist evolution and suggests the key indicator of these changes;

> [M]ay be Knowledge Management's well-known insistence on the difference between tacit knowledge or implicit knowledge, specifically, the categories of 'human capital' and 'social capital'. [xcviii]

His historical perspective concludes that,

> Marx noted how capital first and foremost reproduces its social context for production so as to extend and preserve its own economic values and dominance (Tronti, [1966], [1973]).' Social reproduction constitutes a condition of capital production, and value.

The first quote, within the series on the opening page of this middle of thought, is made by Sylvere Lotringer, it comes from her introduction to Paul Virilio and his works, which covers a range of texts and his more physical activity with another radical architect Claude Parent to devise;

> [A]n open topology based on the meta-stability of a 'living ground' meant to collapse the opposition between inside and outside. [xcix]

And what has been done, or at least attempted, here in this thesis has been to present – a becoming of thought - an open typology of a written thesis and a

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[19] These were from discussions following a research seminar delivered by Stefano Harney in 2004 at the Management Centre of the University of Leicester.

Doctorate permeable and open on all sides, where almost every dimension is subjected to permeability, erosion or a recoding from the spaces captured by the State or Empire. Within the thesis, there is an immanence which is creative of a process or rhizome given dimension, flow and intensity with folds, unfoldings and manifolds of singularities, multiplicities and collective subjectivities. These explicate, implicate and attend to disruption, dis-order and dis-organization. It is productive and inclusive of heterotopic and deterritorialized spaces, which are, at once, hospitable to *Otherness*, becomings, other multiplicities and the repetition of difference. The navigation remains Eastwards and has a disrupted pattern that supplements fragments (*and so an abstract is formed*).

This is also a deterritorialization of a thesis from the re-territorialized space of the policing academic turned administrator. There is a becoming of an autonomous academic or, what Arthur Schopenhauer would call, a *'Private Philosopher'*: it is the singularity and subjectivity of this multiple text. The *'Private Philosopher'* is the ultimate *Other* of the 'State philosopher'; it is the *Other* of academic unconcerned with thought; and, it is the *Other* of the thinker concerned with an image of thought which is freer but still gives singular attention to directly and indirectly assist the 'State philosopher'.

Virilio says of his own texts that;

> I try to be a periscope of probable catastrophes. [c]

But is it a periscope to a particular type of war no longer one solely on the battle fields across the globe?

> If war isn't in war anymore, for everyone to see, but buried in respectable laboratories and well-funded research agencies, science and knowledge themselves should cease to be considered above the fray. Technology is extending the reach of the war exponentially – not just a war against entire populations, but a war of the human race against itself. This kind of delirium should be addressed for what it is, not with letter-bombs (Virilio is no Unabomber), or with terrorist threats, but from within knowledge itself. [ci]

In this exercise awareness must be made of speed,

> In the studio reality, politics has turned into a 'motion picture'. And yet even Guy Debord hadn't really grasped what was so powerful about the pictures he denounced. It wasn't their sheer accumulation that mattered most in the spectacle, but their *motion*. Hyperreality wasn't an ideological manipulation, as conspiracy theorists would have it, *it was the product of speed*, of the dizzying instantaneity and interactivity of images.

> The Situationists still believed that the invasion of the body politics by images had been engineered by the wealthy at the expense of the working class. What their analysis left out is that wealth is always an aspect of speed. (*italics* original) [cii]

The collaboration of different academics and philosophers has also been recorded in this thesis. It has given a speed to mind, body and text. By inclusion, there is a relative speed of a singularity, there is a different speed of intextuality and intersubjectivity and, then, there is the absolute speed of the relationships between them.

> We must distinguish not relative speed and absolute movement, but the relative and absolute speed of any movement. The relative is the speed of movement considered from the viewpoint of another. But the absolute speed is the speed of movement between the two, in the middle of the two, which traces the lines of flight. [ciii]

From one immediate and relevant stand point, what is most interesting remains the duration of the assemblage and becoming. After these things became conceptually apparent; the duration is neither the movement itself; neither is it the creative and courageous actions of participants; and, it is not the speed of philosophical and political engagements through philosophers and political researchers.

The extension of the duration and multiplicity naturally ceases. It can, however, abruptly change and metamorphose with a loss of singularity, or intersubjectivity, which then affects its intensity. What is most interesting is a particular loss of intensity, which is commensurate with the reluctance of most academics to extend the conceptualisation of academic freedom to embrace autonomy.

Some, such as Antonio or Toni Negri and few others, who are not imprisoned by the comfort of and privileges of State remunerations, do not simply and axiomatically advance a State Philosophy. For those who are, however, wedded to the State, seem to do almost everything to ensure a normalisation of thought. Never for them is there a facilitation of generative and productive movements. For them, nearly everywhere and almost always, their enterprise has a constancy of orthodox purpose and dressage, which is the beingness of their territories. Here is a repetition of a quote, re-written earlier, that reminds us why that is so,

> One is always still in the family, always still in the school, always still in the prison, and so forth. [civ]

In the easy surrender of academics, who might have as their very angry moment the bleating but not screaming of the words 'academic freedom', the working day gives much space to a discipline; so trained have they become that without a thought, through habit or ritual, they order and organise their labour to lay down 'speed bumps' and 'land mines' to disrupt the flow of truly productive thought - that which respects and embraces the *Other*. In the acts of instrumental rationality (so vigorously attacked by Adorno and Horkheimer, and more recently described by Bauman) great damage is done to the globe, the world and sense-making. The risks of autonomous working are not always grave but fear and the possibility of exclusion leave a disciplinary reminder - not to transgress.

The rate of acceleration with which academics embraced the advancement of Autonomous Marxist, has not been matched by velocity to regain autonomy from

the aggressive administrative advancement to define, assure and measure; automatism to governmentality, more often than not, remains as a strong signifier for such labour.

A number of writers in *Manifestos For the Business School of Tomorrow* seek to regain the spaces that were theirs and to appropriate what is theirs to have. The editors, Campbell Jones and Damian O'Donerty, open the volume with the observation about a scandal:

> [W]ho has time for scholarship? Moreover, who has time for the future? And what is the future, what can the future be, if we are so enthralled to the immediacy of the present with all its latest distractions, mission statements, initiatives and administrative paperwork? This is forgetting of our responsibility to the future, even when the technocrats claim to speak on behalf of 'the future' (in the narrowest sense), is part of the scandal.

And, a sentence later:

> We must therefore speak urgently and shed the protocols of polite academic discourse. Nothing short of democracy is at stake.[cv]

The writing of that or any other text must be seen, amongst other things, as an act of autonomy and self-valorisation.

SELF-VALORISATION

At the heart of autonomy it would seem that people and communities, or should it be said, singularities and multiplicities, engage collectively in socially productive events and activities which result in self-valorisation. Collective subjectivities need to be productive and valued. There are, moreover, certain things to consider whilst moving forward:

> The *multitude*, in its paradoxical nature, is the foundation of democracy insofar as it allows each individual to introduce into society his own values of freedom.
> (*italic* original) [cvi]

In other words there is need to resolve,

> [T]he problem of the relationship between the ontological power of the collective and the freedoms of the individual. [cvii]

What are the values that might be applied to an experiment in thought concerned with autonomy and such things as *Otherness?*

Also one must not forget that self-valorisation requires acts of freedom from those who think as a career making activity. Let's remember that Gilles Deleuze,

> [E]ndorses Bergson's view that 'true freedom' and therefore the highest power of thought lies in the capacity to discover or constitute new

problems, thereby rejecting the pedagogic conception of thinking as solving problems given to us by others or by 'society' (Deleuze 1988a:15) cviii

An autonomous academic might well consider the criteria sought in a material self-valorisation exercise and might then loosely hold out for the possibility of:

Writing affirmation, vitality and becoming
Affirming the Other
Becoming the Other
Making scholarship a becoming
Affirming the ontological capacity of thought and recognising its duration
Seeking forms which express the Other's own material expression
Through writing and thought produce an affirmative becoming Ethic
Giving space and hospitality to the Other
Creating flows that erase unproductive order and organization for Others
Deterritorializaton from exclusion to a process encompassing inclusive paradigmatic shifts
Folding and refolding to ensure creative and productive relationship
Disrupting material patterns to affirm processes creative of chance becomings
Seeking to become socially productive through the Other
Continuously, conducting experiments with images of thought that ensure their own creativity.

Having considered the above, there are still a number of questions to be asked before proceeding further: How does one write a middle of thought, within a larger text, whilst creating an inclination that encourages the reader to read in the way she, or he, randomly listens to a single track, from all the others, on an extended play musical record? How do you listen to a CD or vinyl musical album? On acquiring a compilation of sound recordings on plastic, sometimes one track is listened to much more frequently than others; sometimes the favoured track has a repeated play function applied to it; and, sometimes suddenly, another track takes the fancy of the listener. But how rarely is the recording repeated from beginning to end? The thinking of these thoughts might well help to arrive at a different pattern for reading and writing – one that repeats difference.

The questions continue. How does one escape, evade or delay the haste to conclude with finished statements to satisfy the need for outcomes and utility? How does one continue with the making or *poesis* of thought? How one does avoid writing a methodology because the text has been both the method and the technique of making? How does a singularity authentically seek the possibly of revealing an immanence? How does one maintain the process of a becoming? Ought a text - largely written at the beginning of a decade, century and millennium - to contain thought which does not reflect the very worst of the *fin de milleux*, so as to eclipse or efface nasty outdated, old or tired things, in order to create new spaces and places for thought? Others have successfully embraced some of these as positives.

A Thousand Plateaus is a heterogeneous assemblage which has no built-in end point or conclusion and a textual machine for creation of new

concepts...It is a rhizomatic body of concepts which allow indefinite proliferation and self-transformation.
(*italics* original) [cix]

In this thesis, this and other middles of thought have sought to not only create a disruptive tempo or alternating beat but, also, to make productive fractures and fragments to upset, what might be considered by many as the accepted prescribed habit of writing wholesome, orthodox, linear and rational texts. Or should that be wholemeal text for a delightful, domesticated market and fairly hungry, traditional, academic family? Placing what has happened in this way is to lie. It also shows a thought process that lacks proper retrospection, introspection and reflectivity. Not that truth is at stake here since truth has given up its mantle. This image of thought can now can be counterpoised to truth with the words 'viewpoints' or 'vantage points' - which in some circles are given greater respect and usage.

There are several doxa or paradigms that do not compete so much, as share a similar heritage or family that seeks, amongst all things, to identify, find and promote the same and similar. This is done whilst accommodating difference only as a concept that represents a variation or deviance, however marginal, from the same and similar. Something needs to be measured in order to be considered important and, therefore, worthy of proper thought. And the measurements need to be capable of repetition.

In the recordings of the movement of pointer readings, deviance from a norm is established and, sometimes, for no other purpose or reason than then to apply the powerful forces of conformance and compliance. Ordering and organizing, for servitude and disciplinary purposes, is part and parcel of the hierarchical features of arborescent thought and thinking. Something is studied and researched for a purpose. It is done, perhaps, to provide a series of techniques, some of which might be useful for activities like dog-training (then an attempt is made to train humans like rats or dogs), normalising food consumption and genetic production of sameness. Perhaps, it is done to ensure, through proper academic training, that thoughts go to the dogs of compliance and not to the multitude.

The previous middles of thought have set out to create an image of thought - but this is also untrue. Those folds or middles have striven to capture thought, as it becomes its own potential when opened to the outside, and it is traced from a fragment or middle to the foldings and unfoldings that constitutes itself. A rhizomatic image of thought was in the making or poesis. This is not in opposition to the arborescent thought, that restricts potential and constitutes an acceptable or orthodox images of thought, because the opposite is not really ever the *Other*.

Very tree-like is the discipline and training gained from an education system which scripts from cradle to grave - this growth from the metaphoric roots to the highest branches of thought which moves from the parent to the school; then to the university; then to employment; then, finally and hopefully for the State, onto active citizenship – that habit together with the sense of wishing to belong drive conformance and prescribed performance. Fear is a powerful tool; this fear takes many shapes, names and speeds. At the heart of some is the fear of exclusion from

the same, similar and the secure identity afforded by being. In an uncharacteristic, atypical or unnatural incident certain events might arise that create fear of becoming – although paradoxically a becoming knows no fear. In the negative and reactive moment where a singularity or multiplicity, unfortunately forgoes or forgets primary affirmation, the becoming might experience a slowing of speed, or reduction in vitality and intensity, which then creates the fear of grounding in the territory of that very same being.

Virno [cx] has written of the anguish and fear identified by Kant. The fear of known risks that refer to facts such as job loss, landslides and other natural disasters contrasted to the anguish 'by our being exposed to the world '.[cxi]

> *Fear* situates itself inside the community inside its forms of life and communication. *Anguish*, on the other hand makes its appearance when it distances itself from the community to which it belongs, from shared habits, from well-known 'linguistic games,' and then penetrates into the vast world. Outside of the community, fear is ubiquitous, unforeseeable, constant; in short, anguish ridden. The counterpart of fear is that security which the community can, in principle, guarantee; the counterpart of anguish (or of its showing itself to the world as such) is the shelter procured from religious experience.
> (*italics* original) [cxii]

Virno notes that Walter Benjamin and others had things to say about repetition. He suggests one way of getting over any fear is to mimic what was learnt early in life as an infantile strategy of coping:

> The human baby protects itself by means of *repetition* (the same fairy tale, one more time, or the same game, or the same gesture)...The childhood experience of repetition is prolonged even into adulthood, since it constitutes the principal form of safe haven in the absence of solidly established customs, of substantial communities, of developed and completed *ethos*. In traditional societies (or, if you like, in the experience of the 'people'), the repetition which is so dear to babies gave way to more complex and articulated forms of protection: to *ethos*; that is to say, to usage and customs, to the habits which constitute the base of the substantial communities. Now, in the age of the multitude, this substitution no longer occurs. Repetition, far from being replaced, persists.
> (*italics* original) [cxiii]

This is a false repetition, or at least, one that could be obliterated by the very large shadow of the repetition which is difference. The latter, however, has few supporters because anguish still persists for the stranger because he, or she, has that 'not-feeling-at-home' sensibility to contend with all the time. The academic who denies repetition of difference can easily find a home. The residence is amongst all those other State Philosophers and Academic Schools who repeat science and other State-endorsed or funded codes of practice, whilst obligingly following a prescribed image of thought. This, then, is a thought that is marked by disciplinary indictments to make knowledge the slave of what can be easily repeated in method, and for the benefit of repetition for its own sake. 'Academics

become the stranger' is an uncommon exhortation that might be heard by a few outside the herd.

> Being a stranger, that is to say 'not-feeling-at-home,' is today a condition common to many, an inescapable and shared condition. So then, those who do not feel at home, in order to get a sense of orientation and to protect themselves, must run to the 'common place', or to the most general categories of the linguistic intellect; in this sense, strangers are always thinkers. As you see, I am inverting the direction of the analogy: it is not thinkers who become strangers in the eyes of the community to which the thinkers belong, but the strangers, the multitude of those 'with no home', who are absolutely obliged to attain the *status* of thinkers, Those 'without a home' have no choice but to behave like thinkers: not in order for them to learn something about biology or advanced mathematics, but because they turn to the most essential categories of the abstract intellect in order to protect themselves from blows of random chance, in order to take refuge from contingency and from the unforeseen.
> (*italics* original).[cxiv]

The earliest part of this thesis showed how disrupted pattern material was used as camouflage to aid survival. Here Virno shows how thinking is also very important for survival. It is especially important for certain people – strangers. He speaks surely of the nomad that arrives through the multiplicity of the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. He also speaks of Derrida's arrivants to whom we should address a material hospitality. Most importantly, he speaks of Asylum Seekers. He also speaks of so many others, not mentioned, who because of starvation do not have the energy to speak. He speaks of *Others* yet to be spoken of as they become strangers with thoughts. Frank Kakfa would seem to be an example of the stranger, as would many other people, like the characters in a Michel Tournier's novel. And, perhaps, Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, Maurice Blanchlot and Pierre Klossowski also fall easily amongst the fraternity of strangers. Let us also not forget how Jacques Derrida and Pierre Klossowski reminded us of the exemplary and extraordinary nature of hospitality to the *Other*.

In moving well away from repetition for its own sake: should we not look to poesis or autopoesis as the means of redeeming a multitude of strangers, or estranged singularities, or very frightened subjectivities?

The more hostile the space, environment or community in which a stranger is resident, located or re-territorialized within, the more he, or she, has to consider techniques of survival. Then maybe after some time, the stranger can seek to participate in acts of self-affirmation that confirm his, or her, own becomings amongst acts, words or gazes of the surrounding herd of onlookers. Any refusal, however, to regularise manner and behaviour to the wishes of the majority will have consequences.

The stranger can decide on the shape and shades of his, or her, presence so as to stand out or merge. The less sharp and distinct the edges of the immaterial and material pattern projected or presented by the stranger, the greater the chances that his or her vitality and expression, can have no definition and formal identity other

than just *Otherness*. Since many schools of painters have affirmed their becomings by mastering techniques that refuse sharp edges to the figures (for instance, Seuret and Da Vinci et cetera) and question springs to mind: Why can't academics, thinkers and philosphers?

Being a stranger can quite obviously take manifold forms and, to a degree, is formless since he or she is not capable of easy identification. A form that is blurred at the edges, in the way of camouflage, can cause recognition to be jeopardised - that is the actual strange form of the process of making or poesis of an object, thing or place. It is always so uncertain an event that it remains without identity and this is the nature of becoming. This is the point made by Heraclitus about never standing in the same stream.

The military know much about the important subject of disguise for the purposes evasion (see Foreword). They know how to ensure a stranger survives in hostile lands and landscapes. And the more hostile the site, land or territory, the more a stranger must consider how to evade recognition. Indeed, as Jacques Derrida has pointed out, the arrivant - or 'absolute stranger' - is incapable of being identified such is his or her *Otherness*.

Juana Ponce de Leon writes of an American dissident and revolutionary:

> I am told when Marcos finally appears before the immense crowd, a solitary figure masked in black, he is asked: 'Why hide your face? What are you afraid to show? Only people who have something shameful to conceal hide their faces.' Right there and then, Marcos offers to remove his mask. A stunned silence spreads through the crowd, only to be broken by a unified cry: 'No! No! No!' The mask stays on. It is a crucial moment in the making of the persona of Marcos. The mask has transformative power that allows Marcos to shed the idiosyncrasies of his birth and assume a communal identity. This nonself makes it possible for Marcos to *become* the spokesperson for the indigenous communities. He is transparent, and he is iconographic. He hides his face so that he can be seen. This paradox will inform his writing. [cxv]

In hostile lands, there are many available tactics, techniques and operations which disrupt patterns. These can be applied by a stranger until he, or she, or he/she, or it, arrives at more hospitable location or territory. Moreover, the application or use of tools must not disrupt the becoming or, if it does it must be to ensure a greater social productive throughout that course of action or process. If the stranger is not to diminish, or place at risk, the multiplicities of virtual and potential productive relationships then strategies need to be put in place. These ought to allow for an primary affirmation of his or her becoming whilst providing, if necessary, an evasive technology from oppression and repression - at least and until a safer sanctuary can be found. Uncertainly will, however, persist even there. Uncertainty persists everywhere.

The chance event of the stranger's sanctuary is the moment, or series of moments, that provides, facilitates and generates hospitality and heterotopia in the instant, or duration, of an appropriate and relevant space and time. At that precise point, the

attitude of the stranger might wrongly, or incorrectly, reject the opportunities of the virtual becoming materially actual. This could be an act of partial self-harm. The rejection arises because his, or her faculties, are damaged or otherwise of an unsympathetic speed or kind in relation to emergent, varying and multi-dimensional perspective.

Closure to the *repetition of difference* is an equipment, skill or habit that should not be held or sustained by the stranger. He or she can ill-afford to loose the attitude and faculties honed for autonomy, becoming, self-valorisation and social productivity - since these are the very variables that hostiles seek to deny – unless, of course, they can be exploited for their own ends.

The synchronicity [20] and alterity of the text should not have left untouched the remembrance of Jacques Derrida's arrivant and the hospitality afforded to Pierre Klossowski's house guests. However, neither of those singularities or abstract machines could, or should, be properly anticipated and re-applied if the Laws of Hospitality were to come about from an ethical consideration of a stranger. It should be remembered that the only *repetition* is *difference* and *difference is all that remains hospitable to the stranger.*

In a kind of synchronicity, a stranger cannot anticipate a sanctuary or act of hospitality. In attending to each situation, there is an affirmative act of helplessness, which is grounded on the fact of the unavailability of knowledge to recognise to whom, what, where and when to extend energies for connectivity and relationships.

There is a 'throwingness or a giving up to' that can only be done with certainty when a singularity gives up first to the generation and repetition of their own different becoming. Appendix 4 gives two examples of the type of mind set. It can attend to both cases of the singularity, or subjectivity, wishing on the one hand to be hospitable and, on the other hand, the stranger seeking a relationship capable of social production

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[20] For a moment, there is a fold away from the flow to a remembrance of Carl G. Jung (1991), who in *Synchronicity; An Acausal Connecting Principle*, London: Ark Paperbacks (pp. 16-17.), comments and quotes Schopenhauer: "Here I should like to draw attention to a treatise of Schopenhauer's 'On the Apparent Design in the Fate of the Individual' which stood godfather to the views I am now developing. It deals with the 'simultaneity of the causally unconnected', which we call 'chance'. 'All the events in a man's life would accordingly stand in two fundamentally different kinds of connections: firstly, in the objective causal connection of the natural process; secondly, in a subjective connection which exists only in relation to the individual who experiences it, and which is thus as subjective as his own dreams...Both kinds of connections exist simultaneously, and the selfsame event, although a link in two totally different chains, nevertheless falls into place in both, so that the fate of one individual invariably fits the fate of the other, and each is the hero of his own drama foreign to him – this is something that surpasses our powers of comprehension and can only be conceived as possible by virtue of the more wonderful pre-established harmony.' " (Jung's quote of Arthur Schopenhauer is taken from *Parerga and Paralipomena*). There has been much change in speed and movement of thought since Jung and Schopenhauer, particularly from their idealism to the materialism of others, but it is important to remember their thoughts around synchronicity. These still oscillate within and around thoughts of becomings, events and durations.

In hostile lands, there are other disguises to be applied, such as the techniques that give form or have the appearance of being inductive or deductive. So, a middle of thought might well use the movement, from particular to general, to give recognition to something that is quite strange to that landscape. Thus a middle of thought might move from the singularity of an event to the multiplicity that contains it.

In *A Grammar of the Multitude*, Virno considers the images of thought that developed from the Seventeenth Century to date. He explicates, amongst other things, references to the movement of thought between Hobbes and Bendictus Baruch Spinoza in their respective treatments of *people* and *multitudes*.

> One could say, perhaps, that 'not feeling at home' is a distinctive trait of the concept of the multitude, while the separation between 'inside' and the 'outside', between fear and anguish, is what earmarked the Hobbessian (and not only Hobbessian) idea of the people. [cxvi]

Virno traces Hobbes thinking as it seeks the uniformity of thought about these things through the production of a particular concept of people.

> Hobbes *detests* – and I am using here, after due consideration, a passionate, not very scientific word – the multitude: he rages against it...For Hobbes, the decisive political clash is the one which takes place between multitude and people. The modern public sphere can have as its barycentre *either* one *or* the other...The concept of the people, according to Hobbes, is strictly correlated with the existence of the State...if there is a State, then there are people. In the absence of the State, there are no people.
> (*italics* original) [cxvii]

So importantly, even at that period or episteme, the multitude is thoroughly detested because of its incompatibility to the High Church of Science. Even at that time, but possibly really properly starting then as a powerful trajectory, the multitude is frozen out of any deliberation about a proper or public place or space for it in the State.

> The multitude, according to Hobbes, shuns political unity, resists authority, does not enter in to lasting agreements, never attains the *status* of juridical person because it never transfers its own natural rights to the sovereign. The multitude inhibits this 'transfer' by its very mode of being (through its plural character) and mode of behaving. Hobbes, who was a great writer, emphasizes with admirable refinement, how the multitude is anti-state, but, precisely for this reason, anti-people: 'the *People*, stirring up the *Citizens* against the *City*, that is to say, the *Multitude* against the *People*' (*Hobbes, ibid*).
> (*italics* original) [cxviii]

There will be a return to the multiple per se shortly but first there is firstly a need to consider equivalence briefly and then, secondly, Autonomist Marxism slightly more fully to bring out the dangers of a certain image of thought – that confined or proscribed by hierarchically inclined organization.

Some could argue there is a time for everything. Perhaps, then there is a time for people and a time-for-the-multiple: Not in the sense 'now it is your time' as some one says as they attend to the needs of people - but rather a qualitatively different time for and between people and multitudes. And today's time is for whom?

As with nearly everything else, once common and without form, now even the dimension of time has been reduced to an over-determined factor rendering it something useful to the State, Regulators [21] and Capital. It has been rendered, like money, as an equivalent ready to substitute with other things important to productivity.

It is this equivalence that denies time its multiplicity, so really a question develops which is 'Whose time?' This can be considered in the same way by the reader as the cautious statement or request, made at the beginning of this chapter, which was to be ready to consider 'Who Speaks?' when an utterance is made.

There is an imminence of immanence that requires the reader to attend to what approaches and this is the temporal application of spatial concept of Maai Oh Ma outlined in Appendix 4. Does the chant 'My oh my' in response to a stimulus give the gap, needed to readily anticipate and hesitate, before response is actioned. Perhaps, in this way one can then properly attend to the potentialities afforded through a new and different relationship? It would seem that in-itself it is not enough, since an altered attitude to that habitually held is needed, for example, in say the manner suggested by Mishima Myamato (see Appendix 4.)

Now the equivalence-making or equivalence-desiring is applied almost everywhere and this makes things tradeable. Let us remember another quote made at the beginning of the middle of thought:

> Nobody is as poor as those who see their own relation to the presence of others, that is to say, their own communicative faculty, their own possession of language, reduced to wage-labor. [cxix]

Marx and others have looked at how labour must be considered, in the form, that allows surplus and use value to be rendered visible. And, in order to make profit, the difference between the two values needs to be easily quantified; money and linear measures of time assist this process almost perfectly.

The equivalence, afforded by the concept and manipulation of multitudes to communities to people, provides another major lubricant to further facilitate the process of profit-making and exploitation. So, shout, 'no to multiple and yes to people' remains a chant for the State and those associations of Capital which requires its support. All that Capital and State can do is chant. Not one drop of spiritual life remains for them ever to exceed themselves, through making the sound image of a mantra, to elevate themselves above the commercial sound-bite.

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[21] There is the regulated time for thought, as in the prescribed period for the study and completion of a doctorate, which is qualitatively different from the proper duration to extend thought to newer horizons.

An observer using Virilio's periscope should see the war as different from the old war. It is a war that is now everywhere, elsewhere and determined by a speed that can be disrupted. A certain speed of thought is needed. The velocity and acceleration of thought could accommodate two things. Firstly, it could accommodate a becoming and a nomadic image of thought. Secondly, it could deny, or refuse, any form of capture by the arborescent thought of the State, the School, the Analysis and the Parent. In order for this to happen time needs to be without equivalence.

But what speed has this text achieved so far in this becoming? What of the older, more orthodox velocity that, in the days of the original proposals, had the unoriginal intention to achieve a plan, schedule and programme which addressed tangible outcomes? What speed was there then to provide an academic unit of utility, ever respectful of the path well- trodden?

The answers lie with Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and others. The former remember minorities in a quote that connects to the need for speed and slowness:

> A minority never exists ready-made, it is only formed on lines of flight, which are also its ways of advancing and attacking. [cxx]

And re-writing, or re-typing, here a quote used earlier.

> We must distinguish not relative speed and absolute movement, but the relative and absolute speed of any movement. The relative is the speed of movement considered from the viewpoint of another. But the absolute speed is the speed of movement between the two, in the middle of the two, which traces the lines of flight. [cxxi]

A plan that had tried to contain thought to some artificial method through a pedestrian, phased, linear and regulated sameness and similarity of speed gives no space for *Otherness*. It might have been wrongly dissimilar to *One Thousand Milleau*. Or, so wrongly similar to several thousand other images of thought, which repeat the acceptable of the functional silos that claim to, represent an academic discipline.

Accepting the speed of orthodoxy will, forever, put at risk things that which could be shown as the *difference-in-itself*. The difference that can be captured and marketed is that which is often attractive to hegemonic capitalist's, or transnational's and multi-national's motivations. Things that vary as degrees of kind are those which they most easily move to suppress, or resist, when it varies to only such a noticeable degree that it seems capable of becoming only a little bit more dangerous to them.

Those arrangements that are different in kind are much more difficult, or almost impossible, to suppress. Singularities can refuse any technique to reduce and render their becomings to the identical, same or similar. By so doing, the unintentional subversion persists whilst productivity continues towards the social. Singularities can disrupt patterns of their own multiplicity and / or maintain

disrupted patterns in a primary affirmation that refuses to be ever reactive. An affirmation is required which refuses any beingness. A non-affirmative act or failure allows degrees of variation to be imposed and reduces the intensity of the mind and body.

And what is helpful to Capital and the State is the synergy that only a coming together brings. Social productivity and general intellect cannot easily be manufactured so both have to be harnessed, harvested or herded by other means.

> As far as capital is concerned, what really counts is the original sharing of linguistic-cognitive talents, since it is this sharing which guarantees a readiness, adaptability, etc., in reacting to innovation. [cxxii]

> The publicness of the intellectual, that is to say the sharing of the intellect, in one sense causes every rigid division of labor to fall flat on its back; in another sense, however, it fosters *personal dependence. General intellect,* the end of division of labor, personal dependency: the three facets are interrelated. The publicness of the intellect, when it does not take place in the public sphere, translates into an *unchecked proliferation of hierarchies* as groundless as they are thriving. The dependency is *personal* in two senses of the word: in the world of labor one depends on this person or on that person, not on rules endowed with anonymous coercive power; moreover, it is the whole person who is subsumed, the person's basic communicative and cognitive habits.
> (*italics* original) [cxxiii]

Those who are suppressed, oppressed and exploited are also the very same victims - who Reich, Spinoza and others noted - fight not for their freedoms but for their own servitude: a thousand Sysphii give birth to their own servitude.

Sylvere Lotringer notes of Paolo Virno book:

> Paolo Virno's *A Grammar of the Multitude* is a short book, but it casts a very long shadow. Behind it looms the entire history of the labor movement and it's heretical wing, Italian 'workerism' *(operaismo)* which rethought Marxism in light of the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. For the most part it looks forward. Abstract intelligence and immaterial signs have become the major productive force in the 'post-Fordist' economy we are living in and they are deeply affecting contemporary structures and mentalities.
> (*italics* original) [cxxiv]

> In a sense the multitude would finally fulfil Autonomia's motto – 'The margins at the center' – though its active participation in socialized knowledge. Politics itself has changed anyway. Labor, politics and intellect are no longer separate, actually they have become interchangeable, and this is what gives multitude a semblance of de-politization. Everything has become 'performative.' Virno brilliantly develops here his major thesis, an analogy between virtuosity (art, work, speech) and politics. They are all political because they all need an audience, a publicly organized space,

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which Marx calls 'social cooperation,' and a common language in which to communicate. And they are all a performance because they find in themselves, and not in any end product, their own fulfillment. (sic) [cxxv]

Hayden reminds of a root and movement, which activates the becoming of the masterful singularity, seeking both autonomy and the joyous spaces of the non-rational. This becoming is through a route that, sometimes, necessitates the madness of absorbing the great *Other* of our lives; and, with that gesture understanding the sentiment or imperative 'Thou art That.' Or, even the more Western sentiment of 'I am another.'

> Nietzsche's philosophy begins only when Nietzsche becomes Dionysus and Zarathustra, and Dionysus and Zarathustra become indistinguishable from Nietzsche the philosopher. [cxxvi]

Perhaps Antonio or Toni Negri, amongst the Italian Autonomous Marxists, most freely acknowledges his indebtedness to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Certainly, it is true to say that Michel Hardt, a writer and worker of those Italians, has a very strong grounding in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. From this connectivity, there arises a movement to acknowledge them within the fraternity that endeavours to create a newer differentiation of territory for future freedoms. Patton concludes;

> To the extent that Deleuze and Guattari describe a world in which the possibility of creative differentiation from the past is ever present , they share with other poststructuralist thinkers a commitment to what Foucault called 'the *undefined work of freedom'*...it implies the ability to question and revise goals and desires which determine the present limits of individual and public reason. In Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, this commitment is manifest in the way that their concepts accord systematic preference to certain kinds of movement or *process* over others: *becoming-minor* over being majoritarian, *metamorphosis over capture, deterritorialisation* over re-territorialisation and so on.
> (*italics* added) [cxxvii]

And, furthermore, he considers that:

> Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of the natural and social world provides both an open-ended machinistic ontology and a normative framework within which to describe and evaluate movements or *processes*. As such, it is an ethics in Spinoza's sense of the term.
> (*italics* added) [cxxviii]

> [T]heir legacy to thinking the political lies in this idea of a philosophy which aims at new and creative forms of counter-actualisation of the present. [cxxix]

The quote to make a seal, or activate a momentary closure, is from the opening pages of *Our Word is Our Weapon: Selected Writings of Subcommandante*

Insurgente Marcos, and it is quoted at length in honour of all *Others*, nomads, multiplicities and minor languages. Jose Sarmago in Ponce de Leon writes:

> As a matter of fact, we still can't understand how it was ever possible for someone to have been a 'Persian', and furthermore, as if such a peculiarity were not out of the question, to persist in being one today when the world seeks to convince us that the only desirable and profitable thing to be is what in very broad and artificially conciliatory terms is customarily called 'Western' (in mentality, fashions, tastes, habits, interests, manias, ideas) – or, in the all too frequent case of not succeeding in reaching the sublime heights, to be 'Westernized' in some bastard way at least, whether through force of persuasion or in a more radical way, if persuasion fails.
>
> To be 'Persian' is to be someone strange, someone different – in simple terms, to be the 'other'. The very existence of the Persian has been enough to disturb, confuse, disrupt, and perturb the workings of institutions; the Persian can even reach the inadmissible extreme of upsetting what all governments in the world are most jealous of: the sovereign tranquillity of their power.
>
> The indigenous were and still are Persians in Brazil (where the landless represent another type of Persians). The indigenous in the United States once were but have almost ceased to be Persians. In their time Incas, Mayas, and Aztecs were Persians, as were and still are their descendents, wherever they have lived and still live.
>
> There are Persians in Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. There is also an overabundance of Persians in that painful land of Mexico, where Sebastio Salgado's inquiring, rigorous camera drew shudders from us with challenging figures facing us. They ask: How can it be that you 'Westerners' and 'Westernized' people to the north, south, east, and west, so cultured, so civilized, so perfect, lack the modicum of intelligence and sensibility necessary to understand, the 'Persians' of Chiapas? [...] That same mist prevents one person from seeing is also the window that opens onto the world of the other, the world of the indigenous , the world of the 'Persian.' Let us look in silence, let us learn to listen; perhaps later we'll finally be able to understand. [cxxx]

APPENDIX 4.

UNCARVED BLOCK, MAAI OH MA AND THE BOOK OF FIVE RINGS

UNCARVED BLOCK

Lao Tzu (1963: 4BC), in Tao Te Ching (tr. & introduction by D.C.Lau. Middlesex : Penguin Books), refers to the *Uncarved Block* and Lau notes an attitude that might well help our case. It might so easily have been written both for the person wishing to be hospitable and the stranger seeking a relationship capable of social production.

> The aim of the sage is to keep the people in a childlike state where there is no knowledge and so no desire beyond the immediate objects of the senses.

> In connection with the freedom from desire, it is necessary to say something about the 'uncarved block'. There may be other implications of this symbol, but there are two features which stand out prominently.

> Firstly, the uncarved block is in a state as yet untouched by the artificial interference of human ingenuity and so is a symbol for the original state of man before desire is produced in him by artificial means. By holding firmly to the principle of non-action exhibited by the *tao*, the ruler will be able to transform the people, but

> > After they are transformed, should desire raise its head,
> > I shall press it down with the weight of the nameless uncarved block.
> > The nameless uncarved block
> > Is but the freedom from desire,
> > And if I cease to desire and remain still,
> > The empire will be at peace of its own accord. (XXXVII, 81)

> Again, the sage says;

> > I am free from desire and the people of themselves become simple like the uncarved block. (LVII, 133)

> Even after the people are transformed, the sage has to be constantly on the look-out, in case 'desire should raise its head', and paradoxically the way to keep people in a simple state, like the *uncarved block*, is for the sage himself free from desire.

> Secondly, the *uncarved block* is also said to be 'nameless'. This, as we have said, is one of the important attributes of the ruler. But the meaning of the term 'nameless' deserves careful examination, because it has a further meaning besides the obvious one of 'not being known'.

When the uncarved block shatters it becomes vessels. The sage makes use of these and becomes the lord over the officials. (XXViii,64)

Now, 'vessel' is a term used, from early times, to denote a specialist. In the *Analects of Confucius*, for instance, we find the saying, 'A gentlemen is no vessel' (2.12), meaning that the concern of the gentlemen is the art of government and not the knowledge of specialist. The *nameless uncarved block* is nameless because it has not shattered and become a vessel or vessels. Hence it is a symbol of the ruler.

Though the uncarved block is small
No one in the world dare claim its allegiance (XXXII, 72)

We may recall that no name is adequate as a description for *tao* because a name is always the name of a specific thing and so will the function of *tao*. Lao Tzu (1963: 4BC: 36-8).

And Nobody is the name of the Indian in Jim Jarmusch's film ***Dead Men*** (remember from Appendix 1).

MAAI OH MA

Okinawarian martial arts provide advise on the proper use of space to create advantage, for instance, Nagamine writing about a particularly highly respected and famous *Sensai* (the Masters or Teacher of a Martial Art):

Sensai often expounded on the importance of understanding *maai* (engagement distance) and *ma* (the space or interval *taisabaki*) in an effort to use one's techniques. "Not being able to place oneself in a position superior to the opponent's world," Sensai said, "unquestionably make any subsequent technique virtually ineffective. The utmost attention must be placed on learning to position oneself correctly, and make the best use of the space or internal distance created by moving one's body in an effort to effectively subjugate any opponent. [cxxxi]

Within the body of the thesis, a sense and an engagement of distance is created between parts of the text - both within the middles of thought and between the flows of fragments in those middles. There is much more importantly, a proper distance of and for the *Other*. Is this the space to be kept between, but sometimes away from, the oppressive and exploitative movements of an Empire and the territorial manoeuvres and makeovers of smaller capitalists and hierarchical organizations?

Any becoming should be like lightning, a fast flash trajectory from a surface such as *Body Without Organs*. The revolutionary and constituting becoming allowed full immanence will escape. In this way it maintains liberty, especially from constituted power, whilst creating extensive, non-recordable, degrees of freedom without trace. In such cases speed is truly of the essence. Movement which is too slow allows the gravitational pull of a capitalist colossus, which can create the

circumstances where the becoming ends up acting reactively. Only a response is not a becoming.

A true becoming fully affirms itself in its own movement, territory and speed. Likewise, a text that becomes massive in its description of that which oppresses and exploits can have no *rhizomatic* flow; in such situations, it has responded and reacted by navigation away from the constituted power. The tendency should rather have a *flowing as a constituting process of repetition of difference.*

Proper distance for engagement is all important. However, too close is also no distance at all. A certain dissonance is sought. Shift-shaping, disrupted patterns and space making 'techniques' are some displays of constituting power that in the movement ignore, break, damage or disavow the linear. Constituting power also speaks the utterances that more closely engage the multiplicities of disengagement from the singular collective of the *Western* modernist philosophical, organisational and management paradigm. This dissonance speaks to disclaim, place under erasure or submerge that *Western* dominating incubus.

A BOOK OF FIVE RINGS

The life of Miyamoto Musashi can be seen on DVD [22] or read through five volumes [23]. In Japan, he was considered a Sword Saint. His book, *Go Rin No Sho*, makes him one of the greatest writers of swordsmanship. His book's English title is *A Book of Five Rings* and it was written in Japan in 1645.

The last book of five, written shortly before Miyamoto Musashi's death, deals with the *Void* and the closing three paragraphs state:

> Until you realise the true Way, whether in Buddhism or in common sense, you may think that things are correct and in order. However, if we look at things objectively, from the viewpoint of laws of the world, we see various doctrines departing from the true Way. Know well this spirit, and with forthrightness as the foundation and the true spirit as the Way. Enact strategy broadly, correctly and openly.
>
> Then you will come to think in a wide sense and, taking the void as the Way, you will see the Way as void.
>
> In the void is virtue, and no evil. Wisdom has existence, principle has existence, spirit is nothingness. [cxxxii]

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[cxvii] Ibid., p22.

[cxviii] Ibid., p23.

[cxix] Ibid., p.63.

[cxx] Deleuze, Gilles and Parnet, Clare (2002) op cit., p.43.

[cxxi] Ibid., p.31.

[cxxii] Virno , Paolo (2004) op cit., p.41.

[cxxiii] Ibid.

[cxxiv] Lotringer, Sylvere (2004) in Virno, Paolo (2004) *A Grammar of the Multitude.* Semiotext9e) Foreign Agent Series. London: The MIT Press. p.7.

[cxxv] Ibid., p.13.

[cxxvi] Hayden, Patrick (1998) *Multiplicity and Becoming The Plural Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze* Studies in European Thought. Vol.15. E.Allen. (Ed.) McCormick. New York. Peter Lang. p.76.

[cxxvii] Patton, Paul (2000) *Deleuze and the Political* London: Routledge. p.135.

[cxxviii] Ibid., p136.

[cxxix] Ibid., p137.

[cxxx] Saramago, Jose (2001) Prologue: Chaipas, a Name of Pain and Hope. pp xix xxii in Ponce de Leon, Juana (2001) (Ed.) *Our Word is Our Weapon Selected Writings Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos.* London. Serpents Tail. Pages xix, xx & xxii.

[cxxxi] Nagamine, S (2000) *Tales of Okinawa's Great Masters* Tr. Patrick McCarthy. Massachusetts: Tuttle Publishing. p.101.

[cxxxii] Musashi, Miyamoto (1982) *A Book of Five Rings.*tr. Victor Harris. London: Allison and Busby Limited. p. 95.

It can never be completely specified. It is always indefinite – life. It is only a "virtuality" in life of corresponding individual that can sometimes emerge in the strange interval before death.
(textual change added)[1]

The philosophy of the future is the explorer of ancient worlds, of peaks and caves, who creates only inasmuch as he recalls something that has been forgotten. That something is the unity of life and thought. It is a complex unity: one step for life, one step for thought. Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living...Now we only have the choice between mediocre lives and mad thinkers. Lives that are too docile for thinkers, and thoughts too mad for the living.
(textual change added) [2]

By contrast, the first figure of transmutation elevates multiplicity and becoming to their highest power and makes them objects of an affirmation. In the affirmation of the multiple lies the practical joy of the diverse.
(textual change added) [3]

No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if we take the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental. A disreputable man , a rogue, held in contempt by everyone, is found as he lies dying...Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of life playing with death. The life of an individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a "Homo tantum" with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularities: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good or evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad. The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life...
(textual change added, first three full stops together added but last original)
(textual change added) [4]

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[1] John Rajchman 'Introduction' in Gilles Deleuze (2002) *Pure Immanence: Essays on Life* tr. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books. p.8. This taken from the first essay. Originally, L'Immanence: Une Vie in *Philosophie* 47 1995. Editions de Minuit.

[2] Gilles Deleuze. Ibid., pp. 66-67. This taken from the third essay. Originally, Nietzsche 1965 PUF.

[3] Gilles Deleuze. Ibid., p.84.

[4] Gilles Deleuze. Ibid., pp.28-29. And as Rajchman notes of the author and chapter that contains this quote, it was: 'Written in a strange interval before his own death, "Immanence...a life" has been regarded as a kind of testament. What is clear is that Deleuze took its "last message" to occur at a time of renewed difficulty and possibility for philosophy. As with Bergson, one needed to again introduce movement into thought...' Ibid., p.20.

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BECOMING ET AL.

AFTWORD
ABOVE THE PAVEMENT THE BEACH

Mine old lord while he lived was so precise...
Which made me curate-like in mine attire,
Though inwardly licentious enough
And apt for any villainy!
(textual change added) [1]

Fortune, that made Rome
Govern the earth, the sea, the world itself,
Would not admit two lords.
Dominion cannot suffer partnerships.
When Lucifer did shine alone.
(textual change added) [2]

The first advantage is at the end of the story. It doesn't finish, it falls in a hole...
And the story starts again halfway. The other advantage and the biggest...is that
you can change course along the way. If you let me. If you give me time.
(textual change added and three connected full stops original). [3]

This story is fiction, not a report. It describes a reality which is not necessarily that
of the reader's own experience...And yet the reality here in question is strictly
physical, that is to say it has no allegorical significance. The reader should see in it
only the objects, gestures, the words and the events that are told, without seeking to
give either more or less meaning than they would have in their own life, or in his
death.
(textual change added) [4]

Entering the house from the front entrance, a head with a calm eye might competently navigate a visual path along the ground floor corridor but physical movement through the passageway meant negotiating a labyrinth, created by objects and obstacles placed here and there. The various clusters betrayed no uniform patterns. The disruption to the spaces arose harmlessly through the various masses like the clothes clustered and dumped on the floor. The spluttered assemblages of toys also corrupted the carpet pattern. Other formations intervened like the books piled high and the stacked carcases of CDs and DVDs. Collectively the flotsam and jetsam of a life lived fairly well by a family of singularities created a maze that could be navigated by movement and thought.

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[1] Christopher Marlowe cited in A.L. Rowse (1964) *Christopher Marlowe: A Biography*. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. p.23.
[2] Christopher Marlowe. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
[3] End statement, shown as English subtitles, to the film *Sex and Lucia*. (2002) Julio Medem. TVD 3387. VFC 39961.
[4] Alain Robbe-Grillet's (1980) introductory note to his book entitled, *In The Labyrinth*. tr. Christine Brooke-Rose. London: John Calder. Originally, Dans le Labyrinthe. 1959. Editions de Minuit.

Many years earlier the art deco residence had housed rooms furnished to be stylistically minimalist. Now with the rush of children, mummy and daddy had given up this fetish to accommodate little others and their requirements. This was no longer a house but a home. The design of the rooms had a tendency to the *heterotopic* – each room welcoming any number of strange activities whilst being also generally hospitable to a multitude of becomings. Likewise the front and rear gardens did their own thing. Neither garden nor house could be considered utopian nor were they dystopian. However, one neighbour had a garden that established a benchmark, it was like Bauman's rose garden, a celebration of order and organisation brought forth into a life otherwise invaded by change and persuaded by the chaos which was otherwise life.

Within this house, *A* had sometimes drifted from room to room, away from the warm ambience of a home, to discover the pedagogy of loneliness and isolation. There, surrounded by a colder space of too much solitude, the folds were most differently active. In that place, the disruption of the metrics of life had so calibrated the machine of thought that the other of night easily crept forward to take its hold. This was, perhaps, the night that so scared children, especially when awaiting sleep, that they asked for the refrain and repetition of the same old nursery rhythm.

It was not easy to leave the spaces of folded thought. Indeed, such was the absolute solitude that a series of stages were required to smoothly climb out of the altered attitude or states to normality - if there was such a thing in a home with children. Allegedly, like coming down from a LSD trip, or emerging out of hypnosis, care for the self was needed in the metamorphosis. Normality was sometimes desired because, in this instance, evolution had not been progressive or kind enough to ensure survival, since singularities had lost their abilities and stamina to be in those other places for too long.[5] Artaud, Van Gogh, Foucault and Deleuze knew about the dangers but, of course, the attraction of being there was the intoxication of spontaneity and the joy of 'pointless creativity' (Oannes). Turning your head from a house to a home, freely hospitable to thought and otherness, was a dangerous business Deleuze had warned shortly before his suicide.

> Now we have the choice between mediocre lives and mad thinkers. Lives that are too docile for thinkers, and thoughts too mad for living.[6]

And prior to that, Deleuze had suggested the difficulty of engaging with such a process:

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[5] One of the four questions raised after the viva was this one: "The Outside - some interesting and useful comments were made by the candidate on the relative dangers of attempting to think in relation to or represent the 'outside' - and why such thinking assumes ethical importance - some brief articulation of the dangers and risks and benefits of attempts to think the outside and in particular how such thinking relates to pragmatic ethical and political choices would be appreciated." This paragraph makes references to the reality of moving too swiftly from, in and away from certain folded realms. These are difficult operations because our operating systems are so scripted by parents, society and education that singularities have to expend significant effort to escape from the identities imposed on them.

[6] Gilles Deleuze (2002) *Pure Immanence: Essays on Life.* New York: Zone Books. tr. Anne Boyman. p. 84. Originally, L'Immanence: Une Vie in Philosophie 47 1995. Editions de Minuit.

'manag[ing] to fold the line and establish an endurable zone in which to install ourselves, confront things, take hold, breathe – in short, think. Bending the line so we manage to live upon it, with it; a matter of life and death. [7]

Since his death the dangerous choices were over-determined. Step outside and misbehave, then face the consequences of your image captured by any number of video cameras in the street. Move to an enclosure, like a shopping centre, where face recognition technology identified you as you went about your business. Escape to your car only to be tracked by yet another series of cameras and so on, ad infinitum. Associated with the panoptic was the panorama of legal equipments. There was a lovely cycle starting with a day's exclusion of a child from school, leading to exclusion from streets, then off to prisons. Then with a criminal record find yourself on the job exclusion register. Misbehave long enough, speak or act incorrectly in your public place, and an exclusion order could be placed on you and your family. Public speech was now difficult and common lands were being obliterated to make way for the sanitized public - the denial of the affirming multitude. This surely was what Foucault sought to prevent through 'the undefined work of freedom'?

The anathema of Derrida's thoughts on hospitality, which was the ultimate sanction of extraordinary rendition, waited for those who truly upset the State. This was an evil twist to make the singularity into the crippled and decoupled absolute other, disconnected from any social bonds. In such action, no polis - only dystopias for the other - and with this state of exception the movement denied the singularity all that was human, spiritual and sacred (see, Agamben[8]). In such cases there was only one choice - choose madness.

The multiple of others might, however, choose intellectual and pragmatic survival strategies to disrupt these manoeuvres by ensuring, always and forever, only the continuous affirming opening of a closed or closing space. This could be undertaken in a sequence starting first in your head, then in your thesis and the task could be advanced within places like your home and street. Spatially the results could extend to whole neighbourhoods and districts. Shouting, pushing, thinking, protesting, clawing, running, writing and saying could provide becomings that disrupted the over-coded territories, to create the *heterotopic*. Don't wear a hood to disguise your identity as you stole what was yours, simply refuse an identity before someone tried to refuse you yours. There was no need to worry about identity politics when you refused any same, similar or identity. Remember always to repeat your otherness and ensure spaces for *parrehesia* and otherness for others. This device could be so easily extended to 'quotidian working life' (Dr. Stefano Harney). The carriage could never be from the organised of an organisation to this kind of thought but the reverse was available and could be obtained. This was the ultimate participative policy planning tool. No exclusions, only participative democracy.

Within one room, stacked on top of a yard of books piled one upon another, there was a book precariously balanced, half opened, with the left and right hand pages flapping

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[7] Gilles Deleuze cited in Charles Stivale (1998) *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari.* London: The Guilford Press. p.7.
[8] Giorgio Agamben (2005) *The State of Exception.* tr. Kevin Attell. London: The University of Chicago. And, Giorgio Agamben and Daniel Heller-Roazen (1998) *Homer Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

as if over a tight rope. It was *The Writing Notebooks* by Hélène Cixous [9] and further down the pile other titles written by her were just visible. However, two of those books had folded single sheets of A4 paper exposed, acting as very rude book markings. Another book had the title, *IAI, the Art of Drawing the Sword* [10], it was wedged between others. On the top of it were two books by Raymond Roussel [11] and Michel Leiris [12] and just below was one written by Aimé Césaire [13]. An interesting set of strategies, one of the sword and the others provided a spectrum of intellectual and word strategies (for instance, Roussel's '*prospecting*' and Césaire's '*negritude*'). A rough tug at the visible book markers released them and revealed the spine and two pages with several quotes which then fell with little trouble onto a page that was about to be written. [14]

> Continuity, abundance, drift [derive, a favourite word of the Situationalists, inherited as a concept from the Surrealists, and passed on to poststructualism via the writings of Jacques Derrida] – are these specifically feminine? I think so. And when a similar wave of writing surges forth from the body of a man, it's because in him femininity is not forbidden. [15]

This quote reminded *A* of the forthcoming viva and connected thoughts arose. Foucault had written how the subject was stabilised and formed by different arrangements - through order and organization. *A* had written to disrupt such formations in order to free the movement of thought at one stroke, from conditions imposed from the outside and, at another, to release thought to the outside.

As the viva approached, *A* wondered what would emerge. Could the multiplicity of becomings continue to move once the speed of the event made the thought less itself and more a cluster of texts attached to the singularity with the initials AS? Possibly, the apprentice rather than the thought would come to the fore through the working of the viva. The remembrance of the other text was swift; women were so able, they

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[9] Hélène Cixous (2004) *The Writing Notebooks*. London: Continuum. Edited and translated by Susan Sellers.

[10] Darrell Max Craig (1981) *IAI, The Art of Drawing the Sword*. Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company.

[11] Raymond Roussell (2001) *Impressions of Africa*. Great Britain. Calder & Boyars Ltd. Originally, Impressions d'Africa (1910) Alphonse Lemerie, Paris.

[12] Michel Leiris (1984) *Manhood. A Journey From Childhood into the Fierce Order of Virility*. San Fancisco: North Point Press. tr. Richard Howard. Originally, L'Age d'homme (1946) Librairie Gallimard.

[13] Aimé Césaire (1970) *Return to My Native Land*. Middlesex: Penguin Books. tr. John Berger and Anna Kunene. Originally, Cahier d'un retour au pays natal (1956) Présence Africaine.

[14] Another consideration arising from the viva was this one: "Strategy - during the viva the candidate clarified to a great extent his own intellectual strategies for selecting and juxtasposing source material - in particular a useful distinction was made between sensibility and the aleatory - some further consideration of this distinction and elaboration of these two categories would be of benefit to the reader." It might be expected that the more confidence a singularity has with the movement and becoming, the more amendable that singularity ought to be towards chance connections. This letting go to chance is found in a number of 'step programme' to deal with dependencies, where the motto is 'letting go and letting God' (yet another aspect of a certain kind of spirituality). Clearly, the more over-coded a singularity is to orthodox scripts, the less able the candidate for becoming. Disrupting sensibilities through disrupting patterns gives spaces for a reconstituting of heterotopic spaces, sense-making and world-making.

[15] Hélène Cixous cited in the introductory essay by Susan Rubin Suleiman in Hélène Cixous (1991) *"Coming to Writing" and Other Essays*. London: Harvard University Press. tr. Sarah Cornell et al. p.x.

could write the other powerfully whilst using the word 'I', no simple pseudonymous artifice was needed:

> You are right, I work (on) relations all the time. We look at the garden tighter: the garden is a place of relations. We could express this place in a thousand ways. Relations of colours together; of different species together; between the vegetable and the human. In relation to all phenomena of growing, to the question of preservation. Gardening is an act that is absolutely strange, in relation to life and death. And if I only listen to myself gardening, I have a very light sense of suffering in saying to myself: why garden when I know it will die? That, for me, is only the other. Between us: death. Together we look at the garden. [16]

There was the possibility that the viva could be like Cixous' gardening. The connections of the annunciations and quotes could be juxtaposed with those sound images. Then, perhaps, these could be intuitively and intellectually 'evaluated or assessed' against emerging criteria like the extent of social productivity or creativity. Affirmation was another obvious one to consider, if you were so minded, but the generation of new problems, or opening up of *heterotopic* territories, was not so transparent a consideration. Decoding and deterritorialization might be up for grabs, what do you think? Possibly, other impossible considerations might be manufactured. Like the self fragmented at the moment of sexual climax, could the connections of text be so productive as to destabilise the self of the reader, writer and thinker? Almost too obvious to mention was the degree to which connections disrupted the same, similar and identity. [17]

Some of the subsequent affirmative series of connections, arising from the four middles of thought, were visible and physical. Undoubtedly, there was a metamorphosis and this was expected of a becoming that maintained an absolute and relative speed compatible to others. There were other aspects and tendencies, some notable and others not so easily recordable as sounds, scents or tastes. Altogether these erupted to ensure the refrain was interrupted by a constant recoding and decoding.

Visibly, by chance and recoding, the differentiation and differenciation[18] of the assemblages of disrupted patterns of the thought obtained a material camouflage, which at first sighting emerged as a simple wrap over. It had a covering of soft green

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[16] Hélène Cixous and Mireille Calle-Gruber (2005) *Rootprints. Memory and Life Writings.* London: Routledge. tr. Eric Prenowitz. p.13.

[17] Following the viva, Dr. Stefano Harney noted and requested the following: "Evaluation - the thesis demands that the reader develop their own evaluative criteria in response to the stylistic and methodological unfolding of the piece. During the viva the candidate offered a number of possible such criteria that different readers might seek to bring to the piece - such as the social productivity of the work and the capacity to produce thinking differently - it would be useful to have some extended commentary on this range of potential evaluative engagements that readers might seek to make." In the spirit of autonomous working, creativity and repetition of difference, these paragraphs allude to such possibilities but care, hesitation and social responsibility has been exercised to avoid any transcendental evaluation, which prejudices the uncertainty of becomings.

[18] Paul Patton (2000) *Deleuze and the Political*. London: Routledge. pp. 36-39.

card. Oannes[19] the bookbinder, or John as many knew him, had with considerable care and extraordinary skill bound the thesis. When two soft glue bound theses were retrieved, prior to the submission of these to the University, Oannes had made a comment. He said, that in over twenty years of binding doctoral theses, only two had been worth the effort and this had been one of them. He had asked for an unbound copy to read slowly. Initially, A had wondered what Oannes had got out of the thesis but, in the duration before the viva, an infinite series of connections were made to the rhizomatic thoughts and annunciations of Oannes.

A had already followed a spiritual trail or scent (this sound image arrived later, during the viva, in response to the creation of a problemisation by Dr. Steve Brown) that had linked Spinoza to Bruno and Kabbalistic thought. A chance purchase and reading of a novel entitled *Tamburlaine Must Die*,[20] had caused A to follow an alternating pattern of connections to Christopher Marlowe. Here was the rhythm of chance and sensibility which was so productive for A. There was nothing more to say since it was up to each and everyone to decide and practice how they used this partnership. Oannes had not known much about the playwright but had generated some awesome connections from Giordano Bruno [21] to Dr. John Dee [22] and others.

Oannes had been most puzzled by those fragments of thought that put forth references to a materiality of change that dealt with social productivity and the multitude. A had not sought any form of clarification, since it felt important to grow the problem properly, through intuition and an attitude of attending married to the fulsome and wholehearted gesture of absolute hospitality to the *arrivante* which was Oannes.

In the moments and events that followed, A recognised that certain points in the four middles of thought carried a radicalised spirituality that emerged sporadically on the surface of the text and this had luminous affects. These were a reflection of thinkers like Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze, who on very close reading emitted a certain light.

> We would say of the kingdom what Deleuze says of *Alice*: to understand it requires "a category of very special things; events, pure events." The coming of the kingdom is an out-coming, from *evenire* (Lat.), the coming-out or bursting out of something we did not see coming, something unforeseen, singular or irregular. Alternatively, the event is what Derrida calls *l'invention de l'autre*, the in-coming (*invenire*) of something "wholly other," the breaking into our familiar world of something completely amazing, which shatters our horizon of expectations.[23]

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[19] Out of a period when men had sunk into barbarism there came a beast, which civilised the Babylonians, called Oannes. Afterwards 'John' became the code name, which was used to describe the half man and half fish monster. See, for example, John Bates (1992) *Being a Brief Study of the Curious and Mysterious History of the Name 'John'.* Contra_Irenaeus Series.

[20] Louise Walsh (2005) *Tamburlaine Must Die.* London: Canongate Books Ltd.

[21] See, for instance, Antoinette Mann Paterson (1970) *The Infinite Worlds of Giordano Bruno.* Illinois. Charles C Thomas Publishers.

[22] Benjamin Wooley (2001) *The Queen's Conjuror: The Science and Magic of Dr. Dee.* London: Harper Collins.

[23] John D. Caputo 'The Poetics of the Impossible and the Kingdom of God' in Graham Ward (2005)(Ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. pp. 469-481. quote to be found on p.477.

Oannes introduced *A* to the idea of *Condensing Cabinets*. These could be a means of appropriately presenting the middles of thought in a more disrupted physical form. In scale, design and territory, these might be considered to resemble the multiple product of a Gothic or Baroque conjunction between a dolls house and those shelves used to display miniature artefacts. It would be designed to ensure the interior provided a labyrinth. But there would be no more mention of these dangerous containers, well not until one had been produced.

Just prior to the viva, *A* had time to ponder the earlier comments made by supervisors especially those about the need for hard edges from which to start or launch thought. *A* was more concerned on how to efface solid words like ' State' and 'capitalist' and make these much more uncertain and undecidable, since holding tightly to definitions only replicated the same, similar and identity. In the life that surrounded *A*, certain work was undertaken that was *travail* rather than *oeuvre*. [24] There it became apparent that clumsy bureaucracy, sloppy professionalism and things like racism attracted certain statements and sentiments which might be clustered under certain emerging patterns. These mundane and banal manifestations of thoughts could be represented with less hard edges in terms of thought, in a way that brought out the repetition of difference which connected to them. *A* found just the soft edge in reading Arendt's thoughts on *radicalised evil*. In short, to moralise on evil and to try to quantify it, as so many deaths, missed other important features that allowed it to be spoken about and recognised by its own tendencies and formative manifestations. Put another way radicalised evil moved not affirmatively but reactively and then was felt as an impediment to becoming and flow. For Hannah Arendt this was characterised by spaces and bodies that lacked, amongst other things, *spontaneity*.

> After the murder of the moral person and annihilation of the juridical person, the destruction of individuality is almost always successful... For to destroy individuality is to destroy spontaneity, man's power to begin something new out of his own resources, something that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environments and events. [25]

Now this initial or putative form of identification gave an opportunity to forego the tiresome and simplistic appellatives of 'Capitalism', 'State', structure et cetera that had been used so far in the thesis. More work was needed but now thought could be suspicious of those spaces, places, procedures and beingnesses that were destructive of *spontaneity*. Becoming gave up to spontaneity and that dragged forth the spirituality inherent in men and women and others.

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[24] Another question, which arose during the viva, was this one; "Relationship to professional life - the candidate defended the device of distancing made possible by the character of *A*. But perhaps the candidate could reiterate the reasons *A* does not engage as a working subject in the text and with this reiteration think about the separation from professional life that isolates the dissertation from considerations arising from the quotidian working experience." Now this is a difficult one to address simply but if consideration is first given to the words, 'becoming' and 'spontaneity', then it ought to be clear that certain directions of thought are prevented, since these are aspects of *being*. Furthermore, there is an aspect of transgressive thought that allows a material strategy to develop that accommodates the repetition of difference that can be transposed into spatial strategies of engagement and participation.

[25] Hannah Arendt cited in Richard J. Bernstein (2003) *Radical Evil. A Philosophical Interrogation.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishings. p.211.

The minor anticipations and short rehearsals of potential speeds of thought, prior to the viva, had idealised what assemblage on the day would best reflect the spirit of the thesis so far. A and the two supervisors collectively agreed that if the viva became another part of the assemblage, so far forming, a slightly different multiplicity would materialise and this would be a great thing. None spoke of the dangers of a wholly antithetical or reactive series of events that might develop on the day and generate resentments for all parties. At best the hospitality to thought of all present would be able to positively connect with the otherness which was each singularity present. [26]

An additional commentary on how the thesis acts as a response to the question of spirituality arose during the viva. In particular, the question was posed 'why is a philosophy of becoming the most appropriate form in which to make such responses?' From the paragraphs above, it should be seen and sensed that Oannes understood a critical component of the movement of thought. Too the extent there is a concern about social productivity, the spirituality would then form part of a tendency that defeats itself. At the putative 'maximal points' of transgression where the singularity meets the outside and the Other, it might be hypothecated at that point, *being* goes beyond itself and an 'absolute' becoming materialises in the opening. In deed a careful reading of the references to Eastern thought should reveal the spontaneity, spirit and essential tendencies.

Following the viva and through writing the text, A became even more convinced that the next movement of thought should create the process and practical expression of *Academics Sans Frontières*.

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[26] This aftword arose after the viva with the PhD examiners, Dr. Steve Brown and Dr. Stefano Harney, and, to a degree, expresses their desires to further the becoming.

Mamãe, disse ele'
(mama, he said)

Adieu

Autumn already! – But why yearn for an eternal sun, if we are committed to the discovery of the divine light, - far from the people who die by the seasons.

Autumn. Our boat lifted up through the motionless mists turns towards the port of poverty, the enormous city with its sky stained by fire and mud. Ah! The putrid rags, the rain-drenched bread, the drunkenness, the thousand loves that have crucified me! Will she not stop at all, then, this ghoul queen of millions of souls and of dead bodies *which will be judged!* I see myself again, my skin pitted by mud and pestilence, my hair and armpits full of worms, and even bigger worms in my heart, lying among strangers without age, without feeling...I could have died there....Frightful recollection! I abhor poverty.

And I dread winter because it is the season of comfort!

- Sometimes I see in the sky endless beaches covered with joyful white nations. A great golden ship, above me, waves its multicoloured pennants in the morning breezes. I have created all festivals, all triumphs, all dramas. I have tried to invent new flowers, new stars, new flesh, new tongues. I believe I acquired supernatural powers. Well! I must bury my imagination and my memories! A great glory as an artist and storyteller swept away!

I! I who called myself a seer or an angel, exempt from all morality, I am restored to the earth, with duty to seek, and rugged reality to embrace! Peasant!

Am I deceived? Would charity be sister of death, for me?

Finally, I shall beg pardon for having nourished myself on falsehood. Then let's go.

Arthur Rimbaud
(1973 [1973])
Seasons in Hell
Tr. Enid R. Peschel
New York: Oxford University Press.
Quote found in
Hélène Cixous
"'Mãmae, Disse Ele,' or Joyce's Second Hand"
in
Stigmata, Escaping Texts
London: Routledge
(pp.131-169)
quote pp. 144-145 & in French 167-168.

SPECIAL NOTE

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