RE-INTERPRETING THE SOVIET SYSTEM:

THE LEVIATHAN REVOLUTION

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Abstract

Leninism-Stalinism has been conceived as part of Marxism as a political ideology. However, both the crisis and collapse of the Soviet system have led to a reconsideration of the fundamental theoretical grounds upon which the practices of the Leninist-Stalinist state were premised. This thesis is an attempt to redefine the nature of the Soviet state in its Leninist-Stalinist dimension. The ultimate aim of this work is to prove that the equation "Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism" is debatable. In doing so, I start by investigating Lenin's work and its impact on the future of socialism in the Soviet state. I will also argue that the authoritarian state which emerged from the Russian Civil War resulted in the Stalin tyranny (I dub it *leviathanism*). The method of approach I adopt in this thesis is political-philosophical. I argue that the theoretical father of the Soviet state was Thomas Hobbes rather than Karl Marx. In arguing so, I mainly focus on aspects in Hobbes's "leviathan theory" which coalesce with the political practices from 1917 to the 1930s. Adopting such a method, I seek to challenge the dominant "Continuity thesis" which argues that the Soviet practice was but a logical application of Marxian theory. I challenge such a thesis by arguing that Leninism-Stalinism was an *autholitarian* (both authoritarian and totalitarian) system which, like Hobbes's sovereign, was concerned more with the consolidation of the state rather than 'smashing' it.

This is to certify that:

(i) the thesis comprises only my original work

(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used.

For Rafika, my comrade, whose love, care, and commitment are simply unimaginable.
For Nadine and Chedy.

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Introduction

1/ Aims and Structure of Thesis:

The present work is an attempt to offer a contribution to the debate about the nature and practice of the Soviet (Leninist-Stalinist) system. My main argument is that the Soviet state (1917-1940) was not the "true" realisation of Marx's theory. Rather, it was the modern form of an authoritarian-totalitarian theory inherent in Thomas Hobbes's theorisation of the state. In order to advance my own reading of the October Revolution and its aftermath, I mainly focus on three aspects which, I argue, would help the reader grasp my main thesis. First, I attempt to approach the nature of the Soviet state by assessing several aspects that helped the Bolsheviks conquer power in 1917. The most important of such aspects, it seems to me, is Lenin's thinking—his early adoption of Social Democracy, his contribution to the split of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1903, his theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," his late rejection of Social Democracy and the democratic state, and the Soviet 'workers' state.' Second I try to show how the forced concept of the "workers' state" only gave birth to an "authoritarian state" which transformed the promised proletarian rule into a rule by coercion practised by the minority regime. Third, I seek to address why the October Revolution was historically condemned to usher in the Stalin dictatorship. In addressing this question, I deal with what seems to me to be the two main schools of interpretation in the field of Soviet studies—the "Totalitarian Model" and the "Revisionist School." I discuss and assess some of the main theses of these two schools. I also try to present my own reading of Soviet history through assessing their achievements and failures. My main thesis stems from, first, my account of the evolution of Bolshevik thinking and the

birth of what I call the Soviet "Leviathan" state, and, second, my assessment of the debate about the nature of both the 1917 October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution of the 1930s. The ultimate aim of my thesis is to contribute to—as well as challenge—the existing scholarly debate.

The thesis comprises four main parts. Part one is entitled "The Backdrop for the Crisis: Lenin's ambivalent Marxism." This part mainly broaches the defining ideas, concepts, and attitudes of the father of the October Revolution, Lenin, and traces the central events which helped the Bolsheviks conquer power in 1917. It also treats significant critical responses to Lenin's thinking (Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, etc.). The structure of Part I is focused on three main aspects: 1) Lenin's early adoption of Social-Democracy and his fight for a Russian Social-Democratic party; 2) Lenin's late Rejection of Social-Democracy being, according to him, a reductive ideology; and 3) Lenin's theorisation of the Soviet "workers' state," being the sum result of the Bolshevik Revolution. Part II is entitled "The Crisis: from the Authoritarian State to the Collapse." It is an account of the main results of the October Revolution. It describes the authoritarian state which derived from the Russian Civil War, the rise of Stalinist rule, and the eventual Soviet collapse as a logical culmination of the crisis of Soviet Socialism. (1) Part II comprises three main sections: 1) The impact of the Civil War on the future of the Soviet state and the birth of authoritarianism; 2) Emergence of Stalinism as an alleged realisation of Marxism-Leninism, and the birth of a state against the proletariat; 3) the end of Stalinism through Gorbachev's reforms.

Part three is entitled "Theories on the Crisis: Revisionists against Totalitarians." This part mainly discusses two opposite theories (the "Totalitarian Model" Vs the "Revisionist School.") which have attempted to explain the link between Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism, and the nature of the Soviet system in its Leninist and Stalinist faces. Part three is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with two central aspects: 1) the

Totalitarian model's treatment of the continuity between Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism; and 2) the model's description of the 'totalitarian' nature of both the October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution. The second section examines first the "Revisionist" (social historians) critique of the "Totalitarian model," and second the research orientations of the school of Revisionism. The last Part of my thesis is "The Forgotten Crisis: the Leviathan Revolution." In this part, I present the main thesis of this work. Basically, I argue that the alleged ideological link between Marxism (Marx and Engels), Leninism, and Stalinism was belied by both the October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution. My main argument in Part four is that such revolutions were of a "leviathan" nature, and that the real crisis of the Soviet system was not a crisis of Marxism itself; the 'forgotten crisis,' as I dub it, was that of a system which, believing itself to be following a humanist ideology, was only negating such an ideology by acting against its emancipatory premises. Part four comprises three main sections. The first section examines Hobbes's authoritarian theory as a basis for totalitarianism; the second looks at the link between Hobbes's "leviathanism" and Soviet state repression ;and the third discusses Lenin and Stalin as "leviathan" leaders.

2/ Differing Approaches:

Eric Hobsbawm once asked, "Can we write the History of the Russian Revolution?" The answer he suggests is 'yes.' Yet, the more intricate question for him is: *how* can we write such a history? In Hobsbawm's view, no single historian can ever write 'the *definitive* (my italics) history of anything...including, of course, [that] of the Russian Revolution.' (2) The only history one might write is 'history as a serious activity...because historians can agree about what they are talking about, on what questions they are discussing, and even on enough of the answers to narrow down their differences sufficiently for meaningful debate.' (3)

The question posed by Hobsbawm here is a crucial one for my enquiry in this thesis.

This is mainly because I think that 'meaningful debate' is hard to achieve without allowing some space for intellectual and scholarly difference. One of the most significant questions concerning the political history of the Soviet Union is the degree of accuracy in interpreting the politico-ideological basis of the Soviet state in both its Leninist and Stalinist faces. Given the enormous work carried out in the field of Soviet studies, one is obliged to admit how much difficult it is for a new comer to this field to explore the history of a state system that has massively been approached by political scientists, historians, and other scholars with different focuses and interests. One of the most difficult tasks in this respect, I would argue, is that of trying to find in the far too trodden field of Soviet studies a different, convincing, and comprehensive interpretation of the main causes behind the collapse of Soviet and Soviet-type socialism. What was the nature of the October Revolution? Why was it carried out in 1917 and not later? How did Lenin make use of the experience of Social Democracy? How did he contribute to such a revolution? Why did he theorise and support a revolution with a strong peasant basis? Why did he justify the Bolshevik Revolution by using Marx's praise for the Paris Commune? Why did he rush the collapse of the democratic state and abolition of the Constituent Assembly in 1918? Why did he support the use of force against the peasants in the period of "War Communism"? On the other hand, how did Stalin turn the promised 'workers' state' into a state against the workers? How did he reduce the international significance of the Revolution to a "socialism in one country?" And was his drive for the "Purges" explainable in purely Marxian terms? All these questions have preoccupied most Sovietologists. Yet, according to me, a fundamental question one should pose is the extent to which the already existing literature has succeeded in interpreting the October Revolution and its aftermath.

Most Sovietologists do agree that the history of both the October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution of the 1930s are still open to differing interpretations. This has to do with

two basic facts: 1) interpretation depends on discipline—political science, history, etc.; and 2) conclusions are the result of either archival or conjectural research. It is mainly for such reasons that 'meaningful debate' has gained ground in the field of Soviet studies. Writing the history of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath has been contrived under several labels that have to do with schools of thought related to very specific disciplines.

The main schools concerned with the interpretation of the Russian Revolution are the "Party history approach," "the ideological approach," "the Trotskyist approach," (4) "the Totalitarianism approach," and "the Revisionist approach." The party history approach argues primarily that there was a close link between Lenin's thinking in *What is to be Done*? and the stream of theories and policies adopted by the Bolshevik party. What Lenin bequeathed Stalin was the idea of a strong, central, and 'vanguard party.' Such an approach also suggests that Stalin inherited Lenin's contempt for the working class. The party history approach is represented in the work of, among others, Merle Fainsod and R. H. McNeal. (5) The second approach, the "ideological," is inspired by both social and political history. It focuses on the significance of the transition from Lenin's policies to those of Stalin. While Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), for instance, left unanswered some questions like those relating to the future of socialism, Stalin's position was a 'moderate' ideological 'manoeuvre' the aim of which was to save Bolshevism and Russian socialism through collectivisation and industrialisation. (6) For this approach, Stalin's struggle with both the Left and Right opposition can be justified by what Stephen Cohen calls 'the salient political fact of 1928-29.' (7) The cohort of the ideological approach are mainly such historians as Moshe Lewin and E. H. Carr. (8) The third approach, the Trotskyist, is centred on the assumption that the October Revolution was aborted in the process when Stalin decided to localise it. When the revolution became national rather than international, socialism was condemned to fail. Instead of the "workers' state", a state against the workers emerged. The new state was characterised by a

yawning gulf between civil society and the ruling regime. In the last analysis, what emerged was a 'bureaucratic state' being controlled by party and non-party apparatuses.

The two remaining approaches are the "Totalitarian" and the "Revisionist." These are, in my view, the most important in the debate. They are important not only because they fundamentally differ from the preceding three approaches but also because they have attempted to provide systematic analyses of the nature of the October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution of the 1930s. Their contribution to the debate has been most invaluable; each has shown deep interest in reading and interpreting the findings of the other, and each often reads the history of Soviet Russia with particular attention to counter-disciplines. In terms of scholarly discipline the 'totalitarian model' has worked in a political-scientific, and, equally, political-historical framework whereas the revisionist school is mainly focused on the significance of Soviet socio-cultural history.

There are mainly three premises of contention between the "totalitarian model" and the "revisionist school": 1) the relationship between Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism; 2) the nature of the 1917 Revolution; and 3) the Stalin Revolution in the 1930s. While until the 1950s the 'totalitarian model' dominated scholarship (mainly Western scholarship) in the field of Soviet studies—by primarily interpreting the Soviet regimes as "monsters" controlling the whole society—the opening of several archives after Stalin's death allowed social historians to penetrate what had been conceived as the political scientists' impregnable walls; the fresh enquiries into the importance of social history started to gain ground since the 1970s with the emergence of such brilliant scholars as Moshe Lewin. The totalitarian model has sought to study the Soviet system by firstly asserting that Soviet history has been that of an unchallengeable dominance of the state over society initiated by Lenin and continued through Stalin's 'revolution from above,' and second arguing that there is an incontestable continuity between Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. (9) The Revisionist school's main argument, however,

comes as a reply to the controversial theses of the totalitarian model. It basically premises its overall thesis on the claim that Soviet history (especially in its Stalinist face) had not totally rested on the absolute dominance of the state over society. There was rather some sort of negotiation between civil society and the state system. This, for instance, can be seen in observing the influence of several groups, and even the working population, on governmental policy-making. The second claim of the revisionist school is that the alleged continuity between Marx, Lenin, and Stalin was only relatively accurate. (10)

In this thesis, I advance my main argument in response to these two rival schools. The aim behind my exposition of the two schools in question is to try to show how the Soviet system has been subject to interpretations that are in great part based on either political scientific surmise or socio-historical investigation. In doing so, I mainly intend to show how the adherents to the totalitarian model in particular, albeit strong in certain areas, have been only partly convincing in their theorisation of the nature of the Soviet system.

3/ Methodology:

The method of approach I adopt in this thesis is politico-philosophical. By "politico-philosophical" I mean an approach which addresses the nature of the Soviet state (Leninist-Stalinist) in relation to Hobbes's leviathan argument. It is mainly an approach which argues that the Soviet practice had a Hobbesean authoritarian-totalitarian element. My approach is fundamentally different from that of the schools of totalitarianism and revisionism. The particularity of this approach stems from my belief that while the revolutionary Leninist-Stalinist state pretends to have had Marxian roots—the class struggle, proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the socialist state, and communism (the classless and stateless society)—the actual practice revealed that the Soviet state had coercive roots that can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes's conceptualisation of the state. Why Hobbes in particular

is significant in this respect is because his leviathan theory rests on an authoritarian element which when put at work may soon develop into dictatorial rule; while promising in scope, leviathan theory does in no way prevent power abuse, and is far from capable of preventing even the most democratic of authoritarian democracies from lapsing into rule by tyranny when the standing army and the police are turned into a tamed apparatus of the state. In the context of the Soviet state, I argue, the two concepts of "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism" overlap—but are not similar—mainly because the one easily converts into the other. The Soviet state began basically as an authoritarian state speaking in the name of the proletariat, but it soon turned into a dictatorial one-party state acting against proletarians: The Kronstadt, "War Communism," and the 1930s Purges do attest to this.

My "leviathan" idea, however, is not totally new. Basically, I borrow this idea from the work of the French political philosopher Joseph Vialatoux who in 1952 published a book—*La Cite de Hobbes*—on the link between Hobbes's *Leviathan* and the modern totalitarian states. My attempt in this thesis is not merely to repeat verbatim what Vialatoux writes, but essentially to make use of his theory by applying it to a specific state practice, namely the Soviet experience. Vialatoux's contribution, I think, cannot be denied, since he traces the politico-philosophical basis of the modern totalitarian state. However, my contribution here is that I take Vialatoux's concepts away from their conjectural framework and apply them to specific cases. For instance, I will try to show how Stalin, just like Hobbes's 'sovereign,' predicates the relation between the state and individuals on the couple of protection and obedience. For Hobbes, a ruler can guarantee social peace only when individuals obey "him" unquestionably. Stalin did but follow such a Hobbesean line of reasoning.

My main argument is that the Leninist-Stalinist state proved in practice that its ideology at work could amount to anything but revolutionary and humanist Marxism. This

appeared greatly in the conflict between what Marx and Engels preached, and the despotic rule which resulted from the Soviet system. Bolshevism's theoretical basis, *What is to Be Done?* (hereafter referred to as *WBD*), Lenin's 'untimely' October revolution, the strangling of democracy—a necessary epoch in Marxian theory—forced collectivisation and industrialisation, Stalin's *racialisation* of Marx's notion of class—by creating new enemy classes of priests, former capitalists, nepmen—the exclusive communist party, and the Great Purges were all unhealthy features of a state that was far from 'withering away'; they were features of a new phenomenon in history that translated only one concern: how to *force* a socialism that seemed healthy only to the party apparatus and to the topmost leaders who in the last analysis only sought to search a popular support—for carrying out the revolution and maintaining unbound power—that turned later into veritable testimonials of individuals against themselves in show trials like the Shakhty engineers case in the 1920s, and the Great Purges in the late 1930s.

This new phenomenon in the history of state rule was a novel form of government much more destructive of the structure of society than totalitarianism. It was a *Leviathanism* which not only subjugated individuals' will to that of an all too powerful state but also dictated that once leviathan rule is established there will be no individual, and no society; their existence becomes simply virtual. My politico-philosophical approach to the question of the Soviet state does not, however, mean that the nature of such a state can only be explained through this approach; ideology as well as economic issues are important interpretations, but an answer to the question *why* the Kronstadt or the Great Purges happened can only, as I firmly believe, be explained by the fact that the need for 'dictatorship' even in its original Marxian sense is a Janus-faced claim that, though presenting an emancipatory and just cause, might backfire and turn into a source of politico-ideological compulsion the end of which is but tyrannical rule. It was thus how Soviet emancipatory socialism turned into oppressive

state rule: the binding Hobbesean logic was practiced by the Bolshevik leadership using such slogans as "Soviet government *must* keep order," "the Communist Party *must* lead the proletarian movement," and "the peasants *have to* accept requisitioning willy-nilly." If any of the *musts* should be abandoned, then the state will punish the lawbreakers.

Adopting such an approach, I seek to contribute to the overall debate about Soviet studies. Nevertheless, while I believe that a politico-philosophical approach is crucial to understanding the nature of the Soviet system, I still believe that other approaches such as the totalitarian or socio-cultural do articulate a defensible argument. In approaching these two schools I do not pretend to argue that my own interpretation of the nature of the Soviet state should overshadow their interpretations. My thesis, I believe, should be best seen more as a *contribution* to the scholarly debate. My overall argument, however, differs from other arguments not only in terms of discipline—"pure" political science and social history being the canon—but also in terms of the general perspectives. I take what I believe is useful from both the political scientific approach and the Socio-historical view. I also rely on the findings of the "Party History Approach"—especially the impact of *What is to be Done?* on the future form of the Soviet state.

Part 1

The Backdrop for the Crisis: Lenin's Ambivalent Marxism

Introduction:

Part I of this thesis aims to address Lenin's thinking which, I suggest, was an underlying cause for, first, the crisis, and second, demise of the Soviet system. I will particularly focus on the development of Lenin's theory of revolution through such works as *What is to be Done?* and *The State and Revolution.* The major themes I will discuss are Lenin's adoption and praise of Social-Democracy in his early work and the rejection of Social-Democratic politics in his late work. Lenin's changing and controversial ideas and attitudes were, as I firmly believe, at the origin of the 1917 October Revolution and, more importantly, the totalitarian state forged by Stalin in the 1930s. In dealing with the development of Lenin's thought and its transformation in what came to be called Leninism, I mainly aim to demonstrate—as will be revealed in Part four—how Lenin's particular views on Social-Democracy, the class struggle, proletarian revolution, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" do raise some cause for concern, mainly because they had ushered in the crisis of the Soviet state which started in 1918 with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

What shows a two-faced Lenin and, therefore, a two-faced Leninism are two basic facts: Lenin's changing attitudes to central issues (including Social-Democratic work) and the way he dealt with the October experience. Lenin's adoption of Social-Democracy and his late rejection of it, his positive views on the German workers' movement and the divorce of the Second International, his valuing of theoretical knowledge and contempt for 'working class consciousness', and his veneration of party dictatorship, all reveal how much the father of the Soviet Union was chained by his own particularity; Lenin's apologia for the October Revolution as an alleged "Commune" experience, his treatment of the question of the socialist state during the Civil War, and his controversial policy of "War Communism" were on the other hand a confirmation of how much his revolutionary career clashed with his theoretical

promises. This part then is an attempt to help the reader grasp my thesis that, as the founding theory of Soviet state practice, Leninism was only the ideological expression of a problematic revolutionary theory which often clashed with its own emancipatory logic. By suggesting so, I argue that what actually emanated from Leninism was an unpredictable context which brought in Stalin's Revolution of the late 1920s and 1930s. The ultimate aim of this part is to reveal how the birth of Leninism as a theory—albeit speaking in the name of Marxism—led to self-contradictory policies, and reflected, as I tend to show in Part four, the birth of an all too devouring Hobbesean Leviathan state instead of a Marxian one.

The main concern raised in this part of my thesis is how Lenin forged a particular theory of the party, and why he repudiated in his late work Social-Democracy altogether. In this part I will try to show how Lenin throughout his work had developed non-Marxian thinking. This task necessitates a deep interrogation of basic concepts such as "economism", "spontaneity", "consciousness", "theoretical knowledge," "social-chauvinism" and "petty-bourgeois reformism." These concepts, however, were context-bound and had specific resonance which coincided with specific periods in the development of Lenin's thought through the overall Russian Marxist tradition which had begun with Populism in the 1860s, developed into several variants such as the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (1898) and the Socialist Revolutionaries (1901), and got consummated by the foundation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist International (Comintern) shortly before Lenin's death. To this extent, most of these concepts forged or addressed by Lenin are particularly telling. Yet, for the sake of theoretical consistency my focus on such concepts will be addressed in light of general themes which touch on the question of continuity or discontinuity between Marx's and Engels's theory and that branded by Lenin. The basic themes I address in this part are: Lenin's 'party of new type', the advocacy of party centralism, and the irrevocable departure from Social-Democracy.

I/ Lenin and the Importance of Social Democracy:

1/ The Necessity of Social-Democracy:

In "Our Programme" (1969), Lenin expressed his particular views of Marx's theory:

> We do not regard Marx's theory as some thing completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists *must* develop in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of Marx's theory is especially essential for Russian socialists; for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently than in France, in France differently than in Germany, and in Germany differently than in Russia. (1)

Lenin's apologia for a Russian revolution that does not follow the strict lines of Marx's theory is clearly broached in this declaration which stresses the necessity to read and apply Marx's text with a careful consideration of different contexts. A close reading of this statement suggests that Lenin held that Marxism was the only theory of revolution which made itself a system-adaptive doctrine fit for and applicable to *all* contexts regardless of their economic base. This is mainly because Marxism, in Lenin's view, constituted the scientific basis (scientific socialism) for every revolutionary mass movement. Lenin's concern about the Marxian text was echoed in *WBD* where his celebration of scientific socialism as a revolutionary theory is at its highest. But, Lenin's concern about a Russian reading of scientific socialism had also to do with a specific interpretation of the class struggle.

For Lenin the class struggle, following from a purely Marxian logic of course, does exist so long as the conflict between capital and wage-labour exists. In theory, however, one would argue, when the proletarianisation of society happens in response to the encounter between the forces of capital and those of labour the question of emancipation is raised. And

emancipation means that the class struggle must culminate in the triumph of labour. But emancipation from what?: from the economic basis which follows from the systemic structure dictated by the laws of capital accumulation, or from the political expression of the class struggle which responds to the will of the ruling class to use the state as an 'oppressive machine'? Indeed this question stands as most revealing in relation to Lenin's view of the necessity of political struggle for emancipation in the case of Russia. And this is, in my view, what marks Lenin's particularity in reading Marx and Marxism when it comes to the question of the class struggle. Lenin does not deny that at origin the problem is economic since the class struggle itself emanates from the degree of exploitation by which a possessing class subordinates a non-possessing class. But the solution for him requires more than pay increase and improvement of the conditions of work: something more substantial than mere 'reform'. The solution resides in a *radical* political transformation. Such a question forms, I believe, the pith of Lenin's views on class conflict and his attack on the economists.

The economists are identified by their belief in the necessity of the economic struggle of the workers—a belief that greatly clashes with the premises of Social-Democracy. Economism (2) was the instance of emphasising the importance of the workers' economic rather than political struggle which had to be led by the trade union leaders. The economists held that the "spontaneity" of struggle had a leading role, and that the recourse to violence in the movement against capital was totally warranted as a medium for emancipation. Economism gave little importance to the political representation of the working class in bourgeois government. Lenin criticised economism by addressing two conflicting concepts, namely "spontaneity" and "consciousness." He thought that the former is an obstacle in the face of the latter, and has unremitting dangerous consequences on the evolution of workers' consciousness of the class struggle and the inevitability of the proletarian revolution. 'The Economists bow to the spontaneity of the "pure and simple" labour movement...' (3)

Spontaneity meant that the working class, relying on its own means of resisting exploitation, is devoid of conscious action against such exploitation. The proletariat is at best only capable of 'trade union consciousness' (4) It is for this very reason that in its incipient phase proletarian consciousness is limited to an extremely narrow scope of knowledge which is generated immediately through their experience in the factory (industrial proletariat) or farm units (agrarian proletariat). It is therefore more than necessary to make the workers *conscious about their unconsciousness*. That would definitely demand a theoretical rather than a practical training for the bulk of the workers. Spontaneity in this respect does not only imply mere struggle over economic demands, including hours of work, etc, but also the recourse to violent action against the owner of the means of production. In Lenin's eyes, however, revolutionary violence was totally permissible in such revolutions as 1905 and 1917 (5) Yet, spontaneous politics should not amount to a guiding doctrine to follow if proletarians should engage in a real proletarian revolution.

Therefore, the alternative to economism, Lenin firmly put it, was Social-Democratic struggle. But what type of Social-Democracy was most suitable for the Russian context? What preoccupied Lenin in the period between 1898 and 1903 was the type of Social-Democracy that the Russian working classes should adopt. In *WBD* he states clearly the importance of the German experience, especially that the intellectual German Social-Democrats and their popular basis had been injected by the revolutionary spirit of scientific socialism. (6) Lenin's interest in the German Social-Democratic experience was fuelled by a contextual quandary in Russia: the majority of the workers were hardly class-conscious (7), and the 'professional revolutionaries' had to act in a level of organisation tantamount to that of the German Social-Democrats. In consequence, the challenge that the Russian vanguard faced was how to re-produce the German Social-Democracy in the Russian context while both objective and subjective obstacles were hard to grapple with. Such a concern forced Lenin to

think that the working classes in Russia had to depart from any formula of struggle dismissive of strong political intervention by leading professional revolutionaries. This means that the aim of all Social-Democrats cannot be achieved without some form of "paternalism" in which the leading intellectuals of the mass movement guide the majority of workers towards political consciousness and, therefore, class consciousness. (8)

On the other hand, in focusing on the necessity of Social-Democratic struggle, Lenin sought also to bridge the yawning gulf between the workers and intellectuals. He did so by arguing that the workers needed to be educated by the vanguard before they could acquire any political consciousness. Lenin argued in *WBD* that the struggle for economic emancipation could only occur in the presence of political struggle. And such a struggle can only occur through a constructive action by leading intellectuals. Actually, here arises as intriguing and important question which Charles Elliot addressed some forty years ago. Elliot argued that the question of the relation between the proletariat and the leading intelligentsia had even perplexed Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels never satisfactorily addressed such issues as the workers' turning away from "history's path". The question according to Elliot was that Marx had left such a dilemma unresolved, and it was the task of his 'heirs' to do the job; by implication, it was Lenin who had to face such a dilemma, and even had to argue against Luxemburg over the question of the role of the proletariat. (9) Thus the relationship between the leading intellectuals and the working class posed a problem for Lenin who was aware that a conciliatory relationship could hardly be maintained if the Russian Social-Democrats failed to see the importance of theoretical knowledge. A central preoccupation that perplexed Lenin was how to opt for a Russian Social-Democratic struggle not divergent from that of Germany.

Lenin starts his argument by supposing that the crisis of the Russian Social-Democracy had been intellectual at origin, since the labour movement was most 'spontaneous' and weak in character, and since the labourers were 'fettered' by 'unplanned'

struggle against tsarist autocracy. (10) The question that seemed constructive for him had to do with the possibility to turn 'trade union struggle' into 'Social-Democratic struggle' (11), that is, transform 'reformist' struggle into 'revolutionary political struggle.' The experience of Social-Democracy then had to follow from the theorisation of the relationship between the labour movement and its guiding vanguard. In this respect, Lenin's envisagement of the Russian socialist revolution was responsive to his critique of the level of workers' organisation in their fight against tsarism. He, for our purpose, did not blame the failure to engage in political struggle on the workers in particular; he constantly thought that the working classes were all too unconscious of their situation to change the status quo. Rather, he sharply criticised the sections of the Russian Social-Democracy which subjected the proletarian movement to the domination of the economist trend.

> Some Russian Social-Democrats...regard the economic struggle as incomparably the more important and almost go so far as to relegate the political struggle to the more or less distant future. This standpoint is utterly false. All Social-Democrats are agreed that it is necessary to organise the economic struggle of the working class, that it is necessary to carry on agitation among the workers on this basis, i.e., to help the workers in their day-to-day struggle against the employers, to draw their attention to every form and every case of oppression and in this way to make clear to them the necessity for combination. But to forget the political struggle for the economic would mean to depart from the basic principle of international Social-Democracy, it would mean to forget what the entire history of the labour movement teaches us. The confirmed adherents of the bourgeoisie and of the government which serves it have even made repeated attempts to organise purely economic unions of workers and to divert them in this way from "politics," from socialism. (12)

The question which requires a careful answer in light of Lenin's argument here is how socialism can ever develop at the same time when political struggle is utterly ousted from the equation set forth by international Social-Democracy. There can hardly be an emancipation of

the workers once the action in pretension of such an emancipation is solely guided by policies of 'reform'. The desire to depoliticise working class demands amounts to the depreciation of the leading role played by the Social-Democrats who would in the last analysis get the workers conscious of their class nature, the class struggle, and the viability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This question however evokes Lenin's insistence on preaching the most appropriate kind of Social-Democratic action.

Lenin's criticism of spontaneous action on the part of the working-class movement is in the last analysis but a criticism of the theoretical background which forms the basis of the workers' spontaneity. In Lenin's words, 'the *spontaneous* development of the labour movement leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology' and 'the task of Social-Democracy is to *combat spontaneity, to divert* the labour movement, with its spontaneous trade-unionist striving...' (13) The failure to adopt a revolutionary theoretical premise akin to the Social-Democratic one would only drown the labour movement in its entirety. (14) In arguing so, Lenin maintained that the economists were the "mongers" of trade union politics—thus forgetting about the real predicament of Russian society. As Frances Becker put it, the underlying reason for Lenin's rejection of economism is that because it strongly feeds on 'spontaneity', which divorces the working class from the 'professional' class of revolutionaries (15) The fundamental flaw of such economists as Martynov (16), Lenin firmly thinks, is primarily conceptual, since they perceive that the proletariat can get 'political consciousness *from within*...by means of economic struggle' (17) For Lenin, such a formula was reductive in the sense that it excluded the role of political knowledge. (18) The remedial formula would only reside in organising struggle by, first, starting over from the necessity to marry theoretical knowledge to practical politics, and second, conceiving of a 'highly centralized party' (19) able to harmonize the proletariat and the revolutionary vanguard.

In practical terms, it can be argued that Lenin's attack on economism was very much akin to Marx's criticism of 'socialist sectarianism' (20) which Engels also criticised with regard to proletarian action at the time of the Paris Commune. (21) The representatives of "sectarianism" in Marx's view were the groups of socialist activists who pretended to be struggling for workers, but with absolutely no 'theoretical knowledge' or party programme: Proudhonists in France, Lassaleans in Germany, and Bakunists in Russia. (22) It was the First International, Marx contended, which represented the remedy against sectarianism, an instance of theoretical and political struggle uniting the world working-class movement round the same principles, and thus forming the organising body of action. Lenin treated the conditions of the workers in Russia in response to what he thought of as economism's failure to amount to a political project for emancipation. The solution for him then resided in strengthening the Russian Social-Democratic movement by focussing on the necessity to fend off such "sects" as the Bernsteinists through forging the link between theoretical education and militant politics. (23)

It was *WBD* which reflected Lenin's concern about the future of Social-Democracy in Russia. Sympathizers like Tom Freeman hold this belief and argue that the 'mainstream' ("Totalitarian school" essentially) maintains an erroneous reading of Lenin's interpretation of Marx in *WBD*. Lenin, Freeman writes, did in no way reject Marx's basic theory of socialist 'party organisation'. Lenin's alleged departure from Marx's concept of class-consciousness can be refuted by the fact that '*What is to Be Done?* could be seen as a concrete expression of Marx's own concern with the role of consciousness in working-class self-emancipation.' (24) It was for this reason that *WBD*, Freeman asserts, constituted a "Marxian" mode of argumentation seeking to warrant the struggle against 'economism', 'reformism' and 'opportunism'. Such were the trends of Russian Marxism which were bent on considering the Russian working class movement only in its immediate context where the revolutionary

demand was, for them, too ambitious and far-reaching to reckon with in present day Russia. (Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.)

For Lenin, to rid itself of the myopic pseudo-liberal economism instilled by Bernsteinism (25) for instance the present proletariat and peasantry had got to accept a formula of struggle in which they could only act under the auspices of the leadership of an intellectual class. Such a formula would constitute the historical task awaiting the mass movement which should acquire the theoretical premise for historical revolt. And that necessitated the foundation of a 'party tradition' in which party membership and militancy can only build on the leading role of party intellectuals. In this respect, what is more important in considering Lenin's standpoint as regards the unity of the workers and the vanguard in one single movement is the particularity of his theory of revolution.

However, an intriguing question to pose is how theoretical struggle can lead to a political struggle which ignores in great part the economic condition (capitalism) preparing the ground for revolution. In theoretical terms, however, one might argue, Lenin's theorisation of an "inopportune" revolution (different from Marx's original theory) can be atoned for by the fact that Marx and Engels themselves looked so differently to the Russian context; for example, their views of the Narodniks and other Russian revolutionaries were to bear witness to how revolutions in countries other than Western Europe can be justified even under violent circumstances. (26) Yet, Marx's overall assessment of the Russian context did not reflect, I would argue, his main theory. In his correspondence with Vera Zasulisch, for example, Marx emphasised some facts which might be wrongly interpreted or intentionally diverted to mean that a revolution in Russia can happen even if the "village commune" was still predominant. (27) Marx's point in the Preface to the 1882 Russian Edition of the *Communist Manifesto* is also particularly misleading: 'If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West', Marx warns, 'the present Russian common

ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.' (28) Marx's statement here is misleading because it seems to suggest that the socialist stage of development may occur in the absence of a developed capitalist system. Marx, however, was but an admirer of such an idea, and had been engaged with the Russian situation only in passing. Furthermore, his statements about a possible socialist revolution without the capitalist stage were impacted by his own health problems in the 1870s. (29) Having been impressed by the Paris Commune, he was also interested in the revolutionary tradition established by the Narodniks. Since he considered the Russian experience different, he had a particular pleasure in reading, for example, N. G. Chernyshevsky's writings on the possibility of socialism without the capitalist stage. (30)

One question that might well raise some doubt is whether Lenin, in his desire to justify an unpropitious revolution, was guided by his reading of Marx's interest in the Russian context in the 1870s. The answer to this question must not, as I firmly believe, exclude the supposition that Lenin was only moved by Marx's and Engels' writing on the Paris Commune and Russian Populism. In posing this question, I would like to assert that the alleged continuity between Marx and Lenin is but an *artificial* continuity which Lenin, in his rush to legitimate his faithfulness to Marx and Engels, made the basis of his thought and work. The continuity between Lenin and Marx on the basis of the latter's views on the Commune and the Narodniks is a *forced* one at best. I will address such an artificial continuity in relation to my "leviathan" argument in Part four of this thesis.

Lenin advances his argument for the necessity of theoretical struggle by primarily arguing against the trends of Russian Marxism which had, according to him, dispossessed scientific socialism of its theoretical and practical consistency. According to him, the unity of theory and practice in militant politics does largely warrant possibilities of action relating to an intelligent management of that unity. Since theory should necessarily lead to an opportune

practice—characterised by conscious action on the part of the workers—a practice without theoretical legitimacy can only lead to the fragmentation of Social-Democracy as a world mass movement. '[I]n order to be able to provide the workers with real, universal, and live political knowledge', Lenin writes, 'we must have "our own men," Social-Democrats, everywhere, among all social strata...Such men are required for propaganda and agitation, but in a still larger measure for organisation.' (31)

2/ Social-Democracy and the Russian Context:

Lenin's reliance on the work of Marx and Engels has to do also with his evaluation of the Russian Social-Democratic movement in relation to that of Germany. In order to present his formula of the Russian Social-Democracy, he employs Engels's position with regard to theory and practice. (32) Lenin was also anxious to brush aside the possibility of advancing practice at the expense of theory. In terms of method, the process of struggle should be based not on the immediate Russian context, mainly because such a context could not reasonably allow a marriage between the present Russian form of Marxism and a working class movement that was already in 'embryo' (33) For him, that was a matter of historical continuity wherein ideology (Marxist doctrine, etc) adapted to the Russian context, together with different contexts for the development of Social-Democracy (Germany, etc), would directly dovetail with working class struggle in Russia. For this reason, the Russian variant of Marxism would be stagnated at the level of 'spontaneous' politics if it failed to learn from the German version which had by then reached its apogee. (34) Besides, this stagnation would be more problematic in the presence of other objective obstacles imposed by, for example, the different Marxist parties (Socialist Revolutionaries, etc).

In view of this Lenin raised the question of how to draw upon specific tactics in order to achieve a German Social-Democratic level work with a possible Marxian practice fit for

and linear with a Marxian theory. In other words, it was Lenin's concern to focus both on the doctrinal importance of Marxian theory and the immediate organisation of workers' struggle; this means that he, as he argues in most of his work, attached so much importance to the canonical reading of the Marxian text and its conversion into practical politics (35) What follows from this is the question of political practice in relation to a party education on the basis of the Marxian text: it is the task of who would teach who, and which version of Marxism should be taught; that implies that the question of organisation was an urgent matter to grapple with. In order to acquire Social-Democratic consciousness, the working class need to distinguish between trade unionism and political struggle.

Lenin's answer to the above question is illustrated in *WBD*. This work was certainly based on the attempt to read Marxism with a careful consideration of the Russian context. Lenin's focus on the European experience, from the Paris Commune onwards, constituted for him the very objective condition allowing the welding of a Marxist theoretical history with a Marxist practical present. Thus the theoretical struggle for an accomplishment of Social-Democratic consciousness for the Russian workers constituted the specificity of Lenin's own theory of revolution. On the other hand, Lenin's preoccupation with the complementarity of theory and practice was closely linked to his understanding of the continuity between ideology and the labour movement. For him, the Russian context could be fully reckoned with only in the attempt to approach the European theoretical and practical experience in its entirety. As for theory the Russian intelligentsia could benefit from France (etc), and in terms of practice it had to build on the German Social-Democracy. (36)

3/ Theoretical Knowledge and the Task of Social-Democracy:

In no way can a scholar acquainted with Lenin's early work deny or overlook the importance of theory in his overall argumentation. It is equally quite important to appraise this

central theme in relation to his intellectual pedigree. In arguing so, the reader of Marxism's history on this basis would definitely trace the influence of the authors of *The Communist Manifesto*. The influence was, of course, not dissociated from general circumstances of political and economic import, and which Lenin himself capitalised in order to arrogate both Marx and Engels to his own ideological ends—by claiming his birthright to Marxian thought (thus axing all other claimants like the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries). In studying Marx's and Engels's influence on Lenin, I attempt here to shed some light on the weight of 'theoretical knowledge.' Theoretical knowledge is significant because it was, as Lenin maintained, an essential component of revolutionary struggle without which proletarian consciousness is unthinkable. For this reason, Engels's and Marx's work was of particular resonance. (37) Although in *WBD* Lenin sketches in full detail the importance of theory in getting the workers to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, he, for all of the novelty of this work, relies heavily on Engels's belief in the necessity of theoretical struggle (a position so much akin to his deployment of Engels's concept of a 'workers' state' as is broached in *The State and Revolution*). Yet, Lenin's general position in his overall work on the workers' consciousness does in many instances focus on why theoretical struggle forms the basis of a strong party organisation. In *WBD* there are two capital arguments which make up Lenin's very theory of party organisation: 1) the critique of economism; and 2) the importance of Engels's and Marx's views on the necessity of theoretical knowledge. Probably Lenin thought so because he was aware of the significance of theory to both Marx and Engels: 'Without knowledge the workers are defenceless, with knowledge they are a force!' (38) Lenin's concern about a working-class consciousness that ignores trade unionism signifies greatly his desire to make the workers in tune with the leading intelligentsia.

Lenin answers the question of the necessity of theoretical knowledge by authenticating three forms of struggle elaborated by Engels: political, economic, and theoretical. (39) While

the first form of struggle is context-bound and very specific, the second is the primordial condition for any revolutionary task, and the third (40), relates to a politically self-conscious proletariat which negotiates its own emancipation from capitalist exploitation through revolutionary work. But the question here is why theoretical struggle—the third form—should be an instrumental and guiding motto. For Lenin, it was Russia's workers' condition which necessitated a very particular reading of Social-Democracy in Russia. Engels, for that, as Lenin himself maintained, was instrumental: Engels's writing on Social-Democracy was far from related to Russia, but Lenin, mostly for this fact, sought to slot Engels's interest in theoretical knowledge in his overall theoretical preoccupation that the workers are in urgent need for political consciousness.

In principle, however, both Marx and Engels were not utterly against a revolution in Russia which could be negotiable on a practical ground not necessarily comprehensive of the three forms of struggle already mentioned. That in itself, albeit somehow paradoxical in relation to Lenin's very theory of struggle, constituted a legitimate premise for Lenin who then prided both Marx and Engels on "sanctifying" a revolution in a non-Western country like Russia. Paradoxically, yet, Marx's and Engels's prospect of "illegal struggle", *violent* revolution and the spontaneous movement of the working-classes made Lenin's formula of the necessity of political struggle off at a tangent, since Lenin was mostly in favour of tactical work even in the most hostile environment: for example, by 1921 he blamed the 'Bolsheviks' boycott of the Duma in 1906.' (41) Marx and Engels had celebrated the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 as 'the formation of a Russian Commune.' (42) Marx even considered such practices as assassination a 'specifically Russian and historically inevitable method about which there is no reason...to moralize for or against' (43) In practical terms, this can be considered as an unabashed challenge to Lenin's adaptation of Engels's views in *WBD*, since Lenin regarded the tactical method of combining economic and political struggle the most

fruitful in the Russian context. However, such arguments by Marx and Engels were so open to interpretation that Lenin contended (as I show it in the opening citation of Section one) that Marxism was not a set of rigid codes to follow. Rather, it was perfectly feasible to reintroduce Marxism in Russia in accordance with circumstances particularly Russian. (44) Here the view that the Russian proletariat also needed the same training as that of the rest of the Western proletariat was in Lenin's logic very accurate.

Lenin's argument that Marx's and Engels's theory was context-adaptive carried him to the conclusion that the Russian Social-Democracy was in terrible need for a doctrinal education that would emerge from the very teaching of the authors of the *Manifesto*. That, in turn, accounted for Lenin's concern to engage the mass movement into a direct political struggle against tsarism. On the other hand, such a concern ushered in the emergence of 'theoretical struggle' as a guiding *cliché* which became characteristic of Leninism's conception of revolution; theoretical struggle meant also that a workers' struggle without a theoretical knowledge of both the Marxian text and past experiences (Germany, France, etc) would in the last analysis be reducible to a trade union struggle. Capitalising Engels for this purpose, Lenin insists that like the German workers, 'the Russian workers will have to undergo trials immeasurably...' (45) Actually, for this purpose, Lenin quotes Engels's words about the German workers:

> The German workers have two important advantages compared with the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; second they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called "educated" people of all Germany have lost...In the same manner as the German theoretical Socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint Simon, Fourier, and Owen...so the practical German labour movement must never forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it had utilised their experiences...For the first time in the history of the labour movement, the struggle is being conducted that its three sides, the

> **theoretical, the political, and the practical economic...form one harmonious and well-planned entity.** (46)

The Russian context was, of course, far-flung from that of Germany, and proletarian struggle historically and qualitatively different: there was a yawning gulf between the contexts in which the two variants of Social-Democracy developed. Nevertheless, Lenin was anxious to assert that the Russian proletariat on its part equally needed to pass through similar phases of struggle. Engels's lesson to the Russian proletariat was that they, as their German counterparts, had to acquire and develop revolutionary tools for developing their consciousness, hinging on similar tools used by Germans: the need for practical solutions (economic) necessitated the foundation of a theoretical *culture*. Therefore, the German context, having been a medium for theoretical inspiration, had to be followed only because 'without a sense of theory, scientific socialism would have never become blood and tissue of the workers.' (47)

On the other hand, Lenin's employment of Engels's ideas conveys the significance of the leading role of theory. Theory could only be fully owned by intellectual revolutionaries who had the capacity to pass on their knowledge and experiences to the labouring classes. Theoretical struggle could not be accomplished root and branch unless a certain Marxist theoretical history be traced, grasped, and deployed. It was Marx himself who ascertained that a practice with a dovetailing theory had to be imparted to the workers. In their struggle for economic emancipation, proletarians have to follow 'Communists' in terms of practice and theory, because the latter '...theoretically have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.' (48) In focussing on the necessity to acquire a German-like proletarian consciousness, Lenin saw that holding on to the *status quo* by the Russian Social-Democrats meant the historical entanglement of the workers (and by far the peasants as

well) in 'spontaneous' action (trade union), and, hence, the deadly fate of Russian Social Democracy in its entirety. For Lenin, Social-Democracy is the basis for emancipation mainly because it represents the sum total of the 'combination' of 'economic struggle and political struggle' 'into a single class struggle of the proletariat.' (49) It follows that Social-Democracy becomes here the *raison d'être* of the struggle for both economic and political emancipation.

Engels had argued in the preface to *The Civil War in France* (1871, 1970) for the necessity of theoretical knowledge. His appraisal of the Paris Commune can tell us about the importance attached to theoretical knowledge in times of working class struggle. According to Engels, the experience of the Commune could be assessed only on the basis of the character of the Commune itself. He contended that compared to the Proudhonists, the Blanquists constituted the majority in the Commune. Yet, the followers of Blanqui's ideas 'were at the time Socialists only by revolutionary, proletarian instinct...,' (50) and only the minority of Blanquists 'had attained greater clarity on principles' preached by Edward Vaillant 'who was familiar with German scientific socialism.' (51) What explains the failure of the Commune, in a way, was the inability of the workers to reach a level of consciousness tantamount to Vaillant's; scientific socialism was the revolutionary theory that had to be adopted so that the success of the mass movement against the will of the autocratic state could be asserted. The problem for Engels then was that the heroes of the Commune were in no way capable of consolidating a strong theoretical basis for the revolution: both Blanquists (as related to politics) and Proudhonists (in charge of economic matters) were blind to comprehensive measures that could have been decisive in favour of the Commune. In his words, Engels accused the two trends of French socialism of doing 'the opposite of what the doctrines of their school prescribed.' (52) What the Paris workers had to be blamed for was only the *unconscious* technical mistakes for which they were but partly responsible: both Blanquism and Proudhonism were found wanting due to their own doctrinal mistakes. Therefore, a

'proletariat socialist by instinct' is in sharp conflict with a proletariat feeding on the maturity of political experience as prescribed in the theory of scientific socialism.

In this respect, as a Russian Social-Democrat, Lenin had been greatly influenced by Marx's and Engels's views as regards the labour movement. His evaluation of the political experience of the German Social-Democrats and the practical experience of proletarians led him to draw many conclusions that, in his eyes, would benefit the Russian working class in its present condition where it lacked elementary requirements for being a revolutionary class in the scientific sense of socialism. The small shape of the proletariat, together with its unconsciousness about its historical role, made Lenin think of a formula of radical change centred on two roles: (1) to learn the lessons of German proletariat which had to pass through strenuous stages of development in order to gain unprecedented consciousness; (2) to rethink the nature of a Russian revolutionary party, and emphasise the differences from other Marxist groups (Mensheviks, etc.) But, as far as the first question is concerned, can we speak of a similitude between German workers' struggle and a Russian struggle, given that the former formally functioned within the framework of a Social-Democracy theoretically warranted by the developed socio-economic conditions in Germany, and the latter objectively stagnated by a lingering autocratic system and a state largely dependent on the vestiges of feudalism?

For Lenin, an approach to both contexts is purely technical, mainly for the difference in degree—and less in kind—between the workers' struggle in Germany and that in Russia. (53) Basic contact between the Social-Democrats and the population had been almost of no avail in the Russian context, mainly because of the autocratic basis of the Russian state: 'The Western-European Social-Democrats find their work...facilitated by the calling of public meetings, to which *all* are free to go, and by the parliament, in which they speak to the representatives of *all* classes. We have neither a parliament, nor the freedom to call meetings...' (54) The difference thus was that the enemy of the workers in Germany was less

complex, and therefore, easier to deal with: 'In a word, the Germans stand for what is and reject the changes; we demand changes, and reject subservience to, reconciliation with what is.' (55) Thus conceived, the struggle according to Lenin is much harder for the Russian proletariat, only because Germans are in a position of power vis-à-vis their critics and enemies—especially with the existence of universal suffrage—while Russians are on the defensive. What is more, Germans and Russians are also different when it comes to their respective realities. Lenin argued that it was 'the absence of recognized party ties and party traditions' which made the Russian version of Social-Democracy less responsive to the necessity of efficient struggle. This, in turn, made the workers and peasants unable, or, at best, less inclined to engage politically in throwing away the order dictated by the tsar.

Lenin was particularly conscious of the hard task awaiting the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) mainly not only for the difficult objective circumstances in tsarist Russia but also for the battle over who would eventually organise the struggle, and over what means should be deployed: since the formation of the party in 1898 Lenin had to struggle over, for example, issues relating to the Central Organ (Iskra) and the Central Committee. The split of the RSDLP at the Second Congress in 1903 widened the conflict between the Iskra-dominating group (Mensheviks) and the Bolsheviks who controlled the Central Committee of the party. In this respect, Lenin's view of the task of Russian Social-Democracy was also confused by the opposing political position of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (Chernov, etc.). Lenin's insistence on summoning the Third Party Congress (1904) for example attested to the condition of quandary in which the Bolsheviks were caught up.

The organisation under the three forms of struggle accentuated by Engels meant that the leading body would be the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. This, in turn, means that the RSDLP would form the basis of all forms of struggle and that the party must

technically be conceived as 'the vanguard' of proletarians. In consequence, the workers should redefine their tasks. They should pre-suppose that their unity is contingent on the degree of their loyalty to a leading party: '[T]he Social Democratic Party as the vanguard of the working class must not be confused with the entire class'" (56) Such was the position of Lenin when he started over by considering the necessity to unite the three forms of struggle spelled out by Engels. However, in practical sense, Lenin's focus on the absence of party traditions in Russia was an invitation to give the Social-Democratic movement there more authority in asserting "Marxist" principles: the immediate method of action had to follow characteristically from the evaluation of the experience of the German Social-Democracy and the position of the socialist movement at the time of the Paris Commune.

Theoretical struggle in this sense means the foundation of a party prerogative—following from the German experience—ordaining the unity between the workers and their leaders on the basis of the theoretical knowledge passed on to the proletariat. As Andrzej Walicki reminds us, Lenin forged his theory of the vanguard by basing his suppositions on the rich history of Social-Democracy. (57) The foundation of a strong party tradition was however not only inspired by the work of Engels and Marx but also both the Russian and German variants of Marxism: mainly Plekhanovism and Kautskyism. These two variants had the lion's share in inspiring and, thus, composing Lenin's theory of the vanguard As Leszek Kolakowski points out, Russian Marxism (post-Narodnik, I would argue) had not only impacted the way Lenin saw the necessity of theoretical struggle but also his conception of the class struggle as a whole. (58) Yet, Lenin differed from those theoreticians in the sense that he sanctioned the adaptability of Marxian scientific socialism to different contexts of differing socio-economic bases. This transformed his socialist theory into a system-adaptive theory. (59) He conceived of Russia as a rather complex context in which the immediate demands of working people were far unsafely entrenched in the present backward economy.

(60) And it was that fact which made him re-read Marxian theory on the basis of the new reality. For him it would be contingent to try to liken such Social-Democratic demands to the *advanced* form of the German Social-Democracy. (61) The solution would be to lay the ground for a Russian Social-Democratic experience that had to "overlook", albeit consciously and temporarily, the bourgeois basis that, in the Marxian sense, is at the origin of the proletarian revolution.

II. Party Vanguardism and the Bolsheviks:

1/ The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party as "Party of a New Type":

The period of Bolshevism's emergence (62), and which Stalin himself traces in his essay "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" (63) was that which emanated straight from the disagreements with the Menshevik faction over issues of RSDLP programme, methods of struggle (reformism or militancy, etc), and institutional tasks (Iskra, etc.). A few years before the 1903 split, Lenin had been concerned with the possibility to forge an all-class alliance within the framework of RSDLP. In his "The Fight for a Marxist Party" (1946), he stressed the capital importance of 'consolidating' the Social-Democratic Party as a 'revolutionary party', and making use of a 'unified Party program' (64) This is also clearly pronounced in *WBD*: 'to bring political knowledge to the workers the Social-Democrats must go among all classes of the population, must despatch units of their army in all directions.' (65) The pronouncement of a Marxist party being principally entrenched in Social-Democracy clearly signifies that Lenin greatly valued the Social-Democratic programme as developed in Western Europe first and advanced towards Russia itself later. A 'unified Party program' meant that the theory of socialism was conceived in relation to Lenin's sustained belief in the possibility to forge a strong Social-Democratic Party in Russia, regardless of differences or contrasts between party sections. The founding Marxists in

Russia, for example, like Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasulich were at first not in conflict with Lenin . Their connection with him had been fortified through such media as the literary and political review *Sotisial Democrat* (The Social-Democrat) in which they had communicated their revolutionary ideas to the Russian proletariat between 1890 and 1892. (66)

The concept of a Marxist party following from an alliance between Social-Democrats precedes the beginning of conflict which arose after the foundation of the RSDLP. The seeds of a Social-Democratic party might well be attributed to the period of the St Petersburg textile workers' strike in 1896: it was even heralded by the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in 1895, chiefly led by Lenin. (67) Although the period between the formation of the RSDLP and its split was extremely short, (1898-1903) the idea of a unity of Social-Democrats in a Marxist party was not totally unworkable. It started with the League in response to working class economic discontent. In *WBD* Lenin clearly reveals such a historic possibility to stand up against official Russia. The formula for him was three-fold: 1) the Russian socialist intellectual leaders should lay the foundation for an independent Social-Democratic party that responds to the contextual specificities of Russia ; 2) the experience of the German Social-Democracy should be highly considered and respected; and 3) the Russian workers should be guided in order to establish a 'party tradition'. All three components would be indispensable in deciding a possible future for the existence of a Marxist party in Russia. Lenin did that in extremely limiting circumstances where the Russian Social-Democracy was still in embryo and he himself exiled to Eastern Siberia (68) But his insistence on a Russian party tradition meant also an unabashed refutation of the early form of Russian socialism, namely Narodnism (69) which, as previously mentioned, had been praised by the authors of the *Communist Manifesto* themselves. Lenin did not differ fundamentally from other Russian Marxists who were anxious to break away with 'revolutionary Narodism' by the 1880s (70) (only to assert his full support of Russian Marxism as had developed since the early 1880s

with Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich, and Paul Axelrod.) Yet, the other work to do was to try in those same circumstances to make use of the experience of the Russian Marxists and to learn from the German Social-Democracy. It is from that instance that his particular conception of Russian politics was forged. (71) The entire idea of having a party cemented by mass support and an organising leading 'elite' demarcates Lenin's very reliance on the role of a socialist party that is capable of blending the German and local experiences. (also a party strongly sustained by the technical basis provided by the central organ and the Central Committee) (72)

Lenin's position in relation to a Marxist party in Russia led Benett Becker back in 1937 to draw some kind of comparison between Marx's concept of "historical materialism" and Lenin's view of the leading role of revolutionaries. In Russia, Becker argued, Lenin wanted anxiously to prove that 'historical coincidence' forced the emergence of the 'vanguard leaders', which implied putting at work Marx's formula of the necessity 'to change the world' rather than 'interpret it' (73) This implies that reality and circumstances are not some thing of our choice, and the moment we seize upon an opportunity to *change* them we must be actuated by whatever means to push for the change. In Leninist logic, this is in total harmony with the Marxian theoretical grounds whereupon the scientific thrust of historical materialism is predicated. Yet, for Lenin, the change cannot be achieved without capitalising the very teaching of historical materialism, and without party organisation and rigour. Actually, to galvanise the working class into revolutionary action, Lenin asserted that the struggle for emancipation necessitated not the call for 'reform' as the economists believed but political struggle. The struggle for a Marxist party was then impacted by the necessity to establish a strong Russian Social-Democratic party premised on "order and discipline" and feeding on the constructive role of the 'vanguard'. This is what would prove Marx's predictions true.

Nevertheless, the supposition that the leading vanguard can be an efficient, if not the only efficient, way to apply Marx's historical materialist logic to reality is a misleading supposition. "Changing" the world through the leading party would, I firmly argue here, reduce Marx's historical materialism to an elitist theory which serves the party leadership rather than the proletariat as a whole. Lenin's argument in *WBD* that Russia needs a 'strong party tradition' was to translate his overall concern to codify a certain view of party organisation pedantically grounded on a "deviant" (from German orthodoxy for instance) reading of Marx's theory of revolution. While primarily not against the spirit of the Social-Democracy characteristic of Germany until 1914, Lenin's reading was rather an attempt to distance his conception of revolutionary work from that of the Legal Marxists, the Mensheviks, and the Socialist Revolutionaries. (74) In a sense, it is Lenin's difference from such Marxists which renders his version of Marxism problematic. Lenin, of course, was moved by objective constraints reflecting the Russian context, and was hardly keen to consider Marxism as a doctrine of strictly inflexible codes. It was for this reason that he drew on a very specific strategy in his preparation for the October Revolution. It was for the same reason that he attacked what he called the "centrist" and "defencist" trends in Social-Democracy which began to emerge as early as World War I.

2/ Lenin, Party Centralism, and the Critics :

Lenin began to forge his specific conception of the party as early as 1904. This came shortly after the foundation of the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democracy. Lenin expounds his theory of the party in *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.* His argument draws on two main questions: party organisation and primacy of leadership. (75) As far as the question of organisation is concerned, Lenin suggests that the true foundation of a strong Russian Social-Democracy cannot be carried out without clearly ascertaining a level of party

organisation that would guarantee the success of the labour movement in its fight against tsarism and opportunism. For this reason there must be a 'social democratic centralism' that derives its legitimacy from, first, the Central Committee and, second, the rest of the party branches (the party congress, etc.)

As for the second point, importance of the leadership, Lenin saw that it was necessary for the proletariat to gain political consciousness through the help of the leading intellectuals of the party (76); it follows that party membership should be highly exclusive. In the first place the proletariat is not directly involved in party organisation, and the majority of the workers have to act from outside the party branches, thus awaiting the intelligentsia to introduce them to the party's structure and programme. This had been clearly confirmed before the split: '[I]t is no longer the proletarians but certain intellectuals in our party who need to be educated in the matters of organization and discipline.' (77) Lenin's definition of party membership is focussed on the concentration of the highly organisational tasks in the hands of elite of intellectuals who 'devote not their '"spare evenings" but their entire existence to the revolution. They would bring class consciousness to the Russian proletariat from without.' 'This organisation of Russian Social Democrats should', Lenin asserted, 'maintain rigid secrecy and specialization of functions.' (78)

Lenin's definition of the party and the party tasks was to reduce the role of the Mensheviks who both Luxemburg and Trotsky sympathized with in protest against Lenin's "extremist" theorisation of the role of the leadership. Rosa Luxemburg responded to Lenin's definition of the party by backing Martov's vision of the party and organisation. (79) She expressed her dissatisfaction with what she saw as Lenin's rigid attitude towards party organisation and membership. In her "Leninism or Marxism"—originally "Organizational Questions of the Russian Social Democracy" (1904)—she argued that Lenin's reading of Marxism was erroneous in two respects: 1) exaggeration of the role of the 'centre' in relation

to the rest of the proletariat and 2) forcing very intolerant conditions for accepting and recruiting party members. '*Lenin's concern*', Luxemburg writes, '*is not so much to make the activity of the party more fruitful as to control the party—to narrow the movement rather than to develop it, to bind rather than to unify it.*' (80) Here Luxemburg thinks that the question of centralisation in Lenin's Russia is far from responsive to the *forced* necessity to establish a strong Social-Democratic party "temporarily" dominated by its leading organising centre. For her, there is no error in accepting centralised party rule in the absence of the 'rule of the majority of conscious workers in the party' (81). Yet Lenin's strategy demanded more than the mere task of founding a "provisional" supremacy by the Central Committee over the working class movement. Luxemburg argued that Lenin's definition of the role of the centre tries to reconcile—and thus confuses—Marxian and non-Marxian organisational questions.

Much of the same concern was raised by Leon Trotsky who attacked Lenin's views of the party by claiming that the working class must not be dissociated from the leading revolutionaries. In *Our Political Tasks* (1904) he emphasised that 'the group of "professional revolutionaries" was not marching at the head of the conscious proletariat, it was acting...in the place of the proletariat.' (82) This according to Trotsky made Lenin's party amount to a one-man dictatorship: the whole class was supplanted by the party, the party by the Central Committee, and the Central Committee by the leader. (83) Luxemburg, on the other hand, sharply criticised Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward* '"for its ultra-centralism" and its denial of the "creative role" of the proletarian masses into the socialist movement'. The fact that Lenin relies for his legitimation on the explanation of Blanquism in relation to Social-Democracy poses a grave problem for the Social-Democratic movement. Luxemburg sees that, apart from Lenin's unconditional support of centralism, Blanquism cannot be viewed as an organised movement that blends in a harmonious way the doctrinal principles of the leading 'revolutionists' and the 'spontaneous' action of the workers. Blanquism builds on

'conspiratorial' politics—with 'the mass at some distance' (84)—while Social-Democracy 'reckons...on the organization and the direct, independent action of the masses.' (85) She proceeds by arguing that spontaneous mass strikes have in many instances proved more availing than the organising centre believes. She gives the example of the 1896, 1901, and 1903 strikes in St Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don. (86) Her justification is that the 'unconscious' might well 'come before the conscious' (87) and that unorganised mass insurgence might lead to better results. This contradicts so much with Lenin's point concerning the necessity of party leadership in actuating proletarian struggle for emancipation.

To view Social-Democracy as Lenin does, Luxemburg thinks, is to take a position characteristically alien to the socialist movement. For her, the socialist movement could only spring from the unity of the toiling classes and the leading revolutionaries. To draw such a parallel between the differing theoretical and contextual elements of Russia and France would amount not only to a methodical anomaly but also to a serious misreading of the theory of scientific socialism. In Luxemburg's view the Blanquists during the Franco-Prussian war were actuated by 'conspiracy' while their mass basis acted in extremely pressing circumstances; such a mass found itself almost entirely unconscious of its historical role and class interests. (88) However, the Social-Democrats in Russia were socialists who had to act according to the theory of scientific socialism as advanced by Marx. Such a theory posits the workers as the class which in its struggle against all forms of exploitation would terminate all class rule and therefore all state rule. (89)

3/ Lenin and the Nature of Bolshevism:

Not long ago Lars T. Lih raised the question whether *WBD* constituted a "profound revision of orthodox Marxism," and whether the guiding theory of Lenin in this work became

itself synonymous with Bolshevism as developed after the split between the two main factions of the RSDLP. (90) Lih answers this question by arguing that 'the textbook interpretation' of *WBD* is 'profoundly incorrect' (91), and that such a single work did in a very little sense present Bolshevism's worldview, and could hardly be dubbed 'a founding document.' (92) He assertively thinks that the significance of this work has been wrongly conceived by such scholars as Adam Ulam and Alfred Meyer (93) *WBD*, Lih adds, only discussed and debated temporary issues relating principally to the question of the Social Democratic Party organisation and the critique of the 'émigré journal *Robochee Delo*.' (94) *WBD*, on the other hand, can only be considered as a blueprint for negotiating a political reality in which Social Democratic leadership would guide the would-be proletarian vanguard (95) Lih's critique of what he calls 'the textbook interpretation' poses the challenging question whether there was an organic link between the content of *WBD* and the essence of Bolshevism, and whether Bolshevism was inherent in Lenin's general theory as was developed in *WBD*.

If Bolshevism should be defined as the theory of socialism which pre-supposes a vertical (unequal) relationship between the party leadership and the working class, one might well assert that it was in *WBD* that Bolshevism took shape. But if one should suppose that Bolshevism preached a horizontal (constructive and equal) relationship between the 'professional revolutionaries' and the proletariat, one would argue that *WBD* was anything but an articulation of Bolshevism. In the eyes of its critics (Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Luxemburg, etc.) Bolshevism was particularly obsessed with centralisation, strict discipline, and intolerance. *WBD*, on the other hand, formed the basis for these categories. (96) But the other question is whether, as the critics maintain, scientific socialism as a revolutionary theory was erroneously approached in *WBD*, and became an ideological instrument for trading an authoritarian state. What proved accurate some of the critical responses to *WBD* was the fact

that Lenin changed his positions in such much more mature works as *The State and Revolution*, and showed more flexible attitudes to the question of the state.

It is true, I would argue, that the link between *WBD* and authoritarianism (97) is clear-cut. Yet, suggesting that Lenin's ideas became less doctrinaire in *The State and Revolution* is not a totally convincing argument. There is an alternative argument which can be raised in this respect: Lenin's struggle for centralism, discipline, and a powerful state was not absent in *The State and Revolution*. He continued emphasising their importance by tacit means. Centralism was accentuated, albeit implicitly, by Lenin's rejection of 'parliamentarianism' in such works as the "April Theses" and *The State and Revolution*. '...We can and *must* imagine democracy without parliamentarianism.' (98) On the other hand, the "democratic" proletarian state remains a controversial issue in Lenin's treatment of the subject. He emphasises that the experience of 'smashing' the state in Russia should be guided by a logic akin to that of the Paris Commune; the state, in its bourgeois dimension, *must* be 'smashed' not by means prescribed by Marx or Engels; it should be dissolved through

> the *experience* of the mass movement' which would 'provide the answer to the question as to what specific forms this organization of the proletariat as the ruling class would assume and as to the exact manner whereby this organization would be combined with the most complete and consistent 'conquest of democracy. (99)

In dealing with the task of smashing the state, Lenin intentionally makes implicit the centrality of the vanguard since he mixes up the respective roles of the party leadership and the proletariat:

> we are not utopians. We do not have 'dreams' about dispensing at once with all administration, with all subordination...we want the socialist revolution with people as they are now, with people who cannot dispense with subordination, with control...But the subordination must be to the armed vanguard of all

> the exploited and labouring people, to the *proletariat* (my italics)...We *ourselves* (Lenin's italics), the workers, will organize large-scale production on the basis of what has already been created by capitalism, relying on our experience as workers, establishing strict, iron *discipline* (my italics) supported by the state power of the armed workers... (100)

Two significant points appear in Lenin's conception of the task of the new state. First, the necessity to continue 'demonstration,' 'subordination' and 'control'; second, the close link between the proletariat and the leadership. Here Lenin does not mention the leading Bolsheviks by name, but calls them 'we *ourselves*, the workers.' The only distinction he makes is between the 'armed vanguard' (the working class) and the 'organizing' vanguard (political leadership). Such a distinction is not of kind but has to do with their respective functions.

The attempt by Lenin to identify the tasks of the leadership and the working class does itself confirm his early (especially in *WBD*) belief in a necessary division of labour where the party plays the central role politically whereas proletarians form the 'armed force' for the party. As a matter of fact, the rise of the Soviet authoritarian state in 1918 might well be said to have such a division of labour at origin. The link between the vanguard and the workers, as prescribed in the above-quoted paragraph, should come in the shape of a binding contract whereby the party-state imposes '*strict*, iron discipline' and the working people only 'support' 'state power.' In my view, this binding contract is but closely tantamount to the "leviathan" contract between the 'sovereign' and his subjects as is theorised by Thomas Hobbes in his political philosophy. This argument is central to my thesis, and will be examined in Part Four of this work.

Although Bolshevik thinking is closely related to Lenin's *WBD*, it should be noted that not only this work can be considered as the blueprint for Bolshevism. True, some of the theoretical premises of Bolshevism can be traced back to *WBD*, yet studying the latter as a

single work would by no means provide a thorough account of the degree of Lenin's application of Marxism. Here, Lih's claim, I would argue, seems more forceful than that of the "totalitarian model," basically because *WBD* cannot explain the entirety of the Bolshevik worldview. Lenin broaches the essence and function of Bolshevism only in such works as *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder* (1921). In chapter two of *Left-Wing Communism* Lenin argues that the success of Bolshevism historically had been conditioned not only by the rigour of the Bolsheviks to assimilate and put at work 'Marxian theory' but also thanks to the 'ramblings, vacillations, mistakes and disappointments of revolutionary thought in Russia (including the early forms of Russian Marxism), the importance of 'checking and comparison with the European experience' and 'the rich international connections'. (101)

Lenin assertively adds that Bolshevism was a true application of Marxism only because it communicated the message that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fiercest and most merciless war of the new class against its more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie...' (102) Bolshevism also fully fathomed the nature of the bourgeoisie and its class war against the workers. (103) In terms of its constructive role leading to the revolution over the bourgeoisie, Bolshevism, Lenin firmly puts it, is the combination of 'the proletarian vanguard' (the source of proletarian consciousness) and society as a whole (including working class and lumpen) (104) Here one cannot deny that Lenin's analysis of the success of Bolsheviks in his *Left-Wing Communism* and other works was primarily accounted for by his conception of the party, revolution, and emancipation as is broached in his early work. In *WBD* Lenin's concern about the condition of Social-Democracy in Russia is expressed through his call upon "true" Social-Democrats to despise economism, rally round the vanguard, and learn from European and non-European experiences. In my view, Bolshevism represented more than what was theorised in *WBD*. Bolshevism, it seems to me, practically

developed through two different stages: 1903-1917 and 1917-1923. The first stage had to do with the development of Social-Democracy (nationally) and the Second International; the second with the Communist Party and the Comintern.

As for the first period of development (which is my concern here), the ideology of Bolshevism was first officially declared in 1903 after the split of the two groups constituting the RSDLP. It emerged with its opposing counterpart Menshevism. The alleged chief principle of the Bolshevik party was to defend the Marxist tradition against what the Bolsheviks called 'reformism' and the heavy reliance on parliamentary democracy. Revolutionary politics necessitated that the leading role in revolutionary work should go to the intellectual revolutionaries of the movement. The workers in turn had to follow the path drawn by such intellectuals. The division of the proletarian vanguard and the working class was what accounted for Lenin's specific theorisation of the party, party membership, revolution, the withering away of the state, etc. This was accentuated by his famous 'dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' forged in 1905, and which bore the first prints of his very revision of Marx's original formula of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (105) This, on the other hand, was one of the defining characteristics of the theory of Bolshevism.

Probably because Lenin was wholly aware of Russia's difficulty to face up the future challenges to a socialism that starts over not from a capitalist context, he then had to ensure a safe path to the development of an "inopportune" socialism. But to do so, he first had to forge a theory co-extensive with, and not wholly deviant from, Marx's theory of revolution. One of the most compelling questions which preoccupied Lenin in his attempt to maintain a level of party organisation that would not disregard the technical basis for carrying out a revolution was how to deal with the Russian political context with a view of socialism substantially obstructed by the absence of a majority of the proletariat in a peasant-based society. To bridge such a gulf Lenin had to prop up his theory of the vanguard by focussing on the necessity to

have a class alliance between the industrial workers and the peasantry. His attitude towards a revolutionary peasantry that could help change the *status quo* had started as early as 1905. And there was a very particular element that Lenin considered in evaluating the experiences of the Russian peasants: violence as unorganised struggle.

III/ The Question of Revolution:

1/ The Role of the Party and the "Untimely" Revolution:

Lenin based his theory of revolution on the central role of the party. On the other hand, for him, the path to a strong Bolshevik party resided in the combination of Marx's scientific socialism with his own theory of the vanguard. In principle, he hardly differed from Marx and Engels as regards the role of petty-Bourgeois intellectuals in the working class movement. (106) Yet, his conception of the vanguard was often carried to an excess as it took Marx's and Engels's original concept of the party beyond what they theorised. On the other hand, central to both is the principle of proceeding to revolutionary work through scientific socialism against other forms of socialism. Here, the question is whether Lenin forged his theory of revolution on an elitist attitude that had to do with his "obsession" with the 'professional revolutionaries' as was first forged in *WBD*. The question is also whether Lenin should be scolded for assigning a leading role to the intellectual elite. Some critics do totally oppose this suggestion. For Lih, Lenin did in no way suggest that the proletarian movement should be drowned by the Social Democratic intelligentsia. This is articulated by such Mensheviks as Potresov. Potresov, Lih affirms, rightly argued that "bringing socialist consciousness to the workers" is not meant as an insult to the workers but as an invitation to the *praktiki* to exercise inspiring leadership.' (107)

One might also argue that the disjunction that arises from Lenin's heavy reliance on the professional revolutionaries is also indicative of the quandary of "Marxism" in its entirety

when it comes to the question of the relationship between the elite of revolutionaries and the workers. Marx himself was criticised for the same position by Bakunin who thought that in Marx's theory proletarians were left under the mercy of an elite believing themselves to be the protectors of society. (108) This comparison between Marx and Lenin might, I would argue, mislead the reader. Marx's view of the working class was different from that of Lenin in great part. Marx and Engels assert in the *Communist Manifesto* that the Communists 'do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.' (109) Lenin, on the other hand, encouraged such 'sectarian principles' without calling them "sectarian"; his contempt for working class consciousness, and his drive for establishing a hierarchical relationship between the party leadership and the rest of the proletariat were but symptomatic of his theoretical and technical separation of such two categories. Whether a criticism of Lenin on this basis is valid remains to be revealed in what follows.

As previously mentioned, in Lenin's view (based on Engels) the relationship between the revolutionary party and the proletariat resides in the unity between three forms of consciousness (political, economic, and theoretical). But the combination of the three forms is only theoretically feasible. There were objective obstacles which prevented Lenin from forging a practical solution premised on the unity of the forms in question. It was the Polish revolutionary Luxemburg who, in spite of being inconsistent while treating Lenin's work, defended Lenin's position as regards the possibility of revolution in Russia. In response to Lenin's theory of revolution she articulated, and thus justified, the difficulties facing Lenin and Bolshevism in grappling with the task of leading the Russian Social-Democracy to a successful stage:

> Everything that happens in Russia is comprehensible and represents a chain of causes and effects, the straight point and end term of which are: the failure of the German proletariat and the occupation of Russia by German imperialism. It would be demanding something superhuman from Lenin and his comrades if we should expect of them that under such circumstances they should conjure forth the finest democracy, the most exemplary dictatorship of the proletariat and a flourishing socialist economy. (110)

There is a great degree of accuracy in Luxemburg's claim that the 'failure of German proletariat' and Russia's occupation by German forces constituted the most compelling circumstance which prevented Bolshevik revolutionaries from guiding their movement towards a resolute dictatorship of the proletariat. That objective question was Lenin's concern too, especially as he explained the complexity of the workers' movement in its German version. As Luxemburg noted, circumstances obliged Lenin to re-read Marxian theory in the hope of adapting it to a reality that stands in sharp contrast with the economic reality envisaged by Marx. Here the argument advanced by Luxemburg is emphasised in her view that the Bolsheviks were compelled by historical necessity to force Social-Democracy in a pre-bourgeois Russian context (autonomy, landed interest etc) (111)

The difficulty facing Russian revolutionaries was 'how to create a Social Democratic movement at a time when the state is not yet in the hands of the Bourgeoisie' (112) The transition to socialism according to Luxemburg could by no means happen in circumstances dictated by a political situation the technical basis of which had not ushered in a bourgeois order. The transition from feudalism to capitalism, which had hitherto been a defining characteristic of England, France, Germany, and the USA, could take centuries for Russia. Then, the major complexity in Russia was that the socialists sought to "jump" from one bank of the river to another without appropriating the tools necessary to perform such a jump. But was such a jump a forced necessity, or at least a justifiable move according to Luxemburg?

The form of the state in tsarist Russia necessitated that the socialist movement *had* to deal with two contrasting and unfavourable alternatives, each fraught with uncertainties. The first choice means that the Russian Social-Democrats should start from a rudimentary stage and "rush" the technical and economic forces of change so that the transition to the bourgeois stage would take place *forcibly*, even in the long run; that in and of itself would demand a revolution against the pseudo-feudal mode of production, which would only occur by toppling the tsarist political order through a strong alliance between the peasants and proletariat. (113) If it should opt for this first alternative, the socialist movement had by then to force itself to advance towards revolutionary action against official Russia, whether it be clad in aristocratic or bourgeois mantle. The second choice left for the Russian Socialists was the immediate organisation of a Social-Democracy that would be forced on a society which had not yet moved to the bourgeois epoch: it was the latter choice that the Russian socialist movement had adopted—and which Luxemburg supported. Such a movement was, of course, insinuated by Lenin, and cannot be attributed to the first form of Russian Marxism as evolved with Plekhanov, Zasulich, and Axelrod.

Lenin's re-reading of Marx and Engels on the basis of the pressing circumstances in Russia has been thoroughly addressed in the work of John Hoffman. (114) Hoffman has been critical of Lenin, mainly for his suggestion that the particular context of Russia allowed for no other alternative but an 'untimely' proletarian revolution. By referring to Lenin's idea of the necessity of 'experience'—as is shown in *The State and Revolution*—Hoffman argues that following from a Marxian logic, Lenin and the rest of the Bolsheviks were '"compelled" to embrace a practice in radical tension with their theory.' (115) Legitimating the necessity to carry out the October Revolution, Lenin condemned the Soviet state to 'slide towards authoritarianism.' Lenin was then forced to 'argue for a revolutionary state significantly different from the democratic republic.' (116) Hoffman has, I think, usefully pointed out an

underlying cause behind the rise of the authoritarian state in Soviet Russia: 'the circumstances argument.' The "circumstances argument" cannot, however, explain every thing. The authoritarian state in Soviet Russia originates more from the experience of the Civil War and "War Communism." (117) The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1918 was but a prelude to what occurred later.

In the early period of the evolution of the socialist movement in its Leninist face, where Russian Social-Democracy was on the wane, Luxemburg and other revolutionaries, including Trotsky, could only hope for the consolidation of a working class movement which would rid the masses of absolutist monarchy. This attitude, being taken by Luxemburg in response to Lenin's views, was that the Russian socialists had to read the defining difference between the Social-Democratic movement in Germany and the one characteristic of Russia. Basically Russian society differed fundamentally from that of Germany. (118) It would only be a folly to equate the crises of the German and Russian Social Democrats: in Germany the bourgeoisie controlled the state; in Russia the state was absolutist and feudal-like, and the Russian Social-Democracy was functioning in a medium 'alien' to it. Luxemburg argued that it would so much resemble an "anachronism" to 'draw a parallel between the present Russian situation and that which existed in Germany during the years 1878-90...' (119)

Lenin himself was self-contradictory while dealing with the two versions of Social-Democracy. He, on one hand, believes that the German Social-Democracy is essential for Russia, and affirms, on the other, that the particularity of the Russian context demands a break with all forms of workers' resistance (including that of Germany) and a foundation of a particularly Russian experience that must be '*internationalised*': 'History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is more *revolutionary than all the immediate tasks* that confront the proletariat of any other country. The fulfilment of this task...places the Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat.' (120) More than

being an evaluation of political practice, such a comparison is anxious to emphasise the fact that morally and physically both German and Russian workers needed to go through different experiences, with a fight against two different 'monsters'. For Lenin, the Anti-socialist Laws in Germany were not worse than tsar's Russia (121), and the trials awaiting the Russian proletariat were neither less severe nor less historically suggestive than those against the German working class. On the other hand, Lenin did not see any danger in temporarily depreciating the transition to the bourgeois stage of development while carrying out the proletarian revolution. He thought so because he could forge the theoretical basis for the jump to socialism. The peasantry as a social force, for example, could then be utilised as a propulsion for revolution, since, as a majority, it was the practical agent to advance towards socialist triumph even far earlier than full industrial proletarianisation could happen. Such a conclusion was to respond to the constructive role of the peasants in the 1905 revolution.

Lenin's position in this context was against the manner in which the Russian Marxists generally had conceived of the struggle for workers' emancipation. To a great extent, Lenin's reinterpretation of scientific socialism on the basis of his new formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry (1905) was problematic for the rest of the Marxists who still had a strong belief in proceeding smoothly to the socialist stage. Trotsky for instance thought that Lenin's formula was far too untimely, and sought to supplant it through forging his concept of 'permanent revolution' in the same year. For many, Lenin's formula was not so much a question of ideology as was a party and regime legitimacy claim. A political historian might well emphasise what Jonathan Frankel described as the possibility of revolutionary Marxism to 'give time' to 'bourgeois democracy...to ensure the final defeat of tsarism and to permit the Marxist party to transform itself from an underground elite into a mass movement of the working class.' (122) Lenin himself, on returning to Russia after 1905, became aware of the significant role played by the workers who were not entirely unconscious of the Russian

political context. Therefore, he was positively responsive to the demands of the Russian proletariat to 're-unite' with the Mensheviks (123) in order to recover the strength of the Russian Social-Democratic movement which had been weakened by the split following the Second Party Congress in 1903. (124)

The overall argument raised by Lenin in this respect is an attempt to justify a socialist revolution not against bourgeois democracy but autocratic rule. It is worth mentioning that his legitimation of the prospect of a socialist revolution in Russia does confirm his justification of a revolutionary role of a "new type" that hardly continues with the Marxian text: a revolution not even predicted, let alone theorised, by Marx who had clearly stated that 'the economical emancipation of the working classes is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means.' (125) Luxemburg's position itself is confusing and ambivalent. She herself took different views with regard to Lenin's programme. Although she was keen not to allow too much freedom for intellectuals to shape the workers' movement in their fashion, she still had more than a single reason to defend Lenin's insistence on overlooking the bourgeois element in the Russian context: that was mainly because the 'Russian socialists' were not choosers. They were

> ...obliged to undertake the building of such a [class] organization without the benefit of the formal guarantees commonly found under a bourgeois democratic set-up. They do not dispose of the political raw material that in other countries is supplied by bourgeois society itself. Like *Almighty God* they must have this organization arise out of the void, so to speak. (126)

Perhaps it was the absence of the bourgeois element which pushed Luxemburg to justify Lenin's position in relation to the Revolution. He had to take the risk of envisaging a future for a Russian state without socio-economic conditions appropriate to the transition to socialism.

The particular point of 'jumping' from one stage to an other—without having to consider varying degrees of difference between Social-Democracy elsewhere and that characteristic of Russia—was also the concern of what came to be called Lenin's left and right opposition. Trotsky's 1905 concept of 'permanent revolution' for instance was one of the most attractive substitutes to Lenin's formula of revolution. Lenin's attempts to convert the workers' struggle against capital into an open struggle against autocracy without a deep consideration of the movement of history was Trotsky's greatest concern. The concept of 'permanent revolution' was rather an assertion of how much Trotsky considered and valued the historical necessity of spreading over the Russian Revolution to the rest of Europe, having in mind a different formula for the transition to socialism:

> [D]emocracy and socialism, for all peoples and countries [represent]...two stages in the development of society which are not only entirely distinct but also separated by great distances of time from each other. This view was predominant among those Russian Marxists who, in the period of 1905, belonged to the left wing of the Second International. (127)

Trotsky's development of the concept of permanent revolution with regard to the Russian context was in great part divergent from Lenin's envisagement of the proletarian revolution on the basis of heavy reliance on the peasant question. Probably in considering a different formula for the revolution, Trotsky had to think in accordance with what Marx himself thought of Russia from the late 1870s until 1882. (128) Marx's view that Russia was dissimilar to the rest of Europe so far as revolution was concerned confirms the validity of Trotsky's intellectual and political position in relation to Bolshevik thinking. Although a number of scholars think that Trotsky only followed Marx himself in his theory of permanent revolution, it is noteworthy that Marx never had a clear-cut and practical attitude in relation to Russia. But Marx's general statements concerning the role of the proletariat in the revolution

show clearly his preoccupation with the permanence of the revolution: '...it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power... (129)

In theory, however, Lenin later clearly states in *Left-Wing Communism* that socialists need to go through parliamentary democracy in order to over-rule it; he does not repudiate the idea of bourgeois revolution as an indispensable step towards socialist society. For him, it was necessary to transcend the very liberal state that the socialists themselves approved of as a necessary step towards the popularisation of Marxism and actuation of socialist society. Yet, in practical terms he knew, and got in a political morass, that a bourgeois revolution in Russia was far from realisable in the short run. In this respect, transcending the liberal state without going through it was what made Lenin rely on the agrarian element and forge his concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry', a slogan that became a reminder of the specificity of the Bolshevik ideology. (It was later sacrificed to his 'dictatorship of the Proletariat and the poorest sections of society') (130); this was in conflict with the Menshevik view of the necessity to forge an alliance with the bourgeois order at first. That was also what made problematic Lenin's argument for the unity between the proletariat and peasantry. It made Lenin adopt 'the circumstances argument' by legitimising his particular view of the revolution, party organisation, and the role of the workers (what became later called 'revolution from above', party ultra-centralism, and contempt for the working classes for lacking political consciousness.). It was only in his late writings that Lenin resolved such a dilemma by articulating the success of the revolution and assuring the Soviet people that '[s]tate power in Russia has passed into the hands of a new *class*, namely, the bourgeoisie and landowners who had become bourgeois. *To this extent* the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is completed.' (131)

2. The Significance of Marx and Engels:

In most of his work, Lenin took pains to forge a definition of revolutionary struggle tantamount to Marx's and Engels's approach. But the circumstances and the setting of October were particularly unfavourable for a revolution as such. In terms of practice, the Revolution of 1917 posed serious problems for most Bolsheviks who preferred to follow the commandments of Lenin. That was partly due to the opposition by many opponents to Bolshevik policy, and partly to factional struggle within the party itself. (132) Given that most revolutions hitherto carried out were merely 'bourgeois revolutions' (with the exception of the 1871 Commune), as Lenin himself acknowledged, (133) contriving, or even planning, a proletarian revolution seemed contingent and uncertain. A proletarian revolution needs substituting majority rule for minority rule, the people for parliament. Yet, the bourgeois element in the Russian Revolution was, as Robert Daniels argues, somehow *artificially* imposed. 'The problem' Daniels writes 'is the ridiculously short duration—eight months—assigned to a "bourgeois regime in Russia. The Russian Revolution was immature and telescoped.' (134)

To fathom the nature of the Bolshevik Revolution, it is necessary to realise, I would argue, that the Bolshevik seizure of power had from the outset a purely theoretical connotation. Everything depended on how Lenin *had* to theorise the process for such a seizure. Lenin certainly was aware of Russia's position as a vulnerable nation state, but he, unlike Kautsky or Plekhanov, saw that a revolution as such could not be considered as an abortive "untimely" attempt to change society. (135) The then oppressive state as he asserted had to be toppled by any sorts of means. What was most necessary in Marx's theory according to Lenin was the necessity to 'smash' the oppressive 'state machine' (136) at any cost in the hope of liberating the proletariat. Lenin's call for *rushing* the dictatorship of the

proletariat was not without a premise. He based his main argument on a re-reading of the co-founders of communism, mainly in matters concerning time of the revolution and its relationship to the state.

The central problem facing Lenin was, it seems to me, his *fixation* on workers' conditions in France, especially during the Second Empire. The experience of the 1871 Paris Commune was a crowning one for Lenin, and his conception of a working class revolution was greatly conditioned by such an experience. Moreover, Marx's attitude to the Commune, I believe, was what accounted for Lenin's earlier theory of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.' On the other hand, it was in *The State and Revolution* that Lenin capitalised Marx's and Engels's views on the Commune, and forged his full-fledged theory of revolution. Apart from the theory which he emphasised in the *The State and Revolution*, Lenin made use of both Marx and Engels in such works as *WBD*. As an interpreter of the Marxian text, he put so much weight on the necessity to understand and put at work Marxism in circumstances, albeit inopportune, responsive to a certain revolutionary logic that might (with legitimate claims) turn away from the original text. (137) For Lenin, a Russian revolution carried out by a united people against a coercive state was not radically different from the Commune. Workers' and peasants' conditions in early twentieth-century Russia were not systematically different from the condition of peasants and workers in France in 1871. The historical necessity of "untimely" revolution was not against the logic of the science of history as founded by the authors of *The German Ideology*. Russia's *ancièn regime* resembled France of the second Empire. In Russia, capitalism was not the mode of economic organisation, and industrialism could not be achieved in the short run.

Lenin starts out chapter III of *The State and Revolution* by the following paragraph:

> It is well known that several months before the Commune, in autumn 1870, Marx warned the workers of Paris that any attempt to overthrow the government would be the folly of desperation. But when, in March 1871, a decisive battle was imposed upon the workers and they accepted the challenge when the uprising had become a fact, Marx greeted the proletarian revolution with the greatest joy despite the unfavourable auguries. Marx did not fall back upon a pedantic condemnation of a 'premature' movement as the notorious Russian renegade from Marxism, Plekhanov, who began in November 1905 by writing encouragingly about the workers' and peasants' struggle, but after December 1905 cried out just like a liberal: 'They should not have taken to arms. (138)

Explicit in this statement is the conviction that Marx's position was adjusted by the objective circumstances leading to the Commune. This means that Marx's theory about the "timing" of revolution was flexible. It means also that before the Commune Marx had partly overlooked the positive outcome of a mass rebellion meant to overthrow the existent oppressive state order. For Lenin, Marx's reconsideration of his views on workers' agitation in Paris was not a wholly unexpected reaction. Nor was it a theoretical position constituting self-betrayal. Marx changed his views because he saw the fruitful results of the Commune. What was most perplexing was that while the founder of communism, on the one hand, 'greeted' the proletarian revolution—albeit inopportune— Plekhanov, on the other, totally failed to follow Marx's path. Both the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 happened with 'unfavourable auguries', but that could not be a pretext for 'condemning' mass action against the present government which had to be resisted and toppled by all sorts of means.

For Lenin, it was Marx who founded the political legitimacy for the violent overthrow of the bourgeois democracy established by the capitalist system. The 'smashing of the state machine' by violent means is entirely answerable to the logic of the movement of history as is theorised by Marx and Engels. (139) That means that to do historical justice to the doctrine of the authors of the *Manifesto*, one has to avail oneself of the most workable tools to implement

such a justice. In order to adopt a tactic akin to that of the designers of the Paris Commune, Bolsheviks had to forge a practice not alien to the reality and circumstances in which the proletarian Revolution had to take place in Russia. In this context, revolutionary struggle against the *ancien régime* had to adapt itself to a situation where the workers were neither a dominant force nor the majority of the population. It had also to furnish its "revolutionary spirit" with the necessity to act in unfavourable economic conditions. Now the historical necessity of a revolt like the Commune was indissociable from the necessity to encourage and take part in revolutions like that of 1905 or 1917. Lenin legitimises this position by pointing out his new theory of revolution:

> He [Marx] regarded the mass revolutionary movement, even though it did not achieve its aim, as an historical experience of enormous importance, as a certain advance on the part of the worldwide proletarian revolution, as a practical step which was more important than hundreds of programmes and arguments. To analyse his experience, to draw tactical lessons from it, to re-examine his theory in the light of it: this was the task set for himself by Marx. (140)

3/ The Significance of Peasant Participation in the Revolution:

There is one central issue closely related to Lenin's general conception of the proletarian revolution. It is the peasant question. In order to adopt a practice in harmony with a theory specific to the Russian context, the communists had to think of a formula of political power which could include also the majority of the peasants. This is how the revolution could impose its popular character; the specificity of peasant participation in the revolt was pivotal in Lenin's theory of revolution. The importance of peasant participation goes back to the years between 1896 and1902. Lenin's concern with peasant struggle is illustrated in his "To the Rural Poor" (1903). Having observed the significant results of an insurgence by the peasants in "southwest rural Russia" in 1902, Lenin decided then to consider seriously the

importance of peasant struggle for emancipation. (141) In "To the Rural Poor" Lenin reflected on the revolutionary character inherent in the peasantry. (142) The question of peasant violence during revolutionary struggle was purely tactical for Lenin. He could not, of course, theorise a premise for legitimating such a violence if he had not observed the efficiency of peasants' revolt against the Russian aristocracy since 1896. There was however a practical question that put grave constraints on Lenin's overall theory of revolution: it was the current Russian phase of economic organisation which was responsive more to peasant demands. As the context allowed a qualitative change of strategy, at least in terms of theory, the question of engaging only the industrial proletariat posed serious objective problems for a revolution solely carried out by the workers. It was then indispensable that the majority of the working population, the peasantry, would take an active revolutionary part in preparing for the revolution.

After 1905, Lenin was only in a position that necessitated his "unconditional support" for the peasant question: he partly supported peasant violence and uprisings and could justify his constant belief in peasant militancy by the fact that the peasants, after all, needed only further political education and a 'leadership' that would guide them towards class consciousness. Once they conceived themselves as 'rural proletariat', they would engage politically and ideologically in committed revolt against the conditions that made of them a backward class. According to Lenin, the question for the socialists resided in achieving a step-by-step peasant consciousness: the first step was, of course, to recover the lands "stolen"; the second to engage peasants in revolutionary level work; the third to give away small farm units and prepare for a class transformation from a rural to an industrial proletariat.

However, Lenin's emphasis on peasant revolt raised the concern of the Mensheviks and other groups. Legitimising peasant violence on a mere suggestion that peasants needed only time to become 'pure' revolutionaries seemed to most sceptics to be a Bolshevik venture

the result of which was unpredictable. Another argument that could be raised in response to Lenin's plans was that, once the peasants took possession of the lands, they would fight for a permanent seizure of such lands. Then the efforts for an unconditional help for the peasants would seem utterly futile and unworkable; that might well usher in more violence and social instability. (143) Moreover, Lenin's long-term plan for peasant unity with the workers can be interpreted as a measure far from favourable to the peasants, mainly because in expropriating the richer farmers—the Kulaks—the poor peasants would only work to provide the cities with food and other goods; their unconditional support for an agricultural policy unable to give them a comfortable position would mean their impoverishment; Lenin's formula can then be interpreted as a formula for peasant self-sacrifice; history teaches us here that the peasants in Soviet Russia were neither given the revolutionary role promised nor enjoyed a comfortable social status.

In theory, the formula of alliance suggested by Lenin was purely circumstantial. It followed from his general theory about revolution formulated first in his early writings and developed in his *The State and Revolution.* In late works such as "The April Theses" the necessity of peasant participation in the revolution was still a defining condition dictated by Lenin himself. Lenin's theoretical argument for the necessity of a proletarian-peasant revolution was accentuated in his "April Theses." Thesis six clearly expresses the importance of the peasant question in Lenin's political agenda: 'The weight of emphasis in the agrarian programme to be shifted to Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies', which means that all 'confiscated lands' had to be 'nationalised' and 'poor peasants' organised under 'separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants' (144) The point that Lenin struggled to emphasise was that without participation of the peasantry preserving the gains of the revolution was an unachievable goal, mainly because of the small size of the working class and the fear of a counter-revolution. To advance his theory of proletarian-peasant revolution—which had

traded under the slogan 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' since 1905 —Lenin envisaged a proletarian state legitimised by the unconditional support of the peasants. The peasants had as a legitimate demand to recover their usurped lands taken over by the Tsar in the late nineteenth century; they had to struggle for such a right, and Lenin's political project could give them every reassurance to restore their properties. For Lenin, a political reassurance of the peasants was enough to call upon them to help overthrow, first, the old regime, and, second, the transitory bourgeois state that *had* to be installed once the revolution took place.

'The circumstances argument' was specific in that it drew on perplexing suggestions that differed in character from mainstream Russian Marxism as represented by Plekhanov, or revolutionary Democracy as represented by the Spartacus Group. (145) This theory, which later (20th c) became synonymous with Marx and Marxism, was formulated in the Russian context and could gain for itself a constructive theoretical ground peculiar to the changing circumstances both in pre-revolution Russia and post-revolution Soviet Union. What is worth mentioning in this context is how Lenin used the circumstances argument in relation to Marx's and Engels's views of the Paris Commune. He did so in order to draw on a new formula for a proletarian revolution. Using his circumstances argument, Lenin could also make a strong case by arguing for a necessary alliance between workers and peasants. The importance of his early ideas about the necessity of worker-peasant coalition derives mainly from the fact that he deployed his doctrinal knowledge of previous Marxist literature in formulating an ideological standpoint as regards a socialist revolution. Lenin's work from 1905 up to the eclipse of the Second International was characterised by a hard-line belief in the positive role of all peasants in a proletarian revolution. His other work, however—especially of 1917 and after—was to exclude what he called 'petty-bourgeois peasants' from the circle of worker-peasant struggle for a socialist state. If Lenin opted for a policy wherein

the peasantry was central and deeply entrenched, why should he in later works write off the role assigned to the *whole* peasantry? If Lenin believed that socialism could not be achieved unless a bourgeois order be established first, why did he then radically adjust this position in "The April Theses" of 1917? If he changed his views for organisational reasons, who then was so much instrumental in such a change? If he partially abandoned his argument for the alliance between proletarians and peasants because of a change in political circumstances, why did he not advocate Trotsky's conception of 'permanent revolution', although his position was akin to that of Trotsky especially in matters concerning a European proletarian revolution? (146)

The April Theses marked a new development in Lenin's design of the post-revolution Soviet state. It set forth the basic structure and function of the proletarian state. Lenin's decision to abandon his early advocacy of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' for his belief in the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the *poorest* peasantry' (my italics) was an ideological transformation of great historical importance; it was a transformation whose later implications showed how Lenin's theoretical position was rather constructed by the very circumstances that he wanted to transcend. The April Theses were to attest to the practical solution which should be adopted in the Russian context. Such a solution presupposed that a movement of the masses does not always take its immediate answers from a theory forged in political and social conditions often related to a distant context. What Lenin did exactly was, first, to assume and, second, try to convince both the Bolsheviks and the Russian people that the peasant question neither constituted a national problem nor prevented the revolution. His 1917 partial departure from his peasant argument can be interpreted in two ways: (1) he knew that the conflict of interests arising from peasant retrieval of the land was an irremediable problem, or (2) found it that such an assumption as dictatorship of the

peasantry was rather too ambitious, and far too unrealistic to realise a socialist state following Marx's theory. In view of this, the whole argument for a Commune-like state is contingent.

It was in *The State and Revolution* that Lenin's "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" revealed the widening gulf between the role of the workers and that of the peasantry. That gulf was, it seems to me, one of the defining traits of Lenin's departure from the Marxian text. The theoretical entanglement of Lenin's work arises from the very contradictions that follow from the characteristic difference of his early and post-1917 work. It can be said that his unabashed abandonment of the dictatorship of the *whole* peasantry in favour of only the '*poorest*' section had a particularly fruitful implication for Lenin's exponents: the abandonment could be justified as an ideological necessity which would serve rather than damage the peasant cause, since liquidating the rural aristocracy was a primary step towards the entire emancipation of the peasant class. Yet, it is quite evident, I would argue, that the difference between Marx's and Lenin's formulae of dictatorship—'proletariat' and 'proletariat and "poorest" peasantry'—condemned Lenin's theory to become reductive in character, mainly for failing to accommodate other categories of the peasantry, and for foiling a purely ideological element on proletarian-peasant struggle. The other question is: what role could the poorest of the peasantry play in dismantling the old state machine? Although assuming that the poorest section in society constituted the majority was a truthful claim, Lenin could not deny that the role of that section was not central by any means.

IV/ Towards the Soviet State:

1/ The Late Lenin and the Rejection of Social Democracy:

Archie Brown has recently argued that there exists 'two Lenins' rather than one. (147): a Lenin who identified on a centralist argument—as theorised in *WBD*—'calling for a revolutionary vanguard and strictly-disciplined Party,' and a Lenin who in *the State and the*

Revolution seems to have revised his political convictions by showing much more orthodox and less doctrinaire views. (148) Such an argument bears some truth in its claim that there are two Lenins. Yet the concern that may be raised in response to this argument is whether the Lenin of *WBD* differed fundamentally from that of *the State and Revolution.* True there were two Lenins, I would argue, but I think that the existence of two Lenins had to do more with *WBD* and the 1917 April Theses than *WBD* and *the State and Revolution.* The Lenin of the *State and Revolution* did continue, as A.J. Polan argues, with that of *WBD.* (149) While Lenin of *WBD* worked out the early phase of Bolshevism by relying mostly on the role of the Social-Democrats to guide the workers towards revolution, the Lenin we find in the April Theses and later work breaks chiefly from the theoretical premise of Social-Democracy. He announced his rejection of the RSDLP and its supporting international movement, the Second International. Such a question concerns the main two stages of the development of Lenin, first as the leader of the majority group (Bolsheviks) in the RSDLP, and the second as a prominent figure to depart from Social-Democracy altogether.

Lenin learnt the ABC of Marxism from three main sources: (1) the Marxian text (Marx and Engels); (2) European working class movements; and (3) Russian Marxism as developed with Plekhanov, Zasulich, and Akselrod. Practically, however, it was the specific context of Russia which made him both a forceful interpreter of Marxism and an ambivalent interlocutor of the Marxian text. It was such a context which also inspired his advocacy of Social-Democracy. Social Democracy, the basis of the revolutionary proletarian movement since the 1880s, was a very misleading concept in relation to the Russian context. Lenin, for our purposes, assigned a primary role to this concept in his early work, and related it to the success of the German working class movement against Bismarck. Nevertheless, he departed from Social-Democracy both as a conception and a practical premise some three years before the October Revolution. There were two basic reasons for such a departure. While the first

was organisational, the second was purely technical, as the name "social democracy" itself posed a problem of signification. To treat these two questions in relation to Lenin's analysis, I quote here a passage from "What should be the Name of our Party" (1964)

> We must repeat that we are Marxists and that we take as our basis the *Communist Manifesto,* which has been distorted and betrayed by the Social-Democrats on its two main points: (1) the working men have no country: "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war is a betrayal of socialism; and (2) the Marxist doctrine of the state has been distorted by the Second International. (150)

Here, two defining facts Lenin criticises in order to justify his departure from Social-Democracy: the rise of 'defencism' in the workers' movement and the abuse of Marxism by the Second International. These were far from local experiences by the Russian working class, albeit Plekhanov and the Mensheviks lived the experience in great part. If we take the first reason, what would we infer? The assertion 'the working men have no country' does pose the question of Marx's and Engels's valuing of the international significance of the workers' unity against 'imperialist war'. To this extent the very principle of scientific socialism is focussed on the slogan 'workers' of the world unite' as is broached in the *Manifesto*. And this implies that any consolidation of the economic and political rights of the proletariat should follow from this principle. It means that any of the workers' parties that does not advance the internationalism of the workers' struggle should in no way be called Marxist. By 'defenders of the fatherland' Lenin means the Marxist trends that trade under what he calls 'social-chauvinism', that is, the very movement which advocates support of the bourgeois government in its war against other imperialist countries.

For Lenin, the "mongers" of defencism were the socialists who had a loose and ambivalent conception of the class struggle. They are socialists but not true socialists who believe in the international significance of the workers' unity: your country wages a war

against another, and you will not show any sympathy with the proletariat of that country. The position of the defencists (social-chauvinists) was characteristic of Plekhanov in Russia, and others who, in their hurry to gain a favourable position in *l'état* (151) had secured for themselves a place in the bourgeois government: 'These people are our *class* enemies. They have gone over to the bourgeoisie' (152)

The second fact which compelled Lenin to renounce Social-Democracy was what he called 'bankruptcy of the Second International'. (153) The "bankruptcy", as it were, was caused by the rise of pseudo-bourgeois practices in the Second International. In purely political terms, the rise of the 'Centrist' tendency in the social democratic parties (Germany, France, Russia, etc) attested to the failure of Social-Democracy to advance its emancipatory claims. 'The Centre consists of people who vacillate between the social-chauvinists and the true internationalists.' It is 'a realm of honeyed petty-bourgeois phrases, of internationalism in word and cowardly opportunism and fawning on the social-chauvinists in deed' (154) While the representative of defencism is Plekhanov, the 'leader' of the Centre is Kautsky. (155) To this extent, the failure of both the social-chauvinists and Centrists to lead the workers' struggle brought with it the failure of Social-Democracy as a proletarian movement. In this instance, the inability of Plekhanov to remain faithful to scientific socialism and the failure of Kautsky to maintain the significance of proletarian revolution condemned Social-Democracy in its entirety. Following from this, Social-Democracy became —Lenin quotes Luxemburg— 'a stinking corpse' (156)

Apart from the practical question whether Social-Democracy kept its emancipatory promises both in Russia and Germany, Lenin raised the theoretical implication of the name "social-democracy" itself. Here, by referring to Marxian theory of revolution, Lenin wanted anxiously to prove that such a label had been erroneous from its inception.

> The name "Social-Democracy" is *scientifically* incorrect, as Marx frequently pointed out, in particular, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme in 1875, and as Engels re-affirmed in a more popular form in 1894 [Engels, Preface to Internationales aus dem Velkstaat (1871-1875)]. From capitalism mankind can pass directly only to socialism, i.e., to the social ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to the amount of work performed by each individual. Our Party looks farther ahead: socialism must inevitably evolve gradually into communism, upon the banner of which is inscribed the motto, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". (157)

The emphasis on the adverb 'scientifically' in this quotation means that Lenin wants to counterpoise Marx's theory of scientific socialism to what he believes to be the "unscientific" claim of Social-Democracy. By doing so, he also emphasises the role of revolution in transforming society from one stage of politico-economic development to another. The very argument Lenin seeks to advance here is that following the *Manifesto* there is only one path that "humanity" can follow historically and dialectically: 'from capitalism mankind can pass *only* (my emphasis) to socialism.' According to this analysis, existence of a social democratic society is both technically and economically in transgression of the doctrine taught by scientific socialism. Therefore, believing that there can be an intermediate stage between capitalism and socialism is a completely parochial and mistaken interpretation of Marxism. In this respect, Lenin's emphasis on what he calls a faulty *exegesis* was injected by his own reading of the German Social-Democracy in the first place and the Russian variant in the second: one minimised the role of the world proletariat, and the other reduced revolution to 'petty-bourgeois reformism.' Thus, both amounted to a an 'opportunism' which sought to depreciate proletarian struggle for emancipation.

2/ The Rejection of the Democratic State:

The label Social-Democracy, Lenin argued, was also a free-floating slogan which had to do with the failure of the generation of the Second International to grasp the true meaning of democracy. It was Karl Kautsky who hopelessly defended "democracy" as a category for propaganda. (158) It was a category fraught with misleading implications. In whose benefit a 'pure democracy' was was the most compelling question in Lenin's thinking.

> It is sheer mockery of the working and exploited people to speak of pure democracy, of democracy in general, of equality, freedom and universal rights when the workers and all working people are ill-fed, ill-clad, ruined and worn out, not only as a result of capitalist wage slavery, but as a consequence of four years of predatory war, while the capitalists and profiteers remain in possession of the "property" usurped by them and the "ready-made" apparatus of state power. This is tantamount to trampling on the basic truths of Marxism which has taught the workers: you must take advantage of bourgeois democracy which, compared with feudalism, represents a great historical advance, but not for one minute must you forget the bourgeois character of this "democracy", it's historical conditional and limited character. Never share the "superstitious belief" in the "state" and never forget that the state even in the most democratic republic, and not only in a monarchy, is simply a machine for the suppression of one class by another. (159)

What is of particular significance in Lenin's view here is his critique of democracy as a particular form of government. Democracy for him not only constitutes an obstruction to 'freedom' and 'equality' but also embodies a form of rule by which a dominant class subjugates another. For him, as he analyses it in *The State and Revolution*, '[a] democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and therefore, once capital has got control of this excellent shell...it establishes its power so securely, so firmly that *no* change of individuals, of institutions, or of parties in the bourgeois democratic republic can shake this power.' (160) Two major reasons make up the complexity and therefore affectedness of

democracy as such. They are 'capitalist wage slavery', which means exploitation of one class by another, and World War I, the war of imperialism. Working class exploitation at home and their engagement by their respective governments in the struggle with other proletarians constitute the savagery of capitalism and imperialism.

Lenin's very insistence on the necessity to resist 'the superstitious belief in the "state"' does highlight the concern that Russian society was in sharp conflict with the existing state. That was mainly because the instrument of bourgeois class rule, namely democracy, was responsive only to the possessing class, and of very little benefit to the workers. Lenin focussed on this conflict by arguing that the 'democratism of the democratic republic' does not express the will of the majority. It is 'always constricted by the narrow framework of capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains essentially democratism for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich.' (161) Capitalism and 'democratism' reinforce each other only because 'wealth' is solely associated with the very class which spreads the power of capital inside the democratic republic and in full response to the political power that constitutes the state itself. If the state in a democratic republic is not in the hands of the class which owns such forms of rule as "democracy" it would cease to be 'above society'. Therefore, the state is the sum result of the conflict that the struggle between wage labour and capital creates. It is for this reason that the proletariat must never, according to Lenin, believe in a possible reconciliation between the state and society on a purely 'democratic' basis, mainly because the state is 'a machine for the suppression of one class by another'. (162)

In response to all this Lenin confirms that the only possible way to terminate exploitation and class rule is to 'eradicate' the state. But, for him, it is a folly to speak of a simple eradication of the state by totally abolishing it from its inception. There are two essential stages leading to the stateless society: 1) violent revolution; and 2) the withering

away of the state. He reached this conclusion in the light of Engel's *Anti-Duhring*. (163) It was Engels, in Lenin's view, who theorised the necessity to go through the socialist revolution and 'the expropriation of the means of production in the name of the whole society', then 'the state in general...can only wither away' (164) By tacitly referring to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1976) Lenin emphasised the mistakes committed by the German Social-Democrats who according to him, and following Marx's critique, had a completely erroneous conception of the state. Their 'slogan' of the 'free people's state' reflected a mistaken concept of democracy that misread Marx's and Engel's theory. (165) Apart from Marx's critique, Lenin emphasised that the Social Democracy of the early twentieth century had much more serious anomalies. It represented an utter departure from the guiding principles of Marxism. 'Dialectics', Lenin wrote, 'are replaced by eclecticism—this is the most conventional and widespread phenomenon in present-day official social- democratic literature in relation to Marxism. (166)

3/ The Soviet State as a Means for the Withering Away of the State:

Lenin's "April Theses" is probably one of his most expressive texts about the envisaged form of the Soviet state. The Theses build on three basic concepts which became later the guiding principle for the Bolsheviks: the Soviets, the Communist Party, and the Communist International (the Comintern). It can be argued that such concepts are indissociable. The soviets are the guiding form of the government that responds to mass representation '... the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the *only possible* form of revolutionary government...' (167); the Communist Party represented the revolutionary party which would buttress the gains of October at the national level (168); and the Comintern attested to the solidarity of the proletarian movement worldwide and its preparation for the world revolution: a 'New International' (169) According to Lenin these three components of

the revolution would only be constructive when the proletarian mass movement dispenses with 'parliamentary democracy,' the Social-Democratic Party, and the Second International. The assertion that the Soviets had to be the sole representative attested to Lenin's rejection of 'the parliamentary republic' mainly because "reformist democracy" meant a negation of peoples' freedom and free will. 'Transferring state power to the Soviets' is a key reminder of the proletarian state that is advancing towards its withering away. Lenin's argument in favour of a revolutionary government presupposes a radical re-reading of the form of political rule that should be adopted. This argument rests on the critique of the form of government which precedes the Soviets, namely the Provisional Government. Far from standing for the proletarian cause, he contends, the Provisional Government had been entangled in the legitimation of the 'imperialist war'. 'No support for the Provisional Government...a government of capitalists should cease to be an imperialist government' (170). The alternative had then to be sought in the Soviets:

> But I ask you, is there a country in Europe, a bourgeois, democratic, republican country, where anything like these Soviets exists? You have to admit there isn't. Nowhere is there, nor can there be, a similar institution because you must have one or the other: *either* a bourgeois government with "plans" for reforms like those just mapped out to us and proposed dozens of times in every country but remaining on paper, *or* the institution to which they are now referring, the new type of "government" created by the revolution, examples of which can be found only at a time of greatest revolutionary upsurge, as in France, 1792 and 1871, or in Russia, 1905. The Soviets are an institution which does not exist in any ordinary bourgeois-parliamentary state and cannot exist side by side with a bourgeois government. They are the new, more democratic type of state which we in our Party resolutions call a peasant-proletarian democratic republic, with power belonging solely to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. (171)

According to Lenin, the new revolutionary government follows characteristically from the one theorised by Marx and Engels who saw the necessity to move to socialism through the tactical adoption of a programme of action dictated by the need for a *gradualist* transition to the socialist society.

For Lenin, the transition here comes in accordance with the foundation of the 'workers' state' as is first embodied in the Soviets. This *transitional* state does confirm proletarian action towards the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', being solely the combined effort of allying the peasants with the workers through the mediation of the vanguard. Here, and, by claiming to be in complete harmony with the historical materialist approach, Lenin asserts that a Social-Democratic party becomes fully useless and has to be decomposed and replaced by a workers' party which combines the struggle of the proletariat with the leading role of the intelligentsia. This led him later to declare the demise of the RSDLP and the birth of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU 1921-1922). Nevertheless, the formation of the CPSU on grounds of unifying the national and international struggle of the workers could only function in the presence of an international mass movement that would break away with the bourgeois-reformist' tendency of the Second International. In this instance Lenin's departure from the concept of social democracy was the inauguration of a Third International, being based on total rejection of 'bourgeois democracy', something that was most manifest in his dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1918. (172)

Lenin's decision to abolish the Second International and replace it by the Comintern was primarily responsive to the character of the October Revolution. This is clearly articulated in *Marxism and Revisionism* (1946) where he basically points out two factors standing after the abolition. First was the importance of the Bolshevik Party, and second the 'heroes of the Second International suffered bankruptcy'. Lenin's rejection of the political representation of the Second International was nothing but a rejection of what he called

'petty-bourgeois democracy' characteristic of the Social-Democratic movement. (173) The Communist International had to do with the formation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the party that practically allies itself to the concept of a 'workers' state', that is, a state that is entirely in tune with society, since 'the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry' is the most developed form of the harmony between the state and society. The basic characteristic of Lenin's International was that the workers' struggle should be primarily injected by the 'theoretical struggle' of 'professional revolutionaries' who had the capacity to educate the workers in most matters relating to the party and revolution. Thus the first step would begin from one single country (later, 'socialism in one country' with Stalin), then spread it out elsewhere.

The importance of Lenin's concept of a disciplined communist party is a defining principle for establishing the Third International and for the idea of the withering away of the state. Lenin, however, was not keen to dictate his own view of the Comintern without taking as essential the role assigned to the party tradition at home. Now that a party tradition was established (Lenin's concern since 1903) in Russia, the working class movement would definitely benefit from a constructive relationship between the state and society, since, and in principle, there would be very little difference to eradicate once the vestiges of the state machine are finally 'smashed.' Yet, what was most paradoxical about the formula of revolution and the withering away of the state as thought by Lenin was Lenin's very vacillation between the necessity of the party as an ideological agent of change—and of consolidating the 'workers' state—and the necessity to smash irrevocably the state when its constituents (police, army, bureaucracy, etc) are no longer required. The question of freeing the workers' state from its statist character, as John Hoffman reminds us, was both historically and ideologically bound. Lenin's 'workers' state' derives from a political model, which is basically illiberal and authoritarian in character.' (174) The specific premise for such an

'authoritarian character' has something to do with Lenin's legitimation of a socialism by transcending the practical element of the "democratic republic". (175)

The paradox here is of an organisational nature: how can we reach such a position—the Marxian stateless society—while the instruments for the change were ideologically dictated by the 'authoritarian trap' (in Hoffman's words) at the same time when the rest of society was both objectively (socio-economic) and subjectively (education and consciousness) bound to a state system emanating from political coercion? Moreover, how can we eradicate the state at the same time when the party leadership badly needs the existence of such a state in order to legitimise its rule? One of Lenin's gravest mistakes in this respect it to confuse the roles of the proletariat and the vanguard. (176) In doing so, he confirms that the party will not cease existing, and the state will exist as long as the party exists. Therefore, the communist state envisaged by Lenin, I firmly argue, will rise as a "leviathan" whose ultimate aim is to serve the party which speaks in the name of the world proletariat. The party will keep functioning, mainly because its mission is international, and the state will be kept intact until the communist stage is reached. Such a dimension of the state resembles so much the "leviathan" dimension of Hobbes's "sovereign" which will be addressed in the final Part of this thesis.

On the other hand, Lenin's advancement of a Third International and his standpoint against the Second International do raise some cause for concern. The relationship between the Comintern and the Communist Party was rather technically and contextually bound; while the latter was a party strengthened by the October revolution itself, the former was only a far-fetched "utopia," since the promised world revolution would normally necessitate both an *internationalisation* of the class struggle and an adaptable theorisation of the concept of the vanguard, a theorisation which would go beyond the national experience of the Communist Party. Lenin's theory of the leading role of the party is found most wanting, since a world

revolution as he theorised, I would argue, could not happen unless the international working class movement be harnessed by the creation of worldwide national parties that would follow from a socialist (in the scientific sense) rather than a Social-Democratic experience. It was thus unrealistic to conceive of a Communist International while such countries as Poland and Austria, for instance, had a relatively small working class. It was for these reasons, and specifically for the complexity of the formula of a world emancipation of workers, that Stalin later regressed to the concept of 'socialism in one country,' a concept that he had to readapt to the most required transformation of Soviet Union into a highly industrialized society.

Lenin's "withering away of the state" thesis also ran into serious difficulty when objective circumstances, such as the Civil War, pushed him to retreat to more rigid and undemocratic policies like "War Communism." Next Part of this thesis will take up such a difficulty and shed some light on how Lenin's 'withering away' formula was turned into rule by coercion, and how Lenin bequeathed the Soviet authoritarian state to his successor, Stalin. The following Part will also examine how the Soviet despotic state advanced to its logical end (demise) when Gorbachev introduced his famous "perestroika" and "glasnost."

Summary

- Lenin's theory of revolution has to do with his adoption of Social-Democracy as early as the 1890s. His adoption of Social-Democratic work was also closely associated with his critique of "economism" and "trade union consciousness."

- It was in his *What is to be Done?* that Lenin advanced his Social-Democratic theory and the necessity to combine economic and political struggle.

- Luxemburg in particular firmly argues that Social Democracy does not contradict with "spontaneity."

- In most of his early work, Lenin considered the German Social-Democracy as an example to follow. He also emphasised the importance of three forms of struggle: political, economic, and theoretical. For him, without such three forms the workers are 'defenceless.'

- Lenin also argued that Party centralism was an essential condition for the success of the coming revolution. He was criticised for such a position by opponents such as the Mensheviks (Martov, etc.) and exponents like Luxemburg and Trotsky.

- In most of his work, Lenin made use of Marx's and Engels' views in the hope of justifying his coming revolution. Lenin also modified Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" and turned it into "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." He justified such a modification by arguing that the Russian context demanded a reinterpretation of Marxian theory.

- In his late work ("April Theses", *The State and Revolution*, etc.), Lenin rejects Social-Democracy and calls for a Communist Party. For him, the 'democratic republic' could not represent working-class will, and has to be dismantled and replaced by a 'soviet' socialist state. He also argued that the 'withering away of the state' can only occur after the bourgeois state is 'smashed' and a workers' state established.

Part 2

The Crisis: From the Authoritarian State to the Collapse

Introduction:

The development of Leninism into what came to be called Bolshevik thinking poses a number of intriguing questions concerning the extent to which the Bolshevik ideology remained in harmony with the Marxian text. This, on the other hand, begs the question how much socialist was the Soviet state, first after the October Revolution, and second in the wake of Lenin's death in 1924. This remark evokes also a number of suggestions the most important of which is whether socialism as thought by Marx and Engels became the practical element of post-Revolution Russia: whether the lessons learnt from the 1918 Civil War forced the Bolshevik leadership to think seriously in terms of the Marxism of the 1880s and 1890s and seek a form of socialism that would in great part resemble the one long predicted by Marx; and whether Stalin, Lenin's self-proclaiming heir, fulfilled Lenin's promise of the 'workers' state.'

To a "neutral" audience the Soviet collapse in 1991 is a fact of history. To an expert, however, the collapse could be explained in many ways. First, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 because there is something wrong about its history: it could be that the starting point—the October Revolution—was simply wrongly thought and carried out. Second, there was nothing wrong with such a revolution but that the political circumstances that followed prevented the system from developing properly; or that perhaps Lenin did his best and could save the Revolution from failure but his heir, Stalin, spoilt the whole work by deviating from what Lenin had preached. To a scholar particularly interested in the life and times of systems and ideologies, these questions and observations are much more important than the event itself, that is, the demise. The demise is but the symptom, while the crisis—which is far from being the demise itself—is the malady. It is for this purpose that I have chosen to deal with what I call the Soviet crisis in this part. This part primarily tends to remind the reader that the

inconsistency of Lenin's thinking, which I have partly broached in Part one, led to a 'pathological' socialism. This, as I argue in this part, did usher in an authoritarianism which in the last analysis turned against the very system and caused its demise. Leninism, the Marxism of its time as Stalin suggests, could but give birth to Stalinism as the Leninism of its time. This part discusses the crisis of Soviet socialism which began with "War Communism," mediated by the First Five-Year Plan and "Socialism in One Country", and ended with Gorbachev's *Perestroika*.

I/ Roots of the Leviathan:

1/ The Civil War and the New Soviet State:

After the October triumph the most difficult task awaiting Lenin and the other Bolsheviks was how to preserve the gains of the revolution and how to keep the support of the working classes. Probably the most unwanted scenario that the Bolsheviks least expected was that the country would be torn by a civil war. While the nation was still recovering from the effects of World War I, at the same time when the Soviet state was still in embryo, the vestiges of the *ancien régime* seem to have been revived in the form of 'reaction.' The forces that were once an integral part of "dual power" (1) and which represented the liberal-bourgeois trend in the Provisional Government—and who now were deemed as 'parasites'—did not give up hope; nor did they cast their last weapons and look for passive reintegration in the then uncompromising Soviet government. The lessons of October did teach them that they had to rally round a cause whose defenders were the Kulaks, churchmen, and the rest of the groups whose class interests were severely affected by the revolutionary government of the soviets. The fact that October represented a new revolutionary order was a direct threat to the possessing classes in particular. And since those classes were the social basis of partly the bygone Tsarist state, and partly the bourgeoisie that spoke in the name of democracy during

the rule of "dual power," the attempts by the Bolsheviks to liquidate them through a revolution whose guiding slogan was 'all power to the soviets" were met by a birth of a culture of revival which comprised elements from both the *ancien régime* and the rural bourgeoisie. The Russian Civil War of course was mainly caused by those who were anxious to resume the old order. (2)

Apart from the fact that the Civil War represented the encounter of hostilities between the Bolsheviks and 'the reactionary" groups, it was also fought by the Bolsheviks in the hope of anticipating the attempts by outside forces like Britain and France to defeat socialism. Where the February Revolution was promising in its scope—and the Provisional Government presented a model of democracy that could but please the rest of the democracies worldwide—the October Revolution not only threatened the existing democratic state in the West but also constituted a new revolutionary spirit representing a political ideology aimed to shake the foundations of liberal democracy. It was for these reasons, at least, that such democracies as Britain took seriously a socialist country that was trying to advance the interest of the world proletariat at the expense of the ruling regimes. It was also for such reasons that the great powers unconditionally supported the Whites in the Russian Civil War. (3) In the Civil War the Red Army had difficulties on the war front mainly for the support the Whites had from both the former 'officers of the old tsarist regime' and European powers. (4)

Lenin's comments on the Civil War did confirm that the October Revolution was in danger. The Soviet state had not yet been fully founded and the Civil War seemed to be the evil the most destructive of the revolution. (5) Lenin's words in the following paragraph express clearly the conditions imposed on the Bolsheviks during the Civil War:

> Obviously, for the Party of the proletariat, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters becomes a crucial issue, because the working masses who side with the proletariat are opposed here by

> the united members of the propertied classes armed both with the power of capital, the power of knowledge and the long-standing, if not age-old, habit and practice of government. (6)

Actually, Lenin was anxious to convey a realistic reading of the difference between proletarian experience and that of the 'propertied classes.' The main areas of difference concern three basic and significant aspects: 'the power of capital, the power of knowledge and...the habit and practice of government' To analyse this, one might well argue that Lenin implies that the Soviet government was the first in history to experience a form of government that is not shackled by the chains of capital, a form of government following from the teaching of socialism as was "prophetically" predicted by Marx and Engels. This was later echoed by Stalin in *Problems of Leninism* when he proclaimed the coming of the epoch of emancipatory Marxism through the revolutionary doctrine of Leninism. (7) By implication also, according to Lenin, if the mass of the proletariat did not rally round the Bolshevik leadership in fending off such a powerful and more experienced enemy, the masses would have to sacrifice their emancipation and revert to the old war of classes in which they had long been exploited. In Lenin's view, the strong position of the Russian proletariat had to do with its significant number as a majority that should not lose its revolutionary achievements by succumbing to the 'reactionary' forces. The Russian proletariat, Lenin continues, should also avoid cooperating with the 'Mensheviks and the Right S.Rs [Socialist Revolutionaries] who act as...the most brazen-faced counter-revolutionaries, who wage a sharper struggle against the Soviet government than the one they had allowed themselves to wage against the reactionary and landowner governments...' (8)

The problem of constructing the Soviet state at the time of the Civil War was the most perplexing for the Bolshevik leadership in general and Lenin in particular. Constructing the basic pillars of the state deeply related to the question of administration which Lenin regarded as the most important among other matters of organising government. The Civil War had

imposed an economic situation which pushed Russian society to refresh its sources of income and consumption. And Lenin was most conscious of that situation. For him, the Revolution was advancing towards the total emancipation of the country, and the conditions of success, albeit difficult to grapple with, were already there. While government by 'peaceful means' was the best choice, the then situation primarily necessitated uprooting the vestiges of tsarist Russia at the same time when the bourgeois elements inherited from the Provisional Government were being substantially dismantled. This also necessitated pre-empting the dangers coming from the capitalist West:

> [T]he transition to the peaceful tasks of governing the whole population irrespective of classes, a transition that is taking place in conditions when the civil war is still going on in some places, when grave military dangers are threatening the Soviet Republic from both the West and the East, and when the war has caused untold havoc throughout the country—it is self-understood that such a transition is beset with tremendous difficulties. (9)

Why was that 'transition' a difficult one? It was because the Soviet government had to fight on several fronts. Three main challenges presented themselves in the face of the new Bolshevik leadership: while militarily it was still engaged in areas outside Russia and had to work on defeating the rest of the White forces, politically it had to keep its legitimacy as a government of soviets which was dedicated solely to the cause of the working masses by fighting 'reaction' from within and imperialist threat from outside, and economically it had to conciliate between the promises of socialism and the necessity to apply such slogans as 'food dictatorship' (10) For Lenin, these challenges reveal a technical question relating to the "best" method of 'administering the state.' Should the new government rely more on politics and ignore economic matters? For Lenin, after the October triumph—and due to civil war

circumstances—state administering had to do more with economic organisation, mainly because the transition to socialism necessitated an economic approach to government affairs.

> The task of administering the state, which now confronts the Soviet government, has this special feature, that, probably for the first time in the modern history of civilised nations, it deals pre-eminently with economics rather than with politics... And now... it should be quite clear to us that the task of administering the state is primarily a purely economic task-that of healing the country's wounds inflicted by the war, restoring its productive forces, organising accountancy in and control over production and distribution, raising the productivity of labour-in short, it boils down to the task of economic reorganisation. (11)

According to Lenin, the military and political 'victory' over the bourgeoisie in the Civil War should be consummated by an integral re-organisation of the economy on the basis of socialist principles. The meaning of Lenin's implication here goes beyond the suggestion that the Bolsheviks should rethink Soviet economy by adopting temporary solutions relating to economic problems of, for example, food production and distribution. Why the problem of economic organistaion was also of great importance for Lenin was because the question of production did not count as significantly as that of the work force. The Soviet state was in embryo, and that was a problem of specific difficulty; the new regime did in no way conceive of the nature and function of the Soviet state as a continuation of an old state or even a reform of it; the Soviet state was conceived as a revolutionary proletarian "Commune" the aim of which was to realise the classless and stateless society envisaged by Marx and Engels (12) Therefore, the form that the economy should assume had to be characteristically different from that of the feudal or capitalist forms. As E H Carr commented, 'the essence of the labour policy of war communism was the abandonment of the labour market and of reorganized capitalist procedures for the engagement and management of the workers; and this made it seem, like other policies of the period, not merely a concession to the needs of the civil war,

but an authentic advance into socialist order.' (13) For Lenin, one specific aspect characteristic of capitalist states should be done with: the existence of capital and labour, a couple most representative of bourgeois society. It was for this reason that Lenin particularly focused on specific elements in his approach to the economy. The socialist economy should begin with a reversal of what imperialist nations do. In this instance, the slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat" was put at work as regards economic matters. For Lenin, the new situation dictated that instead of relying on the workers in boosting the economy, there was a much more workable alternative: to 'conscript' the wealthy of the nation who, as a minority, in those circumstances had to succumb to the rule of the proletarian majority:

> The necessity [of labour conscription of the rich] arises also from the fact that it was precisely the wealthy and propertied classes who, by their resistance, both. military and passive (sabotage), mostly prevented Russia from healing the wounds inflicted upon her by the war, hampered the country's economic rehabilitation and progress... It was the members of these classes who enjoyed the tribute they collected from the working people, especially during the war; it was they who used this tribute to evade a task which is the duty of every citizen, namely, that of lending a hand in healing the country's wounds and putting it on its feet again; it was they who used the plundered tribute to retire and entrench themselves behind impregnable walls and offer every possible resistance to the victory of the socialist principle over the capitalist principle of society's organisation. (14)

In Lenin's logic the new rule for running the Soviet state should begin with the liquidation of the classes regarded as the enemies of the proletarian state. The liquidation is part of the class war waged against the former bourgeoisie, and by far the Kulaks, which, in Lenin's words, had the 'parasitic' character of living on the interest gained from 'the tribute'. (15)

The Soviet campaign against these classes comes as a revolutionary response principally aimed to make Soviet society in tune with the state whose apparatus is no longer controlled by a minority. In Lenin's eyes such a task stands as most crucial, basically because the rich class that had 'plundered' the wealth of the country *must* itself give in to the rule of

socialism. Yet, liquidation by itself is far from sufficient; the classes liquidated *must* make up for the injustices they had caused in the process of accumulating capital. The task of the socialist state therefore was to impose the will of the majority over that of the minority by 'conscripting' the wealthy. In a sense, this responds very much to the rule of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' mainly because the minority whose capital accumulation had destroyed the country was now judged by history in its Marxian sense, that is, judged by the law of the class struggle as was theorised by Marx. In doing so, the Soviet state, Lenin implicitly asserts, would but put history back on the right track. Here, Lenin could in a way justify the application of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" on an important level relating to the tasks of Soviet government. (16)

The question of Lenin's application of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been posed by the historian Sheila Fitzpatrick. For her, the validity of this slogan relates to the revolution itself. She argues that in carrying out the October Revolution, Lenin, together with other Bolsheviks, was in a real quandary: what was meant by their conception of "dictatorship of the proletariat? 'If it meant crushing the counter-revolutionary efforts of the old possessing classes, the new dictatorship would have to establish coercive organs comparable in function to the Tsarist secret police; if it meant a dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party...the continued existence of other political parties raised major problems.' (17) According to Fitzpatrick, the slogan posed serious problems for the leadership. Even if the dictatorship of the proletariat was a flexible strategy aimed to allow relative freedom to 'trade unions and factory committees,' it posed the problem whether Bolshevik political interests would intersect with possible 'different concepts of workers' interests' (18) Moreover, that problem of definition remained highly perplexing in the context of the Civil War. In that context, the slogan dictatorship of the proletariat was significant in the sense that the leadership had an historic opportunity to terminate the influence of the well-to-do classes. In this respect, the Civil War,

albeit an unfavourable circumstance, represented such an opportunity. But, proletarian dictatorship had, as Lenin himself affirmed, an economic rather than political character. It was then for that reason that the strategy followed came with "War Communism" which presented the challenge raised by the Bolsheviks against the possessing classes. Yet, with War Communism politics could not be left aside and the Bolshevik leadership subordinated economics to politico-ideological ends.

2/ "War Communism" in Perspective:

"War Communism" had its origin in the belief that ravaged by the Civil War on the one hand and capitalist interest on the other the Soviet economy could be refreshed only by the nationalisation of industry. Nationalisation, according to the Bolshevik policy, had to do with the necessity to introduce the country to an opportune socialist economy. By implication, nationalisation would play two fundamental roles: 1) to attack private property and expropriate the land exploited by the landed aristocracy, and 2) to control production and nationalise capital. These two tasks were important not only in relation to such immediate goals as feeding the Red Army and the rest of the nation; they were also important in relation to the building of socialism.

In Lenin's view "War Communism" had a double function. The first function had to do with the re-organisation of the economy by curbing the accumulation of wealth by the possessing classes. This actually necessitated addressing the question of capitalist profit, which was important in the sense that the Soviet state had first to liquidate the sources of high income for the rich, and second proceed in "abolishing" once and for all money as a transaction value, that is, passing over to the stage of the 'withering away of money': 'The Soviet government is now confronted with a difficult task, which nevertheless has to be dealt with at all costs—the task of combating the resistance of the wealthy, a resistance that takes

the form of hoarding and concealing the proofs of their claim to levy tribute on the working people.' (19) 'The resistance of the wealthy', as Lenin thinks, was most dangerous, since it did not take a political form but had been tacit. In order to liquidate such wealthy, it was necessary to find out how they could 'levy tribute' and accumulate capital. This in itself constituted a challenge to the socialist policy adopted during the Civil War. In Lenin's view the Soviet government had got to forge the means by which the rich kulak, the rural bourgeois, and the industrial capitalist could be controlled. The answer to this challenge came in the form of what came to be called "War Communism," that is, the socialist policy aiming to nationalise the economy and introduce the country to socialist economy.

The second function was how to administer the government by exploiting the expertise of 'bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist businessmen'

> In all spheres of economic and political life we now find a great number of bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist businessmen offering their services to the Soviet power. And it is up to the Soviet power now to make use of these services, which are definitely necessary for the transition to socialism, especially in a peasant country like Russia, and should be utilised on condition that the Soviet government has complete ascendancy, direction and control over its new assistants and co-operators (who had often acted in defiance of this same Soviet power in the secret hope of protesting it. (20)

The question of recruiting 'bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist businessmen' was actually a question of "necessity" rather than "choice." While Lenin emphasised the significance of recruiting those intellectuals and businessmen, the Soviet reality emanating from the Civil War revealed that—taking into consideration the underdeveloped stage of the revolution then and the total absence of a socialist proletarian culture—Soviet power had to educate a new generation of socialist intelligentsia and skilled proletarians. But neither the time nor the circumstances allowed a cultural revolution at that level. (21) What Lenin labels as a choice

seems to have been contingent on the Soviet context itself, and that could by no means happen without primarily relying on the expertise of the former bourgeois intelligentsia. This was one of the reasons which during the period of "War Communism" made the Soviet government call for a Soviet Socialist culture that had to begin through the negotiation of a new relationship between the state and society, with the latter formally bound up by the rule of the former. Government administering then as conceived by Lenin had to negotiate such a new relationship on the basis of 'making use' of the bourgeois intellectual reserve which the country had in hand. Yet, that reserve was not only a complimentary one to do without in simple terms. Actually, the experience of "War Communism" did nothing but reveal the unworkability of a Soviet state shorn of the former bourgeois intellectuals and the highly skilled labourers who had been once part of the tsarist order.

A good number of scholars have attempted to explain the nature and function of "War Communism." This issue has partly been raised because of the significance of that period first in relation to the Civil War as a crucial stage in Soviet history, and second for its central implication as regards the question of the construction of the Soviet socialist state. For Lenin, the problem of the organisation of the economy in a period of crisis similar to the Civil War is an old problem treated in new forms. Actually, for Lenin that related primarily to the phase that communism reached in that specific period. By observing his arguments in the *State and Revolution*, one would argue that for him the stage of socialist economic development akin to War Communism is the initial, albeit forced, stage of the development of communism which he had elaborated in *the State and Revolution.* He wrote that in the new phase

> [t]he means of production are no longer the private property of individuals The means of production belong to the whole of society. Every member of society...receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done such and such an amount of work...Consequently, after a deduction is made of the amount of labour which goes to the public fund, every worker receives from society as much as he has given to it. (22)

A close reading of this paragraph suggests that "War Communism" was also about the abolition of private property through the integration of individuals in "nationalized" farm units in the countryside and industrial units in the factories. In the countryside, both the kulaks and the rural bourgeoisie would be liquidated in favour of the poor peasantry and the working class as a whole.

Why was "War Communism" significant? Fitzpatrick answers this question by arguing that it was the instance when 'centrally directed' economy was born. That meant the 'nationalization of both large-scale (the decree was issued in the summer of 1918, and by autumn 1919 80 per cent of such enterprises had been nationalized) and small-scale (November 1920) industries.' (2) Nationalisation was important in the sense that, Fitzpatrick asserts, 'a state monopoly on grain was established' (24) And that constituted the groundwork for the overall policy of "requisitioning" which the government adopted as early as 1919. Yet, was nationalisation itself an ultimate aim of government policy during "War Communism."? E. H. Carr answers this question by supposing that 'the nationalization of industry' was not important in itself, but had significant implications in relation to the economy as a whole. Nationalisation was a drastic measure 'to attempt to administer industry on socialist lines' (25) This, in Carr's view, was an attempt by Lenin to organise the economy according to Marxian principles which would benefit both the poor peasantry and the working masses in the industrial cities. Therefore, the argument that "War Communism" meant nationalisation was technically inaccurate, since nationalisation had been but an integral strategy in the overall economic policy. What was more important in that respect was the question of centralisation to which Lenin himself assigned a defining role in relation to the organisation of the economy. The existence of a 'strong central authority,' Carr tells us, made decisions more applicable in reality. Closing down inefficient factories in October 1918 was a reasonable decision taken by such an authority. This helped the different industrial 'branches'

improve the quality of production. In Lenin's words, centralisation was the virtue that could spare the country 'chaos.' (26) The question of centralisation highlights another important issue—the policy of requisitioning. Most significant in this respect is the fact that during the period of "War Communism" the policy of requisitioning was centrally controlled, and had several effects on the general organisation of the economy.

Requisitioning had originated from the period when 'food dictatorship' was declared in 1918. It had to do with the problem of scarcity of food when the Civil War broke out. As Lars T Lih argued, 'Grain requisitioning' was mainly adopted to 'enforce a state grain monopoly by means of the food supply dictatorship decreed in the spring of 1918.' (27) Why requisitioning relatively succeeded in the beginning of War Communism can be politically explained. For E H Carr the success of this policy had to do with the political defeat of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) who could no longer keep the support of the majority of the peasants. (28) Following from this, the new policy in agriculture was from the start dictated by the political triumph of the Bolsheviks, (29) and, in part, the policy of requisitioning relatively smoothly succeeded because of such a triumph. On the other hand, the success of requisitioning in this respect had to do with an efficient centralisation when it came to decision-making. The government entrusted the role of collecting surplus food to the 'trade unions, factory committees, and town and country soviets' whose role was 'to obtain grain at fixed prices or requisition it from Kulaks.' (30) This resulted later in a fierce resistance on the part of the affluent peasants. (31)

Apart from the relative success of grain requisitioning, there was one issue which threw the whole Bolshevik economic policy into crisis. It was the manner by which food surplus was taken from the peasants. Generally, the way the government dealt with collection was somehow problematic, mainly because of two reasons. First, opting for centrally

organised methods of collection meant that the committees or local soviets were allowed to apply 'coercive' means to fulfill their aim; such coercive means included 'forcing' some rich peasants to sell their produce at a relatively cheap price, or often resorting to armed force to collect the surpluses. These methods dictated that the peasants, whether or not wanted it, were not choosers; rather, they were obliged to sacrifice the bulk of their produce in order to feed the Red Army and the working class. As Fitzpatrick commented,

> the necessity of feeding the towns and the Red Army pushed the state to take the peasants' produce by persuasion, cunning, threats, or force: the state often dealt with grain requisitioning by sending armed workers' and soldiers' brigades: this resulted in strained relations between the regime and the peasantry. (32)

Indeed, Lenin himself tried to legitimise the policy of grain requisitioning by arguing that it was more than indispensable to maintain the Soviet economy:

> the peculiarity of war communism consisted in the fact that we really took from the peasants all their surpluses, and sometimes even what was not surplus, but part of what was necessary to feed the peasant, took it to cover the costs of the army and to maintain the workers. We took it for the most part on credit, for paper money. Otherwise we could not beat the landowners and capitalists in a ravaged small-peasant country. (33)

As a result of the excesses following from requisitioning, both the middle peasants and the kulaks reacted with anger to the measures taken. Their reactions took the form of resistance to further food collection. One of the responses of the peasants was to 'object to army service' (34) More concrete forms of resistance were shown by the Kulaks who either favoured to hide

the surpluses of their produce whenever they were approached by collection committees or chose to till only parts of the land supposed to feed their families. (35)

In consequence, Lenin and the rest of the Bolsheviks could crush the resistance by stating two facts which were aimed to persuade Soviet society as a whole that War Communism was not only a pressing necessity but also a virtue capable of transforming the country into a communist "paradise." The first response to the resistance was the declaration that the Soviet socialist state was fully engaged in fighting the classes hostile to the poor peasants and the working class. In part, this was the period of a class war against the vestiges of the landed aristocracy and the rural bourgeoisie. In the attempt to destroy the resistance of the Kulaks Lenin and the leading Bolsheviks counted on the "middle peasantry" (36) which, in Lenin's eyes, had to be won by the Soviet government: 'we stood, stand, and shall stand, in a posture of direct civil war with the kulaks." (37) The middle peasantry, however, must categorically be distinguished from the Kulaks. (38)

3/ The Birth of Soviet Authoritarianism:

The question of coercion in the context of War Communism does highlight an important matter relating to the degree of success of the socialist policy adopted then. While the leadership announced that recourse to tyrannical methods would but amount to a general strategy for crushing the "reactionary" forces and guaranteeing a bright future to socialism, the actual practice of coercion did in great part reveal how forced the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was in the Russian context. Such a practice also revealed the excess by which the Bolsheviks treated the question of class. What was confusing in their policies was the fact of having to deal with most economic and political questions in class terms; this of course made them adopt a rather loose definition of the class struggle, basically binding such a definition to what was happening in present day Russia. The necessity to

define everything in class terms cast an unrealistic image on their view of society as a whole. It was mainly in response to that definition that the coercive measures were justified: a kulak for example remained a bourgeois "parasite" who should in all sorts of ways be accused of supporting the Whites, and then had to be repressed and stripped of his property. In consequence, War Communism, although was justified under a humanist cover, was a state strategy whose immediate effects on society were devastating; in actual fact its failure explains very much why Lenin reverted to a more democratic economic policy, namely the New Economic Policy (NEP).

The failure of War Communism—as a socialism at work—has been depicted by a host of scholars as the failure of a 'utopia.' (39) This puts the question of the validity of "war communism" under scholarly light. Part of the 'utopia' thesis is the implication that if a theory becomes a unrealisable it turns against itself. This means that the practice in whose name the theory speaks becomes rather in total conflict with such a theory, which renders the theory itself obsolete and inapplicable in reality. Yet, if it is applied it definitely will lead to a counter-productive practice. No wonder then that the rise of coercion in the first place and authoritarianism in the second did reveal the problems inherent in Lenin's theoretical legitimation of a 'Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasantry.'

The Soviet authoritarian system which emerged during the period of nationalisation between 1919 and 1921 followed, according to Bertrand Penataude, from "war communism" as a 'utopia.' (40) What explained that utopia, Penataude argues, was that the Bolsheviks thought they could 'break down the traditional isolationist mentality of the Russian peasant, transforming him into a citizen of the Soviet socialist state.' (41) The fundamental mistake committed by the Bolsheviks resided not only in their over-estimation of the role the Soviet government could play in introducing and consolidating socialism in Soviet Russia. It also resided in the emergence of an uncompromising tyrannical policy during the last days of the

Civil War. As one novelist depicted the situation— Penataude tells us—the end of the Civil War on the main front did nothing but inaugurate an other era of violence initiated by the Soviet state itself. (42) The mistake had to do with the belief that after the triumph of the Bolsheviks on the battlefield they had to continue their work by recruiting the Red Army to crush any social upheaval meant to resist economic or political measures. This was justified by the necessity to advance Soviet society towards communism. In a sense, Penataude argues that 'draconian methods' used during the Civil War were continued even in the aftermath of the war. (43)

For Robert Tucker, the "draconian methods" had to do with two main factors: 'the Civil War experience' and the 'militarization of the political culture of the Bolshevik movement.' These two factors were to determine the structure of the Soviet state later. (44) It became a state rather inclined to execute forcibly all decrees and orders: it was geared up 'to resort to coercion, rule by administrative fiat...centralized administration...' (45). The inclination to violence was in turn fuelled by two fundamental facts: party authoritarianism and the Bolshevik leaders' hostility to opposition. The 'draconian methods' were most manifest during the events at Kronstadt in March 1921 when a peaceful demonstration by sailors was relentlessly put down. (46) For Penataude, what happened at Kronstadt was but the consummation of the policies of coercion pursued from the middle of 1918 after decreeing 'food dictatorship.' As Robert V. Daniels commented, those policies were from the beginning contrived because the Bolsheviks hoped that 'War Communism,' for instance, would 'transform Russian society overnight into the communist ideal' through 'force and bureaucratic centralization.' (47) This, Daniels argues, had to do with the coercive policy of grain requisitioning.

Rule by coercion during "war communism" and after cannot be solely explained by the necessity to win the Civil War and introduce socialism. It had a theoretical bearing

inherent in the very nature of Leninism. This means that Lenin's theoretical convictions were slightly brought to an excess as he tried to put into practice Marx's notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Marx's theory, the dictatorship of the proletariat 'only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society...' (48) One would definitely wonder whether the chief aim of the Bolsheviks during the period of War Communism was to pass on to the stage of 'abolition of all classes.' Indeed, in those circumstances of economic hardship and political agitation it seemed that the ultimate aim of Lenin and his comrades was rather far from fully fulfilling Marx's aspirations. The attempts to collect surplus food and monopolise grain production and distribution came with the efforts to liquidate the rural bourgeoisie. Yet, such attempts were not without significance in relation to Lenin's belief to introduce Soviet society to socialism. For Lenin, the class struggle was a defining characteristic of a society which had still to grapple with the vestiges of the rural aristocracy. Existence of the wealthy classes meant the existence of capitalist interest as was promoted by the landed aristocracy for instance. In a sense, fighting in the Civil War had to do with the belief in the necessity to win the class war that would lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat. That also meant that the dictatorship of the proletariat could only occur by *dekulakising* the countryside, that is, stripping the wealthy classes of their source of interest by socialising the land. It was for such a reason that the Bolsheviks sought to apply the slogan "the aim justifies the means." And since the aim was socialism, the means could even amount to mass terror. The belief in "terror" is best illustrated in Lenin's warning that 'If we are not ready to shoot a saboteur and White Guardist, what sort of revolution is that?' (49) Of course, that kind of terror was self-evident and was a legitimate response to White threat. But terror excess had been only revealed shortly before the Civil War was won, when the Bolsheviks extended such a terror through grain requisitioning. (50)

The policy of requisitioning, which came along with War Communism, was a supposedly significant step towards a developed phase of socialism. Yet, the question is: in decreeing War Communism, was Lenin intending to bring in socialism, or it was the power of circumstances which led him to announce the new policy? While an answer to this question needs further development, the general conclusion that one might well draw is that neither War Communism nor the requisition measure were a planned action on the part of the Bolsheviks. In practical terms, this might well explain the coercive measures that followed from the attempt to collect grain surpluses. Following from this argument the application of Marx's theory in this respect seems somehow forced, since, at least given the time factor, Soviet Russia was rather unprepared for a transition as such. Even if one is forced to premise Lenin's justification of coercion on Marx's own text (51), the action by which peasant interests were crushed raises some cause for concern. One should by no means forget the role of the Cheka (the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Struggle against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation) in dealing with 'mass unrest." As Fitzpatrick asserts,

> After the outbreak of the Civil War, the Cheka became an organ of terror dispensing summary justice including executions, making mass arrests and taking hostages at random in areas that had come under White control or were suspected of leaning towards the Whites. According to Bolshevik figures for twenty provinces of European Russia in 1918 and the first half of 1919, at least 8,389 persons were shot without trial by the Cheka, and 87,000 arrested.(52)

The basic flaw in applying Marx's notion was the supposition that Russia had been in unparalleled class war between 'the rural bourgeoisie' and the rest of society, a war that necessitated running the state solely on the grounds of a permanent class struggle. This in itself constituted the reduction of the role of the state to three main apparatuses: the Red Army, the Cheka and the People's Commissariat of Food Supply (Narkomprod) (53)

In a more concrete sense, the actual period of coercion, one would argue, began with the Bolshevik's depiction of the countryside in class terms; this was the period coinciding with the policy of grain requisitioning adopted when the Narkomprod became the strongest authority in decision-making in agricultural policy. The position of Narkomprod is crucial in explaining the crisis that rose from governmental authoritarian rule. As a central authority, Narkomprod could in a short period put the countryside under its absolute rule, thus displacing the central role which the Supreme Economic Council (VSNKh) and the Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem) for instance had used to play. (54) Actually, the policy of requisitioning and the focus on the issue of class might well themselves explain the problem of coercion. First, one might argue that the necessity to isolate the Kulaks from both the middle and lower peasantry had been central in creating the right atmosphere to carry out the policy of requisitioning. At the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 Lenin expressed this class issue by asserting that the proper organisations should 'rob the kulak, not offend the middle peasant, and give to the poor peasant.' (55) Second coercion was justified by the claim that it was the class nature of the Kulaks which necessitated dekulakisation through requisitioning. It was for such a reason that most of the policy directed against grain monopoly was aimed at liquidating the kulaks as a class. Even Lenin was keen to treat this question theoretically as an extremely important issue. His theory of state capitalism was focused on the particular problem of the necessity to control grain produce by the state. (56)

Part of the class war argument, which still had influential resonance after "food dictatorship" was abandoned in 1919, was that united together against the rural bourgeoisie the poor peasantry (and by far the middle peasants) and the industrial working class had to work together in the hope of applying the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. One essential condition for such a class alliance would only be co-operation and concessions. The

middle peasantry in particular should be fully satisfied to sacrifice some of its grain and food produce in order to feed the working masses in the factories. On the other hand, co-operation should be built on warning against the kulaks and rural bourgeois as class enemies whose ultimate aim was to dispossess the rest of society of their sources of income and wealth. But why had the Bolshevik leadership opted for such a discrimination between the well-to-do peasantry as a whole and the rest of society? An answer to this question came in the form of a debate started by Adam Ulam and other scholars. Mainly, there are two opposing arguments when it comes to assessing the issue of class and its relation to the rise of coercion in the Soviet context. The two arguments are best illustrated in the work of Paul Graig Roberts and Adam Ulam. The main question raised in the debate is whether state coercion during the period of War Communism was to target the peasantry in the hope of winning the support of the proletariat.

The main argument that Roberts raises against Adam Ulam is that the latter focuses all too much on the Blosheviks' treatment of the workers and the peasants as distinct classes. Ulam's problem in dealing with this issue in relation to "War Communism" is that he overemphasises the role of politics. For him, the Bolsheviks were in a quandary and could not satisfy the workers by more egalitarian means which would also serve the interests of the peasantry. The workers in Ulam's view were privileged at the expense of the peasantry as a whole. (57) Ulam predicates his thesis on the suggestion that the Bolsheviks could not make an economic *miracle* but had to dispossess the peasantry of its land produce in the hope of 'satisfying' the workers. In Roberts's view, Ulam makes a *simplistic* conclusion by arguing that the Bolsheviks' only hope was to win over the working class, and once that goal was achieved the 'Communist Party' could then 'kill War Communism.' (58) By implication, Ulam's interpretation is that in their attempt to apply the dictatorship of the proletariat and introduce socialism the Bolsheviks did but create an other class struggle within Soviet Russia.

Roberts argues that Ulam's claim is inaccurate basically because 'the workers were still connected with the agrarian population' and 'the policies of "war communism" were not generally popular with the workers.' Roberts' claim finds full support in Lars T Lih's work. Lih argues that the social position of the workers could not allow a hostile stance against the peasants: 'the government's attack on independent grain-purchasing delegations sent by individual factories and towns irritated the workers more than they were pleased by the opportunity to take grain by force.'(59) Moreover, an other argument can be raised against Ulam's claim is the fact that Lenin himself did assert on many occasions that Soviet Russia was dominated by the peasant population. Even when he stressed the proletarian element of the coming socialist revolution, Lenin was fully aware of the influence of the peasantry. Therefore, the Bolsheviks need not exaggerate the importance of the proletariat. 'What we actually have is a workers' state, with this peculiarity, firstly, that it is not the working class but the peasant population that pre-dominates in the country, and, secondly, that it is a workers' state with bureaucratic distortions. (60)

Commenting on the defining characteristics of the workers' state, Alex Callinicos observed that such a state had been 'apparently on the verge of being engulfed by mass unrest—strikes in Petrograd, a bitter peasant rising in Tambov province, and the mutiny of the garrison of the key naval base at Kronstadt.' (61) In this respect, the argument by Ulam that the Bolsheviks' main pre-occupation was how to satisfy the workers seems to have been contingent on an exaggerated interpretation. Yet, as Callinicos reminds us, abandonment of "War Communism" in favour of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was in great part actuated by the need to 'conciliate the peasantry by material concessions,' which led to the departure from the excessive policy of grain requisitioning. (62) In conclusion, one would argue, the change in government policy did respond less to peasant uprisings than to the general discontent—including the working class—that was caused by War Communism.

II/ Stalin's Marxism: A Retrograde Leninism

1/ Stalinist Leninism:

Harold Shukman argues that,

> alongside the growth of his power as a General Secretary, official doctrine was transformed from Leninism into Leninism-Stalinism; instead of just Lenin, a Siamese-twin figure emerged called Lenin-Stalin; the theoretically separate Party and State would be elided into an entity called Party-State...there would be no Leninism without its Stalinist interpretation, no Lenin-in-history without the attached Stalin... (63)

Shukman's comment here casts light on how important it was for Stalin to liken his character and rule to Lenin, partly because Lenin's teaching was considered by most Bolsheviks as an example to follow, and partly because Stalin needed to argue that while Leninism was the Marxism of its time, it had to be complemented by an other form of "Marxism"—Stalinism—which only allegedly continued with the Marxism of the 1880s and 1890s and the Marxism of Lenin. Actually, Stalin's need to interpret himself as the only heir to Lenin came along with his argument that Lenin in turn had been the only heir to Marx.

'And so what is Leninism?' Stalin asked. (64) This question highlights Stalin's concern with defining the very ideology which he for thirty years had acted in the name of. This question also reminds the reader that since 1924 the Soviet General Secretary had pains in forging a form of Leninism that could legitimate his tyrannical policies. Was Leninism an 'application of Marxism,' or was it a 'revival of...Marxism' itself?, Stalin continues. (65) Stalin's answer to this question is dubious, since he thought that such definitions were accurate at the same time when they were flawed. While Lenin 'applied Marxism to Russian

conditions' Leninism cannot but be considered 'an international phenomenon.' (66) Although 'Lenin did indeed restore the revolutionary content of Marxism' Leninism is a much more particular phenomenon, given the novelty of its claims. (67)

> Leninism is Marxism of the era of *imperialism* [my italics] and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels pursued their activities in the pre-revolutionary period...when developed imperialism did not yet exist...But Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, pursued his activities in the period of developed imperialism...when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets. (68)

Through this definition of Leninism Stalin provides an explanation for what became then dubbed "Marxism-Leninism." For him, the history of Marxian thought cannot be disaggregated into "one Marxism" or "one Leninism." Leninism is the Marxism of its time, mainly because Marxism itself, Marxism as entity, had to be complemented by its match, by the ideology of revolution *at work*. That means Marxism had been the ideology of the time of theory, and Leninism the Marxism of the time of practice. While Marxism was the true 'prophesy' Leninism was the realisation of that prophesy through the October Revolution. While Marxism and Leninism were both timely, the only difference between them resided in the tasks they were assigned: one 'prepared' proletarians for revolution, an other led proletarians to revolution. (69)

2/ Leninism and Revolution:

The most remarkable feature of Leninism, being a specific form of Marxism, Stalin tells us, is its revolutionary character. Leninism is a historical phenomenon whose guiding principle was to fight imperialism—as a final stage in the development of capitalism. Leninism derives its practical element from the deduction that the capitalist system is not a static economic system; rather it builds on the principle that capitalism is a *developmental* system of capital monopoly and accumulation which itself gives birth to 'imperialism' (70) Such an idiosyncrasy *forces* the capitalists to compete in the hope of getting more wealth and power. This happens nationally. Internationally, on the other hand, the picture is similar but much more complex. Modern colonial powers, which are necessarily capitalist nations, will endeavour to control the riches (raw materials, etc) of the colonised countries, and monopolise their exploitation of those riches. In such an attempt, the need to compete grows dramatically and finally ushers in "imperialist" wars. In Lenin's view wars stand as a significant sign because they reveal what capitalism is all about: it is a system of a most developed economic development whose internal workings would in the last analysis only lead to the destruction of the imperialist powers themselves.

In Stalin's view this specific feature of capitalism makes it prone to self-defeat and, therefore, self-destruction. And Leninism is the actual objective cause which will eventually terminate capitalism itself. Leninism is significant in the sense that it had two defining historical tasks. It diagnosed the malady, and prescribed the cure. Diagnosis of the malady was carried out on a very specific ground: Leninism is the only theory which had identified the character of imperialism. (71) Prescription of the cure happened by observing both the national and international context: Leninism could successfully rely on a sound revolutionary theory forged since *WBD* and locate the opportune context wherein proletarian revolution *had* to happen.

Imperialist wars like World War I, Stalin maintained, were the very condition of possibility of the proletarian revolution worldwide. World War I holds two important truths. First, 'it gathered all [the] contradictions' of capitalism 'into a single knot and... thereby accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat.' (72) How imperialism was of great benefit to the Russian proletariat, Stalin asserts, was because 'it gave birth to Leninism.' But why Leninism was hosted in the country least characterised imperialist, namely Russia? Stalin answers this question by arguing that Russia was the most appropriate context for the application of Lenin's revolutionary theory. (73) How could that theory be applied is a question which has to be answered by primarily observing the fundamental characteristics of Tsarism. First of all, Tsarism unceasingly encouraged capital investment and the exploitation of the labouring masses by resorting to 'despotic' measures. Second, the role that the Tsar played in colonising 'non-Russian' territories such as Turkey and China cannot be denied. Third, Tsarism helped Western imperialist powers expand their territorial claims by providing them with 'millions of soldiers.' (74) It is for these reasons that proletarians in Russia could rely on and rally round Leninism in its mission to rule out the dictates of imperialism. (75)

To carry out that historic task, Stalin tells us, Leninism had to push for a three-stage revolution. While the first stage concerns the termination of tsarism, the second is about the 'smashing' of 'bourgeois democracy', and the third relates to the establishment of a full-fledged 'proletarian democracy.' The three stages celebrated by Stalin were in his view the cornerstone of revolutionary work in the context of Russia. In this respect, proletarian revolution has to happen at the level of one country first, and then be expanded worldwide. The revolution in one country was to pave the way for the international revolution of the proletariat. He believed 'that the revolution in Russia could not but become a proletarian

revolution, that from its very inception it could not but assume an international character, and that, therefore, it could not but shake the very foundations of world imperialism.' (76)

The three stages preached by Stalin were but a prelude to an imminent world revolution whose practical element is the total abolition of the rule of bourgeois democracy. After the revolution was carried in Russia, Stalin maintained, the task of preserving the gains of such a revolution could not be determined only within the context of Russia itself. Living the revolution nationally without its internationalisation would leave the entirety of the proletarian movement at the mercy of "chance" and the malice of the imperialist powers. The only way to consolidate what the October Revolution had achieved was

> to transfer the struggle to the international arena, to expose the ulcers of imperialism, to prove that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, to smash social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, and finally, to overthrow capitalism in their own country and to forge a new fighting weapon for the proletariat...in order to facilitate the task of overthrowing capitalism for the proletarians of all countries. (77)

Leninism in this sense is not a revolutionary theory bound by what happens at the national level; rather it is a theory that works according to a systematic tactic; it has definite historical tasks the aim of which is to prove that the slogan "revolution" is not a recipe to prepare overnight. Revolutionary work, however, means all the tasks mentioned above: to show how imperialism works, to be able to explain that the contradictions of capitalism would eventually usher in its collapse, to prescribe to the proletariat how capitalism should be abolished in one country and, therefore, in 'all countries.'

On the other hand, Leninism as a revolutionary theory of international significance is not premised solely on the critique of imperialism and prescription of revolutionary tactics. It also rests on the observation, analysis, and critique of the Social-Democratic trends claiming to speak in the name of revolutionary Marxism. The essence of Leninism resides also in its

vanguard approach to the flaws of Social-Democratic 'opportunism' and the failure of the Second International. As Stalin broaches it, the task of Leninism comes in one defining stage: it concerns the critique of the opportunism of the Second International. (78) Actually, as Stalin asserts in an earlier work (79), Lenin's approach to such issues as Social-Democratic opportunism constitutes the essence of Bolshevism itself, since Bolshevik thinking emerged basically from the belief that Marxism as a revolutionary theory should not be abused by being transformed into a *reformist* ideology, or be used to legitimate social-chauvinism for instance. The fundamental premise for Bolshevik revolutionary work which the 'parties of the Second International' resisted in the pre-war period was 'the question of the of the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of liberating the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of the paths to be followed in the struggle against imperialism, the question of the paths to be followed in order to overthrow imperialism.' (80) The opportunists were powerful mainly because capitalism had the power to develop peacefully without passing over to the imperialist stage, before 'the catastrophic contradictions of imperialism' manifested, and before 'the parties of the Second International' could 'think seriously about revolution.' (81) What allowed the Bolsheviks to attack the Second International was when capitalism started to ripen into its opposite, that is, grow to the extent that it became self-devouring; that instance made it easier for the Bolsheviks 'to overhaul the entire activity of the Second International...to examine the entire arsenal of the Second International...' (82) That in turn facilitated the task of 'preparing for the proletarian revolution' and making 'Leninism replace the Second International.' (83) For Stalin the fight against the opportunists of the Second International who deny free nations the right to 'self-determination' (84) is but a fight which reminds the proletariat all over the world that it is in their hands that the future of free nations lies. It is in *WBD*, Stalin suggests, that Lenin prophetically asserted that the Russian proletariat heralded the revolution everywhere. (85)

III/ Totalitarianism at work:

1/ The Nature of the First Five-Year Plan:

Judging Stalin's First Five-Year Plan (hereafter referred to as FFYP) by Lenin's "War Communism" seems to cast some validity onto the claim that Stalin's economic plans did originate from Leninism itself. However, judging it by the New Economic Policy (NEP) seems to put into question most of Stalin's humdrum propaganda that he was following the steps of the father of the Soviet Union, namely Lenin. But judging the Plan by the logic of Lenin's thinking will certainly render any comparison contingent on the very circumstances that Lenin himself treated in different ways. If one should liken one specific economic policy to an other, it seems that Stalin's FFYP was a sophisticated version of War Communism, since in both periods the prevailing argument was how to *force* socialism onto a society that was hardly ready for it; both plans came also as a response to pressing circumstances in which society was caught up in a conflict between labour and capital; finally both plans were contrived with some degree of 'coercion', with War Communism being the *primitive* form. In some way, Stalin's FFYP was the advanced form of War Communism. (86) Stalin regarded War Communism to be an experiment which could be repeated by new means, by regulating the market according to state prerogatives, and by adjusting the relationship between the peasantry and the state. (87)

The NEP experience, on the other hand, came as an answer to the failure of War Communism in accommodating a Socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The coercion that the policy of requisitioning had ushered in and the rise of an authoritarian state ruled by the Cheka and the Red Army did nothing but constitute a betrayal of the working classes carried out in the name of the class war whose alleged target was the rich

kulak and the rural aristocracy. When the Civil War ended on the main front and War Communism achieved nothing but coercive rule on the part of the government and hostility on the part of the workers and peasants, the Bolshevik leadership came to realise that state regulation of agriculture resulted in an oppressive state capitalist economy rather than a revolutionary socialist one, in an excessively coercive state rather than an emancipatory one, and in a proletariat *in itself* rather than a proletariat *for itself*.

Why Lenin decided to depart from War Communism to the New Economic Policy was because the drive for 'collectivism' in agriculture only resulted in a fiasco: first it only relatively boosted the economy; and second it did not succeed at the social level, but only ushered in hostilities to the regime. The NEP in turn followed from that failure mainly because the government decided to increase production by allowing more freedom for individual farmers, and by facilitating the work of individual industrialists in the cities. (88) The NEP, although initiated in response to such events as the Kronstadt (89), came as an answer to the failure of the government to build socialism through such policies as requisitioning. In his seminal study of the Bolshevik Revolution, E H Carr elaborates the main points of the NEP in 1921. First it was a measure which sought to replace harsh requisitioning by 'a grain tax'; second, taxation should be fixed at a level lower than requisition rates; third, to fix taxation according to the level of productivity by the peasants, that is, the more the 'cultivator' produces the less taxes he pays; and fourth, to give more 'freedom' to the farmers in controlling their grain surpluses. (90) The spirit of the new policy, Carr reminds us, was that it encouraged individual cultivators to produce more and, thus, break with the peasants' resistance to land cultivation. (91); the new policy would also encourage profit-seeking peasants to benefit from the opportunities offered by the tax in kind.

The NEP was promising in the sense that it could ease the pressure on the cultivators who would guarantee an unprecedented improvement of production. The measure as Lenin

himself thought was positive in the sense that it would encourage also the state-controlled economy to opt for "private trade." (92) Practically the NEP laws and decrees drew heavily on the choice to privatise ownership while reserving the right for state intervention whenever possible, which, as V. N. Bandera rightly asserted, gave birth to a 'mixed economy.' (93) They gave individuals the right to own a number of properties not regarded as a threat to the socialist economy. The Civil Code enforced in 1923 prescribed items that could be owned by individuals: 'buildings not municipalized, commercial enterprises, industrial enterprises employing hired workers...tools and instruments of production, money...gold...and foreign currency...property of every kind not withdrawn from private ownership.' (94) Further legislation in 1924 also allowed other measures such as land leasing (95)

While signs of the NEP show that basically society was relatively content with a mixed economy, the explanation why Stalin chose to depart from such a policy resides in both subjective and objective incentives. Harrison attempted to present three views in relation to this question. First, the NEP became incongruent with 'any further industrial development'; second, the NEP could easily be transformed into a much more sophisticated system by introducing new industrial development—which later became called the 'Five-Year Plans'; and third, it was 'inconsistent with the extremely rapid industrialization actually undertaken from 1928 onwards.' (96) Contrary to Harrison's claims, Simon Johnson and Peter Temin argued that the decision to abandon the NEP was not solely related to the failure of the NEP to bear the weight of the new economic situation which required both mass collectivisation and industrialization. Johnson and Temin thought that Stalin's departure from the NEP was triggered by 'the macroeconomy and farmers' incentives.' (97) What worsened the economic situation in the late years of the NEP was 'the lingering inflationary pressure...with an annual rate of price increase of between 20 and 30 per cent.' Such a pressure followed from 'the 1924 stabilization of the ruble.' Also, the decision by the leadership to introduce 'restrictions'

on 'private trade' did devastate the economic potential of the NEP, which had principally been based on the importance of such a form of trade. (98)

This macroeconomic explanation, albeit satisfactory, cannot on the other hand rule out other interpretations such as Stalin's personal role. Stalin's abandonment of the NEP did not start when the NEP policies started to fail in 1928 but was rather the result of his own criticism of the NEP results in the early 1920s. His attack on that economic policy started at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 when he observed that 'the NEP fosters not only Great Russian chauvinism—it also fosters local chauvinism...It is this same NEP and the private capital associated with it that nourish and foster Georgian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek and other nationalisms.' (99) For Stalin the NEP combined capitalist elements which would reduce workers' solidarity to mere nationalistic illusions, which, in his view, would condemn the revolutionary aim of the proletariat by chauvinistic claims. Deep down, however, the departure from the NEP had its roots in more objective problems, especially the slow growth of industrial power emanating from technical problems such as the scarcity, and, in many cases, absence of modern means of production. (100) Added to that was the problem of the distribution and exploitation of the land by the peasants who were still unable to conceive of agriculture in scientific terms (101) The NEP failed to provide the necessary structure for maintaining both agriculture and industry. Inefficient and insufficient production caused a supply crisis which affected the purchasing power of the peasants. As Moshe Lewin commented,

> the relationship between industrial retail prices and state agricultural prices was much more unfavourable to the peasants than it had been before the war. Industrial products were dear, of poor quality and scarce into the bargain. There was constant talk of 'the famine of goods'...Prices paid by the state for procurements of grain...were low, and often failed to cover the cost of production. (102)

The decision to abandon the NEP by Stalin directly related to the decision to massively collectivise and industrialise the country. For the Stalinist leadership the failure to boost the economy during the period of the NEP and the inability to achieve the aims promised since the early 1920s could not but speed up the process of collectivising the land in order to revolutionise economic growth. Stalin expressed the need to collectivise the land by asserting that 'the solution lies in the transition from small, divided peasant farms to large united farms based on the social exploitation of the land on the basis of a new, higher technology. *There is no other solution.*' (103) In theory the drive for collectivization, as Stalin explains it, was responsive to the need to modernise exploitation of the land, which would improve both the quantity and quality of production.

2/ The First Five-Year Plan and National Socialism:

The FFYP was the beginning of Stalin's revolution, and what confirms this is the fact that among most Bolshevik thinkers of the CPSU it was only Stalin who imposed his economic version. Stalin's announcement in 1929 that once it accomplished its aims the NEP had to be 'thrown to the devil" (104) was but a prelude to the FFYP. (105) By 1928 Stalin decided to adopt the Plan (1928-1933) in order to replace the NEP, which he abolished one year later. The FFYP years were greatly marked by Stalin's implementation of "socialism in one country" whereby he promised to transform Russia into an unrivalled developed industrial country. Although the catchphrase "socialism in one country" meant industrialisation 'at a snail's pace' (106), to use Bukharin's assertion, Stalin

> ...subsequently gave it an interpretation very different from that of the right-wing leaders [like Bukharin], whose position was stigmatized at the end of the 1920s as the "Right Opposition". To Stalin "socialism in one country" meant strengthening of the dictatorship and an orientation of the nation's economy towards preparation for total war. This was to be achieved through breakneck

> industrialization, emphasizing heavy industry and arms production, and exploitation of peasant labor by means of coercive collectivization... (107)

Apparently, being primarily an economic policy, "socialism in one country" was a thrust not only to force economic development in the country but also to use it as a slogan against its designers. Using the economic policies for political reasons was a defining feature that had marked Stalin's character since the Lenin years. His manipulation of Zinoviev and Kamanev in the early 1920s was a case in point. (108)

Following his new economic plans dictated by the FFYP, Stalin opted also for rapid collectivisation of farms as early as 1929. He, however, was not conscious of the social consequences that would follow in the long run. He was obsessed with the implementation of what was schemed by the FFYP: collectivisation and rapid industrialisation had to take place at any cost. As collectivisation was slow in the first two years of the Plan , Stalin took pains to speed up the pace of events.

> ...at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930s, Lenin's principle of voluntary collectivization [the principle on which "socialism in one country" was based] was violated almost everywhere, and under pressure from Stalin and his closest aides. Organizational and explanatory work among the peasants was replaced by crude administrative fiat and force directed against the middle peasants and even some of the poor peasants. They were forced to join collective farms under the threat of "dekulakization". (109)

Thus peasants were left in a quandary: they had either to cede farm units and convert them into co-operatives owned by the state, or choose to drift away to the industrial towns and be dumped into worse social conditions. So the process of collectivising was a lot worse than had been imagined. 'Perhaps a million peasant households were deported to the slave-labour camps of the Gulag Archipelago' as a result to "dekulakization" in December 1929. (110).

The picture of Soviet peasants moved by fear and uncertainty to leave the countryside due to collectivisation seemed very much like that when English peasants in the mid-eighteenth century had to drift away to the cities because of the "Enclosure Movement." The terrible consequences of forced collectivisation helped so much rapid industrialisation. In the words of Callinicos, '...collectivization, by pushing many peasants out of the countryside, provided the new factories with their workforce.' (111) The other link, Callinicos argues, was that 'collectivization allowed the regime drastically to increase grain exports and thereby to finance imports of plant and equipment from the West.' (112)

In *The Making of the Soviet System* (1985), Moshe Lewin came to a brilliant conclusion about the structure of industrial Russia and its social and economic effects. He identified 'three social wars' characterising the Soviet inter-war years, basically from 1928 to1930. He argued that the industrial process was hampered basically by three counter-productive wars: one against 'technicians' and "the bourgeois intelligentsia" between 1928 and 1931, one against the labour force from 1931 to 1936, and another against Party or non-Party 'cadres'. For Lewin, these social wars were a driving cause for the diminution—whether state-led or voluntary—of skilled workers, graduate engineers, and specialised technicians. But what 'plagued' most the whole process of production and administrative efficiency and competence was the "class" of state-employed 'officials' who caused entire "bureaucratization" of the industrial, and, thus, economic organization. (113)

Failure of the system to maintain a steady rate of economic growth was caused not only by the inability to assimilate in proportionate and reasonable terms the workforce into one equal social fabric as envisaged by socialism but also by the miscalculated estimates that followed largely from the imbalance between pressing requirements for mass and rapid industrialisation and the unfavourable circumstances. Probably, the need for mass industrialisation itself did not evolve naturally as a consequence to social needs and demands.

Rather, it was responsive to the pressure of "catching up" with the West and advancing as priority the principle of a world socialist revolution that had to begin at home. This in turn was carried out in utter disregard of the very basis of Marxian social theory. Marx's theorisation of socialism, it should be noted, starts from a theory of emancipation on how far the "state" is able, in its proletarian character, to emancipate the working classes from the class rule dictated by the *vestiges* of the democratic republic. The primary task of such a state is to expropriate private ownership and establish in its place as a permanent order collective ownership.

> The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property. (114)

The Stalinist model of state reversed the very basic elements of Marx's theory of emancipation : socialism is the aim no matter how we achieve it, even if peasants are forced off their lands and workers deprived of their wages. This is why the Russian Revolution in its Stalinist face was a 'counter-revolution' as Callinicos argued (115) Also, reliance on heavy industry produced serious systemic failures reflecting 'inflationary pressures' since the early 1930s. (116) The organization of a planned economy controlled by an elite of state bureaucrats gradually reduced the "work ethic" among the labouring classes.

It was certainly the drive for abolition of the NEP and its replacement by the FFYP in 1929 which reoriented the economic organisation of the Soviet system. Yet, the consequences of the FFYP did in many ways resemble those of War Communism. The fault, as Igor Klyamkin observed, originated from Lenin's 'single-party system' established in the

aftermath of October (117) Moreover, as David Kotz put it, Lenin's policies were at the origin of Soviet 'authoritarianism' caused primarily by the Civil War. (118) The tyrannical practices which emanated from Stalin's FFYP had been caused by such very authoritarianism. Stalin's political and economic measures—whose effect had continued until 1991—were themselves to spring from the very context of the alleged workers' state set by the October Revolution. On the other hand, Stalin's ideological manoeuvres had always deployed Leninism as a medium for propagating Stalin's personal plans. The Leninist-Stalinist system constituted the crisis of an ideology speaking in the name of Marxism. However, such a system was terminated in 1991. It was Michael Gorbachev, the new General Secretary of the CPSU who paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet ideology.

IV/ Gorbachev and the End of Stalinism:

1/ the Liberal Democratic Trap:

The disintegration of Soviet-type communism in East-Central Europe in 1989, and the actual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 disclosed what Leninism-Stalinism had been all about. This came first with Gorbachev's attempts to refresh the Soviet economy with the NEP-like *Perestroika* (restructuring), and second with his efforts to provide a conciliatory socialism through what came to be known as *glasnost* (openness). (119) What was most remarkable about Gorbachev's rule was the swiftness with which a seventy-year old ideology crumbled. Yet, I would argue, that was not but a sign of the pyramidal growth of Leninism-Stalinism whose birth was the October Revolution, climax Stalin's rule, and denouement *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*. Why Soviet-type communism became fallible only when Gorbachev ascended to the secretaryship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a question that has been dealt with in many forms. Yet, it seems to me that the Soviet Union had been a state which, by pretending to promote Marx's and Engels's concept of the

'withering away of the state' did but wither away itself. Gorbachev was not himself the conscious designer of the collapse but he happened to act in circumstances which made him prepare for the demise of the Soviet system; the history of the USSR tells us a no-secret when we read about the Leninist-Stalinist ideology of coercion and terror in thousands of books and archives. (120) Most certainly, Gorbachev was the gravedigger of Soviet socialism. He started with reform in the hope of refreshing the Soviet economy; he then finished up with a revolution certainly not meant. How such reforms were turned into a deadly weapon against the socialist sanctuary, and how such a weapon terminated the Soviet system itself is the point of our discussion in this section.

Seweryn Bialar attributes the Gorbachev reforms to two main causes: (1) Domestic crisis, and (2) international factors. (121) The first aspect, it seems, has its answer not only in the immediate historical context of the 1980s where socialism's traditional enemy capitalism was overtaking it in ideological global reach but also to the Stalinist mode of economy that had followed from the 1960s, and 1970s, and which ushered in the Brezhnev "stagnation years". So the economic crisis was systemic, and was responsive to a rigid political structure that had not allowed for refreshing initiatives. Moreover prevention of such initiative was itself a result of the cultural industry that had remained for more than sixty years snared within the socialist belief in 'catching up and surpassing' (122) the West in all political-ideological spheres. That catchphrase was a translation of how the economy remained in shambles:

> The social sources of the Soviet systemic crisis can be defined very simply: In the post-Stalin period, Soviet society in all its segments and its aspirations has changed very significantly while the antiquated political order of a different era has remained largely unchanged. First, the Soviet social system of stratification that rewarded power and was indifferent to performance killed the work ethic of the population and was counterproductive to modernization. Second, official corruption and unfulfilled

> promises led to far-reaching political alienation of the society as a whole from the party and the regime... (123)

The question why the Soviet Union collapsed and who hastened the collapse can always be addressed, as a legitimate claim, in relationship to Michael Gorbachev. So the historical legacy together with the political standpoint of the new Soviet leader were decisive factors behind his "revolutionary" break with the past. To this end, it is significant to ask why only Gorbachev among other leaders was conscious of the necessity of political and economic reforms, and which historical and ideological facts urged him, or rather pushed him, to reconsider the bases whereupon both Soviet political and economic organisations had hitherto functioned. His choice to perform systemic "restructuring" of Soviet economy, and his thrust behind political rupture with the legacy of Stalinism, were injected by several circumstances that had something to do with the then shaken Soviet global role and position. But that reflected to a large extent the crisis of Soviet economy and social policy. My account in this respect deals mainly with the factors that led to the Gorbachev reforms, and the reforms themselves: their success and failure.

In 1984, shortly before assuming office (1985), Gorbachev declared assertively that he and Shevardnadze were in total agreement about the future of their nation:

> ...[I]t was impossible to live that way. We began looking for an answer to the question: How should we live? A concept appeared for the country and the world. For internal problems we call it perestroika. And we put forward a simple formula: more democracy, more glasnost, more humanity. On the whole, everything must develop so that the person in this society feels like a human being. There you have it—a simple formula for life. (124)

Gorbachev's "mature" and workable version of this declaration evolved in full shape in the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, roughly three years after he had ascended to power. The rather "romantic" tone through which he expressed his views in 1984 was now transformed into full-fledged political programme aimed at breaking ties with the old "bureaucratic" tradition set by the Communist Party. In the Conference he made the following statement:

> The existing political system proved incapable of protecting us from the growth of stagnant phenomena in economic and social life in recent decades...The ever greater concentration of economic-management functions in the hands of the Party and political leadership became typical... (125)

By then, Gorbachev started to rethink the status, function, and implications of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The same views spelled out by Gorbachev in the 19th Party Conference were to overlap with his overall conceptions of peace and stability. He expressed the same "revolutionary" concern on his visit to the United States, when he delivered his famous speech at the United Nations *A Road to the Future* on December 7, 1988. No Soviet General Secretary before him had ever delivered such an influential speech to an international organisation. He addressed three main issues. First, the new global economy: 'the world economy is becoming a single organism, and no state, whatever its social system or economic status, can develop normally outside it'. (126) Second, the new political condition: '[f]reedom of choice is a universal principle.' (127) Third, the world had now to be redefined on "demilitarising international relations" (128) and "democratising human relations." (129) In all issues there is only one implication: the world is heading for a New Order and the Cold War is about to end. Gorbachev concluded the difference between the order of the past (premised on tension and conflict) and the order of the present:

> Two great revolutions – the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917 – exerted a powerful impact on the very nature of history and radically changed the course of world developments. Both of these revolutions, each in its own way, gave a tremendous impetus to human progress. To a large extent, they shaped the way of thinking that is still prevalent in social consciousness. It is a most precious spiritual heritage. But today we face a different world, for which we must seek a different road to the future. (130)

In this statement Gorbachev declares that the principles on which the Russian Revolution was built are no longer adequate. So it was time for peace to the Soviet people at home and in their international relations. The age of revolution according to him is analogous to a 'history of wars being waged almost everywhere…' (131) Of the Gorbachev new policies on the economic-political agenda the 'freedom' factor was the most promising, albeit limited, choice for his people at home. Marshall Goldman described Gorbachev's option for freedom as a most unprecedented attempt in the Soviet Union. (132)

The effect of Gorbachev's UN speech at home was gigantic. It was time now for real change. In his new political programme, he focused on how political reform could happen and succeed. It was to reside in and rest on his famous concept "Perestroika" (restructuring) which would function as a general and organisational framework for the entire idea of reform. David Lane defines the term perestroika and sketches its different functions. It is 'a set of tactics aimed at resolving contradictions. Rather than a set of policies, Perestroika is an attitude or approach to policies and society…' It is composed of::

1- 'Individual (and group) self-interest.'

2- 'Glasnost (public criticism).'

3- 'Democracy.'

4- 'Law and control.' (133)

The ultimate aim of perestroika was then to attempt to tackle problems relating to the Soviet political and economic system. The components of perestroika, as mentioned above, are not only indissociable but also vital for the "cure" of the plagued Soviet system. But how should perestroika start to work? For Gorbachev, it would work only in the promotion of 'democracy' in the first place. But what does Gorbachev mean by the word democracy? Should it be a democracy as theorised in Marxist-Leninist literature, or a democracy in the liberal democratic sense? It should be argued that Gorbachev's conception of democracy was stamped by both traditions. While, on the one hand, he believed that democracy should be framed within the Leninist tradition, he, on the other, took pains to force the liberal democratic version therein.

In a more comprehensive sense democracy would only achieve its aims in the presence of 'freedom and humanism.' (134) The first step towards a true democratic system, for Gorbachev, was to 'democratise' the Communist Party itself, that is, to decentralise and liberate it from the administrative shackles which had long prevented Soviet citizens from expressing their will with freedom. As he expressed it in his address to the "All-Union Council of Trade Unions" in February 1987, democratisation would be a 'guarantee' 'against repetition of past errors, and consequently a guarantee that the restructuring process is irreversible.' (135) In the 19th Party Conference, on the other hand, he spelled out the real aim: 'radical reform' of Soviet politics. (136) By virtue of the Conference, Stephen White tells us, a number of 'Constitutional reforms were approved in November and December 1988', and they were to 'include a full-time working parliament...A constitutional review commission was also established.' (137) Archie Brown asserted that the most successful achievement of this policy was the creation of 'the system of checks and balances', where the 'separation of powers' played a constructive role. This resulted in more political freedom expressed basically in the media. The system of checks and balances was revolutionary in the

sense that, as Gorbachev himself asserted, it was 'designed to protect society against any violation of socialist legality at the highest state level.' (138) By democratising state institutions through the system of checks and balances, Gorbachev and his team proved that "Marxism-Leninism" was not an unchallengeable ideology, and that its 'basic tenets...lost their ideological hegemony' (139) Decentralisation of the Party, following Gorbachev's speech at the Conference, was to be identified with the need to dissolve 'bureaucratic centralism' and promote the spirit of cooperation rather than 'subordination' (140)

At the outset, Gorbachev's democratisation of the party did not mean to opt for a multi-party system, for that measure would infringe the laws of the socialist ideology itself. In the late 1980s, the Communist Party was still considered 'the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state and public organizations.' (141) The choices favoured by Gorbachev to carry out his reform through the process of Party democratisation rested first and foremost on his belief that '[d]emocratization accords with the very essence of the Leninist concept of socialism...only through the committed and conscious participation of the working people themselves in all of society's affairs it is possible to realize socialism's humane goals.' (142) On the other hand, Gorbachev's other challenge was to communicate the idea that democratisation was also a choice that would flourish in connection with the modern, and partly Western, promotion of the concept of freedom, since freedom of choice, as he stressed in his UN speech, was an imperative ingredient in democracy as a whole. Igor V. Timofeyev has recently argued that Gorbachev had opened the door wide for a public debate on the validity of the liberal tradition. The first success resides in taking such a debate to the 'public media' where liberal intellectuals could express their views without being censored. The second was the appointment of a number of intellectuals to managerial posts in the public media. (143) Gorbachev's concept of democracy in relationship to the Party did not only mean the unfettering of the party by

assimilating people from all walks of life but also the easing of bureaucratic-command structures by allowing more options for people to choose their representatives in the Supreme Soviet or other governmental institutions. Lewin expresses such a concern by defending this political standpoint: 'Doubtless, many in the USSR are sceptical. They have already heard many times about "democratization", about "frank talk" concerning different "woes" of daily life, about the end to "administrative methods." They are used to empty promises and insincere slogans.' (144)

To this end, Gorbachev was quite aware of the fact that the whole process would be difficult, if not impossible, without readjusting the entire political system to fit a novel form of government, that is, to fit an institutional framework partly based on the Western liberal democratic tradition. Gorbachev eventually followed that formula by adjusting in March 1989 the legal requirements for the electoral system in general and presidential elections in particular. The election formula as envisaged in 1989 and 1990 was to respond to the new Soviet constitutional demands that elections had to be 'direct, universal and secret ballot...as in the United States.' (145) 'Electoral commissions' would work to guarantee merit and unanimity.' (146)

The Communist Party was not called into question until 1989. And the press itself was concerned about the future and health of the Party. In June 1988 *Pravda* expressed its support and loyalty: 'We have to understand once and for all that in a socialist society there are no political grounds, no social reasons, for the creation of a new, different political party, still less for the creation of some kind of body of control above the party.' (147) But the dilemma facing Gorbachev, and which, probably, was one undeniable factor for the decline of the Soviet Union in 1991, was how to assimilate this "nostalgic" picture of Party priority into the set of beliefs that he revealed at his UN speech, and which, in theory, were irreconcilable with

socialist thinking, since the drive for parliamentary politics was ignored and despised by Marx himself.

2/ The Crisis and Collapse:

Ironically, Gorbachev's aspirations to structural reform were from the start trapped by the dilemma of fusing socialist values with the requirements of global "interdependence". Gorbachev's focus on parliamentary democracy, which he made his defining slogan in his foreign policy, constituted a further departure from the Marxian conception of political and democratic organisation. In principle, Marx stresses that 'parliamentarism' is only an outlet for communicating the interests of the 'propertied classes', a political situation that Marx finds alienating and inhuman. (148) Thus the expression 'parliamentary democracy' is totally new and "unsocialist" when approached from a "purely" Marxian point of view. It goes without saying that Gorbachev's push for a democratic system was injected by some belief in a democracy in its liberal sense. Richard Sakwa asserts that Gorbachev's 'commitment to elements of commune democracy is now accompanied by the proceduralism of liberal democracy...' (149) Here Gorbachev's venture resided so much in his belief in and advocacy of the fusion of communalism as a mode of socialist government with a liberal democratic tradition. How can two fundamentally different political ideologies intersect? Marx argued that a commune "government"—like the Paris Commune—could only be a 'working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time.' (150) So in Marxian logic, when a commune system passes off to a stage of separation of powers it ceases to be communal. It is displaced in a kind of 'parliamentarism' where the working classes do not control all powers, and if they intend to do so they will be divided by the bureaucratic rule emanating from "parliamentary democracy." In this respect, perestroika itself, as a substantial

prerequisite for democratic change, constitutes a denunciation of the very principles advocated by socialism.

The Gorbachev choice to join two contradictory ideological traditions led to the pressures form the opposition in 1990 to abandon altogether the ideological prerogatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since Gorbachev opened the door wide for a debate on the future of the Soviet Union in light of party democratisation, radical factions seized the opportunity to form in January 1990 the Democratic Platform, which called for a multi-party system parliament. (151) That did not reflect Moshe Lewin's predictions, which stressed that Gorbachev was very unlikely to allow dissolution of the Party too easily:

> But none of the reforms are intended to undermine the political pre-eminence of the party...[S] hould the eventual turbulence produce some demands for a multi-party system, the leadership will cite national interest to prevent undue weakening, let alone a fragmentation, of the party. (152)

Lewin's predictions, being slightly too ambitious, were belied by Gorbachev's measures. Failure of Gorbachev's perestroika in achieving political stability was also worsened by his desperate return to the hard line position that had marked his predecessors. He resumed the Stalinist coercive policies by resisting and putting down strikes in many of Soviet republics, including the Baltic. When people in some republics took to the streets to deplore Gorbachev's policies and ask for more freedom, he employed the army and police to crush the demonstrations. (153)

Failure of Gorbachev's perestroika resided also in his attempts to reform the economy. The general setting for his political reform went hand in hand with the policies he appropriated in the hope of realizing radical "restructuring" of economic organisation. In carrying out his economic reforms, Gorbachev set out a programme of action whereby he could relinquish the complex administrative policies related to central planning, basically to

move to a market economy and, at the same time, retain the socialist tradition; to create a consumer economy by reviving co-operatives, and by not allowing too much private ownership. It seems that Gorbachev's economic policies were not dissociable from his *glasnost* and democratisation formulae. He had in mind a well-defined recipe for the new economic challenge: to get rid of the remnants of the Stalinist system. He declared in 1985 that the Stalinist years had resulted in a 'grim legacy: a backward economy, strong vestiges of feudalism, millions of illiterate people.' (154) For him, then the status of Soviet economy did not get beyond the pre-industrial phase of economic development. It was then the time to double or treble the pace of technological development and industrialisation in order to bridge the yawning gap between the West and the Soviet Union. So his focus was put primarily on heavy industry.

On the other hand, Gorbachev's drastic measures to "save" the economy from total collapse were initiated as a response to the falling rates of economic growth. 'Produced national income', for example, declined from 5.7 per cent between 1971 and 1975 to 3.6 per cent between 1981 and 1985, and gross national product from 7.4 per cent to 3.7 percent. (155) Other economic historians revealed that the myth of a socialist economic miracle was only a lie; official lies about the "phenomenal" 'ninety-fold increase' in national income between 1928 and 1986 were revealed in 1987 by Grigory Khanin and Vasily Selyunin in their article "Lukavaya tsifra." (156) In order to push up the reforms, Gorbachev had to emphasise two solutions: First, to provide the right policies capable of producing 'scientific and technical progress.' (157) Second, to adjust the Soviet mode of economic organisation so that it motivates 'producers, workers and consumers' through 'prices and money as incentives.' (158) The main objective was also to create a consumer market, which would function, relatively, in response to a demand/supply formula. Moreover, such a process would include to a large extent 'privatization' of many state-owned sectors as a trigger for better

productivity. (159) However, the whole process would only occur by reducing the effect of the bureaucratic structure of central planning (reducing the role of the ministries for example), that is, by creating new and less administratively controlled industrial and production units. Such a formula was the direct aim of the 1988 Enterprise Law concerning privatisation and co-operatives. (160) In practice, the law was to create 19,539 co-operative units by the end of 1988. (161) 'The intent of the new law', as Goldman asserts, 'was to strike at the central planning authorities and transfer decision-making power from the centre to the enterprises themselves.' (162) Also, by virtue of the Law, prices in the private sectors would not come under the direct control of the state. (163) The Enterprise Law, being conceived of as a fruitful incentive for development, forced a sort of "debureaucratization" of factories and other workplaces, by assigning respectable managerial roles to the working classes, and by establishing co-operative rather than conflicting relations between workers and bosses. (164)

As the Soviet state was also suffering greatly from the lack of a strong hard currency, it was the policy of Gorbachev to attempt to create a convertible Ruble by actively incorporating Soviet economy in the world market. On paper, the formula was simple: 'to increase its exports to the West' and 'afford to increase its Western imports.' (165) The Soviet Union was terribly in need to improve its technological potential, and to provide solutions to get consumer goods from the West. But due to the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1988, the Kremlin was prevented from achieving instant goals.

Although the Soviet economy was slightly invigorated by the measures taken from 1986 to 1989, Gorbachev's perestroika seems to have failed to achieve its economic aims by 1990. According to official statistics, only some of the programmes envisaged at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 were realised by 1989: For example, 'produced national income was increased by 4.4 per cent.' (166) Moreover, the general impression was that by the end of 1989 the economic situation was relapsing to the pre-Gorbachev period. It is reported that

1990 was even worse: 'gross national product fell by 2 per cent.' (167) By 1991 'inflation' caused Soviet GNP to fall by15 per cent. (168) It was one of the worst figures of GNP decrease in Soviet history. As a result, prices dramatically increased and led to a general social discontent; they increased by roughly 5 per cent from 1985 to 1990. (169) Actually, in the Gorbachev period signs of the "depressed" Soviet economy can also be traced back to the time of the 27th Party Congress when Soviet 'budget deficit' increased by 32 billion Ruble. (170) Goldman ascribes Gorbachev's failure to maintain a good level of budget management to the managerial gap resulting from the focus on heavy industry rather than on 'consumer goods.' Gorbachev's focus on importing 'machine tools' reduced the import of 'consumer goods', which led to 'shortages and lost sales tax revenue.' (171)

Having overlooked his ultimate objective of economic reforms, Gorbachev was to sustain the most unfavourable results of, first, confusing the requirements of two conflicting traditions (socialism and capitalism), and, second, believing that heavy industry and non-state-owned sectors would guarantee the coming of a quasi-market economy. (172) The result, as it were, was a more fragmented society, desperately expecting to get its needs from vital goods. 'One result of the shortages of this kind was queues..."day and night" queues for sugar...in some areas, and queues "like in the war" for bread.' (173) Gorbachev's reform was not grounded on thoughtful gradual policies. The rush for comprehensive and rapid reform had caused him to wander off most of the plans that he had designed. As Goldman rightly pointed out, '[p]erhaps if he had concentrated on some short-run successes, particularly increasing production of food and consumer goods, he could have demonstrated he was moving on the right track.' (174)

Here it can be argued that Gorbachev's economic policy failed for numerous reasons, including: (1) Fusion of socialist and capitalist economies; (2) Inability to reconcile the requirements of the market economy with the need for developing the country in the short

run; (3) Failure to actively incorporate Soviet economy in the international market. Gorbachev himself admits: 'We lost control over the financial situation in the country. This was our most serious mistake in the years of Perestroika...' (175).

> Creating the market is a bit like trying to build a forest. The market, like a forest, is easy to chop down...A forest, like a market, is an organic phenomenon, with an infrastructure of insects, animals, and underbrush, which serve as forms of supportive life, sources of supply, and servicing systems. (176)

In theory, Gorbachev took his nation to an unprecedented era of economic and political reforms modelled on Western values. In practice, the reforms were carried out against an ideological tradition that still identified Russians. The 'restructuring' of Soviet economy and 'democratizing' of Soviet politics pleased the West. The United States would no longer think about containment. In the long run, however, such reforms did not bring the expected relief within the Soviet Union. The reforms did not endear Gorbachev to the majority of the Soviet people, partly because the economic situation kept deteriorating, and partly because the attempt to replace the socialist system with a novel and complex system, left an unprecedented ideological vacuum.

But what remained politically unclear was Gorbachev's real intention behind the reforms. While his visits to the United States were most welcome as a real thrust for modelling Soviet politics on western liberal democracy, his actions at home were confused. One might well think that Gorbachev's position was very much schizophrenic. He oscillated between the mood of keeping up with the West and that of satisfying his people who were still enmeshed within the tradition of hostility to the US. (177) On the other hand, as an economic reformer, he certainly chose to edge his country into an uncertain economic venture, and as a political figure, he conceived of himself as a liberator. But no matter what changes he

performed, Gorbachev did a *historic* service to the United States: he terminated socialism through the help of the United States itself. It should be argued that the US needed Gorbachev just as a "bonus" factor to hasten the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The US was an undeniable factor in dissolving the Soviet empire. Their political and economic offensive against Soviets had begun roughly five years before the coming of Gorbachev. It was due to the Reagan administration that the world order changed: '[e] xamining the collapse of the Soviet Union outside the context of American policy is a little like investigating a sudden, unexpected, and mysterious death without exploring the possibility of murder...' (178)

Summary

- The Civil War was mainly caused by the liquidated classes who sought to resume the old order.

- During the Civil War and slightly after Lenin was primarily concerned with 'administering' the state economically. The Bolshevik leadership sought to make use of rather than liquidate the old intelligentsia.

- "War Communism" was a policy adopted in order to refresh the Russian economy which had been badly affected by the Civil War. The ultimate aim of "War Communism" was to nationalise the economy and prepare the country for socialism.

- Following from "War Communism" a policy of requisitioning was adopted by the government. Requisitioning meant mainly state collection of grain surpluses from the richer farmers in order to feed the Red Army and the working classes.

- "War Communism" had devastating effects. It resulted in a class war against the peasants, and ushered in a dictatorship against the proletariat.

- After "War Communism" and the NEP, the Stalinist phenomenon emerged through the First Five-Year Plan.

- Leninism-Stalinism was terminated by Gorbachev's Perestroika and Glasnost.

Part 3

Theories on the Crisis: Revisionists against Totalitarians

Introduction:

Is there an ideological continuity between Marx (and Engels), Lenin, and Stalin? This question seems vague and open-ended. However, Sovietologists have attempted to come out with reasonably convincing answers since the 1930s. The answers to this question have also been fraught with contingencies, uncertainties, and a lot of surmise. On the other hand, most of the answers to this question have been based on an evaluation of the nature of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet Socialist state which emerged thereafter. As in this thesis I attempt to provide my own answer (part 4), I have chosen to start with two leading schools of thought concerned with the interpretation of the development of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism: the "Totalitarian model" and the "Revisionist school." In the present work I advance my main argument in response to these two rival schools. (1)

Discussing these schools might well, I would argue, help in elucidating my theory in part four that both the October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution are basically 'leviathan revolutions.' The first section of this part examines how the 'totalitarian model' has sought to study the Soviet system by first contesting that Soviet history has been that of an unchallengeable dominance of the state over society initiated by Lenin and continued through Stalin's 'revolution from above,' and second arguing that there is an incontestable continuity between Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The second section tries to elucidate the main points of the "revisionist school" of social historians. The school's main argument comes as a reply to the contested theories of the "totalitarian model." It basically premises its overall thesis on the claim that Soviet history (especially in its Stalinist face) had not been totally entrenched in the absolute dominance of the state over society. There was rather some sort of negotiation between civil society and the state system. This, for instance, can be seen in observing the influence of several groups, and even the working population, on governmental policy-

making. The second claim of the "revisionist school" is that the alleged continuity between Marx, Lenin, and Stalin was only relatively accurate.

The aim behind my elucidation of the two schools in question is to try to show how the Soviet system has been subject to interpretations that are in great part based on either political scientific surmise or socio-historical investigation. My thesis in Part four of the present work will try to give an alternative interpretation of the Soviet system in both its Leninist and Stalinist faces. While I agree with some of the arguments of the "totalitarian model" for instances (revolution from above, conflict between state and society), I totally disagree with the model's "continuity thesis" argument—Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism. My challenge to this thesis is that Leninism-Stalinism was not the ideological expression of the Marxian text; nor was it the practical application of Marx's theory of emancipation. The Leninist-Stalinist state reflected more the Hobbesean leviathan state which in its authoritarian grip constituted a challenge to the very emancipatory claims it advances. Also, while I agree with the "revisionist school" in its claim that society did 'participate' in its own victimisation during the rule of Stalin, I totally disagree with the claim of some of its adherents that the bureaucratisation of politics did weaken the totalitarian grip of the regime which in its loss of control over the centre was emptied of its totalitarian character. In this part I mainly discuss the main areas of contention between both schools.

I. The Totalitarian Model and the Continuity Thesis:

1/ Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and the Challenge of the "Totalitarian Model":

The prevailing theory in Western academic circles has been, since the October Revolution, that of a historiography that looks at Soviet history as the sum result of a historically illegitimate revolution against "democracy" as was partially established by the February Revolution. The advocates of such a historiography have ranged from mainstream political scientists who advance the theory that Soviet history is but a by-product of Marx's

and Engels's theory of revolution (2) to others who principally premise their argument on the hypothesis that Soviet history at work—apart from its Marxist origin—did *spawn* a modern form of totalitarianism that could compare only to Nazism, and with characteristically new forms of political obligation, tyranny, and terror that have been more or less all too simply non-existing in any other authoritarian state. (3) Such a prevailing theory has been known as the school of totalitarianism, or, more technically, the "Totalitarian model." This model advances a "continuity thesis" which basically argues that there is a clear-cut ideological and political continuity between Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. The "continuity thesis" for this purpose is constructed on the accusation by the scholars in question of Lenin's thought first and the October Revolution second of being solely responsible for what later became called Stalinism. The thesis in other words holds that many of the policies attributed to the state functioning under Stalin's rule—abolition of the NEP, the First Five-Year Plan, intra-party purges, the Great Purges of 1937-1938—had roots in the October Revolution and Bolshevik thinking, even as it first evolved with Lenin's *What is to Be Done?*

The continuity thesis greatly rests on the justification by the 'totalitarian model' of the ideological continuity between Soviet regimes. Such a justification is often bred over by a simple observation that without the ideological slogan of a "free workers' state" the regimes in question cannot hold their grip on their societies. The slogan of a free socialist society often hid the leaders' thirst for power and justification of coercion through a politics of 'propaganda' meant, as Hannah Arendt once noticed, to brainwash both intellectuals at home and the 'non-totalitarian' countries into accepting the official discourse of the state. (4) In this instance, the focus on the role of ideology by the "totalitarian model" basically reveals its inclination to study Bolshevism in rather political terms, focusing more on how 1917 was a 'revolution from above' primarily carried out by a "handful" of tyrants. (5)

In his essay "The "Dark Forces," the Totalitarian Model, and Soviet History." (1987) Jerry F. Hough demarcates the difference between two modes characterising the totalitarian model. The first is 'developmental' as it describes the Bolshevik Revolution, the NEP period, the First Five-Year Plan, and the Great Purges as a phenomenon practically resulting from Marx's very theorisation of the class struggle, the revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The second, on the other hand, is 'operational' in the sense that it generally depicts Soviet society as a victim of a political elite who after having carried out a 'revolution from above' consolidated a state entirely in their service, and consummated their monopoly of power by transforming the supposedly 'workers' state' into a veritable police machine. (6) While the developmental model constitutes the very argument advanced by the advocates of the 'continuity thesis,' the operational examines how Marxism at work (Leninism and Stalinism) proved true the complementarity of theory and practice, that is, the inevitable encounter of an unworkable theory and its practice.

The classical work representing the developmental model is that of famous Soviotologists such as Martin Malia and Richard Pipes. (7) The advocates of the operational model are such scholars as Robert V Daniels. (8) Although both groups share the claim that the relationship between state and society in the USSR can only be comprehended politically, they partially differ in locating the nature of the Soviet state (9) Martin Malia's text has represented the developmental model's obsession with "demonizing" the Marxist project in its entirety. In the words of Ronald G Suny, Malia represents the pith of the 'liberal and orthodox' interpretation of the Russian Revolution, its Marxian basis, and its post-revolutionary phases. (10) We need to believe, Malia reminds us, that 'nothing *went* wrong with the [October] Revolution, but that the whole enterprise, quite simply, *was* wrong from its inception' (Malia's italics) (11) In a different work, Malia argues that during October the working class was only used as a social agent for change. The working class 'did not [itself]

come to power; what came to power was a political and ideological organization, the Bolshevik Party.' (12) These words reflect most of the pioneering scholarly work written in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s by a host of political historians whose focus on the 1917 Revolution was later expressed by Robert Tucker: 'The Bolshevik regime was in many ways a novel phenomenon in Russia. It was not originally a dictatorship of one person...but a dictatorship of one party...Lenin was of course the supreme leader and dominating figure...' (13) 'The Leninist system', Tucker adds, 'was basically oligarchical rather than autocratic. Soviet politics in the Lenin period were, in their way, a continuing drama of persuasion of the ruling minority by its acknowledged supreme leader.' (14) Such totalitarian school spokesmen as Malia, Tucker (15), and Pipes have been confident that what happened during October 1917 was rather pre-determined by an ideology of terror the sole designer of which had been Lenin himself. Pipes was, as Suny put it, obsessed with the belief that 'October was a classic coup d'état engineered cynically by conspirators, led by the cowardly, cruel, unscrupulous Lenin.' (16)

This view of October and Lenin is reiterated in a large part of the literature produced by the totalitarian school whose insistence on condemning Leninism, as Alex Callinicos explains, basically comes from the suggestion that 'the methods used by Lenin and his supporters first to achieve then to maintain control of the state brought into being the Stalinist system...' (17) The advent of "conspiracy," mass manipulation, and "terror" of the First Five-Year Plan (18) finds its full expression in the Revolution itself: 'That Lenin's revolutionary dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party paved the way for Stalinism, and that the later system had much in common with the one it supplanted, is true.' (19) Why the Soviet totalitarian regime—Lenin and Stalin—had to resort to conspiracy, mass manipulation, and terror was very much for the sake of maintaining an all too tight totalitarian grip on society as a whole. In the words of Hannah Arendt, this is basically related to what she calls 'totalitarian

propaganda and totalitarian organization'. (20) While propaganda is the strategy for 'winning the masses, (21) and by far preparing for 'indoctrination,' (22) totalitarian organisation 'translates propaganda lies of the movement, woven around a central fiction—the conspiracy of...the Trotskyites—into a functioning reality, to build up...a society whose members act and react according to the rules of the fictitious world.' (23) What mediates between propaganda and organisation in totalitarian rule is an extended use of 'terror' the manifestation of which comes in the form of a 'total' destruction of 'the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space.' (24) Terror as the means for knitting together propaganda rules and organisation forms is not rational but rationalised, and not legitiamte but legitimated. Arendt argues so by attributing the Soviet regime's legitimation of its terror against society to the formal theorisation of "man and history" by Marx himself. 'Marx's law of the survival of the most progressive class,' and his 'class struggle as the driving force of history' are only a catalyst for the development of terror under the Soviet system. (25) Marxism's legitimation of a class war as a groundwork for the emancipation of mankind does warrant the use of terror as a 'lawful' realization of the law of movement':

> [T]he chief aim [of terror] is to make it possible for the force of...history to race freely through mankind...As such terror seeks to "stabilize" men in order to liberate the forces of...history. It is this movement which singles out the foes of mankind against whom terror is let loose, and no free action of either opposition or sympathy can be permitted to interfere with the elimination of the "objective enemy" of history...of the class... (26)

The responsibility of Lenin himself for the age of terror which began shortly after his death has been largely addressed in Richard Pipes' work. (27) Pipes' work has been axiomatic of the liberal orthodox literature which holds both Lenin and the Bolsheviks

responsible for the atrocities against post-revolution Russian society. Overemphasis of the "evil" nature of the Bolsheviks has however made Pipes liable to more than one critique published in *Russian Review* (28) The host of scholars reviewing Pipes regard his account of Leninism and the October Revolution as self-generated, and therefore self-defeating, conclusions about a phenomenon of history that is particularly practically telling. A reply to Pipes' long and repetitive *The Russian Revolution* (1990) came from Peter Kenez who maintained that Pipes was only actuated by his firm determination to "demonize" the Bolshevik Revolution. (29) Such a determination, Kenez maintains, has at heart an explainable incentive. Pipes was fully absorbed into his accusations and could barely find some time or space in his long book to articulate any of the traits characterising the Bolsheviks: '...who the Bolsheviks were, how they saw the world, what they thought they were doing, and why they ultimately prevailed.' (30) In this book Pipes was chained by the mainstream political historiography bred over by a belligerent animosity for Bolshevism. As a historian primarily concerned with politics Pipes, Kenez reminds us, has nothing to care for but dictate a historical understanding of events that is totally dismissive, for instance, of any "negative" role of the '"White" anti-Bolshevik force, the Volunteer Army' as a competitor whose bloody participation in the Civil War is simply indisputable. The sole explanation Pipes struggles to provide is that the Bolsheviks prevailed only because they followed one single and linear policy of 'terror', thus forgetting that 'in the Ukraine alone one hundred thousand Jews were killed largely...by soldiers of the White Army.' (31) Thus characterising the Bolsheviks as solely demon and terrorist, Pipes does not dissociate Lenin from the practice of the party as a whole. Lenin, for his part, was actuated by personal malice to conduct the terror himself and be its only designer.

By amassing a range of unreliable literature in accusation of Lenin Pipes, Kenez argues, has anxiously, but desperately, attempted to confirm the straightforward line of

Lenin's terror by the endless 'desire for power.' Pipes even goes further by trying to legitimise his claim that Lenin was only a single tyrant continuing Russia's 'last tsar'. (32) He finally observes that Stalin and Stalinism were deeply inherent in Bolshevik thinking rather an aberration resulting from Lenin's policies. (33) In line with orthodox political historians, Pipes, in the words of Kenez, only focuses his attention on areas of focus that are ostensibly associated with most dictators in history: peoples' manipulation by the regime, the regime's reliance on foreign 'assistance' (34), and the use of ideology as a cover for power abuse, etc. (35) By arguing so, Kenez, I think, has succeeded in pointing to Pipes's "deterministic" illusions. Instead of developing a consistent argument pertinent to the debate on the nature of Soviet power, Pipes has, in my view, read Soviet ideological history through the prisms of tsarist Russia, and with a total disregard of both the historical and ideological backgrounds of each regime; he read Soviet Russia's coercion through the exegesis of the liberal ideology; he also reduced analytical political historiography to a method of research based primarily on a "moralising" tendency.

Pipes's oft-celebrated attack on Lenin and the Bolsheviks is best illustrated in his *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution* (1995). Shortly published after his *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime,* this work mentions two alleged facts that were behind the triumph of the Bolsheviks in 1917, namely "ideology" and "chance". The October Revolution was a 'classic coup d'état rather than a popular revolution.' (36) For Pipes, there is reason to believe so, since Lenin himself paved the way for such a "coup" by primarily believing in the limited role of the workers in carrying out the revolution. Considering Lenin's standpoint as regards the proletariat, Pipes thinks that Lenin's contempt for the workers and his praise of the professional revolutionaries (referring to *What is to Be Done?*, I suppose) was rather a negation of any popular basis for the revolution, since the revolution was the work of class political consciousness, and the workers, in Lenin's logic, were capable of anything but

political consciousness. (37) The defective link between Bolsheviks' belief in the revolution and their "disenchantment" of the workers, Pipes tells us, is inherent in 'Lenin's belief [the theoretical basis of the Bolshevik party]...that the working class in and of itself is not revolutionary.' (38) In this respect Lenin's revolutionary theory stands on sand and, therefore, the Bolshevik party became elitist in the sense that from its inception it was emptied of any essence, and became a "no-party": the basis of any 'genuine political party' is its popular support, but, 'like the Nazi and Fascist' parties, the Bolshevik 'treated membership as a privilege, restricting it to persons who met certain ideological as well as class or racial criteria.' (39) The drive for centralisation and strict discipline, and the uncouth contempt for the masses made Lenin transform ideology into strict policing, where the use of terror was sanctified by the alleged need to 'physically exterminate' one's 'competitors' (Mensheviks, SRs, etc) (40)

In *The Unknown Lenin* Pipes also discredits Lenin on the basis of what he discovered as documents revealing Lenin's tyrannical tendencies. Characteristic of Pipes's *The Unknown Lenin* is his renewed interest in reducing Lenin as a source of evil. This book constitutes the third part of a trilogy that starts with *The Russian Revolution.* What is new about *The Unknown Lenin* is Pipes's empirical excavation of what Lenin thought and said about a number of subjects. Pipes takes as his target all the documents at hand which bore a print of Lenin, including letters and official documents. This work continues with the rest in the sense that Pipes does not observe then conclude, but rather starts over from drawing conclusions on the ground of hypothetical surmise. Pipes's ultimate goal is to firmly emphasise that Lenin was a dictator, and that he succeeded in paving the way for Stalin. Lenin's complicity with Stalin, Pipes maintains, can be seen in the fact that there is 'much evidence of Lenin's reliance on Stalin, not only in running day-to-day government operations but also in setting major policy goals.' (41)

The link between Lenin and Bolshevism in light of the theory advanced by the "Totalitarian model" highlights also a further link that has been raised by a number of scholars representing the 'Continuity thesis'. This concerns the relationship between the Bolshevik revolution and what occurred after the death of Lenin in 1924. Jerry Hough thinks that the "Totalitarian model" has been most accurate in depicting Bolshevism's responsibility for the revolution and the later rise of the practice known as Stalinism.(42) Hough also assumes that the model is totally accurate in asserting the similarity between Bolshevism as 'left-wing ideology' and Nazism as a 'right-wing ideology.' (43) He then totally agrees with such analyses as, I would argue, Hannah Arendt's. For him, '[b]oth [Bolshevism and Nazism] rested in their appeal on an xenophobic, anti-Western, anti-liberal fanaticism produced by extraordinary insecurities among the masses experiencing urban life for the first time.' (44) Hough goes even further. He reaches another extreme end of totalitarian analysis. For him 'the Khomeini Revolution in Iran' was but a late copy of the Bolshevik Revolution: 'The best way for a modern American to understand the Bolshevik Revolution is to see it as the Khomeini Revolution of Russian history.' (45)

A critical response to the totalitarian model in general and Jerry Hough in particular comes from the ardent historian Stephen F. Cohen. Cohen has constantly argued that the continuity thesis in general has focused on areas of interest which contradict substantially with a "positivist" study of Soviet Russia. The particular focus on the continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism does in great part distance academic research from the task of understanding and explaining history as practice. He writes in "Bolshevism and Stalinism" (1977) that the continuity thesis has a number of weaknesses which prevent Sovietologists in general from carrying out objective research: it 'has largely obscured the need for study of Stalinism as a distinct phenomenon with its own history, political dynamics, and social consequences.' (46) The continuity thesis is bedeviled by its own overemphasis on

Stalinism's inherited 'political dynamics' characteristic of Bolshevism. Quoting Herbert Butterfield, Cohen argues that this overemphasis resonates as 'Whig interpretation of history' as it wrongly takes the present as a mirror of the past. (47) 'The causal dynamics' according to such a historiography 'is of course the party's ideology': ideology as the fundamental constituent of Bolshevik power vis-à-vis the people is viewed by the model as Stalin's only currency. Bolshevik ideology, namely socialism, Cohen tells us, did not march at the head of society and turn into a police machine before it fulfilled some of its emancipatory claims: it emancipated as well as subjugated. 'The Russian Civil War' was one instance which impacted to a great extent the ideology itself by 'repealing the ideas and legislation favoring workers, women, school children, etc.' (48) According to Cohen this was 'a new ideology' structurally different from that associated with 1917. (49)

The other failure of the 'causal dynamics' is its emphasis that the theoretical premises of Lenin's *WBD*? found their veritable expression in Stalinism later: *WBD?* constituted the background for the Stalin state. Advancing his claim against the 'causal dynamics,' Cohen uses Robert C Tucker's thesis that the Purges of the 1930s for instance were a clear-cut departure from Bolshevism both at the organisational and ideological levels as Stalin transformed the ruling party from 'oligarchy' to 'autocracy: 'the change from an oligharchical party regime to an autocratic "Fuherist" regime…' (50) The great Purges, as Stalin's one-way confirmation of his monopoly of power, officialised the terror, and the party itself and its different bodies fell out of favour and became fully subservient to one person. The waning of the party, its functions, and its appeal fully confirmed that the line of march of the Bolshevik party was swallowed by a devouring monster called Stalin. Here, ideology and the emphasis on the party's unity were reduced to the 'cult' of Stalin's personality (51)

Although Cohen's focus on the "Totalitarian model" and the continuity thesis is constructed on the conviction that studying Soviet history should encompass more than the

accentuation of the regime's abuse of power, etc, a host of other established scholars are particularly anxious to show that the role of ideology has determined Stalinism to be Bolshevism's offspring, and that the political practice from 1917 to 1923, at least, was a rehearsal for the acts of terror that followed after 1929. Another challenge to the continuity thesis comes from Robert V Daniels, another important figure in Soviet studies. Daniels's position vis-à-vis Soviet history and politics can be defined as somehow "ambivalent", since at least in terms of consistency, he agrees with the totalitarian model in part, while he devotes the rest of his thesis to his theory of 'post-revolutionary dictatorship.' (52) In most of his work—which has been seriously attacked by some supporters of the totalitarian model (53)—his challenge to the continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism is most clear-cut. The "Totalitarian model", in Daniels's view, 'fail[s] to explain [Stalinism] except by ideological perversity.' (54) Stalin's departure from Leninism is best illustrated by Stalin's intrigue when he 'reshaped the Central Committee of the CPSU to create concentric circles of top officials around himself.' (55) By doing so 'Stalinism,' Daniels firmly believes, 'bastardized [Marxism] and instrumentalized it as a compulsory state religion with the lies that sustained the system and were sustained by it.' (56)

In advancing this thesis, Daniels seeks to suggest that the Totalitarian model—while should be accepted in evaluating Stalinism as a certain form of totalitarian dictatorship—has to be called into question when it comes to investigating the political and social realities emanating from Stalinism as a totalitarian system. Suggesting that Stalinism is simply a straight continuation of Leninism, the model, according to Daniels, seems to have dictated certain historical rules that oblige the researcher to retreat from objective observation of political phenomena. This assertion, being characteristic of mainstream Anglo-American scholarship, does exclude, Daniels reminds us, further investigation into the nature of the Stalinist system. (57) The point for Daniels is simply not a matter of condemnation as is a

question of digging out historical truth through addressing the adequate issues. If one should firmly maintain that there was some sort of an ideological link between Lenin and Stalin, such an assumption should in turn be premised on an accurate reading of what Lenin intended while carrying out the Revolution, and how circumstances, sheer circumstances, played a gigantic role in bequeathing certain dogmas to Stalin himself. A satisfactory answer to the question whether Lenin paved the way for Stalin, presupposes both theorising the degree to which Stalin could arrogate Leninism to his own ideological ends, and the degree to which Lenin himself made the mistake of being too immersed in authoritarian practice.

In Daniels's view a significant fact in relation to Lenin's partial responsibility for the practice of Stalinism is that the October Revolution itself was far from an organised revolution. It was an 'accident' of history or, as he writes in a different work, 'a desperate gamble, unlikely to succeed and still less to hold out.' (58) Viewing the Bolshevik revolution as an 'accident' Daniels, however, does not draw a parallel between what happened during the Revolution and what happened during Stalin's rule. For Daniels, what explains more the success of the Bolsheviks in the revolution was both Lenin the man and Lenin the politician. Added to this was the objective fact that 'the Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries...were unwilling to lead a revolution against the interests of property.' (59) In Daniels's logic the events of October and the personal role of Lenin do by no means explain Stalin's terror. What happened during Stalin's rule was only explainable by the character of the phase in Soviet history that was fully responsive to the nature of the politico-ideological practice characteristic of Stalinism. The circumstances factor was decisive in bringing about October, and Lenin contributed indirectly to Stalin's dictatorship. Yet, in Daniels's view, such a contribution was but "unintentional." Stalin capitalized Lenin's early attempts to refresh the economy through the NEP by forcing the First Five-Year Plan in 1929. Stalin's dictatorship was only a chance, Daniels argues, *unintentionally* prepared by Lenin

when he 'adapt[ed] the party to circumstances of an ebbing revolutionary wave,' 'a maneuver [which] gave his successors an indispensable stake in clinging to the verbal forms of the ideology as well as the dictatorship of the proletariat.' (60)

To confirm that the theoretical and practical discordance between Lenin and Stalin is hard to rebut, Daniels believes that the party dictatorship during and shortly after October was partly mandatory and partly "untimely". Yet, what was most striking about Stalin's rule later was the fact of having to carry political practice itself beyond the scope of revolutionary practice, thus leading it to a completely new stage of development called, in Daniels's words, 'post-revolutionary dictatorship.' (61) The specificity of this period is that it constitutes an entire break with the form of dictatorship theorised by Lenin and witnessed in 1917 and shortly after. Stalin's revolution which began with the First Five-Year Plan, Daniels tells us, became a 'counter-revolution from above' where 'cadres decide everything.' (62) Stalin's post-revolutionary dictatorship was consummated by the 'Great Purges' and got off to a stage that can be characterised as 'the functional equivalent of a monarchical restoration.' (63) Daniels's "totalitarian paradigm" (being characteristically different from the interpretation of the totalitarian model) stands as a refutation of the classical belief maintained by orthodox Western scholarship that Stalinism was basically a replication of Marxian thought. He exposes his rejection of the continuity thesis by suggesting that 'the central myth of Stalinism' is that it desperately deceives itself by suggesting that Marxism has been 'the inspiration and the plan that have guided the development of Soviet-style socialism ever since the Revolution of 1917.' (64) Stalinism in this respect is an ideology that legitimises its abuse of Marxism by asserting that every single practice following from the 1917 Revolution—whether it be cloacked in Leninst or Stalinist vestment—was 'inspired' by Marxism. The illusion of the continuity thesis here, according to Daniels, is that it adopts the same logic used by Stalinism in legitimating its practices.

2/ Marxism and Bolshevism: the "Genetic Link":

The belief that Bolshevism was naturally inclined to inspire a state system based on terror has been a fundamental argument preached by adherents to the continuity thesis. This has been but one defining facet of those seeking to legitimise their "negative" view of Stalinism. In general terms, however, the continuity thesis is based on a broader question relating to Marxism itself. Leszek Kolakowski, for instance, not only clearly suggested that Stalinism is a continuation of Leninism. (65) He once noticed that the practice known as Stalinism had clear-cut 'Marxist roots'; not that Marx and Engels theorised *intentionally* a society that must succumb to the rule of the totalitarian regime in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but that Marx's teaching was only applicable in theory, since the actual practice of the Soviet leaders confirmed that his theory's 'basic values could hardly be materialized otherwise.' (66) Marx's 'imagination', Kaolakowski maintains, 'was incapable of stretching as far as to envisage the transition from pre-history to genuine history and to fancy a proper social technology which could convert the former into the latter.' (67) In believing so, Kolakowski asserts that Marx's "utopia" of 'a perfect unity of mankind' and his preoccupation with the "noble" proletarian cause has reduced the entirety of his thought to an all-too-easy convertible theory capitalized later as 'an ideology of the [Soviet] totalitarian regime.' (68) Kolakowski's apologia for such a continuity follows, I would suggest, a "Darwinist" line of analysis which maintains that a "genetic" evolution of Marxian thought could only result in a political practice that is entirely alien to the emancipatory claims in whose name Marxism speaks. Such an apologia in turn does not stop at the level of depicting Marx's inability to see beyond 'proletarian consciousness' or 'unity of mankind'; it rather proclaims that 'Soviet ideology' is 'a strongly simplified, yet not falsified' form of 'the dry

skeleton of Marxism', and that Stalin's ideas and most "notorious" practice were but expressions embedded in the *Communist Manifesto* (69) Kolakowski also suggests that in order to keep a strong hold on society the totalitarian regime starts by entirely drowning all 'human activity' into the 'goal of the state.' (70)

The question of ideology in relation to Marxism is also addressed by the Russian intellectual N.V. Zagladin who thinks that Marxism's crisis resides in 'the conflict between Marxism as a science and Marxism as an ideology.' (71) The point for Zagladin is that Marxism as a science is constructive in the sense that it helps people better understand social and political phenomena. Yet, 'as soon as communism became a "party doctrine," i.e., an ideology, there was no longer any place in it for abstract scientific truths, no more than for "useless" knowledge that did not immediately serve the goals of the class struggle.' (72) The question of Marxism's analytical scopes, in Zagladin's logic, lies in what has as yet been a yawning gulf between Marxism's ability to depict, and analyse social and economic phenomena and its inconsistency as an ideological enterprise. When it is communicated to the masses—as in the case of Russia—as a doctrine of emancipation, and sells as 'an ideology of class hatred' anxious to substitute 'a new order' for the old one it soon turns against its 'humanist and democratic' reach. (73) Such a defective link between Marxism as a science and Marxism as an ideology finds its utter articulation, Zagladin maintains, in the difference between the 'movement's leading elite' and the majority of the people. A classic case exemplifying this situation was the mistake committed by the Russian Social Democratic Party when it 'adopted Leninist ideas' based on the need of 'the violent seizure of power and establishment of a dictatorship in the name of the "progressive class." (74)

This accentuation of the straightforward ideological continuity between Marxism and Bolshevism was also echoed in the work of Adam B Ulam who in *The Unfinished Revolution* (1960) sought to demarcate the ideological implications of the triumph of the Bolshevik

Revolution. He believed that Marxism was bedeviled by its *natural* inclination to 'anarchism' (75) Anarchism, as an ideological facet constituting the first stage of revolutionary transformation, is an imperative constituent of Marxism's strategy to reverse the status quo by means of "violent" revolution. Being a basic characteristic of Marxism, anarchism might only be fully comprehended in its evolution. It is part of a theoretical formula that is self-substantiated by the need of the proletariat to carry out its historical mission of first smashing the autocratic political machine and then forging the groundwork for challenging the very technological structure of capitalism, that is industrialism. (76) According to Ulam the strict line of continuity between Marxism and Bolshevism is accounted for by a causal relationship which is entirely determined by Marxism's own concern to dictate certain ideological rules: '...the psychological mechanism instilled by Marxism in its devotees...makes them prone to anarchism in the time of revolution, to centralism and inegalitarianism after power has been won.' (77) The drive for anarchism, being a defining stage in revolutionary Marxism, did but turn the Communist Party into a 'totalitarian party' (78) that itself 'became the state.' (79) Such a continuity, according to Ulam, did nothing but insure that the inclination to anarchism was continued in Stalin's age of industrialization and collectivization, which made the revolution deviate from its emancipatory promises.

Ulam's point of, what I would term, 'Marxism's genetic anarchism' evokes an other thesis in relation to anarchism made by John Hoffman in a recent argument. For Hoffman the Bolshevik Revolution was but an 'authoritarian trap' (80) which translates in great part the inability of the Marxian text to produce a political practice responsive to Marxism's egalitarian claims. Marx's theory falls prey to several paradoxes inherent in the very nature of Marxian text. In the opening paragraph of his "The State: Has the Withering Away Thesis Finally Withered Away?" (1992) Hoffman makes his point clear:

> Marxism appears to be equivocal about the state. On the one hand it rejects the anarchist contention that the state should be spontaneously swept away by the the insurgent masses. On the other hand it emphasizes...that the state itself is a barrier to human emancipation and must ultimately disappear. (81)

Hoffman's point here is that Marxism is 'betrayed by its own logic' (82) Marxism is at the same time an allegedly anti-anarchist and anti-statist doctrine. In Hoffman's logic, this encounter between anti-anarchism and anti-statism in Marxian theory is fraught with a paradox hard to grapple with. (83) The problem of this contradiction, Hoffman argues, can only be revealed in observing the October Revolution and its aftermath. It is basically then when the continuity between Marxism and Bolshevism can be traced in its full. Marxism's legitimisation of its own contradictions has been fully exported through Marxian thinking itself only to reach its full manifestation at the event of October and its aftermath. In trying to bridge this gulf between what their theory envisages and what their practice reveals, both Engels and Marx sought to argue that history is also about particular 'circumstances' that should be treated by an exceptional practice not necessarily "faithful" to Marxian theory. (84)

In the words of Hoffman, failure to surmount the problem of a practice conflicting with theory is most manifest in Marxism's inability to confront 'the thesis of the historical petard': '[N]o theory is as vulnerable as Marxism to the thesis of the historical petard.' (85) The conception advanced by Hoffman's thesis here is that Marxist theory is simply prone to give birth to a flawed practice which, instead of keeping the promise of emancipation, does culminate in despotic rule. Focussing on this thesis, Hoffman overstates, it seems to me, the case of Marxism's failure to usher in a healthy practice. (86) Hoffman adds that even the attempts by ardent defenders of Marxist theory to try to salvage Marxism from the thesis of the historical petard have been only relatively sustainable. Alex Callinicos's thesis that 'the collapse of the Stalinist regimes' was a 'vindication rather than a refutation of the classical

Marxist tradition' is well-formed and penetrative, but it fails to undo the quandary posed by the thesis of the historical petard. (87) Even the classical defense forged by adherents to 'the circumstances argument', Hoffman maintains, is only indicative of how the 1917 Revolution was but a desperate attempt by the Bolsheviks to adapt 'untimely events' to the logic of Marxism's theory. (88) Such an adaptation, Hoffman contends, formed the basis for 'an authoritarian' practice the result of which was the 'suppression of the Constituent Assembly.' (89) Having been a theory legitimated by Marxism's designers themselves the 'circumstances argument' did condemn not only Lenin's revolution but the entirety of the emancipatory project which was later undermined by Stalin in 1930 when he violently consolidated the state through crushing what he called 'the enemies of the people' (90) Elsewhere Hoffman suggests that the gulf between theory and practice in Marxism not only led to an authoritarian state but also confirmed the close connection between Marxism and tyrannical rule. Adopting a logic used by Joseph Femia for this purpose Hoffman writes that there is essentially a 'genetic' link between Marxism and despotism. (91)

The question of the genetic structure of Marxism's history has been constantly challenged by Daniels who, although shares many of the views advanced by the "totalitarian model" such as the concept of terror and ideology, thinks that 'determining the lineage of bad ideological genes' should not be the concern of the scholarly work relating to Marxism. What is important for him is to find out how much the practice was able to realize the theory, and how one should primarily trace and assess the degree of putting at work 'socialism and Jacobinism' by Marx, 'Marxism and the Russian revolutionary heritage' by Lenin, and 'Marxism-Leninism' by Stalin. (92) Daniel's criticism of the totalitarian model in this respect appears in his reply to George Enteen,

> The question of Marxist ideology is my main area of disagreement with Enteen, as it is with what I might call the straight-line school of ideological determinism maintaining that Marxism brought about

> Leninism and Leninism brought about Stalinism...Lenin's roots reached more into non-Marxist sources than into Marx...Stalin had some roots in Lenin, but there were other influence on him and in the ways he used Lenin's words and ideas. (93)

Daniels's point of contention in this respect is that while Marx theorised, as a guiding slogan, the necessity of the proletariat to grow with its own class consciousness and prepare for the revolution with maturity, Lenin was indeed chained by his thesis that the workers were incapable by themselves of 'class political consciousness,' and had to get it 'from without.'

II/ Revisionist Perspectives:

1/ Revisionists against Totalitarians: Responses to Responses:

The partial opening of the archives for Western social historians in the late 1970s and early 1980s was a gratifying answer to why Stalinism had been brutal and ferocious. Access to an open range of archives after the Soviet collapse has also confirmed the suspicions about the biased and unworkable conclusions drawn by a number of political scientists who saw, and still see, the Stalin revolution only as a revolution against society. (94) This seems to have been Sheila Fitzpatrick's argument when she, and other revisionist historians, started to write Soviet history afresh after the opening of the archives.

'[S]ocial history...was virtually impossible to write within the totalitarian framework.' (95) This assertion by Sheila Fitzpartrick constituted the premise for the conflict between the totalitarian model and the revisionist historians. The hot debate started by Fitzpatrick and other revisionists in the 1980s had been preceded by a revisionist literature since the late 1950s with scholars such as Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer. (96) While the aim of such a literature had been to shed new light on the contribution of Soviet society to the political life of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, Fitzpatrick, together with a host of historians, preferred to

revisit the main meaning of the Stalin revolution by suggesting a "revolution-from-below" thesis. This means that Fitzpatrick's main concern was not only to negate the early attempts by political scientists to heap the blame for the age of terror on solely Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Her main concern was that political terror, social instability, poverty, and the purges had had a mass basis. For her, although the Stalin revolution basically had roots in all such aspects mentioned above, Stalinism was not state practice from above against society from below; it was rather the sum result of the interaction between politics and social participation. (97)

Therefore, Fitzpatrick's 'new perspectives,' as she pleased to call them, constituted a fresh look in Soviet history characteristically different, for instance, from 'modernisation theory' as had been pioneered by the Harvard Interview Project. The 1980s came also as a strong "blow" against the old historiography centred on "regime studies," the power of ideology, and the state/society debate. Actually Fitzpatrick's conflict with the old historiography has been only part of an overall reaction by earlier revisionists to the totalitarian model. (98) The conflict resulted primarily from the revisionists' growing suspicion about the methods of research used by the totalitarian model. The revisionists' chief concern has been what they think to be the failure of the school of totalitarianism to conceive of history in its socio-historical sense. Such a concern has been reared by the belief that the totalitarian model was bedevilled by its ''inherent political bias and its inappropriateness to contemporary Soviet reality.' (99)

According to Fitzpatrick, the novelty in research orientations concerning Soviotology came from a 'new cohort' of historians who, considering the Soviet reality as particularly idiosyncratic, could forge new theses capable of fathoming the internal workings of the Soviet system (100) By suggesting so, however, Fitzpatrick exposed the new cohort's novel research orientations to severe criticism from both political scientists and social historians. The

responses to her new orientations were single-mindedly focused on two main aspects in her work: overemphasis on social history, and her ambivalence while dealing with totalitarian model's argument of revolution from above. (101) On the other hand, the main reason why scholarly work in the field of Soviet studies has led the so-called "school of ideology" to accuse Fitzpatrick and her cohort of "subjectivity" has been Fitzpatrick's own overemphasised claim for scholarly 'objectivity'

In "New Perspectives on Stalinism" (1986) Fitzpatrick signalled out a new approach to the Stalin revolution in particular, focusing on novel work by a young generation of social and political historians who she labelled the new cohort. The young generation, as Fitzpatrick earnestly reminds us, is a host of social historians, who in seeking to reinterpret Soviet history and politics by giving primacy to the theme of social participation in politics, went as far as to declare that the 'older generation of political scientists' was incapable of sparing scholarship the "excessive" 'preoccupation with 'politics and ideology.' (102) The chief achievement of the revisionist historians, Fitzpatrick claims, was their ability to make use of material evidence as was gained through their access to the Soviet Smolnesk archive. (103) For her, there are mainly three premises through which the social historians' claim to novel scholarship can be justified: the totalitarian model's erroneous conceptualisation of the relationship between state and society (104), the model's 'neglecting' of the validity of social mobility (105), and its biased view that Stalin's revolution was a 'revolution from above.' (106)

As far as the first premise is concerned, Fitzpatrick asserts that the model's approach to the relation between the Soviet state and society fails to see beyond the state's victimisation of society and society's 'passive resistance' to the state. In her view, this approach entailed the supposition by the totalitarian model that the Soviet state was actuated by the vilest of its intentions to 'use the Communist Party as an agent of mobilization and reinforce its dictates

with police coercion and terror' (107) The model goes even further in depicting Soviet society to be an 'undifferentiated whole' in relation to the functioning of the totalitarian state. (108) The job of the new cohort, Fitzpatrick thinks, was to methodically disaggregate society into 'constituent parts': their concern would be to 'analyze society' by avoiding two analytical frameworks: the totalitarian framework which focuses on the conflict between the state as a monolith and society as an 'undifferentiated whole', and the Stalinist-Marxist framework which rests on the division of Soviet society into 'working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia,' the third being a stratum not a class. (109) The revisionists' attack of the latter view, Fitzpatrick adds, can be traced back to Leon Trotsky's view of Soviet society. (110) Trotsky made a significant contribution to social history by suggesting that social hierarchy in the 1930s had undergone significant transformation. Such a transformation occurred through the emergence of the 'bureaucracy' as a new stratum which acquired a ruling character. (111) The new cohort added a new element to Trotsky's original contribution. They asserted that 'bureaucracy itself was [so] hierarchical' that the higher-ranked bureaucrats had distinctly different interests from those of the lower-ranked ones. (112) Not only the bureaucracy was a highly divided stratum. The working class and the peasantry could also be atomised into different strata of specific class character. One, according to Fitzpatrick, might well distinguish between 'skilled and unskilled laborers, "new" workers (fresh from the village) and "old" ones...convict, semi-free, and free labour to be found on the new construction sites (113)

The second premise that Fitzpatrick addresses is the theme of social mobility. The model's other failure was to understand Soviet society as a *static* society totally controlled by the organisational and managerial functions of the state. In her view, the nature of Soviet society in the Stalin "reign" is difficult to study, mainly for the high social mobility associated with the regime's focus on mobilisation: high mobility created new socio-economic terms for

the developing Soviet society. This implies that the class nature of such a society was being determined by the changing position of the different strata: peasants' migration to urban places, the transformation of the 'old working class' into a modern white-collar and managerial stratum, the 'deportation' of the Kulaks and their downward mobility into urban workers, 'World War II and demobilization' (114) were all factors behind the unprecedented transformation in the structure of society. (115) Social mobility had a political as well as a social basis: political 'coercion' of the regime created 'involuntary social mobility (dekulakisation, liquidation of nepmen, etc); 'spontaneous social mobility in the 1930s' posed unsolvable 'organisational' obstacles which were met by further coercion embodied in, for example, the 1932 passport law. (116) Moreover, what urged coercion on the part of the regime was not popular 'resistance', as the totalitarian model claims, but specifically the problem of mobility: in short imposing internal passports by the regime was not responsive to the regime's "desire" to segregate between citizens as was responsive to the growing necessity for creating a workable medium of state control over its organisational structure. (117)

The third premise Fitzpatrick highlights is how the revisionists (in response to her initiative) became revolutionary in their understanding of the Stalin revolution. Unlike the old and orthodox view that Stalin's was a 'revolution from above,' the new cohort have suggested that, while the 'initiative' was politically and ideologically made from above, the actual revolution was triggered from 'below,' with society massively contributing to the making. (118) What is new about Fitzpatrick's formula of a revolution from below is her assertion that workers, peasants, newly promoted cadres, and particular "interest groups" clearly, but not necessarily self-consciously, participated in the Stalin revolution. In this sense, the major focus of the new cohort is the extent to which workable scholarly conclusions can be drawn from *real life experiences* of Soviet people; this, as she argues, might well overshadow the

totalitarian model's claim for objectivity drawn from 'general' observations about the regime's 'policy' and 'laws'. (119)

Fitzpatrick's thesis in "New Perspectives on Stalinism" was somehow re-echoed, but not blindly reproduced, in the work of the new cohort. (120) Part of the revisionists' logic is the claim that even Stalin's role in the self-appointed Communist Party was not clear-cut, and that Stalin seems to have been relying on others' decisions. This point was over-emphasised in the work of J. Arch Getty who considered the Bolshevik leader no more than a 'moderate.' Besides, there is an other attitude which Getty shares with Gabor Rittersporn in this context. (121) It is their view that the Soviet government as a centre was in actual fact emptied of its centrality and "hegemonic" 'functioning'. Yet Getty, as will be mentioned in a following section of this part, goes further in his claim. He thinks that the role of the centre vis-à-vis the local districts was greatly weakened by the lack of co-ordination, and mismanagement. (122) Rittersporn does not go as far. (123) He rather points to a governmental 'system' disabled by the "*careerism*" of the topmost state apparatus. (124) In suggesting so, the revisionists in question openly suggest that the Soviet state as a chief decision-maker did fail to accommodate its prerogative as a power that acts from above. Therefore, both 'chaos' and mismanagement (Getty), and 'careerism' and "system disability" (Ritterspron) made the regime act in response to influential social forces.

Critical responses to "New Perspectives on Stalinism" came from learned scholars who consider many of the theoretical premises of the revisionists problematic, but who equally emphasise the validity of some of the concepts defended by revisionist social historians in particular. (125) Before getting to the debate opened by Fitzpatrick's article, one would argue that her position itself remains highly controversial, mainly for three reasons: first, she is inclined to range herself between the old cohort and the new one, which means that she would often feel obliged to defend new revisionist projects by necessarily reducing

pre-archive research endeavours (126); second, her over-emphasis on the role of Sovietologist social historians overshadows the role of politics in the negotiation between civil society and the state; and third, squaring off her scholarly choices with the above/below (state or society) debate confines revisionist research in general to the state/society conflict. It was for such reasons that one of the critical responses to Fitzpatrick's position came from Roberta T. Manning, a revisionist who thinks that Fitzpatrick

> [o]verlooks the fact that social historians of pre-revolutionary Russia...have never neglected politics and stand in the forefront of current of social historians "to include the state." Since we were exposed to the social history of pre-revolutionary Russia as graduate students, we are not likely to abandon the study of politics as a matter of little concern to social historians. (127)

Fitzpatrick's inclination to depart from the study of politics, in Manning's logic, condemns research in the field of Soviet studies to be fully reliant on and conditioned by the study of society, being wrongly conceived as a detached subject of enquiry capable of approaching and analysing without considering the role of the state. Such a separation between the state and society would in the last analysis dismiss 'political terror', for example, as a subject not within the interest scopes of the social historians. (128) What is most problematic concerning Fitzpatrick, Manning tells us, is her inability to point out clearly the dominant part in the relationship. Fitzpatrick focuses pretty much on the 'either-or proposition', thus leaving little or no room for a third space that might shed some light on the interaction between 'both.' (129) What raises some cause for concern in Fitzpatrick's suggestion is her retreat from her original belief in the dominant role of society over that of the regime. Her regression to Tucker's formula of 'revolution from above' (130) does reduce her "from-below" claim to a cipher, and reveal as impractical her "leaving-aside politics" formula. (131) What Manning suggests in this respect is that revisionist work in relation to Soviet history, although should

repudiate the totalitarian model's one-sided and one-dimensional scholarly orientation, cannot follow strictly Fitzpatrick's revisionist recipe which by fighting excess with excess stands in conflict with its own research interests. It is true here, I think, that the revisionists might be advancing a theory in conflict with their own research paradigms when they tend to "unconsciously" 'destalinise Stalin'. Yet, it would be an exageration if one suggests that the ultimate aim of revisionist work is 'to acquit' Stalin of his crimes.

An other important response to Fitzpatrick comes from Arch Getty who, although *baptised* as a new cohort member, does not feel entirely comfortable in the new position Fitzpatrick chooses him. Getty, while congratulating Fitzpatrick on certain 'constructive' aspects in her work, shares Manning's concern about her regression to Tucker's argument in the second part of her article. He dismisses as myopic her attempt to reduce the state/society conflict to a conflict between a scholarship that tries to assert the revolution-from-above claim and another that is anxious to champion the revolution-from-below thesis:

> It is, then, surprising and disappointing that...she resurrects the old bipolar state-society model in the form of Revolution from Above or Below and tries to force revisionist scholars into one or the other camp. With obvious (and to me inexplicable) relief, she manages to conclude that most of the revisionist work fits Revolution from Above (132)

Fitzpatrick's either-or position, Getty exclaims, 'seem[s] forced,' since, at least in terms of consistency, she is the only social historian who regresses to the ungrounded argument of 'initiative from the regime.' (133) Peter Kenez, for instance, shares Getty's and Manning's view about Fitzpatrick's ambivalence in relation to the nature of the Stalin revolution. While her claim that too much politics involved would spoil the social historian's objective promises remains a valid claim, her oscillation between the below/above positions is self-defeating. (134) This, as Kenez contends, begs the question whether Fitzpatrick's revisionism is

pertinent to the overall debate. Paradoxical is her attack on the historians who, she thinks, rely heavily on the state-intervention argument; not less paradoxical is her belief that the revolution-from-above thesis holds good. (135) In Kenez's view, however, Fitzpatrick's apologia for a research method that includes as well as excludes the sphere of politics echoes the ambivalence of the entirety of the revisionist project.

The new cohort equally run into difficulties while trying to *de-Stalinise* Stalin, that is, while trying to acquit Stalin of the responsibility for the terror. (136) Kenez subjects the revisionists to four critical points. First, their argument of a chaotic and disorganised Soviet government is at best only repetitive of Fainsod's argument in his book *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. Their acquittal of the regime of its crimes by suggesting the 'consent of the governed' as a pretext is a curiously *absurd* (my italics) and unscholarly conclusion. (Manning's work as example) (137) Second, 'explain[ing] mass murder as the outcome of factional struggles' within the 'leadership' is shorn of material evidence. (Rittersporn's and Getty's works) (138) Third, the social-support theory advanced by the revisionists is totally erroneous (Lynne Viola's work as example) (139): society responded positively to government initiative mainly because the 'Bolsheviks...knew how to mobilize a crucially important segment of the population.' (140) Four, the revisionists fall short of a feasibly clear method of approach in their studies. They make observations without providing sensible explanations for them. Neither Getty's *Origins of the Great Purges* nor Manning's "Government in the Soviet Countryside" have convincingly shown what revisionism is all about. (141). Fitzpatrick's point, on the other hand, is found wanting by its very claim for objectivity. (142)

One of the intriguing responses to Fitzpatrick's "New Perspectives..." was Alfred G Meyer's. A key proposition in Meyer's response is his assertion that in dealing with social history one should in no way forget that this research paradigm is but part of political history.

Stalin cannot be said to have relied on the masses or in league with some social actors against society itself. (143) The revisionists are apologists for Stalin's terror when they believe 'that Stalin was not as much in control as the totalitarianism school asserted...' (144) They are *obsessed* with 'present[ing] a view of historic events from below' and 'have neglected to treat the mass desertions to the enemy in the early months of the war...' (World War II) (145) On the other hand, Meyer calls the entirety of the revisionist project in question by suggesting that their work was a no novelty, and thus their 'pride of discovery' was rather an 'exaggeration.' (146) Stephen Cohen made the same point against the new cohort's case. He argued that their attempt was a contribution to the debate but not a contribution to knowledge about Soviet history. The totalitarian model's 'blinkered obsession with the Kremlin', he contends, had been attacked first by 'political scientists... a few sociologists and historians.' (147) Cohen's major concern in his response to Fitzpatrick is what he believes the new cohort's total oblivion to Stalin's terror: 'in all of their publications to date, the terror is ignored, obscured, or minimized in one way or another.' (148) The theme of terror according to him was overshadowed by the revisionists' preoccupation with the social manifestations of politics (149). Being somehow all too absorbed in this research paradigm, Fitzpatrick's social historians do not seem to have moved away from the very one-dimensional model which they criticised, namely the Totalitarian model. For Cohen, terror was part of social history only because it was a pervasive coercive tool deeply associated with everyday life, and 'was an essential part of almost everything else.' (150) For him, Fitzpatrick, to her discredit, was all too immersed in social history to realise the political weight and significance of the theme of terror. Cohen's criticism of Fitzpatrick in particular , and the new cohort in general, seems to be a strong argument, mainly because in considering "terror" the new cohort overlook the interaction of social history and politics.

2/ 'Participatory' Bolshevism:

The early attempts by both Soviet and Western scholars, journalists, historians, and politicians to praise the Bolshevik Revolution were not without significant contribution to the debate about the nature and validity of that revolution. (151) Yet, their inclination to appraise the revolution in congratulating terms did misguide research orientations in the field of Soviet studies.

Whether the Bolshevik revolution had a mass basis is still a question fraught with intricacies related mainly to differing interpretations. The Western social historians whose focus on social mobility and interest groups in the Soviet Union has gained so much fame for the school of revisionism have also been keen to reinterpret the nature of the October revolution by questioning the main theoretical tools used by the political scientists. One of the most significant studies in this respect has been Ronald Grigor Suny's work. (152) In his "Toward a Social history of the October Revolution" Suny studies such a question by firstly arguing that the revolution was hardly possible without the massive participation of the working class and the peasantry. (153) 'The overthrow of the tsar', Suny confirms, 'accomplished by workers and soldiers in Petrograd was the product of a largely spontaneous action by thousands of hungry, angry, and war-weary women and men who had lost all confidence in the government of Nicholas II.' (154) Such a hostility to Nicholas II was not to materialise into militant practice without the political activism of the Bolsheviks whose radical action inspired the workers 'in the metal industry and in St Petersburg', and whose clear engagement with the events eclipsed the role played by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries (SRs) (155) Quoting L Haimson for this purpose Suny is anxious to argue that the Bolshevik leaders were capable of winning the majority of 'labor organizations' by preventing 'the Menshevik liquidators' from "creeping in". After "dual power" (coalition

between Provisional Government and the Soviets) was established the majority of the Petrograd workers became gradually aware of the fragility such a dual power presented. The failure to follow a workable political agenda was revealed by the shaky unity between an elitist Bourgeois government and an incapable socialist minority represented mainly by the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and the Mensheviks. (156) In the words of Sheila Fitzpatrick the coalition could be sustained only as long as both parties retained their primary engagement of having to 'cooperate' with one another as different classes. For particularly this reason, such a co-operation was somehow unrealistic, since 'by the summer of 1917...the shaky consensus of February had been seriously undermined,' and 'the middle ground of democratic coalition started to crumble.' (157)

The role of the Bolsheviks in breaking ties between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet is undeniable. It was not until Lenin wrote the April Theses, Fitzpatrick argues, that the leading role of the Provisional Government was repudiated. (158) It was then when the July 1917 demonstrators' slogan of 'all power to the soviets' was crystallised by being inscribed in the Theses, and by constituting an invitation to a working class war against the Bourgeoisie. (159) The class war, as Suny reminds the reader, started with such slogans by demonstrators as 'Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers.' (160) The alleged leading role of the Bolsheviks in the 1917 February Revolution is illustrated in *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (1939): 'While the Bolsheviks were directly leading the struggle of the masses in the streets, the compromising parties, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, were seizing the seats in the Soviets and building up a majority there.' (161)

Popular support for the March Revolution, according to the official historiography of the Bolshevik party, had to do with the revolutionary work done by leading Bolsheviks like Lenin who, although exiled, could mobilise the masses for the sake of throwing the old order. In many terms, one would argue, this would somewhat explain the dramatic increase of

Bolshevik Party members from 24,000 in February/March 1917 to 350,000 in October. (162) The view expressed in *History* was later articulated by a host of scholars and "commentators" who, although many of whom were Westerners, praised the October Revolution as the beginning of a new, revolutionary, and egalitarian epoch. (163) From March to October 1917 the Bolshevik leadership served as an incentive for a popular overthrow of the Bourgeois government. How and why that happened has been a matter of a unceasing dispute between the school of totalitarianism and the revisionists. The totalitarian model ranges from interpretations that explain October by the sheer personal will of Lenin to interpretations that consider the revolution as an accident of history. Yet the revisionists base their reading of the revolution on the theme of the participation of several groups in policy-making. (164)

Reading the Russian Revolution from a different angle, Stephen Kotkin has asserted that it started rather as a 'coup' and then became a revolution in the process:

> [T]he coup was transformed only after the fact into a qualitatively new revolution that was simultaneously participatory and coercive... What needs to be explained is not just the Bolshevik coup but also the far more remarkable fact that the Bolsheviks held power, re-formed a state, and regathered much of the empire. That was the October Revolution. (165)

Yet, Kotkin's view here does not overshadow his firm conviction that the Bolsheviks were from the start actuated by 'tyranny' in carrying out their "so-called" 'world-historical mission' (166) Kotkin even goes further in questioning the validity of the social historians' project of rereading the October revolution as social history. He firmly maintains that the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 has made serious fissures in the structure of the social historians' project. This can be explained by Suny's article "Revision and Retreat in the Historiography of 1917" which constituted a 'defensive retreat' from the dominant (revisionist) historiography of the Soviet system. (167)

3/ 'Chaotic' Stalinism:

The main question which has caused more contention between the 'totalitarian model' and the 'revisionist school' is definitely the nature of the Stalin Revolution. The question whether Stalin's Russia was basically a totalitarian state is probably the most significant in the long debate between the two schools. While political scientists have ceaselessly insisted on the totalitarian character of the Stalin state, most revisionists have sought to find areas of research that would confirm the opposite. Not only social history is important in this respect; political history is equally telling. Some revisionist historians have been anxious to show that the functions of the Communist Party, the Central Committee, the local councils, and the soviets were to attest to the non-totalitarian character of the Soviet regime. This point was carefully addressed by Arch Getty.

Getty's conclusion about the term "totalitarianism" stands probably as the most challenging of all among the views of the revisionists of his generation. Getty not only repudiates the very theoretical premise whereupon the 'totalitarian model' stands—the Bolshevik party as a totalitarian party—but also believes that from the moment of its emergence until its crystallization into what came to be called the Great Purges, the Stalinist system was neither responsive to a totalitarian apparatus nor productive of a totalitarian regime. What governed first the revolutionary Bolsheviks in 1917 and second the system dubbed Stalinism was only 'chaotic, irregular, and confused administration.' (168) Soviet Russia was greatly impacted by political conflicts between several groups: 'The confusion and disorder in local party membership files and the inefficient fulfillment of cultural directives served to augment and protect the powers of local officials. The less the center knew about local affairs, the less it could intervene and control them...' (169) In Getty's logic, this was what might well confirm that dictatorship in the Soviet Union reflected very

little a totalitarian grip on society. The role of '"inefficient" and clumsy bureaucracy' was also indicative of the state's inefficient control over the bureaucracy. (170) According to Getty, the Stalinist system did suffer from grave deformities in organisation and the center was capable of very little control over the different districts. This actually had to do with the 'split' in the Party's unity by 'conflicts between factions, strata, and key personalities...' (171) Getty forges his theory against the totalitarian claim mainly by clearly referring to the school of totalitarianism as being a theory monolithically concerned with Stalin as the sole designer of the political scene in the Soviet Union.

> Stalin did not initiate or control everything that happened in the party and the country. The number of hours in the day, divided by the number of things for which he was responsible, suggests that his role in many areas could have been little more than occasional intervention, prodding, threatening, or correcting...He was an executive and reality forced him to delegate most authority to his subordinates, each of whom had his own opinions, client groups, and interests. (172)

Here Getty's primary assertion is that in the attempt to disaggregate Stalin's tasks into those done by himself and those 'delegated' to others, one might well reduce the concerns of the school of totalitarianism to a cipher. Such an assumption led Getty even to question Stalin's contribution to the Great Purges. (173)

Actually, Roy Medvedev made a similar point in 1971. He posed an important question: 'How, in spite of the monstrosity of his crimes, did Stalin manage to retain not only his power but also the respect and trust of the majority of Soviet people? It is an unavoidable fact that Stalin never relied on force alone. Throughout the period of his one-man rule he was popular.' (174) Medvedev tackles this seemingly perplexing paradox by suggesting that Stalin's rise to the position of a "god" had determined his popularity. His personality cult did

eclipse the character and personality of other party leaders. This determined his triumph politically and worked as an incentive for Soviet people to canonise his cult. (175) Getty's supposition that the Soviet totalitarian system was only a false name for a wrongly-conceived reality was also echoed by Robert Tucker in 1961. Commenting on a paper presented by Brzezinski (176), Tucker was keen to avoid the term 'totalitarian' while describing Soviet 'authoritarianism' or 'dictatorship.' (177) Tucker bothered little to call the Soviet system a 'conservative' or 'modern' totalitarianism as Brzezinski or others did. (178) His concern was to debate the failure of having to equate 'Soviet Russia' with 'Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.' The totalitarian model's chief mistake in doing so was to divert peoples' attention away from a thorough knowledge of the true nature of the Soviet system. (179) Believing that the term 'totalitarian' was all too vague and exhausted to describe the Stalinist system, Tucker suggested that scholarship 'needed a base-concept that is at once wider in range or generality than that of totalitarianism and at the same time more concretely descriptive of the phenomenon.' The new concept, Tucker asserts, 'is the concept of "movement-regime"...being an abbreviation for "revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices."' (180) While Tucker's focus in this respect is not chiefly on the Stalinist regime, his concept of 'movement regime' (he thinks) serves both to clarify the nature of the Soviet system and to adequately compare it with other systems of similar nature. (181) It is for this reason, as he tells us, that adherents to the totalitarian model were not conscious that the concept of totalitarianism failed to perceive that the regime-systems dealt with were not totalitarian systems per se but 'novel forms of authoritarianism' (182)

Tucker's concept of authoritarian 'movement-regime' sheds some light on the scholarly reactions the totalitarian model received from revisionists, whether they be social historians, political historians, political scientists, or other. Gordon Skilling's work, for instance, has contributed so much to the issues raised by the revisionist school in this

direction. His expertise in the question of 'interest groups' has helped explain why the concept of totalitarianism is somehow an exaggeration of the role of the state vis-à-vis society. In viewing the role of social groups in influencing state decision-making, Skilling has observed that the Stalin system was rather only partly totalitarian. (183) He even goes further by adopting Andrew Gyorgy's suggestion that an appropriate word to describe such states as the Soviet one is 'partilatarian', which means that at worst the form of government characteristic of those states came as an excess of party power over the rest of society. (184) Skilling argues also that the persistence of the concept of totalitarianism in Soviet studies has long been influenced by the Cold War syndrome which condemned research scopes in that area of study to be fully understood 'in black and white terms.' (185)

III/ Stalin's Russia: Revisionist Literature at Work:

1/ Stalinism and the Family:

This sub-section addresses the controversial relationship between the Stalinist regime and the Soviet family as is approached by a number of social historians. The issues discussed in this sub-section are meant to show how the Stalinist regime did count greatly on the family question in the hope of controlling Soviet society as a whole. While in theory Stalinism promised to guarantee freedom and prosperity what emerged was only a fragmented family threatened by divorce, poverty, and children's delinquency. The position of women was also worsened by a labour market which gave them only menial and low-paid jobs. This section, therefore, deals mainly with the significance of the family in general and women in particular in relation to the Stalinist state. Like the rest of the constituents of society, the family was used by the state as a propaganda tool which could legitimate the regime's perfect control of society. On the other hand, women in particular were part of the political propaganda which the Stalinist system sought to use and abuse in the hope of winning the masses. The family

question arises as most important in this respect because one of the most engaging promises that the Bolsheviks set for themselves was how to turn the "victimised" Russian society into an illuminated one guided by the emancipatory premises of a classless society where every family would identify itself as inseparable from socialist unity.

To the scholars concerned with the social history of the Soviet Union, the issues of divorce, abortion, women's employment and upward mobility presented not only a socio-economic problem to reckon with. Such issues had also to do with a defining relationship between the regime and a very delicate section of society, namely women. It is for this reason that the scholars dealt with in this sub-section are not in total agreement when it comes to an evaluation of the socio-economic status of women and the role played by the state in maintaining a 'healthy' Soviet family. The respective concerns of the scholars in question reflect a considerable gulf between their research results. This mainly relates to the scholars' areas of interest and whether they think that the "unhappiness" of the Soviet family for instance derives primarily from government policies.

The significance of family stability in relation to the Stalinist system was emphasised by Vera Alexandrova who thought that the Soviet family benefited greatly from government legislation. (186) She suggests that most of the problems such as divorce, poverty and disintegration of the family did not reflect a failure of the Soviet state to protect the family. As an apologist for the Soviet state, it seems to me, Alexandrova also heaps the blame for the disintegration of the peasant family not on the political system but the structure of Soviet society itself. Such a society, Alexandrova believes, remained greatly chained, especially in the first decade after the Revolution, by its pre-revolutionary gendered structure. (187) Husbands' abandonment of wives was caused not by the new laws legislated by the revolutionary government, but by the legacy of tsarist Russia. This made it too difficult for the Soviet government to negotiate permanent solutions for family problems. Alexandrova thinks

that if the Soviet family was 'unhappy' the state could not be scolded for such a situation. The main cause for family unhappiness could only be explained by the 'social ascent of one of its members.' (188) And because most of the time it was the husband who benefited from social ascent, peasant women in particular were socially condemned to suffer from the repercussions of their husbands' rise to a better rank. Alexandrova did not blame the legal system for women's unhappiness. 'The decrees... brought about equality for women and facilitated divorce.' (189) But she considered that this inconvenience was a misleading sign about the health of the Soviet family: the 1917 revolution, like 'every great revolution [was] accompanied by a gigantic upheaval, raising the people from the bottom to a higher social position.' (190) Therefore, upward mobility, which followed from 'a gigantic upheaval', can only be interpreted as a benefit to all the family, but women were particularly unfortunate mainly because of the highly gendered structure of society. What was to blame in Alexandrova's logic was rather the social legacy of pre-revolution Russia which for historical reasons condemned peasant women in particular to remain reserved, shy, and non-self-assertive. For instance, Catherina, a peasant woman, Alexandrova maintains, was abandoned by her husband who, actuated by his social ascent, had to find for himself a much more "civilised" woman in the city. (191) A further suggestion Alexandrova made, and whereby she seemed apologetic for the Revolution and its political implications, was that, once capable of grasping rightly and correctly the laws and decrees of the new state, women could do the work of men and even choose freely the right men to go out with. The story of Gleb and his wife Dasha was a good illustration of this. (192)

The question of political propaganda in relation to the family concerns also other aspects such as the right to divorce. Vera Sandomirsky thinks that issues like divorce were closely associated with a new relationship between the state and citizens. For example, government policy in the 1930s was particularly strict and uncompromising: the only time

when divorce could take place was once one spouse proved a "bad" citizen who amounted to the '*unworthy* citizen.' (193) A "good" man or woman then could only be judged according to the values of the socialist state which, in the eyes of the regime, had to protect individuals by preventing them from promoting the values of individualism characteristic of bourgeois society. This, as Sandomirsky asserts, could only occur when citizens would 'possess the best Soviet qualities.' (194) In Wendy Z Goldman's view, such a discourse was part of an ideological propaganda whose aim was to convince citizens to reject the 'libertarian commitment to individual freedom' which conflicted at large with socialist principles. In other words, this has also to do with the general cultural context which emanated from the drive for collectivisation and industrialisation during the First Five-Year Plan. (195) According to Goldman, the Stalinist regime was to approach the problems of divorce and abortion from a purely ideological standpoint: a socialist society is "conservative" in the sense that it must reject individual freedom as wrongly conceived by the liberal democratic values (196) As Sandomirsky argues, the promotion of the alleged collective well-being came with those measures like the abortion decree of 1936, which, in the eyes of the regime, sought to establish and preserve "family responsibility" and save Soviet society from the "evil" of the 'free love era' of the 1920s. (197) And such a responsibility was as an essential ingredient in socialism.

The other important issue in relation to the Soviet family is that of employment and mobility. The issue in question can be considered as most significant mainly because it did not only relate to the transformation of the Soviet family after the Revolution but also to the importance of employment and mobility as a discourse used by the Stalinist regime to promote its picture as a guardian of society. Some historians argue that women's employment and mobility had less to do with the alleged revolutionary decrees passed in favour of women. Women's social mobility did reflect the inability of the Soviet government to guarantee the

well-being of the Soviet family. Sheila Fitzpatrick in particular has argued that the number of women entering the labour market in the 1930s affected both the stability and the future of the Soviet family. While economically the Soviet family benefited from additional income, socially it suffered from many problems relating to women's mobility. (198) The main cause for concern in Fitzpatrick's view was that women's employment was not a voluntary initiative on their part. Generally, it was the industrial city which in a great part pushed women to enter the labour market—family problems were also a direct cause for such a mobility: the rising rate of divorce or husbands' abandonment of the peasant household had to do with that. (199) In Fitzpatrick's words '10 million women' were obliged in the 1930s to 'enter the labor market' due to husbands' low income, divorce, etc. Therefore, for Fitzpatrick, the economic conditions of the Soviet family were basically the cause of the social problems from which most families suffered. In this sense, the government's economic policy can be said to have contributed to those problems. And one of the devastating results was divorce: bringing up children became a heavy burden for millions of husbands who simply chose to abandon their wives; nevertheless, many of the divorcee often chose to remain in the same apartment for money problems. (200)

Having been obliged to enter the labour market women had also to sustain the economic repercussions socially. The direct result of this was that women had to accept a division of labour which, by far, forced them to accept minor posts and lower payment. As Donald Filtzer has argued, the degree of women's mobility socially was technically and economically controlled by a division of labour whose basic aim was to 'channel [them] into the lowest-skilled and worst-paid jobs where they had little prospects for promotion.' (201) Yet, this does not mean that women were officially conceived as a social stratum to sacrifice in the hope of encouraging and promoting industry and economy; nor were they conceived in comparative terms with men. (202) The dominant rhetoric was that like men women were

only part of the labour force constituting the proletarian economy that in the last analysis would usher in the building of socialism.

Women's "static mobility", as I would term it here, was mainly caused by the failure of collectivisation economically, which had its grave social repercussions on the female workers themselves. This would to a large extent weaken some revisionist claims that the Soviet family was an active partner of the Soviet state. Women were obliged to go out for work first because they were needed as a cheap labour, and second because they had opportunities to improve their families' standards of living. (203) But another result of women's static mobility was its direct impact on family stability as Goldman thinks. Moreover, women's absence from the city household during hours of work diminished 'the supervision of children' who as a result of the 'crowded apartments' where they lived had to spend many hours in the streets. This phenomenon caused to a great extent the emergence of 'little crime' among schoolchildren. (204) The conclusion here is that forced by the thrust of industrialisation and modernisation the Soviet state in the 1930s in particular was off at a tangent in treating the family question: on the one hand, it sought to fill the vacuum of labour shortage by recruiting an army of women workers; on the other it had to call for the preservation of the family as a basic unit by passing laws and decrees against divorce and abortion at the same time when women's overwork and the necessity to be constantly present at work caused the disintegration of the Soviet family.

2/ The New Intelligentsia and Mobility:

In her "The New Leadership Generation" Sheila Fitzpatrick asserts that

> ...Stalin *did* (Fitzpatrick's italics) have a special interest in the new cadres. He believed them to possess specific qualifications which were essential for Soviet leadership, and he also believed that the old cadres' lack of such qualifications exposed the regime to manipulation by its present and potential

> enemies. During the First Five-Year Plan, Stalin initiated a program through which over one hundred thousand workers and Communists from the factories and apparats were mobilized and sent to higher technical schools. As a result of the Great Purge, this group received dramatic promotions into positions of industrial government, and party leadership. It has remained a core group in the Soviet political leadership up to the present day. (205)

Here the issue of mobilisation, according to Fitzpatrick, played a gigantic role in deciding the future of the regime. While the regime meant to preserve its own political structure through the advent of a new generation that functions in a completely novel form, it was upward social mobility that guaranteed stability to such a regime. (206) Elsewhere, Fitzpatrick calls this a 'cultural revolution' initiated as early as the 1930s. (207) The cultural revolution argument has also been reiterated by other revisionists such as Getty. (208) The new generation derived its strength and ability from the training it acquired from 'cadres' and experts trained by the tsarist regime. (209) Fitzpatrick traces the cultural revolution (emergence of a new revolutionary Soviet intelligentsia and a conscious proletariat) to the Shakhty trial of 1928. (210) The trial revealed that the epoch of bourgeois intelligentsia came to a halt, and that a technical as well as cultural revolution was to take place in order to substitute for the old order a new proletarian one. The cultural revolution came with large scale social purges initiated in 1928, continued into the 1930s, and became later called a 'class war.' (211) The cultural revolution created its official form through the foundation of organisations such as the Komsomol (the Communist Youth League), the Communist Academy, and RAPP (the organisation of proletarian writers). (212) Those organisations played a decisive role in campaigning against the right and left opposition. (213) The cultural revolution also resonated as a proletarian mission that aimed to rule out the vestiges of bourgeois culture. Moreover, the process of the cultural revolution, on the other hand, had to bear an essential proletarian

element crucial for achieving socialism. It was for this reason, according to Fitzpatrick, that the term 'proletarianisation' had a specific importance in the discourse of the government:

> The objectives of the cultural revolution in education were the proletarianisation of schools and universities by selective entrance and purging of "socially-alien" students...In scholarship and the arts the objective was proletarianization through subordination to communist, proletarian organizations...then proletarianization of culture meant politicization and extension of party control. (214)

Proletarianisaion in this sense meant an exclusive cultural task the ultimate aim of which was to bring into harmony the people's aspirations to equality and the state's endeavour to establish a fully socialist order.

The instance of proletarianising all aspects of life went along the necessity to uproot the vestiges of the old bourgeois order. But how could that be realised? The answer to this question came in the suggestion that there was a class war going on between the 'formers' on the one hand and the proletariat and peasantry on the other. In the regime's logic the Shakhty events of 1928 came to confirm the treason of the old intelligentsia, as 55 engineers and technicians from Shakhty were accused of acts of hostility and 'conspiracy' against the country. (215) This was followed by a veritable attack on what *Pravda* described as 'liberal culture-mongering': 'We will unbendingly forge the armour of socialist culture...which must be an impenetrable wall protecting us...from alien class influences, bourgeois degeneration, petty-bourgeois wavering and blunting of revolutionary vigilance in the face of the more cultured class enemy.' (216) These words were a prelude to the class war which continued in various forms until 1932. For Stalin and his men the class war was started by the 'enemies of the people' who had to be liquidated by promoting a proletarian culture. But which classes, groups, organisations, or parties were by large considered enemies of the people? As Donald

Filtzer points out, alongside the Shakhty conspirators, a number of 'enemies of the people' was declared: 'the "Toiling Peasant Party" (1930), the "Industrial Party" (1930), and the so-called "Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party" (1931)...' (217) Apart from such parties there were other less politically active 'enemies of the people' that the regime warned against. Fitzpatrick dubs them as the 'formers,' that is, 'tsarist bureaucrats, former bourgeoisie, former nobles [including Kulaks]' (218), and 'the new NEP bourgeoisie.' (219)

Central to the cultural revolution of the late 1920s and early 1930s was the establishment of a new technological, economic, and political order whose ultimate aim was to replace the 'formers' by the two main classes capable of building socialism and leading the country to communism, namely the working class and the peasantry. In Stalin's theory, which was clearly articulated in Article One of the 1936 Constitution, the new intelligentsia (cadres, intellectuals, experts, professionals, etc) was only a 'stratum' and was bound to 'a socialist state of workers and peasants' (220) Thus such an intelligentsia had a leading role regarded as an unconditional 'service' to the working class and the peasantry. (221) This was mainly because the new intelligentsia was no longer regarded as an extension to the old one—which was now withering away—but a technically independent stratum recruited primarily from the ranks of the industrial and agrarian proletariat. (222)

The Cultural Revolution meant that the First Five-Year Plan constituted both a revolutionary order—whose defining features were a new Soviet man and a new Soviet culture—and revolutionary break with the past. The revolutionary order was premised on strategically approaching the questions of the economy, politics, and culture by first *forcibly* opting for a large scale industrial and agricultural revolution. This demanded, as Stalin himself asserted, that 'the working class must create its own productive-technical intelligentsia, *capable of standing up for its own interests in production, as the interests of the*

working class.' (223) Moreover, the creation of a 'productive-technical intelligentsia' from the ranks of the proletariat needed a huge mobilisation of labour created under circumstances dictated by the process of industrialisation. In the words of Donald Filtzer, creation of the new intelligentsia demanded 'a new streamlined education and training courses [which] prepared these people to assume their new positions.' (224)

The new intelligentsia played two major roles. One concerned the foundation and management of the new industrial sectors, and another related to the collectivisation drive. The contribution of the new intelligentsia to industrialisation was significant in the sense that the rise of cadres from the ranks of the proletariat played an economic as well as a social role. As industrialisation was nurtured by a tone of political revolution meant to lead to socialism, any attempt, as Stalin explained it at the Sixteenth Party Congress in the Summer of 1930, to '*reduce* the rate of development of our industry' was a crime against socialism committed by 'agents of our class enemies.' (225) The only way to realise a socialist order had to happen according to an 'accelerated' pace of industrialisation. This practically led to a situation where only 'cadres decide everything' (226) Yet, the cadres in question were part of the new logic forged by Stalin who following 'a principle which had long guided Bolshevik practice' expected the 'elite' of technicians, engineers, and other experts to lead the socialist cause of the proletariat. (227) The starting point for the Stalinist regime was to send at least 'ten thousand Communists to engineering and other colleges between 1928 and 1931...' (228) Later in 1930 this was followed by a large inclination to forming students in 'technical education.' (229) During industrialisation education of cadres was decisive in work orientations within different industrial sectors. In 1930-33 for instance some '660,000 Communist workers' were estimated to have ascended from rank-and-file positions to 'white-collar employment' (230) This can be explained by a remarkable 92 per cent increase in industrial workers, and 293 per cent increase in building in 1932. (231)

Alongside mobilisation in industry, building, and other sectors, labour mobilisation in agriculture was crucial to government planning in relation to collectivisation. The role of the new intelligentsia in the rural areas was revolutionary in the sense that an army of industrial skilled labourers, engineers, and experts was mobilised to contribute to the modernisation and socialisation of Soviet agriculture. One of the crucial steps the regime took was to mobilise what came to be called the '25,000ers' in the hope of strengthening the collective farm system by experience and expertise. (232) The 25,000ers, being mainly recruited from the intelligentsia, were first called in in the winter of 1930. Lynne Viola argued that the 25,000ers' 'participation in collectivization and the initial organization of the collective farms was designed to serve as a breakthrough policy to enable the regime to implement the momentous transformation of agriculture and peasant life which took place at this time.' (233) This according to Viola was also aimed at revolutionising and modernising the methods of land management and land tillage. The main task of the newly mobilised workers was to collectivise the farms by a process of dekulakisaion, and 'to reorganize peasant agriculture by bringing the industrial revolution to the countryside.' (234) Dekulakisation meant a rather uncompromising policy of socio-economic "cleansing" of the pseudo-feudal agrarian structure of Soviet countryside. It meant the struggle with and elimination of both the economic order established by the 'local kulaks' and its base structure as was vested in the supportive religious authority of 'churchmen' (235). The role of the 25,000ers to collectivise farms went hand in hand with the regime's propaganda to uproot the religious legitimacy of the kulaks. In brief, the 25,000ers were instrumental in winning for the regime the class war by expropriating the means of production exploited by the kulaks as a dominant class. (236)

Reading dekulakisation from a strictly political standpoint, Boris I Nicolaevsky argued in 1951 that the 'communist state' of the 1930s and 1940s was actuated by its ideological defect to liquidate not only the kulaks but also 'the peasantry as a class.' (237) This argument

in turn does overshadow the regime's claim of fighting for the cause of the peasants in the face of the private farm. This also conflicts with the view (by the revisionists) that dekulakisation was popular. A relatively thorough study of the "kulak" was made by Moshe Lewin in 1985. (238) According to Lewin there was hardly any thorough characterisation of the term, and most definitions were basically context-related: some would characterise the "Kulaks" as 'those who "eat up the commune"'; during the NEP period Lenin described the "Kulaks" as the 'peasant entrepreneurs'. Later they were dubbed as 'rural bourgeoisie' and 'village capitalists.' Roughly two years before the First Five-Year Plan the "Kulak" was identified as "devourer of the *mir*" (village council) and a "skinner alive'; by the time of the First Five-Year Plan it was called 'the capital usurer' and even a representative of "commercial capital." (239) Lewin's study of the different interpretations of the Kulak confirms that the attack on this stratum (largely dubbed as an enemy 'class' by the Communist Party officials, Bolshevik leaders, and even a host of political scientists and historians) came in the form of a campaign of both historical and ideological importance. Dekulakisation then was not the outcome of the immediate decisions made up by the Stalinist regime. It had resonance both within the official Bolshevik ideology of the necessity of war against the 'peasant entrepreneur' and within the official Stalinist discourse as was spelled out by 'Communist leaders' as Bazarov and Sukhanov. (240)

In Marxist-Leninist logic elimination of the Kulak as a class was legitimate in its own right, given the destructive role the Kulak would play in further stratifying the countryside. Yet the "class war" implied in the process of 'liquidating' the Kulak by the Stalinist regime did pose the problem of land distribution and management when expropriation was taking place. In trying to liquidate the Kulak the regime, relying basically on violent methods, not only had to deal with the social consequences of such a liquidation but also had to carry out extensive collectivisation by forcibly creating new farm units capable of comprising large

numbers of peasants. (241) The instance of sacrificing the private farm to the state meant that instead of dealing with the Kulak directly the poor peasants had to work in state-owned farms largely controlled by state-employed managers and technicians. This in turn meant that the peasant had to deal with a bureaucratic structure whose administrative intricacies were completely incomprehensible to him. On the other hand, there was an objective problem which caused social malaise in the rural areas. The process of rapid collectivisation was so excessive that it, in Viola's words, caused 'massive policy violations in the countryside and a wave of peasant discontent.' (242) In an interview published in *Pravda* (September 1988) the Russian historian Viktor Danilov and the economist N. V. Teptsov asserted that the collectivisation process was inevitable for a country which based its policies on 'socialist reform of agriculture.' Yet, according to them, what was excessive about that process was 'the implementation of "solid collectivisation" in two or three years and by whatever means.' (243) Why that posed a grave problem was because 'no objective conditions could justify the violence against the peasantry that was committed in the Stalinist implementation of collectivization and dekulakization.' (244) The defect of such an implementation was confirmed by the 1931-2 famine which was caused not by bad grain harvests but primarily by the administrative mismanagement of the 'Stalinist leadership.' (245)

The break with the past as a second facet of the First Five-Year Plan was also decisive in giving some credibility to the regime's claim of the cultural revolution. The break, as the revisionist school understands it, was primarily based on an entire rupture with the Bourgeois element by which the Soviet government had constructed and given legitimacy to the Soviet state in the aftermath of the October Revolution. But the break with what came to be called 'Bourgeois culture' only relatively terminated the regime's reliance on the expertise of the old cadres and experts. The break in other terms meant, as Fitzpatrick puts it, 'the proletarianisation of the intelligentsia.' To proletarianise meant to educate, recruit, and

promote to the ranks of the new intelligentsia a large number of working people. It is for this reason, Fitzpatrick tells us, that the regime's insistence on the necessity of proletarianisation had had a tone of a civilising task. This traded in the form of slogans such as 'the Radiant Future' and 'out of backwardness.' (246) The new discourse of a civilising task came with two defining and interrelated elements: building socialism and modernisation. (247) While socialism was the aim, modernisation was the means. Modernisation was a key stage in the development of Soviet society into a socialist one. It had to do with industry and the introduction of industrial innovation into the rural areas. The Bolsheviks

> had a clear idea that the key to "building socialism" was economic development and modernization. As prerequisites of socialism, Russia needed more factories, railways, machinery, and technology. It needed urbanization, a shift of population from the countryside to towns, and a much larger, permanent working class. It needed greater popular literacy, more schools, more skilled workers and engineers. Building socialism meant transforming Russia into a modern industrial society. (248)

In short, the Bolsheviks needed an industrial revolution so much akin to the English industrial revolution in the 19th century, but with the intention to achieve socialism rather than capitalism. (249) Although modernisation meant an illuminated socialist society bred over by modern industry and technology, the argument by a host of historians in favour of 'modernisation theory' fails, as Filtzer reminds us, to see how the promotion of industry was basically replete with 'inherent deformities and inefficiencies' the result of which was the emergence of 'class struggles' within such a society. (250) While modernisation was the promising form of industrialisation and collectivisation, it remained valid only in its immediate connotation as a propulsive method for economic change. Its social implications were far less encouraging and promising. In Filtzer's words modernisation of the Soviet economy meant by far the 'impoverishment' of Soviet society by the industrialisation drive,

which in government discourse was an impoverishment for the sake of achieving the goals of socialism. (251) The class struggle and liquidation of all classes threatening socialisation had to be carried out by Soviet citizens who in having to sacrifice their material well-being would in the end achieve the socialist society promised. As Filtzer puts it, the regime's 'rhetoric of heightened class struggle' was the primary cause of the impoverishment that resulted from rapid industrialisation and collectivisation. (252)

The break with the past constituted also a class war against the very peasants and workers said to emancipate. The break did not only mean the unabashed departure from the "technical" and "professional" hegemony of bourgeois intelligentsia but also the creation of a new knowledge elite the ultimate aim of which was to control the working masses by a process of managerial and administrative routine. This in itself constituted a new elitist attitude towards the proletariat and the peasantry. Jerry Hough summed up the new sort of control which resulted from the First Five-Year Plan by pointing out the concept of "*edinonachalie*" or one-man management. (253) Hough explains such a concept by relating it to the relationship between lower decision-makers in Soviet government and state policy-making. 'Lower managers perform their duties in accordance with the principle of *edinonachalie* (one-man management and control)...These managers, according to one authority, "enjoy the right of decision" for all questions within the jurisdiction of their organization.' (254) Filtzer describes *edinonachalie* as 'an increased centralization of managerial authority,' which confirmed that the 'regimes' policy' did nothing but dramatically weaken the unity of the working class by 'undermin[ing] its cohesion and solidarity...' (255) The principle of *edinonachalie* inaugurated a new phase of the class struggle wherein the working class became a working class *in itself.* And the rhetoric of the proletarianisation of the intelligentsia revealed only a *racialisation* of social class by the

Soviet regime. Such a racialisation in turn ushered in the emergence of what became known as "privileged groups."

3/ "Privileged Groups":

Proletarianisation of the intelligentsia—which the revisionists believe was a feature of Stalinism—served as a pretext to cleanse specific strata and classes which had been relied on technically and economically from October 1917 to the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. Yet, instead of serving as a total strategy for achieving the promised socialist society, proletarianisation only paved the path for an elitism whose aim amounted at best to the creation of new strata of specific class character which transformed the Soviet Union into a veritable stratified society. One of the repercussions of the stratification process was the emergence of "privileged groups" whose political and economic influence was beyond belief.

While "privileged groups" in Soviet society cannot simply be conceived as a new social class, it might well be argued that such groups were new strata which in the last analysis can be approached in class terms. Privileged groups in the Soviet context of the 1930s and 1940s were the groups which emanated from the Stalin cultural revolution initiated during the First Five-Year Plan. (256) In his "The New Inequality" Mervyn Matthews points out the groups which were privileged most in Stalin's Russia:

> As for the most privileged groups, it is relatively easy to distinguish between them on the basis of the type of favour which they received. The specialists employed in state enterprises were rewarded mainly by high salaries. Party and state officials were kept with much stricter salary limits, but were included in favoured supply categories during the time of great shortage, and enjoyed administrative advantages denied to others. Military officers were visibly set apart and enjoyed benefits on a steadily growing scale. Members of the creative intelligentsia...were given some significant, if secondary, privileges... (257)

A close look at Matthews's classification of these groups informs the reader that the number of those receiving permanent 'favours' was extremely limited to Party or party-related positions while the rest of "civil society" had to struggle for the minimum of rights. Moreover, as many observers have put it, the distribution of favours was socially manifest in the remarkable standards of living of such groups. As is shown in the preceding section of this part, housing and the purchasing power of the majority of the population were even far below official projections and expectations. Decent housing was limited to 'a minority of upper classes.' (258) The existence of privileged groups in Stalin's USSR did constitute a negation of both the Marxian concept of a society without classes and 'the principle of the legal equality of all Soviet citizens' which was inscribed in 'the Stalin Constitution of 1936.' (259) Inegalitarian legal procedures weakened the Stalinist ideologists' claim of a Soviet society that was advancing towards 'classlessness'. The contradiction between claim and practice, Matthews tells us, was revealed by the 'elitism' of a Communist Party whose guiding rules were inherent in Leninism itself. By crowning itself as the only leader of Soviet society, the Party condemned its very emancipatory promises. (260) Privilege was also camouflaged by a widespread and unlimited government censorship on statistics relating to 'the national distribution of income...elite life-styles or material privileges...' (261) The contradiction between claim and practice, I would argue, begs the question whether interest or pressure groups in the Soviet system had any role in adjusting government policies concerning the question of privilege.

The idea of why privileged groups emerged strongly during Stalin's secretaryship is also related to the new thinking which emerged through the First Five-Year Plan. The role of the intelligentsia was pivotal in determining the character of new active groups which later became of special importance, and acquired the status of "privilege.' In his famous 1929

December Speech Stalin argued that passing on to the socialist phase of development required the massive recruitment of 'Soviet-minded technicians and experts for the work of socialist construction and training new Red technicians and Red experts from among the working class.' (262) As Alex Inkeles noted in 1950, the need to promote heavy industry did encourage a social stratification on the basis of skill and specialty. Stalin, Inkeles argued, severely 'attacked...wage equalization and began a movement for personal incentive based on differential awards.' (253) He on the other hand insisted that the qualified technicians had to be 'shown' 'greater attention and solicitude' by 'enlisting their cooperation...creating suitable conditions for them...' (264) Skilled workers, for their part, had to be promoted to 'higher positions and to payment of higher levels of wages.' (265) According to Inkeles, the policy of creating a new intelligentsia, together with highly qualified technicians and workers, resulted in the economic estrangement of some classes and the emergence of completely new strata in society: '...ten social-class groups could be distinguished for purposes of sociological analysis.' (266) For Inkeles 'the system of social stratification' might well be explained by the upward occupational mobility created by the government's need to industrialise and collectivise the economy. (267) Yet such a sort of mobility did not mean that the different strata had a fixed economic status. Although the existence of ten social groups reflected grave economic problems 'an appreciable number of workers and peasants had incomes on the average higher than those of large segments of the white collar group and in some cases equaling the incomes of many individuals in the general and even in the superior intelligentsia.' (268)

Privilege for some groups, Inkeles reminds the reader, was sanctioned under official covers like the "Stalin Prizes". 'Qualifying for those prizes' was practically restricted to a minority of people who could prove their competence in the fields of science, politics, etc. (269) Fitzpatrick for example argues that privilege given to artists for instance was often a

'strategy to deflect possible popular resentment of privilege away from Communists.' (270) Other types of privilege were granted on the basis of a person's service and loyalty to the regime. Individuals who benefited from those privileges were 'widows and heirs of prominent Soviet officials, scientists, and artists.' (261) In *Everyday Stalinism* Sheila Fitzpatrick points out two main 'classes' benefiting from privilege, namely Communist officials and the intelligentsia. (272) Generally, privilege was related to 'access' to 'goods, services, and apartments,' mainly because Stalin's Russia in the 1930s was in time of shortages. This in turn made particular groups like 'party and industrial administrators' benefit from 'special elite stores' called 'GORT.'(273) Such stores were so exclusive that even people who had money, but enjoyed no privilege, could not have access to. (274) Privilege was even extended to other areas like housing: 'New elite housing was also provided in the first half of the 1930s by turning existing buildings into cooperatives for the use of personnel in various government agencies like the Central Committee, the OGPU, the Red Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Heavy Industry.' (275) The drive for privilege had two direct repercussions: first, the rural areas were particularly raged by the privilege enjoyed by the officials of the urban soviets; second, the people who enjoyed privilege in the cities would think that they did not belong to 'a privileged upper class,' but that was part of their "natural" mobility from one proletarian status to an other. (276) Fitzpatrick (borrowing Pierre Bourdieu's concept) describes such a practice as a '"misrecognition" about privilege.' (277) For her, Stalin made his contribution to misrecognition of privilege by appropriating the term "intelligentsia." He ascribed to the elite of new leaders with broader knowledge the cultural superiority of academicians. Such an elite was privileged not because it was a ruling class, but because it was 'cultured in a backward society.' (278)

Summary

- The « Totalitarian Model » premises its main argument on the continuity between Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism. It advances such a continuity by supposing that the link between Marx (and Engels), Lenin, and Stalin was basically ideological, and that both the 1917 October Revolution and the Stalin revolution of the 1930s were inspired by the Marxian text itself.

- The totalitarian mainstream tend to 'demonize' Lenin because he is thought to have been the designer of a 'classic coup d'état.'

- The "totalitarian model" also argues that, like Nazism and Fascism, Bolshevism was a 'fanatic' ideology having to do with 'anti-Western and anti-liberal' propaganda.

- Some totalitarian model scholars like Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Ulam think that the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism was 'genetically' determined.

- The Revisionist social historians call in question most of the findings of the "totalitarian model".

- The main concern of the Revisionists is that the totalitarian model disregards the importance of social history in the Soviet Union.

- The Revisionists also argue that Sovietologist political scientists exaggerate the conflict between state and society during Stalin's rule.

- For Sheila Fitzpatrick and her 'new cohort,' the Stalin revolution occurred from below rather than above, mainly because government policy-making was largely influenced by such groups as the upwardly promoted strata.

Part 4

The Forgotten Crisis: the Leviathan Revolution

Introduction:

In part three of this thesis I have discussed some of the findings of the two main schools of thought concerned with interpreting the nature of the 1917 October Revolution and the Stalin Revolution of the 1930s—the 'Totalitarian model" and the "Revisionist school." In the present part, however, I display my own interpretation. In this part I seek to address a 'forgotten crisis.' By "forgotten", I mean a hitherto undiscovered, unexplored, and even, unpredicted crisis, which crippled the Soviet Union for more than half a century. To me, this crisis was caused exclusively by a Soviet ideological practice which had very little to do with Marxian theory. The Soviet crisis has been "forgotten" because of a misleading historiography that argues for the continuity of Marxian theory and the Soviet state model. Such a historiography is disseminated by such scholars as Adam Ulam and Martin Malia. (1) In this part I would like to argue that the crisis and, then, collapse of the Soviet ideology reflected very little the Marxian idea of revolution and emancipation. Marxian arguments such as aim of revolution, revolutionary role of the proletariat, social significance of the individual, and the withering away of state were all too easily dismissed from Soviet political practice; they were just the aura of official ideological propaganda aimed at serving the elitism of top party officials, and the primacy of the Central Committee.

The Soviet state depended very much on leviathan-like actions against "aberrant" individuals; Soviet citizens were subjugated by the same despotic social link, which Hobbes sanctions in his *Leviathan*. If one observes the authoritarian state which emerged after the 1917 Revolution, and the totalitarian state which came out of Stalin's rule, one is seriously reminded of Hobbes's 'sovereign.' Hobbes's sovereign is permitted to use even the 'sword' to make and keep social peace. In using the sword, such a sovereign is prone to *abuse* his power and turn into a monster: Hobbes's sovereign is an authoritarian who might well become tyrannical and totalitarian. Being sovereigns in the Hobbesean sense, Lenin and Stalin did

epitomise such an authoritarianism-totalitarianism. The one (Lenin) paved the way for the other (Stalin) and the consequence was a state against the workers instead of a 'workers' state.'

My concept of 'forgotten crisis' is, in political-philosophical terms, about the direct, or indirect, relationship between Hobbes's state theory and Soviet state experience: how Soviet politics was modeled on a mode of state repressive in character; how the political character of Soviet state was an end in itself rather than a transitory condition paving the way for the withering away of the state as such. In the last analysis, the ultimate aim of this part is to repudiate the concept that the demise of the Soviet Union amounts to a final liberal democratic triumph over Marxism as a political ideology. In what follows I will attempt to demonstrate how Lenin and Stalin were to establish, maintain, and secure a state model Hobbesean in character.

I/ The Forgotten Crisis:

1/ A Reflection on the "Continuity Thesis":

In my view, the "Continuity thesis" has addressed two central issues relating to Marxism. First, it rightly points to the organic continuity between Lenin and Stalin. The adherents to the "continuity thesis" have succeeded in arguing that Stalinism is based on the 'adoption and conversion' of Leninism. Stalinism converted Leninism by transforming it from 'party dictatorship' to a 'one-man dictatorship,' from "War Communism" to the First Five-Year Plan, and, most importantly, from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. Second, the adherents to the Continuity thesis have wrongly argued that Lenin and Stalin continued with Marx. In this section, I treat this second issue.

By observing the history of Leninist thought—as displayed in Part I—and the way Lenin used Marx's and Engels's texts to validate his theory of revolution, one would call in question the whole suggestion that Marx and Lenin were on the same theoretical and practical

track. The crucial question here is where one can locate Leninism in Marxian thought: while we speak of the practice known as Leninism, do we mean it is Marxism by other means, or the Marxism of its time—as Stalin observed? (2) Yet, if we believe that Leninism is the Marxism of its time, one is forced to adopt Lenin's very thesis as exposed in *The State and Revolution* in order to justify other contexts. This means that reading Marxism through what Lenin himself proclaims poses a perplexing problem: if one observes the Paris Commune, one would also argue, following Lenin's logic, that Proudhanism and Blanquism were also the Marxism of their time, since *experience*—which Lenin celebrates in *The State and Revolution*—constitutes the practical element of Marx's theory of revolution, and since such a theory can itself be read through the prisms of experience; applying Lenin's logic here means that 1871 did only differ in degree from 1917, and that what counts more is 'experience' and not when or where such an experience occurs. Believing Lenin on the basis of his proclamations and arguments is hardly a scholarly investigation, mainly because engaging in an analytical and explanatory task requires measuring up such very proclamations and arguments against what Marx and Engels themselves advanced. It is worth arguing here also that the slogan "Marxism-Leninism" as a concept has to do with a theoretical assessment of Lenin's ideas and practice on the basis of his own allegation that the October Revolution was a proletarian revolution in Marx's sense of the word; it has also to do with the belief that "War Communism" was a period of "Socialism" at work. Equally, Lenin's writings on the workers' state and the eventual withering away of the state are also instances on which the conflation "Marxism-Leninism" is based. According to me, the link between Marx and Engels on the one hand, and Lenin on the other, was a link substantiated and legitimated through Lenin's theory and not through the Soviet practice itself; this is mainly because Lenin's theory of revolution adopted Marxian theory on the basis of few exceptions made by Marx or Engels: such exceptions include Marx's praise of the Paris Commune despite its untimely occurrence,

and Marx's and Engels's celebration of the assassination of the tsar in 1881 by the Populists. Therefore, the equation of Marxism and Leninism seems to be premised on a practice supposedly in tune with Marxian theory.

The other problem relates to the equation Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism. What I aim to convey here is that the continuity between Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism is far from accurate. Whether Lenin in his canonical defence of Marx and Engels proved to be practically faithful to their teaching remains highly debatable; and whether Stalin was the true guardian and custodian of Marxism is also a question fraught with many complexities. In his political life, Stalin kept struggling to show that even in diverting the Marxian text through a certain ideological manoeuvre he was but doing historical justice to scientific socialism. Lenin, in turn, struggled to the full to convince both his opponents and proponents that his theory of revolution was a revolutionary theory of very significant character, a theory whose conception of both pre-Revolution and post-Revolution Russia had been stamped by a Marxian logic. Both his early development of a Russian Social -Democracy and late rejection of it attest to how much ambivalent and irresolute he was. Both his focus on the necessity of the democratic state and the need to dismantle such a state (dissolution of Constituent Assembly in 1918 for instance) did prove his "untimely" application of Marx's and Engels's theory of revolution. Stalin, for his part, only transformed party dictatorship into an absolute one-man dictatorship.

The equation Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism is found wanting by its very suggestion that the link between the three categories is 'genetic.' The genetic link has been addressed by such authors as Adam Ulam and John Hoffman. These authors clearly tend to overstate Lenin's belief that he was the true follower of Marx, and that, as a self-proclaimed disciple, he was the 'genetic' heir to the Marxian lineage. The question one should pose here is who proclaimed the link, and whether Marx or Engels had a clear definition of who should be a

true claimant to the lineage. If one bases Lenin's genetic link to Marx on Lenin's very theory, then much doubt should be cast on Lenin's claims. If one bases such a link on the experience of October and its aftermath, one is also obliged to question many of the premises of this claim, since Soviet reality during Lenin's rule did reflect a political practice that was in many ways alien to Marxism. First, Ulam's argument of Marx's genetic anarchism for instance (3) derives from his belief in the causal relationship between Marx and the Marxists. Ulam furnishes this inaccurate thesis by presupposing that Marxism is internally bedeviled by an ideological systemic flaw which pushed Lenin to 'anarchism' during the revolution, and Bolsheviks to 'centralism' and 'inegalitarianism' later. Ulam thinks that anarchism, centralism, and inegalitarianism were characteristic of the Soviet state only because the theory that inspired such a practice was itself based on anarchistic and inegalitarian premises. Ulam's point, it seems to me, does in great part read the relationship between Marxism and Bolshevism through the prisms of the Soviet political reality and not vice versa. By observing the centralist nature of the Soviet state—which was at the origin of inegalitarian practices—Ulam prefers to interpret Marx's link to Lenin not by approaching their similarities and dissimilarities but by taking Lenin's very words and his self-proclaimed Marxism as the true yardstick for measuring the nature of the relationship. This means that in his observation of Soviet reality Ulam looked at Marxian theory more in its 'psychological' reach than in its practical element. For him, there was a Marxian 'psychological mechanism' inspiring Soviet political reality.

Second, the view advanced by Hoffman that 'no theory is as vulnerable as Marxism to the thesis of the historical petard' seems also to be particularly problematic. The "historical petard thesis" presupposes that Marxian theory was *necessarily* conducive to a flawed practice. This theory, which Hoffman champions in his work, intentionally attempts to read Marx's theory through both Soviet practice and collapse. 'For if theory is only to be judged

through practice', Hoffman asserts, 'then a Marxist theory in conflict with Marxist practice is a Marxism which has turned against itself.' (4) Hoffman's problem in this context is to believe *unquestionably* that the Bolshevik state was a 'Marxist practice,' and that the Soviet collapse reflected the crisis of the Marxian ideology. Hoffman makes this conclusion by observing that the 'socialist societies' as 'historical realities' were proved flawed firstly when the 1989 revolutions took place, and secondly through the Soviet collapse itself. (5) The Soviet collapse for him constituted a premise whereupon the "historical petard thesis" can be validated, since the whole Marxist project—from 1917 to 1991—seemed but a system whose practice was in sharp conflict with its emancipatory claims. Hoffman also suggests that a reading of Soviet Marxism on the basis of Marx's very theory of historical materialism is problematic. This is because such a reading cannot salvage Marxian theory from the crisis generated by the practice (Bolshevism) that it had inspired. For Hoffman, holding 'history itself' and not Marxism responsible for the Stalinist dictatorship is but an analytical attempt—by a few Marxists—that overshadows the alternative analysis made by the thesis of the historical petard. In Hoffman's view, Marx's historical materialist method therefore cannot utilise the logic of its own historical analysis in order to criticise the very system it had generated, namely the Soviet state. This means that Marxian theory is in no way capable of advancing a critical assessment, and even a possible refutation, of the very practice emanating from it. For Hoffman, this task should rather go to the thesis of the historical petard, since Marxian theory 'slides over the problematic relationship between theory and practice.' (6)

Hoffman's argument against the defenders of the analytical capacity of Marxian theory (Callinicos, etc.) has, it seems to me, overlooked the strength of the historical materialist method. Hoffman, I argue, has committed such a mistake mainly because he has failed to see that Soviet Russia under Stalinism—being an ideology which intensified rather than terminated the class struggle—was a veritable class society. Such a class society could but

prove that Marx's theory of 'emancipation', as Callinicos confirms (7), was betrayed by the Stalinist regime. In focusing too much on the analytical capacity of the historical petard thesis, Hoffman, I believe, has not realised that Stalinism (and equally Leninism) was a practice that Marxists can approach and define by using Marx's historical materialist method: really existing socialism was a *class* socialism whose "leviathanist" character resided first in the authoritarian state which emerged from the 1917 Revolution, and second in the totalitarian order established by the Stalinist regime.

2/ Leviathanism and *Autholitarianism*:

The defining concept which underlies my thesis in this part is "leviathanism" or "autholitarianism." This concept, however, is not without theoretical basis. It is closely related to two significant concepts having to do with the description of the Soviet system by political scientists, historians, etc. The two concepts in question are "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism". Before discussing what I mean by Leviathanism, I think it is essential here to broach the meaning of these two categories. Being essentially concepts often contrasted with "democracy" and liberalism, "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism" are often taken as categories depicting the political systems which advance the interests of the state at the expense of the governed. In general terms, however, these two concepts are often conflated and hardly addressed as implying different meaning. Even in scholarly debate there has been little attention as to the defining difference between such terms. Some critics argue that authoritarianism and totalitarianism are not totally dissimilar, with the latter being 'an extreme form' of the former. (8) This means that in kind the two concepts do hardly differ, and that it is an overstatement to use them as two completely differing analytical tools. The concept of authoritarianism in particular has been paid very little attention. Even in introductory glossaries to political theory concepts, the word "authoritarianism" is only mentioned in

passing. In his *A Glossary of Political Theory*, John Hoffman provides a sketchy definition of authoritarianism. 'The term authoritarianism,' Hoffman writes, 'captures the uncomfortable link between the "authority" of the state, and erosion of free choice that the state implies.' (9) It means that an authoritarian system is by definition anti-liberal. For Hoffman, this term is problematic mainly because of the paradoxical nature of the term authority itself. Authority means the co-existence of 'consent' and 'constraint.' And it becomes more problematic once approached in relation to the state, mainly because the latter is identified on 'force', and force is necessarily conducive to a problematic relationship between the state and 'individuals' (10) Moreover, authority rests greatly on 'legitimacy' which 'can be based upon an irrational support of an elitist leader...' (11) Adorno et al identify authoritarianism as a purely psychological matter. It reflects a 'personality'—suffering from an 'authoritarian syndrome'—which tends to follow unquestionably the power of 'convention,' 'think in rigid categories,' 'be preoccupied with dominance and submission,' 'believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world,' etc. (12) Therefore, authoritarianism is a political behaviour which has primarily a psychological bearing that makes an individual, and more generally a group, 'predisposed to fascism.' (13)

Basically, I think that an authoritarian system is a political system which uses political power as a means to control society through state legitimacy claims. In such a system the state makes use of its ruling right in the hope of controlling the governed, and often resorts to coercion as a means to achieve an alleged social "stability" and "peace." An authoritarian system often has ideological ends which, in the eyes of the ruling elite, are but in the benefit of society as a whole. During the Russian Civil War, the Bolshevik leadership for instance used the slogan "socialism" as an ideological label meant to emancipate society from both tsarist and bourgeois elements. An authoritarian system, as Daniel Levy once asserted, generally rests on 'rationalization,' 'exclusion,' and 'coercion.' (14) While 'rationalization

denies socio-political demands...,' 'exclusion forces important groups out of the policy-making process,' and 'coercion' aims to 'quash democratic expressions of strength such as elections, demonstrations, protests, and strikes.' (15) In my view, these three categories were characteristic of the state which sprang from the October Revolution. "War Communism," as it were, was to rationalise the economic measures taken against the peasantry as measures meant to introduce socialism to the country. In its entirety the working class was excluded as immature and unconscious of its historical role, and could not actively contribute to 'state administering.' The job was left to the 'professional revolutionaries.' Most of the protests—only to mention the Kronstadt events—were put down by an oppressive state machine led by the Cheka and the Red Army.

The second concept to define in this section is totalitarianism. A classic work that addresses the defining characteristics of totalitarianism is Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. According to Arendt, the totalitarian system rests on its 'demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual member.' (16) As a system of perfect control, totalitarianism, Arendt argues, follows first and foremost from the ability of the political regime to 'exercise a fascination' by which the masses are enthralled, and through which the regime—being essentially propped by 'mass support'—maintains an ultimate control of society. Mass support comes as a natural result of a political "ignorance" most characteristic of the masses who 'form the majority of those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls.' (17) Of course, mass support, Arendt adds, is conditioned by an entire social 'atomization' through the creation of 'new classes and nationalities.' (18) An atomised society is a catalyst for 'a totalitarian government' which in Stalin's time for instance meant first the liquidation of 'the national soviets' and their replacement by 'a firmly centralized party bureaucracy,'(19)

second dekulakisation, and third 'the liquidation' of the party bureaucracy itself (20) and substituting for its role that of Stalin.

The concept of totalitarianism has been a central analytical tool since the late 1930s. It has mainly been associated with the "totalitarian model" whose findings I discuss in Part III of this thesis. Brzezinski's work reflects the definition given by the totalitarian model. (21) The totalitarian regime rests on 'the dynamic need to subordinate society wholly to its power.' (22) I think this does not contradict with Arendt's definition which implies that *total* social control is inherent in the totalitarian regime's or movement's drive for *ultimate* political control. The description of a modern political system as totalitarian does not please some political scientists who think that the use of the term in contexts such as Stalin's Russia is simply erroneous. (23) Although some of the leading scholars as Tucker and Hoffman question the validity of this concept, I think that the "totalitarian model" has provided a valid definition. To build on such a definition, a totalitarian system, I would argue, is a system in which the ruling dictator regulates the relationship between the state and society so that the former totally submits to the power of the latter. In this system civil society is conceived as an inseparable part of the state which uses its governing prerogative to guarantee ultimate control of individuals and their public and private activities. The defining feature of the totalitarian state is that the party and the movement which speak in the name of the people would submit fully to the "whims," personal plans, and ideological convictions of *one* person. Indeed, this specific feature is what distinguishes totalitarianism from authoritarian rule. The totalitarian regime also relies on a "protection/obedience" rhetoric: failure of individuals to obey the rule of the state will definitely disqualify them from state protection, can even lead to their accusation of 'conspiracy,' and ultimately ushers in trials, confessions, and purges. On the other hand, the totalitarian leadership aspires to full bureaucratisation of politics, constantly

advances and champions such slogans as "enemies of the people," and depends greatly on propaganda in order to mobilise the masses.

In what follows I turn to the term I have coined in order to describe the Soviet system in its Leninist-Stalinist version: it is *"Autholitarianism"* (or *Leviathanism*). By autholitarianism, I mean a state system determined by both authoritarian and totalitarian practices. In other words, an autholitarian state, I argue, is a state characterised by an authoritarian use of force, and progresses to a stage of development where such a force comes to concentrate total rule in the hands of one or several persons who act in total disregard for society. For this reason, I believe that the Soviet state had such a leviathanist feature, being the sum result of an authoritarian Leninism and totalitarian Stalinism. My use of such concepts is closely related to the category "leviathan" as is theorised by Thomas Hobbes. Yet, the point I make in this respect is that in his *Leviathan* Thomas Hobbes was by no means bent on theorising a totalitarian state that would subordinate civil society. Hobbes, one dares say, had a formula for state rule anxious to keep social peace and stability. Yet, this formula is found wanting by Hobbes's inability to predict how much a ruler even in the most democratic states might well abuse the power given to him by his people and break the 'covenant' signed with the subjects. This means that there is no guarantee that a ruler elected democratically for instance would not 'atomise' and subordinate society. The authoritarian state which Hobbes champions may easily degenerate into totalitarian rule. By the same token, the proletarian state envisaged by Lenin was easily converted into Stalinism.

In this part, I mainly argue that the Soviet state started as an "authoritarian" system—from the October Revolution to the period of "War Communism"—legitimated by the Marxian theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." It therefore degenerated into a totalitarian state where society was fully 'devoured' by the sword of the Stalinist leviathan. In theory, the logic of a necessary authoritarian Soviet state as Lenin argued, I believe, was quite

justifiable, mainly because it did not contradict with Marx's theory that a workers' state starts primarily on an authoritarian premise which would protect the gains of the revolution once it occurs. In Marxian theory, the dictatorship of the proletariat, being the defining tool of the revolutionary "authoritarian" state, means imposing the will of the proletarian majority over that of the bourgeois minority: this is the ultimate aim which would guarantee the transition from socialism to communism and the classless and stateless society thereafter. As Marx himself argued,

> The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. (24)

As a concept, "authoritarianism" did not itself pose a problem. It was concomitant with the revolution because it was needed. On the other hand, Lenin's concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" did not itself pose such a problem; this is mainly because in his theory of revolution Lenin focuses on the coercive role played by the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry once the revolution occurred; even his confusion between the role of the proletariat and the party can be justified as a necessary tactic aimed at adapting Marxian theory to the Russian context which was predominantly peasant. What was problematic in Lenin's—and equally Bolshevik—strategy was the decision to apply the "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" during the Civil War and through the policy of "War Communism"; why the problem was acute then was because such a dictatorship meant the very impoverishment of the peasants and the justification of this impoverishment by the necessity to pass on to the socialist stage; the new authoritarian state was authoritarian against the very class said to be the heartbeat of that state, namely the peasants. Uprooting the kulaks and the rural aristocracy had to happen by making the poor peasants suffer and sacrifice their

agricultural produce through such practices as requisitioning. The Soviet authoritarian state was then not problematic in itself but in the way it contrived its practice.

On the other hand, I believe that the birth of the Soviet authoritarian state during Lenin's rule was at the origin of the Stalin "totalitarian state." As Ronald J. Hill put it, the Soviet system 'was genetically deformed at birth' and 'evolved...into a brutal dictatorship under Stalin...' (25) This does not necessarily mean that Lenin intended to create a state that would devour civil society; Lenin, it can be said, was chained by unfavourable circumstances and his own particular theory of revolution—primacy of the party, etc. The birth of "totalitarianism" in Soviet Russia had to do with a reversed application of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" during the Civil War; it had to do with an excessive use of force against the toiling peasants and workers. Stalin's totalitarian rule had to do with the adoption of a policy similar in kind to—but different in degree from—"War Communism." It was the First Five-Year Plan whereby large-scale collectivisation was made. The cultural revolution (dekulakisation, etc.) (26) which coincided with the drive for collectivistation and industrialisation was also a defining feature of the totalitarian state. Moreover, the great Purges of the late 1930s did consummate the job of the all too devouring Soviet leviathan. In my view, the two specific features--authoritarianism and totalitarianism--charcterising the Soviet state constituted an *autholitarianism* or "leviathanism" whose defining feature constituted both authoritarian and totalitarian traits. By arguing so, I mainly try to convey that the Soviet leviathan state is based on a practice which can be approached by grappling with Hobbes's 'leviathan' theory. Hobbes's theory is based on the argument that an authoritarian state ruled by the 'sovereign' had the prerogative to reconcile individuals' interests and keep order and peace even by 'coercive' means. To me, Hobbes's authoritarian 'sovereign' is prone to become 'totalitarian' once he is obliged by circumstances or personal "whim" to use power beyond what the 'covenant' with his subjects allows. State 'coercion' is rather a loose concept

fraught with differing interpretations, and can be used in legitimating power abuse in the name of a necessary authoritarian order; this is how Stalin, for instance, moulded that concept and abused power in the name of socialism.

3/ The Ideological Basis for Autholitarianism:

Apart from the suggestion by the "totalitarian model" that Soviet society was ruthlessly bound by a politics of ideological obligation inculcated by the regimes in question, the drive for the totalitarian system in Soviet Russia was, I would argue, inherent in the very nature of socialist rule theorised at first by Lenin. Here however, the question of the degree of tyrannical rule by the Bolshevik party is only relatively important when addressed in a wider framework encompassing the real basis of Soviet-type totalitarian rule. Here, moreover the debate over the liability of the Soviet state to become tyrannical due to certain circumstances should not overshadow the real scholarly concern of both political scientists and historians. In general terms what happened in the pre-revolutionary, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary phases of Russia should, I firmly think, be universally approached in relation to a general theory that must be capable of telling why such phenomena in history as totalitarianism should happen to exist in the first place. This would require more than studying the immediate context of Soviet and extra-Soviet politics and society. It is basically a purely theoretical problem that within a comprehensive framework scholars must approach, and draw conclusions from.

The question of why authoritarianism is prone to degenerate into totalitarian rule can be answered both by drawing conclusions from state experiences like that of Soviet Russia, and supposing *a priori* that in practical terms *every authoritarian theory for state rule must finally result in a totalitarian system in practice*. Although this supposition seems to be an over-generalisation of theory and practice in relation to the comparison between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, the reality of every rule based on authoritarian ideas does

not betray or belie the supposition in question. Consider for instance most of the countries governed by Islam as a political ideology. Consider also the Western right-wing nationalist parties such as France's liberal conservative Front National. The subject of our discussion here is in no way the degree of the political and historical validity of Marx's "authoritarian" dictatorship of the proletariat, since in Marx's and Engels's logic such a dictatorship was meant to stand as a *transition* to a more developed stage. For Marx and Engels, such an authoritarianism would in the first place guarantee the "smooth" (albeit sometimes with violent means) transition from capitalism to socialism and from socialism to communism. Whether Marxian theory in this respect is fully applicable to all contexts, and whether such a theory necessarily leads to the withering away of the state and social justice is not my concern in this part. My main concern here is whether Lenin's authoritarianism—bred over by his overall theory as first came with *WBD?,* and later crystallised into the October Revolution, and War Communism—constituted the basis for the Stalinist totalitarian state which started in 1929 with the First-Five Year Plan. My response to this problem posed here is that I totally disagree with the host of scholars—represented for example by Pipes's postulate—who believe that Lenin himself was a totalitarian statesman who bequeathed his totalitarianism to Stalin. Yet, I agree with the side of the "totalitarian model" which advances the thesis that Lenin's authoritarianism was inescapably convertible into totalitarian rule. The question why the latter argument was accurate can be answered by observing Lenin's very theory of the party, his contempt for the masses and his clear-cut elitist understanding of the revolution.

II. Hobbes's Totalitarianism:

1/ Joseph Vialatoux's Thesis and the Critics:

One of the most pertinent theories in relation to Soviet state rule, I would argue, is Joseph Vialatoux's. As early as 1952 Vialatoux successfully identified Soviet Marxism to be based on a genuinely Hobbesean statism based on a "totalitarian" worldview. (27) Vilalatoux's idea, it seems to me, is important in the sense that it was the first to approach the link between Hobbes's politico-philosophical theory of the state and an ideological practice which seems to have been 'the concrete' form of that theory. His main argument is that the Soviet state had an inherent Hobbesean component, that is, a state practice injected by a 'totalitarian' theory of the state. Vialatoux's argument about the relationship between Hobbes and Soviet totalitarianism is significant in the sense that it does not draw a direct link between them, but rather confirms that such a relation is between 'abstract' theorisation and 'concrete political history':

> Hobbes is not the ancestor of the concrete totalitarian states. He is rather something quite different; he is the abstract *theoretician* (Vialatoux's italics) of statist totalitarianism and, undoubtedly, the purest and most logical theoretician one can encounter...(28)

Explicit in Vialatoux's assertion here is the suggestion that while Hobbes should not be regarded as the forefather of modern totalitarian states, he is the "unconscious" apologist for totalitarianism. (29) Vialatoux distinguishes between two kinds of totalitarianism; an indirect abstract one versus a direct concrete other. But the question is: how does Hobbesean theory relate to totalitarian practice? Does the 'unconscious apologist' influence totalitarian states indirectly? What is the point of intersection between Hobbes's theory of totalitarianism and a totalitarian practice whose theoretical background is not supposed to be Hobbesean? More importantly, how can one *rationalize* the link between Hobbes's formula for a *forced*

leviathan state and the Lenin-Stalin formulae for a *forced* workers' state? The other important question is: if we believe there is a link of some sort, will one read Soviet totalitarianism through Hobbes's leviathan theory or vice versa? (30) Vialatoux anticipates this question by writing that it is the concrete political history of the totalitarian state which urges an 'attention' to be paid to the existence of abstract totalitarianism in the history of ideas. (31)

Vialatoux rationalises the link between Hobbes's leviathan theory and Soviet state practice by asserting that the theoretical premise for the leviathan state is closely akin to the Soviet state:

> What Hobbes values most is the fact that the authentic totalitarian statism is a naturalism, that the authentic naturalism is a materialism, and that the authentic materialism is a pure mechanism...Scientific socialism [on the other hand]...is actuated by a mystical prophetism and by a mythology in whose absence, undoubtedly, nothing of the communist movement will ever be left. (32)

Complex as it stands this assertion by Vialatoux highlights two significant aspects in the link between Hobbes's state theory and socialist theory. The Hobbesean formula of state is based on the supposition that the leviathan state should be premised on a "natural" rather than "artificial" social contract, and that such a natural birth of the state is a concretely perceivable 'biological' reality. The logic of scientific socialism, on the other hand, approximates to Hobbes's formula: the Soviet state is the state of 'a new man historically' produced by 'a new mode of production', and the state which necessarily responds to a 'historical and dialectical materialism.' (33) Moreover, according to Vialatoux, what confirms rather than refutes the close link between both systems—Hobbes's 'city' and Soviet state—is the fact that the difference between Hobbes's 'individualist' theory and socialist communtarianism does not amount to a conflict. Although the one premises its worldview on the transformation of the individual into the 'inter-individual' and the other on the social individual, they both argue, in

principle, against 'spiritual man' and 'the philosophy of the spirit.' Therefore, both Hobbes and the Soviet state agree that man *must* be 'depersonalised' and 'absorbed into the state.' (34) Following from this logic, Hobbes's 'merit', Vialatoux firmly puts it, is to have formed a solid basis for 'the logic of totalitarianism.' (35)

Joseph Vialatoux argues that Hobbesean state power is premissed on an economic as well as political prerogative. First, sovereign power ('one man or assembly of men') is the '"sword of justice"', that is, the ability to punish.' In Vialatoux's view, giving the 'sword' to one person means giving him 'all the power of the City' (the nation). The sword in turn will be 'the sword of war.' On the other hand, and by implication, such very sword will dictate how every secondary power is distributed—'the power to judge...to nominate officers, ministers.' (36) By virtue of this power, the sovereign, Vialatoux suggests, will only have 'the right to everything.' (37) By definition, Vialatoux asserts, Hobbes's sovereign is permissible to act 'above every civil law' mainly because the social contract signed with individuals 'emanates' from the sovereign himself (38) Following Hobbes's theory, 'absolute power' is an essential characteristic of every ruling sovereign, since the civil laws—which are but a reflection of the natural laws—might well be used by the state uncontrollably. As a matter of fact, Vialatoux concludes, Hobbes's state theory makes 'every political regime absolutist'; moreover 'government form does not change the essential nature of the state, which at origin is absolutist.' (39) Second, sovereign power has got an economic dimension. Vialatoux argues that Hobbes 'offers the State the total command of national economic life.' The most defining feature of such a command is that economic life is guided by 'absolute statism within the City' In modern time, Vialatoux adds, there are examples of this command like that of 'state socialism or national socialism.' (40) In absolutist economies the 'pact' between the sovereign and the ruled stipulates that in order to preserve their economic interests individuals have to depend on the will of the leading state which is the only body capable of generating 'economic

phenomena like production, exchange...' (41) For Vialatoux this was the basis for justifying totalitarian rule in Soviet Russia.

One of the few critical responses that Vialatoux's book has ever received is from the distinguished thinker, Carl Schmitt, author of *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (1996). Schmitt rejects any link between Hobbes and Bolshevism. He strongly disapproved of Joseph Vialatoux's assertion in *La Cite de Hobbes* that Soviet Russia—and other totalitarian systems like fascism—followed from the state paradigm designed by Thomas Hobbes. (42) Schmitt took pains to defend Hobbes' leviathan as a harmless and vital formula for social peace and stability. Hobbes 'used the image [of leviathan], Schmitt contends, 'without horror and without reverence.' (43) Schmitt also explains that the very basis whereupon one should place a leviathan state is the "moral obligation" of man to a guardian political power.

> If protection ceases, every obligation to obey also ceases, and the individual once more regains his natural freedom [state of nature]. The "relation between protection and obedience" is the cardinal point of Hobbes's construction of the state. All one-sided conceptions of totality [like the one appropriated by Vialatoux] are incompatible with this construct. (44)

Although Schmitt successfully identifies the necessary link between a protective leviathan state and obedient individuals, he seems to be wandering off the real concern highlighted by Vialatoux. He offers rather simplistic answers to Hobbes' political-philosophical conjectures; he reduces the state theory advanced by Hobbes to a simple give-and-take recipe, you protect me and I will obey you blindly. Probably, Schmitt's arguments against Vialatoux were injected by the very state-centrism he advocated in his political work. George Schwab points out a significant motive behind Schmitt's monolithic views. Schmitt, Schwab argues, was pushed by his belief in the consolidation of a strong state that would promote and protect the

values of liberal democracy. (45) Schmitt went as far as to launch an open attack on the political parties that 'opposed' an omnipotent state. (46) For this reason, I think, that Schmitt's understanding of Hobbes remained fettered by the narrow political context in Germany. Helmut Schelsky, for example, debunked Schmitt's opaque picture of state rule by identifying his relationship to the German state. He was an authorised 'traditional bourgeois liberal' (47) who spoke in favour of 'a strong state in order to protect life and property.' (48) Schmitt dismissed Vialatoux's major points on Hobbes because he was thinking and, by the same token, acting according to a ready-made state-centric logic that had something to do with the Nazi state itself. Conspicuously, and truly George Schwab, in his introduction to Schmitt's book reminds the reader that Schmitt's political mind, although was not of direct influence on Hitler's Germany, partly identified with Hobbes' rigid state theory:

> What remains of Schmitt's state theory is...authoritarian in form and content, a theory that he developed before Hitler's conquest of power. At the helm of the power apparatus of Schmitt's state stood a sovereign. With the help pf the other pillars of the state, the army and the bureaucracy, the sovereign was responsible for ensuring domestic order and tranquillity so that citizens could live their lives free from fear of physical harm. (49)

Actually this picture described by Schwab is an irrefutable reminder of Bolshevik political organisation that is traceable to Bolsheviks' break with Social-Democracy before the October Revolution. It is the same picture that was characteristic of Leninism itself. But probably the sole difference between Leninist state theory and that of Schmitt, for instance, is that while the latter was directly influenced by Hobbes's statism, the former—believing himself to be employing Marxian scientific socialism—was only "unconsciously" opting for a Hobbesean authoritarian state theory. It should be noted in this respect that on paper Bolsheviks in

general and Lenin in particular took pains to repudiate state-centrism, and held the belief that what they were introducing to Russia was revolutionary socialism.

Analysing the undeniable benefit of a leviathan state set up by a 'Commonwealth' rule Hannah Arendt shows also the danger of overestimating the role of political power in organising the relationship between state and society. Hobbes's picture of an emancipated liberal man—who is permissible to prosper thanks to the spirit of "honest" competition with other men—can in the last analysis make society relapse in the natural condition against which Hobbes's state theory itself was forged. (50) The main problem, Arendt thinks, is that the age of the bourgeoisie constitutes an unabashed challenge to Hobbes's concept of power. In theorising a morally sanctioned premise for material competition between individuals, bourgeois society is solely defended by the law emanating from the all too omnipotent state which in turn legitimises poverty in the sense that the spirit of competition has got its own natural selection whereby the prosperous have proved useful, and the poor useless. (51) This according to Arendt what would throw Hobbes's state theory in a quandary:

> Hobbes's Commonwealth is a vacillating structure and must always provide itself with new props from the outside; otherwise it would collapse overnight into the aimless, senseless chaos of the private interests from which it sprang. Hobbes embodies the necessity of power accumulation in the theory of the state of nature, the "condition of "perpetual war" of all against all...This ever-present war guarantees the Common-wealth a prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to increase its power... (52)

What Arendt asserts here is that the state in Hobbes's thinking cannot maintain its control of individuals if it fails to accommodate a legitimate continuity for its rule; the thrust of protection that the leviathan is capable of asserting can only work in the presence of other

"hostile" states threatening the stability of the state in question, and the presence of continual threat of individuals to one another, which requires anticipation by the state. So for a Commonwealth to perpetuate its condition of 'power accumulation' it has to sort out the problems which emanate from allowing a chance for bourgeois society to produce paupers, criminals, prostitutes, etc. Here Hobbes's problem is mainly theoretical as he challenges the Commonwealth with the same weapon said to have been efficient in controlling the 'war of every one against everyone': he allows individuals to resume their private interests if the Commonwealth fails in guaranteeing their prosperity and security.

2/ Implications of Hobbes's Formula for Peace:

Hobbes forges his state theory by offering a strong prerogative to state power. This goes with his belief that individuals *must* do away with the innate physical and behavioural constraints that prevent them from attaining peace and security. The need for both political and civil stability necessitates tight control on individuals' 'natural condition' deriving from individuals' self-generated push for self-protection. Hobbes's starting point in theorising an intact model of society is couched in his *concern* about an innocuous human condition conducive to safety and stability. The means for achieving such a society would be comprehensible and workable only if his hypothesis gets assimilated and put at work. That means Hobbes's solutions that follow from his analysis of the human condition in its natural status cannot be realised unless his method is deciphered.

Hobbes starts his *Leviathan* by supposing that humans are "endowed" with certain exceptional physical and "psychological" traits that mark them off as fundamentally different from other species. 'Men' are "united" by their faculties of 'Sense' (53), 'Imagination' (54), 'Speech' (55), 'Reason' (56), and 'Passions' (57) He proceeds in asserting that 'men' are characterised by a 'Naturall Power', which resides in 'the eminence of the Faculties of Body,

or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility.' (58) These 'faculties', Hobbes contends, might well turn out to be counter-productive. Natural physical and "psychological" equality between humans is the basis for the emergence of tension and conflict. Hobbes calls this the 'Naturall Condition of Mankind.' (59) In such a condition, individuals are equal in kind but different in degree: '...there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another...' (60) The difference in degree is the focal point from which Hobbes starts investigating the emergence of tension between individuals. It is at this very point where 'men' become divided into strong and weak, wicked and innocent, and good and evil. However, Hobbes argues that there are no definite grounds whereupon a final decision—of who will remain constantly strong or weak—can be determined. Strength and weakness, and good and evil depend greatly on the differing strategies that individuals often opt for: 'For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.' (61)

However, here rises as unequivocal Hobbes's belief that equality between human beings is a unifying characteristic. And the paradox in this context amounts to an equation: men are equal because they share the same traits; by the same token, they are unequal because of differences in their strength and intelligence; however, in the final analysis, they should be considered equal since the weak might outsmart the strong by means of 'machination' or 'confederacy.' Simply, the equation is: equal = unequal = equal. Accordingly, assimilation of this equation makes 'every man' think that 'he' can achieve the same objectives desired by others. Hence the rise to the conflict of interests. The conflict of interests ushers in 'envy', 'competition', and eventually wars:

> From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End...endeavour to destroy, or subdue on an other. (62)

Thus equality in 'body and mind' evokes the drive for "anarchy", that is, the uncontrollable situation where individuals' passions and competition will lead to the 'war of everyone against everyone' (63) Self-protection of individuals becomes the sole imperative requirement which cannot be fulfilled in a condition of peace. Hobbes argues that, following this requirement of self-protection, '...there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great to endanger him...' (64) It follows from this that the process resulting from the 'natural condition' of men develops into an incessant war of destruction. Theoretically, the natural condition means the following: equality begets threat, threat begets anticipation, and anticipation begets anarchy. Every single stage induces further insecurity. Anticipation of threat, as a legitimate response, may itself, in specific circumstances, amount to an unrivalled threat. In such a case anticipation becomes wittingly strategic, just a pretext for invasion and 'conquest.' It can stand as threat 'because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires.' (65) So, according to Hobbes, man's aspiration to get security and self-protection might constitute a further step towards insecurity. This occurs because the push for self-protection by pre-emption *blinds* men to how far they should advance their demands for security: 'It follows, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to everything; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man...' (66)

Proceeding from this logic, Hobbes engages in theorising a political formula for individuals' security and peace. He starts from the civil status of individuals themselves, only to come up with a theory of state premised mainly on an envisaged form of consensus. His recipe for a human "government" incorporates two conditions: First, individuals *must* form a protective body based on their will to protection. Second, the only channel to protection is obligation to the 'Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy...).' (67) Therefore, individuals' 'will' cannot be consolidated without abiding by the rules of the natural laws. It means that, in the process of peace making, individuals are obliged through their wills to obey the values offered by nature. Moreover, the necessity to obey the natural laws emerges as a response to individuals' will to self-protection. As Sommerville puts it: 'so we can have no adequate motive for obeying natural law if it does not in fact promote our preservation.' (68) In thinking so, Hobbes advances a "positive" give-and-take formula where the need for self-protection stresses obedience to use-values of the natural laws.

Basically, it is the formula of protection/obedience which underlies Hobbes's recipe for peace and security, and it is such a formula, I would argue, which renders the Hobbesean worldview problematic, mainly because of the binding "contract" which he suggests. It is in response to such a formula that Hobbes's leviathan state emerges. In my view, Hobbes's theorisation of a leviathan state is at the origin of the statism he advances in such works as *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. The need for investigating state systems that follow from Hobbes's theory can only be satisfied through a sketch of his statist theory itself. As my task in this part is restricted to demonstrating to which extent Hobbes's leviathan can influence such absolutist state systems as Stalinism, I will be little concerned about Hobbes's interest in religious concepts, and about his employment of religion as basis for his overall theory. In this context, my engagement in the debate about Hobbes's theory focuses mainly on what is "purely"

political in his work. The ultimate concern, however, is to try to approach Soviet totalitarianism through the authoritarian basis provided by the Hobbesean theory of the state.

Hobbes' state theory is first and foremost premised on the prerogative of the 'laws of nature.' The natural condition of 'man', being confined to desire and war, does invoke necessity of a political solution of some sort, a solution primarily meant to terminate the aggressive tendency of 'our naturall Passions that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like.' (69) To this end, the laws of nature constitute a medium for pre-empting destruction therein. They stand as values, which determine the use-value of peaceful co-existence, but also stand as values that make individuals obey a specific political power. In *De Cive*, Hobbes contends that 'the law of nature always and everywhere obliges.' (70) In this context, it is very important to add that the laws of nature do not contain a necessarily forcible formula. They are only morally binding. 'The laws of nature', as David Gauthier asserts, 'are not themselves obligatory.' (71) They become so only when individuals' will-to-protection calls for a protective political power. Paradoxically, however, Hobbes implies that the natural laws are "obligatory" by other means: He suggests that individuals in their natural condition are determined to destroy one another, and that they *are* definitely always anxious to buttress their security somehow. In the final analysis, they oblige themselves by themselves in the hope of insuring self-preservation.

It follows that the great demand for establishing peace through obedience to the natural laws necessitates a greater effort on the part of 'contracting' individuals. Once they show willingness to obey, they have to search for a political framework to communicate their willingness. It rises as necessity to transfer their will from mere theoretical and verbal grounds unto a much more comprehensive institutional framework. The framework would be a consistent form of institutionalised state power that individuals themselves *choose* as a protective body. It comes in the shape of a 'Covenant', that is, a social contract capable of

preserving citizens' self-interests. M Goldsmith argues that in Hobbes's sense 'a covenant or pact does include a promise, the promise to perform, but it also includes a transfer of the right to that performance...' (72) Accordingly, 'the right to performance' implies that the covenant represents much more than an agreement or an accord. It is a formula for co-existence. It resides in individuals' choice to and drive for investing their hopes and aspiration in 'a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.' (73) For Hobbes, on the other hand, the 'Common Power' aims at liberating 'men' from their inborn enmity. It is the 'finall Cause, End, or Designe of men...in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves...is the foresight of their own preservation...of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre...' (74) Following this logic, individuals would acquire a new condition of peace predicated on a *political* consciousness. They would cease being a group of individuals chiefly moved by their destructive 'passions', and disunited by enmity and war. By virtue of their consciousness, they, as Goldsmith comments, would 'incorporate themselves into a political society.' (75)

Therefore, individuals might well consign their will to the power of a ruler, that is, to 'one Man' (Monarchy) or an 'Assembly of Men' (democracy). They *must* 'reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will...' (76) Hobbes calls the Common Power a 'Commonwealth.' (77) In this sense, the social contract in the Hobbesean sense derives from the need for constructing a necessary covenant that implements individuals' political obligation to state rule. The power transferred to a Commonwealth through a covenant is sanctioned by virtue of individuals' agreement to *force* peace in all sorts of ways. If they should infringe the 'Sovereign's' laws—which emanate from the laws of nature—individuals would be kept at bay by the same state prerogative that they have allowed in the first place: 'And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words...' (78) But covenants must also be

answerable to individuals in relation to their guardian. Both are partners and both are '*contractarians*.' Rulers are also obliged to preserve the bonds constituting the contract. (79)

Hobbes' commonwealth*ism* is based on his veneration of what he calls a 'LEVIATHAN...that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence...' (80) Therefore, in *Leviathan* Hobbes contends that individuals' natural tendency towards war must be subjugated to a sovereign who employs his authority to enforce the law. Law making and law enforcement are essentially the responsibility of the sovereign who thanks to his acquired political power is capable of reinforcing all possible formulae of peace and security in civil society. Leviathan rule, as, firstly, a socially sanctioned political practice, and as, secondly, a "safe" road to an overall state rule, will not stand intact if the chosen ruler fails to maintain and continue the power granted to him. This means that the contract made between individuals and ruler does not come at work in healthy shape unless it is capitalised by the ruler, and made an irreversible priority. In this context, Hobbes's political-philosophical formula has to do with his conception of state "authorisation", which constitutes, according to him, a departure from the state of anarchy to the state of "organised" rule. Authorisation dictates the need for citizens to obey the "rational" rule of the state. In *De Cive* Hobbes asserts that the need for people's security justifies the painful means used to achieve such a security. (81) Individuals should authorise a powerful ruler to act on their behalf and guarantee their protection. The ruler therefore guarantees that his subjects would 'live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.' (82)

The issue of "authorisation" is a significant concept which is directly connected to my approach to the influence of Hobbes's leviathan formula on Soviet Bolshevik rule. Hobbes's leviathan idea stands as a source for rule by coercion, as the ruler may abuse the political power he is authorised. But Hobbes's thrust in consolidating an omnipotent leviathan state is always legitimated by his seemingly logical argument against man's ruthless natural

condition. Thus, a leviathan is a ruler "rationally" permissible to anticipate individuals' natural condition by means of universal consensus that stands in entire harmony with the rule of law. The new condition of humankind would in the final analysis produce two political categories, namely the 'subject' and the 'Sovereign': the '...SOVERAIGNE, and said to have *Soveraigne Power*; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.' (83) On the other hand, the degree of a sovereign's success is essentially measured by how much politicised the relation between sovereign and subject is. A sovereign's rule can only work in the presence of political authority over subjects. And the covenant, or contract, is self-sustained only when it assumes such a political shape, that is, when the sovereign is authorised to guide the subjects. Hobbes calls the politicised relationship a 'Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution...' (84)

In Hobbes's political philosophy the issues of 'authorisation', political power, and political obligation are the condition of possibility of social stability and continual peace. However, Hobbes's state theory which follows from such issues is not infallible. In practice, it stands in sharp conflict with freedom and democracy. It might well be used as a pretext to justify a state-centric system of some sort. Hobbes's state theory is plagued by its own over-ambitious premises. Probably, the weakest link in this theory arises basically from the identity that he assigns to state power. The state in his conception is contingent on how far the ruler as leviathan pushes for the use of coercive means to uphold the law. And, probably, the only difference between human natural condition and the new condition theorised by Hobbes resides in the transition from individual/individual violence to state/individual violence. Under the new condition violence becomes an institutionalised form of rule, and is transformed into rationalised tyranny. In this respect, Hobbesean theory advances a statism that forms the basis for the appearance of state-centric theories and practices. David Gauthier

pinpoints the weak and, often, self-deceiving grounds of the leviathan state theory. It is a state greatly hoist with its own petard.

> In basing his later political theory on authorization, Hobbes provides himself with a serious problem in explaining the basis of the sovereign right to inflict punishment on the subjects. Hobbes begins by failing to notice the problem—by supposing that, in owning all the actions of the sovereign, the subjects therefore own the acts whereby they are punished. (85)

Gauthier here demonstrates how the theoretical standpoint of Hobbes is self-contradictory. It means that the "dialectical" logic advocated by Hobbes in his *Leviathan*, or even in *De Cive*, fails to maintain the legitimising arguments of political obligation and power. Hobbes's theoretical problem has to do with the inability to resolve such a self-contradiction. Gauthier's contention here is that 'no man can be supposed to authorize another to punish him, or kill him.' (86) What is more, authorisation constitutes a premise that might well usher in a totalitarian monster rather than an egalitarian system.

Gauthier criticises another Hobbesean argument. He argues that while individuals' obedience to the sovereign is justified (and obligatory) through his supposed protection of them, it poses a serious problem when the sovereign calls for "blind" obedience without a justified cause for obligation. (87) This rises mostly when the sovereign engages in acts violating the bonds of the covenant, like serving his private interests, or waging unjustified wars on foreign nations. Simply, this means that obligation to the sovereign can be counter-productive. The sovereign can use his institutionalised political power and his prerogatives to abuse the very cause for which he is elected. Accordingly, political power might amount to acts of oppression often justified in the name of protection. Thus when protection induces blind obedience, it remains totally enmeshed within self-legitimation; it might well speak in

the name of protection and peace, but might also usher in an immutable departure from these values. As Gauthier argues,

> [t]he Hobbesian sovereign is in the position of the Bonapartist Emperor or Nazi Fuhrer. All Hobbesian governments are, in effect, plebiscitary democracies...We can reasonably suppose that the up-to-date Hobbesian sovereign would not rest his position on an assumed act of authorization, but would demand, and of course receive, repeated plebiscitary endorsements of his right to rule. If the sovereign is iniquitous, God may punish him, but the subjects can complain of no justice. (88)

To this end, one is often reminded of the outcome following from Hobbes' theory of leviathan rule. Undoubtedly, it does not provide a convincing social justice recipe. It fails to reconcile individuals' aspirations to security and the means appropriated by the sovereign to realise the envisaged goals.

In this respect, Hobbes's theoretical premise contradicts sharply with John Locke's for instance. John Locke's theory is in great part against the authoritarian dimension of the state as theorised by Hobbes. Locke does posit his state theory more on conciliatory socio-political solutions than on deterministic assumptions. He contends that, generally, the 'state of nature is not...essentially a state of war. (89) Moreover, he thinks that the right of the sovereign in ruling over his subjects becomes self-negating when political power is transformed into an "ideological" tool for repression. In his *Second Treatise of Government*, Locke rebuts any practice stemming from an absolutist justification of state power:

> ...[S]o tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any has in his hands, not for the good of those who under it, but his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however entitled, makes not the law but his will to rule,

> and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion. (90)

Locke's work here contradicts sharply with that of Hobbes. Locke's state theory reveals for us the destructive outcome of a theory like Hobbes's; Locke basically discloses the abuse of political power when power is established as an end in itself, as a configuration of tyrannical rule.

3/ "Leviathan" as basis for Soviet State Repression:

Hobbes' concept of leviathan, an all too invincible political power, or a Commonwealth, derives from his conclusion that 'men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity...and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre...' (91) 'Leviathan' is therefore, 'that Mortall God to which wee owe...our peace and defence...he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all...'(92) For Hobbes, this thrust legitimises rule by domination. State power over individuals, being inherent in the 'Mortall God', is justified by Hobbes's claim that individuals are plagued by a deadly conflict of interests: 'And...if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End...endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.'(93) The primary task of the "leviathan" state lies in its prerogative to act by all possible means, whether peacefully or *by force*, to uphold the law, and individuals as subjects in *forced* agreement are not permissible to encroach on any of the bonds constituting their contract. If they should do so, they *must* sustain punishment and repression. (94) Here, state repression stands in favour of individuals themselves; they must defer to a

stronger "guardian" in order to gurantee their integrity in civil society. The need for a power to protect individuals from one another rises as a necessity not an option. Hobbes's protection formula rises principally as an attempt to make man sacrifice his destructive desires and adopt a peace formula through a 'commonwealth', that is, an all too powerful ruler or "sovereign". The ultimate aim of this formula is the alleged emancipation of *the individual from his inborn enmity,* mainly because his humanity stands both as a physical and moral obstacle to a conscious self-criticism. Following this line of argument, Hobbes tends to premise his theoretical contention on man's 'state of nature.' (95)

In this part I argue that the logic of Hobbesean state theory might well be appropriated by any state-centric system justifying a political repression of some sort, be it authoritarian or other. Hobbes's state theory is a solid political-philosophical basis for the construction of a totalitarian state. What is dangerous about a state system following from the concept of leviathan is the tacit, or, more clearly, the *unconscious* adoption of a repression formula that such a system is anxious to reject. The practice that follows from a Hobbesean *repression theory*, so to speak, would in the last analysis constitute an irreversible departure from all theoretical premises that speak in the name of freedom and democracy. In this respect, the task of this part is to demonstrate how the Russian Revolution ushered in this very formula, how such Bolsheviks as Lenin and Stalin were only moving far away from Marx's teaching. (96) Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to prove how Lenin and, particularly, Stalin, were trapped by the very ideological logic against which they worked, adopting a state theory Hobbesean in character while speaking in the name of emancipatory Marxism.

III/ Soviet Autholitarianism:

1/ The Face of October: the use and abuse of Marx:

In Marx's argument, the end of class rule would amount to the end of all forms of state. (97) This seems also to be the argument of post-revolution Russians. After October, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party invoked Marxian theory into legitimising their political practice. The October Revolution was supposed to serve the working classes and transfer political power to their hands. Commenting on the promising Soviet state, Bukharin wrote in *The ABC of Communism* (1969): 'Soviet power is the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, organized in its Soviets as the ruling class, and, with the aid of the peasants, crushing the resistance of the Bourgeoisie and the Landlords.' (98) Before addressing the leviathan element in both Lenin and Stalin, I start in this section with some reflections on the October Revolution. My analysis in this context is theoretical. In the following I seek to approach the essence, form, aims, implications, and practice of October.

1.1- The Essence:

By "essence" I mean the nature and characteristics of the Revolution. Here I begin with highlighting the physical charcteristics of such a revolution: what it was and what circumstances made of it a revolution. It should be noted that the 1917 Russian Revolution was not primarily against tsarist Russia as was against the February Revolution which had established a democratic government based on the alliance of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet— 'dual power.' (99) It was also a revolution against both the democratic form of government (established by the Provisional Government) and the vestiges of the tsarist autocracy which had survived in part after the first months of the Revolution. But was it a working class revolution? Russian society in 1917 was still predominantly peasant. (100) And most Russian population was poor, uneducated, and unconscious of its role as an agent of

social and economic change. Political circumstances themselves did not allow much change. There was no proletariat in the Marxian sense of the word. Russian society was not fully industrial and the economic mode of production was not capitalist. The dilemma facing the Bolsheviks, and which the Mensheviks were aware of, was how to carry out the revolution while both economic organisation and class structure in society were far from being ideal for a radical change modeled on Marx's theory of revolution.

Lenin could surmount the dilemma by adjusting Marx's original theory and adapting it to the Russian context. His theoretical argument was to reduce Marx's concept of dictatorship of the proletariat to "Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the *Poorest* Peasantry" (April Theses). By allowing such a structural change Lenin ultimately reduced role of the proletariat to almost no role. As class, the industrial proletariat was no longer the most important agent for change. It follows from this that Lenin's theoretical legitimacy was based on two arguments. First, he believed that the proletariat was not a majority and that a proletarian revolution *per se* was unthinkable. Second, he argued that even if the proletariat had been a majority, it could not be assigned a revolutionary role without being supported by the 'professional revolutionaries'. The revolutionaries were, of course, the political leadership constituted by the Bolsheviks. But in the last analysis the Bolsheviks stepped out of the dilemma by replacing the revolutionary role of the proletariat by their role. The practical quandary of the Bolsheviks was caused by the uncertainty of the success of the revolution; this was later proved by the threat following from the Civil War. It is for such reasons that the Bolshevik Revolution could not have a "pure" proletarian element.

1.2- The Form:

This concept is to show us how proletarian and peasant support for the Revolution did not necessarily make it a proletarian revolution. The form of October was an elitism that had

begun long before 1917: its context can be traced back to the historical divorce between Bolshevism and Social-Democracy. But how was October an elitist revolution? The Revolution did usher in a single-party state where the political leadership controlled every sphere of social life. It was a working class revolution but not in the benefit of working men. Bolshevik theoreticians such as Bukharin believed that if given leadership to carry out the revolution, the proletariat would drown the whole process long before the Revolution starts to gain any success. Opposing the time and context of October, Rosa Luxemburg criticised Lenin for the wrong steps which led to 'the absence of democratic liberties'(101) Thus the form of the Revolution was determined by the Bolshevik "circumstances argument" (as argued by John Hoffman). The circumstances argument was based on the assumption that the Russian revolution was inevitable, but inevitable in a way 'different' from Marx's main theory that the whole process is far more complex than a mere decision to carry out an elitist revolution in the name of the proletariat. Inevitability of the revolution is primarily wrought by the extent to which man has arrived at a stage allowing a revolutionary change. For Marx, it is the "materialist conception of history" which underlies man's capacity and readiness to make a revolution; revolution is far from a *forced* action on the part of the working class; revolution is rather history's self-conscious occurrence through the active will of men dictated by reality at a juncture where such men have realised how much the 'productive forces' and human 'social intercourse' are crucial for the coming revolution:

> [The materialist conception of history shows] that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history...that history does not end by being resolved into 'self-consciousness' as 'spirit of the spirit,' but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another...a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions...It shows that circumstances make men as much as men make circumstances. This sum of productive forces, capital funds, and social forms of intercourse... is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as 'substance' and 'essence of man'...These conditions of life, which

different generations find in existence, decide also whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary convulsion will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire existing system. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present (namely , on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of society up till then, but against the very 'production of life' till then, the 'total activity' on which it was based), then, as far as practical development is concerned, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves. (102)

1.3- The Aim:

The alleged aim of October was to put an end to tyrannical rule and make political power serve the interests of the working classes. Therefore, the political revolution already achieved would be only a means for contriving an overall socialist revolution whereby all class rule is abolished. It was Bukharin again who defined the aim of the coming revolution. The aim depends on the kind of state the Bolsheviks aspired to. The state can either be ' a parasitic apparatus' or 'productive apparatus'. (103) While the first state category is basically bourgeois, the second is proletarian, a state owned and managed by the majority of the population, a non-autocratic state. (104) The '[bourgeois] State is the organization of force, that is the expression of the domination of one class over another class or over other classes.' (105) Proletarian state, however, stands as an ultimate accomplishment of the values of human freedom and democracy. It is, on the other hand, an irrevocable eradication of the class structure that follows from the bourgeois state. Bukharin pointed to the aim of the proletarian state:

The Soviet [State] Power realizes a new, a much more perfect type of democracy—*proletarian democracy*. The essence of this proletarian democracy consists in this, that it is *based upon the transference of the production into the hands of the workers*, thus depriving the bourgeoisie of all

> power. In proletarian democracy, those who formerly constituted the oppressed masses, and their organizations have become the instruments of rule. (106)

The clear implication of Bukharin's message is that the aim of the Russian Revolution was to terminate all bourgeois coercive rule, all class antagonisms; the present Soviet society was free from the laws of economic organisation which would expect obsequious consent on the part of the proletariat. The basic truth about the 1917 October Revolution was that it emancipated the masses of working men from the chains of the rural aristocracy and the bourgeois class. Here Bukharin takes pains to ascertain that the proletarian 'sheep' have ultimately subverted the class rule imposed by the bourgeois 'wolves'. (107) By this very norm, the revolutionary role of proletarians resides in reversing the logic of historical development.

Yet, once one observes the state system which emanated from the October Revolution, the argument raised by Bukharin loses its logical legitimacy. By 1918, the ultimate aim of the Revolution was to make both peasantry and proletariat provide *blind* obedience to the Soviet state. In Lenin's and Stalin's time, a characteristic feature of the general crisis was the subjugation of individuals' will. The irony of this fact is that Marx's argument for the emancipation of the working classes through the dictatorship *of* the proletariat is transformed into an enslavement through a dictatorship *against* the proletariat. Marx's original theory encompasses a formula of rule mainly emphasising the will of the proletariat to engage in a radical break with bourgeois rule and 'traditional ideas' (108) The implication of this, in Marx's logic, is to 'raise the proletariat' through the revolution 'to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of democracy' (109) Since the revolutionary state is nothing but a proletarian state at work, all forms of organisation—socio-economic, political, etc—must succumb to the rule of the new revolutionary class which should in the last analysis retain

state power until all conditions of 'political power' cease to exist. (110) After 1917, Lenin's theory that proletarian consciousness can only amount to "syndical consciousness" (111), and his contempt for working men, constituted a theoretical prerogative for a monolithic party rule which was a departure from the defining Marxian concept of a revolutionary proletarian state.

In Marx's writing there are at least three instances confirming his valuing of the role of the working class in a revolutionary order. First, in *The Holy Family*, for example, he insists on the revolutionary role of the self-conscious working men in abolishing private property; 'the proletariat...is compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the condition for its existence, what makes it the proletariat, i.e. private property.' (112) Second, Marx emphasises the crucial role of the working class to control 'the productive forces' and act in total freedom in relation to production relations; 'only the proletarians of the present day...are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities.' (113) Finally, in his analysis of the role of a revolutionary proletariat, Marx draws practical conclusions from the experience of the Paris Commune;

> 'the whole sham of state mysteries and state pretensions was done away [with] by a Commune, mostly consisting of simple working men, organizing the defence of Paris, carrying on war against the praetorians of Bonaparte, securing the supplies for the immense town, filling all posts hitherto divided between government and police, and prefecture, doing their work publicly, simply under the most difficult and complicated circumstances...' (114)

The actual experience of the October Revolution reveals that the three instances emphasised by Marx were absent to a large extent from the logic governing the Soviet state. What was theorised by Lenin in *WBD*? simply found its full expression in the state system which followed from the Revolution. The Communist Party was given priority and the

working class was not assigned the same roles theorised by Marx. In Marxian theory, the party organisation cannot be justified by circumstantial logic, or by pressing conditions, given that the mass of the Russian population was attracted to the emancipatory programme of the Bolsheviks and not to pro-liberal "Kautskyans" (or even Mensheviks) for instance (115) First, with Lenin the party was given ultimate control over citizens; second, with Stalin, 'the authoritarian trap', led not only to consolidation of statist character of the one single-party rule but also to a crisis of the moral link between state and citizens. My contention here is that both aim and implication of 1917 did distance the working classes from their revolutionary historic role of achieving at a first stage a 'workers' state', and, then, a classless society.

2/ Lenin's Marxism and the limits of *What is to be Done?*:

Arguing against the mainstream critique of Lenin, Tom Freeman—an uncritical advocate of Lenin's theory of revolution—wrote in 2004 that

> Lenin's declarations on consciousness "from outside" then were not a formula for a new elite, which broke with Marx's aim of working class self-emancipation. They were rather part of an argument for a historically interventionist approach to realising that aim, directed against the deterministic approach inherent in revisionism, and in particular its Russian variant Economism. (116)

By arguing so Freeman is, it seems to me, echoing an apologia for a Marxism without Marx, an apologia which sees that in its full scope Marx's writing had rather been a project open to more than one application. The Marxian text seems, by suggesting so, to stand on sand, a text which allows fundamentally different applications depending on the context for revolutionary action. Taking too seriously the question of "volunteer interventionism" of political agency, Freeman's view comes to confuse the premises of political history and the social contexts to

which they are related. It argues that whatever the social basis of the working class is the 'professional revolutionaries' must always play a leading role. Self-action and emancipation of the proletariat is only conceivable in the presence of an intelligentsia whose role is to introduce the bulk of the workers to theoretical knowledge and guide them towards social democratic consciousness. In my view, Freeman does exaggerate Lenin's ability to adapt Marx's emancipation theory to different contexts. What Lenin did was to distance the revolutionary masses from the intellectual elite by making the latter superior to the former.

On the other hand, in making distinction between a necessary Leninist 'interventionist approach' and a 'deterministic' one, Freeman also sheds some light on the particularity of Lenin's theory of revolution which, I would suggest, reduces social action on the part of proletarians to a will-to-obey formula. According to Freeman's emphasis, the masses have to re-conceive their revolutionary role by basing their action not on their "spontaneous" socialism inherent in their direct engagement with the conflict between the accumulation of capital and wage-labour but on following a certain formula of struggle wherein the 'proletarian instinct', to use Engels's words, is lost to Social Democratic education, as Lenin himself argued in *WBD*? As a starting point, Lenin's theory of revolution is hardly dissociable from his particular view that proletarian class consciousness comes from outside. His emancipation formula derives from the belief that class consciousness is primarily not a defining characteristic of the working class; the working class by itself is capable only of 'trade union consciousness' at best. Syndical consciousness—being in purely Marxian sense the basis of worker consciousness—becomes with Lenin a paralysing constraint on any eventual attainment of political consciousness. (117) This is, it seems to me, what made Lenin stand Marx's theory of emancipation on its head. Lenin's treatment of trade unionism in *WBD?* was an attempt to strip Marx's view of the workers of every single value. Lenin's

mistake in this respect was to misread Marx's theory about the political role which the trade unions could play. This can be proved by Marx's very comments on such a question:

> Apart from their original purposes, they [trade unions] must now learn to act deliberately as organizing centres of the working class in the broad interest of its *complete emancipation.* They must aid every social and political movement tending in that direction....They must convince the world at large that their efforts...aim at the emancipation of the downtrodden millions. (118)

The question of working class consciousness in Leninist literature is of course too open to interpretation to beg a thorough account here. Yet, given that the suggestion in this respect is to dig further in Marxist literature to know which Lenin—of 1905-1907, 1917, or 1921—was much more faithful to Marxian theory, the question of consciousness was also the very premise whereupon Lenin had wrongly addressed the validity of trade unionism for instance. Contrary to Freeman's logic—which stands on a "blind" justification of Lenin's veneration of the party—the defence of Lenin is hardly valid if one supposes that Lenin's *WBD,* for example did not constitute the authoritarian basis for Bolshevik thinking. In this respect, there is little doubt that such schools as the "Totalitarian Model" (119) for example are not right when they trace Soviet authoritarianism to Lenin's thinking.

Lars T. Lih (2003) has recently argued that *WBD?* as a book of historical significance has been severely attacked not for its conjectural structure but for the practical solutions it suggests. If we should believe this claim, it is then of almost no avail to firmly believe that *WBD,* for example can by itself show the real degree of Lenin's application of the Marxian text. However, and as Lih shows, the fact that *WBD*? posed a problem both inside Russia and elsewhere cannot be wholly circumvented, given the roaring critique received from for example the Bor'ba Group (David Borisovich Riazanov in particular) or such revolutionary figures as Martov, Trotsky, Luxemburg and Kautsky. (120) This means that *WBD*? as a text

poses a theoretical quandary as to the degree of its continuity with the textual substance of *The Communist Manifesto* for instance.

The question of (dis)continuity with the Marxian text brings us back to Lenin's legitimation of his critique of economism as is forged in *WBD*?, and to whether his attack on the economists had to do with his contempt for trade union politics; this also sheds some light on whether he poorly considered the role of economics as theorised by Marx and Engels. Such a question also brings to attention the instance of reducing the contributive role of the working-class and its replacement by that of the political vanguard. It is my argument here that Marx's praise of the Russian revolutionary movement did not have a direct influence on Lenin, since, at least in organisational sense, Marx had praised and encouraged the Populist movement (121) whereas Lenin's interest in revolutionary activity was fuelled more by the Black Repartition Group (Plekhanov, Zasulich, etc.) (122) Following from this, I should also add that Lenin's conception of a Russian Revolution was practically influenced more by Russian Marxism (Plekhanov, etc): the influence of Marx and Engels was only in the way they saw the Paris Commune as a 'heroic' act. Lenin's fixation on the Commune is inherent in his belief that the 1917 Revolution was the true realisation of the promises of the Commune, and that there was hardly any difference between both experiences. The October Revolution, 'in different circumstances and under different conditions, continue[s] the work of the Commune and confirm[s] the genius of Marx and Engels.' (123) It should also be noted here that Lenin's assessment of the Commune experience was rather equivocal and curious. As john Hoffman maintains, Lenin had a two-faced view of the Paris Commune: 'In 1905 Lenin had criticized the Paris Commune for confusing "the tasks of fighting for a republic with those of fighting for socialism"...In 1917, however, the Commune was now presented as a model for the future socialist state...' (124)

3/ The Leviathan Revolution

In "What Time is it in Russia's History", Tucker observes that '...whatever was said about "Soviet power" having been established by the October Revolution, what *de facto* emerged was a new line of tsars under another name, starting with Lenin.' (125) In my view, Tucker's point here is important not because he compares the Bolshevik regime with the tsarist autocracy, but because he emphasises the fact that 'Soviet power' did mean anything but working class power. The notion of a popular revolution cannot be applied to Soviet reality, mainly because the Soviet state was not the "Soviet workers' state" as envisaged in *The State and Revolution.* Tucker's point highlights the devastating effect of what had been conceived as the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." The 'new line of tsars under another name' was a condition wrought first by Lenin's fight for a classless society structurally based on the necessity to keep the party strong and united, and, second, by his belief that the conditions of Russia could not allow the working classes and peasants to assume a vanguard position in politics. The new state emanating from the 1917 Revolution was but the application of Lenin's very thesis that 'it is no longer the proletarians but certain intellectuals in our party who need to be educated in the matters of organization and discipline.' (126)

The omnipotence of the repressive Soviet state was responsive to Bolshevik thinking that the proletarian class was not wholly involved in the class struggle in Tsarist Russia. Russian society was predominantly peasant and both working men and peasants were historically still all too unconscious of their active role as agents of social change. The working class character of the revolution, the Bolshevik designers maintained, was unmistakably Marxian, and, as Bukharin asserted in the *ABC of Communism*, the revolution could only be conceived as a 'confirmation' of Marx's prophesy that the workers would have their own 'socialist order,' and their own 'state':

> Marxism foretold the war, Marxism foretold the period of revolutions and the whole character of the epoch we are going through, Marxism foretold the dictatorship of the proletariat and the rise of a Socialist order...The Revolution has proved *the great destroyer of fetishes*...The Revolution has destroyed one State and built another: it has *practically* invaded this sphere of reality, and has ascertained the component parts of the State, and its functions, and its personnel, and its "material appendages," and its class significance...The Revolution has *completely* confirmed the theoretical teaching of Marx on the State. (127)

Confirming the construction of the new state and marrying its destiny to the dictatorship of the proletariat had an implication that the Russian Revolution was mainly about a substitution of a state for an other. Bukharin's theoretical premise was based on a forced statism which, under the pretext of preserving the revolution, led to omnipotence of the Bolshevik party under Lenin and an age of terror under Stalin. (128) Bukharin's argument for the continuity between Marxism and Bolshevism was belied by the very reality of the Soviet state: it was socialist only by name. This was even confirmed by Lenin's very inconsistency while treating the results of the Bolshevik Revolution. In the "April Theses" he asserted that 'it is not our *immediate* task to "introduce" socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the *control* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.' (Thesis eight) In 1918 Lenin confirmed that achieving 'Socialism' was only a matter of a few months. (129) One year later, he warned that 'we cannot establish a socialist system at the present time. It will be well if our children and perhaps our grandchildren will be able to establish it.' (130) Following from this, Bukharin's glorification of the new state as a realisation of Marxism reveals clearly how inconsistent and contradictory the Bolsheviks themselves were.

The other problem one might well raise resides in defining the relationship between Lenin's state-centric tendencies and his envisagement of socialism. Lenin's argument in favour of a future socialist state was in sharp conflict with his belief in a necessary powerful state which can fight reaction and 'capitalist encirclement.' If socialism should be achieved through fortifying state control of society, such very socialism would be impossible once state power is concentrated in the hands of the minority. In actual fact, this what happened during the Civil War, and especially when "War Communism" was still in effect; even the NEP break could not take state power away from the hands of Lenin and other topmost leaders like Kamnev, Zinoviev, and Stalin. Minority rule and abuse of power after 1918, I firmly argue, was the main problem with Lenin's conception of power. His belief that the party must do the job— while the rest of society is told to wait and see— is the very source for the birth of an elitist notion of power where the sovereign decides everything. On the other hand, the authoritarian element inherent in party dictatorship condemned Lenin's formula of a socialist state to depend on an exclusive theory: achieving socialism became an exclusively party role. In other words, Lenin's argument for party dictatorship in order to 'liquidate' the forces of reaction for instance constituted a justification for tyrannical rule—practiced by the minority. His position here is far from reflecting the Marxian approach to socialist society. In Marx's view, the condition of socialism dictates that 'collective property' determines and controls minority representation of the majority. (131) Therefore, the political leadership is but a 'representative' of the majority: it acts on its behalf and not in its place.

It was the argument of Lenin in 1902 that the revolution was needed in order to terminate the Tsarist authoritarian system. (132). However, when Bolsheviks took power in 1917, they were 'trapped', as John Hoffman argues, by the very logic against which they had worked: an 'authoritarian state emerged' (133) Bukharin theorised that the need for a state in Russia would not amount to repression and loss of individual freedom. For him, the

revolution ushered in a state that had no *state character*, a state with no governing body. But if Bukharin was right in his argument, why did Lenin then decide to dissolve the Constituent Assembly in 1918? Why did the Bolshevik party continue to rule most uncontrollably both in Lenin's life and after? Why was authoritarianism "institutionalised" into a totalitarian state form whose results were such events as the Stalin Purges of the late 1930s?

Trotsky's views in this respect are very significant. For Trotsky, the elitism of Lenin's party organisation was at the origin of the fragmentation of the unity of proletarians themselves. The process of reducing the proletariat to mere servants of the Revolution made it impossible for the Bolsheviks to unite under one single revolutionary doctrine, for the task of revolution is in the last analysis a constructive socialist task. It is the argument of Trotsky that '[t]he group of professional revolutionaries was not marching at the head of the conscious proletariat, it was acting...in the place of the proletariat.' (134) For Trotsky, the danger comes mainly from the role assigned to the Party's intellectuals, who transformed the achievements of October into a sanctioned elitism, an elitism that, I argue, would amount to a leviathan role where the majority of people are sacrificed by a dictatorial one-party state. In Trotsky's conception, what rises as an outcome is a bureaucratic-command state wherein the total socio-political structure is reversed sharply: the class of workers was drowned by the rigid party, and the party by the Central Committee. (135)

Rosa Luxemburg for her part explains Lenin's schizophrenic position by pinpointing two different historical functions of the Bolshevik party. In its incipient phase, it had basically had a proletarian character: '[t] he party of Lenin was the only one which grasped the mandate and duty of a truly revolutionary party and which, by the slogan—"All power in the hands of the proletariat and peasantry"—insured the continued development of the revolution.' (136) But after the Revolution it was turned into an elitist and repressive apparatus. She claims—by arguing against Lenin's abolition of the Constituent Assembly in 1918—that Bolsheviks after

the Revolution were trapped in the authoritarian formula of allowing 'freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party.' (137) One can observe in this context that the elitist character of post-Revolution Bolshevism distanced it from its theoretical substance, namely Marx's theory of revolution.

The other problem with Lenin's conception of 'the workers' state' has to do with his perception of the task of the proletariat once the revolution occurred. In conceiving of the role of working class, Lenin was inclined to approach the question of proletarian political participation by constantly signposting the indispensable role of the "professional revolutionaries." Lenin had to base his trust in working class participation by focussing on the degree of workers' ability to consolidate socialism through 'peaceful organisation and cultural work' (138). Yet, Lenin's demand was often chained by a reality in which Bolsheviks desperately had to reconcile the peasantry and workers on the one hand, and defend the Party itself from factionalism on the other. Lenin's focus on "cultural work" constituted a challenge to an actual, or even potential, proletarian power, because after the Revolution the issue of a "proletarian culture" was seriously put on the agenda of the Communist Party programme: proletarians could not get political power without education and class-consciousness. Trotsky himself identified the extent of a proletarian culture.

> After the conquest of power and after almost six years of struggle for its retention and consolidation, our proletariat is forced to turn all its energies towards the creation of material existence and of contract with the ABC of culture—ABC in the true and literal sense of the word... (139)

Trotsky's suggestion was an expression of how distanced was the proletariat from the notion of the 'workers' state.' This, in turn, gave every pretext for the Communist Party to exert total monopoly of power. Such monopoly was also strengthened by Lenin's concept that the party

was the only possible apparatus for buttressing the gains of the proletarian revolution. This brings us to the conclusion that, as Robert Tucker once observed, Lenin's conception of party 'organization' was what made him stand Marx on his head:

> Unlike Marx, who tended to think that history itself would make the revolution, Lenin based all his thinking on the premise that revolutions have to be organized. His theory and practice of revolutionary "party construction" not only shaped the organization of Communist movement everywhere, it also radiated far and wide into nationalist and fascist. (140)

Lenin justified state control of power after the October triumph as continuation of the revolutionary tradition the Paris Commune had established in 1871. (141) It was in the *State and Revolution* that Lenin envisaged a Soviet 'Commune state' as an ideal model for proletarian rule. (142) The relative success of the Paris Commune was a driving incentive for Lenin. However, in practice, except perhaps for the NEP, Lenin's model of state had failed to realise the political aspirations of the working classes. By 1918 the promised "commune state" seemed to rely on a divided and often conflicting leadership; it was turned into a statist order whose elitism ushered in a minority dictatorship breaking chiefly from Marx's concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. (143) What marked most the post-Revolution Lenin state was its deployment of Marx's positive views of the Commune to justify, in all sorts of ways, a mode of state oppressive in character. In *The State and Revolution*, Lenin used Marx's views in the hope of legitimating an unpropitious revolution. He wrote that Marx 'regarded the mass revolutionary movement, even though it did not achieve its aim, as an historical experience of enormous importance, as a certain advance on the part of the worldwide proletarian revolution, as a practical step was more important than hundreds of programmes and arguments.' (144) Basing his argument on Marx's own revision of *The Communist Manifesto*

on the basis of the relative success of the Commune (145), Lenin used such a revision in order to justify his own conception of revolution. He even used Marx's correspondence in the hope of validating the claim for an "untimely" revolution; he quoted Marx's letter to Kugelmann in which Marx expressed the courage of the Commune 'to smash' 'the bureaucratic-military machine' instead of simply 'transfer[ring] it from one set of hands to another.' (146) Lenin capitalised Marx's support for 'smashing' the state by asserting that, like the epoch of 1871, the 'epoch of the first great imperialist war' in 1914 necessitated a proletarian revolution.

Nevertheless, Lenin developed this belief by observing that Marx did only succeed in pointing to the necessity to 'replace the smashed state machine.' (147) Marx did by no means 'indulge in the utopia' of trying 'to explain the means of accomplishing' the 'tasks.' (148) The epoch of the second Industrial Revolution (1850-1900) did not allow Marx to provide ready-made explanations. In Lenin's view, Marx prescribed the remedy without dictating it. In other words, Marx made 'abstract' theories and 'expected the *experience* (Lenin's italics) of the mass movement to provide the answer to the question as to what specific forms this organization of the proletariat as the ruling class would assume...' (149) The Paris Commune,' Lenin wrote, was one of the most significant instances which showed clearly to Marx how "experience", only experience provided the answer. By believing so, Lenin, I would argue, seems to have read Marx as he 'pleased' and not as Marx should be read. (150) Contrasting 'utopia' to 'experience' Lenin seems to have forged a new position in understanding Marx's text; he implicitly asserted that one should understand Marx's theory through the prisms of experience, mainly because the latter might well prove Marx's 'abstract answers' right. In thinking so, Lenin also seems to suggest that the theoretical Marx of the age of capitalism can only be supplemented by the practical Marx of the age of imperialism, namely Lenin. By implication the *Communist Manifesto* was the document which described

the necessity to do away with the state, and *The State and Revolution* was the practical document guaranteeing replacement of the bourgeois state by the workers' state. (151)

This was the premise of the Lenin Revolution, which Stalin capitalised later after abolishing the NEP in 1929 only to turn it into a one-man dictatorship. In this context, the structure of Soviet political leadership was contingent on, I would argue, a *legitimacy theory* that amounted to a veneration of a leviathan state (as theorised by Hobbes) perceivably inherent in the legitimation of state power over citizens. Hobbes's theory that individuals must give in to the will of a "Sovereign Power" is re-echoed in the Lenin state, which dictates authority of Bolshevism over the masses. (152) Such an authority implies that, if measured up against state power, individuals must give in to the rule of the Party elite and the decisions made by the Central Committee. Lenin's leviathan revolution, as it were, follows from this very principle: state power through consolidation of the Party. On the other hand, Bolshevism amounts to the rule of the 'one Assembly of men'. (153) What is more, Lenin's argument for an invincible Bolshevik Party has to do with Hobbes's theoretical legitimation of the necessity of a commonwealth. Lenin's *commonwealthism*, in turn, was formulated in connection with his belief that the Soviet state was the medium for uniting proletarians: 'The most pressing and topical question for politics today is the transformation of all citizens into workers and employees of one big 'syndicate', namely the state as a whole.' (154) That belief led, as Tucker argues, to '...the dictatorship of popular Russia's self-appointed organ of consciousness, the Bolshevik Party.' (155)

By the early 1920s Bolsheviks overlooked an essential Marxian teaching: when the state has ignored basic individual rights, society, as Engels puts it, becomes '...entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself...' (156) Soviet society after the revolution was characterised by a yawning gulf between Bolshevik "cadres" and the mass of proletarians and peasants. 'On paper', as David M Kotz thinks, 'political power was held by the soviets...But

in fact all power was held by the Communist Party.' (157) Hobbes's concept of a 'Covenant', or individuals' *forced* agreement to obey the state and carry out its obligations does not contradict with this formula, which under the pretext of protection forces individuals to follow state rule or perish. It follows that the form of "political obligation" under whose auspices the practice of the Lenin state took place was premised on the very moral obligation that Hobbes sanctions in *Leviathan*. Therefore, in a state system as such individuals are forced to function in *blind* conformity with the rules of political power. For them, the process becomes a moral commitment. In the Bolshevik state, individuals were urged by a very similar political discourse to obey their guardians, the elite of Bolshevik "cadres". Several events attest to the repressive link that Bolshevism produced after the Revolution. Callinicos argues that the 'workers' state' (which Lenin spoke in the name of) 'was also a state apparently on the verge of being engulfed by mass unrest—strikes in Petrograd, a bitter peasant rising in Tambov province, and the mutiny of the garrison of the key naval base at Kronstadt.' (158) Those events were to spring from a state system incapable of changing the appalling conditions of the peasants and workers. According to Jordan, the Kronstadt event was to plague 'the body of the party' with 'cancer'. (159) The Lenin Revolution grew into a leviathan-Party state, '...a totalitarian monster', as Sakwa thinks, 'that has swallowed up both 'the individual and society.' (160) It also spawned one of the most dehumanising ideology in human history, namely Stalinism.

4/ Stalin as Leviathan:

Stalin's revolution from above differed from Lenin's Leviathan Revolution in degree. Yet, it was its natural offspring. While Lenin's Revolution was the authoritarian basis, the Stalin Revolution was its totalitarian form. Stalin followed the Bolshevik line of thought from which he had risen as a potential leader in the hope of consolidating his position as the

most appropriate heir to Lenin among party comrades. By this very norm, he used his ideological affiliation and commitment to the Party to advance a tacit separatism from other Party cadres, only to construct his aura as "saviour", "guardian", and "protector." Robert Daniels brilliantly describes the Stalin position as *cunningly* conciliatory between the past and the present:

> If each instance of the postrevolutionary dictatorship is unique, was distinctive to the Russian case and to Stalin's personal role? The most unusual feature in its time, though it has been replicated in subsequent Communist revolutions, was...the organizational and ideological continuity that Stalin maintained between the revolutionary era and his own regime. He himself came out of the apparatus of the party revolutionary extremism, and made this apparatus the foundation of his post-revolutionary rule. At the same time Stalin insisted on the formal observance of the revolutionary ideology, now designated "Marxism-Leninism", which played a key role for him to use the doctrine for these purposes because he commanded the power to reinterpret its meaning as he chose, to make it serve the radically changed social structure over which he presided. (161)

Stalin was able to make use of the state-centric tradition, which the Party leadership established after Revolution. He was part of the order initiated by such Party theorists as Bukharin. In 1925 he was criticized for being '...the total prisoner of this political line, the creator and genuine representative of which is Comrade Bukharin.' (162) My focus on Stalin's characteristics as a Bolshevist constitutes my concern with his late emergence as an unrivalled dictator, to be compared only to despots like Hitler. In this context, I think, Stalin evokes the image of an all too omnipotent "monster" that amounts to the picture of a leviathan who has relentlessly abused his authority. Stalin's penetrative capacity and intelligence resided in how he could use in his own favour the factionalism that had bedevilled the Party leadership since the 1917 Revolution. What is more, from the mid-1920s his political tactics

could softly pervade and violate the Party organisation designed by other party leaders, including Trotsky. The manoeuvre was carried out in full shape through pro-Stalin members like Zinoviev and Kamanev. (163)

Party members such as Zinoviev were to believe in and defend Stalin as genuine guardian of the Party structure that Lenin had long sought to preserve. (164) The Stalin-led faction was anxious to distance Trotsky from Party leadership. Zinoviev, as Medvedev contends, dismissed Trotskyism as myopic and reductive: 'whoever wants to build the Party in alliance with Trotsky, in collaboration with Trotskyism, which openly opposes Bolshevism, such a person is abandoning the fundamentals of Leninism.' (165) But when he buttressed his position at the top of the Party, after Lenin's death, Stalin started to gradually depart from all Party prerogatives, including the economic policies designed by Lenin and Bukharin. The First Five-Year Plan in 1928 was a first step in his departure. (166) And his dissolution of the NEP in 1929 completed the process. Stalin ignored the achievements of the NEP in the mid-1920s. For Bukharin, for instance, the NEP formed the cornerstone for an expected transition to full-fledged socialism. 'Bukharin's most distinctive contribution as leader of the Right', Callinicos asserts, 'was to argue that NEP should become a permanent framework of building socialism, even if this meant industrialization "at a snail's pace".' (167) The NEP for Bukharin was 'a tactical maneuver to be pursued only until the inevitable change of conditions which would make victory possible...' (168)

Towards the early 1930s Stalin started to deploy the Party as a medium for sanctifying a new form of rule, namely the one-man rule formula. He transformed power from 'the one-party system...to a one-person system, the ruling party to a ruling personage.' (169) On paper, Stalin did not disown priority of the party. He invoked it in justifying the Great Purges of the 1930s, and in carrying out forced collectivisation. He performed his departure from Leninism on the ground of his "conspiracy theory" argument. What followed from that argument was

his alleged *historic* responsibility to protect, first, Bolshevism, and second, the Soviet Union itself. The "conspiracy theory" argument was structurally based on one famous belief that Stalin had always maintained and defended: 'We have internal enemies, we have external enemies. This comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.' (170) Stalin had maintained that belief from the early 1920s, and had held it more as a reaction against criticism than as a grounded evidence of a real threat against the Party or the USSR. In response to Lenin's sharp criticism that he was 'too coarse' and unable to manage the General Secretary position, Stalin argued in a misleading way: 'Yes, I am too coarse, comrades, in dealing with those who coarsely and treacherously destroy and splinter the party.' (171) Later, in 1929, when he abolished the NEP, Stalin focused on a discourse of protection and obedience. He used a "protection" formula to force citizens' obedience to the state and vindicate his dictatorial political and economic measures. By adopting such a political stance, Stalin only moved away from Marx's teaching on political power. For Marx, social consensus and the will to peace are constructed on the "will" of individuals, not on their subordination. What Stalin did was, to use Daniel's words, ' to transform Marxism in a system of ideological "false consciousness" in the original Marxian sense of the word.' (172)

I think that Stalin's idea of 'internal and external enemies' might to a large extent be traced in the theoretical justification on which Hobbes theorises his state model. In Hobbes's theory, the relationship between citizen and citizen on the one hand, and citizen and the state on the other is based on a 'covenant' dictating state protection of individuals in return for their obedience. Stalin's protection formula did not escape such a Hobbesean logic. It was legitimated through the consolidation of the leviathan element of the state. If one reads Stalin's protection formula through Hobbes's state theory, one would find a striking affinity between the Soviet General Secretary and the author of *Leviathan*. The following paragraph

clearly reveals how Hobbes's leviathan forms the "unconscious" (173) ideological premise for a Stalin "paternalist" repressive state:

> The only way to erect such a Common Power [leviathan], as may be able to defend them from invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to conferre all their power and upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will...and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements to his Judgement. (174)

In forging this essence for the 'common power', Hobbes seeks to establish a social link answerable to the political order of the day, that is an all too invincible monarch, or ruler; a leviathan state apparatus. This social link forces individuals to get rid of their reciprocal enmity only under the rule of the "sovereign" who provides protection. Their obedience to the state would also guarantee their protection against foreign enemies.

Stalin did use the same protection/obedience formula by asserting that the Soviet people were still fragile and therefore in need for a strong state to protect them.. In *Mastering Bolshevism* (1937), he pointed out the 'internal' and 'external' enemies against whom he would protect the Soviet population. They were the "Trotskyites" and "the Capitalists": ' First, the wrecking and diversive spying work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom the Trotskyites played an active role, affected to some degree or other all or almost all our organizations, both economic, administrative, and Party.' (175) Stalin even deployed the Central Committee as an ideological and administrative authority to pile up reports against what he called "the Trotskyite-Zinovievite group". As a reaction to the murder of Kirov (member of the Stalin-led faction) the Central Committee reported in 1936:

> Now when it has proved that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite scum unite all the most bitter and the sworn enemies of the working people of our country...in the struggle against Soviet power...all our Party organizations, all members of the Party must understand that the vigilance of the Communists is necessary in every field and in all situations. (176)

Most of such reports were made by the February-March 1937 Central Committee plenum. It was Central Committee Secretary A. A. Zhdanov who insured the success of the reports. (177) Much of what came in the reports was about "hidden" enemies within the party itself. Such enemies did of course have an organisational structure: they were either followers of Trotsky, Kamnev, or Zinoviev. For this reason, Stalin believed that it was in no way sensible to depart from the coercive practices used during the Civil War. (178) State power was needed to guarantee the liquidation of 'enemies of the people.' In principle, the recourse to vengeance and purges was in sharp conflict with the dictates of the new Soviet Constitution drafted by the Extraordinary Eighteenth Congress of Soviets in December 1936. (179) The new Constitution did emphasise the degree of individual freedom guaranteed by the Soviet government. Yet, the practices of the Soviet secret police revealed the yawning gulf between what the new Constitution promised—'freedom of conscience, speech, press...' etc.— and what Stalin himself committed as a General Secretary in the late 1930s. (180) On the one hand, he declares that 'our principles do not permit us to shed the blood of old party members, however, weighty their sins.' (181) On the other, however, he only dealt mercilessly with his old Bolshevik comrades and friends. Party leaders like Zinoviev and Bukharin even reached the point where they had to 'confess non-existent crimes' (182) and beg Stalin from their cells for pardon and acquittal: 'I have reached the point,' Zinoviev writes, 'where I sit and stare at your portrait in the newspapers, and those of the other Politburo members and think: my dear ones, look into my heart, surely you can see that I am no longer your enemy...that I have

understood everything and am ready to do anything to deserve your forgiveness and your leniency.' (183) Very similar words were pronounced by Bukharin after his arrest. He addressed his old friend "Koba"—as he nicknamed Stalin—with, expressions of 'true devotion.' 'I acknowledge myself to be entirely yours'; 'I would be ready to carry out any of your demands.' (184) These confessions and expressions of devotion to the Soviet despot revealed the desperation of those who had once been influential and leading party members. They knew that their fate had already been determined, and whatever loyalty they displayed they would not be spared.

These events evoke many questions of significant implications: was not the new Soviet Constitution the "covenant" Stalin signed with both party and non-party members in order to protect them against any violations of civil liberties? Did not his breach of the contract amount to an ideological and political abuse of the doctrine of socialism itself? Did not his practice against the alleged 'enemies of the people' present a pretext for suppressing the whole society? Did not the late 1930s Purges constitute the leviathan element in the Stalin state which, by basing its rule on tyranny, departed entirely from its emancipatory claims? Such questions also lead to an equally important conclusion. Stalin's attempts to indoctrinate the Soviet people against opposition attested to how both socialism and the alleged 'workers' state became ideological instruments in the hands of one person, a dictator. The rule of the new state did but confirm how much the supposed 'workers' state' was tightly and tyrannically policed. In the words of Catherine Merridale, '[w]hile the majority of the population may have accepted much of the rhetoric about 'enemies' and the danger of opposition...it remained outside the party and the Communist belief system.' (185)

It is worth mentioning that the Stalin 'totalitarian state' had seeds in the authoritarian state established in the aftermath of the October Revolution. It is, however, important if one reminds the reader that while Leninism was partly responsible for the omnipotent Stalin state,

Lenin himself did in no way *intentionally* envisage such a totalitarian future for the supposed Soviet socialist state. In his Purges, Stalin chose to start with those enemies who had much more assertive roles right after the Revolution occurred. His attack on Trotsky, for instance, was historically justifiable. In this respect, Lenin's views in 1922 and 1923 had a gigantic impact on Stalin. Lenin was quite conscious of the conflicts between Party cadres, but he was specifically conscious of the Trotsky-Stalin tension. He also openly favoured Trotsky:

> Comrade Stalin, on becoming General Secretary [of the Central Committee], concentrated enormous power in his hands, and I am not sure he always knows how to use his power carefully enough. On the other hand, Comrade Trotsky is distinguished not only by outstanding abilities...Personally, he is, I daresay, the most capable member of the present Central Committee. (186)

But that was not the only reason for Stalin's hostility to Trotsky. He also knew that Trotsky was a potential successor to the Party leadership. And he knew that Lenin no longer trusted him as a reliable General Secretary: '...I suggest to the comrades that they think of a way of transferring Stalin from this position and assigning another man who differs from Comrade Stalin... more loyal, more polite...less capricious, and so on.' (187) The words pronounced by the Soviet leader did confirm the danger that the Soviet people would face once Stalin remained the CPSU's General Secretary. Lenin's fears proved to be based on a realistic reading of the future Soviet despot. If one observes the 1930s Great Purges against topmost Communist Party leaders like Bukharin, one is quickly reminded of Lenin's words quoted above. Lenin's open favouring of other party leaders to Stalin, it must be said, was one of the reasons behind Stalin's condemnation of, for example, what he called the "Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." On the other hand, one might well argue that the formula whereby Stalin adopted and ensured Stalinisation of Soviet society was based on a self-sanctioned

prerogative to make such a very society act against those alleged 'enemies of the people.' (188) Moreover, Stalin's purges were rationalised within an economic framework. The rationale was that since the Soviet people needed to prosper, they had to guarantee political stability through acting against the enemies of socialism. The drive for Collectivisation and industrialisation was then the rationale legitimising the purges for instance. As a result, massive collectivisation and the dekulakisation of society were thought to have adverse, but necessary, economic consequences. In rationalising such consequences, Stalin even went as far as to relinquish Marx's theory: 'Equalization...levelling the requirements and the individual lives of the members of society...has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism.' (189)

Stalin worked out his aura as "liberator" through the issue of 'transition from socialism to communism'. ((190) That was the ideological framework on which he based his future policies, including the economic and the social. Under the shield of those policies, he carried out the 1930s brutal show trials. And he consolidated his personality cult by dumping Soviet society into most enslaving processes of collectivisation and industrialisation. What followed from the cult that he established was a class society that he himself designed. Stalin's rationalisation of his cult, however, was masked by an apparent self-denial and misrecognition which he constantly celebrated. He began by promising at the 'Second Congress of the Soviets' to ensure putting at work all Lenin's 'commandments.' (191) By doing so, he sought to arrogate Lenin to the promotion of his own cult. Particularly paradoxical and misleading was Stalin's letter to the Bolshevik M. Shatunovskii in 1930:

> You speak of your 'devotion' to me. Perhaps that phrase slipped out accidentally. But if it isn't an accidental phrase, I'd advise you to thrust aside the 'principle' of devotion to persons. It isn't the Bolshevik way. Have devotion to the working class, its party, its state. That's needed and good. But don't mix it with devotion to persons, that empty and needless bauble of intellectuals. (192)

The words spelled out in response to Shatunovskii's confession, as Robert Tucker tells us, were belied by the official ossification of the Soviet state into one single path towards Stalinisation, which was inaugurated through 'the official celebration of his [Stalin's] fiftieth birthday in 1929'. (193) The letter reveals the difference between what Stalinism really was and what it pretended to be. The search for a position above society made Stalin then create his own world of power in which ideology and politics hardly translated Lenin's concern about the foundation of the workers' state. Following from the solidification of his personality cult—which later traded under such slogans as "Thank you Comrade Stalin"—Stalin proceeded since the early 1930s by creating a Soviet state responsive to his non-Marxian codes. As Hannah Arendt shows:

> [H]e first undermined the national Soviets through the introduction of Bolshevik cells from which alone the higher functionaries to the central committees were appointed...The Bolshevik government then proceeded to the liquidation of classes...The liquidation of the middle and peasant classes was completed in the early thirties...The next class to be liquidated as a group were the workers...It took Stalin about two years from 1936 to 1938 to rid himself of the whole administrative and military aristocracy of the Soviet society. (194)

The Stalin years were characterised by a huge gulf between 'the New Class' and the masses, the new class which 'was reflected in Stalin's repudiation of the goal of egalitarianism and in his enumeration of the three "strata"—workers, collective farmers, and the "toiling intelligentsia" within the nominally "classless" society of socialism.' (195) The 1940s were not particularly different from the late 1920s, and the 1930s. Stalin as leviathan became the sole decision-maker in the Soviet state where he could transform his country from a potential 'workers' state' into an *absolute police state*. Indeed Stalinism had stamped the

post-Stalin Soviet state with an irrevocable political-ideological failure that eventually terminated the Soviet system itself. Even if one holds to the belief that Hobbes, in theorising leviathan rule, set the democratic basis for such a rule, it is hard to believe that Stalin kept faithful to this basis. The first measures taken by Stalin was to break the bonds of the "covenant" between the Soviet state and society set shortly after October.

Summary

- The "Continuity Thesis" mainly argues that Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism. This equation follows from the belief that the relationship between the three categories is 'genetic.'

- The "Continuity thesis" is based on conjectural rather than archival findings

- I argue that there is a 'forgotten crisis' in Soviet Russia, and that the Soviet system was 'autholitarian' (authoritarian-totalitarian). In advancing this thesis, I also argue that Soviet autholitarianism was akin to Hobbesean 'leviathanism.'

- I take my main argument from Joseph Vialatoux who thinks that Hobbes was 'the abstract theoretician of statist totalitarianism.' Joseph Vialatoux, however, was seen by the critics as misinterpreter of the Hobbesean text.

- Hobbes's sovereign might well turn 'coercive' rule—the sword—into absolutist totalitarian rule. As sovereigns in the Hobbesean sense, Lenin and Stalin were to epitomise such a totalitarian rule. Lenin was the authoritarian who paved the way for state totalitarianism under Stalin.

- Soviet practice reflected very little Marx's theory of revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, was turned into a dictatorship against the proletariat—War Communism, the First Five-Year Plan, the Purges, etc.

- Very few instances show Lenin's faithfulness to the Marxian text. Marx's praise of the Paris Commune was a defining example: the Paris Commune experience was used and abused by both Lenin and Stalin in the hope of legitimating the practices of the Soviet tyrannical state.

- Like Hobbes's sovereign, Stalin even used a protection/obedience formula in order to guarantee subjugation of Soviet society. He did that by forging his famous "conspiracy theory," and by pointing to the threat of the "enemies of the people."

Conclusion

In this work I have argued that the rise of Leninism as an authoritarian ideology was at the origin of Bolshevik thinking in general, and even greatly impacted the Stalin revolution of the 1930s. I have also argued that Lenin's and Stalin's Marxism was a Marxism which substantially lacked the defining features of Marx's revolutionary theory of emancipation. In my view, Lenin's departure from Marxian theory had so much to do with the consolidation of the authoritarian state which emerged from the Civil War. The authoritarian state, on the other hand, did not keep its emancipatory promises and soon degenerated into a totalitarian system whose designer was Stalin himself. It is also my argument that the conflation authoritarian-totalitarian has offered a new concept I have dubbed "*autholitarian.*" This new concept signifies the Leninist-Stalinist state system which emerged shortly after the October Revolution with "War Communism," continued through Stalin's collectivisation drive in the late 1920s, and was consummated by the Great Purges of the late 1930s. My other argument is that Soviet state *autholitarianism* was but some form of a Hobbesean *leviathanism* which had a strong basis in Hobbes's theorisation of an all too omnipotent sovereign.

Why such a "communist sovereign" failed to liberate society from class rule and state rule is a question which can be understood by grappling with the very nature of such a sovereign. The Bolshevik sovereign started as a promising ruler fighting for a 'workers' state,' but only ended in turning such a state against the workers themselves. The same sovereign took his legitimacy from Marxism as an ideology for human emancipation. Yet, in using the "sword" he decided to make use of Thomas Hobbes rather than Karl Marx. Whether he did that "consciously" has not been my concern here, but what should be clarified is the fact that the Soviet autholitarian sovereign used his political prerogative with excess and justified it by quoting from Marx and Engels. The use of "force" to enforce socialism was not problematic in itself, since the spirit of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—in Marx's view—does not contradict with the use of force; what was problematic was the use of such a

force against the majority—peasants and workers. Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" was reversed. It was reversed first through "War Communism," the Kronstadt, etc., and second through Stalin's so-called "cultural revolution."

Just like Hobbes's sovereign, the Bolshevik ruler was far from infallible; this is mainly because the need to use the "sword" against society became an end in itself. For Stalin, freeing individuals from the desire to own 'private property' necessitated freeing them from the will to control their lives; Soviet citizens had to accept the 'sword' of the leviathan mainly because that sword was allegedly in the benefit of society as a whole. The Soviet leviathan then was in no way accountable for the atrocities committed in the attempt to protect society from its own self. In other words, the Soviet leviathan reflected Hobbes's obsession with "freeing" human society from the 'state of nature.' For Hobbes, freeing individuals from the 'state of nature' necessitated 'reduc[ing] all their Wills...unto one will...,' and in constituting such a new 'will' they no longer act as self-conscious individuals who control their fate; the Hobbesean sovereign is then prone to degenerate into a tyrannical ruler whose ultimate aim is to serve his own interests rather than caring for the majority.

The similarity between Hobbes's sovereign and the Bolshevik autholitarian evokes then an interesting point in relation to scholarship in the field of Soviet studies. This thesis has tried to argue that Soviet political history can be approached from a political-philosophical perspective, mainly because the natures of the October Revolution and the state which emerged thereafter did not reflect a purely Marxian character. The way in which the October Revolution was conceived, and the manner through which the Soviet state was founded had to do with a Hobbesean state theory: in order to act against "greed" and the desire to possess, the Soviet leviathan used state coercion, consolidated the state as such, and created a proletariat *in* itself. It was Hobbes's concern—and not Marx's—to establish a strong and omnipotent state which keeps individuals 'in awe'. Believing that the relationship between Hobbes's statism

and the Soviet state is evident, I have also argued that many of the political scientists have wrongly conceived of Soviet practice; their equation "Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism" is simply wrong, mainly because Soviet reality was not a practical reflection of Marxian theory, and the alleged "classless society" had been only verbally achieved.

Adopting the political-philosophical method, I have then tried to explain why Lenin put Marx on his head, and how Stalin's 'revolution from above' was a revolution against Marxism itself. Yet, such a method is not an attempt to entirely rebut the findings of the "Totalitarian model" which, in my view, has contributed so much to Soviet studies: the model's defining concepts such as 'revolution from above' are simply impossible to ignore. The "Revisionist school" for its part has successfully shed light on most of the inconsistencies of the "Totalitarian model' and has taught us that understanding political history through socio-cultural reality is an indispensable task.

In dealing with the main themes of this work, I have also thought of further research which this thesis cannot reasonably take. By adopting the political-philosophical approach, I will in a future work study the defining differences between Marx's and Hobbes's views on human nature and the state. In this thesis, I have been concerned more with the Hobbesean character of the Soviet state.

Notes

Notes to Introduction :

1/ In this part I have preferred not to treat the Soviet state practice under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev because this period is not the focus of my concern.

2/ Eric Hobsbawm (1997) *On History*, London, Abacus, p. 319.

3/ Ibid., 320.

4/ In dealing with these three schools, I rely heavily on the work of Chris Ward, especially his *Stalin's Russia* (1999) Arnold Publishers.

5/ See especially R. H. McNeal (1963) *The Bolshevik Tradition*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

6/ Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia*, pp. 26-7.

7/ Cited in Ibid., p. 26.

8/ See especially Lewin (1985) *The Making of the Soviet System* London, Metheun & Co. Ltd and E H Carr (1963) *The Bolshevik Revolution*, London, MacMillan.

9/ For totalitarian literature, see the present work, pp. 284-292.

10/ For Revisionist literature, see the present work, pp. 292-304.

Notes to Part 1:

1/ V.I. Lenin (1969) "Our Programme" in *Selected Works,* London, Lawrence and Wishart, p.34.

2/ The economist whom Lenin criticised sharply was Edward Bernstein. Bernstein represented the Russian variant of revisionism. His main work is entitled *Evolutionary Socialism* (1972), New York, Schocken Books.

3/ V.I. Lenin *What is to be Done?*, New York, International Publishers, 1943, p.73.

4/ Ibid., pp.32-3. Actually, Marx's position was that the class struggle had primarily an economic character and working class emancipation necessitated 'strikes,' combinations, etc.' Therefore, Lenin's "contempt" for the trade unionism was groundless in purely Marxian terms. (for a discussion of this point, see Alex Callinicos, *The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx* (1995) London, Bookmarks.)

5/ Sheila Fitzpatrick (1994) *The Russian Revolution*, Oxford University Press, p.27.

6/ V.I. Lenin *What is to be Done?*, pp.26-30

7/ Fitzpartick argues that until 1917 the Russian peasantry still formed 80 per cent from population (Fitzpartrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p.15)

8/ As a social Historian, Fitzpartick asserts that Lenin committed a mistake by supposing that pre-revolution Russian working class was not politically conscious: '... the empirical evidence of the period from the 1890s to 1914 suggests that in fact Russia's working class, despite its close link with the peasantry, was exceptionally militant and revolutionary...the workers showed considerable solidarity against management and state authority, and their demands were usually political as well as economic.' (Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p.20)

9/ Charles Elliot, "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and the Dilemma of the non-Revolutionary Proletariat" *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* Vol.9, No.4 (Nov., 1965), pp.328-329.

10/ By the early 1890s Lenin's work was not only aimed at making the workers' conscious about the danger of "reformism" as came with the legal Marxists, for example, but also at dictating to them that unorganised struggle like that which led to the 1896 textile strike would be futile. For Lenin's views that the Narodniks and Mensheviks had a devastating effect on the workers and peasants, see Lenin (1977) *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp.17-42.

11/ V. L. Lenin, *What is to be Done?,* p. 32. For a discussion of this point, see Frances Bennett Becker "Lenin's Application of Marx's Theory of Revolutionary Tactics" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 2, No.3 (June., 1937), pp.354-5.

12/ V. L. Lenin, "Our Programme" in *Selected Works*, p.35.

13/ V. L. Lenin, *What is to be Done?,* p. 41. For a discussion of 'spontaneity,' see Frances Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx's Theory...," p 360. Unlike Lenin, Luxemburg, was very much in favour of "spontaneity." For her, the 'revolutionary process' can only be nurtured by the spontaneous movement on the part of the workers and not by the 'predetermined, mechanically-executed' "inventions of any specific leaders..." (Cited in Elliot, "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p.332. For Luxemburg's criticism of the centralising tendency of Lenin's political programme, see her *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism* (1961) The University of Michigan Press, pp.81-108. Charles Elliot argues that Luxemburg got off to a wrong position when she criticised Lenin for 'isolating' the masses from the party: 'Rosa Luxemburg was quite wrong. For Lenin was infinitely flexible in his

tactics...she remained inflexible and intransigent...to the very end of her life.' ("Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p.333)

14/ Becker argued that Lenin's praise of Social-Democracy was only a 'tactical' measure. (Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx's...," p.362.)

15/ Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx's...," p.360.

16/ Lenin, *What is to be Done*, pp.63-7.

17/ Ibid., p.76.

18/ Ibid.

19/ See Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx's...," p.360.

20/ See Marx's letter to Bolte, 23 Nov. 1871 in Marx (2000) *Selected Writings,* Oxford University Press, p 636.

21/ For Engels, sectarianism was characteristic of the 'Proudhon schools of socialism' which thanks to the Paris Commune '... has now vanished from French working-class circles.' The Blanquists were equally part of such school mainly because 'they started out from the viewpoint that a relatively small number of resolute, well-organized men would be able...not only to seize the helm of state, but also by a display of great, ruthless energy, to maintain power until they succeeded in sweeping the mass of the people into the revolution and ranging them round the small band of leaders.' (Engels' Introduction to *The Civil War in France* (1970) Peking, Foreign Language Press, p.14.)

22/ Marx's Letter to Bolte in *Selected Writings*, p 636. In a letter to Schweitzer (p.635), Marx also attacked Lassale with regard to his views on the working class movement. Like Proudhon, Lassale 'instead of looking into the genuine elements of the class movement for the real basis of his agitation, he wanted to prescribe the course to be followed by this movement according to a certain doctrinaire recipe.'

23/ V. L. Lenin, *What is to be Done?,* p. 22.

24/ Tom Freeman, "Was Lenin a Marxist in What is to be Done? ?,"*Studies in Marxism*, No. 10 (2004), p.17.

25/ Bernsteinism is a term which describes the socialist theory of Edward Bernstein—1850-1932—who was a leader in the German Social-Democratic Party. Towards the 1890s Bernstein suggested that socialism could be gained by reform rather than revolution.

26/ See Isaac Deutscher (1957) *Russia in Transition and Other Essays*, New York, Coward-McCann, pp. 162-4.

27/ See Marx's letter to Vera Zasulich in *Selected Writings*, pp. 623-7. In the letter, Marx confirms that the case of Russia is different from that of the European context where *Capital*

was written. For a thorough discussion of Marx's 'personal relations with the Russians', see Henry Eaton's "Marx and the Russians" *Journal of the History of Ideas,* Vol. 41, No.1 (Jan.-March 1980), 89-112; for a discussion of Marx's 'theory of revolutionary practice'—different forms (gradualist or violent) of the overthrow of capitalism—see Shlomo Avineri's response to Alan Gilbert in "How to save Marx from the Alchemists of Revolution," *Political Theory,* Vol.4, No.1 (Feb., 1976), 35-44.

28/ K. Marx and F. Engels (2002) *The Communist Manifesto*, London, Penguin Books, p.196.

29/ In the 1870s Marx's health was seriously weak. A lingering severe lung inflammation, being at the origin of his death in 1883, prevented him from working properly or concentrating on the Russian context. For a view on how Marx's health prevented him from working efficiently, see Stedman Jones's notes to *The Communist Manifesto*, pp. 260-261

30/ See Stedman Jones's notes to *The Communist Manifesto*, pp.260-261n10.

31/ Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, p. 83.

32/ Lenin's citation of passages from Engels' work can be found in other works other than *What is to be Done?*. In *The State and Revolution* for instance he resorts to Engels's and Marx's writings on the relationship between state and society and the possible means to 'smash the bourgeois state' (Lenin (1992) *The State and Revolution*, London, Penguin Books: see particularly, pp.37-59). See also Lenin (1964) "The State" in *Collected Works*, Fourth English Edition, Vol. 29, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp.470-488.

33/ By 1903 the experience of Russian Social-Democracy was short-lived. As Lenin himself clarifies this point in *What is to be Done?*, before 1898 there had been no assertive Social-Democracy in Russia (p.166), and the only trends of "revolutionary" resistance were either reactionary and violent (agrarian Populism) or represented by a rather theoretical—and impractical—Russian Marxism whose aim was to wait for the transition to Bourgeois democracy in Russia before any revolution would occur.

34/ German Social-Democracy took the form of a "revolutionary" socialist party in 1875 when the Social-Democratic Workers' Party or the Eisenachers (founded in 1869 and led by Liebknecht and Bebel) and the Lassallean General Association of German Workers (led essentially by Hasselmann and Hasenclever) convened a congress in Gotha and united under the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1976) Marx severely criticised the common programme of the new party. He disapproved of two main aspects: first, he thought that the Eisenachers made concessions to the followers of Hasselmann, and argued that their definition of 'labour' and 'equality' for example were

erroneous; second he argued against the programme's definition of the state. (K Marx (1976) *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 8-33)

35/ For a view that Lenin was following Marx's doctrine to the letter, see Tom Freeman, "Was Lenin a Marxist...," pp. 1-24.

36/ V. L. Lenin *What is to be Done?*, p. 29. Basically, Lenin took this position from Engels's declarations. (*What is to be Done?*, pp. 29-30)

37/ For Marx's views on the necessity of 'knowledge' and 'organization,' see his letter "On Violent Revolution" to Hyndman, 8 Dec. 1880, in *Selected Writings*, pp. 642-3.

38/ Cited in V. L. Lenin *What is to be Done?*, p. 29.

39/ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

40/ Lenin's insistence on theory here does depend on his interpretation of the Russian context in the first place: Russian Social-Democracy was far too embryonic to lead to the phase of revolutionary politics in the short run.

41/ V. I. Lenin (1921) *"Left Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, Detroit, Michigan, The Marxian Educational Society, p.30.

42/ Cited in Deutscher, *Russia in Transition...*, p. 162.

43/ Cited in Ibid, p.163. For the historical significance of the assassination of the Tsar, see Fitzpatrick, *the Russian Revolution*, p. 25.

44/ See for example Lenin "Our Revolution" in *Collected Works*, Vol.33, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 476-80. Lenin uses Marx's attitude in *The Civil War in France* (letter to Kugleman) to justify his own views of October.

45/ Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, p. 30.

46/ Cited in Ibid., p. 29.

47/ Ibid.

48/ K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 234.

49/ Lenin, "Our Programme" in *Selected Works*, p.36.

50/ Engels's Introduction to *The Civil War in France*, p.12. In a letter to H Schluter, 1895, Engels confirmed that the 'socialist instinct' in itself was a basic requirement but not the end of the road to socialism. Socialist instinct might make the masses amount to 'nothing but sects and no party.' (K. Marx and F. Engels (1971) *On Britain*, Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 537-38.)

51/ Engels's Introduction to *The Civil War in France*, p.12.

52/ Ibid, p.13

53/ Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, p. 26.

54/ Ibid., p.79.

55/ Ibid., p. 26.

56/ Cited in Elliot, "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p.311.

57/ Andrzej Walicki, "Alexander Bogdanov and the Problem of the Socialist Intelligentsia" *Russian Review,* Vol. 49, No. 3 (July., 1990) p. 296.

58/ On the influence of Kautsky and Bebel, see Leszek Kolakowski (1978) *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 381-511. On the influence of Plekhanov on Lenin, see *Left Wing" Communism: an Infantile Disorder*, p. 28; see also Walicki, "Alexander Bogdanov...," p. 295.

59/ Ronald J. Hill argued that Lenin's adaptation of the Marxian text was 'a major evolutionary adaptation reflecting the specific conditions of the Russian working class in the years of Tsarist oppression.' (R. J. Hill (1992) (ed.,) "Communist Politics: an Evolutionary Approach" in *Beyond Stalinism: Communist Political Evolution* Frank Cass, p.8.

60/ Fitzpatrick argues that until 1917 the working class was formally still indissociable from the peasantry, that the 'close connection' between the urban working class and the rural proletariat had been characteristic of Russian society until the beginning of the revolution. (Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* pp.18-20.)

61/ In principle, Lenin was not different from Marx on this point, but Marx and Engels commented on the Russian context only in light of what was happening in the 1870s, and 80s when the tsarist autocracy was still powerful. Marx's and Engels' validation of violence in Russia was wholly compensated for by the need to smash the existing political order. For an account of Marx's and Engels' views, see Isaac Deutscher, *Russia in Transition...*, pp. 162-6.

62/ See Lenin *Left Wing" Communism: an Infantile Disorder*, pp. 21-5.

63/ J. Stalin (1946) (ed.,) "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" in *Marxism and Revisionism* International Publishers, pp.52-64.

64/ V. I. Lenin (1946) "The Fight for a Marxist Party" in *Marxism and Revisionism*, p. 22.

65/ V. I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, pp. 76-77.

66/ See Lenin (1964) "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social Democracy" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p.285n6.

67/ See Ibid.

68/ For an account of Lenin's exile, see *The Letters of Lenin* (1937) (ed.), New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, p. 18.

69/ Ibid. In the period of 1897, in exile, Lenin wrote a series of articles in criticism of the Narodniks (*The Letters of Lenin* , p. 18)

70/ For Plekhanov's rejection of Narodism, see Deutscher, *Russia in Transition...*, pp.162-164.

71/ Leopold Haimson argues that Lenin was influenced by the development of the early ideas of Russian socialism—especially concerning those aspects which related to the separation between 'spontaneity' and 'consciousness'—including that of Plekhanov. (Leopold Haimson, "Lenin's Revolutionary Career Revisited" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* Vol.5, No.1 (2004), pp.56-7.)

72/ Ibid., pp. 62-64.

73/ Becker, "Lenin's Application of Marx's...," p. 354-355.

74/ Until 1914 Lenin was still not entirely in discordance with Social-Democracy and the Second International. It was World War I, he contended, which revealed the real bankruptcy of the Social-Democrats.

75/ Lenin argues that these two questions are of significant and decisive importance: while the first basically concerns 'the political significance of the division of our [Social-Democratic] Party into "majority" and "minority,"' the second concerns basically 'the new *Iskra's* position on organizational questions...' Lenin's ultimate aim behind highlighting such two questions is to reveal 'that the [Bolshevik] "majority" is the revolutionary, and the "minority" the opportunist wing of our Party.' (Lenin (1978) *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 7-8.)

76/ Here Lenin treats the position of *Iskra* in relation to the question of organisation. For this same point, see Lenin (1946) "Opportunism in Questions of Organisation" in *Marxism and Revisionism*, pp.175-205; for Lenin's theorisation of the relationship between the proletariat and intelligentsia, see Igal Halfin, "The Rape of the Intelligentsia: A Proletarian Foundational Myth," *Russian Review*, Vol.56, No.1 (Jan., 1997), 90-109.

77/ Cited in Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, pp.89-90.

78/ This particular issue was one of the main causes of Lenin's struggle with the Mensheviks. Martov, the leading Menshevik, maintained that a party member 'should be one "who recognizes the Party's programme and supports it by material means and by regular material assistance under the direction of one of the party organizations."': Martov's definition was first adopted at the Second Congress, but later Lenin gained control of the Central Committee and *Iskra* because many of the Menshevik delegates were absent. In 1905 the Third Party Congress changed the definition of the Party membership from the formulation of Martov to that of Lenin: the Mensheviks were absent. Lenin accused Martov's definition of "serving the interest of *bourgeois intellectuals*, who fight shy of proletarian discipline and organization."

(Elliot, "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p.329 and p.331.) The party organisation, as seen by Lenin, had been treated heavy-handedly by Russian-Social-Democracy which, even in its most developed forms (1898), was already preparing for its own demise: 'The formation of the party in the spring of 1898 was the most striking [moment of Russian social democracy] and at the same time the *last* act of the Social-Democrats in this period.' (Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, pp.166-67). Actually Karl Kautsky favoured Martov's position. For a discussion of this point see Lars T. Lih's "How a Founding Document was Found, or One Hundred Years of Lenin's What is to be Done?," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol.4, No.1 (Winter 2003), p.15.

79/ See Elliot "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p. 331. Lenin replied to Luxemburg's accusations by supposing that she "mocked" the Second Party Congress, and that her 'objections to centralization in the Russian Social Democratic Party were but " a vulgarization of Marxism, a perversion of the true Marxist dialectics, etc.' (Cited in Elliot "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," p.337.)

80/ Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, p 94.

81/ Ibid, p. 91.

82/ Leon Trotsky (1904) *Our Political Tasks*, London, New Park, p.56.

83/ Ibid., p.77. Trotsky's views against Lenin were changed towards the end of his life. In his *Stalin* (1968) Trotsky argued that 'the key to the dynamic problem of the leadership is in the actual interrelationships between the political machine and its party, between the vanguard and its class.' (Trotsky (1968) *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and his Influence*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, pp. 61-2.) For an account of Trotsky's changing views, see Knei-Paz (1978) *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p.228.

84/ Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, p. 87.

85/ Ibid, p. 86.

86/ Ibid, p.92

87/ Ibid, p.93

88/ Ibid., p. 87.

89/ K. Marx (1964) *The Class Struggles in France*, New York, International Publishers, p.18.

90/ L. T. Lih's "How a Founding Document was Found...," p. 6.

91/ Ibid.

92/ Ibid, p.48. In order to confirm that *WBD* was but a historical document having very little to do with Leninism or Bolshevism, Lih argues that Lenin's closest people—'Nadezhda. K. Krupskaia, Grigorii. E. Zinioviev, Lev. B. Kamnev, his sister Anna Il'inichna Ul'ianova', and

others—had probably had a better picture of *WBD* which only "defined a plan for wide revolutionary work and pointed to a definite task", pp. 24-5.

93/ In their work such scholars misinterpreted Lenin's writing on such aspects as the role of the "professional revolutionaries" and the nature of *WBD*, with the latter being for them a founding document of Bolshevism, pp. 5-6.

94/ Ibid, p. 7.

95 Ibid, p. 23.

96/ The development of party centralism in *What is to be Done?* was, I would argue, was one of Lenin's first attempts to depart from Marx's theory of revolution and the coming workers' state. Such a centralism had, as I understand it, two central implications: 1) it was an exclusive theory which reduced the role of the working class to a cipher; and 2) it formed the basis for the authoritarian state founded in the wake of the October Revolution.

97/ For a definition of authoritarianism, see the present work, pp. 203-5.

98/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p.43.

99/ Ibid., p. 37.

100/ Ibid, pp.44-45.

101/ Lenin, *Left Wing Communism...*, pp. 17-19.

102/ Ibid., p.16.

103/ Ibid.

104/ Ibid., p.17.

105/ Kolakowski for example justifies Lenin's position by arguing that Marx's position itself had been schizophrenic on many occasions, and that the authors of the *Manifesto* were off at a tangent when it came to such questions as "revolution."

106/ In the Preface to the English Edition of 1888 to *The Communist Manifesto* (p.202) Engels emphasises the necessity of workers' emancipation by themselves.

107/ T. Lih's "How a Founding Document was Found...," p. 23. He also suggests that even Trotsky championed the leading role of the intelligentsia: 'I affirm that the Russian proletariat...is not yet able...to give lessons in discipline to its "intelligentsia"' (Cited in Ibid, p. 18.)

108/ See Marx's reply to Bakunin in *Selected Writings*, pp. 606-608.

109/ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.234.

110/ Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, pp.78-9.

111/ Ibid., pp.81-88.

112/ Ibid., p. 82.

113/ The tsarist political order was responsive to the landed interest--in a manner akin to the position of the Tories in 19th c England as was described by Marx --and which took its legitimacy from the vestiges of medieval economies favouring an aristocratic form of society

114/ John Hoffman (1992) "The state: Has the 'Withering Away' Thesis Finally Withered Away?" in *Beyond Stalinism,* London, Frank Cass, pp.87-96.

115/ Ibid., p. 92. In Hoffman's view, Marx and Engels themselves were responsible for the theory of circumstances. (pp. 87-92)

116/ Ibid, p.92.

117/ I study the effect of the Russian Civil War on the future Soviet state in Part three of this thesis, pp. 87-100.

118/ Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, p. 81.

119/ Ibid.

120/ Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, p. 30.

121/ Ibid.

122/ Jonathan Frankel, "Lenin's Doctrinal Revolution of April 1917," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1969), p. 118.

123/ Charles Elliot argues against this argument. He maintains that 'in contrast to Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin had no desire in uniting the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of the RSDLP. His entire policy was based on the maintenance of this split.' (Elliot, "Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg...," pp.335-6.)

124/ For a discussion of this point, see Haimson, "Lenin's Revolutionary Career Revisited," pp. 63-65.

125/ K. Marx (1974) "Provisional Rules of the International" in *The First International and After*, London, Penguin Books, p. 82.

126/ Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...*, p. 83.

127/ L. Trotsky (1962) *Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects*, London, New Park, pp.7-8.

128/ See T. Shanin, *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism*, New York, Monthly Review Press, pp.102-103.

129/ K Marx and F Engels, "Address of the Central Committee of the Communist League (March 1850)," in *Selected Writings*, p.306. For a discussion of this point, see Alex Callinicos (1995) *The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx*, London, Bookmarks, p. 209.

130/ Lenin (1964) "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p.22.

131/ Lenin (1964) "The Class Character of the Revolution That Has Taken Place" in *Collected Works* Vol. 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 57.

132/ For factional struggle within the Bolshevik party see Lenin, *"Left Wing" Communism...*, pp.29-31. For Kamnev's and Zinoviev's opposition to armed revolt was a case in point: see Robert V. Daniels "The Bolshevik Gamble", *Russian Review*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1967), p.337.

133/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, pp. 33-36.

134/ Daniels, "The Bolshevik Gamble", p.332.

135/ Lenin's view of revolution was closely related to two stages in his work: the first had to do with the importance of the peasant question in making the revolution happen (the revolution was only possible in the alliance between the workers and the peasants because for him Russia was predominantly rural and the peasantry could play a gigantic role in revolutionary work); the second was mainly focussed on his concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry' forged in his late political work. For Lenin, carrying out the revolution immediately even in inopportune conditions stood as a historical necessity. That was of course because Russia had very specific features and was not, as Marx himself asserted (*The Communist Manifesto:* Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882, p. 196), similar to the rest of the West. This standpoint was relatively accurate since Marx and Engels themselves praised the Narodniks for their agrarian socialism and even for assassinating Alexander II.

136/ Engels in *Anti-Duhring* and Marx in *Critique of the Gotha Programme* reiterated the necessity to do without the state altogether. In *the State and Revolution* Lenin made use of these works in the hope of legitimating the necessity of smashing the state machine.

137/ In *What is to be Done?*, he expressed such an understanding by altering altogether the role of the workers in revolutionary struggle; the struggle for attaining unassailable power had to be accounted for by the re-definition of workers' historical role (in Marx's sense).

138/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 33.

139/ Ibid., pp. 18-20.

140/ Ibid, p. 33.

141/ See Esther Kingston Mann, "Lenin and the Challenge of Peasant Militance: From Bloody Sunday 1905 to the Dissolution of the First Duma," *Russian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), p. 434.

142/ Lenin (1964) "To the Rural Poor" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 361-432.

143/ In the period of "War Communism" many of the peasants were hostile to, and earnestly resisted, the requisition measures taken by the Bolsheviks. For an account of peasant responses to the policy of requisitioning, see Part three of this thesis, pp. 100-101.

144/ Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" in *Collected Works,* p23.

145/ The Spartacus Group was a group of exiled Socialist-Democratic revolutionaries which consisted of, among others, Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

146/ For Lenin's position vis-à-vis Trotsky's concept of 'permanent revolution,' see Daniels "The Bolshevik Gamble," pp. 331-40.

147/ See Archie Brown (2004) (ed.) *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan , pp.2-3. See also Tom Freeman "Was Lenin a Marxist...?," pp.17-18

148/ Ibid.

149/ Cited in Ibid., p.3.

150/ Lenin (1964) "What Should be the Name of our Party" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 84.

151/ Lenin argued that the representatives of social-chauvinism internationally included 'Plekhanov, Potresov, Breshkovskaya...Chernov and Co. in Russia; Scheidemann, Legien, David and others in Germany, Renaudel, Guesde, Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Hyndman and the Fabians in England. (*The State and Revolution,* p. 3)

152/ Lenin (1964) "The Situation within the Socialist International" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 74.

153/ For this point, see for example *Left-Wing Communism...,* p. 22-3.

154/ Lenin, "The Situation within the Socialist International," p. 76.

155/ Ibid, 'The chief leader and spokesman of the "Centre" is Karl Kautsky, the most outstanding authority in the Second International (1889-1914), since August 1914 a model of utter bankruptcy as a Marxist, the embodiment of unheard-of spinelessness, and the most wretched vacillations and betrayals. This "Centrist" trend includes Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour and the so-called workers' or labour group in the Reichstag; in France it includes Longuet, Pressemane and the so-called minorities (Mensheviks) in general; in Britain, Philip Snowden, Ramsay MacDonald and many other leaders of the Independent Labour Party, and some leaders of the British Socialist Party; Morris Hillquit and many others in the United States; Turati, Tréves, Modigliani and others in Italy; Robert Grimm and others in Switzerland; Victor Adler and Co. in Austria; the party of the Organising Committee, Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze, Tsereteli and others in Russia, and so forth.' ("The Situation within the Socialist International" pp. 76-7)

156/ Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," p. 26.

157/ Lenin, "What Should be the Name of Our Party," p. 84.

158/ Lenin (1974) "Democracy and Dictatorship" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 368-372).

159/ Ibid., pp. 369.

160/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 14.

161/ Ibid., p. 78.

162/ Actually, Lenin took such argument from Engels who in the his introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France* wrote that '[i]n reality...the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy.' (*The Civil War in France,* p.17)

163/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution,* pp.16-21.

164/ Ibid., p.18.

165/ Ibid., p.19

166/ Ibid, p.20

167/ Lenin, "Thesis 4" in "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," in *Collected Works* , p.23

168/ Lenin, "Thesis 9" in Ibid., p.24.

169/ "Thesis 10" in Ibid.

170/ "Thesis 3" in Ibid., p.22.

171/ Lenin (1977) "First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 17.

172 / In 1918 Lenin decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly mainly because, for him, it presented an obstacle to the transition to socialism.

173/ Lenin, *Marxism and Revisionism*, p. 24.

174/ Hoffman, *Beyond the State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 138.

175/ Ibid., pp.137-8.

176/ This can be seen especially in *The State and Revolution.*

Notes to Part 2

1/ 'Dual power' resulted from the February Revolution. It signifies the alliance between the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government in the post-revolution period. By April 1917, it became a rather loose concept mainly because the respective interests of the Soviet and the Provisional government were in constant conflict. By July 1917, however, 'dual power' seemed useless and finally collapsed when the workers marched and cried out the slogan 'All power to the soviets.'

2/ Contrary to this argument, Fitzpatrick thinks that the Russian Civil War was primarily caused by the Bolsheviks themselves. She asserts that 'the Civil War was not an unforeseeable act of God for which the Bolsheviks were in no way responsible. On the contrary, the Bolsheviks had associated themselves with armed confrontation and violence in the months between February and October 1917; and, as the Bolshevik leaders knew perfectly well before the event, their October *coup* was seen by many as an outright provocation to civil war. The Civil War certainly gave the new regime a baptism by fire, and thereby influenced its future development. But it was the kind of baptism the Bolsheviks had risked, and may even have sought. (Fitzpatrick (1994) *The Russian Revolution*, Oxford University Press, p. 72.)

3/ See Ibid., p. 74.

4/ Ibid, p. 75. For the intervention of external forces in the Civil War, see Richard Pipes (1994) *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, London, Fontana Press, pp.63-73.

5/ In 1914, Lenin and other Bolsheviks like Zinoviev asserted that 'imperialist war must be transformed into civil war.' (Cited in Victor Serge (1972) *Year One of the Russian Revolution*, London, The Penguin Press, p.57.)

6/ Lenin (1971) "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, 2nd English Edition, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp.682-3.

7/ See Joseph Stalin (1976) "The Foundations of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp.1-15.

8/ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks...," p. 683.

9/ Ibid.

10/ "Food dictatorship" was a policy decreed in 1918 in adverse Civil War conditions. It was an attempt to allow the Soviet government collect surpluses of grain and other harvests from the richer peasants in order to feed the Red Army and the working classes. Such a policy failed and was abolished in 1919 after it had reduced the regime's popularity.

11/ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks...," p. 684.

12/ State administering, as Lenin envisaged, means taking care of the state's business by organising an institutional framework that would guarantee that capitalist interest is constantly put at bay, and that scientific socialism is correctly put into practice. It was for this reason that the Soviet socialist state had to function in response to an economic rather than political agenda.

13/ Cited in Paul Craig Roberts, "'War Communism' a Re-Examination", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1970), p. 243.

14/ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks...," p. 685.

15/ Fitzpatrick argues that the Civil War was seen by Bolsheviks as a class war, both in domestic and international levels: Russian proletariat against Russian bourgeoisie; 'international revolution against international capitalism.' (Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution.)*

16/ Lenin's definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in this context approximates to Bukharin's overall analysis of the role and function of the proletarian state in the aftermath of the revolution. For Bukharin, socialist economy responds first and foremost to the form of rule the proletarian state takes—which in great part takes its form from the dictatorship of the proletariat; it had to be a state wherein 'the proletariat [is] organized as the state power.' (N. I. Bukharin (1982) *Selected Writings on the State and the Transition to Socialism*, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, p. XL) In this instance, the socialist state structure cannot be organized in its proletarian element unless one basic condition for its success is satisfied—nationalisation of the economy. (p. XL)

17/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p.68.

18/ Ibid., p.69.

19/ Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks...," p. 686

20/ Ibid., p. 687.

21/ The foundation of a proletarian culture seemed a task that could only happen in the long run. The primary condition was not only to forge such a culture with regard to the Soviet context, but also, and most importantly, through an application of Marxist theory as appeared in *the Communist Manifesto*: 'Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture. Only further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by the practical experience of the

proletarian dictatorship as the final stage in the struggle against every form of exploitation, can be recognised as the development of a genuine proletarian culture.' (Lenin (1965) "On Proletarian Culture" in *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 4th English Edition, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pages 300-301). For Lenin's view that socialist culture should be related to the belief in the party as the vanguard, see his "Workers in Education and Socialist Culture" *Collected Works*, Vol.29, 4th English Edition, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 532-539.

22/ Lenin, *The State and Revolution,* p.83.

23/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p.79.

24/ Ibid, p.80

25/ E. H Carr (1963) *The Bolshevik Revolution* 1917- 1923, London, Macmillan, p. 175.

26/ Cited in Ibid., p.179.

27/ Lars T. Lih "Bolshevik Razverstka and War Communism," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter., 1986), p. 673. For this point, see Bertrand M. Patenaude, "Peasants into Russians: the Utopian Essence of War Communism," *Russian Review,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), 552-570.

28/ E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, pp.147-148.

29/ Ibid., p. 148.

30/ Ibid.

31/ Ibid., p.149.

32/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p.81.

33/ Cited in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, p.150.

34/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p.78.

35/ Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 150.

36/ The middle peasantry was tactically used by people like Nikolai Osinskii who believed that it in order to develop the agricultural system the state needed to 'regulate agricultural production.' Some scholars like Patenaude note that the scheme of agricultural organisation could only be carried out feasibly by 'militarizing the economy' through the help of the middle peasants. 'The middle peasant,' Patenaude quotes Osinskii, 'is coming to realize that agricultural production is a state matter which the state can and must regulate and organize and that *only state intervention will prevent an otherwise inevitable crisis and will preserve, consolidate and develop farming.* (Osinskii's italics) (Patenaude , "Peasants into Russians...," p. 564)

37/ Cited in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 163.

38/ Lenin also asserted that [t]he party makes it its task to separate the middle peasantry from the kulaks, to win it over to the side of the working class by attentive consideration for its needs, struggling against its backwardness by measures of ideological persuasion, and at all by measures of repression...and making concessions to it in the choice of means of carrying out socialist transformations. (Cited in Ibid.)

39/ Fitzpatrick, for example, argues that 'there was a wildly impractical and utopian streak in a great deal of Bolshevik thinking during the civil war' One defining element of such a utopia is that Bolsheviks cannot be said to be 'laboratory assistants', but were in great part 'revolutionary enthusiasts.' (*The Russian Revolution,* p.83). For Fitzpatrick, Lenin and other Bolsheviks did have the illusion that the 'economic policies of War communism' reflected Russia's advance towards communism. Two significant aspects reflected such a utopia: 1) They thought that the 'Poles would recognize the troops as proletarian brothers; 2) and they 'confused rampant inflation and currency devaluation with the withering away of money.' (p.84)

40/ Bertrand M. Patenaude, "Peasants into Russians...," pp. 552-570.

41/ Ibid., p. 553.

42/ Novelist name Lurii Libedinskii.

43/ Patenaude, "Peasants into Russians...," p.552.

44/ The two factors constituted what I call in Part 4 of this thesis the Soviet 'Leviathan state'

45/ Cited in Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, P 71.

46/ Patenaude, "Peasants into Russians...," p.552.

47/ Cited in Paul Graig Roberts, "'War Communism...," p. 263.

48/ K. Marx, *Selected Writings,* p.372.

49/ Cited in Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p. 76.

50/ For a discussion of this point, see, for example, Callinicos (1991) *The Revenge of History*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.26-7.

51/ See Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 243.

52/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p.76.

53/ For a thorough discussion of the role of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply, see Patenaude, "Peasants into Russians...," pp. 552-570.

54/ Ibid., p. 553.

55/ Cited in Ibid., p. 557.

56/ Lars T Lih "Bolshevik Razverstka...," p. 673.

57/ Graig Roberts , "War Communism...," pp. 244.

58/ Cited in Ibid.

59/ L. T. Lih, "Bolshevik Razverstka...," p. 675.

60/ Cited in Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p. 27.

61/ Ibid. For a discussion of this point, see Graig Roberts, "War Communism...," p.245.

62/ Ibid.

63/ Harold Shukman (2003) *Redefining Stalinism* (ed.,) London, Frank Cass, p.3.

64/ Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, p. 2.

65/ Ibid.

66/ Ibid.

67/ Ibid., p.3

68/ Ibid.

69/ Ibid.

70/ See Lenin (1982) *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 83-93.

71/ Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 4-6

72/ Ibid., p. 6.

73/ Ibid.

74/ Ibid., pp. 6-7

75/ Actually this explanation might well elucidate Lenin's legitimation of an inopportune (untimely) revolution in Russia as I broach in Part I of this thesis. Basically this can also work as a justification of the fact that the circumstances in Russia played a decisive role in making Leninism assume the responsibility for the revolution.

76/ Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 8-9.

77/ Ibid., p. 9.

78/ Ibid., pp. 11-9.

79/ V. I. Lenin and J. Stalin (1946) *Marxism and Revisionism*, New York, International Publishers, pp.52-64.

80/ Ibid., p.57.

81/ Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, pp.11-12.

82/ Ibid, p.13.

83/ Ibid, pp.13-4

84/ V. I. Lenin and J. Stalin (1946) *Marxism and Revisionism*, p.57.

85/ Ibid., pp.59-60.

86/ Some scholars like Robert Himmer think that Stalin's "Socialism in One Country" was strongly inspired by War Communism. (Himmer, "The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy: An Analysis of Stalin's Views," *Russian Review,* Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), p.516n3.)

87/ See, for example, O. A. Narklewicz, "Stalin War Communism, and Collectivization," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July., 1966), p. 22.

88/ For this point, see, for example, Herbert J. Allison, "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Apr., 1961), p.189.

89/ For a view that the Kronstadt uprising constituted the spark for a new working class and peasant order, see Ruth Fischer "Background of the New Economic Policy," *Russian Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring., 1948), pp.29-33. See also V. N. Bandera, "the New Economic Policy as an Economic System," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 1963), p. 265. Actually in 1922 Lenin expressed his satisfaction with the social stability that NEP had introduced: 'The peasant risings which formerly, before 1921, were so to speak, a feature of the general Russian picture, have almost completely disappeared.' (Cited in E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution,* p.295.)

90/ Carr., *The Bolshevik Revolution*, p.281.

91/ Ibid., pp.282-283.

92/ For a discussion of this point, see Lars T. Lih "Political Testament of Lenin and Bukharin and the Meaning of Nep," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer., 1991), pp. 243-4.

93/ V. N. Bandera, "The NEP as a New Economic System," p. 268.

94/ Cited in Ibid., p. 266.

95/ Ibid., p. 267.

96/ Cited in Simon Johnson and Peter Temin, "the Macroeconomics of NEP," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), p. 750.

97/ Johnson and Temin, "The Macroeconomics of NEP", p.751

98/ Ibid.

99/ Cited in Himmer, "The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy...," pp. 516-7.

100/ M. Lewin, "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Oct., 1965), p.162.

101/ Ibid.

102/ Ibid., p. 164.

103/ Cited in H. J. Allison, "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture," p. 191.

104/ Cited in Calvin B. Hoover, "The Fate of the New Economic Policy," *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 158 (Jun., 1930), p. 186.

105/ For the significance of First Five-Year Plan to Stalin, see M. Lewin, "Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization," pp. 178-182. See also the same article for the immediate effects of the First Five-Year Plan on the peasantry in 1928-1929, pp. 182-184.

106/ Cited in Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p. 28.

107/ R. C. Tucker (1971) *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, Norton & Co, p.57.

108/ Roy Medvedev (1972) *Let History Judge*, London, Macmillan, p.43.

109/ Ibid., p.87.

110/ Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p.30.

111/ Ibid., p.32.

112/ Ibid.

113/ Moshe Lewin (1985) *The Making of the Soviet System*, London, Methuen and Co. Ltd, pp.242-43. For a discussion of this point, see H. Arendt (1976) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, London, Harcourt Brace & Company, pp. 318-23.

114/ K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p.235.

115/ Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p. 40.

116/ Lewin, *The Making...*, p. 243.

117/ Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, pp.64-65.

118/ Kotz, 1997, p.19

119/ In the *Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* Archie Brown et al argue that the basic ideological solidity of Marxism-Leninism was shaken by the 'new thinking' following from Gorbachev's famous *perestroika* and *glasnost*. The authors single-mindedly assert that the Stalinist system (officially Marxist-Leninist) was systemically all too fragile to stand the liberal axioms of freedom of speech, enfranchisement, the market economy, and 'republic sovereignty' (Archie Brown et al (2004) *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan.)

120/ Vincent Jauvert has recently interviewed some of the remaining closest people to Stalin who survived his terror. The survivors interviewed have confirmed that Stalin was not only blood-thirsty but also sought to destroy Soviet society as a whole. (Vincent Jauvert, "Les Derniers Secrets de Staline," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No. 2177 (July/August 2006), pp. 6-15.

121/ Bialer, Seweryn. (1995) "Domestic and International Factors in the Formation of Gorbachev Reforms" in A. Dallin (ed.), *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse*, Colorado, Westview Press, pp.28-35.

122/ Ibid., p.32.

123/ Ibid.

124/ Cited in Marshall Goldman (1992) *What Went Wrong with Perestroika*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, p.84.

125/ Cited in David Lane (1992) *Soviet Society under Perestroika*, London, Routledge, p. 57.

126/ Michael Gorbachev (1990) *A Road to the Future*, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Ocean Tree Books, p. 13.

127/ Ibid., p. 18.

128/ Ibid., p. 30.

129/ Ibid., p. 31.

130/ Ibid., pp.14-5.

131/ Ibid., p. 15.

132/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong*..., p.12.

133/ Lane, *Soviet Society*, p.13.

134/ Richard Sakwa (1998) *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, London, Routledge, p.142.

135/ Stephen White (1993) *After Gorbachev*, Cambridge University Press, p. 29.

136/ Ibid., p. 29-30.

137/ Ibid., p. 30.

138/ Archie Brown (2004) "The Rise of Non-Leninist Thinking about the Political System" in A. Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia*, p.22. Brown also argues that the Gorbachev reforms were at first 'system-adaptive' and brought in very little change. They became 'system-transformative' only in the summer of 1988 when fundamental restructuring occurred. One of the measures adopted was 'the election of presidents in the Soviet republics', a prelude to 'the election of Yeltsin as President of the USSR in 1991'. (p.23)

139/ Ibid., p. 24-25.

140/ White, *After Gorbachev*..., p. 40.

141/ From Article Six of the Soviet Constitution (Cited in Lane, *Soviet Society*..., p. 59.)

142 / Lane, *Soviet Society*..., p. 65.

143/ Igor V. Timofeyev (2004) "The Development of Russian Liberal Thought since 1985" in A. Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia*, p.53. For Timofeyev, the chief areas of interest in which liberalism was truly expressed were 'individualism', perestroika, and glasnost. All three areas touch on the necessity to negotiate a *smooth* transition from exclusive and compulsory socialist communtarianism to the liberated individual—whose freedom is an essential constituent of the stability of society (pp. 53-60)—from party dictatorship to political pluralism (pp. 60-76), and from bureaucratic-command socialism to 'free enterprise'. (pp. 60-76) Nevertheless, Timofeyev argues that the unity of the three components was objectively in need for practical solutions. The main difficulty facing post-Soviet Russians did not lie in introducing liberal thinking but in the necessity to reconcile between the requirements of liberalism and the *vestiges* of communism in a society in transition.

144/ Moshe Lewin (1988) *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation*, London, Hutchinson Radius, p. 126.

145/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 61.

146/ Ibid., p.66.

147/ Cited in Ibid., p. 75.

148/ Marx, *Selected Writings,* p. 585.

149/ Richard Sakwa (1990) *Gorbachev and his Reforms: 1985-1990*, New York, Phillip Allan., p. 143.

150/ Marx, *Selected Writings*, p. 587.

151/ Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his Reforms...*, p. 182.

152/ Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon,* p. 133.

153/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, pp. 224-25.

154/ Cited in White, *After Gorbachev,* p. 103.

155/ Ibid., p. 104.

156/ Alec Nove "The Rise of Non-Leninist Thinking on the Economy" in A. Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia,* p.44.

157/ White, *After Gorbachev,* p. 107.

158/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 38.

159/ Ibid.

160/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, p. 118.

161/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 39.

162/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, p. 118.

163/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 39.

164/ White, *After Gorbachev,* p. 112.

165/ Taylor Naylor (1988) *The Gorbachev Strategy*, Lexington, Lexington Books, p. 145.

166/ White, *After Gorbachev,* p. 120.

167/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 49.

168/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, p. 229.

169/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p . 49.

170/ Goldman, Marshall. (1995) "The Effort Collapses", in Alexander Dallin (1995) (ed.), *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse*, Colorado, Westview Press, p. 339.

171/ Ibid.

172/ In response to a question posed by my supervisor, Stephen Hopkins—whether or not Gorvachev 'intended to rescue the political system from the political morass'—I think that, *true,* Gorbachev was doing his best to '"rescue" the political system. But one would also contend that whether or not he 'intended' the rescue, he only finally transformed the 'morass' into destruction.

173/ Lane, *Soviet Society...*, p. 126.

174/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, p. 230.

175/ Cited in Goldman, "The Effort Collapses" in Alexander Dallin (ed.), *The Soviet System...*, p. 340.

176/ Ibid., p. 345.

177/ Goldman, *What Went Wrong...*, p. 19.

178/ Peter Schweizer (1994) *Victory*: *The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, New York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, p. xii.

Notes to Part 3

1/ Basing my argument on a politico-philosophical reading of the Soviet system, I will try in part four of the present work to argue against basic premises of the political historians. I will direct my criticism against mainly the "continuity thesis": Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism.

2/ Jerry F. Hough argues that there are two basic models in the school of totalitarianism: the 'developmental model' and the 'operational model'. While the first seeks to prove that the actual ideology of the Soviet state came as a result of the 'development' of Marxian thought into Bolshevism, the second is concerned with the study of the totalitarian regime at work.

(Hough, "The 'Dark Forces,' the Totalitarian Model, and Soviet History" *Russian Review,* Vol. 46, No. 4. (Oct., 1987), pp. 397-403.)

3/ See Hanah Arendt (1976) "Totalitarianism in Power" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, pp. 389-459. See also Richard Pipes (1995) "Why Did the Bolsheviks Triumph" in *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution,* London, Pimlico, pp. 38-9. The study of the Soviet "totalitarian" system has itself not only drawn the attention of scholars to consider the socialist experience, its promises, achievements, and failures. It also generated new sub-disciplines within political science and history; we now speak no more of interpretations of the Soviet experience as such but of *interpretations of interpretations*, that is, enquiries on the way Soviet state "authoritarianism" for instance was interpreted by classical historians and mainstream political historiography.

4/ Arendt, "The Totalitarian Movement" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* pp.341-364

5/ For the concept of "revolution from above," see "Revolution from Above" (1977) in Robert C. Tucker (ed.) *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation,* New York. See also Steve F Cohen's "Stalin's Terror as Social History" *Russian Review,* Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 375-6.

6/ Hough, "The 'Dark Forces,' the Totalitarian Model, and Soviet History," pp.397-8.

7/ Richard Pipes's most influential works include, *The Russian Revolution 1899-1919,* London, the Fontana Press, 1992: see especially "The October Coup," pp. 439-505, and "Building the One-Party State," pp.506-565; *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919 1924,* London, Fontana Press, 1995: especially, "Reflections on the Russian Revolution," pp. 490-512. The work of Martin Malia includes, among other well-informed works, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia,* 1917-1991, New York, The Free Press, 1994.

8/ One of Daniels's most influential works is *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism*, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., (1991); for a more thorough account of how the October Revolution was carried out and how the Bolsheviks seized and retained state power, see Daniels (1968) *Red October*, London, Secker and Warburg.

9/ For a discussion whether the 'violence' associated with the Russian Revolution had an 'ideological' (Marxian) basis or historical (Russia's history) basis, see Peter Holquist, "Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* Vol. 4, No. 3. (Summer 2003), pp.227-252. For an argument that the Soviet totalitarian system had both ideological (Marxian) and historical (Russia's past) origins, see Leszek Kolakowski (*1977*) "Marxist Roots of Stalinism" in Robert C. Tucker (ed.) *Stalinism,* p. 293: 'To say that "genes" (inherited ideology) were *entirely* (my

italics) responsible for the actual shape of the child would obviously be as silly as to state that this shape is to be *exclusively* (my italics) accounted for by "environment," i.e., contingent historical events...'. The focus on the 'genetic' link between Marx and Lenin can be traced in the work of Victor Serge. Seeing Lenin as the great epoch-making leader of his time Serge argues that Lenin's book on October, *On the Road to Insurrection* was 'a vital work...a model of revolutionary dialectics' that 'ranks with the *Communist Manifesto*, to which it forms...a necessary compliment.' He also adds that Lenin's 'doctrine of insurrection' approximates to that of Karl Marx. (Victor Serge, *Year One of the Russian Revolution,* London, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972, pp.62-63.) Others like Leonard Schapiro emphasise the interaction of "genetic" and "environmental" factors behind Lenin's revolutionary tendencies. By the end of the 1890s Lenin 'was first making himself master of the works of Marx. These, and the classic of Russian nineteenth-century radicalism, as well as the work of Plekhanov' influenced 'Lenin and his circle of like-minded believers in Marxism.' (Leonard Schapiro (1985) *1917: Russian Revolutions and the Origins of Present Day Communism*, London, Penguin Books, p.24.)

10/ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Revision and Retreat in the Historiography of 1917: Social History and its Critics," *Russian Review*, Vol.53, No.2 (Apr., 1994), p.168

11/ Cited in Ibid. An importnat work by Martin Malia is *The Soviet Tragedy*...(see especially chapter 4 "A Regime is Born," pp.109-138).

12/ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy*..., p.100; for a thorough view of how the Bolshevik Party came to control political life in the aftermath of the Revolution, see "Proletariat or Party?" in *The Soviet Tragedy*, pp.98-108.

13/ Tucker (1971) *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, Norton & Co, p.211.

14/ Ibid., p.212; for a view whether the Soviet system was an oligarchy or dictatorship, see Robert G Wesson, "The USSR: Oligarchy or Dictatorship?" *Slavic Review,* Vol. 31, No. 2. (Jun., 1972), pp.314-322; for a view that Stalinism was a modern, rather than conservative, form of dictatorship, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 20, No. 3. (Oct., 1961), pp. 351-368.

15/ Some scholars like Sheila Fitzpatrick maintain that Tucker's position has also been influenced by some revisionist views: see Fitzpatrick, "Politics as Practice: Thoughts on a New Soviet Political History," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (2004), pp. 30, 33.

16/ Suny, "Revision and Retreat...," p.173. For a discussion whether the February revolution had a mass basis, see Stanley Page, "The Role of the Proletariat in March 1917:

Contradictions within the official Bolshevik Version," *Russian Review,* Vol. 9, No. 2. (Apr., 1950), pp. 146-149. In this article Page argues that the official Bolshevik statement of the positive and self-initiated militancy of the workers in the March 1917 Revolution was basically a gross lie aimed at misleading millions of people around the world. Such a lie is clearly revealed through the declaration by the Central Committee in 1938 that 'the [March] revolution was victorious because its vanguard was the working class which headed the movement of millions of peasants clad in soldiers' uniform demanding "peace, bread, and liberty." It was the hegemony of the proletariat that determined the success of the revolution.' (p. 146) Page argues that with no other possible hope to legitimate the so-called workers' revolution, the Central Committee could at best only validate its claims by quoting Lenin's assertion that 'the revolution was made by the proletariat.' (Cited in Ibid)

17/ Alex Callinicos, (1991) *The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, p.21.

18/ Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind,* p.178. Paradoxically, Tucker states in the same book that the drive for conspiracy was 'un'-Leninist' in character. (p.56)

19/ Ibid., p.6. For Tucker's view that Stalin's practices were akin to those of Peter the Great, see Tucker (1997) "A New Peter the Great" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.,) *The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era*, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, pp.219-233.

20/ Arendt, "The Totalitarian Movement" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* pp.341-388

21/ Ibid., p.341.

22/ Ibid, p.343.

23/ Ibid., p.364.

24/ Ibid, p. 466.

25/ Ibid., p. 463-4.

26/ Ibid., p.465. For the idea of extensive terror against society (Jews, peasants including Kulaks, see Michal Reiman, "The Formation of Stalinism" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.,) *The Stalin Revolution,* p.50; see also pp.56-57 for how social terror, while not being necessarily political, was politically contrived: 'As a social instrument, terror could not be aimed narrowly, at particular persons. It was an instrument of violent change, affecting the living and working conditions of millions, imposing the very worst forms of social oppression...[P]olitical repression [however] only supplemented social repression.' (p.56); for a seminal study of Soviet anti-Semitism, see William Korey, "The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis" *Slavic Review,* Vol. 31, No. 1. (Mar., 1972), pp. 111-135.

27/ See for example, Pipes (1996) *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archives.* Annals of Communism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

28/ See Peter Kenez, "The Prosecution of Soviet History: A Critique of Richard Pipes' *The Russian Revolution,*" *Russian Review*, Vol. 50, No.3 (Jul., 1991), pp.345-351; also "The Prosecution of Soviet History, Vol. 2, *Russian Review*, Vol.54, No.2 (Apr., 1995) pp. 265-269; see also Alexander Rabinowitch, "Richard Pipes's Lenin", *Russian Review*, Vol.57, No.1 (Jan., 1998), 110-113.

29/ Kenez, "The Prosecution of Soviet History: A Critique of Richard Pipes' *The Russian Revolution.*"

30/ Ibid., p.346

31/ Ibid., p.347.

32/ Ibid., p.348: for a view that the October Revolution was a break with the past rather than a confirmation of it, see Hough, "The 'Dark Forces'..., " p.401.

33/ Ibid., p. 351.

34/ This is also revisited in Pipes' *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution*; see also *The Unknown Lenin*, p.16.

35/ Kenez, "The Prosecution of Soviet History: A Critique of Richard Pipes' *The Russian Revolution.*" 349-50.

36/ Pipes, *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution*, p.32.

37/ Ibid., pp. 35-6.

38/ Ibid., p. 35.

39/ Ibid., pp. 38-9.

40/ Ibid., pp.41-2. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between Leninism and Bolshevism, see Moshe Lewin (1985) "Leninism and Bolshevism" in *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia,* London, Methuen & Co. Ltd, pp.191-207.

41/ Cited in Rabinowitch, "Richard Pipes's Lenin", p.111.

42/ Hough, "The 'Dark Forces'..., " p.401.

43/ Ibid.

44/ Ibid.

45/ Ibid. Viewing the October Revolution in such a way, Hough, it seems to me, has made a serious mistake by equating a revolution carried out in the name of Islam and grounded primarily on a religious prerogative with a revolution characteristically transcendental of religion and particularly hostile to modernity mainly in its western cloak. The difference

between the Khomeini Revolution and that of the Bolsheviks, I think, is that while the former sought to reject modernity in its entirety because it contradicted with Islam as a political ideology, the latter, for its part, did not reject modernity in principle but only sought to experience it as a necessary stage leading to the demise of capitalism itself and the 'withering away' of the state. The other mistake which Hough commits in this respect is to believe that Lenin's 'rejection' of the 'West' means a rejection of the technological basis for capitalism, that is, industrialism; Lenin for our purposes, like Marx before him, at least theoretically considered both in his early and late work Western capitalism and the bourgeois revolution as temporary, but necessary stages for the progress of humankind towards socialism. (see section 2 part I of this dissertation) Hough's attack on Lenin as an enemy of 'democratic parliamentarism' (p.402) seems to have been reliant on a simplistic and dismissive reading of Lenin's basic work.

46/ Cohen (1977) "Bolshevism and Stalinism" in Robert C. Tucker (ed.,) *Stalinism*, p. 4.

47/ Ibid., p. 14.

48/ Ibid., p. 16.

49/ Ibid.

50/ Ibid., p. 17; see also Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, pp.173-9.

51/ Here I think that Cohen's treatment of Stalin is somehow misleading, mainly because he avoids referring to Stalinism as a cult. He rather prefers the expression 'Bolshevik cult.' For the Stalin cult, see Tucker, "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult" *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 347-366; see also Roy A. Medvedev, "The Social Basis of Stalinism" and Nikita Khrushchev, "the Cult of Personality," in Robert V Daniels (ed.,) *The Stalin Revolution*, pp.236-8 and pp.196-207; for the difference between the Stalin cult and the Lenin cult, compare the above-mentioned articles with Nina Tumarkin's "Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult," *Russian Review,* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 35-46.

52/ See Robert V. Daniels (1991) "Stalinism as Postrevolutionary Dictatorship" in *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism*, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., pp.121-135.

53/ See for example Lewis Siegelbaum, "Robert V. Daniels and the Longue Duree of Soviet History," *Russian Review*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 330-340.

54/ Daniels, "Thought and Action under Soviet Totalitarianism: A Reply to George Enteen and Lewis Siegelbaum," *Russian Review,* Vol. 54, No. 3. (Jul., 1995), p.345.

55/ Ibid.

56/ Ibid., p. 350.

57/ Ibid., p.346.

58/ Daniels, "the Bolshevik Gamble," *Russian Review,* Vol. 26, No. 4. (Oct., 1967), p. 337. In "Towards a Social History of the October Revolution," Suny asserts that the 'accident argument has been advanced not only by Daniels but also Sergei P. Melgunov. In Suny's words, this might well be called the 'conservative-accidentalist' interpretation of the October revolution, (pp.39-41): '...The uprising had become an obsession with Lenin. The Bolshevik seizure of power, once the title of Melgunov's book, was made by 'Lenin's will' alone. The revolution had no real mass basis, apart from the support it had from the 'sailors of Kronstadt and Helsinki' and 'the Russian public was completely absent on that tragic day.' According to Suny, Daniels, unlike Melgunov, did not deny wholly popular support for the revolution. He only dubbed it a "galloping chaos," "a veritable orgy of democracy," and "a wild gamble." In *The Revenge of History,* Callinicos refutes the 'accident thesis' (p.22) by arguing that

> ...it just seems wrong to regard the 1917 Revolution as an accident. This interpretation leaves out of account the extent to which the entire European state-system was thrown into a *general* crisis towards the end of the First World War. In some ways the most striking episode in this crisis was not the Russian Revolution itself but the succession of upheavals that convulsed the most advanced European Power, Germany, for almost five years, from the Revolution of November 1918 which overthrew the Kaiser to the Communist Party's abortive attempt to seize power in October 1923 in the wake of the Great inflation of that year.

59/ Daniels, "The Bolshevik Gamble," p. 338.

60/ Cited in George Enteen, "Robert V. Daniels's Interpretation of Soviet History," *Russian Review,* Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), p.319. For a similar argument, see Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p.21.

61/ Here compare Daniels's concept with Tucker's concept of 'post-revolutionary revolution' in *The Soviet Political Mind,* p. 8.

62/ R. V. Daniels, *Trotsky Stalin, and Socialism*, p. 129. For the concept of "counter-revolution from above," see Robert V. Daniels (1997) (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era*, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, pp.143-207.

63/ Ibid., p. 131.

64/ Cited in Enteen, "Robert V. Daniels's Interpretation...," p. 318.

65/ The sociologist Zagorka Golubovič criticised Kolakowski's position for being "blind" to 'basic differences' between Lenin and Stalin: "Stalinism against Socialism" in Robert V. Daniels, *The Stalin Revolution*, p.282.

66/ L. Kolakowski, "Marxist Roots of Stalinism," p. 287.

67/ Ibid.

68/ Ibid.

69/ Ibid., p.292.

70/ Ibid., p. 285.

71/ N. V. Zagladin, "Stalinism and Totalitarianism" in Robert V. Daniels, *The Stalin Revolution*, p.264.

72/ Ibid., p.265

73/ Ibid.

74/ Ibid., p.266

75/ Adam B. Ulam (1960) *The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism.* New York, Random House, p. 191.

76/ Ibid., p.191-2.

77/ Ibid., p.194

78/ Ibid., p.195

79/ Ibid., p.203

80/ John Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?" *Leicester University Discussion Papers in Politics,* No. p91/1 (Sep., 1991), pp. 7-9. See also his "The State: 'Has the Withering Away' Thesis Finally Withered Away?" (1992) in Ronald J. Hill (ed.,) *Beyond Stalinism: Communist Political Evolution.* Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, , pp. 92-96.

81/ Hoffman, "The State: 'Has the Withering Away' Thesis ...?" p. 84.

82/ For a thorough discussion of this point see also "Has Marxism a Future?", p.2; for the idea that Marxism is betrayed by its own anti-statist premises, see Hoffman's *Beyond the State* (1995) Polity Press, pp. 140-144.

83/ It seems to me that in terms of theory Marxism is clear about its methodical and intentional *inconsistency*. Let us observe that Hoffman's argument in this respect is erroneous in two respects. First, no single reader of the Marxian text, I would suggest, can deny that both Marx and Engels did on some occasions congratulate "anarchist" revolutionaries on their illegal but wholly "legitimate" violence against the state: the anarchism of the Blanquists at the time of the 1871 Paris Commune is a case in point (see Frederick Engels' introduction to *The Civil War in France* (1970), Peking, Foreign Languages Press, pp.12-13); Marx's support for the assassination of the tsar in 1881 is also a good example. Lenin also was clear about the question of anarchism when he confirmed the fact that the Bolsheviks 'do not at all disagree

with the *anarchists* on the question of the abolition of the state as an aim.' (See Lenin, (1992) *The State and Revolution*, London, Penguin Books, p.55)

One might well notice here that measured against his overall theory, Marx's support for anarchism was only circumstantial and bound to certain events. Second, the problem posed by Hoffman that it is in Marxism's nature to call upon the proletariat to emancipate themselves from the state does in no way confirm that Marxism is ambivalent or contradictory about the question of 'abolishing', 'smashing', or crushing the state. Principally, Marx in most of his political writing does not suggest that the state should wither away by means of unorganised practice, mainly because, in principle, organized revolutionary struggle against the autocratic or bourgeois state does not imply anarchist struggle therein. (Engels' *Anti-Duhring* brilliantly explains this phenomenon)

84/ Hoffman, "The State: 'Has the Withering Away' Thesis ...?," pp.87-92

85/ Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?" p. 2.

86/ Hoffman, "The State: 'Has the Withering Away' Thesis ...?," pp. 88-9.

87/ Cited in Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?," p.4.

88/ Hoffman, "The State: 'Has the Withering Away' Thesis ...?," p.92.

89/ Ibid.

90/ Cited in Ibid., p. 95

91/ Cited in Hoffman, *Beyond the State*, p.130.

92/ Daniels, "Thought and Action under Soviet Totalitarianism...," p.346.

93/ Ibid.

94/ After 1991, a completely novel historiography emerged with the pioneering work of Stephen Kotkin. See especially his *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization*, University of California Press, Ltd, (1991), and "1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks," *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 70, No. 2 (Jun., 1998) Among those who responded to Kotkin's work, we find Robert V. Daniels in "Does the Present Change the Past?" *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 70, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 431-435.

95/ Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Politics as Practice...," p. 30.

96/ See Ibid.

97/ See Fitzpatrick, (1999) *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s,* Oxford University Press, pp.3-4; for Kotkin's contribution to the debate through his concept of 'participatory totalitarianism,' see Astrid Hedin, "Stalinism as

Civilization: New Perspectives on Communist Regimes," *Political Studies Review,* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 166-170.

98/ See for example the work of E. H. Carr, Moshe Lewin, and Stephen F. Cohen.

99/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives on Stalinism," *Russian Review,* Vol. 45, No. 4. (Oct., 1986), p. 357.

100/ The new cohort include mainly J Arch Getty, Gabor Rittersporn, and Roberta T Manning. But generally, revisionist social and political historians whose work Fitzpatrick often cites include Stephen F. Cohen, Moshe Lewin, E. H. Carr, Robert C. Tucker, Michal Reiman, Frederic J. Fleron, Raymond Bauer, Alex Rabinowitch, Jerry F. Hough, Gordon Skilling, Franklin Griffiths, Sarah Davies, etc., For a thorough discussion of their work, see Fitzpatrick, "Politics as Practice…," pp. 30-34.

101/ This actually started as early as her publication of "New Perspectives on Stalinism."

102/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives…," p. 358.

103/ Ibid., p. 367.

104/ Ibid., pp.358-9.

105/ Ibid., pp.364-7.

106/ Ibid., pp. 367-373.

107/ Ibid., p.358.

108/ Ibid., p359.

109/ Ibid., p.361.

110/ For a thorough discussion of Trotsky's position vis-à-vis Stalinism, see Henry Reichman, "Reconsidering 'Stalinism,'" *Theory and Society,* Vol. 17, No. 1. (Jan., 1988), pp. 67-70.

111/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives...," pp.361-2. Here Fitzpatrick refers to Lewin's work "the Social Background of Stalinism" in *Making*, pp. 258-285; Actually Trotsky's criticism of bureaucratism was also shared by Lenin himself. In 1919, Lenin asserted that 'a bureaucratic attitude to the work, or inability to help the starving workers, will be severely punished, to the point of shooting.' (cited in Volkogonov (1991) *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p.557) Lenin's warning, however, was very little influential, especially during the years of "War Communism." As Volkogonov put it, during War Communism '[n]ew elements of state structure came into being, new intermediable, coordinating, connecting links, and so on. The system was growing at an alarming rate under Lenin, absorbing a considerable amount of energy and resources to ensure its own proper

functioning.' (p.557) Lenin was also enraged by the growing shape of the bureaucracy and saw that it was necessary to get rid of 'bureaucratic rats.' (p.558)

112/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives...," pp.361-2;

113/ Here Fitzpatrick shares Stephen Cohen's argument that 'convict laborers' were the lowest-ranked stratum in Stalin's USSR: "New Perspectives...," p. 362n11. She also asserts that 'the *Kolkhoz*' had 'a top stratum of white-collar workers...a middle stratum of skilled blue-collar workers...and, at the bottom, the rank-and-file *Kolkhozniki*...,' p.362.

114/ It is noteworthy that women's mobility during WWII was at its highest, mainly to bridge the gap of labour shortage left by men's participation in the war.

115/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives...," p.365.

116/ Ibid., p.366.

117/ Ibid; a further claim Fitzpatrick defends is the regime's success in 'indoctrinating citizens': the argument that 'indoctrination' played a two-fold role: while the regime could through indoctrinating citizens guarantee its control of society, particular citizens were in need for maintaining their new social status, and were to accept indoctrination as part of the new give-and-take formula. "New Perspectives..," pp.366-7.

118/ Alec Nove, responded to this point positively. He agrees with Fitzpatrick that social changes in Stalin's Russia 'were not only reflections of the tyrant's whim; they had a genuinely popular resonance and a basis in Russian political culture.' He equally emphasises the validity of the social mobility claim. Alec Nove, "Stalinism: Revisionism Reconsidered," *Russian Review,* Vol. 46, No. 4, (Oct., 1987), p.412.

119/ Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives..," pp.367-8.

120/ See for example, J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938,* Cambridge, 1985, and Gabor T. Rittersporn, "The State Against Itself: Socialist Tensions and Political Conflict in the USSR 1936-1938," *Telos,* No. 44, (Fall.,1979), pp.87-104.

121/ In discussing this point, I rely heavily on Kotkin's valuable critique of revisionist work in *Magnetic Mountain,* pp.539n19, 540n20, 540n21, 541n22, and 541n23.

122/ Alec Nove questions Getty's suggestion that some party leaders as Kirov and Ezhov could take political decisions without Stalin's orders. (Nove, "Stalinism: Revisionism Reconsidered," p.416.)

123/ Fitzpatrick cites Rittersporn's words on the Great Purges: 'the struggles of 1936-1938 were unleashed by popular discontent with the arbitrariness, corruption and inefficiency of the ruling strata.' Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives..," p.372.

124/ Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain,* p. 540n21

125/ Most responses to Fitzpatrick's article came in the same *Russian Review* issue (1986). They include Stephen F. Cohen's "Stalin's Terror as Social History," pp. 375-384, Peter Kenez, "Stalinism as Humdrum Politics," pp. 395-400, Alfred G. Meyer's "Coming to Terms with the Past...and with One's Older Colleagues," pp.401-408. For Alec Nove's response, see note 57.

126/ Fitzpatrick belongs to the two generations of social historians, and has strengthened her old position by archival work in the 1980s and 1990s. She believes that the new archives explored strengthened the early claims (1950s, 1960s, and 1970s) by social historians that Soviet Russia was also controlled by social forces.

127/ Roberta T. Manning, "State and Society in Stalinist Russia," *Russian Review,* Vol. 46, No. 4. (Oct., 1987), p. 408. Other scholars argue that in her study of Stalin's Russia Fitzpatrick considers political history as important as social history: Henry Reichman, "Reconsidering Stalinism," p.72. Considering this debate, I think that Fitzpatrick's position is not always clear. Although, she is primarily a social historian, she often conflates social history and politics. In some of her writings like *The Russian Revolution* (1994) her position is basically that of a historian. In other works, however, the conflation of political history and social history is clear-cut. Her *Everyday Stalinism* (2000) is a case in point. Her position is revealed in her definition of the term "Stalinism":

> Stalinism often connotes an ideology and/or a political system. I use it here as a shorthand for the complex of institutions, structures, and rituals that made up the habit of *Homo Sovieticus* in the Stalin era. Communist Party rule, Marxist-Leninist ideology, rampant bureaucracy, leader cults, state control over production and distribution, social engineering, affirmative action on behalf of workers, stigmatization of "class enemies," police surveillance, terror, and the various informal, personalistic arrangements whereby people at every level sought to protect themselves and obtain scarce goods, were all part of the Stalinist habit (pp.3-4)

128/ Ibid.

129/ Ibid., p. 409.

130/ For a discussion of Tucker's point, see Reichman "Reconsidering Stalinism," pp.64-7.

131/ Roberta T. Manning, "State and Society in Stalinist Russia," p. 409.

132/ Getty, "State, Society, and Superstition," *Russian Review,* Vol. 46, No. 4, (Oct., 1987), p. 391.

133/ Ibid.

134/ Kenez, "Stalinism as Humdrum Politics," *Russian Review,* Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), p. 396.

135/ Ibid., p. 396.

136/ Ibid., p. 397.

137/ Ibid., p.397.

138/ Ibid., pp.397-8

139/ See Lynne Viola (1987) *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization*, Oxford University Press.

140/ Kenez, "Stalinism as Humdrum Politics," p. 398.

141/ Ibid., pp.398-9

142/ Ibid., pp.399-400.

143/ Meyer, "Coming to Terms with the Past..," p. 402. As Nove puts it, Fitzpatrick herself had illusions about what she calls 'informal social negotiation' between Stalin and the peasants: in 1933 'millions had died of famine' and peasants were incapable of producing because they were not fed. (Nove, "Stalinism: Revisionism Reconsidered," p.414.)

144/ Meyer, "Coming to Terms with the Past..," p. 404.

145/ Ibid., p. 405.

146/ Ibid., p. 407.

147/ Stephen F. Cohen, "Stalin's Terror as Social History," p. 376.

148/ Ibid., p. 378.

149/ Ibid.

150/ Ibid., p. 384. A similar point was raised by Nove. He argued against the revisionists' unrealistic belief that 'terror only affected a segment of society.' (Nove, "Stalinism: Revisionism Reconsidered," p.417.)

151/ For an account of positive views on the Russian Revolution, see Robert D. Warth, "On the Historiography of the Russian Revolution," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 26, No. 2. (Jun., 1967), pp. 247-267.

152/ See in particular Suny, "Revision and Retreat...,"165-182 and "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution," *The American Historical Review*, Vol.88, No 1 (Feb., 1983), 31-52.

153/ Suny, "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution," p.34.

154/ Ibid

155/ Ibid., pp.34-5.

156/ Ibid., p.39.

157/ Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p.43.

158/ Ibid., pp. 50-1.

159/ Ibid., p.51.

160/ Suny, "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution," p.38.

161/ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, Short Course, Moscow, 1939, p.177.

162/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution,* p. 52.

163/ Robert D. Warth, "On the Historiography of the Russian Revolution," pp. 247-267.

164/ See note 94.

165/ Kotkin, "1991 and the Russian Revolution...," p. 397.

166/ Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, p. 11.

167/ Kotkin, "1991 and the Russian Revolution...' pp. 385-6.

168/ J. Arch Getty, (1997) 'Forging the Totalitarian Party' in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution,* p.190.

169/ Ibid.

170/ Ibid., p.191.

171/ Ibid.

172/ Ibid., p. 193.

173/ Kotkin has asserted that although Getty's position vis-à-vis the totalitarian school is revolutionary in its own right, it amounts to an all too dismissive underestimation of the role of Stalin in the Great Purges: (*Magnetic Mountain,* p.539n19)

174/ Roy Medvedev (1997) 'The Social Basis of Stalinism' in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era*, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, p.236.

175/ Ibid., pp. 236-7.

176/ Robert C. Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (Oct., 1961), pp. 377-382. Zbigniew Brzezinski's article to which Tucker refers is "The Nature of the Soviet System" published in the same *Slavic Review* issue, pp. 351-368.

177/ Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," p. 378; the main idea expanded by Tucker in this review is elaborated in *The Soviet Political Mind,* pp. 3-19; Moshe Lewin made a similar point by arguing that 'the whole social matrix was then breeding just this: authoritarianism.' Lewin, "Grappling with Stalinism" in *Making,* P.311

178/ Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," p. 378.

179/ Ibid; for a different interpretation which focuses on basic similarities between Stalin's Russia, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, see N. V. Zagladin, "Stalinism and Totalitarianism" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, pp.262-276.

180/ Ibid., pp. 378-9; see also *The Soviet Political Mind*, p.7.

181/ In Tucker's view the other systems are mainly Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and 'single-party systems of the nationalist species'. Tucker, *Soviet Political Mind*, p.6. Sheila Fitzpatrick has argued that Tucker's point in this sense emphasises his concern with 'political culture,' which embodies new approaches to the theme of "ideology" by treating it away from the 'old canonical-texts approach. Fitzpatrick, "Political as Practice...," pp.32-3.

182/ Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, p.7.

183/ Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics, *World Politics*," Vol. 18, No. 3. (Apr., 1966), pp. 435-8.

184/ Ibid., p. 436.

185/ Ibid., p. 437.

186/ Vera Alexandrova, "The Soviet Family," *Russian Review,* Vol. 5. No. 2. (Spring, 1946), pp. 74-5.

187/ Ibid., p. 74.

188/ Ibid.

189/ Ibid.

190/ Ibid.

191/ Ibid., pp. 74-6.

192/ Ibid., pp.75-6: According to Alexandrova, the story of Gleb and his wife Dasha was simply a story of a Soviet woman who could assert her femininity on revolutionary modern grounds, and through negotiating a much more assertive gender identity with her husband. Actually, for a number of (non-revisionist) scholars the question of gender was extremely important in confirming the state's domination of society: Susan E. Reid, for example, has argued that 'representation of gender in Soviet art during the Second and Third Five-Year Plans articulated relationships of domination in Stalinist society. Using female characters to stand for "the people" as a whole, painting and sculpture drew on conventional gender codes and hierarchy to naturalize the subordination of society to the Stalinist state and legitimate the sacrifice of women's needs to those of industrialization.' (Susan E. Reid, "All Stalin's Women: Gender and Power in Soviet Art of the 1930s," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring., 1998), p. 133.)

193/ Vera Sandomirsky, "Sex in the Soviet Union," *Russian Review,* Vol. 10, No. 3. (July., 1951), p. 203; see the same article for the idea of 'Free Love' in the 1920s, pp. 199-201. Sandomirsky argues that the free love era ended by the mid-1930s, and was replaced by the "Stalinist Virtue": 'a Soviet citizen cannot "simply" love someone without criticism, without political and moral watchfulness.' 'Our Soviet citizen can no longer love only because of a natural drive. He wants his beloved to be worthy of his feeling, to possess the best Soviet qualities.' pp.201-202. She also asserts that the right to divorce became synonymous with "good" or "bad" citizenship: you have the right to ask for divorce only when your partner proves to be an 'unworthy' Soviet citizen, pp. 203-4; for marriage, sex, and divorce, see Kent Geiger and Alex Inkeles "The Family in the U.S.S.R," *Marriage and Family Living,* Vol. 16. No. 4. International Issue on the Family (Nov., 1954), pp.401-402.

194/ Ibid., pp. 201-2.

195/ Wendy Z Goldman (1997) "Revolution and the Family" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, pp. 172-3; see also Sandomirsky, "Sex in the Soviet Union," pp.201, 203-4.

196/ For an early scholarly study of the conflict between Russian conservative values and modernity, see Sandomirsky, "Sex in the Soviet Union," pp. 199-209.

197/ Sandomirsky, "Sex in the Soviet Union," p. 201.

198/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism,* pp. 139-163.

199/ For women's 'occupational mobility,' see Geiger and Inkeles "The Family in the U.S.S.R," pp.399-400.

200/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, pp. 143-147.

201/ Donald Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, p.103.

202/ Geiger and Inkeles, "The Family in the USSR," p.403. In a different work, Inkeles writes: 'women came to represent a significant proportion of the skilled workers in Soviet industry. Their advance in fields requiring higher training was even more impressive. Between 1928 and 1938 the proportion of women in the universities increased from 28 per cent to 43 per cent...The effect of this upward movement was reflected in the fact that they constituted 40 per cent of all specialists in the Soviet Union before the war. The shifts in the rural regions were no less striking, as large numbers of women assumed positions of responsibility and skill on the collective farms.' Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 15, No. 4. (Aug., 1950), pp.468-469.

203/ Goldman, "Revolution and the Family," pp. 163-4.

204/ Ibid., pp.166-7.

205/ Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The New Leadership Generation" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution,* p.81.

206/ For an opposite view, see Lewin, the *Making,* (p.34): 'The 1930s was an era of great mobility, but for too many the direction was down, not up. Whole classes were created or grew, while others disappeared. Cadres were educated and promoted in massive numbers, while other masses of cadres were destroyed. Professional training was impressive, but the majority of the working class were still working with their bare hands.'

207/ For Fitzpatrick's view on the cultural revolution in Soviet Russia, see "Culture and Politics Under Stalin: A Reappraisal," *Slavic Review,* No. 35, No.2 (Jun., 1976) pp. 211-231. In this article Fitzpatrick is primarily interested in debating the concept of culture in Stalin's Russia by supposing that the dominant view of culture in Western scholarship was both created and dominated by the 'totalitarian model' between '1946 and 1953.' She also argues that such a dominant view was myopic in its claim that the Communist Party had full control of culture in general. One of her most significant arguments in this essay is that the general medium of culture in society was a point of intersection, or rather inevitable encounter, between the old intelligentsia and the party: 'As party values penetrated culture the cultural values of the old intelligentsia were penetrating the party.' (p. 213.) For Fitzpatrick's more specific views on cultural revolution in Stalin's time, see *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 141-47, *Everyday Stalinism,* pp. 106-107, "The Cultural Revolution in Russia: 1928-1932," *Journal of Contemporary History,* Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1974), pp. 33-52; "Cultural Revolution Revisited," *Russian Review,* Vol. 52, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp.202-209.

208/ Arch Getty points out the First Five-Year Plan as 'cultural revolution—against capitalism, 'bourgeois values': see "Forging the Totalitarian Party," p.188.

209/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, pp. 5-6.

210/ The Shakhty trial took place in 1928. It was basically a trial against a group of so-called "bourgeois" engineers from the 'Shakhty region of the Donbass' accused of conspiracy with external forces against the stability and peace of the Soviet Union. With the trial, it is said, the Stalin Cultural revolution began; for a discussion of this point, see Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, p.122 and *Everyday Stalinism*, pp. 5-6.

211/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism,* pp. 118-122.

212/ Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution in Russia: 1928-32", p.35.

213/ Ibid., p.37.

214/ Ibid., p. 36.

215/ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

216/ Cited in Ibid., p. 42.

217/ Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," p. 103.

218/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism,* pp. 116-7.

219/ Ibid., pp. 118-122.

220/ Cited in Jay W. Stein, "The Soviet Intelligentsia," *Russian Review,* Vol. 10, No. 4. (Oct., 1951), p.283.

221/ Jay W. Stein, "The Soviet Intelligentsia," p. 283.

222/ For a discussion of this point, see Ibid., pp.283-284.

223/ Cited in Fitzpatrick, "The New Leadership Generation," p.85.

224/ Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," p. 101.

225/ Cited in Hiroaki Kiromiya, "Industrialization and Class War" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, p.68.

226/ Cited in Fitzpatrick, "The New Leadership Generation," p.81.

227/ Fitzpatrick, " New Leadership Generation", p.84.

228/ Ibid., p. 86.

229/ Ibid., p.87.

230/ Ibid., p.88.

231/ Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," p.99.

232/ For a thorough discussion of the 25,000ers, see Lynne Viola, "Collectivisation as Revolution" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, pp.108-113.

233/ Ibid., p. 108.

234/ Ibid., p. 109.

235/ Ibid., p. 112.

236/ Ibid., pp. 114-5.

237/ Boris I Nicolaevsky, "The New Soviet Campaign Against the Peasants," *Russian Review,* Vol. 10, No. 2. (Apr., 1951), p. 82.

238/ Lewin, (1985) "Who was the Soviet Kulak?", *Making,* pp. 121-141; for a definition of the term "Kulak", see also Fitzpatrick, "Deportation and Exile" in *Everyday Stalinism*, pp.122-24, and "Collectivization" in *The Russian Revolution*, pp.135-139; see also Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* , pp.81-82.

239/ Lewin, "Who was the Kulak?" pp. 122-4.

240/ Ibid., p. 124.

241/ See Nicolaevsky, "The New Soviet Campaign ...," p.81.

242/ Viola, "Collectivisation as Revolution," p. 110.

243/ Viktor Danilov N. V. Teptsov, "Collectivization: the Results" in Robert V. Daniels, *The Stalin Revolution,* p. 128.

244/ Ibid.

245/ Ibid., p.136.

246/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, pp.8-10.

247/ See Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, pp.111-119 and *Everyday Stalinism*, pp.14-15.

248/ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian revolution*, p.111.

249/ Here Fitzpatrick alludes, I would argue, to the Industrial Revolution in England in particular.

250/ Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," p. 101. For the effect of the modernisation of industry on the structure of society, see the work of the economic historian Robert Allen: "Standards of Living in the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Economic History,* Vol. 58. No. 4. (Dec., 1998), pp.1063-1089. Allen contends that between 1928 and 1940 industrialization, while was revolutionary in allowing more labour opportunities, caused a remarkable fall of '7 per cent' of 'real wages per worker.' Such a fall however did not reflect the rise of 'non-agricultural wage payments' which increased by 50.1 billion rubles as 'the corresponding labor force rose from 13.77 million to 26.53 million workers.' (p. 1079) In Allen's view, although the rise of consumption cannot be denied, standards of living of the non-agricultural population were only relatively improved: improvement covered only an aristocracy of skilled labourers and 'the party and administrative elite' while the rest of society 'suffered a substantial drop in living standards.' Farmers, on the other hand, were almost totally deprived of any rise in the level of consumption. (p. 1084); in 1954 Kent Geiger and Alex Inkeles wrote that industrialization of the Soviet Union resulted in a great disappointment of the Soviet people who 'live[d] in conditions of material deprivation, both in relation to the standards prevailing in Western Europe and relative to their own expectations.' Kent Geiger and Alex Inkeles, "The Family in the USSR," p. 398; for a similar argument, see Harvey Wheeler, "Problems of Stalinism," *The Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. 10, No. 3. (Sep., 1957) Wheeler argues that the "myth" of high standards of living in the Soviet Union were merely a political propaganda the aim of which was to trade a false consciousness based mainly on the necessity of people's sacrifice:

> For what is involved is the politics of squeezing people by increasing their productivity while their expectations for change are held at zero. In Stalinist theory '*political power* is used to increase productivity and also to keep people from expecting to increase their levels of consumption as they are

forced to increase their levels of production. (pp.638-639)

251/ Ibid.

252/ Ibid., p. 103.

253/ Hough, "The Soviet Concept of the Relationship between the Lower Party Organs and the State Administration," *Slavic Review,* Vol.24. No.2. (Jun., 1965), pp.215-220; see also Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," pp. 104-105; actually the concept of one-man management was not totally new in Bolshevik thinking. E. H. Carr reminds us that importance of this concept had been raised since the time of the Civil War when 'centralized control, direction and planning' necessitated the recruitment of 'technical specialists' and the adoption of 'one-man responsibility in management': E. H. Carr (1963) *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923* (Vol.2), London, Macmillan, p. 173.

254/ Hough, "The Soviet Concept of the Relationship...," p. 215.

255/ Filtzer, "The Mobilization of Labor," p. 105.

256/ For a discussion of how "privileged groups" in the Soviet Union emerged first with Lenin, see Mervyn Matthews, "The New Inequality" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, pp. 145-6.

257/ Ibid., p. 148.

258/ Geiger and Inkeles, "The Family in the U.S.S.R," p.399.

259/ Matthews, "The New Inequality" p. 144.

260/ Ibid., pp. 145-6.

261/ Ibid., p. 146.

262/ Joseph Stalin, "The Socialist Drive" in Robert V. Daniels (ed.), *The Stalin Revolution*, p. 62.

263/ Inkeles, "Social Stratification and mobility in the Soviet Union," p. 465.

264/ Cited in Ibid.,

265/ Ibid., pp. 465-6.

266/ Ibid., p. 466: Inkeles classifies the groups in question as follows: 'the ruling elite, the superior intelligentsia, the general intelligentsia, the white collar group...the working class aristocracy, the rank and file workers, the disadvantaged workers, the well-to-do peasants, the average peasant, the forced-labor-camps group'

267/ Ibid., p. 468.

268/ Ibid., p. 467.

269/ Ibid., p. 470.

270/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, P.96.

271/ Inkeles, "Social Stratification and mobility...," p. 470.

272/ Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, pp. 95-6.

273/ Ibid., p. 97.

274/ Ibid.

275/ Ibid., pp. 98-9.

276/ Ibid., pp. 103-4.

277/ Ibid., p. 104.

278/ Ibid.

Notes to Part 4

1/ See the present work, pp. 142-143; 155-156.

2/ See the present work, pp. 108-109.

3/ See the present work, p. 154-155.

4/ John Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?", *Leicester University Discussion Papers in Politics*, No. P91/1 (Sep., 1991), p. 2.

5/ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

6/ Ibid., p. 4.

7/ Alex Callinicos (1991) *The Revenge of History,* The Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 17.

8/ Hoffman (2007) *A Glossary of Political Theory*, Edinburgh University Press, p.184.

9/ Ibid., p.11.

10/ Ibid.

11/ Ibid.

12/ Charles D. Farris, "Authoritarianism as a Political Behavior Variable," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 1. (Feb., 1956), p. 62; for a critique of the psychological approach to authoritarianism, see Don Stewart and Thomas Hoult, "A Social-Psychological Theory of the Authoritarian Personality," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 65, No. 3. (Nov., 1959), pp. 274-279; for more general reviews of the Berkley Group, see Alfred de Grazia's review of

The Authoritarian Personality (T. W. Adorno et al) in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4. (Dec., 1950), pp. 1005-6. See also Tamotsi Shibutani's review in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 5, The Sociological Study of Work. (Mar., 1952), pp. 527-9.

13/ For a discussion of this point, see Don Stewart and Thomas Hoult, "A Social-Psychological Theory of the Authoritarian Personality," p. 275.

14/ Daniel Levy, "Comparing Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Insights from Higher Education Policy," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Oct., 1981), pp.33-41.

15/ Ibid., p. 39.

16/ Arendt, "Totalitarianism in Power" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 323.

17/ Ibid., p. 311.

18/ Ibid., p. 319.

19/ Ibid., p. 320.

20/ Ibid., p. 321.

21/ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1961) *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Frederick A. Praeger.

22/ Cited in Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," p. 377.

23/ Ibid., pp. 378-9.

24/ Karl Marx (2002) *The Communist Manifesto*, London, Penguin Books, p. 243.

25/ Ronald J. Hill et al (1992) *Beyond Stalinism: Communist Political Evolution*, London, Frank Cass, p. 8.

26/ For a discussion of the Stalin 'cultural revolution,' see present work, pp.

27/ J. Vialatoux (1952) *La Cité de Hobbes*, Lyon, IMP. M. Audin, p. VII.

28/ Ibid., p.VI. I have translated all Vialatoux's quotations here from French.

29/ Ibid, pp. X-XI.

30/ I am entirely conscious that my thesis might read as a projection of ideas, that is, as a forced argument which reads Hobbes's *Leviathan* through the prisms of the Lenin and Stalin revolutions and not vice versa

31/ Joseph Vialatoux, L*a Cité de Hobbes,* p.VI.

32/ Ibid., p.VII.

33/ Ibid. Here the concrete form of the Soviet state is perceived as the result of the interaction between the productive forces and the new man to whom it gave birth.

34/ Ibid., p. XI.

35/ Ibid.

36/ Ibid., p.156.

37/ Ibid., p.157.

38/ Ibid. p.159.

39/ Ibid.

40/ Ibid., p. 157.

41/ Ibid.

42/ Carl Schmitt (1996) *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes*, Westport, Greenwood Press, p.92.

43/ Ibid., p.95.

44/ Ibid., p.96.

45/ George Schwab's Introduction to *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes*, p. XII.

46/ Ibid.

47/ Cited in Ibid., p.XXI.

48/ Cited in Ibid.,

49/ George Schwab's Introduction to *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Hobbes*, p.XXII.

50/ Hannah Arendt (1976) "The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie " in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, p. 142.

51/ Ibid., pp.141-2.

52/ Ibid., p. 142.

53/ Hobbes (1968) *Leviathan*, London, Penguin Books, p. 88.

54/ Ibid., p.89.

55/ Ibid., p.100.

56/ Ibid., p.110.

57/ Ibid., p.118.

58/ Ibid., p.150.

59/ Ibid., p.183.

60/ Ibid.

61/ Ibid.

62/ Ibid., p.184.

63/ Ibid., p.189.

64/ Ibid., p.184.

65/ Ibid., p.185.

66/ Ibid., p.190.

67/ Ibid., p.223.

68/ Johann P. Sommerville (1992) *Thomas Hobbes : Political Ideas in Historical Context*, London, Macmillan, p.76.

69/ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.223.

70/ Cited in Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes...*, p. 78.

71/ David Gauthier (1969) *The Logic of Leviathan*, Oxford University Press, p.67.

72/ M. M. Goldsmith (1966) *Hobbes's Science of Politics*, Columbia University Press, p.136.

73/ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.227.

74/ Ibid., p.223.

75/ Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics*, p.138.

76/ Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.227.

77/ Ibid.,

78/ Ibid., p.223.

79/ Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics*, pp.140-41.

80/ Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.227.

81/ Cited in J. Vialatoux, L*a Cité de Hobbes,* p. 156.

82/ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 229.

83/ Ibid., p.228.

84/ Ibid.

85/ Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan,* p.146.

86/ Ibid., p.147.

87/ Ibid., p.151.

88/ Ibid., p.164.

89/ John Locke (1976) *Second Treatise of Government*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p.XV.

90/ Ibid., p.100.

91/ Hobbes, *Leviathan,* pp.225-6.

92/ Ibid., p.227.

93/ Ibid., p.184.

94/ Ibid., p.223.

95/ Ibid., pp.183-8.

96/ It is my position that both Lenin and Stalin simply erroneously believed that they kept to the letter of the Marxian text. Very few practices revealed that Lenin, for instance, did have some intention to construct the socialist state as was theorised by Marx and Engels. Stalin, as was proved through his own actions, only spoke in the name of Marxism-Leninism while most action from the First Five-Year Plan up to the late 1940s shows his complete departure from Marxism's emancipatory thinking

97/ K. Marx (2000) *Selected Writings*, Oxford University Press, p.608.

98/ Nicolai Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. (1969) *The ABC of Communism*, London, Penguin Books, p.216.

99/ The Petrograd Soviet was named after the 1905 Petersburg Soviet. For this point, see S. Fitzpatrick (1994) *The Russian Revolution*, Oxford University Press, p. 46.

100/ See the present work, p. 264n7.

101/ Rosa Luxemburg (1961) *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism*, The University of Michigan Press, p.81.

102/ K. Marx (2000) *Selected Writings*, p. 189.

103/ Nicolai Bukharin and Preobrazhensky (1969) *The ABC of Communism*, London, Penguin Books, pp.393-95.

104/ Ibid.

105/ Ibid., p.393.

106/ Ibid., p.218.

107/ Ibid., p.217.

108/ K. Marx (2000) *Selected Writings*, p.261.

109/ Ibid.

110/ Here Marx means that the proletarian state—far from represented by a party as a single monolith—is itself the only guarantee for the disappearance of the class struggle. Marx enumerates the conditions of success for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such conditions include, among other requirements, the 'abolition of property in land...abolition of all rights of inheritance...centralization of all credit in the hands of the [proletarian] state, by means of a national bank with State capital and exclusive monopoly...equal liability of all labour...gradual distinction between town and country...' (K.Marx and F. Engels (2002) *The Communist Manifesto*, pp. 243-4.)

111/ I discuss this point in Part I, section I "The Necessity of Social Democracy," pp. 23-32.

112/ K. Marx (2000) *Selected Writings*, p.148.

113/ Ibid., p.194.

114/ Ibid., p. 60.1

115/ R. Luxemburg (1961) *The Russian Revolution...* p.33.

116/ Tom Freeman, "Was Lenin a Marxist in What is to Be Done? ?" S*tudies in Marxism,* No. 10, (2004), p.14.

117/ V. I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?,* pp.31-5.

118/ K. Marx (1974) *The First International and After,* London, Penguin Books, p. 92.

119/ For a definition of the "Totalitarian model," see the present work, pp. 15-16; 141-144.

120/ Lih, "How a Founding Document was Found...," p. 8.

121/ See Gareth Stedman Jones's notes to *The Communist Manifesto* (2002), pp.260-261

122/ For Plekhanov's influence on Lenin, see L. Kolakowski (1978) *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution* (Vol. 2), Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 385-511.

123/ V. I. Lenin (1992) *The State and Revolution* London, Penguin Books, p.51.

124/ John Hoffman (1992) "The State: Has the 'Withering Away' Thesis...," p.92.

125/ Robert C. Tucker (1991) 'What Time is it in Russia's History' in C. Merridale (ed.), *Perestroika: The Historical Perspective*, London, Edward Arnold, p.36.

126/ Cited in Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...,* pp.89-90.

127/ N. Bukharin, T*he ABC of Communism*, pp.11-12.

128/ In the 1930s Bukharin and other Soviet state theoretician were themselves victims of the same trend of thought they theorised and followed. Stalin's 'Great Purges' in the 1930s were a confirmation rather than refutation of the wrong reach of the state-centrism advanced by the Bolsheviks.

129/ See Richard J. Medalie, "The Communist Theory of the State," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec.,1959), p.518.

130/ Cited in Ibid.

131/ K. Marx (2002) *Selected Writings,* p.608.

132/ R. C. Tucker (1971) *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, Norton & Co 1971, p.8.

133/ J. Hoffman, *Beyond The State,* p.137.

134/ Trotsky (1904) *Our Political Tasks*, London, New Park, p.56

135/ Ibid., p.77.

136/ R. Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution...,* p.38.

137/ Ibid., p.69. It might well be true that Luxemburg's criticism of the statist character of the Bolshevik party was based on an objective consideration of the anti-freedom formula Lenin himself opted for. Yet, one might also argue against the pro-liberal stance which Luxemburg was obliged to adopt. Her insistence on freedom and democracy was very much influenced by the anti-authoritarian kernel of her arguments, which led her to disown the very theoretical basis of the Bolshevik party, the theoretical basis that she elsewhere sanctioned as the only politico-historical necessity to realize an intact 'socialist policy.' (*The Russian Revolution...*, p.35.) Although Luxemburg's criticism of the single and monolithic rule of the Bolshevik party can be accurate, the logic of her criticism against Lenin on this occasion was far from Marxian.

138/ Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, p.58

139/ L. Trotsky, "What is Proletarian Culture and is it Possible?" Philosophy/ History Internet Archive (Feb., 2001), p. 4.

140/ Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, p.10.

141/ For this point, see Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?," p. 8.

142/ Ibid.

143/ Dictatorship here, as Hoffman argues, was primarily caused by 'the authoritarian trap of 1917' (Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?," p. 7.)

144/ V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution.* p. 33.

145/ Marx's revision of *The Communist Manifesto* was based on the following statement in the "Preface to the German Edition of 1872": 'In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry in the last twenty-five years, and of the accompanying improved and extended party organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme [of *The Communist Manifesto*] has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.' (*The Communist Manifesto,*.p.194.)

146/ V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution,* p.34. Ludwig Kugelmann (1830-1902) was a German physician, communist, and active member of the First International. He was a good friend of Marx and often corresponded with him.

147/ Ibid., p.37.

148/ Ibid.

149/ Ibid.

150/ In this respect, Lenin's argument reduces the importance of Marx's theory that a working class revolution *must* be a timely revolution. Marx's praise of the Paris Commune does not override his fundamental theory that a proletarian revolution can only succeed when the capitalist mode of production is fully developed. One might well argue here that by believing so, Lenin was but divorcing Marxian theory from any possible faithful practice.

151/ Lenin's implications found expression later in the work of Stalin who believed Marxism could only be validated by Leninist thinking For this point, see my discussion of Stalin's position in the present work, pp. 109-115.

152/ The leviathan element in Lenin had also to do with his late rise as a god-father of the Soviet people. Nina Tumarkin points to the Lenin cult as emerging from such slogans as 'Lenin lived. / Lenin lives. / Lenin will live.' (Cited in Nina Tumarkin, "Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult" *Russian Review*, Vol.40, No.1 (Jan., 1981), p.38) This expression was articulated in most of the works of literature produced after January 1924. The myth of an *immortal* Lenin haunted peasant life and was incessantly confirmed even in the aftermath of his death. (p.37)

153/ Hobbes, *Leviathan,* p.227.

154/ Tucker, T*he Soviet Political Mind,* p.132.

155/ Ibid.

156/ Cited in A. Callinicos, *The Revenge of History,* p. 117.

157/ D. M Kotz and Fred Weir (1997) *The Demise of the Soviet System*, London, Routledge, p.18.

158/ A. Callinicos, *The Revenge of History,* p. 27.

159/ Cited in Hoffman, "Has Marxism a Future?," p. 6.

160/ Cited in Hoffman, *Beyond the State,* p.140.

161/ Richard Daniels (1991) *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism*, Oxford, Westview Press, p.124.

162/ Cited in Stephen F. Cohen (1977) "Bolshevism and Stalinism" in R. Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism*: *Essays in Historical Interpretation*, New York, Norton & Co., p.22.

163/ Roy Medvedev (1972) *Let History Judge*, London, Macmillan, p.43. Zinoviev and Kamanev belonged to the Old Bolsheviks. They opposed the original plans for the October Revolution, but failed to convince the majority of Bolshevik Party members on voting against the plans. Initially, they sided with the Mensheviks, and published their plight in the Menshevik newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn.* While in 1923 they sided with Stalin against Trotsky (and sought to attack and reduce Trotskyism), between 1926 and 1927, together with Trotsky,

they turned against Stalin. They were both executed by Stalin in what came to be known as the "Great Purges" of the 1930s.

164/ R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge,* p.27.

165/ Cited in Ibid., p.51.

166/ Kotz and Weir, *The Demise of the Soviet System,* p.21.

167/ A. Callinicos, *The Revenge of History*, p.28.

168/ Cited in Cohen "Bolshevism and Stalinism" in R. Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism...*, p.19.

169/ R. C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, p.179.

170/ Ibid., p.55. For Stalin's conception of the Soviet State (consolidation of the state to fend off internal and external attack, etc.), see L. G. Churchward, "Contemporary Soviet Theory of the State," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Apr., 1961), 404-419.

171/ Medvedev, *Let History Judge,* p.28.

172/ R. V. Daniels, *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism,* p.124.

173/ See note 31.

174/ Hobbes, L*eviathan,* p.227.

175/ Joseph Stalin (1937) *Mastering Bolshevism*, New York, Workers Library Publishers, p.5. Actually Lenin himself used a similar logic. The enemies for Lenin were the forces of 'reaction' and 'capitalist encirclement.'

176/ Ibid., p.8.

177/ Dimitri Volkogonov (1991) S*talin: Triumph and Tragedy,* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp.280-1.

178/ Ibid, p.280.

179/ See Ibid., p. 276.

180/ Ibid., pp.276-7.

181/ Ibid., p.276.

182/ See Ibid., p.277.

183/ Cited in Ibid.

184/ Cited in N. Bukharin *How it All Began* (1998) New York, Columbia University Press, p. XVI.

185/ C. Merridale, "Perestroika and Political Pluralism: Past and Prospects" in C. Merridale (ed.), *Perestroika...,* p.17.

186/ Cited in Medvedev, *Let History Judge,* p.24. For Lenin's criticism of Stalin, see Robert H McNeal, "Lenin's Attack on Stalin: Review and Reappraisal," A*merican Slavic and East European Review,* Vol. 18, No.3 (Oct., 1959), pp. 295-314

187/ R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p.25. See also R. C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, p. 51.Actually Lenin's disagreements with Stalin date back to the period of the 1917 Revolution.. By 1918, Stalin adopted a theory of revolution based on the suggestion that revolution and socialism could firstly only happen at the national level; such a theory was in sharp conflict with Lenin's theory. Shortly after Stalin's pronouncement of his theory, he, under Lenin's influence, departed from it. For this point see, Robert H McNeal, "Lenin's Attack on Stalin: Review and Reappraisal," pp.296-298

188/ R. C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind,* p.51.

189/ Cited in R. V. Daniels, *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism*, p.129.

190/ R. C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind,* p.87.

191/ Nina Tumarkin, "Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult," p. 38.

192/ Cited in Robert C. Tucker, "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), p. 348.

193/ Tucker, "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult," p. 349.

194. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* pp.320-1.

195/ R. V. Daniels, *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism,* p.124.

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