WALES' ARTS IN TRANSITION, 1997-2001

A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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Abstract

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During the period 1997-2001, much of the government of Wales devolved to a National Assembly for Wales. As the local political landscape changed, interest groups struggled to position themselves within it. Some sought to define a nation of Wales by reference to the Welsh language and the arts associated with it; others suggested that a distinctive national brand image should be developed. Both positions present challenges to the development of Wales as a modern civic nation. They are interrogated in an analysis of discourses of cultural difference in Wales and their influence upon contemporary cultural policy and practice there.

Wales' arts were also affected by developments in global media during the period in question. The Internet was emerging as a digital channel for promoting and distributing cultural goods to global markets; it had also been conceptualised as a space for sharing (and imagining) cultural beliefs and traditions. In both modes, it offered entrepreneurial opportunities for cultural producers. Two case studies of electronic cultural enterprise are presented. The subjects of both are Wales-based artists who took early advantage of the marketing potential of the Internet to give a platform to minority-interest music. Their experiences suggest that global electronic cultural commerce has a fragmenting effect. There is a greater variety in what is produced; the conditions of its production and consumption encourage either exclusive cliques or, where there are no cliques, insecure and mistrustful relationships among producers.

On the basis of the thesis' findings, an alternative approach to political support for cultural practice in Wales is outlined.

(approx. 88,500 words)

Acknowledgments

1 INTRODUCTION

From the 1920s a group of Welsh nationalists, defining themselves by their stewardship of a language, began to gather cultural capital. By the end of the twentieth century they had accumulated a substantial holding. I explain why that matters.

Definitions and delineation

People who have 'cultural capital' have access to a fund of linguistic competences and behavioural codes and norms. Such capital allows them to share in the status and privilege accorded to a particular social group (Bourdieu 1984). A Welsh-language movement has laid claim to the Welsh language and the arts associated with it as the authentic culture of Wales. They have augmented their own political power and influence in so doing. The logic of their position is that most of the people living in Wales cannot belong to a Welsh nation: the Welsh language is spoken by fewer than 20 per cent of Wales' population of almost three million people (1991 census)[1]. The exclusion from a Welsh nation of most of the people who live in Wales matters more than it used to. The British multi-nation state is moving closer to the citizen as it devolves more power to its national regions.

Language and national identity are not the only source of cultural diversity within a national polity, of course, although they are the only ones under consideration in the present study. Gender, sexuality, religion, age and health can all be classified as cultural variables whose possessors or affiliates demand political rights. Such cultural politics are sometimes associated with social exclusion. Rights campaigners representing different movements might make common cause in challenging the hegemonic culture imposed by an established

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[1] See appendix, table 1.

ruling group but be less reflexive about their own cultural dispositions and the cultural capital that they themselves possess. An alternative, more cynical, interpretation is that it would not be expedient for those dispositions to be other than tacitly acknowledged and understood by those who share the competences, codes and conventions associated with them (see Bourdieu 1993, 73 for discussion). Moreover, the oppositional discourse of rights campaigners might become embedded and bureaucratised both in the organisations that are formed to co-ordinate action on their behalf and in state institutions which change or emerge in response to their challenges. All of that has methodological implications to which I shall return.

The complexity and ambiguity of the word 'culture' is well established (Williams 1983, Bocock 1992). In this thesis, its primary meaning is 'the arts'. The specific empirical focus is on two aspects of arts production. The first concerns cultural policy for Wales. The second relates to the use of the Internet to promote and distribute art from Wales. As well as referring to the arts, 'culture' has two further applications in this work. First, cultural practice produces meaning. The practices at issue here include the construction and reconstruction of nation in political discourse, in electronic commerce in the arts, and in the autobiographical narrative of Internet entrepreneurs in the culture industry. The distinctive values and way of life of a social group are a final relevant aspect of culture. It is applicable to the study of how interest groups have struggled to reinforce and embed cultural difference in cultural institutions in post-devolution Wales.

If Wales is to become a civic nation, it will need a civic arts. 'Civic nationalism' prevails when a territorial people identifies itself with a national polity that delivers benefits to it and makes demands of it, usually through the medium of an impersonal and impartial bureaucracy. It is sometimes contrasted with 'ethnic nationalism'. Ethnic nationalism refers to the affective ties and affinities that bind an individual to the history, heritage and vernacular culture (including the language) of a people (Smith 1995). Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are not necessarily incompatible. A civic national state will simply refrain from privileging the claims of any one ethnic group to the authentic heritage of a nation. A pluralist civic nation needs an innovative, cosmopolitan, universalistic arts; it probably needs ethnic arts, too.

Organisation of the thesis

The thesis is developed over six chapters – including the present one, which introduces key terms and issues; and the final one, which draws conclusions and makes recommendations for further research and future action. The substance of the thesis is presented in chapters 2 to 5.

The conceptual terrain is established in chapter 2, which assembles and evaluates social and economic theories about 'community' affiliations and relationships. Some of them imply that a politics of difference (including ethnic difference) rather than of solidarity is challenging the affective link between nation and state. Another challenge to the nation state comes from the flexible production and distribution networks that are characteristic of economic globalisation. Whether the networks are contained within national or other geographically-defined boundaries, or whether they transcend them, is not the only issue. It is of equal significance that participants in the networks need to be skilled in forming social ties and practicing interpersonal relationships. In that context, the use of the community metaphor in the theory and practice of flexible capitalism starts to make sense, as does the revived interest in civics in recent studies of local economic development The review of theoretical sources is interwoven with incidents from Wales' history[2] and with examples of current developments in the organisation of computer-mediated space.

In chapter 3, I explain the research methodology and the specific data collection and analytical techniques used in the study. I implied above that certain methodological procedures are better attuned than others to answering questions about the actions, intentions and reflexes of social actors. That is why a discourse analytical approach has been applied. The analysis draws from a wide range of sources, including interview transcripts, legal statutes, records of political debates, media reports, policy papers, commercial research, government statistics, publicity literature and press statements, historical accounts and web

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[2] For historical detail, I have relied heavily upon two classic histories of Wales: *Rebirth of a Nation*, Kenneth O. Morgan's (1981) study of Wales from 1880 up to the 1979 referendum which rejected a National Assembly; and *When Was Wales?*, Gwyn A. Williams' (1985) essay on the making and remaking of Wales since Roman times.

pages. They are the product of desk research, and of participant observation and depth interviews conducted among artists and cultural policy makers and administrators in Wales between 1997 and 2001. The principles of speech act theory and the techniques of rhetorical and narrative analysis have been applied in their interpretation.

The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, draws from those materials to identify and analyse a contemporary political and economic discourse about the arts that challenges hierarchical boundaries between subsidised and commercial art and between different cultural genres. Recent cultural policy has assumed that the arts have a role in building place-specific (including national) brands; it further supposes that participation by people in personally-relevant forms of artistic and cultural production contributes to sustainable economic development in geographically-defined communities. The implication is that stewardship of the arts by bureaucratic, centralised institutions is inappropriate. Instead, decisions about what constitutes value in the arts, and how they should be resourced, must be devolved to communities. There is nothing particularly new in that discourse, nor is it unique to Wales. However, it is given a special twist in Wales by the problematic co-existence of English-language and Welsh-language cultures, their competition for space in the new institutional landscape that emerged after the referendum mandate for a National Assembly for Wales in 1997, and the challenge of constructing bridges between them.

In chapter 5, the second empirical chapter, I present case studies of two Wales-based music producers in small organisations who have been innovative in using the Internet to give a platform to minority-interest (or niche market) music. Neither of them conforms to the stereotype of a young, trendy 'dot.com' entrepreneur: both of them were involved in making politically-radical music in the 1960s and 1970s.

The first producer is at once a singer, an established entrepreneur in the music industry and an active local politician. He has campaigned for the Welsh language since the 1960s, when he was briefly imprisoned for his actions in so doing. He is typical of an emerging petit bourgeoisie that owns cultural and craft-based businesses in Wales. A number of observations can be made about his career. First, it epitomises the priority given to a Welsh language popular culture in the political struggle to ensure the survival of the Welsh language,

particularly among successive generations of young people. He contrasts the culture that is produced in the communities of Welsh-speaking Wales (*y Fro Gymraeg*) with the distant and remote cultural institutions based in Cardiff, the capital city of Wales. Second, it reinforces the importance for Welsh-language cultural producers of external links with a Welsh diaspora and with the Celtic cultures with which Wales is perceived to share a common past. Third, it illustrates the diverse ways in which political action contributes to future conditions for entrepreneurial action. For example, he contributed to the successful campaign for Welsh language media. Those media provided a conduit for promoting recorded Welsh-language music. They also ended his company's virtual monopoly in providing access to such work, which has obliged it to seek new markets overseas. Finally, he is embedded in very local networks of production where he is able to make, or at least contribute to, the rules of Welsh-language cultural production. He becomes disoriented in conditions where those rules no longer apply. In other words, he is well able to operate the codes and conventions of cultural production in a local milieu. He is less confident in a context where the customary methods, institutions and expertise for regulating or ameliorating conditions of uncertainty are incapacitated or absent. That reveals itself most clearly in his fears about copyright theft and piracy on the Internet.

The second cultural producer featured in chapter 5 has had a music publishing company since the early 1970s. In the late 1970s, she and her husband, who runs her web site with her, moved to Wales from London where they had been involved in politically-radical experimental music groups. They took advantage of the Internet's potential as a digital transportation channel for music long before it had attracted widespread attention, and they have been digitally distributing modern classical and jazz music over the Internet since the mid-1990s. Their web site also promotes contemporary British musicians and composers. This producer has received plaudits for her innovative work, but she is unable to support herself financially. She is a stern critic both of private enterprise and of state bureaucracy, yet she wants to earn money from her work. She articulates the problems that she has experienced with her web site in terms of the failings of the private and public organisations that could fund her, yet many of her difficulties appear to lie with her own lack of trust in the local and the global conditions in which she works. That contributes to her inability to develop the reciprocal ties with others upon which the development of her business depends.

Key themes

Three themes dominate the thesis. They are: first, the crusade to authenticate post-devolution Wales as a nation; second, the political assault upon a centrally-administered 'high culture' in favour of local micro-cultures; and third, globalisation's disruption of the relationship between cultural identity and territorial location.

The struggle to define the nation of Wales by reference to its language cannot be divorced from the material circumstances in which the campaign has developed. Welsh language nationalism emerged out of economic and social collapse in Wales during the 1920s; it gathered strength from the turn towards local social and economic planning in the 1960s as Britain's post-World War Two experiment in state socialism was diluted. Paradoxically, perhaps, the most significant concessions (they are identified in chapter 4) were secured from the Conservative government of 1979-1997. At a time of massive economic restructuring in Wales, middle-class Welsh language campaigners – many of them employed as educators by the British state - enhanced their potential to influence public life in Wales by securing the redoubts of education and the media. By the late 1990s, they were taking advantage of the new opportunities offered by Objective One structural funds awarded by the European Union to lay claim to the Welsh language as an instrument of sustainable, very local, social and economic development.

An alternative approach to authenticating Wales can be found in suggestions that a distinctive brand identity should be developed for Wales. That branding would arguably bestow an economic premium upon all goods and services originating in Wales, although the clearest value added would be to enterprises engaged in promoting cultural products from Wales and cultural tourism in Wales. Some such businesses are able to satisfy the need that some people have to discover their own roots, or to construct an identity for themselves out of a past that gives meaning to their present lives. Others cater for a more general quest for the type of cultural authenticity that is associated with traditional craft products or folk art. Others provide contemporary audio-visual products that are both global and rooted in some local

past, as in world music. But a brand that would purportedly bring together disparate elements of Wales' cultural output is no substitute for a civic arts. Not until there is a coherent institutional infrastructure and appropriate state funding will a big, distinctive, national art with a cosmopolitan – or universal - appeal be produced in Wales.

A second, related, theme is the political challenge to a centrally-administered high culture in favour of local micro-cultures. The 1997-2001 New Labour government of Britain made much of art as an instrument of community development. That is laudibly egalitarian, but it also encourages the fragmentation already referred to by allowing many voices to lay claim to the authentic culture of a group or a locale. The accompanying assault upon the supposed elitism of certain types of high culture – and the institutions that administer or deliver it - is certainly not constructive. As chapter 4 will demonstrate, a particular site of such tension in Wales has been recent plans by the Arts Council of Wales to (in its terms) 'rationalise' community theatre provision. It provided an excuse for the National Assembly to conduct an inquiry into the management of the Arts Council, and it led eventually to the resignation of the council's chief executive. Assaults on institutions such as arts councils weaken the 'arm's length' principle in government funding and compromise the ability of the state and its agents to mediate between competing cultural groups. The councils simply become sites for an irrelevant struggle between high culture and 'popular' culture genres. Art that might hitherto have been publicly subsidised as part of a nation's heritage is exposed to market conditions. In something of a circular process, it becomes subjected to the fragmenting forces of a global economy. In turn, those conditions further dilute the relatively homogeneous vernacular high culture that influential theorists of nationalism like Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) identify as being an essential operant of modern state nationalism.

A final theme is globalisation's disruption of the relationship between cultural identity and territorial location. Anthony Giddens' concept of 'ontological security' offers a means of explaining that relationship. He defines ontological security as 'confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity' (Giddens 1984, 23). Elsewhere, Giddens (1990, 1999) has implied that globalisation represents a fundamental set of changes to the texture of social life and our conception of who we are and how we live. It disturbs the balance between social structure,

human agency and reflexivity: that is, it undermines the confidence that a social actor has in her knowledge of both the conditions in which she acts and her own contribution to them.

The computer, an instrument of globalisation, changes our relationship with space and time. For example, it is possible to download a piece of music from the Internet directly onto a computer or MP3[3] player or mobile telephone. That takes less time than it would take to travel to and from a shop to purchase a compact disk that had been dispatched from a distance after having been pressed from a recording made at yet another location. In that sense, the Internet shrinks space and speeds up time. The same processes make it possible - theoretically, at least - for a musician or small record label to bypass established distribution and promotional channels by selling music directly from a web site. The Internet has also been theorised as a space for creating, representing and celebrating shared beliefs and traditions, a capacity that offers entrepreneurial opportunities for producers of traditional cultural products.

The two cultural producers who are the subject of chapter 5 have taken advantage of the marketing and distribution potential of the Internet. It is possible for small record companies and individual artists to develop and serve a demand for special-interest genres that bigger labels decline to take up. The storage and distribution efficiencies offered by MP3 technology mean that longer and more varied product lines can be developed to serve tiny and refined taste segments. However, the risks and costs of finding the performers, producing the music and developing and testing the market for such cultural products will often be borne by small companies before the products (and the rights in them) are taken up by larger companies.

Both the artists who feature in chapter 5 are producing under conditions of flexible capitalism. Flexible capitalism relates both to the organisation of production in space and the timeliness of its response to market conditions. It functions by means of production and distribution networks which, although they will be centrally capitalised and controlled, may be formed across global space and dissolved when the conditions that brought them into being no longer

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[3] MP3 (short for MPEG-1, Layer 3) is a digital distribution format that compresses audio files into data files for download from the Internet.

prevail. Flexibility can breed its own obverse: insecurity and mistrust. Information and communication technologies connect people across space but economic globalisation fragments. There may be a greater heterogeneity in what is produced; equally, there is a greater tendency either for producer cliques to arise or for impermanence (or collapse) to occur in social relations among producers. That is the nature of flexible capitalism.

Worldwide Wales

This is a study of the conditions of cultural production in Wales. However, I draw two conclusions from it which have general applicability. First, the rhetorical derogation of high art by some politicians, and their preference for popular culture as the social and economic practice of diverse cultural communities, augments the fragmenting forces of economic globalisation. Related to that is a second theme: the tension between aboriginality and originality in art. Aboriginal art can help an individual to secure his or her sense of personal identity; it can also help minority groups to secure rights and privileges for themselves within a nation-state. By contrast, innovative, cosmopolitan art might be difficult, inaccessible, provocative and even impersonal. However, it stands for a modern, civic, nation in a way that aboriginal art cannot do.

Why does the cultural capital accumulated by a group of Welsh-language nationalists matter? It matters because members of that group use their power to influence the rules of local cultural production. Should they be able directly to control the form and content of the art that they sponsor in order to create the 'difference' that makes a nation? Not in a liberal democracy. Yet a report published by the National Assembly for Wales recommends that, in the name of cultural diversity, 'cultural organisations which receive public funds should, as part of their application for grant, provide a statement on how they propose to promote the Welsh language' (National Assembly for Wales 2001, para. 3.23)

If Wales is to be a civic nation, it needs a civic arts. Wales' artists could become enslaved to the promotion of the language of a minority if some members of the National Assembly had their way.

2 THE ARTS OF ASSOCIATION

I hate to be the one who brings this news to the tribe, to the magic Digikingdom, but the simple truth is that the Web, the Internet, does one thing. It speeds up the retrieval and dissemination of information, messages, and images, partially eliminating such chores as going outdoors to the mailbox or the adult bookstore, or having to pick up the phone to get ahold of your stockbroker or some buddies to shoot the breeze with. That one thing the Internet does, and only that. All the rest is Digibabble.

(Tom Wolfe 1999, [online])

In this chapter, I interrogate the idea of 'community' from four different theoretical perspectives. They are: first, the link between community and the cultural practices that produce nations and nationalism; second, the invention of new communities and the rediscovery of old ones in the context of globalisation; third, the salience of community in conceptualisations of computer-mediated space; and fourth, community as a metaphor for the economic relationships and institutional arrangements that support flexible capitalism. An assessment is made of their applicability to the organisation of culture in Wales and in the World Wide Web.

Nation and community

There are many more nationalisms, and many more putative nations, than there are nation-states (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991, Brubaker 1996, Castells 1997, Hechter 2000). The emergence of nationalisms whose primary objective is not the self-determination of a territorial people but the extermination of an ethnic 'other' is said to have characterised the late twentieth century (Ignatieff 1993). However, new nations and revived nationalisms are not necessarily ethnic nationalisms: many are the result of past imperial nationalism (Brubaker 1996).

Ernest Gellner (1983) defined nationalism as a political principle that 'holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'. Nationalist movements are actuated by nationalist sentiments. Nationalist sentiment is 'the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment' (*ibid.*, 1). When a large empire incorporates a national territory, or when an alien group dominates a local population, the nationalist principle is violated. Wales qualifies as a violated nation on both those counts: it was involuntarily incorporated with England many centuries ago; it has been the destination of English 'migrants' for more than a century. The collective memory (or partial historiography) of past violations has contributed to contemporary Welsh nationalist discourse.

With regard to the first type of violation, Wales effectively became a colony of England from the thirteenth century, when much of it was parcelled up into fiefdoms for the barons of the Welsh marches under the Statute of Rhuddlan (1284). Sporadic unrest throughout the fourteenth century culminated in the rebellion of Owain Glyndwr, who declared himself Prince of Wales in 1400. Glyndwr held parliaments at Machynlleth and Harlech, declared that the Welsh church was to be free of Canterbury, and announced plans to create two universities in Wales. His rebellion, its brutal suppression, and the institutions he had tried to establish have endured as powerful symbols of a Wales free from English control[4]. The process of incorporation was formally completed by a series of measures enacted by the English crown between 1536 and 1543. However, Williams (1985) notes that full linguistic and cultural assimilation was constrained by the nascent British state's need to make Wales Protestant. A Welsh-language Bible and the printing presses that published it kept the Welsh language alive; they also formed the bedrock of nonconformist religion in Wales. The Welsh became, as Williams puts it, 'a people of the Book'. Ordinary social life in early modern Wales tended to be organised around a very local chapel culture rather than the institutions of a distant British state. Such traditions linger. Although social life in Welsh-speaking Wales no longer focuses upon chapel, communities there are often still quite close. Perhaps that explains the attraction of sustainable economic development policies to their political

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[4] For example, one of the more extreme Welsh nationalist cells that sprang up in the 1960s was *Meibion Glyndwr* (Sons of Glyndwr). Its members burned down a number of holiday homes owned by English people.

representatives, but it also contributes a certain parochialism to some Welsh-language culture. I shall return to those matters in the empirical analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5.

As to the second type of violation, domination by aliens, Wales has been an immigrant society since the 1860s. In particular, during the decade leading up to the First World War, it ranked second by rate only to the USA as a centre of immigration, predominantly to the coal valleys of south Wales. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Wales' population stood at a little over half a million people; by 1921, it numbered 2,600,000. The economic depression after 1921 heralded another demographic shift. During the period between the two world wars, almost half a million people left Wales, most of them from south Wales; they were replaced by nearly a quarter of a million who came in, 'overwhelmingly non-Welsh, largely elderly, often retired, *rentiers,* an overspill from an affluent elsewhere, making for the holiday coasts and the little, emptied villages, where property was almost as cheap as people' (Williams 1985, 253). Those population movements were, perhaps, taking their toll on the Welsh language, although there were other influences. The language of commerce in Wales was English; English and American literature as well as radio, film, jazz and popular dance music were offering English language alternatives to local cultural pursuits. The 1921 census indicated that the proportion of Welsh language speakers in Wales had fallen to 39 per cent. The Welsh nationalist party Plaid Cymru was founded in 1925 with the specific objective of safeguarding the language. It did not become committed to achieving self-government for Wales until 1932.

For Benedict Anderson (1991), the nation is not primarily a political unit: it is a community. He accuses Gellner of being 'so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates "invention" to "fabrication" and "falsity", rather than to "imagining" and "creation"' (*ibid.,* 6). For Anderson, the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest nation has boundaries beyond which are other nations. It is imagined as sovereign, because the sovereign state is the gage and emblem of the freedom of the nations from the shackles of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm that was overturned during the age of Enlightenment and Revolution. Finally, it is imagined as a *community* 'because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their

fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (*ibid.*, 6).

If Anderson's imagined boundaries, sovereignties and communities were criteria for 'real' nationhood, contemporary Wales would fall short of them. Wales' boundaries comprise the sea and the remnants of Offa's dyke, an eighth century ditch that separates it from England (Appendix, map). However, its roads and its railways connect north and south Wales with England and not with each other. Cardiff was designated as its capital city in 1955; residents of more ancient towns and cities in Wales resented its pretensions. Wales is not politically sovereign: it has a measure of regional autonomy in Britain and in Europe which was managed by the Welsh Office from 1964 to 1999 and, from 1999, by an elected National Assembly. Above all, it has the Welsh language. Under the Welsh Language Act 1993, the English and Welsh languages must be treated on a basis of equality where it is reasonable to do so in the conduct of public business and the administration of justice in Wales. Welsh is a compulsory part of the school curriculum, Welsh-language broadcast media are heavily sponsored by the state, and most government documentation, road signs and other public notices are bilingual. An increasing number of private companies, particularly retailers, provide signage and notices and conduct some business in Welsh as well as English. Yet Welsh is scarcely a vernacular language across contemporary Wales. It is spoken by less than 20 per cent of the population (1991 census)[5].

Like Gellner, Anderson conceptualises nations and nationalism as creatures of a modern consciousness, although he pays less attention than Gellner does to the way in which the state and its institutions mediate that consciousness. Two pre-modern cultural systems, the religious community and the dynastic realm, preceded the nation as frameworks for linking 'fraternity, power and time' (Anderson *op. cit.*, 36). Eighteenth-century print capitalism supported a new cultural system. Its vernacular novels and newspapers made it possible for an emerging bureaucratic, commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in Europe and the Americas 'to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways' (*ibid.*,

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[5] For a detailed statistical survey of the patterns of the Welsh language's domain, decline and recovery over the twentieth century and their relationship to social and economic trends, see Aitchison and Carter (2000).

36). As a vernacular language is disseminated, 'pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed' (*ibid.*, 154).

In Wales, a vernacular literature did emerge in the eighteenth century, but as a romantic reaction to a rather joyless chapel culture. It conjured up a Celtic and Druidic mythological past; it did not dream of a national future. For the most part, Wales' printing presses were busy producing Welsh language Bibles and religious tracts rather than novels and newspapers. There was no coherent nationalist movement in Wales until the late nineteenth century. Even when a home rule campaign - *Cymru Fydd* (the Wales to be) - did gather momentum in the 1880s, it drew its impetus from Welsh settlers in Liverpool and London. It was defeated by opposition from within Wales itself.

As indicated above, there is a fundamental distinction between the perspectives of Anderson and of Gellner on the matter of community. Anderson believes that nation *is* a community, imagined by its citizens; Gellner (1983) conceptualises the nation as a modern institutional and cultural entity that *replaced* pre-modern micro-communities. In place of the latter, a national culture is disseminated from the top via state institutions. The emergence of the classic European nation-state is intimately associated with industrialisation, but Gellner insists that culture and the state are not simply superstructural features of an economic base. Rather, the three forces are mutually reinforcing:

> The economy needs both the new type of central culture and the central state; the culture needs the state; and the state probably needs the homogeneous cultural branding of its flock, in a situation in which it cannot rely on largely eroded sub-groups either to police its citizens, or to inspire them with that minimum of moral zeal and social identification without which social life becomes very difficult.

(Gellner 1983, 140)

That 'homogeneous cultural branding' is achieved by nationalism. Nationalism emerged alongside industrialisation, which required a mobile, egalitarian and educated workforce whose members were able to communicate with others beyond their immediate locale. The focus of social life shifted away from community and towards nation and state. The primary means of disseminating a homogeneous national high culture was through a national

education system. A school-transmitted culture gained precedence over a folk-transmitted culture. That culture reproduces social individuals and groups geared to perpetual economic growth and technological progress. For Gellner, the 'monopoly of legitimate education is more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence' (*ibid.*, 34). The only effective keeper and protector of such a system is the state.

The tension between a British national culture and the Welsh language has certainly been played out in education in Wales. For example, Williams (1985) cites the 'Treason of the Blue Books' as having stung a modern Welsh nationalism into life in the mid-nineteenth century. The treason in question was the Education Report of 1847, which criticised the inadequacy of school provision in Wales. Great offence was caused by the attack made by the three English school inspectors upon religious nonconformity and the Welsh language 'as an obstacle to culture and enlightenment' (Morgan 1981, 23). Yet despite the expansion and improvement of state education throughout industrial and rural Wales in the later nineteenth century, the British state's monopoly over education was nowhere near as complete as Gellner implies it must be in an industrial society. Religious Dissent not only enhanced its domination of Board elementary school education in Wales after the passage of the 1870 Education Act; it was the moving force in the foundation of the 'college by the sea' at Aberystwyth in West Wales in 1872.

Aberystwyth University was to become a centre of Welsh language activism among students in the 1960s. However, its foundation as a 'people's college' in 1872 seems to be indicative of a social and political consensus then prevailing in Wales[6]. It coincided with the acceleration of industrialisation in Wales, but also with a cultural renaissance in Wales that endured until the outbreak of the First World War. Morgan (1981) marks the period as a crucial one in the formation of a self-conscious Welsh nation: for the first time, Wales had a middle class to give direction to a hitherto unfocussed sense of national identity. Until then, the culture of Wales had been a peasant culture, 'unsophisticated in expression, unconnected with any philosophy of nationhood' and with 'no literate or educated elite of civilizing

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[6] A popular subscription campaign in the 1870s generated over 100,000 contributions to the college of less than half a crown. Chapels would also regularly donate some of their funds to the college on University Sundays (Morgan 1981).

intellectuals, the very engine of national consciousness in other countries' (Morgan 1981, 93). Wales was becoming a self-conscious nation within a multi-nation state, but such nationalism as there was in the late nineteenth century sought home rule for Wales rather than a separate Welsh state.

Morgan resembles Gellner in his view of social homogeneity as a condition of national identity and his belief in the civilizing influence of high culture in forming nation and national consciousness. Such consciousness was not simply a middle class phenomenon, however. Gellner makes the point that the labour movements associated with industrialisation forced a shift in the visibility of culture:

> In the old days it made no sense to ask whether the peasants loved their own culture: they took it for granted, like the air they breathed, and were not conscious of either [....] In stable, self-contained communities culture is often quite invisible, but when mobility and context-free communication come to be the essence of social life, the culture in which one has been *taught* to communicate becomes the core of one's identity.

(Gellner 1983, 61)

In a similar vein, Billig (1995) observes that, unlike the medieval peasant who merely spoke, the modern person has to speak a *language*. Culture is more visible, more associated with an individual's identity. It becomes, as Giddens (1991) would have it, part of the process of reflexive modernity. But with which 'others' does an individual share an identity, and *how* is it shared, when modernity falls apart?

A very different type of nationalism from that prevailing in Victorian and Edwardian Wales emerged during the economic crisis of the early 1920s. The contraction of international trade from 1921 had marked a slump in the staple industries of Britain - coal, steel-making and shipbuilding - which was to last for 15 years. Wales, and particularly south Wales, an area of primary production rather than a manufacturer of finished products, experienced mass unemployment and acute poverty. During the 1920s and 1930s, huge swathes of the population of Wales were redundant: rates of 70 per cent unemployment in the south Wales valleys towns were not uncommon. The economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s brought with it immense hardship for a working class hit by the diminution of employment in the

foundries, mines and docks that dominated the economy of south Wales. However, the depression also marked the fading in Wales of any substantial, local, industrial-entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. That process coincided with the long-anticipated disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales in 1920. Partly as a consequence of that disestablishment, the period also witnessed the fragmentation of many large agricultural estates. Much of the land was parcelled up and sold to small tenant farmers who struggled with mortgage debt throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

Gone was the political hegemony of the Liberal party in Wales. Gone also was the relative homogeneity among employers, industrial labour, landlords and rural *werin* ('folk') that had given birth to a modern conception of Wales as a nation (Morgan 1981). Out of its ashes there arose two irreconcilable political movements. The first was a class-based Labour politics. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Labour party's ascendancy became complete in the coalfield valleys and was strong throughout most of industrial south Wales. The other political force was a language-based Welsh nationalism. Its leading figure was one of the founders of *Plaid Cymru*, J. Saunders Lewis.

Lewis was a Liverpool Welshman, a War casualty, and 'a poet, essayist, novelist, and dramatist of almost limitless talent' (Morgan 1981, 247). He became the party's leader in 1926, and remained so until 1939. He 'saw the new party as embodying the organic unity of Wales and of medieval European Christendom as it had existed long ago, before the sectarian divisiveness introduced by the statist nationalism and the Protestantism of the sixteenth century had fragmented Welsh culture' (Morgan 1981, 206). Lewis, who was received into the Roman Catholic Church in 1932, promoted links between Wales and Latin Catholic countries. He was also anti-democratic, anti-modern, and much influenced by right-wing French Catholic nationalism. Like some of the other founders of *Plaid Cymru*, he believed that Wales needed its own Mussolini (Williams 1985).

It might be thought that a figure such as Lewis would be a source of immense and unequivocal embarrassment to nationalists in Wales. However, that is not the case. When he emerged from retirement in 1962 to give a radio lecture on the fate of the Welsh language, he

ignited a new wave of political action – some of it violent – on behalf of the Welsh language. Excerpts from the broadcast are analysed in detail in chapter 4, as are its consequences.

Gellner (1983) asserts that nationalism cannot be present in 'agro-literate' society: that is, in a culturally differentiated society in which a horizontally stratified 'warrior-and-scribe' class rule a laterally separated peasantry. In such a society, there is no correlation between political units and cultural boundaries. The clerisy is tied to a faith, a church and a liturgical language rather than to a local culture; the allegiances of an absentee feudal aristocracy transcend the myriad of vertically separate local micro-cultures over which they hold sway. There are intimations of such relationships in Saunders Lewis's opposition to statist nationalism. However, the reflexes acquired in modernity cannot be erased: they require a new fix. The conditions for Wales' *post*modernity were established in the 1920s. In postmodernity, nationhood is unravelled. Billig (1995, 134) explains it thus: 'no longer is the national territory *the* place from which identities, attachments and patterns of life spring. The order of the national world gives way to a new mediaevalism'.

Globalisation and community

A nation without a state is impotent. A state without a nation is impersonal. Yet the forces of globalisation are supposedly uncoupling, or de-hyphenating, nation and state. Two of those forces are relevant here: the trans-border operations of international capitalism and the assertion of a politics of identity and difference. They are inseparable.

Manuel Castells (1996, 92) defines a global economy as 'an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale', a capacity that has been endowed by the information technology revolution. States are the expression of societies, rather than economies, and there is a tension between 'historically rooted political institutions and increasingly globalized economic agents' (*ibid.*, 102). However, globalisation is as contested an idea as nationalism. Bourdieu (1998) proclaims that globalisation is a myth that justifies the restoration of an unrestrained and cynical capitalism and the destruction of the welfare

state. Hirst and Thompson (1999) also believe globalisation to be a myth, but it is one shared by the political right *and* left. The right advance it in support of further liberalisation and deregulation of domestic economies, particularly where labour rights and social welfare make a region's economy less competitive; the left use it to reveal the futility of national social democratic reformist strategies.

Anthony Giddens (1999) denies that globalisation is a myth. He cedes to the radical view of globalisation which holds that the capitalisation, production, distribution and consumption of some goods and services is becoming detached from the contingencies and exigencies of local time and geographical place. It is a contradictory process: nations are losing some of their economic power, while new pressures for local autonomy are emerging. The new global order is emerging 'in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion', and the powerlessness that we feel in the face of it 'reflects the incapacities of our institutions' (*ibid.*, 19). Giddens suggests that those who are sceptical about globalisation 'tend to be on the political left, especially the old left'. He accounts for their perspective thus: 'if all this is essentially a myth, governments can still control economic life and the welfare state remain intact' (*ibid.*, 8-9).

The human consequences of globalisation's haphazardness and contradictions, and the challenges that they pose for the political left, are exemplified in Wales in the shift from central to local economic planning over the past fifty years but also in disputes over political devolution for Wales that have surfaced periodically since the Second World War. Their paths are intertwined.

Centralisation, devolution and fragmentation in Wales

The post-World-War-Two Labour government's programme of nationalisation 'de-localised' many of Wales' biggest industries. Centralised social and economic planning was, for a brief time, the new order. The most emblematic nationalisation measure was that which - to rejoicing in the coalfield valleys - brought the coal mines into public ownership on 1 January 1947 under the stewardship of the National Coal Board (NCB). The rejoicing was premature.

The NCB 'proved to be almost as remote from the rank-and-file miner as the old capitalist owner and his agents had been' (Morgan 1981, 311) as the ideal of industrial democracy was displaced by a technocratic, managerial corporation. Worse, investment and modernisation might mask, but it could not halt, the underlying structural decline of the industry in the face of its own inefficiencies and the threat from oil, nuclear power and cheap coal from elsewhere. By the end of the twentieth century, there were few miners left in Wales. In 1913, there had been over a quarter of a million of them.

In other respects, increased emphasis was being given to tailoring economic policy to specific local conditions by means of dedicated administrative machinery and development institutions. After the War, south Wales had been scheduled as a development area. From 1964, the Welsh Office carried out at local level the work of the Board of Trade, the Ministries of Agriculture and Transport and a number of other departments. Almost the whole of Wales was a development area by the time the Welsh Development Agency was founded in 1976 locally to manage the substantial finance that had been allocated to attracting and developing enterprise to and in Wales. Set-up grants, loans and tax concessions were offered to incoming manufacturing companies and Wales became a major destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Priority was given to light manufacturing and service industries, but older industries were also encouraged to modernise.

The success of the different economic initiatives was limited. The steady drift of population away from the mining valleys was maintained. Rural Wales west of Swansea and north of the Brecon Beacons also lost people as rural trades and industries declined and slate quarries closed. The environmental impact of some of the industries that moved into those areas, including nuclear power generation and forestry, often adversely affected the tourism industry upon which local economies increasingly relied. Wales' coal, slate, steel and oil industries had long been in decline. By the end of the twentieth century, it was suffering also from the running down of defence bases in west Wales, by the crises that had beset agriculture in Britain, and by a decline in coastal tourism. Despite its status as a magnet for FDI and the existence of pockets of relative affluence, Wales was one of the poorest areas of Europe by

the close of the 20th century. In 1999, West Wales and the Valleys[7] became one of four regions of the UK that were eligible for Objective One European structural funds for the period 2000-2006. The qualifying areas of Wales had met the criterion that gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant must be less than 75 per cent of the European Union average.

As to devolution, the issue of home rule had not disappeared from Wales after the Second World War. A 'Parliament for Wales' campaign was founded in 1949 under the auspices of *Undeb Cymru Fydd*, a language pressure group. It received cross-party support outside of urban and industrial Wales but faltered in the face of hostility from a number of south Wales Labour MPs. Prominent, passionate (and prescient) among the latter was Nye Bevan. Bevan was determined 'to fight off any suggestion of domination by a small Welsh-speaking middle-class elite drawn mainly from the hinterland' (Morgan 1981, 377). Morgan and Mungham (2000) suggest that the trade union leaders who dominated Labour politics in Wales were so deeply suspicious of federalism in their own organisations that they were unlikely to champion devolution in the country at large. Be that as it may, from the 1960s, Welsh nationalism started to become a political force.

Since its foundation in the 1920s, Plaid Cymru had made little political headway in Wales, even among Welsh speakers. It was perceived as being rooted in intellectual and cultural coteries in the university of Wales, in literary circles and in the BBC. The suspicion that some of its earlier leaders had Fascist sympathies did nothing to enhance its appeal. It had remained a small party with a rural focus for some years after the Second World War. However, in July 1966, Gwynfor Evans won Plaid Cymru's first parliamentary seat at a by-election at Carmarthan[8]. Throughout the 1970s, Plaid Cymru, as well as the Conservatives and the Liberals, made inroads into the Labour vote and took parliamentary seats.

Labour politics was still dominant in Wales, however, and the people indicated no enthusiasm for self-government in a devolution referendum in March 1979. They decisively rejected a proposal for a national assembly. A number of prominent Labour MPs – including Neil

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[7] 'West Wales and the Valleys' (WWV) is the formal European Commission classification for the area.

[8] Gwynfor Evans was leader of Plaid Cymru from 1945 to 1981.

Kinnock and Ron Davies - had campaigned against it, arguing that devolution would fragment class unity.

And then, from 1979-1997, the world went dark.

Morgan and Mungham (2000) paint an unedifying picture of Wales during that period. It was a land of proliferating, scandal-ridden quangos[9] to which Conservative party sympathisers were appointed to deliver government to Wales. Labour-controlled local government was not much cleaner: several local authorities were a byword for corruption, patronage and inefficiency. Despite the 'democratic deficit', only a very few Labour politicians – among them Rhodri Morgan, who eventually became leader of the National Assembly for Wales – would ally themselves to the cause of devolution and start to build the bridges with other parties that were necessary to its attainment.

Meanwhile, the relationship between Welsh-language nationalism and the British national state was becoming ever more paradoxical. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the labour market in Wales. Many Welsh-language campaigners would distance themselves from the British Conservative party; most members of the Conservative and Unionist Party of Great Britain would disassociate themselves from a discrete nationalist movement within Britain. Yet Welsh-language campaigners secured significant concessions from the 1979-1997 Conservative government. For example, generous subsidies were provided for minority Welsh language broadcast media; additional provision was made for school education in the medium of Welsh. That occurred while the state was retreating as an employer of industrial labour in Wales.[10] Middle-class Welsh language campaigners were enhancing their potential to influence public life in Wales by capturing the redoubts of education and the media. They were also securing and improving their own employment prospects.

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[9] i.e. 'Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations'.

[10] although not as an employer in Wales. In 2000, despite the movement of many nationalised industries and public utilities into the private sector, at least a quarter of Wales' working population was still employed by the state (Office for National Statistics/National Assembly for Wales 2000a). In some areas, the reliance upon state employment is even greater. For example, the public administration, education and health sectors together account for over 37 per cent and almost 40 per cent respectively of all employment in the rural areas of Gwynedd and Ceredigion (Objective One Single Programming Document 2000-2006, 35).

One reading of that paradox is that the ideological relationship between Wales and aboriginal Britain endures. The Welsh language is, its supporters allege, the 'indigenous' Britonnic language. If Welsh is the original British and the Tories are obsessed by Britain's national heritage, there is no anomaly in their having given so many concessions to Welsh-language campaigners while rejecting the rights being claimed by other groups[11]. However, the rise of cultural-identity politics in Wales in the twentieth century has to be seen in the context of a more general social and political fragmentation. Those processes have not gone away with the demise of the Tories. I shall return to the issue of identity and affiliation later in this chapter.

In May 1997 there was a change of government in the United Kingdom, the New Labour party having won a landslide general election after 18 years of Conservative rule. In a referendum held in September 1997, the people of Wales voted to have their own National Assembly. However, they did so by such a narrow majority (50.3 per cent to 49.7 per cent), and on such a low turnout - of just 50.1 per cent of eligible voters - that the plan for the Assembly was approved by only one quarter of Wales' electorate. Moreover, the tensions between centralisers and devolutionists within the Labour party in Wales continued after the 1997 referendum. They were reflected in conflicts over whether Ron Davies or Rhodri Morgan should become the Labour leader in the Assembly, and over the constitution of the lists of approved candidates for election to the Assembly. Ron Davies, then also Secretary of State for Wales, had been the victor in the first leadership contest in 1997. He resigned in October 1998, some nine months before the formal inauguration of the Assembly. There followed a further battle between Alun Michael (the favoured candidate of the Labour party in London) and Rhodri Morgan for the position of Labour leader in the Assembly. Appeals for a 'One Member One Vote' election in each of the leadership contests were rejected in favour of an electoral college where the trade-union dominated block vote favoured Morgan's opponent on each occasion.

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[11] Williams (1983) suggests that the British state has looked to Wales as a source of aboriginal British-ness since the time of the Tudors. He observes that the newly Protestant Britain, an imperial nation state in formation, had had to fight for its life against Hapsburg Spain, agent of the counter-Reformation and monopolist of the New World. He continues: 'central to the enterprise was the assertion of an aboriginally independent and imperial

Elections to the 60-seat Assembly were held in May 1999. The result demonstrated how far politics in Wales was fragmenting. On another low turnout of voters (46 per cent), Labour won only 28 seats and failed to gain an overall majority. Plaid Cymru won 17 seats in its best-ever election performance. The Conservatives won nine seats and the Liberal Democrats won six seats. On 1 July, limited powers of self-government duly transferred to the National Assembly for Wales. The Assembly could neither pass primary legislation nor levy taxes, but it took over from the Secretary of State for Wales the responsibility for making regulations for Wales within the framework of legislation laid down in Acts of Parliament (that is, the UK Parliament). The annual spending budget for Wales remained under the control of central government: the Assembly could allocate central resources in accordance with local needs, but it could not redistribute local wealth through tax legislation. However, regional government was now more accountable; the Assembly also offered the opportunity for a more integrated approach to be taken to local social and economic issues.

Alun Michael kept his post as First Secretary of the Assembly for less than a year. The immediate trigger for the opposition 'no confidence' motion that led to his resignation (and his replacement by Rhodri Morgan) was uncertainty over whether Whitehall would match the funds that Wales had secured under the European Union's Objective One programme. Morgan and Mungham (2000) insist that the origins of his fall lie in the method and manner of his election as Labour leader in Wales. I think they underestimate the effect of the European Union's regional economic development policy on Wales' new polity. The vote against Alun Michael was engineered by Plaid Cymru: its leaders had much to gain from the aid that would be channelled to their constituents. Michael might have been short of friends because of the manner of his appointment, but he really was pushed out because of fears that the development aid would not be delivered. Objective One restructuring funds forced the issue of community to the forefront of politics in Wales.

British identity, whose sources had to be sought in those remote ages when Albion was an empire and its Christianity free from Rome. Here, Welsh traditions were inescapable' (*ibid.*, 123).

Economy and association

How might one conceptualise economic relations that are co-ordinated by communities as well as, or instead of, the market or the state? A group of theorists whom I shall label 'associationalists' provides some assistance. They have been inspired by Tocqueville's approval of what he observed in 1830s America: that the network of voluntary civic associations in which citizens were embedded militated against the 'vice' of individualism to which democratic societies might otherwise be prone. They believe that participation in networks of social association is a precondition for the well-being of individuals and of society. Some of them cite the social and economic benefits of reciprocal ties and group solidarity in Japan and Germany, contrasting them with the individualism of Anglo-Saxon societies. However, associationalism is not a homogeneous body of theory. It ranges along a continuum from an anti-liberal, rather authoritarian communitarianism espoused by Amitai Etzioni (1995, 1996) through the neo-liberal social capitalism propounded by Francis Fukuyama (1995) to the social-democratic social capitalism of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000).

Communitarians argue that narrow self-interest or group-interest should be replaced by a sense of collective moral purpose and a re-commitment to civic and family life. 'The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities' (hereafter, the Platform)[12] sets out a manifesto for 'a judicious mix of self-interest, self-expression, and commitment to the commons - of rights and responsibilities, of I and we' (Etzioni 1995, 26). The Platform claims that a community is in deep moral crisis if it relies upon the state to enforce 'moral responsibilities'. Tasks that can be undertaken by the community should not be assigned to an institution that is larger than is necessary to perform the task. On the other hand, the state should intervene to promote 'moral behaviour' on the part of individuals for the good of society in general.

Social capital refers to the habits of mutual obligation that prevail among connected individuals. Putnam (2000, 19) includes Bourdieu's (1984) concept of cultural capital among

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[12] The Platform sets out the communitarian manifesto. It was published in 1991 and signed by a number of prominent Americans. The Platform, with a detailed commentary and rationale, is reprinted in Etzioni 1995. A copy of the Platform and an up-to-date list of its sponsors can also be found at the Communitarian Network web site at <http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/RCPlatform.html> (30 July 2000).

the theoretical antecedents of social capital. However, the two types of capital are different. 'Cultural capital' refers to the fund of linguistic and cultural competences, codes and conventions that mark off the 'habitus' of a social class or group. The possession of cultural capital by a group contributes to social difference and distinction; increasing the social capital of individuals or groups contributes to social cohesion.

Like communitarians, theorists of social capital seek to promote the formation and maintenance of social bonds. They assume that the social 'middle' is absent or diminished in a community whose citizens do not engage in public life. In such circumstances, only the law or state institutions will be available to mediate between competing interests. The ideal role of the state is not to substitute for that middle; it is to facilitate the creation or recreation of intermediate organisations that lie between the private sector and the state. Such organisations decrease the distance between a community and a supplier of some public good while increasing the amount of social interaction in the community. Social capitalists tend to give greater weight than do communitarians to the economic implications of social ties[13].

For example, Francis Fukuyama defines social capital as 'a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it'. He suggests that 'it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical habit'. Ethical habits such as the ability to associate spontaneously are crucial to organisational innovation and to the creation of wealth. 'Communities of shared ethical values' do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because 'prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust' (Fukuyama 1995, 26). A similarly rationalistic view of culture is present in Robert Putnam's studies of how social capital contributes to regional economic development. As Putnam used the term in his (1993) studies of civic life in post-1970s Italy, social capital refers to 'features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating

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[13] The interest in social capital is shared by the World Bank, which sees it as a means to the social cohesion that is 'critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable human and economic development'. The Bank supports a number of programmes on social capital - 'the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals'. Links to studies of, and research instruments for measuring, social capital can be found at the World Bank's web site at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbp/scapital/index.htm> (3 June 2001).

co-ordinated actions' (Putnam 1993, 167). Putnam's studies of regional difference in Italy indicated a clear correlation between levels of civic involvement and a thriving modern economy. He is careful not to say that culture 'causes' economics: he argues that 'civics' *explains* economics, rather than the reverse. In a more recent (2000) study, based on the USA, Putnam points to the importance of both 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital in building strong civic societies. Bonding social capital tends to build exclusive, narrow, groups. However, it can be valuable in mobilising solidarity and providing support: for example, for entrepreneurs who are starting out in business. Bridging social capital connects individuals and groups to external assets, information and ideas. It can generate broader identities and reciprocity with outside groups.

The importance of social cohesion to economic development is implicit in the terms by which Objective One funds were granted to West Wales and the Valleys by the European Commission in 1999. The new grant aid complemented assistance that already applied in much of Wales. As with all previous European funding programmes, the European Commission required that the block grant of funds allocated to the region be matched by equivalent additional funds from central government (that is, the government in Westminster); it further stipulated that specific bids to draw from the funds at local level should normally be matched by resources provided by the bidders. In that respect European funding was a lever to force people and organisations into new kinds of alliances and relationships. Throughout 1999 and 2000, Wales' public life was dominated by questions about what should go into the 'single programming document' (SPD) that would present the region's plans for economic development and restructuring to the European Commission. Then, once the SPD had been approved, people and organisations were preoccupied with finding partners to put forward some scheme or another to the Assembly in order to try to access the funds. But were they, and should they be, accumulating social capital?

The theories that I have labelled 'associational' promote methods both for developing civic society and encouraging enterprise. Their recommendations depend upon neither cultural attachments to the modern nation nor the institutional power of the modern nation-state: the affiliations that they promote are contingent upon personal ties and local self-organisation. Communitarianism attempts to mediate the tension in social life between selfish

individualism and impersonal collectivism; theorists of social capital seek a compromise between indifferent, rationalist explanations of economic behaviour and analyses of cultural difference between individuals and groups. But such theories prompt the question how the web of social relations that they promote is to be held together. For example, there is a contradiction at the heart of communitarianism. Its implied support for a rolling back of the institutions of the state (particularly its welfare institutions) challenges the continued viability of the nation state just as strongly as does the 'hyper-globalisation' that is assumed to prevail by business writers such as Ohmae (1990, 1995). Yet communitarianism seeks 'the *institutionalisation* of' its own principles for 'the nations and peoples now emerging from generations of repression' (Communitarian Network 1991, online; emphasis added).

A further question arises. *Who* can be included in networks of social association? For example, Cooke and Morgan (1998) point to the value of trade associations, chambers of commerce, labour unions and civic associations as intermediate associations which lie between the state and the market. But do not such intermediate associations simply represent special interest groups that compete for resources and power? As Putnam (2000) acknowledges, there is a 'dark' side to social capital, which may flourish amidst corruption, sectarianism and ethnocentrism. There is surely a risk that those interests will simply become institutionalised and bureaucratised in the intermediate associations that represent them. How are intermediate associations different from the much-reviled – in Wales at least – quangos? After all, in opposition, the British Labour party had promised a 'bonfire of the quangos' once it came to power. Nowhere was that assurance more eagerly received than in Wales where, for almost 20 years, government-appointed 'quangos' had been excoriated as the instruments of government by a minority party: that is, the Conservatives. It quickly became apparent after 1997 that the quangos and similar organisations would survive, although many of them were to be brought more closely under the surveillance of the National Assembly for Wales as Assembly-Sponsored Public Bodies (ASPBs). Perhaps quangos are not so very different from intermediate associations. Chapter 4 demonstrates how Welsh language interests have become embedded within such institutions.

A final concern about associationalist theories is that they rarely acknowledge that global capitalism demands the methods of social organisation that they propose. After all, there is

nothing new about communal (and inter-communal) solidarity, institutionalised or otherwise. Its less attractive consequences are also well-rehearsed. For example, the monolithic control that Labour local authorities established in south Wales during the 1920s and 1930s came eventually to breed financial corruption and abuse of patronage. Yet many of them had kept their communities alive during the depression years by bending and stretching rules and resources. Moreover, local institutions - miners' clubs and libraries, welfare halls, the workers educational association, local 'Co-op' stores – retained their importance during the depression despite substantial emigration from the valley towns and the incursions of mass popular culture[14].

Such associations existed to protect their members against the depredations of capitalism. The new associations are the raw materials of capitalism.

In his study of the personal consequences of work in the 'new economy', Richard Sennett (1998) gives a twist to social capital. It helps to uproot people from concrete attachments to place in late, flexible, capitalism. A fund of social capital - 'shared past experiences as well as individual achievements and endowments' (ibid., 85) - enhances people's ability to navigate loose networks and to take risks. Risk is corrosive both for society and for the individual: the certainties of hierarchical bureaucracies have paled, to be replaced by flexible networks and 'teamwork of demeaning superficiality' (ibid., 99). Sennett insists that the idea that those networked relationships have any ethical grounding is a fiction. Such is their transitory and discomfiting nature that the individual can no longer build for herself or himself any coherent life narrative. The case studies of cultural producers presented in chapter 5 certainly indicate that it is not possible to survive indefinitely in the present on social capital accumulated in the past.

Sennett also remarks that when the 'we' of community is invoked as a defence against the incoherence of experience in the new economy, that 'we' is a 'dangerous pronoun'. It is to the issue of identity and affiliation that I now turn.

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[14] They also made common cause with comrades in other depressed industrial areas of Britain and with the International Labour struggle. As an example of the latter, 174 volunteers from south Wales, 122 of them miners, fought in Spain with the International Brigade in 1936-9 (Morgan 1981).

Identity and affiliation

Class interest no longer prevails in political analysis and political activism. Affiliations associated with ethnic, religious, gender, sexual, age, and/or health 'identities' have challenged its dominance. Steven Seidman (1997) attributes this to the 'de-centering' of the left as it broke from Marxism in the 1970s and 1980s and became associated with new social movement (NSM) politics. Social protest and theoretical consensus about its causes and effects became fragmented. Engin Isin and Patricia Wood (1999, 158) likewise associate the re-evaluation of what it is to be political with the 'postmodernization of culture [which] has splintered modern citizenship as a master identity'. In a similar spirit, Iris Marion Young (1989, 1990) is preoccupied with the shortcomings of 'generalising concepts' like community and citizenship. She locates the origins of 'difference politics' in the mobilisation around social group identity – as opposed to class or economic interests - of many emancipatory and leftist social movements.

As will become apparent, by no means all recent cultural-political analysis has been undertaken from a 'postmodern' perspective: communitarian and liberal voices have also contributed to the debate about cultural membership of society. Unlike most communitarian and liberal approaches, postmodern theories of identity and affiliation are often deliberately ambiguous and contentious, for their very urge to deconstruct is directed against so-called unifying theories, ideals and subject positions. Their ambiguity and reluctance to commit to a disciplinary framework does not mean that they shed no light upon the subject of cultural diversity. Indeed, they usefully highlight the multi-layered, constantly shifting differences and affiliations within and between groups and individuals. They also challenge the underlying assumptions of hegemonic codes and actions. But the problem with eschewing 'foundational beliefs' in this context, as Seidman suggests we should, is that it prevents the utterance of a forthright statement that in the real world some cultural politics are simply unacceptable because (i) the subsidisation of them is disproportionate and unjust; or (ii) their

adherents exercise no mutual obligations in respect of the wider communities that support them; or (iii) in the name of group rights they promote or permit the repression, exploitation or silencing of 'other' human beings.

With those caveats in mind, I am going to explain how issues of identity and affiliation are expressed in theories about 'community membership' in national and global contexts. As the foregoing discussion implies, there is no unified field of theory in which to base such a discussion. Moreover, there is a marked reluctance in much cultural-political analysis to engage with the relationship between cultural difference and economic inequality. A final challenge is the blurring – particularly in critiques of liberalism – of the difference between social homogeneity and social cohesion. I shall endeavour to correct those omissions and shortcomings. I shall do so by abstracting 'social capital' from particularist cultural politics and problemetising it as an instrument of civic and economic development in and across culturally and spatially heterogeneous societies in late capitalism. That theme is developed in more detail in the final two sections of this chapter.

As previously discussed, 'nation' has been conceptualised as a community that is both a result and a source of nationalism. In some circumstances, nationalism prevails against the tolerance and inclusiveness that a civic society requires. It can be exclusive, needing an 'other' against which its 'nation' is defined. It is often associated with struggles to create new states or with an extreme right-wing politics of xenophobia, hate speech and race attacks. Yet as Billig (1995) has observed, nationalism is also reproduced daily in the institutional habits and cultural practices of established nation-states. A nation-state requires for its maintenance not only bureaucratic expertise and the actual or threatened sanction of violence; among relevant subject groups there must be an association of the polity with a shared and bounded culture and character in which those groups participate. In other words, some equivalence is required between the borders and character of the political unit and a self-conscious 'cultural community' (Hastings 1997). That self-consciousness equates with nationalism, but it also expresses itself as citizenship.

Discussion of national citizenship usually starts with the work of T.H. Marshall. Marshall's contribution to theory about modern citizenship is widely acknowledged, although many of

his exegetes contest its continuing relevance. But Marshall himself, writing half a century ago in post-War Britain about the possible social consequences of the nascent welfare state, recognised the cultural and historical specificity of the citizenship that he invoked and he acknowledged its internal contradictions. For example, he observed a paradoxical relationship between the three categories of citizenship rights – civic, political and social – out of which modern citizenship had evolved[15]. Capitalism required the development of civic and political rights since they also encompassed the notions of contract, fair exchange and economic individualism; the egalitarianism implicit in the concept of social rights was at odds with the class divisions upon which capitalism was based (Marshall 1977). But citizenship would have been unrealisable in a feudal society. Marshall explained why:

> In feudal society status was the hallmark of class and the measure of inequality. There was no uniform collection of rights and duties with which all men – noble and common, free and serf – were endowed by virtue of their membership of the society. There was, in this sense, no principle of the equality of citizens to set against the principle of the inequality of classes. In the medieval towns, on the other hand, examples of genuine and equal citizenship can be found. But its specific rights and duties were strictly local, whereas the citizenship whose history I wish to trace is, by definition, national.

(Marshall 1950/1992, 8-9)

This argument recalls the analysis of nationalism by Gellner (1983). Nation was for Gellner an unambiguously modern concept; so was citizenship for Marshall. For the latter, citizenship was associated with the fusion of locally variable rights and duties into a national whole but also with the functional differentiation (that is, specialisation) of the state

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[15] Broadly speaking, the three categories of rights developed in three different historical periods, although there was some overlap between them. *Civil* citizenship comprises 'the rights necessary for individual freedom': 'liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice' (Marshall 1950/1992, 8). These rights were expressed in law and exercised through the institutions of the legal system, and they enabled the individual citizen to participate freely in the life of the community. Most of them were established during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. *Political* rights enabled the citizen to participate in the government of the community. They were secured during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the extension of the franchise. Their development signified the transition from an exclusive political empowerment based on property ownership to mass democracy. *Social* citizenship enabled the individual to share in the 'social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (*ibid.*). They arose to counter the inequalities that would otherwise result from the unrestrained operation of capitalism. In Britain, social rights comprised the individual's right to health care, education and economic welfare and security. They were delivered through the institutions of the welfare state.

institutions that made laws, administered justice and delivered welfare. One of the consequences of that process was that the national, specialised institutions that emerged from it were remote: they 'could not belong so intimately to the life of the social groups they served as those that were local and of a general character' (Marshall 1950/1992, 9). In turn, that affected the balance between rights and duties. Marshall puts it like this:

> Rights have been multiplied, and they are precise. Each individual knows just what he *(sic)* is entitled to claim. The duty whose discharge is most obviously and immediately necessary for the fulfilment of the right is the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions. Since these are compulsory, no act of will is involved, and no keen sentiment of loyalty. [....] The other duties are vague, and are included in the general obligation to live the life of a good citizen, giving such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community. *But the community is so large that the obligation appears remote and unreal.*
>
> (Marshall 1950/1992, 45; emphasis added)

Marshall's observation points to an important theme that runs through this chapter and throughout the thesis. It is the tension that arises between (i) the personal relationships and affiliations that are often claimed to constitute 'community' and (ii) the impersonality of a public life that is mediated or resourced by distant policy makers supported by bureaucratic administrative institutions. But Marshall neglected an analogous tension between cultural difference and the *in*difference of universalistic assumptions about citizenship and the rights associated with it, for the typology of citizenship rights and obligations formulated by him in mid-twentieth century Britain does not take account of the paradoxical effects (or potential effects) of globalisation upon the relationship between people, nation and state.

The pressing problems facing stateless peoples and refugees demand the recognition of undifferentiated, universal human rights regardless of their membership of a nation-state (Bottomore 1992). Equally, it has been suggested that the significance attached to the recognition and survival of diasporic and other cultural identities both displaces any sense of 'common destiny' within national boundaries and requires a multi-tiered construction of citizenship that recognises people's membership of communities 'sub-, supra- and cross-states' (Yuval-Davis 1997, 91). Moreover, it highlights the tension between the 'modern' belief in the equal dignity of all human beings, the ideal of individual authenticity and the

legitimacy of claims to collective rights on behalf of specific groups (Taylor 1992, Kymlicka 1995). The assumption that nation states can ever be impartial in mediating cultural difference is subject to the charge that they necessarily institutionalise certain practices and traditions as normative and normalising (Young 1989, Seidman 1997). It is therefore argued that any workable, radical concept of 'citizenship' must take account of many *different* ways of belonging to and being in the world (Isin and Wood 1999). At stake is whether such difference can be embraced by the traditional (left and right) liberal notion of citizenship as a bundle of hard-won but universally-applicable legal, political and social rights and responsibilities that are vested in independent individual citizens and are associated with the development of modern capitalism (cf. Marshall 1950/1992).

At this point, it is appropriate to introduce multiculturalism to the argument. Multiculturalism is a contested concept: like other formulations of cultural politics it can invoke pluralism, diversity, inclusiveness, or fragmentation. Its scope, too, is unbounded. Although it is commonly applied to ethnic difference, where ethnicity is defined as voluntary affiliation to the cultural traditions of a particular 'ancestral' group, it may encompass other cultural variables and the rights and obligations attached to them and ethnicity is itself compromised by the existence of so many other sources of difference. As Bryan Turner (2001) points out, 'cultural membership' may be located in diverse sites in a multi-cultural, multi-national society, and a single individual might occupy more than one of them.

Nira Yuval-Davis (1997, 57) has observed that despite its promotion as a major anti-racist strategy, multiculturalism has been criticized from the left for ignoring class, gender and power relations within and between the boundaries of different ethnic groups, for emphasizing the differential cultures of groups at the expense of the shared experiences of racism, subordination and economic exploitation that might unite them and for assuming that all members of a specific cultural collectivity are equally committed to that culture. She warns in particular of a fundamentalist 'freezing' of some ethnic identities when they are reified and essentialised in diasporic communities by multiculturalism. Moreover, the domain of ethnic multiculturalism extends beyond political relationships within and between nations; it also features in debates about the nature of 'post-national' society. Isin and Wood (1999) find the concept of 'multiculturalism' unequal to the task of encapsulating diversity within a nation

and within individual citizens in the context of global migration. They suggest that it is a thinly veiled politics of accommodation, and they prefer the term 'diasporic citizenship' to describe the practice of radical citizenship and democracy by many cultures to reinvent the nation as a 'post-national' collective. Be that as it may, multiculturalism is the focus of much contemporary political and social debate about national solidarity, and ethnic multiculturalism is relevant to the present study because of its relationship with nationalism.

Calhoun (1997) points out that most prominent twentieth-century analysts of nationalism dismissed the notion that a nation could have any prior ethnicity. Nationalists might conquer or rule in the name of a repackaged ethnic or folk heritage, but a nation has no essential, natural form. The eighteenth century Romantic emphasis upon the origins of nation in traditional folk cultures was misplaced. Such cultures were often fictional, sometimes originating outside the groups or places with which they were associated. For example, the heroic Druid and Celtic mythologies that still influence *eisteddfodau* in contemporary Wales were the invention of homesick London-Welsh scholars and grandees in the late eighteenth century (Morgan 1983). In short, national traditions are invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

But as Calhoun acknowledges, dissenting voices have been raised against the assumption that nationalism is purely a product of a particular (modern) stage of history, be it a self-consciously manipulative project on the part of powerful or power-seeking elites or constructed out of collective cultural practices. Prominent among the sceptics is Anthony Smith, who complains that such interpretations give insufficient weight to the significance of ethnic and pre-modern pasts in shaping the nationalist present. Although he agrees that nations are neither primordial nor natural, they are rooted in ancient histories and enduring ethnic consciousness. *Ethnie* - ethnic communities, and the myths and symbols that convey the values of such communities down through many generations - form 'moulds' within which 'all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact' (Smith 1986, 16).

The fear that group-differentiated cultural rights might allow a group to oppress its own members, to oppress other groups or undermine a shared civic identity is well rehearsed in

liberal theory (Stevenson 2001). But Will Kymlicka's (1995) ambition is to formulate a liberal theory of minority rights *in* multicultural citizenship so that group difference might be both recognised and protected. He maintains that the state can protect the cultural traditions of diverse ethnic groups within it while preserving a shared civic identity and the individual freedoms of expression and of association that hold a liberal democracy together. Like Smith (*op. cit.*), he believes that cultural identity is so intrinsic to the individual's sense of self that it is impossible simply to sweep it aside in the interests of a homogeneous national polity. Indeed, a failure to accommodate diverse groups undermines, rather than promotes, a sense of solidarity and common purpose:

> People from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated.

(Kymlicka 1995, 189)

Kymlicka addresses the traditional liberal position that cultural attachments are not the business of public agencies or legislators. From that perspective, individuals are free to express their cultural attachments in their private life, subject only to their being protected against discrimination and prejudice and their behaving consistently with the rights of others. Any theory of minority rights would therefore have to explain 'how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice' (Kymlicka 1995, 6). Kymlicka enters two caveats. Minority rights should not allow one group to dominate others; nor should they enable a group to oppress its own members (*ibid.*, 194). However, he does not resolve the old paradox that he himself raises: cultural difference can flourish only in a liberal society, whereas some cultural minorities do not tolerate difference.

Nonetheless, he insists that minority rights are required within a democratic state to supplement traditional human rights principles. These rights concern practical problems such as the recognition (or otherwise) of minority languages in parliaments, bureaucracies and courts; the provision of education and communications media in a minority tongue; the drawing of internal political boundaries to reflect the prevalence of cultural minorities;

whether principles of proportionality should apply in the distribution of political office; and the degree of cultural integration that is appropriate. In defining these rights Kymlicka distinguishes between the diversity arising from the incorporation of previously self-governing territories into a larger state and that originating in the voluntary immigration of individuals and families. With regard to incorporation, the co-existence of more than one nation in a state gives rise to a multination state in which the smaller cultures form 'national minorities'. In that context, Kymlicka makes an important distinction between (i) 'patriotism' as the shared feeling of allegiance to a state and (ii) 'national identity' as the sense of membership in a national group. The patriotism of national groups within a multination state depends upon the recognition of their distinct national existence. As to the second source of difference, immigration, a 'polyethnic' polity allows and encourages the ethnic particularity of immigrant groups within it. But the sort of cultural diversity that is manifested by immigrants who maintain habits of food, dress and religion in their family lives and in voluntary associations is different from the cultural diversity associated with national minorities because it is 'institutionally incomplete': that is, it takes place within the institutional framework of the 'dominant' culture.

While appreciating Kymlicka's reappraisal of the 'ideal' of political homogeneity, Isin and Wood (1999) challenge what they call his 'radical liberal' approach. They do so as part of a wider critique of liberal universalism. They make two specific criticisms of Kymlicka. First, they charge that he draws his understanding of multiculturalism from his own experiences of Canada and, in particular, the relationship between Anglophone and Francophone communities there. The 'Quebec question' is implicit in his analysis and he reduces the negotiation of multicultural citizenship to two groups (the Anglophone and Francophone communities) which, although not equal in power, both enjoy economic, social, cultural and political influence at national level. Thus multinational citizenship takes precedence over polyethnic citizenship in Kymlicka's analysis. That is a valid general objection, although for the purposes of the present study Kymlicka's perspective on national minorities in a multi-nation state offers some clarification of the position of Wales in Britain and permits comparison between the 'institutionally complete' status of a Welsh-speaking minority and the less well resourced position of other linguistic groups in Britain. The second criticism is that despite his eschewal of the reality and desirability of political homogeneity, Kymlicka

cannot transcend the limits of the assimilationist paradigm that he purports to have left behind. Group-differentiated rights are to be included within the dominant liberal culture of individual freedom and equality.

Bikhu Parekh's (2000) critique of liberalism in general and Kymlicka in particular is more measured. He acknowledges that liberalism is the most hospitable of all political doctrines to cultural diversity (*ibid.*, 11), but argues that its commitment to 'monism' – in this context, a universally-applicable explanation of human existence and the 'good life' – leaves it incapable of responding coherently to cultural diversity. He acknowledges the contribution of Kymlicka and others to deepening the theoretical resources of liberalism but argues that the principles of the latter are inadequate to construct a theory of a multicultural society that must include non-liberal cultures. Parekh insists that multiculturalism is not about minorities but about the *dialogue* between different cultural communities and that it cannot be theorised from within the conceptual framework of any particular political doctrine 'which, being embedded in, and structurally biased towards, a particular cultural perspective, cannot do justice to others' (*ibid.*, 13).

Parekh distances his analysis from a wider cultural politics. Multiculturalism is *part of* a 'politics of recognition' that is related to older, more familiar politics of social justice and economic redistribution and has been spearheaded by movements that seek economic, social and political rights in order to ensure the freedom, self-determination and dignity of their adherents, but it does not include all such movements. Multiculturalism refers to

> those [differences] that are embedded in and sustained by culture; that is, a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organise their individual and collective lives. Unlike differences that spring from individual choices, culturally derived differences carry a measure of authority and are patterned and structured by virtue of being embedded in a shared and historically inherited system of meaning and significance.

(Parekh 2000, 2-3)

At the same time, not all multicultural societies are multicultural*ist*. The term 'multicultural' refers to the fact of cultural diversity, whereas multiculturalism captures a normative response to it whereby difference is welcomed and respected. In contrast to a monoculturalist society which seeks to assimilate diverse communities into its mainstream culture, a multiculturalist

society makes diversity central to its self-understanding and respects the cultural demands of its constituent communities (*ibid.*, 6).

The idea of a 'national culture' makes little sense to Parekh: 'the project of cultural unification on which many past societies and all modern states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no longer viable today' (*ibid.*, 8). Nevertheless, the experience of several centuries of the culturally homogenizing nation-state has left its mark, and post-national societies appear to be less comfortable with diversity than their pre-modern forebears. Parekh locates the reasons for this in the modern privileging of the individual as the sole bearer of rights. In terms that echo Marshall's explanation of why feudalism and citizenship were incompatible, he writes:

> In almost all premodern societies cultural communities were widely regarded as the bearers of collective rights and left free to follow their customs and practices. The modern state rested on a very different view of social unity. It generally recognized only the individuals as the bearers of rights and sought to create a homogeneous legal space made up of uniform political units subject to the same body of laws and institutions. It set about dismantling long-established communities and reuniting the 'emancipated' individuals on the basis of a collectively accepted and centralized structure of authority. Since the state required cultural and social homogenization as its necessary basis, it has for centuries sought to mould the wider society in that direction. Thanks to this, we have become so accustomed to equating unity with homogeneity, and equality with uniformity, that unlike many of our premodern counterparts we feel morally and emotionally disorientated by, and do not quite know how to accommodate, the political demands of a deep and defiant diversity.

(*ibid.*, 8-9)

To further clarify the concept of multiculturalism, Parekh identifies three types of cultural diversity in modern society: subcultural, perspectival and communal. Subcultural diversity occurs where groups and individuals embedded in a shared culture seek to open up and pluralise the society in which they live but not to replace it. Challenges to the dominant culture are made on its own terms. For example, when gay men and lesbians living in the West pursue the right to single-sex marriage they are simply articulating and extending to their own divergent lifestyles the liberal values of personal autonomy and choice. By contrast, perspectival diversity is more radical and difficult to accommodate. It challenges the basis of the existing culture and – as the label suggests - articulates intellectual perspectives on how the dominant culture should be reconstituted. For example, feminists might attack the

patriarchy of a prevailing culture, religious groups its secularism and environmentalists its anthropocentric and technocratic bias.

Parekh's final source of diversity, communal diversity, is required if a society is to be described as 'multicultural', although the other types of diversity might also be present. Communal diversity is the most logically distinct of the three types of diversity because it provides a focus for studying multiculturalism as a challenge to the assimilationist assumptions or demands of a wider national culture. It is derived from the presence of self-conscious communities that live by their own historically-grounded systems of beliefs and practices. They include newly-arrived immigrants, some religious groups, Gypsies and 'territorially concentrated cultural groups'. Parekh includes 'the Welsh' within this last category, but this study will demonstrate the incoherence of 'the Welsh' as a cultural group within (and beyond) the territory known as 'Wales'. Like Kymlicka, and despite his best efforts, Parekh categorises groups in terms of their difference from a dominant culture. He ignores important differences within groups and within individual members of groups who might enjoy multiple identities and affiliations. Parekh's delineation of multiculturalism is clearer and more precise than many, but its internal contradictions exemplify the difficulties and dangers inherent in associating identities and affiliations with territorially-defined communities.

Moreover, the question arises why 'communal diversity' should be any more worthy of recognition than the 'subcultural' or 'perspectival' diversities identified by Parekh. The fact that communal diversity is *seen* to be so important in so much social and political analysis indicates how pervasive has been the influence of communitarian thought. The populist face of communitarianism – the 'Communitarian Platform' and the rather authoritarian politics espoused by Amitai Etzioni (1995, 1996) – has already been portrayed. But a number of commentators - they include Bell (1993) and Isin and Wood (1999) - have identified other critics of liberal political theory like Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor as *de facto* contributors to communitarian philosophy who are reluctant to be associated with the 'communitarian movement' or to advocate 'communitarian*ism*'. One of them, Charles Taylor, has made an important – if controversial - contribution to debate about the 'politics of recognition'.

Taylor associates the modern preoccupation with individual moral authenticity with 'the massive subjective turn of modern culture' since the eighteenth century (Taylor 1992, 29). Taylor challenges the monological orientation of mainstream modern philosophy, arguing that it denies the dialogical character both of human life and the genesis of the human mind. In other words we express ourselves, understand ourselves and define our identity through our exchanges with others. Taylor emphasizes that this dependence on others did not arise with the 'age of authenticity'. Hitherto, however, 'recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took for granted'. In premodern times, 'identity' and 'recognition' were too unproblematic to be themetized as such.

The modern discourse of recognition takes place in our intimate relationships with significant others, but it also takes place in the public sphere where the 'politics of equal recognition' is made more stressful by the understanding that identities are formed in open dialogue. The public sphere has to respond to the apparently contradictory politics of universalism, which emphasizes the equal dignity of all citizens, and of difference, which requires that the unique identity of every individual or group be recognized. Although the politics of difference, which 'grows organically out of the politics of universal dignity', has a universalist basis, its *assimilation* into a homogeneous polity becomes 'the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity' (*ibid.*, 38-39).

Taylor focuses his analysis upon two facets of the politics of recognition: the circumstances in which the cultural survival of a group might take precedence over individual rights; and the demand for the recognition of the equal worth of all cultures. With regard to the first issue, Taylor makes his case in relation to French-Canadian Quebeckers. He argues that it is insufficient for the Canadian government simply to act to ensure that the French language is available for those who might choose to use it. Cultural survival for Quebeckers requires the enactment of policies that will create members of a community in order to ensure that future generations will continue to identify as French speakers, and political society cannot remain neutral between 'those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development' (*ibid.*, 58).

Therefore, individuals within and beyond the affected community might be expected to cede some of their 'non-fundamental' human rights in the interests of community survival.

As to the second issue, Taylor acknowledges that Western liberal societies are vulnerable to the charge of having imposed their cultures on others because of their colonial past and because of their marginalization of segments of their populations. Multiculturalism demands not simply that cultures be allowed to defend themselves, as was the case with Quebec, but that the equal value and worth of all cultures be recognized and acknowledged. He implies that the Salman Rushdie affair, whereby murder was sanctioned by some members of an oppressed group in defence of its values, was an extreme manifestation of that demand. Its more mundane manifestations are to be found in charges that school and university curricula entrench the hegemony of dominant groups and inculcate among subjugated groups a demeaning picture of themselves because they fail to recognize some cultures. In response, Taylor suggests that people have a duty to approach different cultures with a presumption of equal worth but – notwithstanding controversy over the 'objectivity' of judgments about nonhegemonic cultures – not to expect that all cultures will be of equal value. To do otherwise is nonsensical, condescending and disrespectful. Moreover it is, paradoxically, a demand for homogenization.

Taylor's emphasis upon language use over time as a constituent of individual and collective self-understanding chimes with some aspects of the discourse-methodological approach outlined in chapter three. But his approach is problematic in other respects. In my gloss of his long essay, I have tried to avoid replicating Taylor's tendency to argue from the perspective of a hegemonic 'we', a habit that is particularly marked where he discusses the demand for the equal valuation of all cultures. His rather abrupt dismissal of charges about the impossibility of judgmental objectivity in that respect might separate him from the de-centering thrust of postmodernism but it also effectively marginalizes claimants to cultural recognition by situating judgment about them in a Western liberal 'centre'. Yet Taylor found that same liberal centre wanting in respect of the survival of the French-Canadian Quebecker community. As indicated previously, there is a contradiction at the heart of communitarian thought when the 'particularism' of the attachments that are claimed to constitute people's

sense of 'self' are articulated as a measure of their distance from or closeness to the *a priori* assumptions in which communitarianism itself is embedded.

I noted above that Taylor cites the Salman Rushdie affair as a particular challenge to multiculturalism. That case has been widely examined in the context of multiculturalism, not least because it is a perplexing example of an *in*different state being obliged to protect both the principle of artistic freedom and the physical safety of an artist against an extreme form of censorship – a death sentence - by some members of a particular 'community' in defence of its purported traditions. But perhaps the case should be cited not so much as a justification for the liberal state as an exhortation to a more cosmopolitan sort of cultural politics. That is the position adopted by Jeremy Waldron (1995), who uses the Rushdie case as the basis for an analysis of a cosmopolitan alternative to 'minority culture' politics that cuts across the debate between liberals and communitarians. We are not, he insists, 'the self-made atoms of liberal fantasy, certainly, but neither are we exclusively products or artifacts of single national or ethnic communities' (*ibid.*, 103).

For Waldron, cosmopolitanism is manifest as a hybrid lifestyle whose practitioner 'refuses to think of himself as *defined* by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language'. Waldron – who claims not to understand what postmodernism is - uses the model of the cosmopolitan 'creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self' to challenge communitarian claims that in order to achieve 'authenticity' people need to be involved in the substantive life of a particular community as a source of meaning, integrity and character (*ibid.*, 95). He further insists that where 'indigenous communities' enjoy special provision they have a responsibility to participate in and sustain the wider national and global communities that sustain them. Making a commitment to preserve minority cultures – or some favoured version of them – artificially, in the face of surrounding social, economic and political change, is to cripple 'the mechanisms of adaptation and compromise with which all societies confront the outside world' (*ibid.*, 110). Moreover, to immerse *oneself* in such cultures involves 'artificial disclocation' from what is actually going on in the world. In that respect, Waldron makes an observation which has particular force in this thesis, *viz.*:

That it is an artifice is evidenced by the fact that such immersion often requires special subsidization and extraordinary provision by those who live in the real world, where cultures and practices are not so sealed off from one another. The charge, in other words, is one of *inauthenticity*.

(Waldron 1995, 100-101)

Waldron is not alone, of course, in proposing the cosmopolitan as a model for a progressive global politics (for example, see Isin and Wood 1999 on cosmopolitan citizenship). The case that he makes for it is at once more forthright and more unabashedly elitist than many others. When he writes, for example, that 'many of us' have attachments in much larger communities than those implied by communitarians – 'the international community of scholars [...], the scientific community, the human rights community, the artistic community, the feminist movement, what's left of international socialism, and so on' (*ibid.*, 102) - Castells' (1996, 415) observation that in globalisation, 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local' comes to mind.   But Waldron is quite clear that social life entails attachments to numerous communities in which obligations as well as rights apply. He also provides something that is missing from so much analysis in this field: an appreciation of the link between cultural politics and the distribution of resources.

Social exclusion is a powerful driver of the politics of difference difference struggles. Castells (1998, 162) identifies the origins of a borderless, rootless fourth world that is excluded from *global* society in the 'crisis of the nation state, and [...] the institutions of civil society constructed around it during the industrial era'. The capacity of democratic institutions has been undermined; they cannot correct the social imbalances caused by the unrestricted application of market logic. In that failure lies the rise of ethnic politics, *which is rooted in economics as much as culture*. For example, there is a linkage between the ethnic politics of weak African national states and the political economy of Africa over the past three decades. Ethnic 'clientism' thrives where 'tribes' are manipulated into a dogfight over the spoils of political power. The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, Burundi and beyond demonstrates

the incapacity of ethnically constituted political elites to transcend the definition inherited from the past, since they used their ethnicity as the rallying flag to seize state power or to resist it. In so doing, they made a plural, democratic state non-viable, *as citizenship and ethnicity are contradictory principles of democratic political legitimacy.*

(Castells 1998, 110; emphasis added)

That is an extreme example of a tendency noted by David Hollinger (1995): that 'ethnic identities' become attractive when resources are attached to them. Yet the link between poverty and cultures that are defined by the past is unassailable. For example, Putnam's (1993) studies of regional difference in Italy found that the least civic areas, which were also the poorest, were the traditional villages of the south. They were characterised by hierarchy, exploitation, low levels of trust and a dearth of associations. Wales, too, is one of the poorest regions of Europe: so poor that, as noted previously, much of it was awarded Objective One European structural funds for the period 2000-2006. The qualifying areas included most of Welsh-speaking West Wales. Paradoxically, as will become clear from chapter 4, funds are being claimed from that aid to develop a cultural difference that is embedded in the past.

Ethnic identities bring with them another, less tangible, form of funding in the form of cultural capital accumulation. I want to insist upon this, not least because this thesis is concerned with the cultural capital vested in a Welsh-speaking bourgeoisie who are, for the most part, employed in the public sector. The origins of the political power of this group lie with the failure of entrepreneurial capitalism in Wales in the 1920s.

Some pages ago I promised to consider the relevance of 'social capital' to problems of civic and economic development whose solution depends upon the co-operation of disparate individuals and groups. Social capital and cultural capital are not always kept conceptually separate. It will be recalled that Putnam (2000, 19) includes Bourdieu's (1984) concept of cultural capital among the theoretical antecedents of social capital. But the possession of cultural capital - the collection of linguistic and cultural competences, codes and conventions that mark off the *habitus* of a social class or group - contributes to hierarchical social distinction. By contrast, Putnam implies that increasing the bonding *and* bridging social capital of individuals or groups contributes both to social cohesion in a territorial locale and to

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the development of new relationships between spatially and culturally differentiated individuals, groups and communities. If a fully-rounded 'social capitalism' were to be relevant to civic as well as economic development, the concept would have to be not only separate from a historically particularist communitarianism but also be kept away from the hierarchically-differentiated field of cultural capital. Only then could it offer any means of habituating mutual obligations across and between culturally and spatially heterogeneous societies.

Even then, the question remains whether the collective accumulation of social capital, or the provision of the means for so doing, really does endow a set of structural co-ordinates (albeit fluid ones) for a multi-layered communicative public domain and a cosmopolitan art that lies between the domains of global commercial production, national boundaries, parochial affiliations and private life. A different view would see networks of social capital formation bypassing the public sphere and covertly reinforcing long-established class differences while facilitating the transformation of the national and ethnic cultures that engender identity and belonging into symbolic commodities for exchange in the market place. The Internet and the World Wide Web together provide a site for examining those competing perspectives.

Computer-mediated community

Metaphors and analogies may be the only means of predicting, or staking a claim in, the future of a major new technology such as the Internet (Sawhney 1996). 'Community' is one such metaphor. 'Virtual community' in cyberspace may stand for a transcendental union of souls. As such, it is the most recent example of what Carey (1989, 208-209) refers to as the 'electrical sublime', the association of a communications technology with 'a transposed body of religious belief' that dates back to the introduction of the telegraph. It is just such a postmodern, McLuhnian community that the novelist and journalist Tom Wolfe (1999) is mocking when he writes about the 'magic Digikingdom'[16] in the comments reproduced in the

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[16] In the essay from which Wolfe's observations are drawn, he is challenging the assumption that the Internet represents the final realisation of Marshall McLuhan's 'global village'.

epigraph to this chapter. It resembles the pre-modern community that Saunders Lewis yearned for in 1920s Wales and the medieval European Christendom that Gellner and Anderson identified as having preceded the nation-state. In those pre-modern European societies, a Latin-speaking clerical elite owed allegiance to the Church before any state, and they transcended the local micro-cultures over which they held sway. At least one observer, Kevin Robins, has drawn an analogy between medieval Europe and a technocultural discourse of 'cognitive transcendence'. Robins points to Zygmunt Bauman's (1998) comparison of new 'meaning-producing elites' with the '"absentee", extraterritorial Latin-speaking and writing elites of mediaeval Europe'. He likens the 'corporate ideology of globalization and the network society' to 'the ideology of the "absentee" class' (Robins 1999, 22-23). As Castells (1996, 415) has it: 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local'.

There is space here only for a brief sketch of the Internet's inception, evolution and adoption. Hafner and Lyon (1996) and Naughton (1999) provide detailed historical accounts of the technology; Hine (2000) offers an overview of different versions and interpretations of the 'story' of the Internet. The latter urges that caution be adopted in accepting the myth that the Internet was the result of an attempt by ARPA (the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the USA Department of Defense) to build a bombproof communications network rather than the outcome of a complex set of interactions between computer scientists, politicians and research funders. Rather, it has been 'thoroughly socially shaped both in the history of its development and in the moments of its use' (Hine 2000, 31). By the end of the 20th century, one of its 'shapes' was as an instrument for e-commerce in a variety of cultural goods; another was as a computer-mediated space for social interaction.

ARPANET, a computer-mediated military communications network, was launched by the USA's Defence Department in the late 1960s. Inter-networking protocols were developed and refined during the 1970s and 1980s as the network expanded to include other government agencies, academic institutions and commercial organisations. These inter-connected computers became known as the Internet during the 1980s; the science-fictional term 'cyberspace' also started to be applied to computer-mediated social space at that time. A major growth in the size and popularity of the Internet occurred after the integration into it of the World Wide Web from 1991. Naughton (1999) ascribes a marked shift in emphasis from

public to private investment to the launch in 1993 of Mosaic by Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina. Mosaic was the first major browser to enable transmission of images on the Web. Naughton recounts that Tim Berners-Lee, the Web's inventor, 'bawled out' Andreeson, concerned that a graphical browser would introduce frivolous content to a serious medium that Berners-Lee had envisaged as a tool for enhancing research and communications among scientists. In any event, the Internet now offered a potential channel for multi-media entertainment as well as pure information, thus enhancing and broadening the base of its attractiveness for commercial exploitation. Commercial investment fuelled much of the Internet's growth throughout the 1990s and beyond.

As to cyberspace, William Gibson laid its conceptual foundations in his (1984) science fiction novel *Neuromancer*. He depicted it as a notional (not an actual) space, a 'consensual hallucination', in which billions of computer operators had access to infinite information and the potential for endless exchanges with others. It has been suggested that as community dissolves in physically-inhabited place, it is sought in those computer-mediated spaces (Jones 1998). There are real structural constraints involved. They include access to computer hardware and software (Haywood 1998, Holderness 1998), to telecommunications networks (Winseck 1998) and to services on the Internet (Mansell 1999). Nevertheless, at least four types[17] of computer-mediated community have been conceptualised in writing about new media. They are: first, communities which form, or are formed, in computer-mediated space around some phenomenon (Agre 1998, Giese 1998, Cothrel and Williams 1999); second, online communities as databases of marketing information (Rayport and Sviokla 1995, Weiber and Kollmann 1998, Schiller 1999); third, geographically-defined local communities whose members use information and communication technology to enhance communication among themselves and to extend participation in civic life (Van Tassel 1996, Schmitz 1997, Grosswiler 1998, Harrison and Stephen 1998, Tambini 1999); and fourth, online communities of imagined nationhood (Jegenathan 1998) and 'virtual ethnicity' (Poster 1998).

With regard to the final category, the Internet is an instrument for overcoming the constraints of local time and geographical place. Tom Wolfe (1999) has implied that speeding up time

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[17] Clearly, there is a significant degree of overlap between these 'types'.

and shrinking space is *all* that the Internet does, as the epigraph to this chapter indicates. However, *contra* Wolfe, the Internet - or at least its computer-mediated 'cyberspaces' - has been conceptualised not only an instrument for transporting data but also as a medium for the type of 'ritual' communication identified by Carey (1989). Such communication is

> directed not toward the extension of messages in space but the maintenance of society in time (even if some find this maintenance characterized by domination and therefore illegitimate); not the act of imparting information or influence but the creation, representation, and celebration of shared even if illusory beliefs.

(Carey 1989, 43)

The Internet offers people an opportunity to sample affiliations without obliging them to become identified with, or sedimented within, a 'real' community. Can it satisfy the need for what Herbert Gans (1979) called 'symbolic ethnicity'? Hollinger (1995, 40) defines symbolic ethnicity as a subjective feeling of ethnic identity that falls short of 'the more substantive ethnicity that demands involvement in a concrete community with organisations, mutual commitments, and some elements of constraint'. Poster (1998) argues that the Internet dissociates ethnicity from place. It is a neutral instrument of 'community' that *congeals* ethnicity in space because it enables all who share a pre-established ethnic identity, including diasporic peoples, to communicate with each other, wherever on the planet they may be. It also *dissolves* ethnicity because 'real' ethnic identities must be formed out of ancient, common rituals and everyday 'micropractices' - the smells of food, intonations of voice, bodily gestures and ways of touching - which can only be enacted in low-technology, proximate space. As to 'symbolic nationality', Jeganathan (1998, 527) suggests that 'webspace' stretches out the idea of the 'imagined nation' for in a way that preserves the idea of the nation not as a lived-in space but 'as an emptied-out map, that can be believed in'. In a similar vein, an analysis by Mackay and Powell (1998) of Wales-related newsgroups found that most participants were based outside Wales, often descended from Welsh diaspora. They were preoccupied with the Welsh language, traditional elements of Welsh culture (including a cyber-eisteddfod), genealogy and tourism. There was little interest in contemporary or popular culture. Such virtual affiliations float free of the cultures of lived-in place and

everyday ethnicity. As chapter 5 will demonstrate, they also offer commercial opportunities to cultural producers.

Critics contend that computer-mediated communities are impersonal. They sometimes invoke Tonnies' (1887/1967) distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (see Jones 1998 for discussion). It is argued that the lost communal relationships of *Gemeinschaft* have been replaced by the contingent, rational and contractual *Gesellschaft* attachments of modern, individualistic, large-scale societies. Online interaction produces 'pseudo-communities', in which impersonal associations merely simulate the personalised communication of 'real' community. People sample community without making a commitment to it. However, *Gemeinschaft* itself is open to a critical interpretation. The ideal community with a high degree of intimacy and mutual obligation (or, to put it another way, a substantial fund of bonding social capital) may deny and repress social difference and constrain cultural diversity (Straw 1991, Miller 1999). As Bell (1993) implies, *Gemeinschaft* is but a step away from *Volksgemeinschaft*, the community of the racial people. Sennett (1977/1993) has pointed to the value of impersonality in public life and the destructive qualities of *Gemeinschaft*. People struggle for community rather than trying to reawaken a meaningful public life because of the fear of impersonality. Community becomes a weapon against society, 'whose great vice is now seen to be its impersonality' (*ibid.,* 339). It has *eroded* public life because

> [p]eople in struggling to be a community become ever more absorbed in each other's feelings, and ever more withdrawn from an understanding of, let alone a challenge to, the institutions of power so very willing to have "local participation" and "local involvement".

(Sennett 1977/1993, 309)

Other criticisms are founded in the alleged shortcomings of computer-mediated communication (CMC). Early studies of CMC argued that text-based communication was impoverished: it lacked the richness of face-to-face communication which transmits a range of 'social context cues' such as gender, age, race, and social status as well as facial expressions, body language and intonation (Keisler et al. 1984; Sproull and Kiesler 1991a, 1991b). Critics have argued that generalisations about CMC were extrapolated from context-

specific experiments (Spears et al. 1990, Lea and Spears 1991, Mantovani 1994), and recent work has tended to stress the communicative possibilities offered by CMC 'as a context of social relations in its own right' (Hine 2000, 17).

Chapter 5 provides an example of those communicative possibilities in respect of how people use the Internet to locate ancestral cultural artefacts. One of my informants told me the story of a man in north America who e-mailed my informant's record company in Wales to find a folk song about the farm where his ancestors had lived. He then visited Wales to find the farm and to find the recording of the song. The encounter clearly had emotional significance both for my informant and his visitor. The computer enables the establishment and maintenance of relationships that lead to, or include, face-to-face encounters and the retrieval of individuals' *ethnies*. However, as I shall argue in the final section of the chapter, whether the Internet is also an appropriate context for unmediated *economic* relations is not clear.

Network and community

'Network' is another metaphor frequently applied to the Internet. Indeed, the metaphor has been ontologised by Manuel Castells: the Internet is a globally interconnected network of individual computer nodes; *ergo* society in the 'information age' is a 'network society' whereby physically separate human actors are connected by information and communication technologies in a global space of flows that is detached from historical or geographical place (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). Castells argues that the basic unit of economic organisation is no longer an individual subject (such as an entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial family) or a collective (such as the capitalist class, the corporation or the state). Instead, 'the unit is the network, made up of a variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as networks adapt to supportive environments and market structures' (1996, 198). He is not alone in his preoccupation with networks. The network has emerged as a favoured metaphor for the structural characteristics of a 'new economy' which is built upon links across and between the geographic boundaries of regions and the organisational boundaries of firms in

order to maximise efficiencies of production, marketing, distribution and knowledge. As previously indicated, the networks are sourced by social capital.

Networks in the new economy

Paradoxically, there is a 'localising' dimension to global capitalism. It, too, realises itself in networks. One example is the emergence of geographical clusters of high-technology innovation such as Silicon Valley and Route 128 in north America; another example is planned clusters in technology parks, as in Japan's technopolis projects and regional high-technology (RHT) schemes. Attempts to engineer the relationships upon which such networks depend meet with limited success. For example, Japanese RHT policy implementation has suffered from a centralised, top-down approach to local economic planning (Bass 1998). Nevertheless, such clusters have inspired attempts to form networks to generate innovation in artistic and cultural production (Scott 1997), to develop cultural production in 'creative quarters' in which synergies between proximate micro-businesses spawn innovation and mutual support systems (Raffo *et al.* 2000), and to encourage collaborative networks and 'digital ecologies' among multimedia producers (Henning 1998). One of the documents analysed in chapter 4 devises a framework for the arts to access European Commission grant aid that draws from theories about clusters and networks.

The popularity of the network concept in economic analysis has been interpreted as a response to the rise of small entrepreneurial firms working in flexible networks both locally and across space, and by the competitive successes of large network-like organisations such as the Japanese kieretsu (Nohria 1992). Collaborative networks are promoted as an efficient means of increasing the speed and accuracy with which information, knowledge and learning can be transferred, disseminated, interpreted and shared in a 'knowledge society' (Powell 1990/1991, Senge 1992, Cooke and Morgan 1998). Networks of links across formal organisational boundaries and interlocking relationships among institutions may emerge, or be planned, as corporate governance structures (Baker 1992, Gerlach and Lincoln 1992, Biggart and Hamilton 1992, Galaskiewicz 1996).

As with community, networks imply a degree of trust. Repeated interactions between members of a social network are said to convey information about who is, and who is not, trustworthy. That overcomes the problem of opportunism in market settings while offering an alternative to inflexible, bureaucratic hierarchies (Granovetter 1985, Powell 1990/1991). In that context, the general idea of 'network' serves as both an explanatory model of, and a normative model for, economic organisation that lies between the invisible guiding hand of the market and the formal institutional structures of a hierarchy.

There is nothing new in the network perspective. As Walter Powell observes:

> Economic units emerged [during the Industrial Revolution] from the dense webs of political, religious and social affiliations that had enveloped economic activity for centuries. [....] The history of modern commerce, whether told by Braudel, Polanyi, Pollard or Wallerstein, is a story of family businesses, guilds, cartels and extended trading companies - all enterprises with loose and highly permeable boundaries.

> (Powell 1990/1991, 267)

That begs a question about postmodern commerce that has already been implied about postmodern social organisation. Does it bear more resemblance to its pre-modern forebears than to modern forms of production?

Flexible specialisation

The Internet, as a 'network of networks', has attracted attention for its potential to bring together individuals and small organisations collaboratively to produce, promote and distribute items for custom or niche markets, perhaps regardless of their physical location (Hamill and Gregory 1997, Poon and Jevons 1997). Implicit in such claims is the assumption that 'flexible specialisation' is more efficient than mass production for mass markets by rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic firms. Flexible specialisation is the decentralisation (or outsourcing, or subcontracting) of production to flexible networks of small organisations or freelance workers collaborating on specific projects. Because of their flexibility, such

networks are perceived to be innovative and adaptable to changing market conditions. The idea of flexible specialisation appears to underpin claims such as that by Brindley (2000) who, in his study of digital music distribution for the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR), suggests that 'most analysts (outside record companies) argue that the only essential roles for record companies in the future will be A&R and marketing and promotion' (ibid., 49). Brindley suggests that even those roles can be delegated to freelance specialists.

Flexible specialisation in the creative industries has been studied by Christopherson and Storper (1989) in relation to film and, more critically, by Hesmondhalgh in relation to the music industry (1996, 1998). Hesmondhalgh is sceptical about the dynamics of 'flexibility', suggesting that hierarchies are implicit in the new networking arrangements. He is particularly critical of approaches that assume that specialisation in production necessarily enhances the power of small independent producers, arguing that they ignore the influence of powerful distributors and financiers. Independent labels may be able to cater for niche markets where they are not in direct competition with major labels, but their lack of financial and legal 'muscle' to access centralised media and distribution channels may oblige them to enter into some form of relationship with companies that are better resourced.

Great stress is placed upon the value of horizontal relations of co-operation (rather than hierarchical, contractual relationships) in the theory of flexible specialisation. Such networks will not invariably be egalitarian in practice. The logic of flexible capitalism is that small firms will be organised into asymmetrical networks of client allegiance to a larger and more powerful patron. That appears to have been the case with the Internet Underground Music Association (IUMA)[18], which was founded in 1993 to offer unsigned musicians the opportunity to promote and sell their music on-line. Artists were provided with their own web page where they could post MP3s (i.e. music files) and information about themselves, sell CDs, and create message boards and fan lists. In the summer of 1999, IUMA was acquired by EMusic.com (formerly known as GoodNoise). EMusic.com, then a leading distributor of downloadable music, had license agreements with a number of independent record labels and established artists. Under the terms of the acquisition, IUMA would

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[18] <http://www.iuma.com/> (4 September 2000).

continue to operate as an independent Web site, and IUMA artists who became sufficiently popular to attract the attention of an EMusic.com partner label would be taken up for commercial electronic distribution.

However, flexible specialisation theory is not only relevant to the organisation of certain industries; it is also applicable in strategies for sustainable local economic development. After all, the flexible specialisation thesis originated in studies by Piore and Sabel (1984) of artisanal, craft-based, small-scale but technologically advanced and highly productive economic activity in north-central Italy. They concluded that

> The cohesion of the industry rests on a more fundamental sense of community, of which the various institutional forms of cooperation are more the result than the cause [....] Among the ironies of the resurgence of craft production is that its deployment of modern technology depends on its *reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated with the preindustrial past.*
>
> (Piore and Sabel 1984, 265, 275; cited Putnam 1993, 161; emphasis added)

Once again, the similarities between postmodern and premodern commerce are being invoked. The implication of Piore and Sabel's findings in Italy is that far from destroying 'traditional' cultures, some forms of production in the new economy seem to rely upon a rediscovery of old affiliations.

The dynamics of flexible specialisation in a local context can be illuminated by reference to the 'industrial district'. The concept, which originates in the work of the economist Alfred Marshall (e.g. 1906, 1919) from which Piore and Sabel draw, assumes that the economic profile of a locale may be defined and supported by: first, the shared values and traditions embedded in the local community; second, the development of specialist know-how which arises from the contiguity of individuals and firms; and third, the agglomeration of efficiencies (effectively, free services) provided to each other by people and firms engaged in similar tasks because they benefit the environment of the firm (Courlet and Soulage 1995)[19]. Related research into the innovative milieu (Maillat 1995) has built upon the concept of the

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[19] Interestingly, the lecture upon which T.H. Marshall's 1950 essay on citizenship and social class was based (see earlier discussion) was given in commemoration of Alfred Marshall.

industrial district to explain the processes of collective innovation. Innovation is locally specific, but is built upon a combination of, first, the experience, know-how and interdependencies developed within a milieu and, second, the ability of the 'milieus' to develop ties with complementary external competences and resources. Thus the 'territorial context' is more than just a 'warehouse of predetermined resources': it is 'the result of a process of building specific resources that depends on the behaviour and strategy of the players' (*ibid.*, 162). A milieu is innovative when it is 'capable of opening up to the outside world and of obtaining there the specific information or resources it requires' and when its resources are '*organized, coordinated and linked by economic, cultural and technological structures that render the resources exploitable for new productive combinations*' (*ibid.* 161; emphasis added). As chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate, a parochialism in Wales' culture is a barrier to innovation in the arts. As significant, however, is the weakness of institutions that might co-ordinate development in the arts and culture in Wales. As chapter 4 will demonstrate, they are prey to the fears of a linguistic minority that such institutions would dilute the influence of Welsh-language culture.

Reaching out and digging in

The importance of access to external resources is a constant theme in theories of economic networking. It will be recalled that it is central to Putnam's (2000) distinction between bridging and bonding social capital. Putnam argues that whereas 'bonding' social capital is appropriate to mobilising solidarity and support within a community, it needs to be balanced with bridging social capital that connects communities with each other. The significance of bridging ties was famously identified in Mark Granovetter's (1973) study of the Boston labour market. He found that weak ties, far from being a symptom or a cause of alienation as they are frequently supposed to be, were valuable both for individuals and for communities. As bridges between different close-knit primary groups, they connect individuals who are not regularly or intensely involved with each other. Individual group members gain access to more information than would otherwise be available; the ties between the groups also

encourage overall social cohesion. By contrast, a situation in which groups have many internal strong ties, but few weak ties with non-intimate others, leads to social fragmentation.

Granovetter has accused much economic argument of abstracting human behaviour 'out of social context' and atomising it 'from that of other groups and from the history of its own relations' (1985, 486). He argues that economic behaviour is embedded in historically contingent social practices rather than simply the rational action of utility-seeking individuals. Granovetter challenges what he calls 'undersocialised' theories of human behaviour in which clever institutional arrangements - rather than the obligations inherent in concrete personal relations - make it too costly to engage in malfeasance. 'Oversocialised' explanations of human behaviour are equally unsatisfactory. They view the individual as the sum of a set of internalised social influences which take no account of the specificities of ongoing 'concrete personal relations and structures (or "networks") of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance' (ibid., 490)[20]. For Granovetter, *particular* social relations between firms − not institutions or generalised and internalised 'morality' - are responsible for reproducing trust in economic life. Once again, a theorist of economic development gives theoretical priority to affiliations rather than institutions.

The networks through which entrepreneurs connect with each other and to financial resources, access to markets and social and emotional support have received much attention. For example, Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) have applied Granovetter's thesis to entrepreneurial action. They criticise undersocialised views of entrepreneurs as free agents, 'operating atomistically in an environment where their cognitions and beliefs drive their behaviour' (ibid., 4). 'Trait' theories, which assume that some people are more likely to succeed as entrepreneurs because of their personality, fall into that category; economic, 'rational actor' models of entrepreneurship also focus upon individual decision makers at the expense of considering the wider social context for their actions. Oversocialised models of entrepreneurship are equally inadequate. That approach assumes that certain groups possess beliefs, values and traditions - rooted in, for example, national origins, culture or religion -

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[20] This is a reference to Dennis Wrong's (1961) distinction between 'oversocialised' and 'undersocialised' view of human action. An oversocialised view assumes that human action will be determined by consensual norms; an 'undersocialised' view assumes that action arises solely from the intentions of utility-maximising individuals.

which predispose them to be entrepreneurial. Aldrich and Zimmer prefer an alternative way of considering entrepreneurship: as being embedded in networks of continuing social relations. The case studies presented in chapter 5 suggest that membership of such networks is valuable in helping an entrepreneur to influence the conditions in which he or she acts. However, the frustration of being excluded from a network is damaging to the self-confidence of non-members.

Studies of entrepreneurial networks are often conceptually vague and/or contradictory. Johannisson (1995) observes that it is common to emphasise the personal trust, symmetrical relationships, and the transfer of tacit knowledge that exists in such networks. However, networks themselves might sediment over time, support asymmetrical power relations and, in effect, resemble institutions. Further, a 'rational actor' might simply objectify a network and use it instrumentally to access and manipulate resources. Entrepreneurial brokers occupy the intersections of networks and bridge gaps in communications between their members. The profit to the broker lies in the tariff charged for transmission of information between otherwise unconnected 'nodes' in the network. The tariff may be formally levied in the form of a financial transaction, or it may be tacitly expressed as a mutual expectation that a favour will be returned (Boissevain 1974). A similar assumption informs Burt's (1992) suggestion that 'structural holes' lie between 'nonredundant contacts' that are disconnected from each other in some way. Individuals or organisations surrounded by structural holes are likely to be relatively powerful and autonomous within a network.

A further objection can be raised about the applicability of Granovetter's 1985 argument about the social embeddedness of economic action. He presented it as a direct challenge to the 'new institutional economics', which takes a contractual-transactional view of economic behaviour. From such a perspective, hierarchical institutional arrangements – for example, a vertically-integrated supply chain - exist to mediate economic transactions where the costs to a firm of external contracting are too high; they also check the self-interest, malfeasance, inefficiency and disorder that arises when transactions are left to the market[21]. Granovetter complained that social institutions 'previously thought to be the adventitious result of legal,

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[21]   See Williamson 1975, 1985. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide an authoritative account and assessment of the new institutional economics.

historical, social or political forces' were being rendered simply as 'the efficient solution to certain economic problems' (*ibid.*, 488). Yet the relevance of rational, utility-maximising behaviour to the economics of online culture cannot be dismissed. For example, much has been made of the Internet's potential to disintermediate the channels that distribute recorded music from the artist to the music fan. However, there is a cost to both parties - the artist and the fan - of using those direct channels. The cost to the artist of designing, maintaining and promoting the type of web site required to take, process and dispatch orders is substantial in time, if not in cash, and a greater cost might be feared if there is no faith in the arrangements for copyright protection of work distributed via the Internet. Equally, for the fan unwilling to engage in extensive web surfing, the time required to search for and identify music - as well as the perceived threat of misappropriation of financial and other personal information registered via on-line payment mechanisms - might be too great. It is not unreasonable to ask whether the efficiencies that accrue to both artist and fan from established (and hierarchical) production, marketing and distribution channels within the 'traditional' music industry will also be sought in digital environments. Notwithstanding the observations about computer-mediated communication made earlier, it is difficult to build trust in some online contexts without supporting 'real life' interaction.

Some economists have employed the principles of the new institutional economics to challenge the assumption that new information infrastructures will inevitably lead to the elimination of intermediaries in electronic markets and the flattening of business hierarchies (Sarkar *et al.* 1995). They envisage systems of on-line trade in which intelligent agents, or 'cybermediaries', will take over the co-ordinating functions that are provided by intermediaries in traditional distribution channels. In such scenarios, trusted intelligent software agents may be delegated to act in the buyer's interests (Gazis 1998) provided that the consumer is 'able to express her utility function to her agent' (Vulkan 1999, F70). An example of such an agent is a 'shop-bot', which searches on-line stores for a specified item at the lowest price possible[22]. Another is a decision support agent such as Cyberserf, which matches information about a buyer's lifestyle to the information that he or she requires to

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[22] For example, <http://www.clickthebutton.com/> accessed 29 May 2000.

solve a particular problem or to perform a particular task[23]. 'Cyberserf' reads like an amalgam of postmodern and premodern metaphors, but the principle behind new institutional economics is resolutely modern.

The principles of both hierarchies and instrumental networks can be discerned in the organisation of on-line music. In the late 1990s, new music industry 'dot.com' millionaires were being created as venture capitalists rushed to invest in the future earnings potential of some music websites. For example, in December 1999, the UK-based peoplesound.com[24] was valued by Merrill Lynch, the US investment bank, at £47 million. The site was a showcase for new bands and permitted visitors to download tracks and buy CDs. Similarly, clickmusic.com[25], a music search site, was worth £20 million as at March 2000. Such sites are consolidators: that is, they bring together in one place, as intermediaries in markets have always done, a variety of goods, services, sellers and buyers. As early analysts of electronic commerce predicted, they make extensive use of intelligent agents ('cybermediaries') in matching buyers' preferences with sellers' products. They also function as information brokers: they are electronic advertising hoardings, whose value depends on the number of hits each page receives and the nature and origin of the hitters. They are desirable locations for Internet banner advertisements for the same reason that transport hubs such as airports, railway stations and major road junctions are desirable locations for billboard advertisements: they are destination sites, and human traffic converges there.

Co-ordinating culture

Impersonal, hierarchical institutional arrangements are not restricted to the co-ordination of commerce, of course; they are implicit in state bureaucracies and in the governance of many non-profit-making organisations. They are rational responses to the problems of disorder and

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[23] See <http://bf.cstar.ac.com/> accessed 29 October 1999.

[24] <http://www.peoplesound.com/> (30 March 2000).

[25] <http://www.clickmusic.co.uk/> (30 March 2000).

malpractice that might otherwise arise if capitalism were unchecked. Beetham (1991) observes that despite his pessimistic 'iron cage' metaphor, even Weber was not antithetical to bureaucracy *per se*. Impersonal administrative practice, conducted by experts according to prescribed rules without arbitrariness or favouritism, legitimises organisations and enables them to function more efficiently. Policy is executed and rules enforced by officers who are appointed by, and are answerable to, the governing body that formulates the policy and the rules and provides funds.

In respect of non-commercial art and culture, the 'arm's length' principle in arts funding in Britain throughout most of the second half of the 20th century represented a particular type of impersonal policy execution. The arts councils owe their origins to post-war reconstruction, the welfare state and a policy to broaden access to the arts through the distribution of subsidy to eradicate geographical, financial and social barriers. In engaging with the arms length principle, successive British governments have avoided the appearance of making judgments about what constitutes value in the arts: the government allocates public funding for the arts but is distanced from detailed decisions about who should receive grants and under what conditions (Bennett 1995). In the main, officers within the arts councils are associated with the operational decisions made, although they are accountable to the government of the day for so doing. Chapter 4 will reveal how much strain is being placed upon that principle. It is one of the challenges that face *in*different state organisations that have to administer cultural difference within a nation.

Wherever it is necessary to establish and maintain legal authority, bureaucracy also operates within or adjacent to commercial culture. For example, since the mid 19th century, associations of music copyright holders have been responsible for collecting revenues generated for their members. The relevant copyright collection societies in Britain are the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) and the Performing Rights Society (PRS). As with the arts councils, their institutional structures appear to be breaking down (Wallis *et al.* 1999), as does their rational legal authority. In respect of Internet music, the solution to copyright infringement has been sought in private legal action rather than mediation by copyright collection societies. A series of legal challenges by both record companies and music artists against promoters of unauthorised music downloads in the late 1990s reached a

head in disputes over Napster throughout 2000. They resulted in the closure of the site 2001. Napster software located small MP3 files scattered about the Internet and brought them together into a directory of individual songs. Its owner consistently maintained that it benefited rather than harmed the music industry, that its users were either making copies of music they already own in other formats or sampling music before deciding what to buy, and that it hosted and promoted the music of newcomers to the music scene. Indeed, a number of musicians came out in favour of Napster. On its web site, the company describes itself as 'the world's leading file sharing community'[26].

There is an alternative discourse on copyright that seeks to redress the problem identified by Lester Thurow (1997, 101): that 'free usage of knowledge ends up with societies that create too little new knowledge.' That alternative discourse draws an analogy between feudal land rights and copyright. Thurow continues thus:

> The Industrial Revolution began with an enclosure movement that abolished common land in England. The world now needs a socially managed enclosure movement for intellectual property rights or it will witness a scramble among the powerful to grab valuable pieces of intellectual property, just as the powerful grabbed the common lands of England three centuries ago.

(Thurow 1997, 101)

In a similar vein, Kleinman (1996, 79) suggests that intellectual property rights should be based on principles of access 'similar to the open commons'. Copyright administration might look to the values of the feudal system, 'in which "property" was inextricably interwoven with ideas of service owed to those who use the land'. Similarly, John Perry Barlow (1994), Grateful Dead lyricist and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argues that usage of intellectual property does not comprise episodic transactions. Rather, it is part of an ongoing relationship serviced by the participants in it. Once again, systems and processes give way to affiliations and relationships in theorising about practical life. However, the introduction of feudal metaphor to the World Wide Web - serfing the Internet, as it were – is

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[26] http://www.napster.com/company/ (3 September 2000).

surely best avoided. Feudalism is not egalitarian, it holds back development and - as Machiavelli pointed out - feudalism is inimical to civic government. As T.H. Marshall (1950/1992, 19) puts it, 'no subtle argument is needed to show that citizenship is incompatible with medieval feudalism'.

Conclusion

This chapter has brought together and evaluated social and economic theories about four dimensions of community and their relevance to Wales. First, theories of nation and nationalism were compared for their disavowal or incorporation of territorial and affective dimensions of community. This theme was developed in the second part of the chapter, which examined charges that the operations of global capitalism and a consequential politics of identity and difference are increasing the institutional and sentimental distance between nation and state. The third part of the chapter explored the Internet and the World Wide Web as sites in which different and multiple communal identities and affiliations might be acted out. Finally, the employment of intra- and inter-community networking as a means to economic development was explored with reference both to geographically-defined locales and computer-mediated marketing and distribution channels.

The truism that community is an elusive concept bears repeating. The word may denote the population of a geographical place; it may denote the members of a geographically-dispersed professional group. The word may denote the population of a geographical place; it may denote the members of a geographically-dispersed professional group. But community is often mobilised in defence of certain values and interests or romanticised as a lost world, a counterpoint to the perceived shortcomings of contemporary life.

Controversies about group rights and their just distribution stretch the concept of community into new organisational and relational shapes. That is why multiculturalism and 'difference politics' within and beyond a 'national community' beg hard questions about solidarity, social cohesion, individual and collective responsibility and the permissible limits of cultural

difference. As Frosh (2001) observes, citizenship is now associated with cultural identity. The question arises whether the traditional liberal notion of citizenship as a bundle of universally-applicable legal, political and social rights and responsibilities that are vested in independent individual citizens can connect – to each other *and* to some common public sphere - the personal, local and global spaces in which individuals and groups exercise their individual and collective cultural rights, responsibilities and affiliations.

Questions about identity are intimately connected with an individual's reflexes about self and society. But the contemporary preoccupation with cultural identity (or identities) has more than psychological causes and consequences: it is rooted and manifested in deeply contradictory economic changes. Creative industry in the Internet provides a number of examples of economic change and complexity. The World Wide Web reproduces cultural difference in on-line micro-communities for commercial advantage, yet it is lauded for its potential to unite the world. The Internet can disintermediate promotional and distribution channels, but the most successful ventures rely upon agent software that mediates its spaces and the interaction and transactions therein. Both cultural difference and organisational hierarchy are being produced and reproduced in computer-mediated space.

More widely, modern Fordist regimes of mass production and mass marketing are being challenged by postmodern, contingent, flexible, production networks. The contracts, bureaucracy and hierarchy that characterised modern relations of production are supposedly being replaced by 'just-in-time', lean production methods. Those methods rely upon speedy transfer of knowledge, information and trust and the skills of producers to navigate the flows of global commercial space.

Participants in the global economy must bestride the universe and its mosaic of local micro-cultures, yet that same economy is serviced by local production clusters, zones, communities and quarters. They require workers to be embedded in a set of quite intimate producer relations. Thriving local economies are said to rely upon inclusive local communities. In turn, social inclusion requires some cultural identification with the community. Identification is often forged out of a sense of shared history. A typical communitarian argument is that 'groups of strangers who share a morally significant history' are essential to the cohesion of

society (Bell 1993, 185). Similarly, social capitalists like Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1993, 2000) make much of the historical roots of civic involvement. No matter whether traditions and roots are romanticised or even invented: history matters. But the journey from identity-based community to exclusive community may be a short one. Economic wealth is rarely distributed fairly in exclusive communities.

Meanwhile, any assumption that a welfarist nation-state could or would provide the necessary conditions for the exercise of civic, political or social rights and obligations has been badly shaken by the assault upon welfare provision by neo-liberal governments throughout the West since the 1970s. That assault has weakened the capacity of state institutions to produce and deliver public goods and left them ill-equipped to mediate a new politics of difference.

The funding of individual and collective social capital as a response to the changed situation might be an appropriate ambition for those who seek social and economic justice as well as the development of a cosmopolitan civic society within and beyond national boundaries. If it is to be used towards those ends, the concept of social capital needs to be distanced from the historical particularism of communitarianism and the hierarchical differentiation of cultural capital accumulation. But relationships are not a substitute for institutions. As Giddens (1999) and Mouzelis (1999) imply, globalisation presents an opportunity to reconstruct existing institutions or to create new ones. What is needed is not *no* institutions but new or reformed ones. But at a time of institutional change, different interest groups will battle to position, or embed, themselves in the new or reformed arrangements. Such is the case in Wales.

Finally, I want to return to Richard Sennett's (1998) observation that 'we' can be a dangerous pronoun when it is invoked as a defence against the incoherence of life in the new economy and connect it with David Hollinger's (1995) complaint about the contemporary preoccupation with community. Hollinger (1995) challenges what he labels 'postmodern' theorising about cultural rights, particularly ethnic rights. He insists that a civic nation state can mediate 'between the species and the ethnos' in a way that an ethnic nation cannot do (*ibid.*, 14). The state must not become a hostage to culture wars that prevent it from tackling deep-rooted economic and political inequalities and maintaining civil and libertarian rights.

He recalls the cosmopolitanism of intellectuals engaged in two major international movements in the 1930s and 1940s: 'socialism in politics and modernism in the arts' (*ibid.*, 97). Their universalist, species-based assumptions about values and knowledge might have been ethnocentric, but they sought to break down the 'claims of blood and history' that the World War II generation had fought against. Rather than developing a more rigorous universalism to overcome the flaws of that earlier discourse, the response of intellectuals in the late twentieth century has been a retreat into retribalisation and a growing acceptance of 'of our own historicity' - 'the contingent, temporally, and socially situated character of our beliefs and values, of our institutions and practices' - as a grounds for challenging the 'authority of knowledge celebrated by the Enlightenment' (*ibid.*, 60).

Hollinger takes particular issue with Richard Rorty's privileging of ethnocentric, epistemic and moral communities above objectivity and universal claims to truth and justice. He accuses Rorty of viewing the world as 'an expanse of private, exclusive clubs [...] each defined, animated and sustained by a vivid sense of the difference between "we" and "they". (*ibid.*, 67). As both Hollinger and Billig (1995) observe, over the course of his career Rorty has steadily expanded the 'we' to correspond with American citizenship. That does not overcome the problem posed by the emphasis upon community in postmodernity. Hollinger elaborates thus upon the moral implications of community membership:

> The less one's raw humanity is said to count for anything, the more important one's affiliations become. The more epistemic and moral authority is ascribed to historically particular communities, the more it does matter just who is and is not one of 'us'. The more detached truth and goodness become from the testimony and tastes of any population outside our own tribe or club, the more is at stake when that tribe or club defines itself in relation to other human beings. How wide the circle of the "we"?

(Hollinger 1995, 68)

As this chapter has demonstrated, theorising about cultural rights need not be 'postmodern'. Moreover, and notwithstanding Hollinger's warning, it would be difficult to explain cultural difference without regard to the conditions in which it was rooted. He himself cannot avoid the fact that his conception of a 'post-ethnic' – some would call it assimilationist - civic nation rests upon his own embeddedness in a United States of American 'melting-pot'. As

will already be clear from the amount of historical detail given, I assume that a present discourse of cultural difference in Wales cannot be understood without reference to the past. That it is paradoxical to study the specific historical circumstances in which a preoccupation with the contingent and the particular has arisen does not obviate the need to do so.

But Hollinger's observation about the relationship of raw humanity to community raises a fundamental challenge for cultural-political analysis. The question 'how wide the circle of the "we"' in Wales and in global, computer-mediated space informs the analysis in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 3, I discuss the method employed to answer it.

3 UNRAVELLING THE WEB

And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

(Wittgenstein 1953/1978, 32, para. 67)

The method used to realise this thesis is discourse analytical. The term 'discourse analysis' embraces so heterogeneous a range of activities and is applied in so many different ways within different disciplines that it is impossible to arrive at a single definition of what it is (Silverman 1993, 121). It is usually concerned with the construction through language of relationships with intimate or impersonal others, with the self or with some object. Here, I proceed upon the assumption that although grounded in language, discourse is more than language in use: it is, as Jaworski and Coupland put it,

> language use relative to social, political and cultural formations – it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals' interaction with society.

(Jaworski and Coupland 1999, 3)

Inherent in discourse analysis is the problem whereby data are perceived as discursive 'texts' that are '*part of* the reality being studied' (Alasuutari 1995, 63). Where the primary interest is with how a source constructs 'reality' - for itself and for others - through the rhetorical or narrative organisation of speech, writing, audio-visual material and other communicative forms, there is a danger that the meaning of a text becomes an end of itself with the material or social realm being excluded from analysis. In the spirit of capturing the relationship between text and context, *critical* discourse analysis (CDA) approaches language use in speech and writing as a form of social practice. It assumes 'a dialectical relationship between

a particular discursive event and the situations, institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). In other words, a discourse event and its situational, institutional and social frame are mutually constitutive. Atkinson (2000) equates the non-discursive frame with the material world or 'the Real': there is a dialectical relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive whereby one cannot exist without the other. The Real is the basis for the existence of discourse, but discourse structures our understanding of the Real, becomes embedded and institutionalized within it and thereby changes it. At the risk of stating the obvious, the assumption made in this thesis is that the discursive and its situational, institutional and social frame are mutually constitutive. The methodological implications of that position are that validity and objectivity matter. Indeed, because the context of discourse is so crucial both to its force and to its meaning, the accurate interpretation of a discursive text depends upon a solid exposition of the conditions in which it is produced even if all that can be ascertained about those conditions is that they are unstable.

To adopt the orientation of a critical discourse analyst does not of itself equip one with the tools necessary to unpick discursive text. Further, discourse analysts tend to concentrate upon the process of data analysis at the expense of considering the position of the researcher *in* a given discourse, and how the methods employed to collect and select texts might influence their interpretation. In this chapter, I describe how materials were brought together and chosen for analysis and explain the approach taken in interpreting them. I also reflect upon the research process and the conditions in which the research was undertaken.

The research

The research upon which the thesis is based was carried out between the autumn of 1997 and early 2001. For clarity of presentation, it is useful to organise what was done into three categories: desk research, participant observation, and depth interviews with artists and other relevant informants. They are not sequential categories, and the boundaries between them are fluid. For example, much documentary evidence was collected by means of desk research,

but I also accumulated materials as a result of participant observation at meetings and events and from sources referred to during interviews with informants. Arguably, all of the activities undertaken could be included under the label 'participant observation' because it embraces such a broad range of techniques and approaches. However, the separate categories of desk research, participant observation and depth interviews have been employed for the sake of definitional precision. I describe each component of the research in detail below.

Desk research

The term 'desk research' simply refers to the process of identifying and collecting extant data and documents. Desk research became easier as my project proceeded: government departments and agencies as well as commercial companies were increasingly using their web sites to make available press releases, consultation papers, commissioned research studies and other materials. Although the research was library-based in its early days, I made increasing use of the Internet to locate and download much of the material that supports the analysis in chapters 4 and 5. The following web sites were book marked and regularly scanned for new postings: The Arts Council of Wales[27]; The Department for Culture, Media and Sport[28]; The National Assembly for Wales[29]; The European Commission[30]; The Welsh Development Agency[31]; and The Welsh Language Board[32]. I obtained two types of resource by means of desk research: secondary quantitative data, and documentary material.

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[27] <http://www.CCC-ACW.ORG.UK/> (1 October 2001)

[28] <http://www.culture.gov.uk/> (1 October 2001)

[29] <http://www.assembly.wales.gov.uk/> (1 October 2001)

[30] <http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm> (1 October 2001)

[31] <http://www.wda.co.uk/> (1 October 2001)

[32] <http://www.bwrdd-yr-iaith.org.uk/> (1 October 2001)

By secondary quantitative data, I mean statistics that have previously been collected by an organisation or an individual and are re-examined or applied for some new purpose. Examples of secondary quantitative data consulted for this study are: statistics on Welsh speakers by age and by region over time; commissioned research into attitudes towards the Welsh language; audience figures for Welsh-language radio and television; expenditure on Welsh language media; data on the economic value of the arts and culture compiled on behalf of the European Commission, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and the Arts Council of Wales; and statistics on the distribution of the workforce in Wales by employment sector over time. All such data are in a sense texts, phenomena of the social context in which they were produced and discovered. That does not prevent them from indicating the condition of the material world, particularly where they are triangulated with each other not only in pursuit of verification but to identify consistencies and inconsistencies among them. Where there are inconsistencies, interpretation of the differences and anomalies can produce valuable insights.

For example, a plethora of research studies and policy papers on the economics of culture was published during the period 1998-2001. It is the fact of their publication rather than the accuracy of the data that they produced that is of interest, for their lack of consensus about the domain of artistic and cultural production raises operational problems in terms of non-comparability of data. The authors of the studies invariably complain about the difficulties of collecting data. For example, the Creative Industries Task Force (CITF), which was set up by the UK government in 1997 to map the condition of the creative industries in Britain, complained about the lack of comprehensive official statistics and noted that they 'did not match well with traditional industry classifications on which government statistics are based' (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 1998, online). Researchers who carried out a study of the 'economic impact' of the arts and cultural industries in Wales encountered similar problems (Bryan *et al.* 1998), as did the authors of a proposed European funding framework for the Welsh cultural sector (Arts Council of Wales/Newidiem 2001). Oakley (1996, 15) locates such problems in an unwarranted bias towards manufacturing industry in the collection of official statistics, particularly employment statistics. A researcher using official statistics is left 'looking at the Information Age through an Industrial Age prism'. However, the complaints about data on arts and cultural production provide useful signals about the

priorities and assumptions of those commissioning and carrying out the research. Art is an industry.

By documentary materials, I mean sources that provide qualitative information about, or are an indicator of, social, political and economic conditions and practices. Examples of documentary sources that have contributed to this thesis are: a mission statement made by the Welsh Language Board; a position paper published by the Welsh Language Society; the Single Programming Document that presented Wales' plans for economic development and restructuring to the European Commission; a proposed framework for the arts and cultural sector to access European Union funding, which was produced for the Arts Council of Wales by an economic development consultancy; the National Assembly for Wales' report on its ten-year vision for the arts; the Official Record of a National Assembly debate held in October 2000 about the Arts Council of Wales; biographies of Assembly Members posted on the National Assembly for Wales web site; press releases from the Arts Council of Wales and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport; media reports; and culture industry web sites.

The sources listed above have together supported the analysis of cultural policy and practice in Wales in chapter 4. Triangulation is as relevant in the scrutiny of such documents as it is in the use of statistical data. For example, with regard to political analysis, Hansen *et al.* (1998) observe that single documents rarely provide more than clues to an overall policy, and it is necessary to explore a wide variety of materials in order to determine the relationships between interested parties, events and policy-making. In this study, triangulation has been effected *between* documentary sources and *with* the findings of my participant observation in policy-making processes and the experiences and attitudes of key informants.

Participant observation

Participant observation is a research strategy the object of which is to acquire a close and intimate familiarity with a chosen field of study in order to enter, and enhance understanding of, the subjective worlds of those being studied. As a method, it has its roots in ethnographic

research studies conducted by anthropologists and sociologists. In cultural and communications studies, it permits engagement with the 'untidy' processes of cultural production and consumption that a neat theoretical or ideological framework might not reveal (Hansen *et al.*, 1999).

The balance between objectivity and subjectivity poses a dilemma for the participant observer. Too much detachment weakens the insights that participant observation can provide; too much involvement undermines her objectivity. Complete detachment is impossible, and it will become more so as a research project unfolds and as the researcher engages more extensively and selectively with existing theoretical work. Nevertheless, if the researcher is properly reflexive, and even sceptical, the method can yield primary data which will support, or correct, theoretical explanation and understanding of a phenomenon. As well, a more insightful analysis of secondary data and documentary sources is possible where a researcher has engaged with the processes, conditions and people that produced them.

There are a number of different approaches to the role of participant observer. They have sometimes been classified along a continuum ranging from complete participation, participation as observer, observer as participant, and complete observer (for discussion, see Easterby-Smith *et al.* 1991). My own role developed from being observer-participant to participant-observer. In the early days of the research, my presence was largely confined to being part of the audience for an event or function. As people in the field became aware that I was researching into the relationship between new media and cultural production in Wales, I was assumed to have some expertise in the matter and was invited to participate in meetings or events on that basis[33].

I was a participant-observer or observer-participant at a number of meetings and events during the course of the research. Notes were taken at all of them, including observations of my own feelings about them, and relevant papers and documents collected and filed. Events

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[33] On the question of access, I was particularly fortunate in obtaining the help of staff at the Cultural Enterprise Service (CES) in Cardiff, whom I visited on a number of occasions and who facilitated my access to a number of events and to people in Wales' arts world.

that were particularly influential in shaping my thinking and the focus of the thesis are as follows.

In November 1997, I attended the launch by the Secretary of State for Wales of Wales Arts International (WAI) and its accompanying web site. The emphasis of the event was very much upon the value of the arts in projecting a global image of Wales as an entrepreneurial nation, and much was made of the potential of new media in that context. However, the technology that was supposed to provide simultaneous Welsh and English translations of the proceedings did not work, and I was unable to understand some of the speeches because – like most people who live in Wales – I do not speak Welsh. I discuss the event and its web site in chapter 4.

In November 1998, I was in the audience for the presentation of research into the 'The Economic Impact of the Arts and Cultural Industries in Wales' (Bryan *et al.* 1998). This was a report on the findings of research commissioned by the Arts Council of Wales, the Welsh Development Agency and S4C[34]. The findings of the report contribute to the analysis presented in chapter 4. At the presentation, I picked up copies of the research report and accompanying briefing documents and witnessed the report's authors make a summary of their findings. Afterwards, I wrote up my notes, filed the papers and documents that I had collected and thought little more about the event.

In the spring of 1999, Cultural Enterprise Services in Cardiff put my name forward to serve on an 'arts and cultural industries task force' on new technologies convened by the Arts Council of Wales (ACW). The task force was one of four working groups - the others were 'growth and competitiveness', 'pathways back to employment' and 'regenerating communities'. The purpose of the task forces as stated in the briefing paper presented at the first of their two meetings was to 'take a radical look at sections of the arts and cultural industries in Wales' and 'their potential to improve the economy of Wales and in so doing benefit the arts economy' (Arts and Cultural Industries Taskforces brief, meeting 1, 23 April

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[34] Sianel Pedwar Cymru (Channel 4 Wales).

1999)[35]. It soon became apparent that their underlying purpose was to ensure that the sector's claim for resources be represented in the single programming document for Wales that was to be presented to the European Commission for approval in September of the same year. It also became clear why the report on 'The Economic Impact of the Arts and Cultural Industries in Wales' had been commissioned and published the previous year: its assessment of the economic value of the arts and cultural industries and its predictions for their growth were to be used to leverage European structural funds. My observation of participants in the two meetings of the task force also furnished me with additional fresh insights into the processes of, and participants in, cultural policy making in Wales.

The first meeting alerted me to the unstable position of ACW and its officers, although I was already aware of its troubles from press reports and from anecdotes reported by artists. The moderator of the task force, whom I subsequently met at several social and professional events, was at great pains to distance herself and the task force from the Arts Council. That did not make sense to me. She was an officer of ACW and all the paperwork had been sent out under the aegis of ACW. I began to understand her detachment when I received an e-mail inviting me to her leaving party. She was taking up a post at the European Commission. At that time, ACW was haemorrhaging staff; others were threatening industrial action. At least one artist spoke to me of that particular officer as being sympathetic to artists.

The attitude towards ACW among artists whom I interviewed formally for this study varied according to whether or not they had received funding (or sufficient funding) for their work, with the recipients being more favourably disposed than the non-recipients. That is unsurprising, but the degree of animosity towards ACW among some of the non-recipients might have been driven by the way in which rejections of funding applications were made. At one point during the first meeting, all the Arts Council officers left the room. One of the delegates angrily exclaimed that the task force was all very well, but she knew of an artist who had applied to ACW for funds to develop an archive of Welsh folk music on the World Wide Web. The response had been, "We don't fund vanity publishing." Regardless of the

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[35] It might be worth pointing to a small detail of location. Both meetings were held at the All Nations Centre in Cardiff.

accuracy of the anecdote, the fact of its being recounted and sympathetically heard suggests that ACW did not have the unanimous confidence of arts producers. That low standing was reflected in the investigation conducted into ACW by the National Assembly for Wales in 2000 and discussed in chapter 4; it also emerged in the interviews with the two artists who feature in chapter 5.

At the second of the task force meetings, a remark by one delegate – and my interpretation of my own response to it – alerted me to the rhetorical significance of 'community' in cultural policy-making. In response to a proposed course of action, a participant in the meeting commented: "I don't think the multimedia community would like that". What she meant was that multimedia producers had shared interests that would have been damaged by the proposal. The man sitting next to me, who was managing director of a company that produced and published educational CD-Roms, snorted. I felt myself shudder, because the use of 'community' seemed so inappropriate. When I reflected upon my own antipathetic reaction later, I started to realise how often I had seen or heard the word 'community' used – with far less dissonant effect - in conjunction with the arts and culture. I reviewed my documentary material; I also took a fresh look at the social and economic theory that had informed me thus far. From that reappraisal emerged the theoretical focus outlined in chapter 2.

As well as the key events outlined above, I maintained ongoing relationships (face-to-face and by e-mail) with a number of the people I met at them. I was invited to join the B10c (pronounced 'bloc') network, a group of artists, scientists and technologists in Wales that holds occasional meetings and seminars. All of the people I met and the meetings I attended have contributed to the shape of this thesis.

Depth interviews

There are two broad approaches to interviewing in the social sciences. A positivist perspective assumes that interview data gives the researcher access to facts or beliefs about

the world. The task of the researcher is to generate interview data that are valid and reliable, independently of the research setting. Such data would ideally be collected from a random sample of the subject population by means of standard questions and tabulated to generate information about the occurrence, strength and/or frequency of the variables under investigation and the relationship between them. A second, qualitative, approach assumes that the primary purpose of interviews is to elicit the meanings that informants attach to issues and situations, and especially to their own experiences, and to gain access to the ways in which they construct their social worlds.

Depth interviews fall into the second category. They have been described as a humanistic approach to interviewing in which the type and validity of data depend on the mutual understanding of interviewee and interviewer (Reason and Rowan 1981; see Silverman, *op. cit.* for discussion). From such a perspective, a depth interview would ideally be open-ended and completely unstructured. However, it is impractical to use an entirely unstructured approach when both researcher and interviewee have limited time available to them, as was the case in my project. Neither is it desirable. A non-directive interview will not produce a clear picture of the interviewee's perspective. Rather, it is likely to engender anxiety on the part of the interviewee, who has to interpret what the interviewer wants, and produce confusing data for the interviewer who must interpret what question the informant was answering (Easterby-Smith *et al.*, 1991).

The depth interviews conducted for this study took the form of discussions between researcher and informant, and lasted for at least one hour. Discussion ranged around the topics in an interview guide prepared by me in advance and shared with the informants at the beginning of each interview. As the study developed, so did the interview guide. There was a broad protocol for the interviews, but the guide prepared in advance of each interview varied according to what I had learned from the study to date and what prior information I had about the interviewees from their web sites.

I conducted seven depth interviews over the period October 1997-December 1998 with cultural producers about their feelings towards, and experiences of using, the Internet to promote and distribute their work. The interviews were all tape recorded and transcribed; the

transcription protocols used are described elsewhere in this chapter in my discussion of data selection and presentation. 'Sampling' in respect of the interviewees was more-or-less arbitrary (although technical purists might prefer to label it 'snowball sampling'), for there were relatively few artists in Wales with web sites when I began the study. I contacted my first interviewee because he was a prominent figure in Wales' arts world; the second contacted me because she had heard about my research and wanted to talk to me. Both of them were involved in promoting music on the World Wide Web, and their cases have been selected for detailed analysis in chapter 5. Next, I interviewed a textile artist who was working with a group of young people in an 'eco' cybercafé and wanted to use the Internet to retail the work. I met her by chance when some colleagues and I visited a sustainable development project in Cardiff of which the cybercafé was a part. After that, I conducted three interviews with informants to whom I had been referred by Cultural Enterprise Service in Cardiff: two visual artists and a group of people from a small contemporary dance ensemble. One of the visual artists referred me to my final interviewee: a musician from north America who had achieved chart success in the 1980s, had settled on the south Wales coast and was now using the Internet to promote spiritual awareness and to share samples of his music with other musicians. Meanwhile, he was earning a living teaching web site design on adult education courses.

In April 1999, prior to the devolution of the responsibilities of the Welsh Office to the National Assembly for Wales, I met with two civil servants at the Welsh Office who apprised me, with great prescience, of likely developments in cultural policy for Wales once the Assembly was in place. Beyond Wales, in October 1997, early in my study, I spent an afternoon in London surfing the Internet with the new technologies officer for the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) and the Performing Rights Society (PRS) in London. He initiated me into some of the challenges and opportunities that the Internet presented for the distribution of live and recorded music.

The role of the researcher in depth interviews resembles that of the participant observer; indeed, depth interviews are often used as a technique in participant observation. The content of such interviews will be influenced by the interaction between researcher and researched, and by the context in which the interaction takes place. Where depth interviews are part of, or

complemented by, wider participant observation, the interviewer and interviewee will both belong to the field being researched. The expectations and assumptions of both interviewer and interviewee will be shaped by what they already know – or think they know - about each other and about the subject under investigation. The researcher herself is part of what is being researched. Interview technique and the interviewer's ability to gain the trust of the interviewee are important, but so is her ability to reflect upon her own role in the content and outcome of the encounter.

Thus the detachment-involvement dilemma noted above in relation to participant observation applies equally to depth interviews, although it is often expressed in terms of interview bias. From a positivist perspective, fears of bias centre upon issues such as the consistency with which a question is asked of interviewees, the propensity of respondents to give accurate or truthful answers and the significance of the social and physical setting of the interview. In depth interviews, where the questions asked and the approach taken may differ from informant to informant, the concern is that a researcher will impose her own reference frame on the interviewees, both in asking questions and interpreting the answers. The frame will be influenced both by the researcher's general cultural values, and by her understanding of the field being researched. However, it is inevitable that the researcher will bring some *a priori* assumptions to the field (of which she might be relieved as her study unfolds). Further, as a project evolves, she will increasingly see patterns in data that lead her to explore in some directions rather than others.

In any case, it is misleading to set up a dichotomy between facts and beliefs on the one hand and meanings and values on the other. It might be necessary for a researcher to understand the constructs that an informant uses as the basis for her opinions or beliefs about an issue. Or, a researcher might seek to understand an informant's world in order that she might influence (or change) it, either independently or collaboratively with the informant(s), as in action research[36]. I do not claim that the present study is action research, but it is unlikely that

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[36] Action research is a methodology that assumes both that the best way of learning about a social system is through attempting to change it and that the people most likely to be affected by the changes should be involved in the research process itself. There is a wide literature on action research and its applications. See, for example, Zuber-Skerritt (1991), McNiff (1992) and Stringer (1999).

any researcher who participates in the field of her inquiry will leave that field as she found it. Neither will she remain unchanged by her experiences in the field.

Interpreting the data

Having collected data, it is necessary to interpret it. In this study, the primary focus was upon the relationship between the cultural capital of a group of Welsh language nationalists, the development and execution of cultural policy in Wales and the practice of cultural enterprise in the World Wide Web. As already stated, discourse analysis is the primary method used to access those relationships.

Between them, Schiffrin (1994) and Jaworski and Coupland (1999) identify nine perspectives on discourse – speech act theory, pragmatics, interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, conversation analysis, variation analysis, narrative analysis, discursive psychology and critical discourse analysis – and detail the origins, underlying assumptions, analytical focus and techniques associated with them. From that, it should be clear that the label 'discourse analysis' is applicable to a wide range of methodological approaches and practices. Many of them have contributed to, and borrowed from, each other. In what follows, I shall concentrate on outlining the tenets of speech act theory because, as the first significant approach to the study of language use as action (van Dijk 1997), it captures the broad approach taken here. I go on to explain how the specific techniques of rhetorical and narrative analysis have been applied to the analysis in chapters 4 and 5.

Speech act theory

Speech act theory is grounded in the work of two philosophers, John Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969). It rests upon the assumption that language not only describes the world but is used to perform actions that may transform the world. Its analytical focus is upon how meaning, intention and action are related to language; it also establishes the principle of

building taxonomies of the conditions and shared rules which structure and are structured by communicative acts and the contexts in which they occur. Three active components of speech - locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary - together produce a total speech act, although it is the illocutionary act that is most clearly identified with speech act theory. A locutionary act is simply the production of an utterance of words, morphemes and sentences in some language. An illocutionary act is what is accomplished in uttering the locution. Examples of illocutionary acts include assertions, requests, questions, orders, promises or threats. A perlocutionary act is the consequential achievement of an illocutionary act: that is, the effect of an utterance upon the actions, thoughts and beliefs of hearers. An illocutionary act can be performed only in the presence of appropriate contextual conditions and is subject to the availability of textual formulae. Searle in particular stressed that illocutionary acts are enabled or created by constitutive rules, whose knowledge is a function of linguistic competence. In turn, utterances can perform multiple functions, and one 'indirect' illocutionary act may be performed by another 'literal' speech act. The ability of hearers to interpret and draw inferences from indirect speech acts is a function of their knowledge of the rules of such action. For the purposes of the present study, it will be assumed that knowledge of those rules will be a function of the cultural capital possessed by speaker and listener (or writer and reader).

In chapter 4, I analyse the circumstances for and execution of a speech act that played an important role in reviving Welsh nationalism in the 1960s. In 1962, Saunders Lewis, one of the founders of Plaid Cymru, emerged from retirement to give a lecture on BBC radio in which he warned that the Welsh language would die out if it did not become an official administrative language. The immediate context for the broadcast was the forthcoming publication of the 1961 census, which was expected to show that the number of Welsh speakers in Wales was declining rapidly, although it took place amidst a wider debate about the most appropriate form of administration for Wales and the best way to deliver measures to develop its economy. In the event, the decline in Welsh speaking revealed by the census was not as severe as Lewis had anticipated, but the broadcast provoked a wave of action on behalf of the language and the creation of legislation and institutions to protect and extend the language in public life in Wales.

The outline of speech act theory above draws heavily from Shiffrin's (1994) analysis of its role in the development of discourse analysis in linguistics. Although speech act theory is applicable to a detailed analysis of spoken and written utterances, it also bears comparison with a more abstract level of analysis in communication and cultural studies. For example, Vincent Mosco, the political economist of communication, has argued that communications research needs to move its focus away from institutions and towards 'social actors whose behaviour is constituted out of their matrix of social relations and positionings, including class, race and gender' (Mosco 1996, 215). He commends Giddens' (1984) 'structuration theory' as a research approach that would capture such relations. To simplify considerably, 'structuration' is concerned with the interplay between social structures, human agency and the knowledge that a social actor has both of the rules and resources which constrain or enable her actions and her own contribution to the conditions in which she acts. Giddens' (1984) outline of structuration theory – and its contribution to a perceived 'linguistic turn' in the social sciences - has been the fulcrum of much debate about those relationships.

In a similar vein to Mosco, but independently of Giddens, Bourdieu (1993) has written of the 'structuration' of cultural production as a relational 'field', a set of 'structuring structures', which is also a field of forces (i.e. power) and of struggles among the occupants of different positions in the field. Such a definition permits the analyst to escape from the 'dilemma of the charismatic image of artistic activity as pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist, and the reductionist vision which claims to explain the act of production and its product in terms of their conscious or unconscious external functions' (Bourdieu 1993, 34). Essentialist views of art are as unsatisfactory for Bourdieu as essentialist views of nation are for the analysts identified in the previous chapter; equally unsatisfactory for him is the assumption that art is merely a function or feature of a material base. To put it another way, art – and the status of different art forms and their producers and consumers – is the outcome of ongoing struggles for survival and domination.

Debate about the interplay of structure, knowledge and agency is scarcely new. The approach adopted in the present study is best expressed in the epigraph to this chapter, which is drawn from a longer explanation by Wittgenstein of how a word or concept acquires meaning. Wittgenstein is suggesting that something is called a 'number' when it has a direct

relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number, and this gives it an indirect relationship to other things called by the same name. Thus 'number' gets its meaning not because it has some singular 'essence' but because there are various criss-crossing 'family resemblances' between the things that are called number (Wittgenstein 1953/1978, 32). Similarly, and by extension, the meaning of a 'speech act' cannot be separated from the situation of its use, and understanding of a social act cannot be divorced from the conditions in which it is carried out. It follows that where an actor cannot name something, or names it wrongly, she is unfamiliar with, or does not understand, the contextual rules from which it acquires its meaning. ⌐ The incoherence, or inconsistency, of speech or text in those circumstances is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter under the heading of narrative analysis. Empirically, it is revealed in the accounts of artistic action discussed in chapter 5. It is also present in some of the cultural policy documents analysed in chapter 4.

Rhetorical analysis

I turn now to the first of the two methods used in the detailed analysis of selected texts in chapters 4 and 5. Gill and Whedbee (1997) identify two consistent themes among the plethora of classical and contemporary definitions of rhetoric. The first is that its activities are located on a political stage; the second is that it is intended to influence an audience to some end. In addition, and reinforcing what has already been stated above about discourse analysis in general and speech act theory in particular, they note that rhetorical critics over the past thirty years have in common

> explication of the dynamic interaction of a rhetorical text with its context, that is, *how* a text responds to, reinforces or alters the understandings of an audience or the social fabric of the community.

(Gill and Whedbee 1997, 159)

They identify three basic questions that a rhetorical critic must address. First, what expectations are created by the context surrounding a rhetorical text? Second, what does the text present to an audience? Finally, what features of the text are significant?

The issue of the context can be broken down into a number of interacting elements. *Rhetor credibility* is a function of the authority, status or reputation of a speaker or writer among the audience being addressed. *Exigence* simply refers to the events to which a text is addressed or responds, although its implications may be more far-reaching than an explicit statement of purpose or focus conveys. A third contextual component, *audience*, is also frequently ambiguous. Audiences for political discourse are typically wider than what Goffman (1981) calls a 'ratified' audience. Take, for example, *A Culture in Common*, the National Assembly for Wales' ten-year vision for the arts, which is analysed in detail in chapter 4. Its formal, or ratified, audience was all the members of the National Assembly, for whom the report was prepared by a working group of Assembly Members (AMs) drawn from the Post-16 Education and Training Committee. However, the entire report was also available via the National Assembly's web site to anyone who wanted to read it. Theoretically, therefore, its audience was anyone in the world with Internet access. In practice, the general public's exposure to the very lengthy report would have been shaped by print and broadcast news media which, in turn, would be more likely to respond to selective press releases than to undertake a detailed reading of the whole document.

A further contextual component, *genre*, refers to a group of texts that share some discursive feature. The importance of genre classification in rhetoric is that it establishes standards for the audience. Where those standards are not met, or are overturned, there is a disjuncture between what is expected and what is experienced. Bakhtin (1981, 1986) has influenced an approach to text that assumes that specific genres mediate between social and discursive practices. A text will be shaped by socially available repertoires of genres but may mix genres within it. The mixing of discourses and genres in texts is associated with the restructuring over time of relationships between different discursive practices or 'orders of discourse' within and across institutions (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 265). The heterogeneity and ambivalence of text in those circumstances affords an opportunity to analyse the relationship between socio-cultural change and discursive change. It will be recalled that in the discussion of desk research above, I noted that the triangulation of quantitative data and other documentary sources enables consistencies and inconsistencies among them to be interpreted and gave as an example the variety of cultural policy texts produced or sponsored by different levels of government. Their ambivalence about what

activities constitute the arts and culture and the contradictions within and between them regarding the economic, aesthetic and civic dimensions of art indicates that the restructuring of the boundaries between them has neither been fully achieved nor embedded in institutional discourse about art. The heterogeneity and ambivalence invoked by genre and genre-mixing also recalls the observations made about flexible capitalism in chapters 1 and 2. Flexible capitalism in global creative industry has the effect of increasing the variety of what is produced, and accelerating the tendency towards impermanence and ambiguity in the social relations between the producers. Genre switching is also relevant to the adoption of multiple – or symbolic – ethnicities and other affiliations that were discussed in chapter 2. I shall return to those issues in chapter 5.

Genre offers one perspective on how the text and the social are mediated. There is an alternative view. It concentrates upon the processes and power conditions which reproduce personal and social cognitions in discourse. For example, elites who control the presentation, setting, topics, and style of discourse, and decide who may participate in it, mediate attitudes and identities in respect of the nation. Such relationships influence racist discourse that presents a positive self-image among dominant in-groups and a negative other-presentation of dominated out-groups (Van Dijk 1992, van Dijk *et al.* 1997). A focus upon the production and reproduction of racist or nationalist discourse does not preclude an appreciation of sociocultural change. Power may shift, or dominant groups and individuals might adopt opponent or victim discourses that conceal the extent of their power and influence. In other words, as noted in chapter 1, groups or individuals might be unable or unwilling to articulate their cultural dispositions and the cultural capital that they have accumulated. One of the tasks of the discourse analyst is, therefore, to reveal such dispositions and their realisation.

Gill and Whedbee (*op. cit.*) identify a second question that must be asked of a rhetorical text. It concerns what it presents to an audience. Text can create a rhetorical persona for the speaker or writer, perhaps by the manipulation of the active and passive voice or the use (or lack) of self-references. It can also redefine its subject by naming (or renaming) it in a particular way. For example, referring to Wales as a country, or a nation, implies a greater political autonomy for it than would the label 'region'; employing the definite article - as in 'the country' or 'the nation' – is even more effective because it precludes the inference that

such a status might be dubious or contested. Finally, any fictive 'implied audience' within the text impels the *actual* audience beyond the text to participate in a collective fantasy. In nationalist discourse, the construction of 'a people' is a common ploy, as is the invocation of 'community'. Billig (1995) makes a related point about the 'deixis of homeland'. Such deixis might take the form a form of rhetorical pointing which anchors the audience to the interpretive world of the writer or speaker by the use of words such as 'we', 'this', 'here' and 'now' in some extra-linguistic context. The use of 'we' – Sennett's (1998) 'dangerous pronoun' – implicitly excludes or silences some others.

The relevance to Wales of Hollinger's (1995) question 'how wide the circle of the "we"?' was raised at the end of chapter two. To answer it requires a consideration of who constitutes whom as being in which 'ingroups' and 'outgroups', but also whether there are actors who act as bridges or brokers between the different groups. Genre mixing within a text might be a signal that bridges are being constructed; that is why it is appropriate to consider discursive intertextuality as well as the power relations that mediate the production and reproduction of discourse.

Finally, Gill and Whedbee identify some of the features of text - structure and temporality, argument, metaphor and iconicity - that create the effects noted above. Take, for example, the following paragraph from *A Culture in Common*, the National Assembly for Wales' 10-year vision for the arts, which opens the section of the report headed 'Confident Diversity - Positive Distinctiveness'[37]:

> Following the establishment of the National Assembly, Wales is embarking on a new
> and challenging phase in its history. We see this not only in terms of how Wales is
> governed but also as a cultural response to the distinctiveness of the Welsh identity.
>
> (National Assembly for Wales 2001, online; para. 3.15)

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[37] The document was also published in Welsh. A more substantial excerpt from it is analysed in chapter 4.

This first paragraph in a lengthy demonstration of how Wales is both diverse and distinctive creates a temporal and spatial setting, but it not a static setting. Wales is moving on, it is making history, an illocutionary act of embarkation predicates a future destination. The embarkation metaphor, perhaps invoking associations with a ship of state, is a reminder that metaphoric language structures understanding of an idea in terms of something previously understood (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Elsewhere in *A Culture in Common*, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, archetypal metaphors are also discernible. Gill and Whedbee observe that archetypical metaphors 'operate across generations to place value judgments on the subjects to which they are associated' (*op. cit.*, 173). It will be recalled that Anthony Smith (1986) makes a similar point about the rootedness of nations in ancient histories and enduring ethnic consciousness. He argued that the myths and symbols that convey the values of ethnic communities across generations form 'moulds' within which 'all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact' (Smith 1986, 16). As to iconicity, it works similarly to metaphor in representing an idea that is already understood (or reproducing an ideology) by mimicking it through the syntactic combination of words into sentences and phrases. The paragraph from *A Culture in Common* selected for analysis here is too short to give a real flavour of that feature, but even in its two sentences there is a parallelism in its rhythm of paired clauses that has a balancing effect. Note also the interplay of passive and active forms and the attribution of agency - 'the establishment of the National Assembly' (by some outside force?); 'Wales is governed' (by whom, from where?) – by a collective rhetor that is downplaying its own considerable power. As to the deictic anchors, the 'we' in this paragraph is ambiguous: are 'we' the committee, or are 'we' the audience? What is not ambiguous, however, is the premise upon which the succeeding argument is based: that Wales has a distinctive identity. The text presents readers with a (to be inferred) condition for action that has already been fulfilled: '*the* distinctiveness of *the* Welsh identity'.

Rhetorical analysis is applicable to texts that have been produced for a political stage and are intended to influence an audience to some end. In circumstances where text has been produced in more intimate circumstances – as in a depth interview of a respondent by an interlocutor – it is less relevant. Nevertheless, rhetorical analysis has much in common with other approaches to discourse in its preoccupation with context, delivery, syntactical

structures and lexical features. Equally, the application of narrative analytical techniques –
the subject of the following section – is applicable to political debate.

Narrative analysis

Narrative analysis does not relate merely to the interpretation of personal accounts of action
or experience. Elinor Ochs (1997) observes that narratives may be co-produced or co-
authored: for example, in conversational narrative where interlocutors ask questions, or
comment, or contribute in some other way to an evolving tale. As co-tellers produce a story,
they script messages about truth and morality which contribute causal explanations. A
narrative message might concern the truth of events, or it might concern what *should* have
happened. Ochs suggests that in some cases, collaborative story telling helps to create
solidarity in a family, institution or community. In other cases, co-tellers challenge each
other's explanations in ways that alter or re-draft a story line, although there might be social
expectations concerning which stories are challengeable and where the power to challenge
stories lies.

The techniques of narrative analysis are used here to explore the properties of both political
and non-political speech. In chapter 4, I demonstrate how politicians in the National
Assembly for Wales collaboratively develop a story line about the Arts Council of Wales in a
formal debate about its management and its future; I also consider how stories about Wales
and the Welsh language shape the form and content of *A Culture in Common*, the National
Assembly's vision for the arts. The principles of narrative analysis have also been of value in
interpreting the depth interviews with cultural practitioners that are the focus of chapter 5.

A narrative typically interweaves acts, agents, settings and emotions into a sense-making
scheme, story or plot that revolves around some event or situation. Many analyses of 'story
grammars' borrow from Vladimir Propp's (1975) morphology of Russian folktales to
reproduce a syntax of story narratives (see Alasuutari 1995 for discussion). However, such
analyses seem to be more concerned with the narrator's tacit knowledge of, and adherence to,

the rules of story structure than with how she exercises agency in structuring her own understanding and explanation of the situation or event that is the subject of her narrative. William Labov's (1972/1999) structural approach to narrative is more appropriate to an analysis of how narrators recount *and* refashion their experience, and it is the method that is preferred in this study. Even so, there is still a tendency for the *analyst* of narrative to shape and edit accounts into pre-ordained categories. I found it challenging to strike a balance between over-interpretation and interpretative coherence in constructing the two case studies presented in chapter 5. My first informant, who is prominent in Wales' public life, was accustomed to speaking to journalists and researchers about his work. He gave me a fluent and coherent account of his company's history, its current activities and its plans for the future that lends itself to analysis in the style of Labov. The very coherence of such an account must be interrogated hard to identify the underlying themes that it conceals. The interview with the second informant was much more fragmented and digressive, despite my preparation of a protocol for the interview. I discuss the possible reasons for that incoherence in chapter 5, but it should be noted that in such circumstances a double interlocution occurs. The narrative that is presented is not only shaped by the many questions asked by the interviewer during the discussion in order to draw out relevant information and explanations; there is a danger that editing and selecting from a transcript provides an account with a focus and direction of which the narrator herself is unaware.

Labov's approach emerged from his analysis of the structure of stories told by young street-gang members. He defines narrative as a 'method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred' (*ibid.*, 225). Some simple narratives are ordered in a temporal sequence of narrative clauses and are complete insofar as they contain a beginning, a middle and an end. However, a more developed narrative might contain the following sequential elements: *abstract* (one or two clauses at the beginning of a story that summarise or encapsulate it, and enable the narrator to emphasise its point); *orientation* (the way in which narrative elements such as time, place, characters and setting are established or set up at the outset of a story); *complicating action* (the essential component of a narrative, to which I shall return), *evaluation* (the point of the story); *result or resolution* (the outcome of the chain of events recounted in the narrative); and the *coda* (typically, clauses that are independent of the

narrative's temporal order and which signal that the narrative is finished, make some general observations about the events narrated, or bring the narrator and the listener back to the point at which they entered the narrative). The inclusion of *complicating action* is a necessary condition for a narrative. It is realised by a set of syntactic and pragmatic elements that Labov labels 'intensifiers', 'comparators', 'correlatives' and 'explicatives'. Intensifiers include non-verbal gestures, expressive phonology and repetition; comparators compare events that occurred with those that did not; correlatives combine events into single accounts; and explicatives explain complications inherent in the narrative (Jaworski and Coupland 1999, 216). Labov's approach contributes to the analysis in chapter 4 of a debate about the Arts Council of Wales by the National Assembly; as indicated above, it is also applied to the accounts that artists provide of their experience as Internet entrepreneurs in chapter 5.

Analysis of the narrative organisation of text gives access to the 'ontological security' of its source. It will be recalled that Giddens (1984, 23) defined ontological security as 'confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity'. He has suggested (1990, 1999) that globalisation is disturbing those parameters. Sennett (1998) makes a similar point when he observes that the transitory, discomforting relationships experienced in the mutable, flexible networks of a new capitalism make it difficult for an individual to build any coherent life narrative for herself or himself. Yet Ochs (1997, 185) observes that a life without narrative would be impossible, for it would mean 'a world without history, myths or drama; and lives without reminiscence, revelation, and interpretive revision'. All narratives depict a temporal transition from one condition to another. If humans experience time as a fusion of past, present and future, as Heidegger (1962) suggested, they experience themselves in the present but with a memory of the past and anxiety for the future. Narrative brings the past into present consciousness, providing a sense of continuity of self and society and helping to manage an uncertain future (Ochs 1997, 191).

Heidegger – who seems to have influenced Giddens' ideas about time and space - will be invoked in chapters 4 and 5 for the insights that his philosophy offers into the materials being analysed. It is the earlier work of Heidegger that is relevant. Its assumption that meaning is derived from its context resembles the observation made by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical*

Investigations, as discussed earlier[38]. However, Heidegger's applicability in the present work derives from his perspective on authenticity and its historicity, including its realisation in his own personal politics.

Charles Guignon (1993a, 215-6) suggests that Heidegger's ideal of authenticity has often been refracted through the lens of more accessible writers - Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus - who have 'existentialized' it. The 'terrible freedom' of the human condition found in such works conceals Heidegger's recognition of how people understand themselves as being embedded in a world where not all things are possible. Moreover, the equation of authenticity with the freedom to create one's life 'as a work of art' appears to be consistent with an amoral or even immoral way of life, and certainly a selfish one. That is far from what Heidegger means by authenticity. This is how he describes it in *Being and Time*:

> Resoluteness, as *authentic Being-one's-Self*, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is *authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous being with Others.

> (Heidegger 1962, 344[39]; emphasis in original)

The taken-for-granted patterns and norms of a *shared* public context (or 'life-world') of intelligibility are what make everyday actions meaningful. As Guignon explains:

> it is in terms of the plot lines made accessible in the anecdotes, tales, and stories circulating in our public language that we come to see what is at stake in situations, what is worth shooting for, and what courses of action will be appropriate. This rootedness of our personal life stories in the wider drama of our community's history is expressed in the claim that Dasein's "historicity" is embedded in the "co-happening" of a "community, of a people"[40].

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[38] The similarities between the later Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* and the early Heidegger of *Being and Time* (originally published in 1927) have been analysed by Rorty (1993).

[39] Page numbers cited here refer to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*. In my citations, I have retained the German expressions inserted for clarification by the translators. I have removed their references to Heidegger's own footnotes.

[40] Guignon is quoting from Heidegger 1962, 436).

Since life-stories are 'inseparable from the wider text of a shared we-world', authenticity demands 'a fuller and richer form of participation in the public context' (Guignon *op. cit*, 228). However – and crucially – that shared context of the 'they' of public life also contributes to *in*authenticity. It restricts 'the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable' (Heidegger 1962, 239). Conscience requires a readiness to understand the potential of what lies beyond the 'they-self'. Heidegger describes its dynamic thus:

> The common sense of the "they" knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making "mistakes". But in the appeal, the they-self gets called to [angerufen] the ownmost Being-guilty of the Self. Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is *having*-a-conscience as Being-free for one's owmost Being-guilty. "*Understanding the appeal*" means "*wanting to have a conscience*".

(Heidegger 1962, 334)

Heidegger's observation about the manipulability of public rules is relevant to much of what has already been said about rhetoric in a political arena, but it also opens a window into the human, psychic consequences of inauthenticity. An inauthentic life has a warped temporal structure because it becomes absorbed in the demands of the present. It is fragmented into a collection of means-ends strategies that are 'governed by the latest public attitudes about what constitutes success' (Guignon *op. cit.*). Inauthenticity is characterised by falling and forgetting. Guignon describes the condition of 'falling' thus:

> In the ordinary busy-ness of handling daily affairs, Dasein tends to become ensnared in its immediate concerns and to drift along with the taken-for-granted practices of average everydayness. We hide behind social roles, enacting parts in familiar dramas and following the rules of socially approved games. This tendency to fall into mundane activities catches us upon the "turbulence" of life and tears us away from the possibility of taking hold of our existence in a coherent, integrated way.

(Guignon *op. cit.*, 227)

As to 'forgetting', some degree of forgetting is unavoidable if the self is to act in the public world, but such 'first order forgetting' is compounded by a 'second-order forgetting' whereby the forgetting itself is forgotten. Guignon clarifies:

> [...] we become so mired down in ordinary chores that we forget that we are called upon to take a coherent stand in a world where things are genuinely at stake. This self-forgetfulness, paradoxically, tends to aggravate our own self-preoccupation and self-absorption.

> *(Ibid.)*

Heidegger believed that a human being makes its 'self' over the course of a lifetime. Projection and thrownness are central to the self-constituting process. 'Projection' refers to the future-directedness of being; 'thrownness' relates to the embeddedness of being in what is 'ready-to-hand', which pre-defines the possibilities for action. Thus life is a narrative to the extent that

> a person's identity can be grasped only in terms of his or her life story as a whole. [....] [A]ctions in the present are fully intelligible only in terms of their place within the narrative unfolding of the person's life – in terms of what has happened up to this point and where things are headed in general.

> (Guignon *op. cit.*, 225)

Absorption in distracted, fragmented, forgetful everydayness indicates a flight from 'the indefinite certainty of death' (Heidegger 1962, 310). Facing up to death enables one to grasp the temporal continuity and future-directedness of one's own life. Authenticity is focused upon a coherent range of possibilities for defining one's existence:

> It involves taking over the possibilities made accessible by the past and acting in the present in order to accomplish something for the future. Or to rephrase this in the narrative mode, such a life is lived as a coherent story. It is a life that is given focus by its future-directedness [....]

> (Guignon *op. cit.*, 229-30)

Authenticity is inseparable from historicity for Heidegger. The attunement to shared commitments and ideals according to which authentic Dasein interprets itself, and from which it draws its future direction, is rooted in history. He puts it in these terms:

> But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny [Geschick]*. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.

(Heidegger *op. cit.*, 436; emphasis in original)

All of that echoes much that has already been said about the operation of nationalism – and, indeed, of global capitalism. It is appropriate to cite once more Anthony Smith's (1986) insistence that nations and nationalism are rooted in ancient histories and enduring ethnic consciousness. Renan (1990) observes that what is forgotten about the past is as important as what is remembered in building nations and nationalism. Daniel Bell (1993, 185) invokes Heidegger in his presentation of the communitarian argument that 'groups of strangers who share a morally significant history' are essential to the cohesion of society. The emphasis given by social capitalists like Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1993, 2000) to the value of civic *traditions* in sustainable local economic development implicitly echoes those assumptions.

The discomfiting aspects of such explanations are intensified when they are coupled with Heidegger's concept of authentic historicism and the way in which he carried it through into his own life. Heidegger was a Nazi in the 1930s, and never in his life did he publicly express regret for that. As newly elected rector of Freiburg University, he ostentatiously joined the party on 1 May 1933 (Sheehan 1993, 85-86)[41]. Heidegger explained his political engagement with the party in terms of its relevance to his central philosophical concept of historicity. He

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[41] Sheehan notes that in his brief tenure as rector Heidegger was not only an outspoken propagandist for Nazi foreign and domestic policies; he was an active Nazi informer.

saw Nazism's combination of nationalism with a militantly anticommunist 'socialism' under the guidance of a charismatic leader as the only way 'to save and focus local and traditional practices in the face of global technology as exemplified by the Soviet Union and the United States' (Dreyfus 1993, 312).

Viewed from the perspective of his own philosophy, Heidegger's actions might be interpreted as a product both of German traditions and an every-day absorption in the spreading distrust of modernity in Germany in the first decades of the twentieth century. From that same perspective, a nation has as 'fateful' a destiny as the individual who inhabits it. That seems to be the implication of Heidegger's rectoral address, delivered in May 1933. In his gloss of the address, Guignon (1993b, 32) observes that Heidegger speaks of 'the German fate in its most extreme distress' and of the need to recover 'the *beginning* of our spiritual-historical being'. It is part of the 'spiritual mission of the German *Volk*' to 'resolutely submit to this distant command to recapture the greatness of the beginning'. As will become clear in chapter 4, some present-day rhetoric about the Welsh language as the 'unique heritage' of Wales is not devoid of such sentiments.

Heidegger's ideas about language and nation coincide somewhat with those of Saunders Lewis, his contemporary and a founding figure in Welsh-language nationalism. Like Heidegger, Lewis was profoundly anti-modern and undemocratic. Like Heidegger, he put his faith in authoritarian, heroic leadership as a means of achieving a nation's destiny although he did not go quite as far as Heidegger in formally allying himself with fascist causes. It is unsettling that attention is still being paid to Wales' historic destiny at the end of the twentieth century, although it is expressed less in terms of recapturing the greatness of the beginning than of nurturing and protecting that beginning: the Welsh language. One example must suffice. It is another passage taken from *A Culture in Common*, and I shall return to it in the next chapter.

> The demise of the Welsh language would be an incalculable loss to the cultural richness and identity of Wales. Its revitalisation would enrich our cultural life just as cultural revitalisation is essential to give the language new life.
>
> (National Assembly for Wales 2001, online; para. 3.18)

In chapter 2, I noted that there is a conflict of opinion over whether historically-rooted affiliations are inimical to social cohesion and a civic nation (Hollinger 1995) or whether denying them undermines solidarity and common purpose (Kymlicka 1995). Regardless of whether they are beneficial or harmful to individual and social well-being, they are impossible to ignore. In the context of the present study, attention to how the past, present and future is constructed in the utterances of politicians and of artists contributes to a better understanding of how the nation of Wales is being produced and reproduced in and beyond the space that it occupies on a map of the world.

Selection and presentation of materials

This thesis is itself an intertextual narrative, using a battery of syntactic, lexical and pragmatic devices to reinforce its argument. It draws from a variety of sources and modalities - interview transcripts, legal statutes, records of political debates, media reports, policy papers, commercial research, government statistics, publicity literature and press statements, historical accounts and web pages - to tell its story. Throughout this chapter I have emphasised the importance of context in interpreting discursive text. Much of the material collected contributes to an exposition of the context for the thesis and the development of its argument. For reasons of space and coherence, relatively little of it can be subjected to detailed textual analysis.

However, a small number of texts have been selected for scrutiny in chapter 4 as part of an analysis of the development of cultural policy in Wales. First, in the introduction to the chapter, I briefly consider the language used in press materials that supported the launch of Wales Arts-International in 1997 and explain how it positions the arts as an instrument of economic development. Second, I examine extracts from a BBC radio broadcast made by Saunders Lewis in 1962. I assess the significance of the broadcast as a speech act that played an important role in the emergence of a new wave of Welsh language nationalism in the 1960s. Third, short excerpts from documents produced by two bodies concerned with

promoting the Welsh language are compared and contrasted. The documents in question are: 'The Welsh Language: A Vision and Mission for 2000-2005', which was prepared for the National Assembly for Wales by the Welsh Language Board (*Bwrdd Yr Iaith Gymraeg*), a government-sponsored body which was set up under the terms of the Welsh Language Act of 1993; and 'A New Welsh Language Act for a New Century', produced by the Welsh Language Society (*Cymdeithas yrIaith Gymraeg*), a group founded by Welsh language activists in the wake of Saunders Lewis' 1962 broadcast. The Welsh Language *Board* seeks to embed Welsh as an administrative language within institutions. The Welsh Language *Society* wants the Welsh language to be *the* Welsh culture. Fourth, analysis is made of extracts from *A Culture in Common*, which, as previously noted, presents the National Assembly's ten-year vision for the arts in Wales. The extracts in question are drawn from a detailed claim that Wales is both unique and culturally diverse. Fifth, the inconsistent position of the Arts Council of Wales (ACW) on the subject of art as an economic instrument is revealed in a comparison of the recommendations made in a report commissioned by ACW and ACW's own response to it. Finally, I analyse a debate on the Arts Council of Wales held by the National Assembly for Wales in October 2000 and explain how it produces a set of normative statements about community, culture and cultural institutions in Wales.

In chapter 5, the analytical focus shifts from the purely local to the global *in* the local, and from the politician to the musician (although both the artists featured have been active in radial politics). What prompted the decision to concentrate upon the production of music, as opposed to other forms of culture, for the World Wide Web? By the close of the twentieth century, the Internet's facility to distribute music was attracting a great deal of attention from the business press, political think tanks and special advisors to governments, much of it hyperbolic. It seemed also to be fuelling the strategic mergers and takeovers that took place among multinational entertainment corporations in 1999-2000, as well as heavy investment by them in 'dot.com' start-up enterprises. In addition, private legal actions were being taken by or on behalf of them in respect of music copyright piracy in the Internet. The experiences that had been recounted to me by music producers working in the World Wide Web offered a marked juxtaposition to such high profile global corporate manoeuvres.

Once I had made the decision to concentrate upon music, the two narratives selected for detailed examination in chapter 5 were self-selecting. They offer a small organisation perspective on promoting and distributing music in the World Wide Web. However, they also point up features of a wider discourse about nationalism as cultural practice. One of the narrators is embedded in a local-global web of Welsh-language Welsh-ness; the other moved to Wales in the late 1970s; does not speak Welsh, and is quite isolated in both the local and the global contexts in which she works. It should be added that both of them also rebut the stereotype of the trendy young Internet entrepreneur – both of them are middle-aged – and both of them have been involved in producing political music in the past[42].

The question of preparing transcripts for presentation within a wider analytical framework must be addressed. Bourdieu (1999, 1) observes that the act of transcription 'transforms the oral discussion decisively'.   Even a verbatim transcript cannot fully convey the pronunciation, intonation, body language, innuendoes and so on which enrich understanding of what is 'silent' in the spoken word. The presentation of transcriptions in this context becomes an act of rewriting, and a properly reflective rewriting will reconcile two doubly contradictory goals:

> One the one hand, the discussion must provide all the elements necessary to analyze the interviewees' positions objectively and to understand their points of view, and it must accomplish this without setting up the objectivizing distance that reduces the individual to a specimen in a display case. On the other hand, it must adopt a perspective as close as possible to the individual's own without identifying with the *alter ego* (which always remains an object, whether one wants it or not) and turning into the subject of this worldview. And the analyst will never succeed in this enterprise of participant objectification so well as by managing to make self-evident and natural, even given, constructions that are wholly inhabited by critical reflection.

(Bourdieu 1999, 2)

The notation of transcripts and the way in which verbal and non-verbal behaviour is represented depends upon the goals of the research undertaken (see Ochs 1979/1999 for discussion). In some approaches to talk, such as conversation analysis, it is appropriate to

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[42] The names of the two artists who featured in chapter 5 and their web site addresses have been withheld.

indicate features such as false starts and the length of pauses, and to denote the pattern of turn taking and interruptions (Silverman 1993). However, when the spoken word is transcribed strictly verbatim, and when too much nonverbal information is included in the transcripts, the resulting text is often difficult to read. The primary focus of my analysis was not the interaction between the informant and the researcher (although that is not irrelevant), but the self-narrative of the informant. I therefore decided that in the trade-off between verbatim accuracy and readability, the advantage would lie with readability.

I have lightly edited the transcripts by removing false starts where they are not relevant to the analysis. Where a thought trails off and a sentence or phrase is not completed, that is indicated by a row of five points. Punctuation has been used to indicate the speaker's intonation as it would in, say, the script for a play. A brief omission or excision is indicated by a 'three-point' ellipsis, [...], if it is simply part of a sentence. A more substantial 'cut' is indicated either by a 'four-point' ellipsis, [....], or by a brief description of the missing element, italicised to distinguish it from the spoken words. Underscoring indicates some form of stress in pitch or amplitude; a left hand square bracket, [, indicates an interruption by one speaker of the other. The words of the interviewer are rendered in bold font.

Reflections

When I embarked upon this research in the autumn of 1997, my area of interest was quite broad. The potential of the Internet as a digital channel to transport creative work among artists and between artists and audiences was intriguing; so were the political changes emerging in Wales. However, I was finding it difficult to articulate for detailed study specific questions about the relationship between the artists, the technology, territorial place and global space. For some time, I worked inductively, trying to figure out the connections between (i) a global medium, the World Wide Web, about which there was a great deal of hyperbole and relatively little authoritative evidence and (ii) an under-researched and ambiguously defined group, arts and cultural workers, based in (iii) Wales, whose political status was changing as more of the work of government in Britain devolved to a local level.

I was troubled by the paradox that I appeared to be researching a culture whose language I did not speak until I discovered that Welsh was spoken by less than 20 per cent of the population of Wales. I had thought that the number of Welsh speakers was much greater. I was also becoming aware of a divergence of views about the World Wide Web. On the one hand, it was conceived of as an instrument for exchanging data *in* space; on the other it was of itself a space for acting out the 'ritual' communication described by Carey (1989, 43) as being 'directed not toward the extension of messages in space but the maintenance of society in time'. Although I had more sympathy for the former perspective, the fact that the latter perspective was receiving such attention in cultural analyses of the Internet was instructive. It was part of a wider preoccupation in academic theory with the role of space and time, particularly historical time, in the construction of self and social identities. My project started to take shape.

However, Giddens' (1984) observations about 'ontological security' apply as much to a researcher as they do to subjects of a research study. The parameters of the social world that I was investigating shifted markedly while I was researching and writing the thesis. Potentially the most cataclysmic shifts, occurring in the wake of the attacks on America of 11 September 2001, cannot be considered here: their nature and effects are not yet understood. However, a number of smaller (but radical) local and global changes occurred prior to those events.

First, over a period of some twelve to eighteen months between 1999 and 2001, electronic commerce on the Internet boomed; then a lot of it went bust. The information presented in this thesis about music industry mergers, investments and stock market values should be taken as being indicative of short-term conditions rather than as necessarily evidence of established structural changes. Second, moving into local territory, the people of Wales voted (narrowly) to have a National Assembly in September 1997; it started work in the summer of 1999. Not since the rebel parliaments of Owain Glyndwr in the early fifteenth century had Wales had such a forum. It is unsurprising that the institutional landscape of arts and culture was so unstable during the period of my research: people and policies were struggling to embed themselves within it.

Finally, but no doubt related to the second point, a bitter row broke out while I was writing up this thesis after two influential public figures in Wales made derogatory comments about English people and the English language. Early in August 2001, John Elfed Jones, a former head of the Welsh Language Board, and presently advisor to the National Assembly for Wales and chairman of HTV, was reported to the Commission for Racial Equality in Wales for his claims that English-speaking 'migrants' were moving into rural Wales like a human form of foot and mouth disease. Jones made the remarks in an article for the Welsh language magazine *Barn*, and claimed that the 'in-migration' of 'outsiders' helped to inflate local house prices ('Migrants to Wales "move in like foot and mouth"' 2001, online; 'Race body dismisses incitement claim' 2001, online). A few days later, Gwilym ab Ioan was forced to resign from Plaid Cymru's national executive after remarking in an Internet news group that Wales was becoming a 'dumping ground for England's oddballs and misfits' ('Plaid executive resigns in race row' 2001, online). It has not been possible to incorporate those developments into this thesis. However, it should be noted that at the time of writing, the National Assembly is conducting a review of the Welsh language in Wales. Its findings are unlikely to concur with the argument being pursued here.

The row over English 'in-migration' and 'oddballs and misfits' is unsurprising. As Billig (1995) has implied, the ideological work of producing and reproducing nationalism in 'our' homeland, and of categorising the world outside 'our' nation as a collection of other nations, is an ongoing process. But to invoke Benedict Anderson (1991, 6) once more, 'communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'. Any study of a national culture thus entails an investigation of how nationalism operates as a social habit and of the discursive style in which collective and personal national identity is claimed. That is what I have set out to do in chapters 4 and 5.

To summarise, the application of a discourse analytical method is appropriate here for four reasons. First, as noted in chapter 1, it might be inexpedient or impossible for those who share the cultural competences, codes and conventions associated with a particular *habitus* to articulate them directly. Second, the use of 'we' – Sennett's (1998) 'dangerous pronoun' – is instructive in nationalist discourse. The question 'how wide the circle of the "we"?' in Wales was raised at the end of chapter 2. To answer it requires a study of who constitutes whom as

being insiders and outsiders; it must also identify actors who act as bridges between the different groups. The answer has political implications: how embedded are the 'we' in relevant policy-making and administrative institutions? Third, the depiction of nation in time and space is revealing. Analysis of the source of the depiction, the media used, what is remembered, and what is forgotten, all contribute to an understanding of how a national culture is produced and reproduced. Finally, analysis of narrative in text, particularly speech, gives access to how its sources order their understanding of their own actions and those of others in time (past, present and future) and in space (local/national, and global/entrepreneurial).

4 SHAPING WALES

Far and wide through the world, I have heard,
orders for work to adorn that wallstead
were sent to many peoples. And soon it stood there,
finished and ready, in full view,
the hall of halls. Heorot was the name
he had settled on it, whose utterance was law.
Nor did he renege, but doled out rings
and torques at the table. The hall towered,
its gables wide and high and awaiting
a barbarous burning. That doom abided,
but in time it would come: the killer instinct
unleashed among in-laws, the blood-lust rampant.

(Beowulf, trans. Seamus Heaney 1999, lines 75-86)

In November 1997 I attended the formal launch by the Secretary of State for Wales of a new public agency, Wales Arts International, and its accompanying web site. The event took place some two months after the people of Wales had voted to have a National Assembly for Wales and eighteen months before elections to it were due to be held.

Wales Arts International (WAI) was a joint venture by the Arts Council of Wales and the British Council in Wales, and its purpose was to promote Wales' arts overseas. At the launch, speeches were made in English by the Secretary of State, in Welsh by the chairman of the Arts Council of Wales and in one or other of the two languages by some of Wales' artists. I could not understand all of what I heard because the headset that I had been given to receive simultaneous Welsh-English translation did not work. Like around 80 per cent of Wales' population, I do not speak Welsh. The failure of the simultaneous translation technology serves as a metaphor for one of the themes that runs through this chapter: the problematic co-existence of English-language and Welsh-language cultures within the same national space, the battle to embed each of them into the new institutional landscape that was taking shape in Wales, and the challenge of constructing bridges between them.

There is a second theme, however, and it is to do with the commercialisation of culture. That is not simply a question of art being, or becoming, a commodity. It is a matter of how culture – including language - is being used as an ideological instrument in a discourse of local

economic development. Once again, the launch of WAI offers some illumination. At the foot

of the bilingual[43] press-release-cum-letter that had accompanied the invitation to the launch

was a text box that contained the following statement, printed in an italic font, presumably for

emphasis:

> The image of Wales abroad as represented by its artists is one of a distinctive
> individual culture, of a dynamic, self-confident and risk-taking people, a place of
> innovators as well as tradition and a place of richness and diversity. All agencies
> involved in tourism, economic development, employment, trade, industry, inward
> investment, export, and business can benefit from the promotion of this image.
>
> (British Council in Wales and the Arts Council of Wales, publicity material, undated)

The language of difference – adjectives like 'distinctive', 'individual' and 'dynamic' – was

being used to intensify the economic appeal being made. The rich, diverse traditions that are

emphasised in the press material that accompanied the launch are further promoted on the

Wales Arts International website. The site has hardly altered since its launch in 1997[44]. On

the home page, this claim still appears:

> The arts in Wales are rich and diverse. Welsh language and culture have been
> celebrated since pre-Roman times and many of the traditional arts have evolved into
> innovative and contemporary forms, celebrated on the international stage while
> remaining uniquely Welsh in character.
>
> (Wales Arts International web site, home page)

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[43] As noted previously, under the terms of the Welsh Language Act 1993, there is a duty upon public bodies in Wales to treat the English and Welsh languages upon 'the basis of equality' where it is appropriate and 'reasonably practical' to do so.

[44] The web site is bilingual. The Wales Arts International web site is at <http://www.wai.org.uk/home.html> (1 August 2001).

That statement contains at least one misrepresentation. Strictly speaking, there was no *Welsh* language and culture in 'pre-Roman times' - not because there was no social life among the inhabitants of the territory that is now labelled as 'Wales' on a map of the world, but because there was no Wales. Williams (1985) identifies the construction of Offa's Dyke in the late eighth century AD as - literally - a defining moment for Wales and the Welsh people. 'Wales' was marked as such, and then by outsiders, only when Offa, ruler of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Mercia, built a ditch and an earthen wall from the River Dee in the north to the River Severn in the south to keep out the West Briton *weallas* or foreigners (see appendix, map).

The promotion of Wales' 'tradition', 'richness' and 'diversity' to earn an economic premium for business in Wales is part of a wider political discourse about the contribution of art to place-specific brands. It adds a new twist to the phenomenon observed by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983): that national traditions are inventions. The 'invented present' that think-tank-inspired national brands such as 'Cool Britannia' are supposed to project is a mutation of the Hobsbawm-Ranger thesis. The 'unique' values of a place might be invoked both to protect local cultures against the threat of absorption into a supposed global monoculture *and* to exploit the economic potential of the implied 'authenticity'. Rhetoric about such brands implies that they can combine diverse traditions and modern innovations *at the same time as* projecting a recognisable, unique identity for a place. The challenge of accommodating English-language and Welsh-language cultures within a single national space is therefore accentuated by the urge to extract economic value from (purported) national cultural characteristics. It raises once again the question posed by David Hollinger (1995): 'how wide the circle of the "we"'?

In what follows, I apply Hollinger's question to Wales. I answer it by attending to three dimensions of culture in contemporary Wales. First, I account for, and explain the nature of, the institutionalisation of Welsh-language culture since the 1960s. Second, I analyse political rhetoric that purports to reconcile cultural difference within Wales while promoting the Welsh language culture as a 'distinctive selling point' for Wales. Finally, I explain how statements about the values of a new Wales are being forged in debate among politicians about the arts.

In-circling the 'we'

In February 1962, Saunders Lewis, one of the founders of Plaid Cymru and leader of the party from 1926 to 1939, emerged from retirement to broadcast a lecture on BBC radio. In the lecture, *Tynged yr Iaith* (The Fate of the Language), he declared that only 'revolutionary methods' would uphold the Welsh language. The future of the language was more important than self-government, and it alone should form the basis of any viable form of politics or nationalist ideology in Wales (Morgan 1981, 383).

When he made the broadcast, Lewis was anticipating the publication of the results of the 1961 census and what they would reveal about the Welsh language. He spoke thus of his foreboding:

1. I shall presuppose that the figures which will shortly be published will shock and disappoint those of us who consider that Wales without the Welsh language will not be Wales. I shall also presuppose that Welsh will end as a living language, should the present trend continue, about the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Later in the broadcast, he identified the opposition to Welsh as coming not from England but from the Welsh people themselves:

2. Naturally, there would be a few muttered curses from clerks looking for a dictionary and from girl typists who were learning to spell, but the Civil Service has long since learned to accept revolutionary changes in the British Empire as part of the daily routine. The opposition - harsh, vindictive and violent - would come from Wales.

Then, a little later, to underline that the Welsh language must take precedence over self-government:

3. In my opinion, if any kind of self-government for Wales were obtained before the Welsh language was acknowledged and used as an official language in local authority and state administration in the Welsh-speaking parts of our country, then the language would never achieve official status at all, and its demise would be quicker than it will under English rule.

(Lewis 1973, 141; all extracts cited Aitchison and Carter 2000, 43)[45]

Leaving aside the lofty disdain with which Lewis dismissed 'clerks looking for a dictionary' and 'girl typists who were learning to spell' (paragraph 2), those are extracts from a rich and many-layered speech act.

A speech act requires for its realisation the presence of appropriate contextual conditions and interpretative competence among its hearers. There are three active components to such an act, as outlined in chapter three. A *locution* is the utterance of words, morphemes and sentences in some language. An *illocutionary* act is the action performed by the utterance, such as an assertion, a request, a question, an order, a promise or a threat. Illocutionary acts have *perlocutionary* consequences: they affect the actions, thoughts and beliefs of hearers.

With regard to context, Lewis' broadcast perfectly caught the *zeitgeist*. First, although the 'Parliament for Wales' campaign that was founded after the Second World War had floundered in the face of opposition from some prominent figures in the Labour movement, there was growing pressure for a Secretaryship of State for Wales to attend to Wales' economic development needs and the reorganisation of local government. That office was to be created in 1964, some two years after Lewis' broadcast. Second, there was public outrage in Wales over the flooding of Welsh villages to build reservoirs to supply English cities with water, a process which local authorities in Wales were powerless to prevent. Third, Lewis tapped into a growing concern about the viability of the Welsh language in advance of the

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[45] Paragraph numbers added.

publication of the 1961 census, the articulated context for his speech[46]. Finally, nationalism and the linguistic and cultural issues associated with it were to draw great impetus from the social and political revolutions of the 1960s, and particularly from student radicals in Welsh universities. Lewis' call to action was a moment whose time had come.

As a rhetor, Lewis had great credibility among his hearers. He was one of the founders of Plaid Cymru and had served a prison sentence in pursuit of his political aims[47]. Moreover, his listeners were equipped with the requisite knowledge and understanding to interpret and respond to the broadcast not primarily because it was delivered in Welsh but because Lewis constructed within it an audience that shared his anxiety about the future. It comprised 'those of us who consider that Wales without the Welsh language will not be Wales'. *Excluded* from it – from the 'we' - are other people within Wales who, he warns, will offer 'harsh, vindictive and violent' opposition to the proposal that Welsh be used as an official language.

Lewis' broadcast had the illocutionary force of a threat: that the Welsh language was going to die. The locution was constructed using conditional clauses[48], a powerful way of interweaving time, chronology and action which had the effect here of emphasising what must be done – or what complicating action must be undertaken - in order to prevent the undesirable (i.e. threatened) consequences. After all, Lewis (a playwright, among other things) was staging a dramatic narrative about the fate of the language (*tynged yr iaith*). Another such device was his articulation of two 'presuppositions'. One of them was that the figure for Welsh language speakers would be shocking, an assumption that in the event was not justified. It was implicit within Lewis' utterance that the realisation of his second

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[46] Note that when the census was finally published, the state of the language was not quite as dire as Lewis had predicted.

[47] In the spring of 1936, three members of Plaid Cymru, including Saunders Lewis, burned down an RAF bombing school on the coast of north-west Wales (the school having been built in the face of local protest) and then informed the authorities of their responsibility. The transfer of the trial from a local Welsh court to the Old Bailey on the grounds that a Welsh jury would show undue bias, and the imprisonment of the 'three' for nine months in Wormwood Scrubs after they refused to give evidence in English, provided Welsh nationalism with its first martyrs.

[48] in the translation into English.

presupposition – that Welsh would end as a living language by the beginning of the twenty-first century - could be prevented by appropriate action.

As to its perlocutionary effect, Lewis' broadcast did inspire young Welsh-speaking people to action. The subject of one of the case studies presented in chapter 5 was among them. A new Welsh Language Society, *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg*, was founded in the summer of 1962. In the name of the Welsh language, television masts were wrecked, road signs defaced, sit-ins held, and traffic blockaded throughout Wales. Much of the action was non-violent, but not all of it was so. The 'Free Wales Army' - from which Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Language Society dissociated itself - conducted parades and manoeuvres and paid homage to the exploits of the IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein. Death threats were made to Cledwyn Hughes, the Secretary of State for Wales, at the Aberavon *eisteddfod* in 1966. Explosions occurred at pipelines, at tax offices and at other public buildings in Wales. A child had his hands blown off in one of them. Two people died in an attempt to destroy a railway line that would carry the royal family to the investiture of Prince Charles as the Prince of Wales at Caernarfon in 1969. *Meibion Glyndwr* (Sons of Glyndwr) burned scores of cottages bought by 'outsiders' as holiday homes.

Concessions have been made. Welsh eventually became a compulsory part of the school curriculum in Wales, the number of schools delivering the whole curriculum in Welsh has increased, and most government documentation, road signs and other public notices are bilingual. An increasing number of large private companies, particularly retailers, provide signage and notices and conduct some business in Welsh as well as English. Among the Welsh language campaigners' most significant successes has been the development of Welsh language broadcast media that provide platforms for cultural work executed in the medium of Welsh. BBC Radio Cymru was launched in 1978 and, like its English-language counterpart BBC Radio Wales, it broadcasts to the whole of Wales. Almost all Welsh-language television broadcasting in Wales is transmitted via Sianel Pedwar Cymru (Channel 4 Wales, or 'S4C'), which was launched in 1982. Gwynfor Evans, the leader of Plaid Cymru, had threatened to fast to death if a Welsh language television channel was not provided. In 1999, S4C broadcast an average of more than 35 hours a week of Welsh language programmes on its analogue

service[49], with 93 per cent of peak hours (6.30 pm to 10.00 pm) devoted to Welsh language programming (S4C Annual Report 1999). Therefore, most of the peak hours in S4C's schedule are taken up with Welsh language programming, including news. Although S4C carries around 70 per cent of the output of the main UK Channel 4 service, albeit to a different schedule, it does not take the Channel 4 English-language news service. Putnam's (2000) survey of social capital in the USA suggested that TV news viewing was positively associated with civic involvement. People in Wales who do not speak Welsh - the majority population - are effectively deprived of a full public service fourth television channel unless they subscribe to satellite or cable television or are able to pick up a signal for Channel 4 by adjusting their TV aerial, the latter option being confined to some areas of the south-east and the north-east of Wales. Unlike Channel 4, Sianel Pedwar Cymru is not self-supporting, although it is responsible for selling its own advertising time, net revenues from which are ploughed back into the service. It is funded by the UK Treasury, from which it received £77.4 million in 1999. Its commercial activities in 1999 generated an operating profit of £5.868 million (S4C Annual Report 1999).

The achievements of the Welsh language campaign have been many. Yet despite the ubiquity of the Welsh language in public space in Wales, the absolute number of Welsh speakers in Wales continues to decline although the rate of decline has slowed and the number of Welsh speakers in younger age groups has started to increase[50]. The 1991 census records that there were half a million Welsh speakers over three years old, some 18.5 per cent of the population (appendix, table 1). It was the first census that did not ask whether respondents were able to speak English; therefore, the number of monoglot Welsh speakers in Wales is unknown. Among the working age population, the percentage of Welsh speakers was lower than for the population as a whole, at 17.1 per cent of 15 to 24-year-olds, 14.5 per cent of 25 to 44-year-olds and 17.3 per cent of 45 to 64-year-olds.

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[49] Since 1998, S4C has had a digital as well as an analogue service.

[50] Data drawn from 2001 census (unavailable at the time of writing) will no doubt indicate what the effect has been of teaching Welsh to every child between the ages of 5 and 16.

The 1991 census may have undercounted the number of people in Wales who knew some Welsh. A survey carried out by the Welsh Office in 1992 estimated that the number of speakers with some degree of fluency was 930,200. Of these, 467,300 were able to speak some Welsh, 94,900 were fairly fluent, and 368,000 were fluent Welsh-speakers. It might be inferred that it is people from the latter category who use Welsh in everyday communication in Wales. Extrapolations from census data suggest that there are also around 150,000 Welsh speakers in England. In Patagonia, Argentina, it is estimated that there are 1,000 speakers of the language. There are Welsh speakers in various other countries throughout the world, but how many and how fluent they are is not known (Euromosaic 1996, online).

The distribution of Welsh speakers throughout Wales in 1991 is shown in table 2 in the appendix. The percentage of Welsh speakers ranges from 67.3 per cent in Gwynedd in north-west Wales to 2.3 per cent in Monmouthshire on the England-Wales border. However, the figures conceal an increase in speakers *outside* those areas generally regarded as traditionally Welsh-speaking (that is, rural north and west Wales). For example, the number of Welsh speakers in Cardiff in 1991 represented an increase of 79 per cent on the 1951 figure, and 10 per cent of all Welsh-speakers in Wales lived within a 25 mile radius of the capital (Welsh Language Board undated, online). These changes were partly a function of migratory patterns: in-migration to rural areas of Wales by English speakers outpaced a still significant out-migration by Welsh speakers, some of whom moved to urban and suburban south-east Wales where, in selected areas, there was indeed a resurgence in the Welsh language (Aitchison and Carter 2000). Migration was only one factor in the resurgence, however: there were increasing pressures on public organisations, many of them headquartered in Cardiff, to operate bilingually. The major centres of Welsh media production were also based in Cardiff. All of those developments created employment opportunities for Welsh speakers in the capital.

A survey of public attitudes towards the use of the Welsh language undertaken in March and April 2000 for the Welsh Language Board found majority support across Wales (67 per cent)

for use of the Welsh language (Welsh Language Board 2000)[51]. Respondents were also asked about their 'national' identification, and were allowed to choose more than one of the various options (e.g. Welsh and British). While three quarters of respondents indicated that they considered themselves to be Welsh (76 per cent), close to half of the sample regarded themselves as British (51 per cent). Next came European (20 per cent) and English (19 per cent). Welsh speakers (96 per cent Welsh and 29 per cent British) considered themselves to be more Welsh than non-speakers (73 per cent Welsh and 56 per cent British). Welsh identity increased in the younger age groups; perhaps surprisingly, it was also higher in south-east Wales than north-west Wales. That might be a consequence of the job opportunities for Welsh speakers in the Welsh capital; it might also be associated with the high preponderance of social classes D and E in some parts of south-east Wales, for the survey found that Welsh identity was also greater in those groups than it was among other social classes (appendix, table 3). British identity was claimed by a higher proportion of respondents in the east of Wales than in the west; slightly more respondents in the north than in the south reported themselves as being English. The choice of European identity was significantly over 20 per cent only in south-east Wales (27 per cent) and among AB respondents (30 per cent) and 16 – 24 year old Welsh speakers.

As indicated above, when respondents were asked to choose an identity, they were allowed to choose more than one of the various options. The average number chosen was nearly 2 (1.7). That so many respondents chose more than one of the options appears to support Hollinger's (1995) contention that multiple affiliations have more contemporary relevance than fixed 'ethnic' identities. The findings also suggest some difference between social classes in orientation towards place. There was a greater tendency for social classes A and B to identify themselves as European; there was also a greater incidence of Welsh identification among

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[51] Note that the survey was carried out in order to assist the Board in marketing the Welsh language. The research universe was defined as adults over 16 who were resident in Wales; the primary sampling units were sub districts of local authority areas. Eighty interviewing locations throughout Wales were selected at each of which 15 interviews were completed using a quota sampling procedure. The sample was structured 'to provide statistically reliable sub samples for separate analysis in terms of both unitary authority area and Welsh speaking'. Welsh speakers comprised 43 per cent of the achieved sample compared with their actual incidence within the defined universe of 17.5 per cent according to the 1991 census. Because of the disproportionate sampling in terms of area and Welsh speaking, the researchers returned each sample cell to its correct relative importance within the total at tabulation stage. They argue that the resultant weighted sample is representative of Wales as a whole.

social classes D and E. Do the data support Castells' (1996, 415) assertion that in the information age, 'élites are cosmopolitan, people are local'? Perhaps they do. However, there is an elite in Wales that is also very preoccupied with the local and its development.

The 1967 Welsh Language Act recognised the 'equal validity' of Welsh with English for official, governmental and legal purposes; the 1993 Act imposed a duty upon public bodies throughout Wales to treat the English and Welsh languages equally wherever it was appropriate and practical to do so. The 1993 Act established the Welsh Language Board (*Bwrdd Yr Iaith Gymraeg*), the function of which is to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh language. Under the Government of Wales Act 1998, the WLB became answerable to the National Assembly, having previously been accountable to and funded by the Welsh Office.

Here is an excerpt from the introduction to *The Welsh Language: A Vision and Mission for 2000-2005*, which was presented by the WLB to the Post-16 Education and Training Committee of the National Assembly for Wales on 10 November 1999[52].

1. Wales is a bilingual nation. It has two official languages, Welsh and English. In addition, there are smaller communities in Wales who use languages besides these in their everyday lives. The Welsh language has a special place in our history because it is one of the major factors which has made us what we are. It is not the only factor by any means, but few would deny that Welsh has played an important part in the formation of our national identity. As such, it is a part of the heritage of every citizen of Wales, whether they speak Welsh or not: it is something in which we can all take pride.

The audience for this document is the National Assembly, to which the Board is now answerable, but a wider audience – and its agreement with the aims and objectives of the Board - is being implied. The Welsh language has made *us* what *we are*; *few* would deny its

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[52] Paragraph numbers added.

part in forming *our* national identity. This is a rather more inclusive in-circling of the 'we' than Saunders Lewis offered: *we* can *all* take pride in the Welsh language, whether or not *we* speak Welsh. Wales' status as a nation is taken for granted: 'we' have a national identity. Note also the employment of temporality from the outset. The language is part of Wales' heritage: to repeat, it has made us what we are. The past is invoked to explain the present. Far from foreshadowing future anxieties, as in the case of Saunders Lewis' 1962 radio broadcast about the (implied) fate of the Welsh language, the WLB uses the relationship between the past and the present as an argument to *control* the future by language planning. The bureaucratisation of the language is under way, as the next two paragraphs reveal.

2. For most of the world's 6,000 or so languages, the future is not bright: indeed it is predicted that the majority will die or become moribund during the next century. Welsh, on the other hand, is one of the very few minority languages that is expected to buck this trend. One of the main reasons for this is well focused language planning.

3. Through such language planning, Welsh has moved from a sharp decline this century to 'level maintenance'. At its best, language planning has led to Welsh becoming revitalised, to its being used more, more Welsh medium education, more status within institutions, and to its becoming increasingly connected with the economy, especially in the context of sustainable development. There is now a general acceptance in Wales that bilingualism is beneficial for individuals and communities. For individuals, bilingualism provides wider communication opportunities, giving access to two windows on the world by being bicultural, enabling access to two literacies, raising self-esteem, enabling a secure sense of identity, and widening employment opportunities. *For communities, bilingualism provides continuity with the past, cohesiveness for the present, and a source of collaborative endeavour for building the future.*

(Welsh Language Board 1999, 2; emphasis added)

The future is bleak for *other* languages. The Welsh language, however, has benefited from planning: that is, the type of activity that needs to be managed by institutions such as the

WLB. Without such institutions, languages *die*, and death is the greatest existential anxiety of all[53].

Halfway through the third paragraph, the emphasis switches to bilingualism: again, the in-circling is wide. There is a reprise of taken-for-granted assumptions, this time about the benefits of bilingualism. There is a '*general* acceptance' that it is beneficial. Not only that, but its possession alleviates anxieties: it raises self-esteem, enables a secure sense of identity, and widens employment opportunities. In the final sentence, the ideal of bilingualism is deployed to engineer an optimistic rhetorical relationship between continuity with the past, present cohesiveness and future collaboration. Benedict Anderson's emphasis upon the emotional resonance of a vernacular language will be recalled. He intimated that through language 'encountered at mother's knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed' (Anderson 1991, 154). There are shades here too of Heidegger, whose perspective on the intertwined destiny of individuals and of communities was outlined in chapter 3, *viz.*

> if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny [Geschick]*. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects.

> (Heidegger *op. cit.*, 436; emphasis in original)

The implication of the WLB's argument is that collaboration between different linguistic communities will be enhanced by bilingualism. The WLB's 'vision' also has shades of the

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[53] Language planning is not unique to Wales, of course. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, language planning (or linguistic engineering) was required in respect of a number of European languages that were to be used for the first time as the national languages of new nation-states. They include Norwegian, Finnish, Bulgarian and Czech. A similar exercise is under way in respect of Basque, a language spoken in the parts of northern Spain and south-west France. Language planning agrees a standard form for a language that had previously lacked one, and creates new vocabulary for technical subjects (Trask and Mayblin 2000).

answer given by Castells (1997) to the question why language is so important in the definition

of Catalan identity. Castells states:

> Although Catalan nationalists define as a Catalan whoever lives and works in Catalunya, they also add "and wants to be a Catalan." And the sign of "wanting to be" is speaking the language, or trying to (in fact, "trying to" is even better because it is a real sign of willingness to be). Another answer is political: it is the easiest way to expand, and reproduce, the Catalan population without resorting to criteria of territorial sovereignty that would then necessarily collide with the territoriality of the Spanish state. Yet, an additional, more fundamental answer, may be linked to what language represents, as a system of codes, crystallizing historically a cultural configuration that allows for symbolic sharing without worshipping of icons other than those emerging in everyday life's communication.

(Castells 1997, 48-49)

The successful mobilisation of Catalan culture has been noted as a role model for the

economic development of Wales' arts (e.g. by Bryan *et al.* 1998). Its example has also

inspired assertive demands by the Welsh Language Society (WLS), *Cymdeithas yr Iaith*

Gymraeg[54], for a more wide-ranging Welsh Language Act that would give Welsh the status

and recognition that both the Catalan and Basque languages have as national languages within

Spain. The WLS makes its demands 'in order to set a firm foundation for the development of

the Welsh language as a living, national language for the whole of Wales as part of the wider

process of democratising our country' (Welsh Language Society 2000, 3).

The Welsh Language *Society* is firmly opposed to the Welsh Language *Board:* it accuses it of

being a 'quango'. The WLS claims that the 1993 Welsh Language Act effectively

marginalised the Welsh language by obliging each public body in Wales to present its

language scheme to the Board rather than integrating the Welsh language into all aspects of

policy, administration and service provision and making it central to public, and therefore

social, life. The WLS explains its own position thus:

> We do not accept that the language only belongs to the few who gained access to it
> by chance of birth and education but rather that it belongs to all the people of Wales

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[54] The Welsh Language Society is the pressure group that was founded in 1962 after Saunders Lewis made his call to action in defence of the Welsh language.

as a common inheritance and that it is one of the chief attributes of Wales as a country. The aim is not to pander to a minority and push the Welsh language further to one side by some kind of 'Welsh on demand' mentality but to give the language a central place in the lives of Welsh people. We believe in the need to radically change ideas and habits as well as redistributing opportunity and power in society in order to make this a deliberate policy and ultimately a reality. The fight for the Welsh language is therefore part of the wider struggle to create a world that is fairer and more equal.

(Welsh Language Society 2000, 4)

The implication of that is that unlike the WLB, which wants to embed the Welsh language in institutions, the WLS wants to embed the Welsh language in *culture*. For the WLS, language is not a matter of planning; it is a question of ideology and cultural practice. By radically changing *ideas* and *habits*, the language will have 'a central place in the lives of Welsh people'. That implies that not class, but language – the 'common inheritance' of 'all the people of Wales' – is at the centre of its 'struggle to create a world that is fairer and more equal'. The Welsh language 'belongs to all the people of Wales as a common inheritance', yet fewer than 20 per cent of the population of Wales speak it. So who are the *people* of Wales?

Making the difference

When the National Assembly for Wales set out its vision for *A Culture in Common* early in 2001, it considered the arts from a number of perspectives: their role in developing communities and building a learning country, their economic contribution, and their importance in building a national identity for Wales both outside and inside the country (National Assembly for Wales 2001, online). Cultural policy had become a many-genred thing. It broadened the field of activities that fell within its remit; it also – rhetorically, at least - blurred the boundaries between those activities. It mixed genres in another sense: it was a pastiche of aesthetics, education, economics and social policy.

Despite its newly-devolved powers, the National Assembly for Wales was speaking with its (London) master's voice. Shortly after it came to office in May 1997, the New Labour government had underlined the importance of Britain's cultural life to its modernising project. In a speech to the Royal Academy on 22 May 1997, Chris Smith, the new Secretary of State at what was then still the Department of National Heritage, said:

> Enhancing the cultural life of the nation will be at the heart of the new Government's approach. It is not an optional extra for government; it is at the very centre of our mission.

(Smith 1997a, online)

The new cultural policy was presented as a modern alternative to that of the previous Conservative government. Chris Smith parodied Conservative views of national heritage as a myth of 'warm beer and the sound of leather on willow and "old maids" bicycling through the morning country mists to communion' (Smith 1997b). The re-naming of his ministry as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was an indication of how alien those associations were for the new government. New Labour also sought to broaden the definition of what constituted arts and culture and to break down the hierarchical boundaries between different cultural forms and between commercial and subsidised art, hence the remit of the new ministry was much broader than its predecessor.

The role of the arts and culture in the urban regeneration programmes undertaken by some Labour local authorities during the 1980s appears to have influenced the 1997-2001 government, many of whose members had backgrounds in local government. Those associations were betrayed in a preoccupation with building place-specific cultural brands around culturally-diverse 'creative industry' products, as in the much-ridiculed, think-tank-inspired notion of 'Cool Britannia' (Leonard 1997) that preoccupied the government in its first months of office. The national brand was to replace the national heritage. Yet heritage management can be associated with the kind of civic nationalism, public and/or private, that gets national museums, art galleries, theatres and libraries built, supports their running costs, accepts the need for a bureaucracy to administer them, attracts international art and artists, and augments the 'bridging' social capital of a people by exposing them to a cosmopolitan art.

In the final months of its first term in office, New Labour enacted a significant measure in that respect: it abolished museum entry charges.

New Labour in government has proved itself to be rather inept at instigating, developing and managing big new national cultural projects of any kind. Its indecision over the Millennium Dome and the fiasco of a national sports stadium are probably its most infamous failures in the United Kingdom as a whole. Its tentativeness is infectious, and it spread to Wales. At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that Richard Rogers' glorious plans for a building for the National Assembly for Wales will ever be realised after – incredibly – he was sacked by the National Assembly. The Millennium Arts Centre in Cardiff, which will provide a permanent space for the Welsh National Opera and headquarters for other theatre and ballet companies, has been held back for years by political squabbling. When built, it will be magnificent. However, it is now scheduled to be completed at the end 2003, which will make it somewhat post-millenial. Plans for a Graham Sutherland gallery in the beautiful little Cathedral city of St. David's in west Wales have so far come to nothing. Ironically, recently-completed big cultural projects in Wales that were instigated under a Conservative government have been a great popular success. The Millennium sports stadium in Cardiff is a superb edifice that contributes much to the city's already glorious skyline and attracts spectators and audiences from all over the world. The National Botanic Gardens of Wales, the centrepiece of which is a Great Glasshouse, designed by Norman Foster, opened in 2000 and quickly exceeded its visitor expectations.

Such was the wider political context in which the National Assembly for Wales set out its vision for how Wales should be established 'worldwide' through its arts by the year 2010 (National Assembly for Wales 2001). *A Culture in Common* was produced under the aegis of the Assembly's Post-16 Education and Training Committee. A working group of Assembly Members (AMs) - one Plaid Cymru, one Labour and one Conservative - was drawn from the committee. Ceri Sherlock, a theatre director and academic, advised them. Between January and June 2000, the committee consulted almost 200 individuals or organisations. Its massive report was published in January 2001. The authors discuss at extraordinary length the relationship between culture and the arts. A flavour of the argument is reproduced below.

We are custodians, creatures and creators of our culture. Culture is as much about becoming, as being. So it includes a broad range of activities such as sport, heritage, play, leisure, tourism, language, the worlds of our imagination, the creative industries and the arts. A definition of culture as synonymous with the arts is inadequate and can lead to an exclusive interpretation of culture and create barriers in achieving a creative society for the many as opposed to the few.

(National Assembly for Wales 2001, online; para. 2)

A Culture in Common defines the remit of, and recommends policies and priorities for, culture and the arts in Wales. It also indicates what role specific institutions within Wales should play in supporting, monitoring and evaluating the sector. The section analysed below covers paragraphs 3.16-3.23 of the document. The paragraph numbering in the original has been maintained.

In a lengthy section entitled 'Confident Diversity - Positive Distinctiveness', the committee tries to square the circle of distinctiveness in such a way as to include all (or most) of Wales within it. The section opens with a clear statement that Wales is embarking upon a new phase in its history that requires a 'cultural response' to the distinctiveness of the Welsh identity. That opening paragraph was discussed in chapter 3. The next paragraph develops the theme thus:

3.16 What then are the elements of Welsh distinctiveness? First, the very considerable diversity that springs from the complex socio-economic, political and democratic history of our country, which has bequeathed to us a cultural mix that exists nowhere else. Second, there are those cultural phenomena that are particular to Wales, which we and no-one else can contribute to the human family's heritage, and which by virtue of their particularity, merit special attention.

The two answers given to the question asked at the beginning of paragraph 3.16 simply reinforce the assumption implicit in the question itself: Wales is different. First, Wales is

diverse, it has a mixed culture, nowhere else has Wales' particular cultural mix. Second, there is something particular about Wales' culture, 'we' can give something to the world that no-one else has, therefore it deserves special attention. The potentially diversive effect of 'distinctiveness', 'diversity' and 'particularity' is mitigated by the rhetorical pointing to a *collective* distinctiveness - *our* country, bequeathed to *us*, *we* and no-one else - but also the call to membership of a greater family, the human family. *Contra* Hollinger (1995, *op. cit.*), it appears that cultural diversity does not exclude common humanity, at least in Wales.

Claims about the uniqueness of Wales' culture prepare the ground for the ensuing argument. The next two paragraphs together tell a familiar story about the fall and rise of the Welsh language and the threat that it might fall again if sufficient resources are not allocated to it. The images of subordination by complex political and economic forces (i.e. power) seem to position this as a discourse of the oppressed, even though the authors of the statement are secondary legislators with considerable power.

> 3.17 Among these[55], the Welsh language must loom large. It is through the Welsh language, the one among the Celtic family most capable of revitalisation, that our cultural experience has, until the onset of "language shift" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, overwhelmingly been expressed. Complex political and economic forces led to the subordination, limitation, often denigration and sentimentalisation of Welsh language culture. Yet it has shown great resilience and vitality and the literary renaissance of the twentieth century (to take one example) has been remarkable.

> 3.18 The demise of the Welsh language would be an incalculable loss to the cultural richness and identity of Wales. Its revitalisation would enrich our cultural life just as cultural revitalisation is essential to give the language new life.

Space and time are united by means of archetypal metaphors which conjure up Wales' Celtic roots but, paradoxically, also imply that Welsh must fight with linguistic kin from the 'Celtic

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[55] [cultural phenomena]

family' for the resources required for its survival. The Welsh language 'looms large' among the cultural phenomena that are particular to Wales. As a metaphor, the verb 'loom' speaks of something that is indistinct and may be a mirage, something that is taking shape, something that is impending. The noun 'loom' also has connotations with weaving, perhaps implying that the language is woven into the fabric of Welsh life. The audience is being told a story of the language's oppression, its resilience in the face of adversity, its rebirth and the threat to its health if it is not nurtured. One of the artists who features in chapter 5 uses a similar language of revitalisation to contextualise the work of his recording company. Indeed, the word 'revitalisation' appears three times in paragraphs 3.17-3.18; references to 'vitality', 'renaissance' and 'new life' also reinforce the message that Welsh is a living language. Ever-present, however, is the threat to its life and its identity.

A complex set of tensions is played out across the next four paragraphs, which reach a crescendo in a plea for Wales' diversity to become an example among nations.

3.19 However the powerful and creative reality of English as one of the two main languages of Wales must also be recognised. The cauldron of industrialisation generated Welsh forms of English which have their own vitality and strength. They feature strongly in much of Anglo-Welsh literature. Yet they have been perceived as inferior, as needing to be jettisoned by the upwardly mobile. It is time for "Welsh English" to take its place as a respected, high-status code, and cultural policy has a key role in achieving this.

3.20 Welsh English is of course not a single dialect. And in any case English in all its forms is spoken in Wales, ranging from, say, the Received Standard English or Cockney of migrants to our rural areas, of the dialect of the Little England beyond Wales, to the colourful variations of the northern coastal strip and the softer tones of the Powys border country. They are all part of the cultural mix that is twenty-first century Wales.

3.21 But that is by no means all. The presence of African, Caribbean and Asian communities in Wales is nothing new, but it is growing. What is warmly to be welcomed is the contribution of these communities, particularly in the context of devolution, in playing a vital role in the life of our new and constantly changing

> Wales. In this way, the weave of Welsh cultural life becomes that much the richer and more intricate.
>
> 3.22 There is an exciting opportunity, through cultural policy, to give substance to the notion of Welsh citizenship built on diversity. Thus a strong sense of identity can be compatible with tolerance, nay appreciation, of the strange and different. And thus could Wales aspire to being an example among nations and regions.

Note that this is both a reflexive and a theoretically-informed cultural policy. The reference in paragraph 3.19 to "Welsh English" as 'a respected, high-status code' draws from a tradition in minority language activist movements which concentrates not on political action but with raising 'cultural challenges to the dominant language, to the codes that organize information and shape social practices' (Melucci 1995, 41; see Hourigan 2001 for discussion). However, the paragraphs conceal a predicament. Despite implications to the contrary, Welsh is a minority language in Wales: the majority speak English. If the Welsh language is to receive the attention and resources that its protectors seek for it, it will be necessary to head off claims made on behalf of other 'minority' languages in Wales which might have, or which might come to have, an equivalent significance. There is a further dilemma. English-speaking Welsh people must be included in Wales' historically-rooted 'cultural mix' (which occurred in the 'cauldron of industrialisation' rather than a melting pot), and they must be allowed to share the oppression experienced by the Welsh-speaking Welsh on the grounds that Welsh forms of English have been 'perceived as inferior' (by whom?). The strategy employed here seems to be to divide English-speaking Welsh into groups according to the dialect of English spoken and to render some of them as 'invaders' of rural Wales. Note the intensifier deployed in the sentence: 'Welsh English is *of course* not a single dialect' (paragraph 3.20). Neither is 'Welsh Welsh', but that is not the point at issue here. African, Caribbean and Asian 'communities' are present *in* Wales but Cockneys and people who speak 'Received Standard English' are migrants *to our* rural areas (paragraph 3.21). The 'invaders' are, by implication, from London and the south-east of England, the seat of Britain's imperial power and England's oppression of Wales.

Paragraphs 3.19 to 3.22 culminate in a final hyperbolic flourish in which tolerant, multicultural Wales becomes a shining example of 'citizenship built on diversity' for other nations. Hard upon that, however, follows a coda. The focus switches to precisely how it is that the *Welsh* language (no other!) is to be promoted. One of the committee's recommendations reads thus (the emphases are in the original).

> **3.23** In order to both stimulate and preserve this important aspect of the diversity of Wales, the **Committee believes that bilingualism could be further promoted in the following ways:**
>
> Cultural organisations which receive public funds should, as part of their application for grant, **provide a statement on how they propose to promote the Welsh language. [....]**

Many larger arts organisations in Wales, including those who work in the medium of English, do try to observe Wales' bilingualism in the promotional and educational material that they produce. However, making grants conditional upon a commitment to promote the Welsh language would be an onerous burden for some small arts organisations, particularly in fields like the visual arts or dance. It is paradoxical that such language auditing should be suggested in the light of strong criticism of the Arts Council of Wales elsewhere in the report for imposing onerous reporting regimes upon grant recipients. The language requirement is, nevertheless, a demonstration of the commitment to the Welsh language by a powerful group in Wales and their determination that Wales should be marked or branded by its language. They are assisted by a more general instrumentalism in cultural policy.

For example, *Creative Nation*, a report commissioned by the Arts Council and prepared by an economic development consultancy, recommends a framework for accessing European funding to-develop the arts and culture in Wales. It suggests that one of the ways of managing the unpredictability of markets for cultural products is 'to build a strong implicit and explicit brand identity for Welsh cultural products which allow them to transcend the day-to-day vicissitudes of fashion-driven markets' (Arts Council of Wales/Newidiem 2001, 33-34). Although it does not give details of how to build such an identity, it is true to the spirit of

the Single Programming Document (SPD) that presented Wales' plans for economic development and restructuring to the European Commission in 2001. The SPD noted that 82 per cent of Welsh speakers live within the Objective One region. The Welsh language 'is an important factor defining the identity of many parts of the area and underpinning their unique culture', and 'there is concern about its decline in parts of the region as a result of migration and other socio-economic factors'. The document insists that 'the culture of the area and the arts sector with which it is linked [...] are significant assets in relation to the process of drawing in visitors, particularly from overseas' (Objective One Single Programming Document 2000-2006, 22). Elsewhere the programming document argues that

> Welsh is a distinctive component of the image and branding of Wales and of Wales's tourism product. The tourism industry already capitalises on the language and the culture most closely associated with it as *a distinctive selling-point* for Wales. Welsh also represents a potential marketing tool for businesses wishing to target markets in Wales, draw attention to a product being from Wales, or demonstrate commitment to local communities.

> (Objective One Single Programming Document 2000-2006, 111; emphasis added)

Although it is reasonable to take account of the importance of the Welsh language in strategies of sustainable local economic development, designating the Welsh language as a tool of economic regeneration *per se* is paradoxical. The Objective One funding was awarded because the designated regions were among the poorest in the European Union. There is a correlation - nothing more than a correlation can be claimed - between the poverty of some of the relevant areas of Wales and the prevalence of spoken Welsh. However, Putnam's (1993) research into regional differences in Italy will be recalled. He suggested that the least civic areas, and also the poorest, were the more traditional southern villages that suffered from a dearth of associations with the outside world. Encouraging the Welsh language might be an effective means of developing 'bonding' social capital; it seems that it can fund the

accumulation of 'bridging' social capital only if it becomes a branding tool that draws in visitors[56] from outside or presents an image of Wales to the world.

Taking its cue from the SPD, *Creative Nation* argues that culture 'has the potential to perform a number of vital economic roles'. It identifies them as:

Generating employment and innovation, creating sustainable jobs, often in areas where few other opportunities are available, while stimulating creativity and enterprise in other business sectors.

Promoting social cohesion through widening community access to the arts, and improving personal and community self-confidence.

Reinforcing our international profile by defining Wales as a creative nation noted for its excellence, innovation and breadth of imagination.

(Arts Council of Wales/Newidiem 2001, 10)

Perhaps the tide is turning against such thinking, or at least those affected by it are beginning to understand its rules. The Arts Council of Wales sent the framework document out for consultation with a covering paper which suggested that 'the completed report [i.e. *Creative Nation*] goes much further than envisaged in the original brief and offers a much wider definition and analysis of culture than the arts'. It is also quite critical of the report's economistic perspective. It states:

The approach of the report is centred on an economic and demand driven analysis of the cultural sector. Although ACW recognises that the sector must embrace the language and thinking of the economy to ensure access to the considerable funds available for economic development and to educate and highlight the importance of the cultural sector in the economy to the policy makers *[sic]*. We recognise that some of the comments contained in the report do not reflect the wider vision or view of the

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[56] Note that the emphasis is upon attracting visitors, not permanent incomers.

Arts. More specifically ACW recognises that creative endeavour is often not demand driven and that the process of creativity involves both developing the product and developing the market base (support for art and development of an audience).

Much of the work has been taken from an academic review of the current understanding of what culture is.

(Arts Council of Wales Planning Division, undated)

Creative Nation uses the language of networks, envisioning 'creative clusters', 'cultural intermediaries' and 'cultural entrepreneurs' who, it suggests, are 'overlooked by arts administrators' (Arts Council of Wales/Newidiem 2001, 36). It also shares some of the assumptions of social capital, suggesting that 'in creating the basis for shared vision, values and expectations, culture can help build the social bonds of reciprocity and mutual trust which allow people to share ideas, information and risk with relative ease' (*ibid.*, 39). Perhaps that is what gives the Council a clue that 'the work has been taken from an academic review of the current understanding of what culture is', an observation which seems to have a negative resonance for the writer of the covering paper. The Council no doubt resists the implicit challenge within *Creative Nation* to its own *modus operandi*. After all, the report was not the first study that it had commissioned into the economic value of the arts and the most appropriate means of exploiting European funding (see chapter 3 for discussion). *Creative Nation's* observation that the arts play a role in '[R]einforcing our international profile by defining Wales as a creative nation noted for its excellence, innovation and breadth of imagination' is also familiar. It is almost identical with the claims made by Wales Arts International, an initiative of which the Arts Council of Wales is a co-sponsor, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

The behaviour of the Arts Council of Wales complex and contradictory. Sometimes, it seeks to exploit the economic value of the arts in Wales; at others, it seeks to protect them from the economic predations of other agencies. Its own understanding of its role and its domain appears to be unclear: it does not know whether it is responsible for presenting Wales' arts to the world or delivering sustainable cultural development to local communities. The forces

that contribute to such uncertainty are exemplified in a debate that took place in the National Assembly on 12 October 2000 following the resignation of ACW's chief executive. It is that debate, and the background to it, that occupies the final section of this chapter.

Politicians telling tales

The rhetorical priority given to distinctive linguistic and artistic practices in cultural policy for Wales conceals a significant element of *realpolitik* that operates across a range of Assembly business. Some members of the National Assembly want more autonomy and the power to pass primary legislation and to levy taxes; others see the Assembly as an opportunity to deliver development policies that are relevant to Wales and will be sustainable. In either case, it is appropriate for them to emphasise what is unique about Wales, its culture and its institutions. Such interests frame the sustained attack by some politicians in Wales upon the Arts Council of Wales (ACW).

ACW was established with its own Royal Charter in 1994; previously it had been a committee of the Arts Council of Great Britain. It absorbed at that point the three regional Arts Associations within Wales. It also eventually became one of the distributing bodies for National Lottery funds. Criticism of ACW runs through *A Culture in Common*, and the report recommends that a cultural consortium be formed to embrace a number of relevant Assembly-Sponsored Public Bodies (ASPBs) in Wales. The new consortium, *Cymru'n Creu* would include the Wales Tourist Board, the Welsh Development Agency, the National Council for Education and Training in Wales and the Welsh Joint Education Committee, the Sports Council, broadcasters and the Welsh Local Government Association as well as the Arts Council of Wales. The latter would play a 'full part, both within Cymru'n Creu, and independently, as the Assembly's agency for the arts' (National Assembly for Wales 2001, para. 4.22). A few paragraphs later, the report expresses concern about the Royal Charter that applies to the Arts Council:

> We do not feel that the Royal Charter model is appropriate in the new political climate. We believe that an arts agency should be directly accountable to the Assembly as an Assembly Sponsored Public Body, but continue to operate within a similar arms-length principle. We would ask the Assembly Secretary to investigate the implications of effecting this change.
>
> (National Assembly for Wales 2001, paragraph 4.30)

Bodies such as the Arts Council are already subject to a battery of audits and benchmarking regimes that secure their accountability for the funds they disperse and the services that they deliver. Nevertheless, part of the remit of devolved government in the United Kingdom is to integrate the formulation and delivery of policy across a spectrum of activities and to increase the public accountability of the bodies that are engaged in such activities. In that context it is logical for the National Assembly to seek to draw together agencies involved in funding and promoting the arts and to ensure that they are properly accountable. However, the authors of the report appear to be working to an unarticulated agenda: to attack a bureaucratic institution which – as noted in chapter 2 - originated in a post-war, centralised welfare state machine and which distributes funds impersonally, but at arm's length from government. That agenda is chilling. The Arts Council of Wales has few friends, particularly among artists, but it is a significant intermediary in the channel between government and artist. The arm's length principle would not be maintained in Wales under the proposal outlined above. The distance between the government and decisions about arts funding may in practice often be a fiction, but the *principle* is dismantled at the peril of artistic freedom.

The principle was further challenged in January 2000, when the National Assembly announced an 'independent' review of the management of ACW. The review was to be conducted by Richard Wallace, a retired former senior civil servant at the Welsh Office. Concern from inside and outside ACW about decision-making in the organisation had come to a head over its drama strategy, particularly its award of franchises for the provision of Theatre for Young People (TYP) in Wales. The strategy was to reduce the number of Theatre-in-Education companies from eight to five. There was fierce resistance from local government, politicians, artists, and the general public, as well as the threat of legal

challenges. In January 2000, ACW suspended the TYP element of the Drama Strategy, and funding for the existing eight Theatre-in-Education companies was confirmed for three years from April 1 2000. Wallace's report was published by the National Assembly in early September 2000. It recommended a restructuring of ACW in such a way as to foster a culture of openness and partnership within the organisation and between it and the 'arts community'; in particular, it sought a devolution of grant decision making to regional committees of ACW (National Assembly for Wales 2000a). Meanwhile, in March 2000, ACW had commissioned its own internal auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), to undertake a review of the franchise process that it had tried to implement. PWC found that ACW had failed adequately to consult, that the objectives of, and underlying reasons for, the strategy had been unclear, and that that there were no clear or consistent procedures in place for the competitive franchise award process that had been adopted (ACW press release, 5 October 2000).

Soon afterwards, Joanna Weston, the chief executive of the Council, resigned. Rhodri Morgan, the First Secretary, made a statement to the National Assembly about the Council's affairs on 12 October, and a short debate ensued. Ochs' (1997) insights into the co-production and co-authorship of descriptive and normative narrative messages have contributed to my analysis of that debate as it was reported in the *Official Record* of the Assembly's proceedings[57]. Consideration of its structure borrows from Labov's (1972/1999) approach. The methodological orientation of both Ochs and Labov was discussed in chapter 3.

The debate opened with a statement in English to the Chamber by Rhodri Morgan, the Assembly's (bilingual) First Secretary. He provided an abstract of and orientation (or context) for the construction of the story that was to emerge by outlining three recent developments concerning the Arts Council of Wales. The first was the recent resignation of the Chief Executive of the Arts Council and the appointment of the Council's planning

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[57] The debate lasted for approximately 20 minutes, from around 11.00 am until 11.20 am. The lexical and syntactic features of the debate as speech will have been tidied up by the *Official Record*'s sub-editors prior to its publication. The debate took place in English and Welsh; the *Official Record* translates each contribution into Welsh or English as required. The extracts from the debate reproduced here have been extracted from the English language portions of the record. I indicate in my annotations the language in which the speeches were delivered.

director as acting Chief Executive. The second was the recent publication of the Wallace report, and the detailed action plan being prepared by the Council in response to its recommendations. The third was the publication of the PWC report, as discussed above. Rhodri Morgan ends his statement thus:

1. Nobody doubts the increasingly important impact of arts and culture on our society. The Assembly should ensure that the strategy that underpins such developments is appropriately supported and is delivered effectively. There have been difficulties within the arts in Wales, but I am confident that we are now taking the necessary steps to put the arts back on a firm footing as far as public advocacy and administration are concerned. I am sure that we will have a useful, albeit brief, consideration of this matter today, and I look forward to hearing Members' views.[58]

Note Rhodri Morgan's assertion in paragraph 1 that 'nobody doubts the increasingly important impact of arts and culture on our society', and the manipulation of time and agency by use of active and passive clauses: 'There have been difficulties within the arts in Wales' [in the past, not of our making] but 'we are now taking the necessary steps to put the arts back on a firm footing' [for the future, through our actions].

The next contribution was made in Welsh by Owen John Thomas, the Plaid Cymru Assembly Member (AM) for South Wales Central. Rhodri Morgan's reply to him was in Welsh.

2. **Owen John Thomas:** Plaid Cymru has already welcomed the report. We are pleased to see the suggestion that the decision making process should be devolved so that communities can do what they wish rather than receive orders from Cardiff. We also welcome the suggestion that things should be more transparent and that the Council should be more accountable to the clients that it represents. We also welcome the opinion that the confidence of the cultural community should be regained and strengthened as it does not exist at present. We welcome the opinion that radical changes are needed to release this council's huge potential to strengthen culture and the arts in Wales. We look forward to seeing the Welsh Arts Council making a

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[58] Paragraph numbers have been added.

substantial contribution to the development of cultural tourism that has huge implications for the economy of Wales.

3. **The First Secretary:** I am not sure if there were questions in the statement for me to answer. I think that Owen John Thomas was referring to the Wallace report. He agrees, and I also agree with the report's recommendations. I believe that we all agree on this. I am grateful for his contribution.

Owen John Thomas places great stress upon grass-roots decision making and upon devolution down to the most local level possible. He contrasts it with having to 'receive orders from Cardiff' (paragraph 2). His local 'communities' of place are complemented by a 'cultural community' which presumably transcends these local places. Like other Assembly Members, he appears to have accepted that 'cultural tourism' would benefit Wales. Rhodri Morgan is not going to let him complicate the story by responding to his comments about cultural tourism, but he takes the opportunity to emphasise the consensus that he is trying to shape: 'He agrees, and I also agree with the report's recommendations. I believe that we all agree on this' (paragraph 3).

The next contribution, in English, is from the Conservative AM Jonathan Morgan, who also represents South Wales Central. He was one of the working group of three AMs involved in producing *A Culture in Common.*

4. **Jonathan Morgan:** The Welsh Conservative Party's view is that the Arts Council for Wales, in its present form, has come to the end of its natural life. The Arts Council has lost the confidence of the arts community. Those of us who have been involved in the Assembly's review of arts and culture could not fail to notice the strength of feeling in the arts community about its lack of a working relationship with the personnel and management of the council. The Arts Council as it is presently constituted, with its current structures and personnel, is not the sort of organisation that we need in this new political era. I understand the recommendations of the Wallace report, but I do not believe that merely changing the structures would be the answer. The problems go deeper than that. They relate to the people who currently run the Arts Council and its ethos and outlook. We have consulted our colleagues in Westminster who agree with our position that we need a new cultural agency in Wales. As First Secretary, will

you commit yourself to a new cultural funding agency that can deliver on the Assembly's priorities as will be outlined within the Assembly's arts review, rebuild relationships with the arts community, many of whom view the current management with deep suspicion, and offer a less bureaucratic structure? The recommendations of the Wallace report, as confirmed by officials responding to concerns in the Post-16 Education and Training Committee, will increase the administration costs of the Arts Council. That will not be accepted by the arts community, which wants to see more money spent in grants.

In his speech, Jonathan Morgan uses the phrase 'arts community' four times to attack the Arts Council of Wales. The Arts Council has come to the end of its natural life; it is denoted by soul-less words such as 'personnel', 'management', 'organisation', 'structures' and 'bureaucratic'. By contrast, the 'arts community' has 'strength of *feeling*' about its lack of a 'working *relationship*' with ACW (paragraph 4). Yet Jonathan Morgan challenges the explanation that the Arts Council's shortcomings are due to inappropriate management *structures*. His personal attack on *the people who run* the Council is paradoxical in the context of his demand for an agency with a less bureaucratic (thus less impersonal) structure. It is also disingenuous. The Conservatives want rid of the Arts Council as an institution: it is associated with the welfare statism to which their party is opposed. Note Jonathan Morgan's reference to 'our colleagues in Westminster'. The Conservative party in Wales opposed the setting up of a National Assembly prior to the 1997 referendum and a rhetorical link with the United Kingdom government must be maintained.

Rhodri Morgan's response follows.

5. **The First Secretary:** I go along with a lot, but not all, of your questions or the commitments that you asked me to make. I am not at a stage today to say scrap the Arts Council and start all over again. I would not go that far. There is a common thread between the three developments to which I referred, namely the resignation of the chief executive, the Wallace report into greater openness, more emphasis on better management and better regional delivery mechanisms, and the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report into why people were so angry about the reawarding of the theatre for young people contract. Those three things undoubtedly manifest

much unhappiness with the way that the Arts Council has been run, and a loss of faith by people in the artistic community. That is why a restructuring of the Arts Council is inevitable when you have a new chief executive and have accepted the terms of the Wallace report.

6. I am also considering the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report and its conclusions. It is probably fair to say that every time that the Arts Council makes a decision about the allocation of funds - because the arts by their nature are subjective - those that are not chosen to deliver a service are angry. They ask why you have awarded it to that body over there, because it does things in an old-fashioned way, or in a new-fashioned, trendy way, or whatever, and the body to which you award it, which was not awarded a contract five years earlier, is happy. You cannot satisfy the losers that you have made that award on an objective basis, because the arts by their nature - whether it be the Booker prize or the Nobel prize for literature, or whatever - involve a high degree of subjectivity in decision making. How do you decide these things? It is on a hunch in the end, because there is no real, mathematical formula; it is based on whether you like something better than something else. Therefore, in that area of subjectivity that is inherent in the arts, there will always be a degree of unhappiness, which is why I do not go quite as far as you in saying scrap the Arts Council and start all over again.

The conflict between the personal and the impersonal in the arts is neatly encapsulated by Rhodri Morgan's response to Jonathan Morgan. He suggests that 'the arts by their nature are subjective' and 'involve subjectivity in decision making' (paragraph 6). That, in turn, begs unarticulated questions about taste and cultural capital. Despite Rhodri Morgan's stated reluctance to 'scrap the Arts Council', his own comments imply that the arts council is a contradiction in terms. How can a supposedly indifferent bureaucracy regulate aesthetic difference (or taste)?

The following contribution, by Christine Humphreys, the Liberal Democrat AM for North Wales, is in English although she speaks fluent Welsh. Note how she uses the word 'consultation' over and over again.

7. **Christine Humphreys:** I welcome the statement and the recognition of the contribution of the arts and culture to Welsh life. There is an acceptance in your report that structures need to be changed to reflect the needs of the arts in Wales, and to rebuild confidence in the arts in Wales. I particularly welcome the publication of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report, which I believe is now in the public domain, and its criticism of the lack of consultation in the implementation of the theatre for young people strategy. The report confirms what many of us felt for a long time, that there was not proper consultation; indeed 21 of the 22 local authorities felt that they were not consulted properly.

8. The Pricewaterhouse Coopers report points out that the consultation carried out by the Arts Council did not ask basic, fundamental questions, such as what did young people want, what the views of the specialist theatre practitioners and teachers were, and - an essential question - what resources were available. We are becoming aware of the Arts Council's previous attitude, which was, at best, a mother knows best attitude, and, at worst, a cavalier attitude towards the people that they serve. I believe, as do many people, that it was this Assembly's review of the arts and culture that put in train the process of questioning and bringing a halt to some of the extreme actions of the Arts Council. This has wider implications than just for the Arts Council for Wales. Can you tell me what steps you have taken to ensure that not only the Arts Council for Wales but all other Assembly sponsored public bodies that have a responsibility to this Assembly and to the people of Wales enshrine this Assembly's commitment to openness and accountability, and undertake meaningful consultations with key players when fundamental decisions and changes have to be made?

9. **The First Secretary:** As with Jonathan's speech, I do not agree with some of the words that you used, such as 'cavalier' and 'extreme', but I know what you are talking about. Undoubtedly, there were strong feelings widespread in the artistic community, save for the problem that I mentioned in responding to Jonathan, that you will never make all the customers happy, because in the end you have to say that somebody is getting the contract, and somebody is not. That will give rise to screams of abuse. It does not matter if you are the archangel Gabriel making the dispositions as regards theatre for young people because you will still have people screaming blue murder that they, for some obscure reason, did not get the contract to which they felt they were entitled due to their right way of carrying out a particular cultural project.

10. In all other senses, I agree with what Christine said. It is about openness, transparency, regional delivery and carrying with you the artistic community and the wider public interested in arts, culture and their importance to the future of Wales. They are all important issues that have gone wrong over the past few years. We now have an opportunity, with the arts review, a new Chief Executive, the Wallace report and with digesting the consequences of the report into theatre for young people, to put it right.

The interchange between Christine Humphries and Rhodri Morgan emphasises the key values that the Assembly strives for - accountability, openness, consultation, local delivery of local needs - in contrast to the 'cavalier' and 'extreme' Arts Council of Wales.

In the final paragraph (10) of his response to Christine Humphries, the First Secretary reprises his earlier manipulation of time and agency, but this time he specifies the instruments that are available to assist future action to right past wrongs:

> They are all important issues that have gone wrong over the past few years. We now
> have an opportunity, with the arts review, a new Chief Executive, the Wallace report
> and with digesting the consequences of the report into theatre for young people, to
> put it right.

Rhodri Morgan's even-handed approach serves only to highlight the contrast between the National Assembly and the Arts Council of Wales. He, like other contributors to the debate, has started to contrast the Arts Council with the 'artistic community' (paragraph 9). By now, there is a great deal of repetition taking place in the debate. Contributions to it are being selectively re-shaped by the First Secretary, as when he says: 'I do not agree with some of the words that you used, such as 'cavalier' and 'extreme', but I know what you are talking about.' He distances himself from views that go too far away from the 'story-line' that he has developed; he then uses his own version of what his interlocutor said to reinforce and justify the action that he outlined in his statement to the Assembly at the outset of the debate.

The next speaker, Tom Middlehurst (Labour AM for Alyn and Deeside in north-east Wales) plays an important role in exposing the issue that is at the heart of this debate, the arm's length principle. He had been the Education Secretary in the first Assembly Cabinet appointed by Alun Michael, an appointment that was criticised in some quarters because he is not a

Welsh speaker. It was Tom Middlehurst who commissioned the Wallace report into the Arts Council of Wales, but by the time the debate took place he no longer held a Cabinet post.

11. **Tom Middlehurst:** I do not intend to be a jack-in-the-box Assembly Member, but many of this morning's issues have been of a direct interest to me.

12. Does Rhodri agree that we need to maintain the arm's length principle? Whether we have an arts council that goes by another name is another matter. It is easy this morning to take pot shots at the Arts Council for Wales. The Wallace report gives us that opportunity and the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report confirms the concerns expressed throughout Wales as regards the council's work. It is important, at this stage in the Arts Council's life, to draw a line under that, and recognise that, because of its significant personnel changes, we should send the council some positive messages today to show that we want to move forward on the basis of the Wallace and Pricewaterhouse Coopers reports and, more importantly, on the basis of the arts and culture review, which the Assembly will publish shortly. Due to the significant personnel changes, the fact that the Chair has only been in office for a short time and that we are about to appoint a new chief executive, we should give the council the opportunity to put its house in order.

13. **The First Secretary:** You are right, Tom. It is inevitably open season on the Arts Council for Wales this morning. I hope the council realises that this does not derive from hostility about its future potential to be able to lead, guide and resource the cultural industries of Wales so that we can be legitimately proud of them. It is probably fair to say that, post devolution, the cultural life of Wales is more important than it was before. Inevitably, we feel responsible for trying to ensure that it is as successful as possible, which applies to both subjects raised this morning. Our message is that we hope to see the Arts Council become very alive, strong and able to communicate in an open and transparent way with all the different aspects of culture in Wales and all parts of the country.

Despite his apparent agreement with the question asked by Tom Middlehurst about the arm's length principle – 'You are right, Tom' (paragraph 13) – Rhodri Morgan evades making a clear statement about the principle. He looks forward to a revived Arts Council, but his observation that 'we feel responsible for trying to ensure that it is as successful as possible'

raises the spectre of continued intervention in its affairs. Once again, the First Secretary emphasises the enhanced importance of Wales' cultural life and the responsibility of the Assembly for it.

The final speaker, Cynog Dafis, is Plaid Cymru AM for Mid and West Wales, an area with a high proportion of Welsh speakers. He was also a Member of Parliament from 1992 until 2000. His biography on the National Assembly for Wales web site indicates that he has 'a special interest in bilingual education, the environment and sustainable development'. Presumably, those interests influence his insistence upon the regionalisation of arts provision. Cynog Dafis was Chair of the Committee that published *A Culture in Common* in January 2001. He is being disingenuous when he says that he cannot foresee its contents (paragraph 15, below). He makes his contribution in Welsh.

14. **Cynog Dafis:** I support Tom Middlehurst's comments about looking carefully at what will be said about the arts and culture in the Post-16 Education and Training Committee's report. I cannot foresee the contents of that report.

15. I feel strongly that the work of reforming the Arts Council for Wales should not be left entirely to the council itself. Supervision and external assistance will be required to ensure that the council can carry out the important revisions ahead.

16. There is no reason to believe that a regionalized, devolved pattern would cost more than the present system. Money could be saved if regions were to deal with small applications. That would release whatever our central body will be to take a strategic view of the situation and to be responsible for funding national organisations.

17. Regionalization means that we must consider what is appropriate for it. Our attention has been drawn to literature already. However, it would not be appropriate to regionalize responsibility for supporting authors, unless that the authors in question were particularly local. Literature, therefore, is one field where responsibility must remain central.

Cynog Dafis certainly holds no truck for the arm's length principle: he wants the 'revisions' in the Council to be supervised and externally assisted, by inference by the Assembly (paragraph 15). It is not clear what he means when he says, 'Our attention has been drawn to literature already' (paragraph 17), unless he is referring to the aside by Rhodri Morgan earlier in the debate about the Booker prize or the Nobel prize for literature. In any event, he takes the opportunity to make the point that literature should not be regionalised. There is nothing in what he says to justify why such an exception should be made, although a cynical analyst might suggest that it is connected with the generous support that has always been given to Welsh language literature by the Arts Council of Wales. Rhodri Morgan replies to him in Welsh.

18. **The First Secretary:** Thank you for those supportive words. We look forward keenly to the report by the Committee that Cynog chairs. Perhaps we will be able to take a number of steps forward after hearing the contents of the report.

19. As regards the regionalised aspect, Richard Wallace was formally the chief financial official of the old Welsh Office. I am not sure whether he worked for us during the period of the Assembly itself. Undoubtedly he would have taken a detailed view of the financial aspect and therefore on whether there would be an additional cost if services were broken down to the regionalised level.

20. It is important that we try to move forward and get away from the squabbling. It is not appropriate to try and split the cultural world of Wales between the different political parties. It is not a political matter in that sense. We are all in favour of seeing a much more sumptuous and flourishing life in the cultural world because it would be of benefit to us all in Wales, and also bring credit to the Assembly.

(National Assembly for Wales, 2000b)

Rhodri Morgan closes the debate by placing differences and splits in the past. The emphatic claim that 'we are all' in favour of a sumptuous and flourishing cultural world because it would benefit 'us all' (paragraph 20) summarises a consensus that he has imposed upon the debate throughout.

As a piece of collaborative story-telling by politicians, the debate on the Arts Council was constrained by the standing orders and other procedural practices, including time limitation, that regulate the business of the National Assembly for Wales. It is also mediated by two layers of translation: the first between English and Welsh, and the second between the spoken word and the written word. Despite – or even because of -those constraints, certain themes run through the debate.

Ochs (1997) proposed that collaborative story telling produces messages about truth and morality that contribute to causal explanations in narrative. The message being articulated in the debate about ACW was that past deficiencies in the management structures and personnel of the Council had contributed to over-centralisation and a lack of openness, accountability and consultation. In turn, those characteristics had resulted in unfair decisions being made. Those are not the values of the new Wales. Institutions in the new Wales are accountable, open, they consult and they deliver local needs at local level.

Ochs also suggested that such co-productions might create solidarity in a group. Alternatively, participants might try to alter or re-draft a story line. However, prevailing social norms and the distribution of power among story tellers will influence which stories can be challenged, and by whom. In the case of the ACW debate, partly by virtue of the procedural constraints noted above but also because he is the First Secretary, Rhodri Morgan has control over the story line. Attempts by Jonathan Morgan and Christine Humphreys to steer the narrative away from the solidaristic track are met with gentle rebukes about extreme language as the First Secretary draws the tale to its moral conclusion (paragraph 20), which is that

> We are all in favour of seeing a much more sumptuous and flourishing life in the cultural world because it would be of benefit to us all in Wales, and also bring credit to the Assembly.

The structure of the narrative being constructed in the debate also repays consideration. It will be recalled that Labov (1972/1999, 225) defines narrative as a 'method of recapitulating past

experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred' (*ibid.*, 225). A simple narrative will contain a beginning, a middle and an end as in the sequence of events which is instigated by the Arts Council of Wales' decision to reduce the number of theatre-in-education companies (beginning), followed by widespread complaint (middle) and the decision by ACW to restore the *status quo* (end). The collective story-telling by politicians in the National Assembly constructs a rather more complex narrative that does follow the sequence of abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda that Labov identifies.

As indicated earlier, Rhodri Morgan provides the abstract and orientation for the narrative in the statement which opens the debate. He summarises the story by outlining three recent developments concerning the Arts Council for Wales. He also introduces the main characters in the story – personnel of the Arts Council, Richard Wallace, PriceWaterhouse Cooper and the National Assembly itself – and clarifies its temporal setting by setting the misdeeds of the Arts Council in the past. The complicating action is recounted not only by Rhodri Morgan but is emphasised and repeated by other participants in the debate who speak of ACW's failure to meet local needs in an open and accountable fashion. As the actions of ACW are evaluated during the course of the Assembly debate, the values for which the Assembly stands - openness, consultation, accountability, responsiveness – are reinforced. The story's resolution is revealed before the debate opens. The chief executive of ACW has resigned; the Arts Council is to restructure, or be born again. The coda uttered by Rhodri Morgan to close the debate breaks with narrative time and re-orients the observers (and the participants). They are left looking at a 'more sumptuous and flourishing' future.

Conclusion

Contemporary cultural policy in Britain is articulated in terms of the economic and social uses to which the arts might be put. The blurring of hierarchical boundaries in art enhances cultural diversity, but it also contributes to social fragmentation. In Wales, that process is augmented by a tradition of Welsh nationalism that has tended to express itself in demands

that are articulated in terms of language rights rather than a desire for a separate state, although a desire for greater political autonomy also lies behind such demands.

Welsh language nationalism has been forged by an elite which is largely employed by the state: a narrow social group of university lecturers, teachers and broadcasters who have achieved remarkable success since the 1960s in extending a Welsh language culture into schools, broadcast media and the arts. That elite proves the obverse of Schumpeter's (1942/1976) dictum that capitalism destroys the institutional framework that supports the entrepreneurial classes that feed it. Capitalism failed in Wales in the 1920s, there have as yet been few indigenous sparks to reignite it, and with its failure also died a part of Wales' civic life. However, out of its ashes rose a cultural capitalism, based in the Welsh language. Those who have driven this movement forward have not only ensured the survival of the Welsh language as a cultural practice: they have constructed an institutional apparatus around the language that protects and augments both the language and themselves. They have done so in the name of attacking the centralised state bureaucracies such as the Arts Council of Wales that have traditionally delivered cultural policy. Moreover, the Welsh language itself has become bureaucratised and commodified. Its stewards speak of 'language planning', emphasise its importance in economic development, identify it as a 'distinctive selling point' for Wales and commission market research surveys into attitudes towards it. They have no choice, because that is how they will attract resources for the language, but they are sending out complex and muddled messages that have troubling political implications.

If, as Hollinger (1995) implies, people will choose to affiliate to, or identify with, some 'ethno-racial' group in order to empower themselves or to gain access to resources - including the cultural resources - embedded in, or channelled towards, that group, then Welsh-language nationalism has developed an effective power base. Substantial resources have been allocated to the maintenance and extension of the Welsh language. It is a success story in that, unlike many of the world's other minority languages, it has survived as a living language. Nevertheless, the actual number of Welsh speakers in Wales remains low. The idea that a 'new Wales' might be constructed out of its 'historic' language is a powerful one, but it would exclude the majority English-speaking population.

The question arises whether the cultural capital vested in a small but influential Welsh-speaking *bourgeoisie* in Wales contributes to or militates against the development of a civic nationalism in which all the people of Wales - including other elites, other Welsh speakers, and speakers of languages other than Welsh - might share. To put it another way, supporting Welsh language culture in areas and among groups in which Welsh is widely spoken is undoubtedly a means of building bonding social capital. However, bridging social capital needs to be invested in relationships with 'the other' in Wales and beyond. Artistic freedom is both a condition for and an expression of a strong civic society in which a significant degree of trust and self-confidence prevail. The National Assembly for Wales, in the name of cultural diversity, recommends that 'cultural organisations which receive public funds should, as part of their application for grant, provide a statement on how they propose to promote the Welsh language' (National Assembly for Wales 2001, para. 3.23). Innovative, cosmopolitan art will not be produced in a suspicious, inward-looking society that monitors its artists for their willingness to promote the nation and its language, yet the Assembly has proposed to do just that.

The epigraph to this chapter is drawn from Seamus Heaney's translation of the poem *Beowulf*. In the introduction to his translation, Heaney observes that the poem 'perfectly answers the early modern conception of a work of creative imagination as one in which conflicting realities find accommodation within a new order' (Heaney 1999, xvii). He also observes that Beowulf's 'emotional and imaginative geography' evokes 'no very clear map-sense of the world, more an apprehension of menaced borders, of danger gathering beyond the mere and the marshes' from some other world (*ibid.*, xv). Within those phantasmal boundaries, Heorot is an actual and symbolic refuge: it is a hub of the value system upon which the poem's action turns. In that context, Heorot stands as a metaphor for the Assembly that represents the new nation of Wales and seeks to establish therein the values of openness, consultation, accountability and responsiveness. But will this new nation be destroyed from within by what it excludes? Can English-language and Welsh-language 'Welshness' share the same nationality? If they cannot, Wales will not exist as an actual or a symbolic refuge for the real people who live in it. It will be, at best, a shapeless phantasm of emotional tourism.

5 ONLINE SONGLINES

The leading lawman of Tribe C had the unforgettable name of Cheekybugger Tabagee. An expert tracker in his youth, he had guided prospecting expeditions through the Kimberleys. He now hated every white man and, in thirty years, had not addressed one word to the Spaniards.

Cheekybugger was built on a colossal scale: but he was old, arthritic and covered with the scabs of a skin disease. His legs were useless. He would sit in the half-shade of his humpy and let the dogs lick his sores.

He knew he was dying and it enraged him. One by one, he had watched the young men go, or go to pieces. Soon there would be no one: either to sing the songs or to give blood for ceremonies.

In Aboriginal belief, an unsung land is a dead land: since, if the songs are forgotten, the land itself will die. To allow that to happen was the worst of all possible crimes, and it was with this bitter thought that Cheekybugger decided to pass his songs to the enemy - thereby committing his people to perpetual peace, which, of course, was a far, far graver decision than conniving at perpetual war.

(The Songlines, Bruce Chatwin 1987/1998, 52)

This chapter is concerned with the subjective experiences of Wales-based artists in the use of global information and communication technologies. It is a defence of artistic autonomy insofar as it recognises the personal in creative experience, the intimate in cultural practice and the indefinable in artistic appreciation. It rejects reductionist assumptions that art has only economic and social functions, including the instrumentalist sequestration of art as a means of building individual and collective social capital. That does not mean that artists must (or can) be abstracted from the social, economic and historical conditions in which they work and to which they contribute; nor is it intended to negate the importance of art in improving relationships within communities and between them. But the difference of art and of artists deserves as much respect as any other form of difference.

Most of the chapter is devoted to two case studies of Internet entrepreneurship in the promotion and distribution of minority-interest music. As I explained in chapter 3, over the period October 1997 to December 1998 I interviewed a number of artists about their feelings towards, and experiences of using, the Internet to promote and distribute their work. At that

time, few artists in Wales had their own web sites and only two of my informants were using the Internet deliberately to disintermediate existing distribution channels between themselves and markets for their work. Both of them were working in the music industry. The other artists I spoke to were generally enthusiastic about the potential of the Internet, but they were not at the time of my discussions with them actually taking the same sorts of risks with it.

Nevertheless, the working practices of some of those artists illuminate how the use of new media can break down all sorts of boundaries – between art forms, genres, markets and people – in a different way from the political boundary-blurring discussed in the analysis of cultural policy in chapter 4. Some of the artists are mixing up lifestyles and identities and artforms in computer-mediated space in a way that is reminiscent of the cosmopolitan 'creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed up self' invoked by Waldron (1995, 95) and discussed in chapter 2. Their testimony is used to underpin the discussion in the first section of this chapter about the autonomy of the artist in the contexts both of recent political claims about the social and economic dimensions of multimedia art and of academic literature on the relationship of art and society.

The second section of the chapter provides background to the two case studies and a rationale for the manner of their presentation. The third and fourth sections comprise the case studies themselves.

Multimedia cultural practice

During the first term of Britain's first New Labour government (1997-2001), the multimedia industry was identified as a high-technology pathway to prosperity in the 'Information Society' in Wales (Welsh Office 1997, 1998, Osmond 1998). It was also deemed an appropriate-focus for cultural policy throughout Europe (European Commission 1998), in the United Kingdom as a whole (DCMS 1998) and in Wales (Bryan et al. 1998, National Assembly for Wales 2001). Multimedia software and communication is produced for a range of digital media platforms, including the Internet, CD-ROM, DVD, networked kiosks, interactive television, intranets, touch-screen and point-of-sale displays, extranets, enhanced

music CDs, laptop presentations and infotainment systems. But whatever its form, and however distributed, multimedia production is both a high-technology activity and a cultural practice that relies upon creative input for its content.

Digital media companies most commonly operate as 'micro-businesses' comprising creative partnerships of two to nine people[59]. The British Interactive Multimedia Association (BIMA) estimates that as at September 1998, there were approximately 2,750 such companies in the UK whose primary activity was to design and create content for digital platforms. In addition, there were some 2,000 freelance or sole-trader artists, developers and consultants working in the sector (cited Henning 1998). As those figures suggest, the multimedia industry is characterised by a predominance of very small firms and self-employment: as such, its structure reflects that of both technology-based industry in general (Jones-Evans and Klofsten 1997) and of the artistic and cultural sector across Europe (European Commission 1998). Henning (1998), writing on behalf of the the Digital Media Alliance (DMA)[60], notes that the large software and electronic publishing groups that dominate the global multimedia industry by dint of their financial and brand strength depend upon micro-businesses for innovation and market-responsiveness. The DMA was advocating the encouragement of digital networks and 'ecologies' among multimedia producers, and Henning points to a number of successful collaborative networks spanning the public and private sectors. Her argument implicitly echoes the 'flexible specialisation' thesis of Piore and Sabel (1984) that was discussed in chapter 2 and, like the *Creative Nation* report discussed in chapter 4, it is a discourse of social capitalism.

Creative Nation, which was commissioned by the Arts Council of Wales (ACW) and prepared by an economic development consultancy, recommended a framework for accessing

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[59] The data reproduced here are indicative only. Estimates of the value and size of components of the multimedia industry in the UK were examined, but this brief analysis does not purport to provide a precise measurement of it. As noted in chapter 3, the authors of many recent economic studies of culture have complained about the difficulty of obtaining data. The multimedia sector is relatively new, highly fragmented, and standard industrial and occupational codes tend not to match the activities conducted within it.

[60] The DMA is a cross-industry alliance sponsored by Channel 4 television, PACT (Partnership in Advanced Computing Technologies), the Arts Council of England and the Department of Trade and Industry.

European Commission funding to develop the arts and culture in Wales. As noted in chapter 4, tension was apparent between the authors and the sponsors of the report. The report emphasised the importance of networks, creative clusters, cultural intermediaries and cultural entrepreneurs and it asserted that 'in creating the basis for shared vision, values and expectations, culture can help build the social bonds of reciprocity and mutual trust which allow people to *share ideas, information and risk with relative ease*' (Arts Council of Wales/Newidiem 2001, 36; emphasis added). But ACW's sharp retort to parts of the report bears repeating. The covering paper that ACW included with the document when it sent it out for consultation was critical of the economistic, demand-driven perspective taken by the report's authors. One of its complaints was that '[M]uch of the work has been taken from an academic review of the current understanding of what culture is' (Arts Council of Wales Planning Division, undated).

Certainly, few academics would now subscribe to the condemnation of industrially produced mass (popular) culture that was made by Adorno (e.g. 1938/1991, 1941; Adorno and Horkheimer 1944/1979). Adorno's work has been criticised for failing to take into account the specificities of creativity and to acknowledge the uneven progress of capital valorization of it (Miége 1989). It has also served as a benchmark of elitism in critical theory against which 'claims for a democratic transformation of culture may be secured' (Bernstein 1991, 1). Adorno himself anticipated the sustained critique to which his work would be subjected. He pre-empted the 'controlling movement of postmodernism' in his observation of 'the collapse of the difference between culture and practical life' and its 'false aestheticization of the empirical world' (*ibid.* 10). It was brave, if politically unfashionable, of ACW to criticise an instrumentalist, materialistic perspective on art.

Yet it is difficult to justify the irreducibility of art to a material practice without reinforcing hierarchical and/or alienating distinctions between certain types and forms of art and artist. In chapter 2, I noted the difficulty that some exponents of the constitutive importance of historically particular communities have in suspending their own criteria for valuing 'other' cultures, Charles Taylor (1992) being a case in point. The paradox there is that the assumption of a universalist aesthetics applies a supposedly *im*personal, *in*different valuation to cultural practices and works that are often associated with the development of a

differentiated (i.e. unique) individual or group authenticity. As Bourdieu (1984) implies, it is as if 'pure' aesthetics operates (for those who have access to its expression) as if it were ethically neutral or morally agnostic.

In the previous chapter, I remarked that the National Assembly for Wales' cultural policy was highly theoretically informed. Its preoccupation with the economic and social uses to which the arts might be put suggests that that one influence upon it, directly or indirectly, has been Bourdieu's 'popular aesthetic' based on 'the affirmation of the continuity between art and life, which implies the subordination of form to function' (*ibid.*, 4). Bourdieu counterpoises this popular aesthetic, which takes account of art's functions, with the arbitrary 'pure' aesthetic that separates off art from other aspects of social and practical life. But Bourdieu's more substantive argument concerns the class base of aesthetic preferences and the way in which intellectuals of the dominant class have deployed them to reinforce their own cultural capital. The cultural capital that reproduces the distinction between themselves and the dominated class also reinforces their position *vis-à-vis* the dominant fraction of their own class: those who own economic rather than cultural capital. In this thesis it has been argued that Welsh-speaking intellectuals in Wales have accumulated cultural capital and deployed it to their economic advantage and at a democratic cost to other groups. The privileging of a 'populist aesthetics' does nothing to solve that problem: at best, it simply evades it. Indeed, Janet Wolff (1983, 38) suggests that Bourdieu contributes little to the problem of why art has been accorded autonomy and why the aesthetic has value: he 'fails to answer the question, by refusing to consider it, of the peculiar nature of aesthetic experience'.

Wolff has analysed the relationship between art and society as an historical phenomenon. From the late 18th century, art and aesthetics became conceptually detached from 'society' by the modern processes of specialisation which not only distinguished art and aesthetics from material practices but fixed cultural forms into certain categories and in institutional structures and, perhaps most importantly, hardened value judgements and categorisations about what was art and what was not art. Wolff acknowledges the important contribution that 'sociological approaches' have made towards correcting this tendency in that they comprehend the arts in their social and historical location and as constituted in specific conditions and practices of production and reception. But she warns that 'aesthetic value' is

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irreducible to social, political or ideological co-ordinates and a balance must be struck between denying any essentialist notion of the aesthetic and recognising the specificity of art:

> [T]he critique of reductionism means not only allowing the relative autonomy of art (to develop at its own pace, to play its own part and demonstrate its own effectivity in the historical process [...]) but also contemplating the possibility that 'the aesthetic' has its own irreducible specificity.

> (Wolff 1983, 26)

Elsewhere, Wolff (1990) engages with the validity of categorising cultural critique and cultural practice as 'modern' and/or 'postmodern'. She usefully distinguishes between (i) the philosophical debate about postmodernity and the postmodern condition, which is an epistemological challenge to the grand narratives and universal theories of modernity; and (ii) postmodern*ism* as a cultural practice, which concerns the failure of modern*ism* and 'the commitment to critical, fragmentary, democratic cultural politics'. She notes that the political implications of postmodern philosophy sometimes contradict the potential political effects of practical postmodernism. For example, she fears that 'the refusal of a theoretical position or a fundamental model of analysis (such as the structures of gender inequality in society)' implied in the abandonment of theory or 'grand narratives' damages the feminist political project, although she acknowledges the promise of the cultural practices of postmodernism in the 'guerilla tactics' of 'collage, juxtaposition, re-appropriation of the image, and so on' that might be deployed in engaging with and 'destabilizing' a patriarchal regime (*ibid.*, 91). I made a similar point in chapter 2 about what Wolff calls 'the commitment to radical relativism' in the context of 'difference politics' in general. The valuable illumination of differences within and between groups and individuals and the deconstruction of hegemonic codes, actions and institutions must not be achieved at the cost of establishing a rational and coherent project for social justice.

Frederic Jameson (1998) illustrates the theoretical complexity of such issues when he writes of the *aesthetic* dilemma that is presented by postmodernism. He describes postmodernism as the 'newly emergent social order of late capitalism' whose 'moment' began some time in the second half of the 20th century and whose defining intellectual preoccupation has been with

the 'death of the subject' - or, at least, with the end of individualism and personal identity. The most radical formulation of that preoccupation - the poststructuralist position - rejects the proposition that the individual subject has *ever* been anything more than an ideological construct which is 'merely a philosophical and cultural mystification which sought to persuade people that they 'had' individual subjects and possessed some unique personal identity' (*ibid.*, 6). *That* presents the aesthetic dilemma. As Jameson puts it, 'older modernism' functioned against its society, but

> if the experience and the ideology of the unique self, an experience and ideology which informed the stylistic practice of classical modernism, is over and done with, then it is no longer clear what the artists and writers of the present period are supposed to be doing.

(Jameson 1998, 6-7)

Can the 'logic of late capitalism' identified by Jameson be discerned in the apparently widespread assumption among cultural policy makers that art is an industry (although it is not *only* an industry but also an instrument for overcoming social exclusion and a component in a national brand) and that artists may also be entrepreneurs? That assumption stretches the problem of individual autonomy beyond the domain of art. If the modern artistic subject is dead, then so must be the entrepreneur. The modern notion of an heroic, wilful, Promethean figure who rides the crest of waves of 'creative destruction' in art *and* in economic life can be no more.

The individualism that is often associated with modern artistic creativity sits uneasily with Marxian assumptions about the sociality of economic or artistic action. For example, Scott Lash (1994) accuses aesthetics of having failed to engage with *community*. He complains of 'analysts in the tradition of allegory from Nietzche to Benjamin and Adorno, to Derrida, Rorty and Bauman', whose 'radical individualism' merely replaces a utilitarian individualism with an aesthetic individualism (*ibid.* 144). They offer no method of reaching beyond the 'I' that is increasingly free of communal ties towards a 'we' of community, including the darker, vengeful 'we' of 'ethnic cleansing, of eastern German neo-Nazi skinheads and the nationalist fragmentation of the former USSR' (*ibid.* 111). David Harvey (1990, 15-18) has implied that

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the type of radical individualism referred to by Lash was at the heart of the 'modernist project' in the twentieth century. That project was predicated upon a conviction that a new world could not be created without destroying much that had gone before. Like Lash, Harvey attributes this to Nietzsche: the modernist preoccupation with creative destruction is derived from Nietzsche's conception of the modern as 'nothing more than a vital energy, the will to live and to power, swimming in a sea of disorder, anarchy, destruction, individual alienation, and despair'. The 'artist as individual' embodied that will and had an heroic role to play in bringing about the creative destruction. Harvey notes that for Joseph Schumpeter, entrepreneurs played a similar role in economic change. Schumpeter believed that economic growth was generated by cyclical waves of creative destruction wrought by entrepreneurs who engaged in organisational and technological innovation in order to create new advantage in the face of competition and falling profits.

Kilby (1971, 7), who does not draw the analogy with modernist aesthetics or with Nietzsche, also concludes that 'Schumpeter's economic leaders are individuals, motivated by an atavistic will to power'. His early work on entrepreneurial motivation certainly indicates an assumption of autonomous endeavour. He wrote thus:

> First of all, there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, though not
> necessarily, also a dynasty [....] Then there is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to
> prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of the
> success itself [....] Finally, there is the joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of
> exercising one's energy and ingenuity.

(Schumpeter 1912/1961, 93; cited Burt 1992, 79)

But in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, written thirty years later, Schumpeter was suggesting that individualism and willpower counted for less in environments which had become accustomed to constant economic change. He described the role of the entrepreneur thus:

> the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by
> exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a
> new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply
> of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on [....] This

function does not essentially consist in either inventing anything or otherwise creating the conditions which the enterprise exploits. It consists in getting things done.

(Schumpeter 1976/1942, 132)

Schumpeter was much more engaged in his later work with the social conditions for and consequences of enterprepreneurship. Cooke and Morgan (1998, 196) have suggested that two models of innovation - the individualist and the socialised - can be found in his work. Notwithstanding the preoccupation in his earlier writings with the figure of the heroic entrepreneur, they credit him with having produced an outline theory of entrepreneurship upon which 'neo-Schumpeterians' have, since the 1970s, built an approach to innovation which are linked by 'the leitmotiv of associative, co-operative, learning-based creativity occurring through exchange amongst social interlocutors rather than by single, heroic entrepreneurs'. That approach recalls the nature of flexibile specialisation and of social capital investment as a theme in local economic development policy and its contemporary application to multimedia production. I shall return to that theme shortly.

It should be clear by now that modernism is associated with two often derogated dimensions of autonomy: the tendency for certain creative and intellectual processes and practices to become separated from the material world and classified as 'aesthetic'; and the individualism that is often (but in different ways) associated with modern artistic and entrepreneurial creativity[61]. Both those issues are elaborated upon in Raymond Williams' (1977, 1981) Marxist sociology of culture. Williams offers a more richly inflected concept of 'cultural production' than is available in many Marxist analyses – or, indeed, in Marx himself who was working 'both with and beyond the categories of bourgeois political economy' and could not conceive of art as a productive force because the labour entailed in it did not reproduce capital (Williams 1977, 94). Equally, his work is notable for integrating art with a wider set of social

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[61] As a good 'specialising' modernist, Schumpeter had no doubt that art and economics were separate fields of endeavour: the arts should be excepted from the general rule of what constitutes 'entrepreneurial leadership' (Schumpeter 1949, 254).

processes and practices. In that sense, Williams complements communitarian theories that speak to the constitutive force of cultural tradition and economic sociologies that insist upon the social embeddedness of economic action. Prominent examples of such work were discussed in chapter 2. But in integrating art into everyday life, and despite his best endeavours, Williams also risks reducing it. In chapter 2, I indicated that analysis of cultural politics could not be detached from its economic context. At the risk of being accused of the kind of essentialism that Bourdieu (1984) associates with arbitrary aesthetic judgments, I should add that wholly to *submerge* art in the material world deprives artists and audiences of metaphysical or spiritual experiences which are not only important to their own way of being in the world but connect them to a plane of common humanity. That is far from Williams' intention, for he himself was preoccupied with the potential for human creativity and self-creation in Marxism and its realisation in art; indeed, Wolff (1983) writes approvingly of Williams' contribution to the tendency against reducing 'aesthetic value' to social, political or ideological contingencies.

In *Marxism and Literature* (1977), Williams attributes the differentiation of and within art and aesthetics not only to modern capitalism but also to romantic and socialist responses to it. Romanticism ratified certain artistic forms and practices as a quasi-metaphysical means of authentic inner development, distinguishing them from the superficial and artificial properties of a universal and impersonal 'civilisation'; traditional Marxist formulations of culture as 'intellectual life' and 'the arts' reduced them to a 'superstructural' status in which they merely *reflected* (and in some versions mediated or distorted) the material base by which they were determined. As a result, 'the full possibilities of the concept of culture as a constitutive social process, creating specific and different 'ways of life', which could have been remarkably deepened by the emphasis on a material social process, were for a long time missed' (Williams 1977, 19).

For Williams, the Gramscian version of hegemony best captures the complex and dynamic processes, practical relations and sometimes inarticulate and unsystematic forms of culture as a *signifying practice* through which 'a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored' (Williams 1981, 13); it also produces a profound and active sense of revolutionary activity as 'alternative hegemomy' arising from the practical connection of

different forms of struggle that might not be recognisably or primarily political and economic. Moreover, cultural activity becomes transformed both as tradition and as practice. Williams explains it thus:

> Cultural work and activity are not now, in any ordinary sense, a superstructure: not only because of the depth and thoroughness at which any cultural hegemony is lived, but because cultural tradition and ·practice are seen as much more than superstructural expressions – reflections, mediations, or typifications – of a formed social and economic structure. On the contrary, they are among the basic processes of the formation itself and, further, related to a much wider area of reality than the abstractions of 'social' and 'economic' experience.

> (Williams 1977, 111)

The figure of the 'author' can only be conceived in that context. What Williams describes as the characteristically bourgeois concept of the individual author merely counterpoises the private individual with society. But at the other extreme, in some versions and applications of Marxism, the reciprocal and dialectical relationship between individual and society has been deformed into a 'collective' that denies (or would repress) the specificity of the author. After Lucien Goldmann, Williams implies that the terrible practical consequences of that type of collectivism can be overcome by a 'trans-individual' collectivism in which authorship is conceptualised as a range of relationships and responses that are situationally contingent but do not deny individual specificity.

Nevertheless, Williams' dismissal of the 'private individual' as a bourgeois abstraction *is* problematic. It is notable that Wolff (1990) offers an alternative perspective on privacy when she analyses the exclusionary effect upon women writers and artists of the displacement of experience from the private to the public sphere in modernity. That perspective throws into relief Williams' dismissal of the private, for it is *also* a negation of the intimate. As such, it implies a methodological sanction against hermeneutic empirical engagement with the personal experiences of artists. To undertake such an exercise by no means abstracts artists from the social conditions in which they work and to which they contribute; indeed, it can illuminate the complexes and contradictions within and between artists, the self-concept of artists in relation to market and non-market institutions and their propensity to work communicatively and collaboratively with others. The testimony of the two artists to whom

most of this chapter is devoted includes details of how communication and collaboration have been used in the construction or attempted construction of the 'alternative hegemonies' of which Williams writes; it also gives an insight into the social conditions and personal consequences of their achievement and non-achievement.

Williams makes a detailed historical analysis of cultural production in *Culture* (1981). He points to the danger of abstracting too much from the complexity and variability of 'real' social relations by making generalisations about the culture associated with particular epochs or places or art forms. He suggests that their ambiguity can only be captured by considering the relationship of cultural producers not only to recognisable social institutions but also in terms of the formations in which producers organise themselves and the cultural 'movements' that signify the mutable positioning of art and cultural producers in relation to society. Thus the modern notion of the artist 'as free creative individual' is qualified by the relationship between the internal organisation of certain kinds of art and the integration of such ordering within the general social order. Significant breaks from the 'rules' of a particular art or arts – or, conversely, greater formalisation and rigidity – are often related to periods of change or crisis in that relationship. The period covered by the present study is one of change, if not crisis, in a least two respects. First, in Wales, government was devolving to a new National Assembly and the local political environment of the arts was shifting. Second, globally, the convergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs) was facilitating the development of a multimedia industry for which the arts and cultural sector was an important source of content. But are the rules changing?

Part of chapter 4 was devoted to detailing campaigns from the 1960s onwards for the provision of Welsh language media. One effect of such action has been the emergence of small production companies that produce work mainly for Welsh-language media. Arguably, the success of those campaigns has enabled the development of expertise in multimedia production that would not otherwise have been possible, and to that extent it is a vindication of Raymond Williams' (1979) perspective on revolutionary activity as an 'alternative hegemomy' which changes the conditions of and for cultural practice. But the proliferation of such small companies has occurred during a period of general structural change in an industry that increasingly relies upon corporate outsourcing and flexible specialisation. Moreover, the

provision of multimedia content is not confined to those who have familiarity with traditional broadcast media platforms: the proliferation of computing power and access to the Internet and the World Wide Web across the arts and cultural sector has given creative workers from more traditional backgrounds in the performing and visual arts the opportunity to recreate themselves as multimedia artists or even broadcasters.

For example, in the course of my fieldwork, I interviewed the two (one male, one female) founders of and performers in a contemporary dance company that had been working across different art forms throughout its ten-year history[62]. Dance is normally classified as 'live performing art' and not an industry. But the company had already published its own music CD and produced a film, and it intended to produce a CD-Rom of its work for promotional and educational purposes, *de facto* becoming a multimedia·publisher. When I spoke with them, its members were also anticipating the prospect of being able to use a webcam to perform in real time for (or 'broadcast' live to) global Internet audiences.

More significant in the context of a debate about artistic autonomy is that from the outset of the interview, the performers were keen to emphasise that the global human issues in which their work was based were manifested in the performance of personal relationships rather than the production of political messages. During responses to my opening question about the origins and mission of the company, the male performer explained:

> Our work does tend, tends also to be, has evolved into being quite issue based. And that's global, that's also macro as well as micro. And also it goes down to a very personal level rather than being any kind of what would want to be termed agit prop. It's got nothing, it's nothing like that, for example. But it does deal with issues, human relationships.[63]

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[62] The company's (female) administrator was also present at the interview.

[63] As indicated in chapter 3, interview transcripts have been lightly edited. Where a thought trails off and a sentence or phrase is not completed, that is indicated by a row of five points. Punctuation has been used to indicate the speaker's intonation as it would in, say, the script for a play. A brief omission or excision is indicated by a 'three-point' ellipsis, [...], if it is simply part of a sentence. A more substantial 'cut' is indicated either by a 'four-point' ellipsis, [....], or by a brief description of the missing element, italicised to distinguish it from the spoken words. Underscoring indicates some form of stress in pitch or amplitude; a left hand square bracket, [, indicates an interruption by one speaker of the other. The words of the interviewer are rendered in

I then asked them whether, in view of had just been said, there was an issue of reconciling the local and the global in their work. The conversation continued thus:

FEMALE PERFORMER: Well, I think when you're dealing with something which is, has got some depth then it's pertinent to every person in every society - so yes, yes.

ALLARD: And when you, when you take your work globally, you find there's a universality of connection there?

MALE PERFORMER: Yes there is, there has to be for us, for us there has to be. And I think if you're trying to achieve a higher standard in performance work and in theatre, then you have to make, there has to be that connection inherent in the work.

FEMALE PERFORMER: Well, something that's important is the fact that we are movement-based and the work is semi-narrative means that it can translate very well into different cultures without having to get tied up with reams and reams of text, you know, of a specific language. And the fact that the work is *semi*-narrative and not narrative, it means that audience *(sic)* can put their own ideas and interpretations into the work. So they in themselves make it relevant to themselves.

ALLARD: So it's not dependent on, it's not linguistically dependent on, any .....

FEMALE PERFORMER: No.

MALE PERFORMER: It's not linguistic, linguistically independent, but if we use language we're careful what we use, it's quite precise.

ALLARD: Right, okay.

FEMALE PERFORMER: And language can be used for its rhythm and for its texture as well as for the sense .....

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bold font. Some of the people, organisations and venues mentioned by speakers have been removed to preserve anonymity.

MALE PERFORMER: Its musicality as well as its content, yes.

(Interview with author, 20 November 1998)

In chapter 3, I explored different perspectives on the production and co-production of narrative: these performers instantiate the global reach and connectivity of a semi-narrative and non-narrative art which goes beyond language and whose authority, if not author*ship*, is diffused among performers and audience. Their emphasis upon the personal and upon personal relationships also invokes the importance of intimacy in art, an element that is missing in Raymond Williams. They also echo philosophers of language like Heidegger who insist that language is not merely an instrument that we use to represent things or thoughts to ourselves. Heidegger believed that language - and art - produce shared understanding because they define the world[64], but these artists' integration of movement into communication offers a means of overcoming the potentially disastrous association of language and authenticity in Heidegger's historizing.

Another artist I interviewed similarly embraced the 'mixed-up-ness' of contemporary culture. He is part of a two-person independent live art and technology partnership based in a building that houses a number of studios and workshops. The art and technology partnership was founded in 1979 and has consistently used emerging new media to support its exhibitions and collaborative projects, which include the development of a CAD (computer-aided design) system and a robot. As with the dancers, his work was created through interaction. He told me about an important juncture in the work of the partnership.

We changed our work in 1984 into a thing called locomotion which was an enlarged rotating drum ..... about sixteen feet across and it went up to over twenty feet across, and

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[64] In particular, see Heidegger's essay, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (Heidegger 1971, 17-78). The essay, prepared and revised by Heidegger between 1950 and 1956, was based on three lectures originally given in November and December 1936. In it, Heidegger rejected the understanding of art as *mimesis*. Artworks do not just represent or symbolise: they produce shared understanding by holding up (that is, defining) the world.

..... it was like a huge tent that floated on tracks, and we started working inside this with, no longer did we have audiences, we had participants. And so the whole workshop mode of thinking that we were simply sort of co-ordinators and agents provocateurs and so on in this space, and an event would come out of that that was more, that broke down the distinction between observer and participant, you know, the observed.

And we were very interested in those issues from an art-historical perspective rather than physics or, you know, high energy physics from the beginning of the century or whatever. But anyway, a lot of people saw it as connected with that, and so many scientists came to that work, and liked it, and we got invited then a couple years later to be artist fellows at Amsterdam University where we were given fellowship with an amazing andragological institute, which is basically pedagogy but, you know, writ over your entire life kind of thing. So they were interested in exploring how interactions really ..... between different groups, i.e., people giving out funds and people receiving them for instance should happen: the laws of exchange between these. And we found that we had a lot of information about that and a lot of ideas about that kind of issue, and it connected us to a world-wide network of people who were systems-based scientists, social scientists, biologists, non-biologists, engineers, architects, all sorts of people.

(Interview with author, 12 November 1998)

These days, the artist is well networked within his immediate geographical locale – the 'creative quarter' in which his studio is based – and beyond. He is a leading member of a local art and technology network that is funded by the Arts Council and brings together people from a wide range of creative, business and technology backgrounds with visiting speakers from outside the local area. He has also been involved in a number of projects that have resulted in the provision of new studio premises and exhibition space for artists in Cardiff. He is socially, as well as creatively, entrepreneurial: he is, in short, a good social capitalist - although it is unlikely that he would use that term himself.

Crucially, though, this artist demonstrates how art is different from other social activities without being disconnected from them or exclusive. In 1995, the partnership won one of five categories in the Wales Multimedia Innovation Challenge, competing with a number of much larger public and private sector organisations. My informant observed of the award:

That placed us in the limelight with all the other multimedia industries across Wales [....] That was a very strange thing because we have minimal resources and there's just a couple of people in the back garden shed effectively achieving comparative types of impact - in terms of innovation and design and comprehension of what is required - as the health authorities, or the combined effects of various universities, or Splash, which is a big multimedia company, and S4C, a television company. We're competing with them, and we get this award. When we stand up and we speak about it, we speak about it in profoundly different ways. I speak about metaphors and philosophy; they speak about GDP and net interest [....] But I think we're beginning to understand that you've got to have interest in both those sides of things to deal with the modern world. The modern world has ceased to be a place where you can specialise.

(ibid.)

Note the observation that '[T]he modern world has ceased to be a place where you can specialise', a theme which was developed in this artist's comments about the Internet. At the time of our discussion in late 1998 (when it was the exception rather than the rule for any organisation to have a web site) the partnership was using its rather rudimentary site to showcase its work using photographs and brief case studies. But my informant was enthusiastic about the Internet's entrepreneurial potential:

I think all this Internet stuff is going to hugely empower the entrepreneurship of people. I think you can research and connect and transgress boundaries in the way that is truly entrepreneurial. So perhaps this technology makes us all much more entrepreneurial. I think the life of an artist in all of this is becoming hugely changed. Perhaps more people now live more entrepreneurially: they have to retrain several times in their lifetime, they find themselves speaking in different languages with different hats on in different places in the space of one day than they ever had to do before. That's the beginning, isn't it, of entrepreneurial activity?

ALLARD: Do you find that word [*entrepreneurship*] has a positive resonance for you?

Oh, absolutely, yeah, yeah. It's migratory. It loses distinction.

(ibid.)

Another artist was an exemplar of the kind of self-reflexive 'postmodern', deconstructive cultural practice of which Wolff (1990) writes. Originally from north America, he had settled on the south Wales coast. He is a musician, and his (rockabilly) band achieved chart success for some years during the 1980s. He still gets work as a session musician: indeed, when I interviewed him early one bright and bitter winter morning in the coffee bar at Swansea railway station he was on his way to a recording session in London. He had also recently been earning a living teaching web site design on adult education courses. He was using his own web site non-commercially to promote global spiritual awareness, but he was contemplating a future as a web design consultant. He was not distributing or promoting his music on the Internet, but he was using it to collaborate with other bands across the world. He told me how this had come about.

I scoured the Internet for unusual programmes that involved text manipulations. One day, miraculously - I think it was in July, the Damascene conversion - I found this program on some freeware site, Random Verse Lab. I downloaded and used it and thought, 'Oh my God, this is it, this is a cut-up'. I'm from the tradition of Burrows and everything, and postmodern writers, and I have used cut-ups since I was sixteen - with scissors, and then word processors and so on. But this is it, this is my dream random text generator. And that started me working with cut-up again for the first time in ten, fifteen years and then started a whole new trajectory overnight with my creative expression: oh, right, well I can do this, I'll make a web site available. So I made a web site within twenty-four hours and started putting the stuff online. Then I started sending it around the world to people who were interested in similar things, in France and America. Then I found a band in Chicago called [name withheld] who work with cheesy 70s-style Atari music samples and said, 'Do you want to do a collaboration? You're the ideal sound to use for my cut-ups.' They went, 'Okay', so I just sent them the tape with me speaking the cut-ups. They're now sampled.

(Interview with author, 3 December 1998)

This musician, who loves his work to be sampled by other bands, expressed his attitude to Internet copyright in a way that brings out the de-centeredness of ownership, if not authorship, in art:

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In the mundane, old-fashioned days, copyright was a big issue. I'm not saying that I'd be happy if someone lock, stock and barrel lifted my material, but then there would be a debate with myself about who am I who's done this, and do I own it.

(ibid.)

A similar theme was present in the testimony of one further artist, working in a somewhat different context. A textile designer in her own right, she was interested in using the Internet to promote craft products being made at a local sustainability project in Cardiff at which she was a voluntary worker. But her testimony suggests that people involved in such projects might be pursuing different – and sometimes contradictory – goals in other aspects of their lives. My informant wanted to use the project's website to brand and sell the goods produced by participants in her sewing and textile courses by hyperlinked association with the websites of other 'environmentally-friendly' crafts and textiles, although she was unclear about the practical – and particularly the financial - implications of doing that. Interestingly, she was less well disposed towards using the Internet in respect of her own work, as the following exchange between us indicates:

ALLARD: Do you use the Internet at all in your own trade?

I don't yet, no, because they're all ..... And I don't know that I ever would. I would, maybe. I've got my own page through the Yellow Pages, yes, which was a free service that they offered, and I haven't added anything to that yet. But I wouldn't try and sell, other than, well, I kind of advertise on there. But each piece, the fact that they are fine art textiles and each one is unique, I never produce two the same, so it's not an easy thing to sell.

ALLARD: So you think .....?

So I can advertise my services on there, but not an individual product.

ALLARD: Right, okay, that's an interesting point.

I think it's got to be something that's repeatable and easy to look at, easy to describe, and easy for people to understand if they're going to be able to buy it. It's the same as mail order really

(Interview with author 29 October 1998)

That final paragraph provides a neat little discourse about the reproducibility of art in a digital age, and when a little later I asked her about her views on copyright and the Internet she provided another poignant illustration of the complexity of such matters:

The settees that we are sitting on, the images on there [*the screen-printed loose covers*] were taken from sites on the Internet. [*She names some of the web sites*]. Where we found images that we thought were interesting or relevant, we downloaded them, played around with the colours, then we printed them out, and now they're on here. [...] Now I don't know as far as copyright goes, I mean I've got no idea, if I was to put that onto a cushion and we were to sell those cushions, I don't know whether because I've manipulated the image, I mean it is somebody's photograph, but whose photograph I don't know 'cause they don't tell you that, so I haven't got a clue.

After some musing about whether a manipulated photograph lost its original copyright, she added:

So that's why I'm saying about me selling on there. I would be reluctant to put a piece of my art work on there, because I've got no control over who's looking at it or what they are doing with it, which you haven't either if it's in a gallery either, but you're just reaching a much wider audince and a possibility that people will download it and then manipulate it. It's much bigger.

(*Ibid.*)

The tangible presence of the sustainability project at which this artist worked was an Internet café. The project as a whole had been funded partly from the proceeds of a landfill tax administered by the city council, but it also received funding from the Countryside Council

for Wales, the Environment Agency and the Council for the Protection of Rural Wales. It did not campaign on environmental issues but had been established to act as a 'hub' for a network of information-sharing sustainability projects throughout Wales and to develop relationships with similar bodies throughout Britain and the rest of the world. Like the dance company, it put more emphasis upon relationships than upon political didacticism. It was involved in a European-wide education project for bioregions and had partnerships with schools in Greece, Italy and Tenereife. But priority was given to its links with local schools, businesses and community groups and it was associated with another local project which renovated furniture, various types of machinery, electrical equipment and computers. The Internet café acted as a 'hook' to get people into the centre. Located close to a Somali community where there was little youth provision, it was attracting young people, particularly girls, who were logging on to 'chat' with Somali communities across the world. The managers of the centre perceived that connection of the local and the global as a realization of their mission to promote sustainability. But it was also involved in low-technology community projects. For example, soup was prepared in its kitchens for a soup run to nearby rough sleepers.

That project is a good example of the interplay of the local and the global, and of bridging and bonding social capital. But it no longer exists. Does the impermanence, the lack of institutional presence, of such projects not matter? Does their abrupt disappearance – and the transitory nature of their staffing – not contribute further to social insecurity?

One is reminded – again – of Manuel Castells' approach to globalization. His 'cosmoplitanism' is much less sanguine than that of Jeremy Waldron. Like Schumpeter, Castells is preoccupied with 'creative destruction' in his quest for the elusive ethical foundations of enterprise in the 'Information Age'. But he finds no heroic individuals. The basic unit of economic organisation is no longer an individual subject (such as an entrepreneur or an entrepreneurial family) or a collective (such as the capitalist class, the corporation or the state). Instead, 'the unit is the network, made up of a variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as networks adapt to supportive environments and market structures' (1996, 198). Castells asks what 'culture' glues the networks together, and concludes that:

it is a culture of the ephemeral, a culture of each strategic decision, a patchwork of experiences and interests, rather than a charter of rights and obligations. It is a multifaceted, virtual culture [....] It is not a fantasy, it is a material force because it informs, and enforces, powerful economic decisions at every moment in the life of the network. But it does not stay long: it goes into the computer's memory as raw material of past successes and failures. The network enterprise learns to live within this virtual culture. Any attempt at crystallizing the position in the network as a cultural code in a particular time and space sentences the network to obsolescence, since it becomes too rigid for the variable geometry required by informationalism. The "spirit of informationalism" is the culture of "creative destruction" accelerated to the speed of the optoelectronic circuits that process its signals. Schumpeter meets Weber in the cyberspace of the network enterprise.

(Castells 1996, 199)

Two case studies: an introduction

Whether the networks promoted by cultural policy makers, consultants and lobbyists exist in proximate territorial creative quarters or 'virtual' global villages in which distant partners are linked by electronic means, they invoke the type of economic organisation that is funded by individual and collective social capital. In the remainder of this chapter, I am going to explore that 'associational' approach to entrepreneurial and artistic action in relation to the subjective experiences of two artists.

My first subject has lived through, and contributed to, the development of Welsh language nationalism since the 1960s. He is a singer and a businessman whose company has been recording and distributing Welsh language music for over thirty years. The second is an artist who has also been involved in political music-making since the late 1960s. She was distributing music over the Internet, as well as promoting musicians and composers on her web site, long before the Internet's potential as a digital transportation channel for music had attracted widespread attention.

Each of the case studies comprises three subsections. First, I establish the background to the case and explain the circumstances of my interview with the informant. Next, I analyse the talk of each artist in the context of their own careers, of the conditions in which they now find themselves, and also within the framework of this thesis. In each case, I have labelled this second subsection 'Talking about my generation'. In part, the label is a pun, drawn as it is

from the title of a song that was popular in the era in which each artist first participated in both art and politics: that is, the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, it also serves to emphasise the influence of Heidegger upon the analysis here.

In chapter 3, I discussed Heidegger's perspective on authenticity and its historicity, and noted his conviction that

> Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. *Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.*
>
> (Heidegger 1962, 436; emphasis added)

Heidegger's preoccupation with the 'generation' of destiny recalls Raymond Williams' insistence upon 'the possibilities of culture as a constitutive social process, creating specific and different 'ways of life'' (Williams 1977, 19). As previously observed, there are many troubling features to Heidegger's emphasis upon immersion in historically particular 'lifeworlds', but for the moment it is appropriate to note Heidegger's conviction that cultural 'authenticity' is constitutive of, and constituted by, communication.

Heidegger's influence is also present in the final subsection in each case study, 'Rules, expertise and the economy of ties', in which I reflect further upon the understanding that the subjects have of themselves and their relationships with others in the local and global conditions in which they work. For Heidegger, authenticity is inseparable from a shared 'we', but *too much* accommodation with the rules of the 'they' of public life contributes to *in*authenticity. As Heidegger puts it: 'The common sense of the "they" knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them' (*ibid.*, 334). The line between the authentic and the inauthentic would always be a fine one using Heidegger's method of distinguishing between them, but his implication that authenticity depends upon the ability of the 'self' to define and redefine existence beyond the norms of the public world recalls much that has already been said in this thesis about the problematic relationship between freedom, contingency, authenticity, uniqueness and innovation in art.

Artist one: dreaming Wales

Background

Artist one is a prominent figure in Wales' cultural and political life. He is a folk singer, a local councillor and a director of a small company that owns a number of small record labels, multimedia concerns and audio-visual recording facilities. He was a Welsh language activist in the 1960s, and he was briefly imprisoned for his actions at that time. He is not a traditional middle-class Welsh language activist: he is a businessman rather than a teacher, university lecturer or broadcaster. He is more typical of an emerging petit bourgeoisie that owns cultural and craft-based businesses in Wales. In the 1960s, he wrote and performed satirical folk songs about the British state; he also co-founded a record company to produce and distribute the works of Welsh language artists, including himself. The record company survives (as do the songs). In 1995, the most recent year for which figures were available when I prepared for the interview, the company had a turnover of £800,000 and employed 17 people.

This artist is a great social capitalist. His cultural and political actions yielded entrepreneurial consequences: they created the conditions (specifically, market conditions) for further entrepreneurial action by him and others. Since the 1960s, much has been done to ensure that the Welsh language be re-introduced to and preserved in public life in Wales. The Welsh language media for which my informant campaigned have provided a conduit for promoting recorded Welsh-language music, although they have also ended his company's virtual monopoly on providing access to such work. The company is also involved in publishing and distributing sheet music, stimulated by demand from schools that must satisfy the Welsh language requirements of the school curriculum. The area of Wales in which the company is based has benefited from its presence. It creates employment and generates demand for business services, and it is part of a network of Welsh language media producers and cultural tourism operators that has developed in and around the area.

The company has been using the Internet since 1996 as a channel to promote its music and its facilities and, increasingly, as an extension of its mail order business. At the time of the

interview, in October 1997, even to have a web site made my informant something of a pioneer in the music industry and in Wales. The bilingual site (Welsh and English) provided information about a diverse range of Welsh music - folk, rock, choir, classical, easy-listening, ballads, country and folk-dance - and the artists that record for the label. The site gave details of the company's recording studio, duplication and publishing facilities, and it hosted hyperlinks to other music industry and Celtic interest sites. It also hosted the label's back catalogue, although there was no online ordering facility.

This cultural producer knows what he has to do to survive in the global conditions in which his company increasingly operates, even if he does not like the fact that 'the big companies are just mopping up the little ones, and it's happening all over'. He understands that for his company, surviving is a question of 'finding out what the interest of people is, and if people are interested in traditional music, well, the record could have been recorded 30 years ago'. That means keeping a long back catalogue, broadening the portfolio of musical styles, locating interest groups across the world and reaching as many of them as possible. To that end, 'the beauty of the Internet is that it is a medium designed for the individual and the small, niche market and interest group'. In other words, a company like his can serve a need that people have to sample various cultural affiliations. The Welsh language is a way of making a difference and getting noticed in a global market; to some extent it also protects Wales-based cultural producers from global predators.

As to the interview itself, I had written to my informant in September explaining that I was exploring the use being made of the Internet in his industry. I asked him for an hour of his time to discuss this. The letter was followed up with a telephone call about a week later and he agreed to meet me. The interview, which lasted for an hour and a half, took place over lunch in a hotel in north Wales on Friday 3 October 1997, about a fortnight after the devolution referendum that had narrowly approved proposals for a National Assembly for Wales.

Three themes dominated our discussion. First, there was a constant emphasis upon the importance of Welsh language popular culture in the political struggle to ensure the survival of the Welsh language, particularly among successive generations of young people. Second,

the links between Welsh-language artists, the Welsh diaspora that consumes their work, and the Celtic cultures with which Wales is perceived to have a common past were revealed as being psychologically important to those involved in them, regenerative of Welsh culture and economically valuable. Third, a tension between rules, expertise and community in the organisation of culture as an economic instrument betrayed itself.

Talking about my generation

This artist is well used to speaking in public (and to journalists and researchers) about his company and its role in promoting Welsh culture. In the first part of our interview he gave me a fluent and coherent account of the history of his company, its current activities and its plans for the future. It lends itself to analysis in the style of Labov (1972/1999), whose method of analysing how narrators recount and refashion experience was discussed in chapter 3 (and applied to the National Assembly for Wales debate discussed in chapter 4).

It will be recalled that Labov identified the following elements in a developed narrative: abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda. An *abstract* typically comprises one or two clauses at the beginning of a story that summarise or encapsulate it, and enable the narrator to emphasise its point. The *orientation* refers to the way in which narrative elements such as time, place, characters and setting are established or set up at the outset of a story. The presence of *complicating action* is a necessary condition for a narrative to be defined as such. The nature of the action might be conveyed by use of intensifying devices (non-verbal gestures, expressive phonology or repetition), and its significance expressed by comparing events that occurred with events that did not. Disparate events that contribute to the complicating action are often correlated into single accounts, with complications or contradictions in the narrative being smoothed out by the use of explicatives. *Evaluation*, the point of the story, is often rehearsed throughout the narrative, particularly where the point of the story is to place the narrator in a favourable light. The *result or resolution* is the outcome of the chain of events recounted in the narrative; the *coda* marks a shift away from the temporal order of the story.

I began the interview by asking my informant to talk about the background to his company and the relevance of the Internet to his work. He immediately provided an abstract of, and orientation for, his subsequent account. Note in paragraphs 1-3 below his ability to place it both within a local, Welsh context – 'Welsh language and culture' – and as part of a developing global popular music industry and the technological developments associated with that.

1. Well, I'd have to put it in the context of the Welsh language and culture - that is, a so-called small language, or minority language - because this is very relevant to the pop industry especially. We started the company in 1969 very much as part of the general resurgence of Welsh awareness, but also - and this coming from the young generation then - an awareness of the huge developments in the recording industry. Now, there was a recording industry in Wales, but it was technologically very undeveloped, it was very simplistic, it's a question of a microphone on the table and you sang round it, and ..... hoping that it would pick up the guitar and the voice.

2. **ALLARD: A bit like this (*indicating the microphone on the table*)?**

3. Er, it was very much like this. And most people were quite happy with that, you know, I mean, because most of the records were of a solo singer or a choir or a party, so it was ..... I mean, if you like, the audience was not very sophisticated. But on the other hand, the standard of recording, even with very elementary methods, the standard of recording was very high. But, of course, with the advent of pop music and the need for multi-track recording, the whole recording industry was transformed, especially by the Beatles and George Martin and that period in the '60s. So there was a growing awareness amongst the young people in Wales, if we are to have Welsh records they have to stand up to comparison with what is happening with the wide world.

For Labov, narrative matches 'a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred' (*ibid.*, 225). Here, the story that the narrator is going to tell is '*very* relevant to the pop industry *especially*'. It began as part of a general *resurgence* (rebirth) of Welsh awareness (paragraph 1), but also a particular awareness on the part of his generation of Wales' place in the 'wide world' (paragraph 3). The sentiments of *A Culture in*

Common will be recalled from the previous chapter. Much was made there of the resurgence of the Welsh as a living language, conveyed in terms of its 'revitalisation', 'vitality', 'renaissance' and 'new life'. In the speech of this artist, it is coupled with the actions of a 'young generation' (paragraph 1). The Welsh culture of this generation was not to be 'undeveloped' or 'simplistic' (*ibid.*). He continues:

4. So that is the raison d'être, if you like, behind setting up a new company because there were several labels like (*he lists a number of Welsh record labels*) had finished more or less. But, you see, there was a tradition of Welsh recording but we set up in '69 and deliberately went for a more sophisticated and a more expensive method of recording. Well, so that was ..... And so the beginning of our company was very much to record the music of the young people. Very often that was politically-orientated, they were original songs expressing the view of the singer-songwriters of the '60s and early '70s, our views on Wales, the language, the need for more autonomy and political freedom, but also touching on the popular subjects of the day in the Western world. There's war in Vietnam, the human rights issue, civil rights issue in north America, this general awareness that something had to be done to put things right. And the young people then, I think, in the '60s, thought that anything was possible and it was good to express ourselves. So it grew out of that.

The description that the narrator gave in paragraph 3 of music recording in Wales prior to its (implied) professionalisation by his generation makes it sound rather like the type of participative community culture that policy-makers are so keen to develop. In view of his later strong defence of community culture, that is ironic, as is the positioning of his modern company against what had gone before (paragraph 4). He explained that 'there was a tradition of Welsh recording *but* we set up in '69 and *deliberately* went for a *more* sophisticated and a *more* expensive method of recording'. By this stage, he is already starting to evaluate the story: '*So* that is the raison d'être, *if* you like, behind setting up a new company *because* there were several labels [...] had finished more or less'. He also reprises the theme of the local and, if not the global, then the 'Western world' that he introduced in his opening remarks. The need for more autonomy and political freedom for Wales are linked with the war in Vietnam and human and civil rights in north America.

The final two sentences in paragraph 4 mark a caesura in the narrative which prepares the listener for the complicating action that occupies the next stage of the story: 'the young people *then*, I think, in the '60s, thought that anything was possible and it was good to express ourselves. *So it grew out of that*'. The narrator includes 'ourselves' in the category 'the young people then'. However, the belief that 'anything was possible' is placed firmly in the past: '*then*', '*in the '60s*'. Maturity, it is implied, requires a recognition that that is not so. To put it another way, he complies with Heidegger's notion of people understanding themselves as being embedded in a world where not all things are possible.

He continues, without intervention from me, as follows:

5. But over the '70s and into the '80s our company grew to be the main Welsh recording company and expanded into all the fields of Welsh music: choirs, obviously, and classical singing, traditional singing, hymn singing, and instrumentals. So everything, we now record everything which is recordable. And of course things have changed in the meantime. At that time, in the early '70s, if you wanted to hear original and contemporary Welsh music, you had to buy a record or a cassette. Usually a record then, of course. There wasn't much on television and there wasn't much on radio. But of course during the '70s and '80s we had this reawakening and development of the Welsh media in general.

The narrator began his story by associating his company with the advances in recording technologies in the 1960s and his desire to ensure that Welsh music stood comparison with what was happening in the 'wide world'. The very same technological advances challenged the company. Note the 'but' at the beginning of paragraph 5, which signals the introduction of those complications. Note also the correlative 'and' which links two clauses thus: 'our company grew to be the main Welsh recording company *and* expanded into all *the fields* of Welsh music'. That is, after all, how the company has survived. He lists those fields that constitute Welsh music, and emphasises the presence of his company in all of them: '*everything*, we now record *everything* which is recordable'. For this producer, the application of technology in global creative industry makes it both possible and necessary to

increase the variety – to mix the genres - of what is produced. Social and economic life is not constrained so much by limited possibilities but by limitless potential and infinite choice.

The narrator continued with his story, still uninterrupted by me.

6. And in '79, I remember, I went to America in '79 after the referendum of '79. I remember having great difficulty in explaining in America why people should refuse the right to have more power over their own lives, which was a difficult job. But I remember coming back and driving up from Cardiff to Caernarfon on a Sunday and realising that I was listening to, on Welsh, to Welsh programmes all the way. And what had happened during my few weeks away was that Radio Cymru had been set up in a big way and suddenly instead of having half an hour here and there or at inconvenient times, you had this whole channel, and all day that Sunday was in Welsh. So obviously a lot of use was being made of Welsh recording and Welsh songs. So during the '80s you had the choice. Of course, S4C was set up so if you wanted to listen to Welsh music you had the option of radio, television or records.

In paragraph 6, the narrator is 'remembering' three sets of events and combining them into a coherent sequence: he remembers going to America after the referendum of 1979, he remembers how difficult it was to explain why people should refuse the right to have more power over their own lives, and he remembers coming back to Wales and realising that there was now a Welsh language radio station. The political logic of people's right to have more power over their own lives is further reinforced by reference to a language of choice and options that is customarily associated with markets. Compared with the 'inconvenient times' at which Welsh-medium broadcasting had previously been available, the new services meant that 'during the '80s you had the *choice*' and 'you had the *option* of radio, television or records'. When else but during the 1980s, the decade that restraint forgot, would this have happened?

The next paragraph (7, below) goes on to emphasise the ever-increasing variety of media and formats and their effect upon the range of goods offered by the narrator:

7. And so during the '80s we saw a sort of evening out of the Welsh record industry because now we were sharing with all the other media. So the big sellers, you know, during the '60s, '70s, now sort of evened out and it became a new situation and it

became a question, especially from our point of view in the company, of selling less of more: that is, less numbers of more titles rather than a large number of a few titles. So it was·a question of developing a wider range of recordings in Welsh and of Welsh interest music for the people in Wales and, of course, developing new markets. And with the advent of the cassette and then later of the CD and then later still of the video, we also have enlarged the formats.

The 'new situation' – the proliferating possibilities and obligations of what is to hand – required that less be sold of a greater range of items to people in Wales 'and, of course, developing new markets.' The next paragraph expands upon the nature of those markets.

8. But the question of enlarging the market from just the Welsh speakers here in Wales to people coming to Wales as visitors and wanting to take some Welsh music home with them, and, of course, ex-patriot Welsh people who started to buy through catalogue, and now of course the new possibilities, the, of the Internet. Now this expanding of the market overseas and outside Wales and to the five continents is now a real possibility, and it's becoming more and more an important part of our business. Catalogue selling, selling through the catalogue and mail order, has gradually grown since the late '80s, throughout the '90s, and is now an important part of our business and this has now expanded into the Internet.

'The market' for Welsh culture is no longer restricted to Welsh speakers in Wales: it has expanded to visitors to Wales and 'ex-patriot Welsh people' outside Wales. Later in our interview he explained in great detail who and where his markets were and what kind of products they were buying. I return to that issue later.

The geographical reach of the company has expanded; what is possible has also expanded. The narrator casts the listener into the future: 'the new possibilities, the, of the Internet'. Perhaps his stumbling over words here is indicative of some uncertainty, for his account up until now has been fluent. The story ends with a neat temporal sequencing of clauses: Catalogue selling [...] has *gradually* grown *since* the late '80s, *throughout* the '90s, and *is now* an important part of our business and this *has now* expanded into the Internet. There is, however, a coda (see paragraph 9, below), which promises more. The rather hesitant speech pattern here suggests that the narrator has run out of words. Indeed, from that point, the interview became much more of a co-production between the informant and me. The

hesitancy also indicates unfamiliarity with the technology (the firm was big enough to employ its own multimedia designer).

9. What we propose to do very soon with the Internet is to have the whole catalogue on it and people will be able to in fact use the, if they have the right software, to search the catalogue, edit-find, you know, so if they have a word or a part of a title or an artist's name, or a song title, they would be able to find it in our catalogue.

As the interview progressed, it became clear that despite the recent vote in favour of a National Assembly for Wales, my informant was anxious about the future both of Wales and his own family in Wales. He was concerned about the lack of political involvement by young people, echoing the same fear that was articulated by Saunders Lewis in the early 1960s: that without political action to embed the Welsh language in public life, the language - and the communities that speak it - would die. Some of his observations suggest a historicizing in line with that proposed by Heidegger: everyday actions become meaningful only in a shared public context, by 'taking over the possibilities made accessible by the past and acting in the present in order to accomplish something for the future' (Guignon 1993a, 229; *op. cit.*).

We discussed the recent international success of a number of Welsh bands, including Super Furry Animals. He had mixed feelings about it, as indicated in the extract below.

10. It could, it could help and it ..... some people have been saying in Wales that this is it, we've arrived, this is the saving of Welsh culture. Well, we've got to be careful. If the saving of Welsh culture is that everything done in Welsh has to be done in English to be recognised, then it could be the opposite, it could be the demise of Welsh culture and then it becomes a different thing in English. I'm not sorry it's happening, but we have to be quite clear about the need for things to be done in Welsh and to keep that link. That, not that I listen to a lot of this Super Furry thing, but I read the words and, I mean, it's very good, very interesting, but it's not, it's not very Welsh.   -

This Welsh language campaigner may well draw the 'circle of the we' far wider than did Saunders Lewis, but he is quite unambiguous about Welsh culture being Welsh language culture: 'we have to be *quite clear* about the need for things to be done in Welsh and to keep

that link'. Like Lewis, he implies that the threat to the Welsh language lies as much within Wales as outside it.

A little earlier in our conversation, my informant had implied that Welsh language music has difficulty getting exposure outside Wales because is not accepted as 'ethnic' music. He observed:

11. The British pop industry is not very interested in anything sung in any other language but English. I mean, groups on the Continent complain about this, that they have to sing in English to be recognised. The, the exception is African music. I mean, they accept African music, ethnic music, world music, so I mean, as long as the language is far enough away. But they are very reticent to play music in French, Norwegian or Welsh, you know.

Note the employment of the 'they' here. '*They* accept African music, ethnic music, world music', but '*they* are very reticent' to play music in other languages. In answer to my question why (paragraph 12, below), he continues the 'they-ing' (paragraph 13), then concludes that a Welsh language band has to change its language to be given a chance 'in the big wide world'.

12. **ALLARD: But why is it, do you think, that there is an acceptance of African music but not Welsh or whatever?**

13. I don't know ..... because ..... 'cos it's genuine probably, and because they think it's, you know, genuine world and ethnic music whereas we, we've been educated long enough to do it in English. *(Laughter)* It's a pity though, because ..... There are exceptions. John Peel has played Welsh tracks for years and years, and he was probably the first to do it on Radio 1 and so on and still does it, you know, if he likes a record he plays it whatever the language. But he's an exception. And it's a pity, because really, what has to happen then is a Welsh language band has to change its language to be recognised. It's not that the Super Furry Animals have improved so much but it's, I mean, they just weren't given the chance in the big wide world.

He goes on to explain that a greater awareness of Welsh language music is developing through the inclusion of Welsh language artists in Celtic compilation albums being put together in Spain, France, north America and Germany. The presence of Welsh language artists at events such as Womad and their participation in Afro-Celt fusion music has also increased its exposure and 'we believe that we've been vindicated in the sense that now they're coming to us, to some extent, and people are listening to music, songs sung in Welsh, or traditional Welsh music, and liking it for what it is'. Genre-mixing is helping to sustain this particular minority language.

Towards the end of the interview, my informant spoke of complaints among young people that the town in which we met was boring. He described some of the initiatives that had been undertaken to improve leisure facilities there, then added:

14. So I'm not saying that a lot needs to be done in *[name of town]*, but on the other hand, the prevalent view of young people anywhere, as far as I can see .... And sometimes I think it's because of the, you know, the film, video, impression given that there's something tremendously exciting happening elsewhere.

15. **ALLARD: Out there?**

16. Out there. It's not true. It is a world of fantasy in a way. So obviously, my eldest children are down in Cardiff, all of them.

17. **ALLARD: Are they?**

18. All in jobs, or otherwise. Because obviously, one, they think there's more chance of a job down there, and two, there's more of their friends down there. But I would much rather have them living in this area, and on the council that is my main aim is to try and make this area more vibrant and more appealing to young people because otherwise there's no future.

He seems to be implying that young people are somehow disembedded from the local, seduced by a hyperreal 'world of fantasy'. If young people leave, 'there's no future'

(paragraph 18). Earlier, however, he had complained about the political disengagement of the young, and their lack of care for the future:

19. Coming back to politics, the problem with politics today is that young people are not interested, and one thing is that the kind of politics which they express in their songs and music is not really understood by us older people. But there is a politics there, but it's a ..... it's a more anarchic protest, personal protest, against the general way of things and not channelled against, or to, any particular direction. Now that is my criticism. I think that's fine, yes, okay, express your angst and disillusion and cynicism, but in the long run you have to think of what kind of world you want to see tomorrow and what's, and that is politics. So it has to be channelled, you know, and I think in our generation music was channelled to some direction, there was an idealism which was translated into actual principles. Now I think it's a kind of general, you know, disenchantment with the way things are, but what is there, what do we have to ..... I think the, I think the young have ..... the young have to be involved in politics.

A little later, he returned to that theme, implying that a lack of idealism among young people is compounded by unrealistic, or single-minded, expectations of their own personal future. In the passage below (paragraph 20), it is almost as if he is accusing them of falling into inauthentic lives, so bound up are they in the means to achieving rock stardom:

20. I think sometimes, though, that young people tend to, I mean, they forget anything else and they put everything into their band and that can be a sort of substitute for reality. You know, I don't know if I'm expressing myself well, but it, it sometimes occurs to me that the only thing which is important to them is success in the rock world and I can't see, I can't see that that is healthy. There is a need to keep everything in perspective. And that is why I said earlier that this tremendous energy has to be channelled also in a creative political direction - not necessarily through a political party, but at least that they have an agenda and have something, you know, to replace it.

In chapter 3, I observed that for Heidegger, inauthenticity is characterised by falling and forgetting. Inauthentic people 'fall' into mundane roles and play games according to the latest social rules about what constitutes success; they 'forget' the necessity of taking 'a

coherent stand in a world where things are genuinely at stake' (Guignon 1993a, 227; *op. cit.*). Paragraph 20 reverberates with such language. Young people 'forget anything else and they put everything into their band and that can be a sort of substitute for reality'. They do not direct their energy towards political action in the real world, they live in the 'rock world', and 'the only thing which is important to them is success in the rock world'.

For Heidegger, authentic Dasein interprets itself, and draws its future direction – or its 'agenda' as my informant calls it – from co-historizing, from shared commitments and ideals. An agenda implies an awareness of what is to hand and a plan for how to use such resources: my informant is concerned 'that this tremendous energy has to be channelled also in a creative political direction - not necessarily through a political party, but at least that they have an agenda and have something, you know, to replace it'. There are resonances with Heidegger's designation of 'the community', as indicated in this chapter's introduction:

> Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.

> (Heidegger 1962, 436; *op. cit.*)

Yet my informant, in his own career, has contributed to the broadening of the cultural field in which Dasein would be rooted and the proliferation of possibilities in the 'wide world' upon which it might focus its resoluteness. It is to those processes and their consequences that I now turn.

Rules, expertise and the economy of ties

One of the themes that ran through my discussion with this first informant was the emotional, cultural and economic importance of the ties between Welsh-language culture, its perceived Celtic roots and a Welsh diaspora. For example, he recounted an anecdote of a man who

travelled from America to find a song about his forefathers' farm. I reproduce the anecdote and its context in paragraphs 21-24 below.

21. Of course, the beauty of the Internet is that it is a medium designed for the individual and the small, niche market and interest group. And this is something which we have to develop and work on and hopefully find a way into all these interest groups.

Note the recognition that this is for the 'individual' and 'interest groups'. He goes on, uninterrupted by me, to develop the theme of interest groups.

22. The most obvious one is the Welsh interest group. Now they may be people living outside Wales who've moved from Wales and obviously want any kind of link with their homeland. They may be descendants of people who moved from Wales a generation ago or more than that, you know, and are looking for their roots and tracing their ancestry. And interest grows then in what is Wales and what is Welsh. And of course, you find other people who are just interested in ethnic music, or folk music, and then you find people who've just stumbled across the Welsh language, for instance in Japan or whatever, and have learned it, you know. And there are examples of people who've learned it in Japan, and there is a core university course in Welsh and Celtic languages, and we get letters from them in Welsh, you know, on the E-mail, asking for specific recordings. And we find this very interesting, obviously. There are people learning Welsh all over the world and they interchange, they interchange letters, they discuss fine points of Welsh grammar. And obviously they like to find Welsh records.

Having presented a context for the story, he goes on to develop it thus, again uninterrupted by me.

23. There was an interesting correspondence recently from a man in North America who was descended from Welsh emigrants and he started asking about a particular Welsh folk song, and apparently this Welsh folk song mentions the farm, the actual farm, his forefathers left for America. And of course when he actually, he wrote asking for the words of the song, and actually saw that the farm was the self-same farm, he came over to Wales and came to [name of company] and asked for a copy of the cassette and ..... The first thing we told him was that it was unfortunately out of stock. We saw the disappointment on his face because he had literally come all the way from America to look for his, for this farm and to look for this recording. But luckily we were

wrong, there were copies left. So we gave him not only the cassette but a translation of the actual words and he went home a very happy man because ..... It was a ballad, probably from the last century, about a drover who drove cattle from Cardiganshire to London and this farm, his forefathers' farm, was one of the farms from where the cattle came. But more than that, the actual drover himself was probably related to him.

24. Now, probably, that sort of thing is going to happen more often because people can ask, you know, simple specific questions on the E-mail, and get an immediate answer, perhaps they wouldn't put in a letter, you know, it's so immediate. Because it's so immediate and you get an immediate reply.

Note in paragraph 23 how much attention is given in the orientation of the story to authenticating the people and the places mentioned. The narrator speaks of 'the farm, the *actual* farm, his forefathers left for America', and emphasises that the visitor '*actually* saw that the farm was *the self-same farm*'. The visitor 'had *literally* come *all* the way from America to look for his, for *this* farm and to look for *this* recording'. Not only did the song mention the farm: '*But more than that*, the *actual* drover *himself* was (probably) related to him. Note also how the emotional significance of the events being described for the subject of the story and for the narrator himself is implied in the presentation of the complicating action and the story's resolution. '*We saw* the *disappointment* on his face' at the news that the cassette was out of stock – here comes the comparator - '*but* luckily we were wrong'. Having been given not only a cassette but a translation of the '*actual* words', the visitor went away 'a *very* happy man'.

As both a communications instrument and a ritual space, the Internet offers a means of developing (sometimes ancestral) social ties through the use of e-mail, newsgroups and hyperlinks. The social and emotional ties being described in that anecdote are not of the type Smith (1986) and Kymlicka (1995) invoke in relation to civic nationalism, as discussed in chapter 2. They are the ties that bind an individual to a place or to an *ethnie* less as a citizen than as a tourist. Such affiliations are detached from the cultures of inhabited, everyday place: they do not resemble the lived ethnicities that are enacted in low-technology, proximate space (Poster 1998). Thanks to the Internet, Benedict Anderson's 'imagined nation' becomes

stretched out in webspace and preserved not as a lived-in space but 'as an emptied-out map, that can be believed in' (Jeganathan 1998, 527).

The timelessness and placelessness of computer-mediated space – 'it's so immediate and you get an immediate reply' (paragraph 24) – raises the perplexing question whether Wales' identity is being re-mixed in Web space. As noted in chapter 2, the Internet has been conceptualised both an instrument for transporting digital data *and* a gateway to a space for computer-mediated social interaction. When people use the Internet they are acting in global networked space, but the technology has applications that might sharpen the sense of 'being-in-the-world' that they draw from various communities to which they belong, or imagine themselves to belong.

Later in our interview, the potential of Welsh (by which my informant means Welsh-language) associations was made more explicit. They can be used to build a particular type of tourism which is attractive to people 'with more money' and 'a more genuine interest in Wales', and which benefits the shops, hotels and culture industries in the area. It also requires Wales to be different, a theme which ran through chapter 4. People 'want to see something different and want to hear different music' (paragraph 25 below). My informant explained that:

25. I'm involved in economic development in the local authority and I'm very keen to see Welsh music and Welsh culture not being exploited as it were, but to be strengthened as a part of the, part of this area and part of the reason why people choose to come here. Because I think the more people who come here because they are interested in Wales and want to see something different and want to hear different music, I mean, the better for us, because they tend to be people who will come back again and who are more prepared to spend money on things like Welsh music and, you know, I mean, it's ..... they come here for the right kind of reason. We've had too many sort of fly-by-night people, a few nights in a caravan or, food in the back of the car .....   -

26. ALLARD: And it's a beach holiday.

27. Couple of days climbing or a couple of days on the beach and back home. We need more permanent, interested visitors and so music and singing, since we have it, is

now beginning to be organised in a more structured way in hotels, in a place like this,
so that it becomes part of the Welsh experience.

In paragraph 27, a curious paradox is deployed. Music and singing as part of '*the Welsh experience*' is 'beginning to be *organised* in a more *structured* way'. How authentic is that?

That question is relevant to a final theme that ran through my interview with this artist: the tension between rules, expertise and community that emerges when culture is used as an instrument of local economic development. My informant is embedded in very local networks of production where he is able to make, or at least contribute to, the rules, although he encounters resistance from people who are even more committed to a 'grass-roots' approach than he is. At this level, and as a local councillor with an economic development brief, he is well able to recognise the requirements for some management and co-ordination of cultural production in order both to nurture and exploit it. For example, he notes the dilemma posed by his desire to support young bands and the financial impossibility of doing so:

28. For many years we saw ourselves, I saw myself as a company, part of its duty was to
continue to support young bands. But we found that we couldn't sell their stuff very
much and in the end, financially we couldn't afford to, you know, put money .... and
having a record released was not always the thing they really needed because I think
a lot of young bands have records produced far too early before ..... What they need
is good management, an agency to ..... to arrange good gigs for them and support,
and professional support.

This is the businessman speaking, rationalising his unwillingness to bear financial risk. He goes on to explain that some time ago he had supported a proposal to set up a council for rock and folk music. He met opposition in some quarters:

29. They thought well, it's not, it's not through organising from the top that you get this
done but from helping. Well, I was ..... my view was that its whole purpose was to try
and help things from the grass roots up.

30. **ALLARD: Where was that based?**

31. Well, it was based in [*name of town*] in the end. [*Name of organiser*] is a ...... but it's all gone now and there are many reasons for that. But I was sad in a way because I thought that it needs that kind of agency. You see, in the Welsh language culture we don't have professional agencies, we don't have professional managers.

The rather mysterious reference to the rock and folk council was left uncompleted, and it is unclear what were the reasons for its disappearance. However, the emphasis upon professional agencies and professional managers is interesting, not least because it is also present in *Creative Nation*, the framework document for accessing European social funds that was produced by an economic development consultancy and discussed in chapter 4. As will become apparent, the issue of professionalism also arose (albeit in a different context) in my interview with the second artist, who told me of her shock upon discovering that there was little work for professional musicians in Wales. Artists, like politicians, may speak of the desirability of a less hierarchical, more inclusive type of culture but they are anxious to protect or develop their own professional distinction. Their cultural capital depends not only upon how they are categorised as consumers of culture but as participants in and producers of it.

A further, unsurprising, paradox emerges. Despite his enthusiasm for local organisation, my informant is hostile to the imposition of rules by distant (i.e. Cardiff-based) bureaucratic institutions. He illustrated their shortcomings by reference to community theatre. Much of what he said foreshadowed the storm that was to break out some two years later over the Arts Council of Wales' theatre policy. He anticipates the new political arrangements for Wales with optimism.

32. Hopefully we can have a different kind of 'culture culture', you know. I mean ..... and these Quangos, running the culture as it is now, it's ..... I mean it's ..... terrible. And in Wales, as in England, it's, you know, committees deciding who should get a grant sort of thing, and that decides on popular culture. It's not that, I mean, it's got to be sort of grass roots up.

33. In fact, in ..... obviously I'm speaking more of the Welsh language, but you know one of the things that has saved us over the last 20 years is the small community theatres, you know, like (*Welsh name*) and (*Welsh name*). Some of them are bilingual, some of

them ..... West Glamorgan, they did productions in Welsh and in English. And they were good. They were radical all the time, they weren't afraid to make fun of Thatcherism or whatever. A very ..... A breath of fresh air, you know. Not that it was a mass movement but it, at least it was there, a beacon of light. But some of them have had to go out of existence and of course they can be snuffed out like that by a committee deciding that their grant comes to an end.

Rather stumblingly, he goes on to criticise centralised cultural institutions like the proposed building for the Welsh National Opera, which he refers to as 'a big house in Cardiff' (paragraph 34, below):

34. So there has to be a stronger structure of ..... and perhaps less emphasis on a huge opera house sort of picture. Although Cardiff probably needs it, but ..... Yeah, opera is another thing, isn't it, because that is an idea, an idea that people should, cultured people should go to the opera. But it's so class-ridden, and it's so, well ..... And if opera is such a good thing it must be brought closer to people. Can't expect everybody to go to a big house in Cardiff. So opera for all, that sort of thing which has had to be cut down, you know, the smaller productions going round the villages. Now that's an excellent idea but, of course, that had to be cut down because of the money.

Yet another paradox, but again an unsurprising one, is that my informant became disoriented and much less confident when he spoke about conditions where the rules, institutions and expertise for regulating uncertainty and rectifying injustice are incapacitated or absent. For example, he is frustrated that he lacks the financial resources to take legal action against large record companies that poach artists whom his label has developed. He gives the following example:

35. Independent companies and small companies, sort of niche market companies such as ours, either have to sort of in the end succumb and become part of the big ones, or ride on their backs as it were, or be aware of the fact that the only way that we can really distribute something if we have something of, you know, huge interest, they come in and say, 'Look, we'll take that and you'll have a few points, you know,

royalties, but we'll distribute that'. So, I mean, if they see something which, like, for instance we had in [*name of artist*] and we, we thought we had him on contract and everything but then [*major record company*] came in and said, 'Thank you very much, you know, how much do you want?' But before long they realised that the contract we had with him would not hold much weight in court so they said, 'Well, if you don't want to contest the thing in court we'll, we'll record him, you know'. And, so virtually he, they took him from us.

36. And this is what the big companies can do, you know, nice as they are, they, in the end, if money's involved they challenge you: 'Well, look, we'll settle it in court'. And we don't have tens of thousands to fight court cases so in fact we have to succumb, we have to give in, or become part of a deal and that is why you often hear now of a song in the charts which is a small company, stroke [/] EMI, a small company, stroke [/] .....

37. **ALLARD: Right. And that can happen on individual, for individual artists and[**

38. Oh yeah, songs. So what happens, of course, with some companies, if you regularly come up with some good ideas and some good songs or good artists, they either pay a lot of money to get the artist from you or you have a sort of agreement with them that you do things in collaboration. So the other side of the coin is that we can exist, we can survive by developing different methods of reaching out to people who have an interest in what we do.

Such experiences of flexible specialisation seem to bear out Hesmondhalgh's (1996, 1998) scepticism about it, which I discussed in chapter 2. Hesmondhalgh suggested that collaborative networks – or, as my informant puts it, 'a small company, stroke [/] EMI' - conceal the financial and legal power of major labels over smaller ones, who lack the resources to access media and distribution channels. Independent labels can cater for niche markets only where they are not in direct competition with major labels. In the case of my informant, major labels are unlikely to challenge him in Welsh language music; he also has good access to a specialised Welsh language media and distribution network. However, once an artist shows the potential to have a wider success, he or she will be taken up by a larger company to record in English. My informant does not like it, but he recognises and understands it. As he said to me a little later, 'that is the real world we live in'. In that sense,

the blessings of cultural diversity and new information and communication technologies for small cultural organisations and businesses are mixed. They offer both new market segments to target and new means of reaching and serving them. Producers can develop and serve a demand in culturally diverse, computer-mediated space for 'real' or 'imagined' Welsh products. Technological innovations make it possible to engineer longer and more varied product lines to meet the needs of ever more refined taste segments. However, the risks and costs of development and market testing are often being borne by small companies before they get taken up by large companies.

Flexible specialisation is not only a matter of how relationships between large and small companies are configured. There is a localising dimension to it. In that manifestation, as will be recalled from chapter 2, it draws from the concept of the industrial district (Marshall 1906, 1919) whereby the economic profile of a locale is determined by interdependencies among local firms. That is very relevant to the work of my informant, who is involved in building networks among local businesses and individuals involved in the 'cultural tourism' supply chain: coach drivers, hotels, shops and artists. In that context, he understands and applies the rules of flexible capitalism.

In relation to copyright theft and piracy on the Internet, however, he is concerned that there are *no* rules. When I asked him what he thought about the Internet's potential as a direct distribution channel for music, he commented:

39. Well, the question, the obvious question is who, who's going to pay for it all? I mean, if somebody can sit at home and download a CD onto a CD writer or whatever, or just onto the hard disk, I mean, what is there to stop it ..... It's like .... I mean, we'll lose control of the market completely, so there must be some way ... It's like copyright, you know. What are the rules if there are songs flying around the Internet? At the moment there is a way of trying to trace every performance of every song. It doesn't work quite like that, but in theory they're supposed to trace any public performance or any mechanical use of any song.

Control of the market and *rules* about copyright rely on institutional forms of cooperation. Piore and Sabel, the originators of the flexible specialisation thesis, concluded that the successful cohesion of small, craft-based firms in north-central Italy rested upon a

'fundamental sense of community, of which the various institutional forms of cooperation are more the result than the cause' (Piore and Sabel 1984, 265; cited Putnam 1993, 161). Yet there is little sign – yet – of such institutions emerging. They are needed. As Maillat (1995) has observed, an innovative territorial 'milieu' depends not only upon ties between local firms and with external sources. It requires that its resources be 'organized, coordinated and linked by economic, cultural and technological structures that render the resources exploitable for new productive combinations' (*ibid.* 161).

Artist two: living on thin air

Background

The pundits and gurus of electronic commerce in global, computer-mediated space rarely pay much attention to the structural constraints of place. Likewise, the get-rich-quick guides to how to exploit the commercial potential of the World Wide Web (Bayne 1997, Bickerton *et al.* 1996, Cronin 1994, Cronin 1995, Kiam 1995, Levinson and Rubin 1995) remain silent on such matters. Some politicians and their associates are no more realistic about the challenges that face individual creative workers and small businesses seeking to promote or distribute their work on the Internet.

For example, in a programme broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on 9 August 1997, Charles Leadbetter described the characteristics of what he called a 'thin-air' economy[65]. Leadbetter - who was then of the influential think-tank Demos and who subsequently became a special advisor to New Labour - was speaking about the information-technology-fuelled 'long boom' in the economy of the United States. He caught the spirit underlying New Labour's ideas about the relationship between the creative industries and information technology in the new economy when he said:

> There's something very important happening [in California], and this is the emergence of a
> sort of weightless, thin-air economy where money is just made out of thin air by people having

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[65] See also Leadbetter's (1999) book on the same subject.

great ideas which don't need more than a computer and a sort of garage to produce and can then become global products as a result. This is a new kind of economy where the assets are not tangible, not physical, you can't weigh them. The key thing about California is that its boom is due to the economy moving away from 20th century industries - like defence, aerospace and manufacturing - into the 21st century industries of internet services, computer services, biotechnology and entertainment [.....]

Britain has huge strengths in the soft software industries, not just in software itself, but in those cultural and creative industries - architecture, design, music, fashion - which are really the industries of the future. *So rather than bemoaning our industrial past, we should focus on those creative industries where we have ideas and knowledge that we can create new products out of, and in that sense Britain can learn from California - what has made California so successful in the '90s.*

(Leadbetter 1997; my transcription; emphasis added)

Leadbetter is describing a disembodied hyper-capitalism, uprooted from its own history. But context matters. My second informant was selling music directly over the Internet from Wales, as well as promoting British musicians and composers on her web site, long before the Internet's potential as a digital transportation channel for music had attracted widespread attention. She did have a great idea which didn't need 'more than a computer and a sort of garage' - or in her case, an attic - to produce. However, realising the idea has been almost impossible because she cannot understand, let alone manipulate, the local conditions in which she works.

This artist and her husband, who runs the web site with her, have been involved in making and producing music for many years. In the late 1960s they were involved in an experimental music collective in London, the Scratch Orchestra. I learned about the orchestra not from my informant but from researching it in the World Wide Web, where a number of its former members have pages. An understanding of the orchestra helps to make sense of her narrative.

The orchestra had been founded in 1969 by the composer Cornelius Cardew as part of his repudiation of what he had come to believe was the elitist and bourgeois musical *avant-garde* that he had hitherto championed. The improvising of the Scratch Orchestra represented for Cardew a populist music that was consistent with his intensifying Maoist political convictions. It seems to have involved all the participants - at the same time and according to their own individual rules and interpretations - playing either specially composed music or

well-known classical pieces. The orchestra thereby produced a music in which everybody accompanied everybody else, accepting everything that happened in the process. The orchestra split up into factions rather quickly and appears to have collapsed in about 1972. With other members of Scratch, including my informant's husband, Cardew formed the People's Liberation Music group. He died in 1981 after a hit-and-run accident near his home in East London. He had been an active member of the Revolutionary Communist Party and an advocate of Irish Nationalism, and the circumstances of his death prompted suspicions that he had been assassinated.

My informant and her husband had formed a music publishing company in 1972, and they moved to Wales in 1979. They set up a recording company in 1991 to produce CDs; in 1995 they launched a web site to distribute music direct over the Internet with the hope of circumventing some of the problems experienced with agents who were being used to push cassette tapes and CDs into retail outlets but who paid late, if at all. At the time of the interview in the summer of 1998, the web site offered a small range of contemporary classical and jazz music CDs. A 'micropayment' system on the web site allowed customers to pay for individual tracks with their credit card and to download the music, a pioneering feature in 1998 when the interview was conducted. My informant explained that she was forced to resort to this system because her lack of trading history and low turnover prevented her from obtaining a credit card facility. A third party, the telecommunications company BT, operated the micropayment system. It took a substantial margin of each sale, again something that I learned not from the artist herself but from an informant who was part of the arts and cultural industries task force on which I served. It seems likely that just as my previous informant was developing and market testing new talent for global entertainment corporations, this artist was trying out new technology systems for a communications giant – and bearing the risks of doing so. BT was co-sponsor of an award for innovative e-commerce initiatives which was made to this artist some months after our interview took place. To give the web site a prize seems the least that the company could do.

I met the artist after she e-mailed me. Her e-mail stated that she understood that I was conducting an inquiry into micropayments on the Web (although that has never been the case and, before I met her, I was unfamiliar with the term 'micropayments'). Although it took us

some time to arrange a mutually convenient time to meet, I eventually interviewed her at her home, where she runs her web site with her husband. The interview took place on the afternoon of 24 June 1998, and our discussion lasted for almost three hours.

The account that she gave me of her experiences of on-line music production was riddled with contradictions. Three observations can be made about it. First, she is extremely hostile to capitalism and all its works, she thinks that the state should fund art, yet she wants to make money out of what she is doing. Second, she is a stern critic not only of private enterprise but of the state and other organisational bureaucracies that either fund her work or pay her royalties from it. Third, someone who trusts neither the local nor the global conditions in which she acts is unlikely to develop the reciprocal ties with others which are essential to the theory and practice of flexible capitalism. Like it or not, playing by the rules of flexible capitalism is likely to be her major source of income.

Like my first informant, this second artist understands that big companies dominate traditional distribution channels, which are difficult for small companies with few products to break into. She told me that 'most of the small record shops that would take our product have closed' and that large stores will not deal with her because she does not have a big enough product. She had tried to find a distributor, but most distributors wanted to pay her less than her CDs cost to produce and her experience of using smaller distributors had been unsatisfactory. Like the first informant, she understands that her future lies in being able to reach a global niche market for her music; unlike him, she does not see why she should find out what the characteristics of that niche are in order that she can adapt to it. I asked her what information she had about the markets for her work. She was not interested. She replied, 'I haven't got time to be bothered. I don't really care. I mean, I would just like ..... want people to buy'. Also unlike the first informant, this artist is not embedded in any local networks of production where she can influence the conditions of local production. She feels excluded from such networks, attributing her exclusion to Welsh parochialism. For example, she told

me that she and her husband had unsuccessfully tried to organise a trip by Wales-based record companies to the MIDEM festival that year (i.e. 1998)[66]. As she explained it:

1. I mean, we, [*husband*], spent ages phoning round all the record companies. And there is a problem with the record companies in Wales ..... I mean, like we had [*few words inaudible*] Welsh language which precludes everybody who doesn't speak Welsh. And, I mean, nationalism is a plus and a minus. And that would be okay, and there are other communities we could sell to who would be interested. But there's still a parochialism, which is a problem which we have been ..... hit several times.

In analysing this case, not only Heidegger but Wittgenstein (1953) comes to mind. The logic of the latter's argument that something is called – say - a 'number' when it has a direct relationship with several things that have hitherto been called 'number', and that this gives it an indirect relationship to other things called by the same name, applies here in two contradictory senses. First, an individual cannot name something, or will name it wrongly, if she is unfamiliar with the contextual rules from which it acquires its meaning. This artist is divorced from a meaningful local context for her work not because she cannot speak Welsh but because she is isolated from producer networks in Wales, and because she has alienated powerful cultural decision-makers there. She cannot make sense of what is happening to her, and is very frustrated. Secondly, and on the other hand, in the context of her own career she has learned to call something disappointment – and to relate it to a whole constellation of other negative emotions – to such an extent that she has very little confidence in herself, in others or in the future. A sequence of shocks and setbacks have framed her expectation of what is to come. That is most unfortunate, because she is exposing original, contemporary classical music to new audiences. Further, her innovative use of the Internet has paved the way for other users.

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[66] MIDEM is the international record, music publishing & video music market that is held every January in Cannes.

Talking about my generation

This narrative was more of a co-production than that presented in the previous case study. Perhaps that is because it arose out of talk between two women, but it must also be acknowledged that the interviewer (i.e. myself) and the interviewee had different agendas. The interviewee wanted to talk about the technology and she wanted me to tell her how she could access funding for what she was doing. I wanted her to talk about her markets and the online and off-line networks that she belonged to. The result was quite a fragmented, digressive conversation. I have tried to maintain a sense of that in the excerpts that have been included in this chapter.

The transcript was quite challenging to prepare and to select extracts from, and the chosen passages will doubtless be more difficult to read than those used in the previous case[67]. I have had to edit quite substantially in order to produce a 'narrative', and what follows does not sit comfortably with Labov's perspective on narrative structure. Its structure has been doubly shaped by me, first as interviewer and second as editor. Nevertheless, a question from me about the company's background does elicit a story with a beginning, a middle and an end (although no resolution). I reproduce it below (paragraphs 2-8):

2. **ALLARD: Could you say a bit about the background of the company and how long it's been trading and what ways it's changed since its foundation?**

3. Right. [*Husband*] and I have always worked in the cultural field. He's a composer and a musician and he was a professional composer and musician for, well, a musician for fifteen, sixteen years in London working on West End shows and things like that. We formed a publishing company in 1972, I think, and we've had other cultural things that we've either been running, been organising or been associated with right the way through. Let's see, we moved to Wales in '79, he started working at [*name of institution removed*] in '81 and he more or less stopped being a musician but not a composer. There wasn't much music work in Wales. Well, more-or-less nil. Certainly nothing he could earn a living at. It was, um, it was one of the little shocks we had.

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[67] The transcription conventions outlined in chapter 3 apply.

4. ALLARD: Uh huh. It's not, not what you'd expect.

5. No, no. And what there was minimal, and what there was was very tied up. I don't think there are very many professional musicians, I mean people exclusively earning money from playing music.

6. ALLARD: Right, right.

7. Right, so that was that. We've always produced things; it has always been very difficult producing things. We've never produced CDs; we've never had the money. We've always produced cassettes and things like that.

This artist, like the first one, speaks of culture as a field (paragraph 3). That marking is unsurprising in view of her subsequent comments about professionalism (paragraph 5). She designates her husband as a professional composer and musician. As in the previous case study, this artist – perhaps despite herself - is anxious to protect a personal distinctiveness. She clarifies her definition of a professional: '*I mean* people *exclusively* earning money from playing music'. Like the previous informant, she indicates that Wales does not have a professional music culture, slowly explicating over a series of clauses not only the limited possibilities for, but the certain impossibility of, earning a living from music: 'There *wasn't much* music work in Wales. Well, *more-or-less nil. Certainly nothing* he could earn a living at. It was, um, it was *one* of the little shocks we had' (paragraph 3). That last sentence is an early clue to the wealth of experienced and expected disappointments that inform this account.

Having set out the background to the company, my informant signals that she is ready to move on to its current difficulties with her 'Right, so that was that.' Note the use of the always-never comparator in paragraph 7 as she summarises the problems that she will reveal. She implies a creativity that is 'always' frustrated by lack of resources: 'We've *always* produced things; it has *always* been very difficult producing things. We've *never* produced CDs; we've *never* had the money. We've *always* produced cassettes and things like that.' She continues:

8. In 1981, a friend of ours got killed and in 1991 we wanted to bring out the later piano music that he had done because most of the Arts Council funding for any of his music is always the *avant garde* music which he didn't want to be associated with towards the end of his life. And the only way of getting the other music heard was to do it as a CD. So we formed initially it was *[name removed]* Records, then in 1981 we registered that with, in 1991 we registered that with PPL[68]. So the publishing company has been registered with everything since '72, MCPS[69]. So we registered with PPL, we registered *[name of record company]*, produced that *[title]* CD, and then we had plans to do some other things. *[Husband]* was still working at *[name of institution]*, just money and time, it takes a long time to do anything. I mean *[title]* was easy, we had tapes, historical tapes. And we have a lot of tapes which we would like to do but it still costs a lot of money to produce a CD.

The friend who 'got killed' was Cornelius Cardew. There is stumbling over dates in paragraph 8 - the events she was recounting were troubling, although at the time of the interview I did not know the full details - and shortly afterwards the temporal structure of the narrative broke down. We then talked for several minutes about the process of forming the company, the difficulty of raising finance from banks and the barriers to accessing retail distribution channels. I suggested to her that the Internet must be a great opportunity for opening up new distribution channels. She responded by talking about Internet service providers. I persisted.

9. **ALLARD: So basically you got in there as soon as it was available in a cost-effective way.**

10. Right, right. And we were thinking of doing it for e-mail and things like that. I found the Web very early on and I thought it was very exciting. *[Husband]* took a little convincing but I thought it was really exciting and was going to explode as soon as I found it. It had to.

11. **ALLARD: Yeah? Did you realise fully its potential as a medium for direct distribution?**

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[68] Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL).

[69] Mechanical Copyright Protection Society

12. Oh yes, oh yes. And being able to talk to people. I mean, it was, I was very, very
    clear about it as soon as I, as soon as I found it. We did the web site immediately.

The artist was able to identify more possibilities than either her husband, who 'took a little
convincing', or me. It was she, not I, who identified it as a medium for talking to people as
well as distributing music. Note her expressive language in paragraph 10 - 'I thought it was
very exciting [.....] I thought it was *really exciting* and was going to *explode*' – and her
certainty: 'it had to'. That clarity of thought ('I was *very, very* clear about it *as soon as I, as
soon as I* found it') is linked with decisive action: 'We did the web site immediately'
(paragraph 12).

The conversation turned for several minutes to matters of html, modem speed and bandwidth.
I brought the focus back to music by asking her how she would sum up her mission. She said
that she wanted to ensure that more British composers were heard. I asked her how the
Internet could help her to achieve that. She replied:

13. The possibilities with the 'Net are that we don't have to make CDs. CDs are expensive
    to make – less expensive than they were, but they're still expensive to make. You
    have to put them somewhere when you've made them. If you make 500 or 1,000, they
    have to go somewhere.

14. **ALLARD: Yeah, yeah.**

15. And you're probably going to have to store them for 10 years. Because it's going to be
    slow sales always in this area. It's a niche market, a very small niche market in every
    country in the world. And most of the time we have no access to the rest of the world,
    because we're not big enough. For the moment there is a little window on the Internet
    until it becomes more controlled by somebody.

16. **ALLARD: And you think that's going to happen?**

17. No idea. But looking at the way things go in life, it's a possibility. I mean, I think the
    window will be there for a period of time. It may continue, and it may not.

The enthusiasm for the Internet that she expressed earlier has been qualified by a more pessimistic (or realistic) evaluation of its possibilities given the nature of her markets - small niche markets across the world, like the previous informant's – and the size of the company. Like the previous informant, she is able to evaluate what is possible with what is to hand, and she understands the constraints. The Internet provides a 'little window' on the world 'for the moment' (paragraph 15).

Later in our discussion, she returned to the subject of the Web's future after another long digression about how she could obtain finance for her work:

18. When I saw the Web, not the Internet, when I saw the Web, even with its 'Browser One', and the fact of the way it had been developed by the physicists and that they weren't money orientated, that they had done it on the basis of communication ..... I mean, I'd never done programming or anything like that ..... [*tape change*] ..... Because it had come from the physicists, from Berners-Lee, it was just, it was just so exciting. I mean, I looked at it, and I wondered how long the money people would take to get hold of it.

Once again, she expresses her excitement about the Internet. She extinguishes it, almost with bathos: 'it was just, it was just so exciting. I mean, I looked at it' (here comes the anti-climax) 'and I wondered how long the money people would take to get hold of it.' It is as if money devalues the Internet, makes it less authentic. As she says, physicists had developed it and 'they weren't money oriented [...] they had done it on the basis of communication'.

Elsewhere in our interview, she expressed similar sentiments about other aspects of the information and communications infrastructure. I asked her to tell me about her experience with the BT micropricing experiment. She replied:

19. BT were an old state company. There are still people in BT who think in that way, like there are still people in the BBC who think in that way. They are technologically trained, so we could talk to them. We've only been dealing with their technical people.

20. ALLARD: And do you feel that there's an empathy?

21. Oh yes. But we've had hardly anything to do with product managers, who I think are shit.

22. ALLARD: What are the product managers trying to do? Sell?

23. Product managers are trying to please accountants and make money.

24. ALLARD: Right, okay.

25. The technical people are trying to make something work. That's the difference.

Unsurprisingly, she has similar sentiments about art. When cultural policy makers and economic development agencies are exhorting artists to be more entrepreneurial, they sometimes forget the lingering attachment among artists to the idea of art for art's sake. Here is an example of my informant's views on that matter:

26. The Welsh Office all want to know how much money you think you're going to make out of it, but I haven't got a sodding clue. We don't ever do things on the basis of making money, otherwise we'd be millionaires, you know, because we wouldn't have done anything that we're doing. We wouldn't have done any of this stuff because you, you wouldn't have done it. I mean, I desperately tried to find an accountant down here, and I went into a whole load of accountants, and, I mean, tried to explain about things and they all looked at me and said, 'But you'd have to sell x units. Why are you doing it?'. And to try and explain that it's something that should be done and that's why you're doing it, um, we have a really good accountant now, but he's certainly not a straight accountant.

She is quite clear that the state should fund her work. I asked her about her relationship with a web ring[70] to which her site is hyperlinked.

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[70] A web ring is a device which links related web sites.

27. **ALLARD: I notice that the banner advertising on the Classic Ring site was not dissimilar from the type of advertising that one would hear on Classic FM for example. Quite heavily financial services oriented. How do you feel about that?**

28. [*Few words inaudible*] to be honest. I hate Classic FM. Stop for the ads.

29. **ALLARD: For the ads. So you wouldn't want to have banner advertising on your site itself?**

30. Oh, come on! I mean, there may be a time when you don't have a choice.

31. **ALLARD: Right, right.**

32. But, I mean, these things should be properly funded. They should be state funded. There isn't any other way of doing it.

Towards the end of the interview, I asked her what she thought was the role of bodies such as the Arts Council, the British Council, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Welsh Office that were connected with promoting the arts, and what they could do for her. She replied:

33. They could do a lot, but they actually require you to go cap in hand, a bit grovelly. They all want, they all want]

34. **ALLARD: Do you think they should do something?**

35. They all want, they all want you to say that you're going to make a lot of money. Unfortunately.

36. **ALLARD: Right. Do you think that they should do something which doesn't, is not necessarily contingent upon you making a lot of money?**

37. Yes. I think they should support the composers from here on the basis of supporting the Welsh culture. I think it's that important. You know, like I think British composers

should be supported. The American composers get subsidised in this country all the
time.

Throughout the course of our discussion, my informant frequently expressed both her mission
to promote contemporary composers and musicians and her enthusiasm for the Internet. She
clearly had a great deal of technical knowledge about the latter: far more than I did, and more
than my previous informant had demonstrated. She seemed to have less interest in, or
understanding of, the people who use, or who make access possible to, or who fund, the
technology. It is as if her engagement with the Internet fulfils the requirements of *techne* but
not *praxis* in that she has the skills to produce things, but she lacks the confidence in herself
and her being-in-the-world that would enable her fully to realise the possibilities of the
Internet. She speaks of the Internet in terms of its potential alienation under capitalism: 'for
the moment there is a little window on the Internet until it becomes more controlled by
somebody'. On the other hand, this artist could not be accused of having fallen into a
contingent accommodation with the demands of daily affairs of the sort that Heidegger
associated with inauthenticity. I take up that theme below.

Rules, expertise and the economy of ties

My informant has received plaudits for her work, but she is unable to support herself by it. In
October 1998, the web site won an award in a UK-wide competition, sponsored by BT and
The Daily Express newspaper, to identify innovative e-commerce initiatives by small
business. In an e-mail to me to announce the award, she commented that sales were still not
good and that not enough people yet had the technology to download the music. However, it
is unlikely that infrastructural limitations were the only reason for the lack of sales; nor can
the other problems facing the business be attributed simply to a lack of funds.

I observed earlier that someone who has little trust in either the local or the global conditions
in which she acts is unlikely to develop the reciprocal ties with others that are essential to the
theory and practice of flexible capitalism. In that respect, the pattern of this artist's
relationships is contradictory. When she is talking about concrete examples of human

interaction, she does seem to have had some experiences that rely on mutual trust. For example, when we were talking about the difficulties of processing orders from people who did not want to make payments over the Internet, she recounted the following story:

38. Some poor bloke in Germany desperately wanted the [*title*] cassette. I mean, I sent it to him anyway, and then he felt he wanted to pay. And he kept saying he wanted to pay. I mean, it would have been easy ..... So I said, well, he could try going to the bank and see whether he could do a bank transfer, what they would charge him. Like they wanted to charge him more than the cost of a cassette. And I said, well, the only other thing I can suggest is that you go and get - it was £6.50 plus the postage, actually – I suggest what you do is you go into the bank, buy a five pound note, stick it in the envelope and send it to me.

39. ALLARD: And did he?

40. Mmm.

As in the anecdote about the visitor recounted in the previous case study, that encounter had an emotional charge for seller and buyer. In other respects, however, this artist appears to be quite socially isolated, both online and off-line. Her web site is in English only. There is no strong identification with a place or with a nation, even though part of it is devoted to promoting British music. She does not write about Britain on her site in the way that the previous informant writes about Wales on his. The site has no hyperlinks to other Welsh sites; indeed, it has few external hyperlinks at all, although it is part of a classical music web ring.

My informant stated that she sees the future of herself in the Internet in terms of links with other people who are producing on the Internet, but she feels that her skills base is so high that other people would be unable to reciprocate:

41. But anyway, going back to how I think it will develop, I mean, I would like it to develop so that we could do a lot more selling over the Net. That's what I would like to develop. I would like specifically, we would like to be able to sell tracks over the Net, I would like to link to other people because we know there's quite a lot of small people who are managing to produce things. None of them have got it together to sell over

the Net yet because of either the credit card thing or because they're not as experienced in the technology as we are.

I kept asking her about the types of network that she would work with, and she kept telling me that although she was prepared to work across artistic genres, her skill level was so high that she would end up teaching and 'on the reciprocal level ..... would be doing all the giving'.

She also feels let down by the various public agencies that she has encountered in her venture. Although she is a great critic of private enterprise, and although she thinks that the state should fund art, she has an extremely low opinion of the state bureaucracies that manage arts funding. Nor does she have any understanding of the challenges that face the people who work in them. She puts her feelings thus: 'I mean, dealing with the Welsh Arts Council, I mean, the English one is shit, I mean, the Welsh one seems to be even worse ..... unfortunately'. Some of her antagonism is undoubtedly justified. As indicated in the previous chapter, there is widespread despair among artists and politicians over the shortcomings of the Arts Council of Wales. It will be recalled that my first informant also made clear his misgivings about the Council and its committees. My second informant offered an interesting insight into some of the Arts Councils' failings – but also their own disorientation in the face of globalisation - when she described her experience in respect of the one part of her web site that has received state funding (paragraph 42 below).

42. We applied for five thousand, we only got two and half because, well to start with they told me because it was, and this was from the English Arts Council, initially they said they weren't considering Web because it was worldwide and it didn't benefit Britain, didn't benefit England. Then they said it was because it was England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and it wasn't just English. And then, when I tried to get extra money from the Welsh Arts Council, they said I already had some Welsh composers on there and it would be double funding. How it could be double funding if it had 50 composers and you add another 50, or you add another 25, I mean, if they'd said, well, you know, we can't think of 50 Welsh composers, why don't you just do 20 Welsh ... I could have understood that. But how, if you have 50 and then you have 70, it is double funding is beyond me.

She was also critical of the copyright collection societies that administer and distribute royalties on music. Indeed, at several points in our discussion she criticised PRS and MCPS[71] (and their computer systems) as being 'crap', 'very inefficient' and 'totally incompetent'. Her frustration was born of concern that the shortcomings of such agencies would restrict the potential of the Internet. For her, the infinite possibilities of the Internet are being held up by rule-making. She commented:

> 43. There's a lot of talking. I mean, what is bothering is that those copyright issues can be used to hold things back: the possibility, the openness of the Internet.

While I was carrying out my research, I twice heard people express exasperation with this artist and certainty - the certainty that comes from knowing the rules - that she would never succeed in what she was trying to do. An arts support worker (not a member of Arts Council of Wales staff) told me that she had been to meetings in which my informant had harangued the Arts Council for its shortcomings and that she seemed not to understand that 'times had changed' and the state did not fund art in the way that it used to. A representative of a local economic development project indicated that he had tried unsuccessfully to recruit her to an employment bank that matched skilled people with employers' needs on a freelance basis, but she did not participate. It seems that she does not understand that the rules and resources that might support the production of 'art for art's sake' no longer apply (if they ever did). Moreover, she does not understand the rules of flexible capitalism.

As noted in chapter 2, Richard Sennett (1998) has suggested that our fund of social capital - 'shared *past* experiences as well as individual achievements and endowments' (*ibid.*, 85; emphasis added) - enhances our ability to navigate a loose network and to take risks. However, the transitory and discomfiting nature of the networks are such that the individual can no longer build for herself or himself any coherent life narrative. My second informant has taken significant risks in the past: moving to Wales, starting a company, launching it on-line and being sufficiently innovative in so doing to win an award. She has, perhaps, funded

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[71] The Performing Rights Society and the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society.

those risks with the social capital she has accumulated out of her past experiences of collective action: most notably, the orchestra and concert society to which she and her husband belonged. However, she has little trust in the local conditions in which she now acts, and little more in the global ones. If an individual's social capital is a function of her ability to develop reciprocal ties with others, then she now seems to experience some resistance to doing that. After all, penetrating established networks requires self-confidence. It also demands the ability to withstand constant set-backs and disappointments, even if one complies by the rules. My informant told me about her exclusion from a music project:

44. The Arts Council guy who has control of it down here for instance has had some meetings with people about the Welsh centre down here, and although I've said I'd be willing to go to meetings, I haven't got anywhere, so I'm obviously not in the circle.

45. **ALLARD: Okay, so this is a network that you cannot penetrate?**

46. I don't spend all my time trying to do it, I suppose. I mean, even when one does, I mean, I was talking to a lady down at the [*venue name*] and, I mean, she'd done some opera, small opera thing, and actually gone to the expense of forming a charity and everything on the basis of getting money and it still all folded. You know, she had gone down the path of doing what they wanted you to do and being compliant. I'm not compliant. And she had done all that, and it still got nowhere and had come out of it very badly and was very distressed by what had happened. I mean, I know they're a load of shits.

Conclusion

Recent theories of social capital accumulation purport to offer a solution to structural economic deprivation. They tend to make much of the cultural ties embedded in a locale from which new economic ones can be forged. But the narrative accounts presented above indicate some of the drawbacks of an over-reliance upon such ties.

In chapter 2, I explored the usefulness of 'social capital' as a means of civic and economic development. I suggested that if it was to have any validity in that context it must include

bonding *and* bridging dimensions and be kept conceptually separate from the historically particularist impulses of communtarianism and the hierarchical differentiation of cultural capitalism. Those conditions having been met, social capitalism might complement cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism as defined by Waldron (1995) acknowledges that people are not the 'self-made atoms of liberal fantasy' (*ibid.*, 103) but it dismisses the communitarian assumption that in order to achieve authenticity they need to be immersed in the life of a particular community. Waldron's insistence upon the obligations of minority cultures to the wider national and global communities that sustain them bears repeating, as does his warning that the preservation of minority cultures – or some favoured version of them – artificially, in the face of surrounding social, economic and political change, is to cripple 'the mechanisms of adaptation and compromise with which all societies confront the outside world' (*ibid.*, 110).

The quotation from *The Songlines* at the top of this chapter implies that aboriginal traditions can be safeguarded by artists who are knowledgeable about, and able to manipulate, the rules and norms of contemporary social life. In the parlance of flexible capitalism, Cheekybugger Tabagee was eventually obliged to become a 'good networker'. His reluctant pragmatism might protect aboriginal art, but such contingency does not necessarily produce unique or innovative original art. But proponents of multiculturalism and of communitarianism make much of the importance of recognising and protecting 'aboriginal' traditions in a culturally diverse polity. They often ignore important differences within groups and within individual members of groups who may embrace multiple identities and affiliations. Postmodern analysts of 'difference politics' usefully highlight the latter condition, and they offer practical tools for engaging with and destabilising hegemonic regimes even if their tendency to dismiss grand theory and foundational beliefs inhibits them from formulating coherent and cohesive political and cultural projects. The artists whose testimony has been presented in this chapter instantiate a complex, hybrid communicativity which is distinct from the economistic discourses of social capitalism.

In chapter 3, I said that a typical narrative interweaves acts, agents, settings and emotions into a sense-making scheme, story or plot that revolves around some event or situation. Each of the two case studies presented in this chapter offers a complex narrative of quite heroic action.

Both artists have made innovative use of the Internet to give a platform to minority-interest (or niche market) music. They have done so in the context of a local political discourse which positions art as: first, an instrument of economic development, second, a means of enhancing 'community' in social life; and finally, the foundation of a distinctive national identity. For art to perform those functions, cultural authority and essentialism in art must be assaulted. In particular, the supposedly arbitrary, hierarchical boundaries between high art and popular culture must be eroded. One of the consequences of those blurred boundaries is that no art can be protected from the conditions in which other, unambiguously 'economic' goods are produced (Bourdieu 1993). Framed as being analogous with 'ordinary' economic production, and if the logic of 'late' (and flexible) capitalism is to be pursued, the production of art must be embedded in dynamic networks of social interaction.

The political action taken by the subject of the first case study in the 1960s in order to extend the use of the Welsh language in public life in Wales has influenced the local conditions for further artistic and entrepreneurial action by himself and others. However, his political and cultural affiliations preclude him from engaging with creative production in Wales that does not have Welsh-language associations. He has little control over *global* conditions, but even though he does not like the imbalance of power in global markets, he understands that for his company, surviving - and protecting itself from predators - is a question of finding a (market) niche and adapting to it.

The subject of the second case study also understands that the future for her company lies in finding a 'global niche' for her music. However, she does not see why she should adapt to it. She has not mastered the rules of flexible capitalism. She articulates the problems that she has experienced with her business in terms of a lack of financial capital, yet many of her difficulties appear to lie with a dwindling stock of social capital, a stock that diminishes as her self-confidence declines. Like the first informant, this is a cultural producer who bucks the stereotype of the 'cool' young Internet entrepreneur. Like him, she was around in the 1960s; like him, she wants to use technology in order to get music heard that otherwise would not be heard. Unlike him, she does not understand what she has to do to survive. She is well intentioned, but she is not contingent. Perhaps it is because she is 'dreaming' Britain, rather than Wales; or perhaps it is because she still believes in the intrinsic merits of certain forms of

art, an essentialist language that cultural policy makers no longer speak. She lives in a small nation (Wales), whose rules of and conditions for action she feels powerless to influence. She is disappointed in a British state that fails to deliver to her the benefits that she expects of it. She works in a global economy whose rules are infinitely flexible. She has a great deal of technical knowledge about both music and information technology, but it is not clear that this has been converted into forms of social capital that are relevant to the circumstances in which she lives and works. She is spatially and culturally disoriented. Yet of the two artists featured in this chapter, she is the one presenting innovative work to the world.

6 CONCLUSION

Running through this thesis has been the question whether the many different ways of belonging to and being in the world can be embraced by the liberal notion of national citizenship as a bundle of hard-won but universally applicable legal, political and social rights and responsibilities. Established notions of citizenship have been challenged by globalization and the upheavals that are said to be associated with it: diasporic migration, industrial reorganization and the supposed redundancy of the welfare state (Corner and Harvey 1991, McGuigan 1996).

The revived interest in citizenship by both the left and the right in Britain since the late 1980s has been located in its potential to bridge the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism (Bianchini and Schwengel 1991), a tension which – as detailed in chapter 2 - is sometimes manifested in controversies over group claims to cultural recognition. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that governments over the past two decades should have used cultural policy as a site to renegotiate the terms of Britain's post-war settlement with itself. To the extent that devolution in Wales is a function of Britain's 'post-colonial' status, the interest taken in cultural policy by the National Assembly for Wales highlights, even if it does not solve, some of the political challenges entailed in nurturing the transition in a new democracy from a politics of resistance (as practiced both by Welsh language campaigners and by labour movement activists since the 1920s) to a politics of participation.

In that context, the question that was raised in chapter 2 bears repeating. Can social capital – the accumulation of ties between connected individuals through which flow information, trust and mutual obligation - substitute for a social state in enabling a multi-layered communicative public domain and a cosmopolitan art spanning the domains of global commercial production, national boundaries, parochial affiliations and private life? I think not. As noted in chapter 2, a civic nation state is a community that offers legal rights and welfare entitlements. Citizenship in such a context usually involves the exercise of certain responsibilities and obligations, as well as participation in the social and cultural life of the nation in question. Yet by the late twentieth century, the assault by neo-liberal governments upon welfare

provision had weakened the capacity of state institutions to mediate the cultural difference that seems to be so intrinsic to people's sense of self and is not necessarily inimical to affiliation also with a national (or a global) culture. Among such institutions is the Arts Council of Wales. Its critics argue that its bureaucracy and hierarchical controls not only stifle innovation and creativity; they prevent art from being a social activity. They prefer the notion of cultural production in clusters, networks and creative quarters whose members are connected by bonds of mutual reliance and trust. But in those circumstances who, or what, will reconcile the politics of cultural difference and arbitrate the cacophony of powerful voices that would lay claim to the authentic culture of a nation? It might be possible conceptually to separate social capital from historically particularist communitarianism or hierarchically differentiated cultural capital. But the cluster of 'associational' theories reviewed in chapter 2 all promote affiliations that are contingent upon personal ties and local self-organisation. Therein lies their challenge to a democratic cultural politics.

Nikolas Rose (2001) has theorised the reinvention of association as part of what he calls the 'ethopolitics' of New Labour in Britain. This 'Third Way' politics conceives of human beings as not so much social, or rational or psychological as *ethical*, hence the focus on 'acting on the ethnical formation and self-management of individuals to promote their engagement in their collective destiny, in the interests of economic advancement, social stability, and even justice and happiness'. That is to be achieved by 'building a new relation between ethical citizenship and responsible community fostered, but not administered, by the state' (*ibid.*, 4). The image of the state as guarantor of social welfare, solidarity and security has diminished over the past two decades. The state is now a facilitator, enabler or animator and populations are 'set free' to find their own destiny. The 'recreation of civil society' is not to be achieved through 'the traditional apparatuses of representative democracy (a professional bureaucracy, Town Hall politics, elected political representatives, and all the paraphernalia of municipal socialism). Rather, it will be facilitated by the new 'political technologies' of the Third Way mechanisms – focus groups, citizens' juries and various hybrid partnerships – accompanied by strategies for self-development and economic, physical and cultural 're-attachment' to community that are targeted at 'the excluded'. Rose summarises what is new in this politics:

New territorializations of politics are involved in the emergence of community as an object of government. New specifications of political subjects are involved in the framing of moral responsibility in terms of identity, values, and belongingness in the new politics of conduct. New conceptions of economic and moral processes are entailed in the take up of the terms human capital and social capital in this politics, and new moralizing explanations of individual and collective pathologies underpin political strategies to regulate crime, enhance individual competencies, and administer security through activating the responsibilities of communities for their own well-being.

(Rose 2001, 14)

But New Labour's engagement in cultural politics is more direct than Rose implies. The centrality of culture to the political project identified by Rose became apparent soon after New Labour came to power in 1997. As indicated in chapter 4, within days of the general election, Chris Smith, the new Secretary of State at the Department of National Heritage – soon to become the Department for Culture, Media and Sport – had declared:

Enhancing the cultural life of the nation will be at the heart of the new Government's approach. It is not an optional extra for government; it is at the very centre of our mission.

(Smith 1997a, online)

The 'mission' entailed deploying art as an instrument of economic development, as a means of enhancing community and as the foundation of a distinctive national identity.

That instrumentalism is partly – and paradoxically - a consequence of the complex and ambiguous meanings that have been bestowed upon the word 'culture' by leftist intellectuals since the 1960s. In turn, they have influenced a generation of politicians now coming to power in Western democracies. For some of these new elites, artists still create and perform art; they also produce social meaning. But so do all cultural practices in the anthropological sense of culture. And if all cultural practices do that, there should not be hierarchical boundaries between them. Moreover, if all cultural practices produce social meaning, then culture is an appropriate focus for policy and planning. The cultural policy outlined in chapter 4 challenges (rhetorically, at least) hierarchical boundaries within art and between different cultural forms. Such a realignment of the spaces of art appears to be laudably

egalitarian. But who really benefits when '"culture", in the restricted, normative sense of ordinary usage, is reinserted into "culture" in the broad, anthropological sense' (Bourdieu 1984, 99) by cultural policy makers and managers?

Denise Meredyth and Jeffrey Minson (2001) have suggested that

> [T]o engage with the practical and political challenges of putting liberal pluralist conceptions of civic formation to work requires taking seriously the empirical means of forming civic and civil attributes. *Cultural policy is one of the zones of social governance in which this work of making citizens takes place.*

<div align="right">(Meredyth and Minson 2001, xi; emphasis added)</div>

The apparent privileging of a culture that is formed by politicians and managers over culture that is made by social practice is reminiscent of those who would abolish Arts Councils on the grounds not of the councils' operational shortcomings but because they are opposed to the principle of 'arm's length' delivery of cultural policy (see chapter 4). Tony Bennett (1998) illuminates that perspective. His own position emerges from his reading of Foucault, although it appears to be a less critical reading of Foucault than that evinced by Rose above. Bennett contends that culture has increasingly been envisaged within liberal systems of rule as a means of acting on the social. He explains:

> By 'liberal' here I do not have in mind the philosophical or political party meaning of the term. Rather, following Foucault, I refer to the development of new forms of social management and regulation which, predicated on the supposition that the citizen possesses a degree of freedom and autonomy (and thus is a citizen and not a subject), aim to *'govern at a distance'* by creating frameworks in which individuals will voluntarily regulate their own behaviour to achieve specific social ends rather than needing to be subjected to forced direction.

<div align="right">(Bennett 1998, 110; emphasis added)</div>

Culture becomes 'a field of social management in which culture is deployed as a resource intended to help 'lift' the population by making it self-civilising' (*ibid.*, 128). There are echoes here of the 'firm frame for autonomous individual endeavour' that Schumpeter (1976/1942) found in an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, but the cultural managerialism

advocated by Bennett is surely the foundation for a class of conservative administrators of the type that Schumpeter warned against. As for governing at a distance, it remains to be seen whether the Arts Council of Wales, after the internal restructuring which was ongoing throughout 2001, will still be able to develop and support art at arm's length from government and its 'technologies'.

Curiously, despite his preoccupation with the allocation and management of cultural resources in multiculturalism and his acceptance of culture as industry, Bennett downplays the role of economics in cultural analysis. 'Romantic' Marxists such as Raymond Williams whose authority he challenges would – as Bennett acknowledges - eschew any crude base-superstructure modelling of the relationship between economics and culture. But one does not have to be any kind of Marxist to concede at least a mutual constitution of economic and cultural difference. Equally, it is unnecessary to subscribe to the cruder manifestations of rational choice theory's assumptions about utility-maximising *homo economicus* before suggesting that the burgeoning managerialism in publicly-funded arts and culture is self-perpetuating. It offers a source of employment in a cultural-capital-rich segment of the labour market for a class of administrators who are not necessarily cultural entrepreneurs or artists themselves (although some might carry out administrative work in order to fund creative practice).

A further problem is that in his preoccupation with the pragmatic, Bennett strips art of its affect. McGuigan (1996, 28) has criticised that consequence of the instrumentalism that he identifies across Bennett's work. McGuigan acknowledges that it places cultural studies closer to the centre of politics but argues that what tends to get lost is 'the specifically cultural, culture as communication and meaning, practices and experiences that are too complex and *a*ffective to be treated adequately in the *e*ffective terms of economic and bureaucratic models of policy'. It should be clear from chapter 5 that this thesis assumes a similar stance towards 'aesthetic value' as that of McGuigan. But – and this is rather a significant 'but' - perhaps there is a point to what Heidegger would have dismissed as a 'passionless reflection' upon aesthetics.

Heidegger believed that 'authenticity' in culture resists explication and rationalisation: people just intuitively know how to 'go on'. The roots of alienation and nihilism are to be found in modernity's very requirement that presence – our everyday, engaged existence; our intuitive know-how - be theorised (or made explicit) in order that it might be reflected upon. The resulting detachment, the passionless reflection, is exacerbated by the lack of anything in the modern public world that might solicit commitment[72]. Heidegger proposed that the antidote to modernity's shortcomings was the communal 'historizing' that determines authentic 'being'. Proponents of the 'historizing' that was discussed in chapter 2 rarely make the connection with Heidegger, although he has been cited in the communitarian argument that 'groups of strangers who share a morally significant history' are essential to the cohesion of society (Bell 1993, 185). The bias against reasoned and reflective articulation in Heideggerian philosophy would not hold out much hope for a democracy of difference. A cultural politics that overcomes fragmentation and particularism will make space for the traditions and 'ways of being' of many cultures to be articulated, understood, respected and accommodated by their practitioners and non-practitioners alike. In its absence, the 'we' of community becomes Sennett's 'dangerous pronoun'.

But the operation of the political technologies of which Rose (*op. cit.*) and Bennett (*op. cit.*) write merely enhances the bureaucratic complexity that has bedevilled the rights-duties balance in citizenship (cf. Marshall 1950/1992). The preoccupation with community – whether it be in a Welsh-speaking rural community or an English-speaking former mining town - is a symptom of social fragmentation rather than a solution to it. Postmodern thought may give priority to affiliations and relationships over institutions and processes; in postmodern practice, such affiliations often become embedded within the organisations that are developed to co-ordinate them.

For example, the determined and often heroic action that has been taken to preserve the Welsh language and the arts associated with it as a living culture for Welsh-speaking communities manifests the value of the arts as a focus for sustaining community in practical

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[72] For discussion, see Clark 2002, especially chapters 1 and 5.

life. People who feel that their identity is rooted in Welsh-language culture, whether they live inside or outside Wales, will take comfort in its continuing health. But the rhetoric of community that clothes much Welsh-language campaigning conceals a will to strengthen the institutional and legal carapace that protects both the language and the influence of the interest groups that promote it. The resources devoted to its maintenance and promotion give Welsh-language nationalism an effective power base upon which to build support.

A different type of community development is evident in some of the cultural projects that have been established in the abandoned chapels and factories of industrial south Wales. Their names are redolent of associations with that industrial past, but their activities are focused upon the new economy. They include the Pop Factory, a multi-media facility that 'puts the fizz back into pop music', based in an old Corona pop works in Porth in the Rhondda valley[73]. Nearby in Ferndale is the Arts Factory, which operates a number of enterprises, including a garden centre, a computer-aided design service, and a studio producing outdoor furniture and art work. Both of those schemes seem to have significant potential to regenerate local communities and to improve the skills and employment prospects of the people who live in them and each of them is an ambitious and resourceful regeneration project.

Indeed, a plethora of community development schemes, charities and other bodies have grown up at grass-roots level to take advantage of the development funds that have been allocated to some regions of Wales. But it remains to be seen whether the result will be more flourishing local communities or institutionalised social and cultural fragmentation. Also of note is that many such schemes take the form of time-limited projects rather than financial capital investments in the cultural infrastructure of a locale. The shortcomings of the latter type of development have been documented by Bianchini and Parkinson (1993), and certainly it is undesirable and inefficient to fund buildings and production equipment if insufficient resources are provided for their running costs. Nevertheless, the symbolic discounting of a 'virtual' project, albeit a contingent one whose impending obsolescence is part of its rationale, seems likely to add to social insecurity. I noted this phenomenon in relation to the discontinuation of the 'eco' project described in chapter 5. As Castells (1996) suggests, a

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[73] < http://popfactory.atticmedia.com/html/contentfs.html> (8 December 2001).

virtual culture of creative destruction is alive and well. Projects need to be funded over a substantial period if they are to support individuals and communities in making a genuinely sustainable living. The targets should be softer, too. The complaint about potential funders made by the artist featured in the second case study in chapter 5 was a cry from the heart, and it is worth repeating. She said: 'They could do a lot, but they actually require you to go cap in hand, a bit grovelly. They all want, they all want, [....] they all want, they all want you to say that you're going to make a lot of money. Unfortunately.' (Interview with author, 24 June 1998).

As to the general principle of art – and particularly computer-mediated art – as enterprise, we might turn once more to Schumpeter for illumination. His analysis of entrepreneurialism's inevitable decline is based in the dynamics of capital agglomeration. Schumpeter believed that economic growth and associated social change were generated by cyclical 'waves of creative destruction' wrought by entrepreneurs who engaged in organisational and technological innovation in order to create new advantage in the face of competition and falling profits. But the high profits achievable in such growth conditions encouraged economies of scale and industrial concentration, putting a brake on innovation. The speculative Internet mania that occurred throughout 2000 might be read in that light: during the year, Internet company share values soared and then fell, and industrial concentration took the form of proposed alliances between 'old' and 'new' media multinational corporations. One example was the merger between media conglomerate Time Warner and Internet company America Online (AOL) and the subsequent proposed joint venture with EMI records. Another was the acquisition of Seagram by Vivendi which combined Vivendi's television, telecommunications and Internet interests and Seagram's Universal films and music into a business to rival the AOL-Warner operation. Both of these mergers were subject to delays and conditions by the US Federal Trade and Communications Commissions and the European Union, and they quickly became the source of some catastrophic shareholder losses. But they were still agglomerations of capital.

Schumpeter warned that such configurations were antithetical to economic development. Once capitalism takes ownership of 'property' away from an entrepreneurial bourgeois, all passion goes from economic life:

The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property. It loosens the grip that once was so strong - the grip in the sense of the legal right and the actual ability to do as one pleases with one's own; the grip also in the sense that the holder of the title loses the will to fight, economically, physically, politically, for "his" factory and his control over it, to die if necessary on its steps. And this evaporation of what we may term the material substance of property - its visible and touchable reality - affects not only the attitude of holders but also that of the workmen and of the public in general. Dematerialized, defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not impress and call forth moral allegiance as the vital form of property did. Eventually there will be *nobody* left who really cares to stand for it - nobody within and nobody without the precincts of the big concerns.

(Schumpeter 1976 (1942), 142; emphasis in original)

Raymond Williams' (1981) analysis of how the ownership of many forms of cultural property increasingly passed from artists to become centrally sited within the corporate market with the development of cultural commodity production might be recalled. We might also reprise from chapter 2 some pessimistic contemporary approaches to 'absentee ownership' in a global economy, including Kevin Robins' alignment of the 'corporate ideology of globalization and the network society' with 'the ideology of the "absentee" class' (Robins 1999, 22-23). It is in a similar spirit that Manuel Castells (1996, 415) writes that 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local'.

Yet the artists whom I interviewed during my fieldwork for this study all demonstrated a great passion for their work, notwithstanding Schumpeter, and some of them were ambivalent about their 'authorship' of it. They wanted to make a decent living rather than untold riches and – with the exception of the record company owner who was the only one of my informants who had a business of any size – they had a fairly relaxed attitude to copyright and a conviction that the present system could not hold. But the issue of property ownership may be highly significant to the local development of cultural enterprise and, as noted in chapter 2, it is the focus of ongoing legal and legislative intervention. It is certainly an appropriate focus for cultural policy makers. Interestingly, both the Digital Media Alliance (Henning 1998) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (1998) have suggested that one of the chief obstacles to the development of multimedia industry in the UK lies with the failure of originators of multimedia products to licence and retain intellectual property rights for use in other domains or media. Freelance artists and small multimedia businesses lack the resources

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required to promote their products, strike distribution deals and protect their intellectual property rights in global markets. Additional support is required, as is more research into how originators of work would like to have, or share, ownership rights.

A more optimistic perspective on cosmopolitanism than that conceived by Castells allows it to accommodate many, sometimes conflicting, affiliations that are instantiated in the 'self'. The concept of social capital is relevant in that context if it habituates mutual obligations between people in a territorial locale and the development of new, overlapping, relationships between spatially and culturally differentiated individuals, groups and communities. In that respect, information and communication technologies offer great potential. I have explained how the World Wide Web can reproduce cultural difference in on-line micro-communities for commercial advantage. To survive in those circumstances, most 'electronic entrepreneurs' need heavy capitalisation and they tend to rely upon agent software that mediates their web spaces and the interaction and transactions therein (see chapters 2 and 5). But social association (and cultural innovation) can still be produced in the World Wide Web for purposes other than – or as well as - profit.

Lessons might be drawn from the example of one of the artists referred to in chapter 5 who was using the Internet to create new work from samples of his music in collaboration with others. A further dimension that cultural policy might address, then, is the role of the Internet in building co-operative cultural production in global spaces. But the Internet can also support co-operation that is based in the local exchange of skills and knowledge as well as content. For example, a scheme in Bristol uses the Internet to administer MELTS[74]. MELTS are 'Musical Economy Local Trade Supplements', a postal or digital currency to trade in the skilled time of individuals involved in the music industry. Thus a recording engineer could trade with a session bass guitarist or a producer with promoter. The MELTS scheme is a powerful use of the Internet to build local and sector-specific bonding capital in cultural production. Grants of hardware and software to artists and arts organisations, support for web design and hosting services and subsidised connectivity are appropriate methods of supporting global and local co-operative production.

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[74] <http://tranquil-solutions.co.uk/musicmelts/melts.htm> (8 December 2001)

Encouraging cultural production in such ways is preferable to more consumption-oriented approaches to cultural tourism, territorial 'image-making' and the banality of the 'cultural brand'. Studies of cultural policy strategies for urban regeneration in a number of West European cities during the 1980s suggest that they have tended to be less significant in creating wealth and employment than for their indirect effect in 'constructing positive urban images, developing the tourism industry, attracting inward investment, and strengthening the competitive position of cities' (Bianchini 1993, 2). In such circumstances, 'cosmopolitanism' – which has for the most part been presented as a desirable condition in this thesis - may be reduced to consumption. As Kevin Robins (1991) puts it:

> Cultural products are assembled from all over the world and turned into commodities for a new 'cosmopolitan' market-place: world music and tourism; ethnic arts, fashion, and cuisine; Third World writing and cinema. The local and 'exotic' are torn out of place and time to be repackaged for the world bazaar. So-called world culture may reflect a new valuation of difference and particularity, but it is also very much about making a profit from it.

(Robins 1991, 31)

The danger of consumption-orientated cultural policies in a national context is that they can heighten tensions between competing versions of a nation's authentic culture. The 'valuation of difference and particularity' of which Robins writes refers not to aesthetic or moral values but to a commodity valuation. Yet aesthetic, moral and commodity values often become confused in cosmopolitanism.

For example, it was noted in chapter 4 that some claims for European structural funds were based in the assumption that culture and the arts should contribute to a Wales 'brand' that would protect cultural producers in Wales from the uncertainties of global markets, as well as adding value to other goods and services produced in Wales. The 'unique' values of a place (that is, its difference) might also be invoked both to protect local cultures against the threat of absorption into a supposed global monoculture and to exploit the economic potential of an implied 'authenticity'. Certainly that difference has helped the record company featured in the first case study in chapter 5 to survive in a global market. But it is ironic that in an era in which so much political protest is focused upon the global hegemony of powerful corporate

brands and their impact upon developing nations, a small country should be urged to look to branding for its survival and development. Naomi Klein (2000) has attributed the increasing power of corporate brands during the final decade of the twentieth century to the divestment by major corporations of the manufacture of things and their concentration upon the marketing of images at the centre of the organisation. Production is subcontracted out, freeing the corporation from onerous labour costs and responsibilities (or, if analogy were to be made with an arts brand, freeing government from the burden of funding cultural producers).

On a related matter, the appeal by Wales Arts International to Wales' purported 'tradition', 'richness' and 'diversity' to earn a premium for business in Wales (see chapter 4) is more than a foray into a global cultural bazaar. It can also be read as a discursive re-animation of enterprise after the manner identified by Corner and Harvey (1991). Wales Arts International merely implies a mimetic function for local art and artists: they represent an image of certain values that supposedly pertain in a place. But as both Raymond Williams and Martin Heidegger in different ways maintain, art does not merely represent or symbolise: it *produces* shared understanding. In that context, the local-arts-based 'brand' starts to look like less like a 'governmental technology' than a dangerous mutation of the Hobsbawm-Ranger thesis that national traditions are inventions. The brand defines Wales-in-the-world.

Brands have values that are manipulated by brand managers to appeal to different market segments or 'consuming tribes' (Lannon 1994). Who gets to vote on who the brand manager of the national Wales 'brand' should be or what values the brand should have? No one. Brands are not produced out of heterogeneous social practice. Focus group and other market research findings are fed through into 'brainstorming' and 'creative briefing' sessions at the advertising and design agencies that produce a 'brand identity'. The brand's *modus operandi* is style manuals; strategic decisions about resource allocation are expressed in terms of product line and brand extensions. Such thinking would produce more, not less, of the kind of thinking that led the National Assembly to recommend that 'cultural organisations which receive public funds should, as part of their application for grant, provide a statement on how they propose to promote the Welsh language' (National Assembly for Wales 2001, para.

3.23). To repeat: brands are not produced out of heterogeneous social practice. They are undemocratic.

It is not yet clear whether Wales' very public bilingualism – its marking on signage, in public service broadcasting, in education and the arts – is a sign of a divided nation or of a new democracy that can tolerate difference. If it is to be the latter, its government needs to establish the conditions in which artistic freedom, daring and innovation can flourish. But a government cannot *make* a culture.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Welsh speakers by age, 1921-1991

Source: Office of National Statistics/National Assembly for Wales (2000b, online, table 1.18)

Persons speaking Welsh (thousands)	Age							
	3-4	5-9	10-14	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+	All ages
1921	25.5	79.8	88.1	164.4	280.3	212.5	71.5	922.1
1931	18.5	64.7	73.7	146.4	280.6	238.1	87.3	909.3
1951	13.7	38.4	39.6	77.0	207.2	224.1	114.6	714.7
1961	10.5	32.4	42.8	71.5	158.7	221.9	118.3	656.0
1971	9.7	32.6	35.2	61.5	116.9	169.1	117.4	542.4
1981	8.4	33.6	41.9	63.8	110.8	132.6	117.0	508.2
1991	12.0	44.6	47.1	66.2	111.4	109.0	109.7	500.0

Percentage of persons in age group speaking Welsh	Age							
	3-4	5-9	10-14	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+	All ages
1921	26.7	29.4	32.2	34.5	36.9	44.9	51.9	37.1
1931	22.1	26.6	30.4	33.4	37.4	44.1	49.9	36.8
1951	14.5	20.1	22.2	22.8	27.4	35.4	40.7	28.9
1961	13.1	16.8	19.5	20.8	23.2	32.6	37.2	26.0
1971	11.3	14.5	17.0	15.9	18.3	24.8	31.0	20.8
1981	13.3	17.8	18.5	14.9	15.5	20.7	27.4	18.9
1991	16.1	24.7	26.9	17.1	14.5	17.3	22.6	18.5

Table 2: Distribution of Welsh speakers in Wales by unitary authority, 1991

Source: Welsh Language Board (undated, online)

Authority	Number	Percentage of population speaking Welsh
Blaenau Gwent	1,523	2.5%
Bridgend	10,159	10.3%
Caerphilly	9,714	6.9%
Cardiff	18,080	6.7%
Carmarthenshire	89,213	54.3%
Ceredigion	36,026	52.5%
Conwy	31,443	29.6%
Denbighshire	23,294	26.9%
Flint	18,399	14.1%
Gwyndedd	78,733	67.3%
Isle of Anglesey	41,240	62.3%
Merthyr Tydfil	4,237	9.3%
Monmouthshire	1,631	2.3%
Neath/Port Talbot	23,711	19.3%
Newport	2,874	2.4%
Pembrokeshire	19,759	18.4%
Powys	23,590	20.9%
Rhondda Cynon Taff	20,042	10.5%
Swansea	28,557	13.9%
Torfaen	2,128	2.7%
Wrexham	15,990	14.5%
Vale of Glamorgan	7,755	7.7%

Table 3: Self-reported Welsh-ness of residents of Wales by social class

Source: Welsh Language Board 2000 (online)

Social class	Consider yourself to be Welsh %
DE	85%
C2	78%
C1	71%
AB	63%

Map: England under Offa and Egbert

Source: Treharne and Fullard (1969, 7)

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