

Some remarks upon the relationship between
the concept of happiness and morality.

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Chapter One.

Happiness and Morality -

Introductory.

In this thesis, I have set myself the task of making some useful comments about the relationship between happiness and morality. It would be pleasant to think that within the pages that follow I have set out a theory which will account for the many problems that arise in thinking about morality and its place in the life of men, but it will become obvious that no such theory is to be presented. All that I have felt myself capable of producing is a series of comments, linked more by themes than continuous argument, which will I hope shed some light upon an obscure relationship. Most of what I say needs further examination, not, I hope, because it is internally inconsistent or because it involves non sequiturs, but because I present a view, or a way of looking at things, without then arguing whether the view is in any sense 'true'. I hope and believe that to a large extent this does not matter, for what I am doing is not to say that 'this is how it all is', but to say that this is what I take the internal relations to be. I am concerned primarily with mapping concepts on to one another to show how they interrelate and I am aware that there are broader questions which I do not deal with. For this reason I am content that I sometimes appear to be working in a circle, for though I accept that there are problems concerning the position of this circle in a still larger area of discourse, I cannot and do not make any comments upon such areas here. I will not therefore be arguing whether morality is possible; I shall not take up cudgels with the determinist, nor shall I be arguing whether we understand morality aright in our moral life. I take as my 'given' the facts of moral

life as I see them and I take also as 'given' the facts of life as I live it.

There are, I would claim, philosophical as well as personal reasons for this approach; that the problems concerning the relationship between what man 'ought to do' and what 'will make him happy' arise within the circle that I have sketched. It is only upon the assumption that morality 'makes sense' that the paradoxes claimed to arise can do so.

What then are the problems that arise in thinking about morality and happiness? There are of course many problems and these are not simply those of the philosopher. The answer to these problems could make a great difference to our thinking about our position in life which would necessarily result in changes in our lives. If we say that we just cannot see the justification of a set of rules which interfere with our pursuit of happiness, then I would maintain that either there is something 'odd' about the set of rules under discussion, or that there is something 'odd' about the notion of morality that is being worked with. In either case, the resolution of the problem would have profound effects upon the course of the life that we have lived up to that point. The reasons that I have for making this statement will, I hope, become clear as I proceed.

There are many ways in which a puzzlement about happiness and morality can show itself. The most important of these, perhaps, is

the problem of 'evil'. We take it hard when a person who has done nothing but good suffers some tragedy; we do not like to see evil-doing 'rewarded' while the good do not profit. Somehow we would like to see some connection between doing good and receiving good. Perhaps the notions of Hell and Heaven, in their most 'fundamentalist' sense, owe much of their power to this desire for 'eternal' justice.

They owe perhaps an equal amount to a puzzle over the motivation of human action. How, we ask, can we expect a man to act justly, if by doing so he is sacrificing his own interests? If the good man does act without concern for his personal advantage, for what reasons does he act? Acting against the dictates of morality is comprehensible, for we can see why a man should act in the way he does when he seeks his advantage, but for what reason should a man act were he to claim that reasons other than his advantage were his?

The answer to these questions cannot, I feel, be given in any other way than by saying that some men act for moral reasons and that such action is irrelevant to a consideration of the agent's advantage. We must not expect that the good man will receive reward nor that the evil-doer will necessarily suffer. To answer thus does not of course remove the puzzle, for unless we already felt this in some way, the puzzlement would not arise. An answer then must be attempted which will remove the puzzle and such an answer can be given, I hold, only by examining the nature of the concepts involved.

There is in the puzzle a misunderstanding of the way that moral

reasons become reasons and a misunderstanding of the nature of happiness. The former misunderstanding often involves the taking of moral dictates as rules preventing us from doing what we 'want' to do; the latter misunderstanding involves thinking of happiness as the result of the satisfaction of our desires or interests.

But even this is not clear, for although it appears to be simple to talk of human action as 'interest-satisfying', what constitutes an 'interest' is not straightforwardly obvious.

Thus, my procedure will be as follows. I shall first outline certain theories that attempt to account for the puzzles and try to show why they are unsatisfactory. In doing this, I shall make appeal to the facts of the moral life as I see them. I shall try to show that these theories are based upon a certain view of human action and suggest that it is here that their failure is guaranteed. I shall try to suggest ways of interpreting the concept of 'interest' that throw added doubt upon the clarity of such theories.

The interest theories, as I shall broadly term them, involve a particular view of what constitutes happiness. Roughly this may be characterised as follows: happiness as a state is that state of having satisfied all one's interests. Feeling happy is therefore to experience the emotion consequent upon such satisfaction. Although there is no logical connection here, the nature of emotion is often not clear either, and I shall attempt to explain the concept in order

to deal later with happiness itself. Another reason for dealing with emotion, is simply that it will enable me to introduce a concept which I think is methodologically vital in talking about the problem of morality and happiness. This is the concept of importance. It is an artificial one in some senses in that I shall define and use it for my own purposes but it is not so very far from the ordinary uses of the word 'important' as I shall attempt to show. Indeed, when I talk about it in detail, I shall talk of it as being implicit in our language.

Having discussed emotion and introduced the concept of importance, I shall move on to something resembling an analysis of the concept of happiness making use in places of the new concept, which I shall then explain in detail. Finally, I will make an attempt to relate what I have been saying to morality, both by talking about morality in terms of 'importance' and by talking about the relation between morality and emotion. Here, I shall be only marginally concerned with the theories of the 'Emotivists'.

I hope in this way to be able to set out some connections although I shall not be able to build upon a theoretical framework. My thesis is therefore that moral reasons can be talked of in terms of a concept of importance which is also central to talk about emotions and to talk about happiness.

In this way, I hope to demonstrate the connection that I see

between happiness and morality, by drawing out a common thread. My argument is really designed to show how a point of view works, and the test of it will be whether the view does in fact link the phenomena together in the way that we feel that they ought to go together. It is a conceptual unpacking of what we obscurely know already.

Let me commence by setting out more fully the nature of the problem that my following remarks are meant to assist in dissolving.

There are various adages like 'Cheats never prosper' and 'Honesty is the best policy' which appear to encapsulate the problem. Now in the world of business for example, it is often true that honesty is the best policy, for, especially in the context of buying and selling where time is valuable and verbal agreements are acted upon prior to the written agreement being drawn up (sometimes months after the action), the dishonest man will soon find himself shunned. Even among thieves we are told there is honesty. But here we have the beginning of the problem for, even in the contexts just described, honesty is the best policy only up to a point. Thus, there may come a point when it is more advantageous, to the firm that one works for or to oneself, to appear to be honest rather than be honest. One can sometimes fool the person with whom one is dealing, getting him to act upon an agreement while backing out oneself and finding some plausible reason to excuse oneself. If one does this too often there would no doubt be a comeback, but occasionally such a procedure is advantageous.

One can see the motive in acting thus, but how do we account for the man who refuses to act thus? Is the man who refuses to act dishonestly even when such refusal appears to be contrary to what we understand by his interests, in the 'long run' made happier by his action?

It is often said, foolishly I believe, that the dishonest man will always be found out and shunned, thus receiving the just punishment for his 'crime'. This seems to me foolish on many counts. Firstly, it is obvious that the unjust man is not always discovered and secondly, in the world of business he is not necessarily shunned for occasional actions of that sort. There is even an admiration expressed for the man who is 'tough' enough to ignore the 'right' thing to do on occasion. True, if he always sought his own interest he would be shunned for no one could carry on business with him, but if he occasionally seeks his own advantage, expertly and especially when by doing so he will remove himself from the circle of those he 'does down', he is treated as a hard-headed business man and as exemplifying certain virtues. On the contrary side of the picture, the man who refuses to act dishonestly on occasion is often treated as 'soft', and even as a liability to his firm for he will not seek the advantage of his employer by every practicable means.

The problem here is a two-fold one. Firstly, it seems unjust that the good man should suffer and the man who is prepared to ignore moral reasons, profit. (There is no reason to call this second man an evil man. Few hard-headed businessmen deserve a title accorded

to people like Barabas in the Jew of Malta.) Secondly, there is a problem of motivation which is of course conceptually connected with the first problem. We can understand the man who acts to serve his own interest or the interest of his firm, for this man in serving his firm may well be serving his own interest. (Sometimes the problem is not settled in this way. Often, in fact, the buyer or salesman is hard-headed from pride or vanity rather than for interest reasons. This is perhaps something to pick up later.) Thus, if honesty is a policy which can be discarded when not appropriate, honesty is a means like a fund of good jokes, or at least it works in the same terms. However, why should the man who refuses to treat honesty as a means, but as something resembling a command, act as he does? Is he thereby happier than the man who does not act this way?

It sounds an excess of piety to claim that 'true' happiness can only be gained by acting rightly, for we do not always see unhappy villains. Besides this, the introduction of the term 'true happiness' is suspicious. Qualifications like this need explanation and justification and are often a persuasive redefinition of the concept.

My answer to these problems is along these lines. I do not believe that acting wrongly brings unhappiness for all people. It is only the just man who is worried by unjust action. Indeed, this statement is circular for we could reasonably define the just man as he who is worried about unjust action. The man who cares nothing for

morality is not therefore worried by acting against its dictates except when he is shunned because he does it too obviously. Only the man who can feel guilt is troubled by the possibility of guilt. Certain, perhaps irresponsible, psychiatrists, I am told, have argued that the greatest barrier to man's attainment of happiness is his sense of right and wrong. I am sure that in some sense at least this is a true if foolish comment. It is true that many people are unhappy because they feel guilty of some wrong, and would not be unhappy if they cared nothing for right and wrong, but it is foolish because the psychiatrist is arguing that we should 'do away with' morality and the moral life. Guilt is a phenomenon of the moral life and only, surely, becomes the subject of psychiatric concern if it becomes irrational in the sense that the degree to which someone feels guilty is out of proportion to his 'crime'. (It has always seemed to me that St. Augustine overdid his 'crime' of scrumping apples for example.) Thus, I think the demand that the moral man be rewarded and the immoral man be not, is a reflection of our concern for justice but is a demand that we cannot, cosmically, expect to be satisfied.

However, even if we cease to worry about this problem, and I do not suggest that we should, there remains the problem of the motivation of the moral man. Why does he act as he does? Perhaps more importantly, why should he say that he could not be happy acting otherwise? Here we begin to see that the problem of happiness is not solved by talking in terms of interests, for it is surely a comprehensible point of view to hold that happiness is not achieved

by self-seeking. By comprehensible I mean that it appears to make sense to say this, and that there are recognisably human beings who hold and act upon this belief.

The resolution of this problem is to be achieved only by an examination of the concept of happiness and its relations with such seemingly straightforward concepts like 'interests'.

There are, however some theories of morality which seek to avoid the paradox just described by re-defining the moral life so that it does not arise. In my opening remarks I said that I would regard as 'given' the phenomena of the moral life as it is lived. I cannot see that talk about the concepts involved can be carried on in any other way. Thus, I think that theories that seek to re-define morality can be criticised if they lead us to positions that conflict with our moral thinking. That is to say, if a theory tells us that morality is of such and such a nature and this implies certain phenomena which do not square with our moral thinking then this is so much the worse for the theory. The way that any theory may be criticised for doing this, of course, has to be demonstrated in terms of the theory, for it is always possible that a re-description as opposed perhaps to a re-definition may in fact both square with our thoughts about the moral life and help us the better to understand it. Thus, I propose to evaluate two types of moral theory in an attempt to see whether they are satisfactory. If they are, then the problems that we have discussed will appear chimerical for these theories claim that there is in fact no gap between morality and 'interest', or at least what

gap there is can be bridged. I will call these theories respectively, the 'self-interest' and the 'functionalist' theories. I think that it is true to say that both these theories have been held in the form that I discuss them. I shall take as an example of the 'self-interest' theory, that put forward by G. R. Grice in his recent, stimulating book 'The grounds of moral judgement'.¹ However, when I come to the 'functionalist' theory, I shall use as my springboard the theory put forward by John Kemp in his 'Reason, Action and Morality',² without thereby wishing to imply that his comments represent fully what I should want to call a functionalist position. It seems to me that some remarks in chapter eleven of this book suggest that such a theory is put forward but there are other remarks which suggest differences. I choose the book because I wish to discuss it from another point of view later and therefore there is economy in using it as a springboard here.

The similarity between the two theories is that they both claim that morality is a means to man's happiness; the difference between them is that while the 'self-interest' theory holds that man in acting morally is acting directly in his own 'interests', the 'functionalist' theory holds that the relation is indirect. They can be briefly characterised as follows. The 'self-interest' theory holds that a reason to be just can be given to any man in terms of his interests; that it is, though it appear otherwise, in fact in the interests of

1. All references to Grice in this thesis are to this book.
2. All references to Kemp in this thesis are to this book.

the agent to act morally. The 'functionalist' theory, on the other hand, holds that morality serves a function in social life; that it maintains the conditions necessary for man to live a certain style of life. Thus morality is a means to some further end in that though the motive for acting morally is not on each occasion a self-interest one, the institution of morality is to be justified in terms of its effects.

Now, as I mentioned before, it is not entirely clear what is covered by the terms 'self-interest' or 'interests' here. There are many ways of using the term 'interest' which do not always add up to the same thing. Thus we talk of (1) a man being interested (opposite uninterested) in sailing or pottery where we mean something like he enjoys sailing or making pottery, or follows its activities. If a man is interested in sailing, we should expect him to follow the reports in the newspapers, to take part in races or rallies, to talk about it, read about it and so on. Such an interest can of course be casual, passing, or abiding, these terms referring perhaps, to the amount of time the man spends on his interest. A man with an abiding interest in sailing may have many books on boats, be very interested in the history of sailing, spend time in his boat, while a man who is casually interested in it may only crew for a friend occasionally but take, say, no trouble to learn the intricacies of sail-making. It is impossible to legislate for what the interested man would do, of course, for the interest can take many forms, but the central point, I take it, is that there is no end towards which his sailing is directed.

He is not interested in that he expects or hopes to gain in other ways from his activity.

Another sense of interest, which I think is more central to self-interest theories of morality, is the sense in which a man may be interested (2) in the production of a play (opposite disinterested). There is no reason to suppose that this man is interested or indeed uninterested in sense (1), for what we are saying, perhaps, is that the man stands to gain or lose by the success of the play. He may be the author or he may have backed the play financially, for example, or he may 'have an interest' in its failure if he wishes to put another play on at the same theatre or if he wishes to see his rival director fail. In reports of court cases we sometimes hear talk of the 'interested parties' being represented by counsel. Counsel here is retained to 'look after their interests' - to ensure that they are not adversely affected by the progress of the case.

Yet another sense in which we use the word is the sense (3) in which we speak of a man taking an interest in, say, the course of his son's education. Here, we may not mean that he is interested in either of the other two senses, but simply that he cares for his son and seeks to ensure that his son is educated properly. He may, to do this, have to force himself to take an interest in the theories of education.

It is fairly clear that what links these uses together is the

concept of motivation. To talk of a man being interested (1), is to classify his activity in a certain way, to say that it is not end-directed and to link it with other motivation concepts like 'enjoyment' and so on. To say that a man is interested in sense (2), is to say that he seeks some gain by his activity and that there is a possibility of bias in his comments in respect of his interest. Sense (3) is not as clear as the other two, but roughly it seems to mean that the man cares about something because he cares about something else intimately connected with it.

Much more could be said about these uses but it will be immediately more profitable to discuss them in terms of the 'self-interest' theory. Which use is involved here?

When we talk of something being in someone's interest, we mean that there is a reason for his doing it, whether he recognise it or not. If x is in A's interest, then A has an interest in x, whether A recognises this or not. Now, it would be difficult to say that A was interested (sense 1) in x, if he did not recognise it. However, A could have an interest in x and not recognise it in sense (2), for it could be that what happens with regard to x will affect A in some way. What A is unaware of, therefore, is some empirical connection between x and other of his interests or his aims. Thus, it is possible to talk of acting in A's interest even when A does not recognise the action to be such. Nor does sense (3) seem appropriate, for this seems to explain A's actions consequent upon

his taking an interest as being the realisation of a connection between something he cares for and the subject of his interest. Sense (3) seems closer to sense (1), than it does to sense (2).

However, it is not entirely clear that all self-interest theories do use only sense (2) of the concept, for the self-interest theory is one which attempts to explain the motivation of action, and it seems obvious that not all human action can be directed at some further end. There has to be a stop somewhere. Thus, x is in A's interest only if x affects something that matters to A. Thus, if the play that A is backing will make A a lot of money, there is a sense in which certain actions, like advertising the play, talking highly of it, getting a prominent personality to speak well of it and so on, are only in A's interest if A cares for the money that it will bring. (Of course A may have an interest in it in other ways; he may for example think that the author deserves some recognition and so on, but it is difficult to see here that this is his self-interest.) Thus, in general terms we might say that x is in A's interest (2) if the action which is x will bring about or assist in bringing about or prevent the failure of, or some such formula, something which is or will bring success for some of A's aims.¹

1. It is possible for some other person to say that x is in A's interest even if A claims not to want some end aided by x. It might be said that A ought to want this end or that he will come to appreciate it. It cannot, however, be said of A that he is acting for his interests unless the end, which is supposed to represent, at this moment, his interests, is recognised as such by the agent A. Allowance must be made here for possible descriptions of actions in terms of unconscious motivation, of course.

However, such a formula will not satisfy entirely the needs of the self-interest theory. For example, suppose that A's aim is the relief of suffering in some part of the world. It is in the interest of the relief of suffering that A acts, not really in terms of his own interests. Somehow, it seems that what the self-interest theory wants is some 'personal' identification of someone's interests.

Let us briefly examine Grice's theory and see whether this is so.

On page 22 of his book, Grice claims that his theory will give any man a reason for acting in accordance with the dictates of morality. In fact he proposes never to claim that:

"...s1, as a reason for a man's doing an action x, is better than s2 as a reason for his doing not-x, unless I think that, whoever he may be, he would be convinced that it is; provided only that he understands what is being said to him. Good will is not presupposed."

(The emphasis in this quotation is mine.)

Grice is therefore claiming that there are reasons which make appeal to any man, no matter what his interests are. Thus, he appears to hold that there is a type of reason for action which every man would see as a reason. He makes a distinction, it seems, between these reasons and the reasons which only the man of good will could have. In other words, Grice is pointing to what he takes to be a fact about human nature. The interests are therefore to be identified

in terms of the man as a unit or individual. Self-interest therefore must be the set of interests that a man has, seen in contradistinction to the interests of others for only the 'altruistic' man as Grice later calls him, is interested in others. They are self-centred reasons in that they make reference only to the self of the agent. The essential thing is that they must be seen as belonging to an individual and can be identified only in distinction to the interests of another agent. Thus, take a man A who wants a, and sees action x as in his interest because it will bring about a. Take another man B who wants b which can be represented as not-a, then we have a situation in which the interests of A run contrary to the interests of B, for as long as the situation is kept to this simple minimum. x is not in B's interest because it will bring about a state which he does not want.¹ B has therefore a reason to prevent x, and A a reason to encourage x. Now, Grice maintains that the use of such reasons can account for the whole of moral thinking as well. In his words, he is claiming that

"... reasons can be given for acting morally not only to a man who wants to be moral but also to a man who does not care a brass farthing whether he is moral or not."

(op.cit. P 23)

We should remember here that there is only one type of reason permissible - that in terms of the agent's interests defined in

1. To say that A wants a is not, of course to say that a is in A's interest. It may be the case both that A wants a and that a is in A's interests, but this is not always so. In Grice's discussion, there does not seem room for this distinction, so I have set out the above in his terms.

contradistinction to the interest of anyone else. But one thing that morality commands us to do on occasion is to give up actions which are in our interests, for the sake of the interests of others. Grice is therefore committed to showing how his theory can account for a distinction between types of reason for action which he has implicitly denied is relevant.

Let us follow through Grice's theory to see what happens. It will be instructive because there is a point where he begins to confuse sense (1) and sense (2) of the use of 'interest' which gives a surface plausibility to his remarks. To proceed, Grice commences by making a distinction between 'independent' interests and 'non-independent' interests.

The former is the interest of the agent assessed independently of the interests of anyone else while the latter is the interest of the agent combined with the interests of other people. The logical connection between these two is very obscure but Grice explains it as follows: (P 30)

"A man of altruistic disposition characteristically acts in certain ways because it is in the interest of others that he should do so...there is a good sense in which it is in his interest to act in these ways; he is not, except occasionally, made more miserable by doing so. On the contrary, he is, on the whole, made happier. When we speak in this way of its being in his interest to act in the interest of other people,

I wish to say that this is an assessment of his interest which is not independent of the interests of other people."

Thus non-independent interests are interests that are not independent of the interests of other people. This distinction which Grice holds to be crucial, is however only an illusory one. It is only in the interest of an agent to consider the interests of others if he is of 'an altruistic disposition' and if he is not, then this distinction disappears. Indeed, even for the altruistic person, the distinction is unimportant, for it marks, according to Grice's psychology, merely a part of his interests. He happens to like helping others just as he happens, perhaps, to like breeding ducks. Thus, what is in his 'non-independent' interest is simply in his interests independently assessed - if he does not do x which aids someone else then he is not doing something which is in his interests to do. In the same way, if he does not attend the lecture course on hatching duck eggs, he is omitting to do something which will enable him to further his interest in breeding ducks. For the man who cares nothing for ducks nor people, neither action is in his interests in any sense, and there can be no reason for carrying out the actions. This is so because Grice has claimed that 'good will is not presupposed'.

The surface plausibility of Grice's attempt to describe all reasons in terms of the concept of 'self-interest' comes from his confusion over 'interest'. There is indeed a sense in which the man of 'altruistic disposition' is interested in the well-being of other

people and indeed takes an interest in their well-being but it is simply a confusion to say that action which safeguards their well-being is in the agent's interest. Grice is using 'interest' in the latter use here in the sense of the interest of the agent expressed in contradistinction to the interests of others. A coincidence between the interests of others and the interests of the agent occurs when it is in the interest of the agent to help others for some further end of his own. That the agent is interested, or takes an interest in the welfare of others does not mean that it is in his (self) interest to act for their well-being. Thus, suppose that A does x because it is in the interest of B that he do it and this is his only reason, A being a person who takes an interest in the well-being of others. x cannot be in A's interest (sense 2), unless either x will enable B to do something which is in A's interests or doing x for B will persuade, say, another person C to do something which is in A's interests. These alternatives being ex hypothesi counted out, it cannot be said that A's action for B is in A's interest. This is because to be able to identify A's interests (2) in the first place, we had to distinguish them from B's and A's interests cannot be served unless the results of the action 'return' to A, which again ex hypothesi, they do not.

I have said that I do not intend to argue whether altruistic action is 'possible' for I take as a fact of moral life that such actions occur. Thus, it would seem that some notion of 'good will' is in fact required to account for disinterested action.

Let us continue with the examination of Grice's theory to see where the facts that he has missed show up in his account.

To proceed, Grice has defined the sentence 'A ought to do x' such that it implies 'a proposition in terms of the concept of better reason for doing x than' (any other reason) (P 25), and better reasons are those which anyone who understands will see as better reasons for acting without recourse to good will. That is to say one reason is better than any other only if it can be seen to appeal more successfully to the agent's interests. There is a reason to do x and a reason not to do x. The reason that rationality demands we follow is that which serves our interests best. Grice proceeds to make a distinction between an abstract (similar to Ross's "prima facie") obligation and an actual obligation, which he sets out as follows;

"A ought (abstractly) to do x
implies

There is a reason for A's doing x which is better than any in terms of his overall independent interest for doing either x or not-x." (P 31)

"A ought (actually) to do x
implies

There is a reason for A's doing x which is better than any other reason of the same kind for doing either x or not-x."
(P 31)

An abstract obligation holds that there is a reason for acting which is better than any reason to the contrary that is expressible in terms of the agent's interests. An actual obligation is one which holds in the conflict of two abstract ones. The thing to notice here is that Grice is already beginning to go back upon what he said at the beginning. It is no doubt true (and I would hold it to be an essential part of the concept of moral obligation) that a moral obligation yields a reason for acting no matter what one's own independent interests are but unless Grice can show some way in which the action performed under the obligation is in fact in the interests of the agent, then he has explicitly contradicted his statement that only reasons in terms of the interests of the agent are rationally acceptable.

He wants to do this in terms, of course, of his concept of 'non-independent' interests, but we have already seen that the distinction is illusory. It seems that Grice has noticed a fact about moral life which his theory will not account for.

Grice says (P 92)

"'Doing x is against my interest', is not incompatible with, 'The requirement upon everyone, including me, to do x, is in my interest.'"

Grice's point is that while x may be in my interests, it might further my interests even more, if, even though it means my not doing

x, no one else did it either. Thus, if I can find some means of getting everyone not to do x, my interests will be the better served.

This method or means, Grice seems to suggest, is morality, represented as a form of fictional contract not to do x. Thus he says, to say that x is obligatory (everyone ought to do x) is to say that everyone individually benefits by there being a prescription to do x - or better, to say that x is obligatory is to say that it is in everyone's interests to make a contract to do x.

It is the presence of the moral rule which is beneficial to each member of the society and since an obligation to do x is to be defined as a better reason for doing x than any reason in terms of the agent's independent interests, every member of the society has a better reason for doing x, given the existence of the moral rule. Thus, with various modifications which follow on from this, Grice claims to have given a reason for any person to act morally - good will not being assumed. However, most people would be highly suspicious of this argument, and rightly so for it is really only a clever piece of sophistry.

There are two major difficulties here. The first is that the argument depends upon the distinction between independent and non-independent interests which we have seen to be untenable. If it is untenable then the move from x is obligatory to A has a reason for doing x will not, on Grice's starting point, hold. If only reasons

in terms of the agent's interests are possible, and there is no reason in terms of the agent's interests, (as there is not if non-independent interests do not make sense, or are reducible to independent ones), then Grice has given the man without good will, no reason at all.

The second difficulty is allied to this. It is always up to some 'master-criminal', as Grice calls him, to break the rules so long as he can get away with it. Grice tries to defend himself against this by saying that such action is possible but irrational. So long as someone understands Grice's argument, he will have a reason to act morally. Some people will not be able to understand, and to that extent their actions will be irrational.

On page 133, Grice says;

"If there are classes of action such that it is rational that every member of a society should be required to do actions of those classes, then we cannot deny that it is rational for individuals to do such actions...we cannot then deny that there is a reason for everyone's doing them."

On page 139, he says

"For any individual, it may be the case that his greater interest is served by everyone else doing such actions, while he does notBut it cannot be rational to act in this way. It is rational only to act in accordance with the requirements which are in the contractually harmonized interests of everyone."

In the first quoted passage above, we must agree that if a moral rule is a rational one, then what it asks us to do or not to do, must be rational as well, in the sense that it will not be irrational to carry out its commands. A moral rule which asked us to clap our hands three times every hour would, in this society, be irrational. But that something is a rational thing to do, does not mean that not to do it is irrational. It is not irrational to prefer marmalade to jam nor vice versa. It is in this sense that the first quoted passage is true, but in the second passage we find the words 'It is rational only to...' which is not implied by the first passage. Grice has proved that morality is not irrational, not that only morality is rational.

Thus, Grice is not to be allowed to escape the 'master criminal' argument in this way, and must face up to the fact that the master criminal has reasons for acting - that his action is rational. To say that his actions are irrational is to say that they do not make sense and, unfortunately, they make sense only too well.

Thus, it seems to me that Grice's arguments fall right at the beginning of his theory, for he cannot give "any one" a reason to act morally outside of morality. He makes the vital distinction between self-interest and morality and cannot bridge the gap between them. Grice has a point, which we will discuss further in talking about functionalism, when he says that it may often be in the individual's interests to make a contract to do or not to do certain things. But

as with Hobbes and his contract, this already presupposes a concept of morality for the making of the contract to be possible. The concept of a contract is logically post and not prior to morality. Thus Grice must assume, as he does, an understanding of moral obligation before his analysis of it in terms of interests. It works before this and without this. Though it be in an individual's interests to make such a contract, what makes him keep to it is, so to speak, his moral sense, and not his concern for his interests. As Peter Winch¹ points out, social life would be impossible without rules about truth-telling, but what stops me lying is not the thought that social life will be harmed but the thought that it is wrong. A moral injunction may be explained by reference to its function in social life, but individual applications of it are not so justified - they do not need justification.

We can therefore, say that the connection between morality and happiness is not that morality is concerned to make the agent happier. Self-interest theories founder upon the fact that morality sets problems for us rather than solves them for us.²

There is therefore a difference between reasons in terms of the agent's interests (sense 2), and moral reasons and these can sometimes conflict. Grice's failure is due to his ability to recognise that

1. 'Nature and Convention' PAS 1959/60.
2. As Winch also says c.f. Moral Integrity (Inaugural Lecture King's College, London (Blackwell)).

there is a difference in the first place, for once this fact is recognised there is no real hope of finding a theory which will reduce both types of reason to the same kind.

However, there may still be something to be said in favour of the 'social', as opposed to the 'personal', utility of morality. Grice's mistake lies in attempting to show that there are reasons for any man to be just. Among those theorists who we might term 'functionalists' there are those who make the same mistake. Kurt Baier and Marcus Singer could be numbered among these but that this is mistaken does not mean that morality does not serve a function in terms of social life.

The functionalist position is that morality exists to guarantee the conditions that make social life possible. As Hume says in his Principles of Morals:¹

"The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and untruthful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men."

This theory need not attempt, on the surface at least, to give each man a reason to be just, for it is much more interested in explaining the 'rationality' of morals. Effectively, what it does

1. Selby-Bigge edition of Enquiries Sect 144, P 181.

is to set up criteria for evaluating the propriety of any particular moral code or statement. If the code or the principle which the statement implies, serves the function of bringing about or maintaining a certain level of social life, then it is a rational and proper one.

John Kemp says:

"A moral rule must not merely fulfill the condition...that it can be acted upon, or adopted as an ideal; it must also fulfill the more restrictive condition that it can be adopted as a means of initiating or preserving or extending some kind of co-operation or social activity between human beings."¹

Here Kemp is saying that the main function of moral rules is that they enable us to 'get on' with other people.

As I said before, there are passages in this book which suggest that Kemp's theory is not simply a 'functionalist' one, and I will come to these differences in a moment. However, let us suppose for our immediate purposes that we are dealing with a simple functionalist position.

Thus, the functionalist position is that there is a form of life - call it the 'good life' - which men wish to attain. In a state of nature, it would be impossible to achieve this 'good life' because its attainment depends upon certain forms of interaction which would

1. Op. cit. P 196.

be, in this state, impossible. Morality is seen as a means whereby the 'good life' can be achieved and maintained. The existence of morality brings about greater happiness for man.

Note that the theory does not say that individually each man will necessarily benefit from his moral acts, and does not, on the surface at least, offer motives for moral action. Indeed, it appears that the only motive for moral action is in fact respect for the moral code.

In his paper, 'Morality and Advantage', David Gauthier describes this thesis as follows. It is the thesis that:

"Morality is a system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts upon it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts."¹

Elsewhere, Gauthier demonstrates that the agent can expect to benefit from the disadvantageous acts of others but not from his own.²

However, as he points out in the first mentioned work, it seems a fact of our moral life that morality does not cease to bind when it begins to be more advantageous to live outside the moral system, rather than support it.

What is the force of this criticism? The point is that even

1. Philosophical Review 1967 P 461/462.
2. David P. Gauthier Practical Reasoning.

this theory seeks to justify morality in terms of the advantage that can be gained from it. If morality can be taken as a means then in principle at least, it is replaceable in the event of a more effective means. The connection between means and ends here is not as simple as in the self-interest theory, but in effect it comes to the same thing.

Let us put it this way. Suppose a society found out that if everyone took a very deep breath at 6 o'clock in the morning, all hurricanes would be avoided. It could be quite rightly said that everyone, whether they lived on the normal track of hurricanes or not, had a duty to take the deep breath every morning. Now, if later a different way of controlling the hurricanes was discovered which was more effective than the deep breaths of the populace, then it could replace the old system immediately. In one sense, the taking of the breaths did not matter, it was only its result that mattered.

If we put the whole of morality, (morality as an institution), on a par with this, then the discovery of a drug, for example which made the population amenable to one's will, could bring about the conditions for the 'good life' and replace the older, and probably more inefficient means of having a morality. From the point of view of one member of the society, the morality serves a function, and when this function is better, for him, done by some other means, there seems on the 'functionalist' account no reason why he should not adopt it.

It may be true that ordinary men need the moral system but once a man finds that he does not need it, then on the functionalist account there seems no reason for him to stick to it.

Nietzsche's *Übermensch* did not need the social system to enable him to live what for him was the good life. On this account, there is no reason for him to live according to any morality for it is not a means that he needs.

This objection is of course similar to that made concerning the self-interest theories and relies upon the fact that morality cannot be solely a means to an end for it is also the judge of any means. Means and ends are themselves both the subject matter of moral scrutiny.¹

In particular, the objection framed to the functionalist position raises again the spectre of 'interest', for it is not clear when speaking of the good life whether this is to be interpreted in terms of the 'self-interests' of any agent involved or not. In my objection, I spoke as if the good life was some reflection of a body of 'self-interests' but in Kemp's treatment, this does not appear to be so.

1. This argument is designed to show that morality, as a whole, cannot be conceived as a means to some end. However, it is possible and probable that some moral rules gain their force from the fact that they are means to some morally good end. This is especially so of some rules of etiquette perhaps - wiping your feet on the mat - but also of rules for particular situations - returning books to the library promptly.

Thus, if the 'good life' is merely a reflection of self-interests writ large, then the problem of justifying it as the good life does not occur. There can be no dispute about ends. However, Kemp is prepared to countenance the possibility of a dispute about ends. He argues, for example:

"If a man ... disputed the need for, or the value of, co-operation and social activity, or the claim that it was the function of morality to promote these ends, he would be committed either to attempting to show that certain ends which he and his opponents agreed in valuing could be better achieved in some other way (and it is difficult to see how he could begin this attempt, let alone succeed in it (A.1.): or to rejecting the ends for the achievement of which some sort of social life and some sort of morality are essential conditions - and to do this would be to reject any kind of recognisably human life altogether. (A.2.)"

There are in this passage two different arguments, which I have marked by putting (A.1.) and (A.2.) after each respectively. The first, (A.1.), is really the functionalist argument, which can be answered by the supposition of another means, for example, a drug which caused great love for others, or less pleasantly, an operation which reduced man's aggressiveness. These examples may seem far-fetched but they are comprehensible and do, perhaps, have some sort of counter-parts in real life (Alcohol, some 'truth' drugs, in the first case and lobotomy in the second.) However, the second argument, (A.2.), is

different in form, relying upon the concept of 'recognisably human life'. This is particularly interesting because it suggests that the 'ends' which the pure 'functionalist' or 'self-interest' theory (perhaps 'naive' is a better word than 'pure') pre-suppose, are not in fact 'morally neutral'. The concept of a 'recognisably human life' seems to me to contain moral value. If this end is not just something 'desired' but 'valued' then morality in the sense of the moral code might be termed a means for bringing about the 'morally valuable life'. However, this is no longer to claim morality as a means, for there appears not a causal but an internal relation between the form of the moral code and the ends that it achieves. This can no longer be called a functionalist position. Thus, I find an ambiguity in this work and shall come on to deal more fully with the idea that the moral code is set up to achieve the moral life, a somewhat obscure statement, later on in chapter 6.

Up to this point, I have been dealing with theories that claim morality to be a means to happiness and have found reasons for rejecting them. However, one of the major reasons for rejecting them that has been implicit in what I have been saying is that they imply that happiness is the result of the satisfaction, in some sense, of the agent's interests. My argument has therefore been directed to showing that in this sense morality cannot be a means to happiness because morality often requires that we ignore our own interest. However, I do not wish to imply that morality must be conceived as a barrier to happiness, for we must account for the man who could not be happy doing what is

wrong. My theory is that for some people right action is an integral part of their happiness.

However, to explain this we have to develop some concepts which will enable us to find a different way of conceiving of human action. Both the 'pure' functionalist and the self-interest theorist see human action as motivated only "from the self". Behind these theories there appears to lie a conception of man as a unit with needs operating in a purely objective world. Value in the world comes only from the needs of the unit. On a deep level this may have a great deal of sense in it but on this surface level it is simply a misrepresentation. It seems to be a picture which is very difficult to escape and can lead into some very wierd lines of thought. For example, the picture leads the psychologist sometimes to talk of 'altruistic desires'¹ which totally confuses a crucial moral distinction, in a way similar to the theory of Grice, with his talk of the 'altruistic' man'.

To try to develop some concepts, I am going to investigate the concept of emotion. In this investigation, I shall suggest that a different picture of man's relation with his world must be used to account for the facts about our emotional life.

1. See Individual in Society. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey
P 97-99.

Emotion is relevant here for two reasons. Firstly, emotions are often referred to in talking of human motivation and it is this concept that plays a large part in our present problem. Secondly, it will help us when we come to talk about the concept of happiness later. In this chapter on happiness, I shall be trying to show that the 'interest' view of the nature of happiness is wrong-headed and I shall need, in order to do this, to have suggested a few points first.

Chapter Two.

Action and Emotion -
(Part One).

In this chapter, I shall be concerned with examining the nature of some, though not necessarily all, uses of emotion words. I shall be primarily concerned with examining those uses which explain or account for action. In other words, I shall be interested in the relation between emotion and action.


The unsophisticated view of this connection is of a force which, generated from 'within' the agent, causes overt behaviour. All emotional behaviour on this view is caused by some state of the 'self' and is thus fairly easy to fit into some kind of 'interest' theory if this concept is not too closely examined. It will be my concern to show that such views are mistaken and that emotional action can be explained only in terms of a relationship between the agent and something 'external' to himself.

Recent work on the concept of emotion has been directed, largely in refutation, at the theories of William James. In James we find a particularly clear statement of a traditional approach to emotion and for this reason his work provides an excellent starting point. Most modern theories direct our attention to the fact that James misconstrues the nature of emotion words. He held that words like 'anger', 'fear' and so on, name certain internal experiences that we have. Being internal and private, they cannot be described and it is only "their relations to the objects which prompt them..."¹ which can be discussed.

1. William James Psychology P 373.

Emotions, for James, consist in the conscious awareness of bodily change, consequent upon perception. Emotion for James is essentially sensation.

His theory might be represented in a diagram thus;



(B.R. = Bodily reaction: R. = reaction in overt terms.)

(Figure 1)

The theory is essentially a causal one. The 'exciting fact', some part of the world, is perceived through the senses, or presented to consciousness by the imagination or memory, and causally produces a bodily reaction, which in turn produces a reaction (R) in terms of the agent's position in the world. Sensation is essentially a by-product. We are aware of our reaction in that we are aware of our bodily reaction to the stimulus.

For James, emotion is feeling, the awareness of reaction and not something which brings about such reaction.¹ Hence his famous comment;

"Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run... The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect... and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble..."².

There can be, in James, no meaningful ascription of an emotion word without the ascription of feelings. Distinction between emotion is a matter of distinction between feelings. Anger is one set of sensations, whereas fear is another set.

James says at various points in his writings, that emotions can be artificially induced in someone, simply by inducing in him the sensations constitutive of that emotion. However, it is not entirely clear that James' theory will totally support this view. If we say that emotion is merely sensation and any sensation however caused will count, then it follows that emotions can be artificially induced. On the other hand if emotions are those sensations of bodily change consequent upon perception of some exciting fact, then the converse is true. No set of feelings is an emotion set unless it is the consciousness of bodily change consequent upon perception.

1. As distinct from Descartes for example. The 'traditionalness' of James' theory is in treating emotions as feelings.
2. Op.Cit. P 376 and elsewhere in works.

To give someone the sensation of fear in this case, it is necessary to scare him; that is make him perceive some exciting fact which will have the required effect upon him.

In talking about emotion, James links them to instincts. The latter for James is a tendency to act, and "Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well."¹ In the diagram (Fig. 1) above, the reaction to the stimulus is represented as non-mediated. It is an immediate reaction, not mediated by thought, or decision making. This is roughly what we mean by 'instinctive action', that in acting instinctively we act without considering the best thing to do. James seems to take emotion, the awareness of bodily change, to be awareness of this type of bodily change, an instinctive reaction. He suggests, (pps 386-390), that bodily change which does not result in action (trembling as opposed to running away in fear), has in fact its genesis in earlier stages of development of man, when something like this did in fact aid the agent. One is not quite sure how serious he is all of the time but he quotes Darwin, Spencer and other evolutionaries in support.

In other words, while James says that emotion is merely the awareness of bodily change, one is left with the feeling that what he means is awareness of non-mediated bodily change in reaction to some 'exciting fact'. If he does not want to imply this, he should also accept certain kinaesthetic sensations, like that of

1. Op. cit. P 373.

moving one's leg, as emotions and he does not do this.¹

If we suppose that James would want to say that it is only those sensations of immediate action which are the emotions, then his theory becomes less easily seen as an investigation into the concept of emotion. What he tells us is the nature of emotional experience. He says that what we feel, when we are experiencing emotional feelings, are sensations of bodily change.

To spell this out a little, let us suppose that I decide to go to the shops in a strange town, see a sign pointing to the town centre and turn in that direction. My action is, therefore, consequent upon a perception. To make the story different from that of Fig.1, let us add that I reason that in the town centre there are likely to be found the shops that I wish to visit. According to the sort of view that James holds, I have certain sensations of my legs moving consequent upon my seeing the sign. Unless James is prepared to say that these sensations are emotion, he is committed to a view which makes a distinction between types of action consequent upon perception. His treatment of instincts with his treatment of emotions, and his talk of 'exciting facts' suggests that he would make such a distinction. Thus, he cannot strictly mean what he says. His theory becomes not the reductionist thesis concerning the concept of emotion, but a theory about the nature of feelings in (otherwise identifiable) emotional experience. As such, it is empirically false as we shall

1. The existence of kinaesthetic sensations may be doubtful, but James holds that every bodily change, including movement, is felt.

later see but it includes by implication the view of the concept of emotion which says that emotional action is non-mediated reaction to a stimulus.

I find the theory of emotion which can be presented along these lines particularly attractive. It seems to me that part of what we mean by saying that someone is acting from emotion is that what he is doing or the symptoms that he is displaying are not the result of conscious decision upon his part. In the rest of this chapter I shall be concerned to amplify this comment and to show that the addition of this neo-Jamesian view to the comments made by more recent writers will enable us to get an overall view of the concept of emotion.

The James theory has been attacked in depth by modern writers who use his theory as a springboard to present their own. Before proceeding to deal with some of these theories, let us summarise what James holds.

He holds, explicitly at least, that emotion words name sensations, that the difference between sensations is the difference between emotions. Behaviour consequent upon perception of the 'exciting fact' is causally connected with it and that the ascription of an emotion word to someone implies the ascription of feelings to that person. His theory depends upon the fact that there are many different sets

of sensations - many, that is, sets of bodily changes which we are, or can be, aware of.

Philosophers have mounted four main lines of attack on James. Firstly, that the distinction between emotions is not a matter of empirical investigation into sensations. There are distinctions of a conceptual nature to be made. Secondly, that emotion words do not simply name sensations, but explain and account for action. Thirdly, and consequent upon the first two points, that the concept of emotion is tied conceptually, and not empirically, to the concept of action. To say that a man is afraid is to imply that he is, will be or feels like doing something. Lastly, that emotion words can be predicated of a man without implying thereby that he is experiencing any sensations.

Psychologists have mounted three main lines of attack. One, that not all bodily changes are felt and that subjects vary in their skill in detecting bodily change, without demonstrating thereby a proportionate difference in variability of emotional life. Two, that bodily changes which are felt in emotional experience do not seem to vary, sufficiently to satisfy James' account, with difference in emotion. There is insufficient variation in bodily change to account for the richness of emotional life. There would seem to be, in fact, only two important bodily changes which can be associated with emotional experience - the secretion of adrenalin and of noradrenalin into the bloodstream having a consequent effect upon such factors as

heart-rate or breathing rate and so on. Three, even these bodily changes occur outside of what would be called 'emotional experience'.

I will leave these psychological points until later when I shall deal with an interesting series of experiments carried out by Stanley Schachter, and will commence with the philosophical objections to James' theory.

There are three main works in recent literature which deal with emotion, and all of these gain inspiration from the work of Wittgenstein. I refer to work by Errol Bedford, Philippa Foot, and Anthony Kenny.¹

Mrs. Foot argues that there is an internal relationship between an emotion and what she terms its 'object'. Thus, she says that for a man to be properly said to be proud of something, what he is proud of must fulfill certain conditions. This is not to be thought an empirical matter but a fact of the logic of the terms involved.

Mrs. Foot, Bedford and Kenny all insist upon the 'intensional' nature of emotion words, Mrs. Foot claiming that certain 'mental attitudes and beliefs' carry an 'internal relationship' to their objects. Pride, she instances as such a 'mental attitude' for there

1. - Errol Bedford, 'Emotions', reprinted from PAS 1956/7 in Gustafson (ed), Essays in Philosophical Psychology.
 - Philippa Foot, 'Moral Beliefs', reprinted from PAS 1958/9 in her Theories of Ethics.
 - Anthony Kenny, Action Emotion and Will.
- All references to Bedford, Kenny and Foot are to these works, unless otherwise specified. Page numbers (in connection with Bedford and Foot) refer to the collections mentioned.

are logical limits to be set for what a man can be proud of. If a man is properly said to be proud, then, assuming that this is not a description of his character but imputes some kind of emotion to him, there is some x, or there appears to the man to be some x which stands in a roughly specifiable relationship to the man. Mrs. Foot suggests (P 86) that the characteristic 'object' of pride is;

"... something seen (a) as in some way a man's own and (b) as some sort of achievement or advantage."

There is a slight difficulty about the use of the word 'object' here for it need not be assumed that what constitutes the 'object' of the emotion is an object in any other sense. Thus, the 'object' need not be a 'thing-in-the-world' and need not even be said to exist. The relationship between emotion and object seems to be similar to the relationship between verb and object, and perhaps this similarity accounts for the choice of the word. Wittgenstein uses the term 'target' to express substantially the same point but the concept still needs further elucidation.

Suppose that a man is said to be proud of a painting. The painting here is the 'object' of his pride and it would be natural to assume that he is the artist responsible for it or that he owns it. It is not the 'object' simply qua 'thing-in-the-world' but in virtue of the fact that it is what he is proud of. Mrs. Foot claims that it can only be the object of his pride if both it represents some advantage or achievement (which we could here translate as the fact

that it is a good or valuable painting for example) and that it belongs to him (which in this example could be translated as the fact that the man painted it or owns it). Thus, the claim that Mrs. Foot makes is that the object qua 'thing-in-the-world' is only, and can only be, the 'object' in this more technical sense if it is 'related' to the man in these ways - that it is for him, some advantage or achievement, and that it belongs to him in some way.

To put this in terms of another example, let us suppose that a teacher is proud of one of his students. The student is the 'object' of the pride if he has, for example, gained brilliant results in an examination and 'belongs' to the teacher in that the teacher taught him. Mrs. Foot is careful to point out that the conditions that she lays down do not pretend to legislate for the object qua 'thing-in-the-world' and that a man can be proud of all sorts of things. What she is claiming is that an ascription of 'pride' to a man in respect of something makes sense only if this something fulfills the criteria for the use of the word 'proud' in respect of it. It is this that she means by the 'internal relationship' between an emotion and its 'object'.

Throughout what follows, I shall try to use Wittgenstein's term 'target' instead of the term 'object' and will avoid using the term 'object' to refer to 'things-in-the-world'. I shall therefore, except when it is necessary to refer to the writers' own comments, use the terms 'target' and 'thing'.

This is useful especially when one has to talk of targets which cannot be said to 'exist'. Thus a man may have an imaginary fear - there is a target for his fear but nothing which instantiates this target. Again a man may fear that his plane may crash - there is a target, the plane crashing, but since this is only a future possibility there is no 'object-in-the-world' which he fears, at least as far as this particular fear goes.

Mrs. Foot talks of the emotion of 'pride' in particular but Bedford and Kenny extend their remarks to emotions generally. They show that for a man to be properly said to be in a certain emotional state, or to be 'under the influence' of an emotion, it must be the case that there is some target towards which the 'state' is directed (where this target includes reference to some relationship between the man and the world as it appears to him).

For a man to be indignant about x , it must be the case that x represents some wrong or some putative wrong that has been done the agent or someone with whom, loosely speaking the agent 'identifies'. For a man to be afraid of x , it must be the case that x represents some danger, be it physical or moral or whatever.

Again, for a man to be indignant, there must be something which he is indignant about (some x), and for a man to be afraid he must at least have some notion of the danger that his fear is directed to. In the case of fear, however, the target is not involved in the same

way as the case of indignation. Thus, it is quite possible that a man be afraid of something but not know what this something is or even have reasons for believing that anything is dangerous in his environment. Thus, there are 'nameless' fears which creep up on one. When this is not a case of anxiety - which might be called a state of worrying what will happen - such fears do still fit into the sort of pattern that we have been discussing for it is the fact that some danger is thought to be present (the form being unknown) which permits of the use of the word 'fear'.

The difference lies simply in the nature of the target. Thus, we could, for example, say that a man was indignant about some wrong, and a man was afraid of some danger, but this is very uninformative. It is similar to saying that a man is eating some edibles or drinking some liquid or that the wind is blowing in some direction. We know from the use of 'indignant' that there is some wrong which the man thinks has been done, and we know from the use of the word 'afraid' that the man thinks himself in some danger, just as if we know that a man is drinking we know that it is some liquid that he is drinking. (There are odd exceptions to the case of eating and drinking; for example that a man is said, in some circles, to 'eat' his soup. I do not think that these oddities affect the case.) However, whereas it seems possible that a man should have a 'premonition' of approaching danger without knowing the form of the danger, it seems very unusual (though perhaps not logically odd) for a man to feel wronged but not know in what way. Thus, the difference noted above can be

accounted for in this way. It does not substantially alter the point that all emotions have 'targets'.

Indeed, the fact that we know from a (true) ascription of indignation to a man that he thinks himself wronged supports the point made. For, there is, it is held, a conceptual relation between an emotion and its target which can be expressed in the fact that a change in the nature of the target involves a change in the nature of an emotion. Thus, a man may be said to be afraid of bears only if the 'bears' can act as a target for fear - they must represent the source of some harm i.e. they must be dangerous - whether such fear be reasonable or not. Change in the way that the agent views bears necessarily involves change in the emotion word used. Thus if a man discovers that bears are in fact cuddly and friendly when administered with a drug, say, he will not be afraid of them in this condition. They may become a target for love, when the man thinks of them as cuddly and friendly, but not of fear.

Ideas similar to these appear in Hume, and indeed the very phrasing used suggests a close parallel. Talking of the causation of pride, Hume says:

"Anything, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object."

When distinguishing between pride and humility he says:

"Accordingly we find, that a beautiful house, belonging to ourselves, produces pride; and that the same house, still

belonging to ourselves, produces humility, when by any accident its beauty is chang'd into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure, which corresponded to pride, is transform'd into pain, which is related to humility."¹

For Hume, the difference between pride and humility is both in their experience, one is pleasant and the other painful, and in their cause. Both share the fact that they are caused by something 'related to self', but the qualities of this something are different in each case. This sounds initially similar to the position that Mrs. Foot holds to but, in the development of it at least, by Anthony Kenny, there is in fact a great difference. Hume holds that there is a 'something', in this case a feeling, which is pride or humility, and that this is caused by certain characteristics of the world impinging upon our senses. The view is thus very similar to that of William James at this point. However, what Kenny at least, is at pains to point out is that there need be no such something to be caused. Hume's point is a piece of general psychology, whereas Kenny's point is a conceptual one. To say that a man is proud, or is acting from pride, or is feeling proud is to say that he is in, and is aware of, a certain relationship with the world. The feelings, actions or whatever, associated with this state, are the feelings of pride in that they are so associated. To say that all emotions have targets, is not to say that all emotions, identified as phenomena, are caused

1. Hume Treatise Bk II, part 1, sect iii, Green and Grose edition of Philosophical Works Vol. II Page 87.

through perception of a certain part of the world, but to say that it does not make sense to ascribe pride¹ to someone unless one can point to what he is proud of, or show that some such pointing could be carried out. In saying that A is proud, on Hume's account it is necessary to point out his feelings, or the expression of them - pride is a something. On Kenny's account, it is to say that his actions or whatever are to be explained by reference to his relation to something in the world that he is aware of.

What exactly this comes to we can only see by proceeding somewhat further, but the main point here, is that emotions are not considered as phenomena - there are emotional feelings, emotional actions but there are not, in the same sense, emotions. The question of the cause of emotions thus does not arise.

To say that a man is acting from emotion, is to say something about the nature of his action and his relation with the world. The actual emotion word used is specific as to the relationship. To say that the man is emotional is to say that he has a 'target'. It is necessary to investigate what we mean here by 'relationship' of course. In my view, Kenny and the other theorists are not sufficiently clear about the nature of the relationship, but the main point is that to say that a man is indignant and to explain his actions by saying this, is not to say that certain of his feelings are of such-and-such

1. in the emotion and not character sense of the word. The two are closely related.

a kind, nor that they are causing him to act in such-and-such a way, but to explain his action as being brought about or dependent upon his perception of certain factors in his environment. To say that he is indignant, is to say that it is his perception of some wrong which accounts for his actions.

On this account to say that emotions are conceptually related to their targets, is to say that the use of a particular emotion word includes reference to the environment of the agent.

The specific way that a certain sensation is related to the world, be this relation in terms of the cause of the bodily change or the prediction that can be made from the existence of the sensation, is accidental to its being a sensation. A man cannot be indignant (say), without it being the case that his 'state' is related to the world in a certain way. Knowledge about the man's situation from the true ascription of an emotion is yielded in quite a different fashion from knowledge yielded given that a man has a sensation. Thus, given that a man is feeling indignant, we know by deduction that he feels himself

to have been wronged in some way.¹ Given, on the other hand that a countryman's toe itches, we can deduce that it will rain later only given additional information in terms of constant conjunction, and indeed the sense of 'deduce' in the second case is a weak or informal sense. It may be true both that the man has an itch and that it seems unlikely to rain later, but it cannot be the case that the man is indignant and that he does not feel himself to have been wronged in some way. The latter case is a case of a misuse of a word while the former case is a counter-instance to the 'theory' relating gouty toes and the weather.

The toe instance yields a causal relationship - the theory states presumably that gouty toes are affected by changes in, say, humidity,

1. This is not strictly speaking sufficient, though it can be expanded to make it more convincing. A man can be indignant about some wrong done to someone else and when he is, this tells us something about the way he feels about that someone else. Thus a man may be expected to be indignant if someone is rude to his wife since it is taken for granted that he cares about his wife. However, a man may also be indignant, for example about the situation in another country - the living conditions of the negroes in New York for example. A man would be accused of being insincere if he proclaimed his indignation but made it clear in other ways that he did not, in fact care about the situation. Indignation proclaims an interest in the target of the emotion. To be indignant about x, it must be true that what one is indignant about can properly act as a target - it must be a wrong of some kind and it must matter to the agent. As it is expressed above, the target is simplified, but the point remains that the person experiencing the emotion, is only experiencing this particular emotion if certain conditions obtain. It only makes sense to say that he is indignant given that these conditions obtain, for saying that one is indignant is saying that the world is affecting one in a certain way and from a certain point of view.

but the target of an emotion must be distinguished from the cause of the man's being in a certain 'state'. As Kenny points out, it may sometimes be the case that cause and target coincide, but this is not invariably the case.

"When a burnt child dreads the fire, the object of his fear is the fire which he is here and now afraid of; but his present fear is the effect of past experience." (71)¹

and, again,

"'I dread the next war' does not report the occurrence in me of an event caused by the next war, nor can 'I hope Eclipse will win' be replaced by 'I am hopeful because Eclipse will win.'" (72)

I am not at all sure that, strictly speaking, the cause of the fear is ever the object of the emotion, even in Miss Anscombe's² case of the hideous face at the window. What causes the fear is the perception of the hideous face but what we are afraid of is the face not the perception of it. However, we do say both that I was afraid of the face and scared by it and so this point is perhaps a bit pedantic.

According to James, it is the perception that causes the fear, say, of a bull and what causes the fear is what we are afraid of.

1. Kenny uses the term 'object' here, for 'target'.
2. G. E. M. Anscombe Intention (I.10).

However, this will not do, for it may be true that it is the perception of the bull which causes our fear, but our fear is of the anger of one's wife, for one had forgotten to buy the Sunday roast, which the bull reminds one of. A facetious example admittedly, but there are many cases in which what one sees is connected, by memory, deduction or association, with something that we are afraid of. The perception of the first thing brings about the "state" of fear which is however directed at something else.

The causal theory of emotion depends upon the possibility of being able to identify an emotion quite separately from its cause. Hume and James both assume that an emotion is a feeling. Given that it is, then it does make sense to ask what causes this feeling. The theory of Mrs. Foot, Bedford and Kenny, says that emotion words do not name but explain and that sensations are incidental to the concept of emotion.

What then is the connection between an emotion and its target? We are not told by Foot et al., what this is but there is a connection that can be expressed in the following way. The target of the emotion may not cause the emotional experience but the removal, in some sense, of it will cause the emotion to cease, if not immediately the sensations which may be associated with it. This seems to go for all emotions. Thus, if a man is afraid of a bull, either the removal of the bull or a clear demonstration that the bull is not dangerous (as when the farmer's infant daughter leads it off by the nose) will

cause our emotion to cease. If a man is indignant about the removal of his car, the demonstration that it didn't happen will cause his indignation to cease. Such acts are not of course all that we can do to still emotions but they are one sort of way.

By 'removal' of the target of the emotion here, I do not mean the removal of a cause. If a car is running 'rough' because of some particle of dirt in the carburettor, then the removal of the dirt will stop the rough running. The removal of the target of the emotion is not to be construed in this way. For example, if it could be shown that the living conditions of the negroes in New York were entirely the fault of the negroes themselves, then one could not be said to be indignant about them any more. There is no wrong being done to them and as such there is no longer any target for the emotion. The living conditions are of course still the same. Thus, 'removal' here can sometimes be construed physically but more often it means showing that a certain description will not do. Sometimes the physical removal of the target will not serve the purpose in any case. If a woman is scared of a spider, then putting the spider out of sight usually will not stop her being afraid.

Kenny sums up the objections to the sensation theory and also to the behaviourist analysis, which I have not mentioned¹, in the following way;

1. But see my paper 'Emotion and the Psychologist' New Scientist 13 Nov. 1969.

"It is not, in general, possible to ascribe a piece of behaviour or a set of sensations to a particular emotional state without at the same time ascribing an object to the emotion. If a man runs past me, I can say nothing about his emotions unless I know whether he is running away from A or towards B; no flutterings of the heart or meltings of the bowels could tell I was in love without telling me with whom." (60)

The objections are directed against a theory which holds that emotion-words name sensations and that the distinction between emotions is therefore a distinction between things named.

If emotion-words are bound up with targets in this way, in that distinction between emotions turns upon a distinction between targets, this suggests that emotion-words do not just name. Given that a man is emotionally upset, to say that he is indignant is partly to explain why he is upset - the word offers a reason rather than a name.

The question then arises as to what part sensations play in emotional situations. Bedford treats them as almost incidental to the emotion. He takes 'being angry' as logically prior to 'feeling angry'. Given that we have taught a person what being angry is, we can then teach what feeling angry is but not vice versa;

"If we can assume the meaning of 'is angry', or teach it...., we can go on to explain 'feels angry' by saying that it is

to feel as people often do who are angry." (79)

Bedford treats 'feeling angry' as a relatively unimportant part of the problem of understanding emotion. He picks upon the explanatory or interpretative power of emotion-words as the most interesting part of the concept. Emotion-words, as Kenny notes and discusses at length, function often as motive words. In this respect, emotion is intimately connected with action.

Kenny's account is more comprehensive than Bedford's, which the latter admits is only a sketch, but in essence the two accounts are very similar.

However, Kenny does not dismiss sensations quite as readily as does Bedford, though he does reduce them to the part of emotional experience.

Kenny takes the degree of physiological reaction that a man experiences to be one measure of the intensity of a man's emotion. But we can also measure the intensity of a man's emotion by the amount of his behaviour that we can account for by reference to it. What dimension we use, says, Kenny, depends upon either the emotion itself, (love is a long-term emotion, while fury is usually short-term), or upon the target of the emotion. (One may be angry with a man for stepping upon one's toe in the short term but angry with a politician for one's whole life.) These categories do not of

course pretend to be exclusive, for it is not held that one cannot, logically, be angry for a long time with a man who trod on one's toe. It is very unusual, that is all. Kenny sums up as follows;

"In general, where emotions are immediate reactions to present stimuli, such as animals may display, the first method will be natural; where the object of an emotion is something distant in space or time or something that only a language user could appreciate, the second method will be the more appropriate and often the only possible one." (36)

Thus the target not only distinguishes between emotions but it also, in part, determines the measure of the intensity.

This distinction is tied in with Kenny's important distinction between 'emotion-as-feeling' and 'emotion-as-motive'. The connection between the two is said to be in terms of the concept of action but it seems to me that the nature of this connection is somewhat obscure in Kenny. In my opinion we can make more of the connection in terms of the idea of 'symptoms' and that if we do this, it will clear up what I consider a lack in Kenny's theory.

One possible symptom of an emotion, for Kenny, is the presence of bodily change - going pale in the face, trembling and so on - and since some bodily changes in this complex, particularly those associated with the adrenalin-noradrenalin system, are felt, another symptom is the presence of sensation, but says Kenny, in a vein similar to Bedford;

"Feelings of emotion are the sensations linked with the symptoms of an emotion; but the sensations are feelings, just as bodily changes are symptoms only if they occur in a certain context." (99)

Thus a man's going pale is a symptom of an emotion (fear say) only if it occurs in the face of at least putative danger. Sensations are part of the emotional complex only if they occur, linked in some way, to a target.

The same can be said, as Kenny himself has shown in arguing against the behaviourist analysis of emotion, for actions. The relevant passage has already been quoted, (see my page 55) but we can paraphrase it as 'Actions, or behaviour, are symptoms of emotion only if they occur in a certain context. A man's running away, is a symptom of fear only if it occurs in the face of at least putative danger.' Thus, sensations, other bodily changes and actions are all symptoms of E only if they occur in the context containing a target proper to E. Perhaps we should add here, as Kenny often does, that an ascription of E only makes sense (whether it be true or not) in these circumstances.

It seems to me that given this, we still need to know something else. We need to know what makes it true that a certain man A is under the influence of an emotion E as opposed to what circumstances make it intelligible to say that A is E. This is a fairly simple

point that I am making, for all I am saying is that there is a difference between the circumstances that make it intelligible to say for example, "It has been raining" (the ground is wet), and true to say "It has been raining" (the wetness of the ground is the result of water falling, naturally and due to meteorological conditions, from the sky - and not the result of some over-enthusiastic watering of the garden). Kenny does not give us this and it is this that is responsible for the weakness of his account of emotions as motives.

Kenny's account of motives is too detailed and involved to discuss fully here but the main bones of it as it affects emotions can be picked out. He distinguishes between motives and intentions and to explain the distinction he takes a 'scheme' of action;

A is P (and doesn't want to be).

A acts.

A is Q (and is content to be) - (where the limiting case of Q is that Q is \sim P).

As a simple exemplification of this pattern he gives, "When a man being cold, goes to the fire and warms himself". Explanations of this sort of behaviour may be in terms of 'backward-looking' (BL) reasons or forward looking (FL) reasons, or in terms of the whole pattern. Examples are;

(BL) 'I was cold'

(FL) 'I did it to get warm'.

(BL) gives a different sort of reason to (FL). The latter Kenny calls

the statement of an intention. The action can be explained also by telling the whole story, the whole pattern of behaviour, which when described by the use of one word, produces a motive word. Thus Kenny invents a word here, 'Thermophilia', to show that it is as artificial as this, and says that we could explain the man's actions by saying that he acted out of thermophilia (91). Pattern explanations are motive explanations but (BL) explanations can also be called motive explanations, if not so naturally. According to Kenny;

"Which backward-looking reasons we shall naturally call 'motives' depends upon the comparatively trivial circumstance of whether or not we have a name for the specific scheme exemplified." (92)

What Kenny says here is not altogether accurate, for there are occasions when we use the word 'motive' somewhat differently. It might be said that to give a (FL) reason is sometimes to give the motive, as when the hero of a detective novel says that the guilty man had a motive to kill the victim because he would inherit the money. The word is used to mean 'possible motive' (he had a reason for murder but did he act upon it?). The connection here is possibly that, when we say his motive for murder (if he committed it) could be expressed in terms of his future inheritance, we mean that this (possible) motive would be a (real)motive only if he wanted the money. Thus, the (FL) is referred back to a (BL) one. Kenny's account concentrates upon occasions when we say that someone was 'motivated

by' pride, or jealousy, or greed. This explains an action by the agent but an agent could be said to have a motive, even though he did not commit the action.

There is a feeling, manifested strongly in Ryle's Concept of Mind, that to use a 'pattern' word, in this case 'Thermophilia' is to imply that there is some regularity about the man's actions - to imply some characteristic of his personality. Thus, to say that a man acted out of thermophilia is to imply that the man is a 'thermophiliac', but I do not see that this is so. There are occasions when we want to use the emotion word as a motive word without implying that the person regularly experiences such an emotion. Thus, a woman may say in surprise 'Why, you're jealous!', and whereas it might be natural to hear her follow this with, 'I didn't know you were the jealous type!', it seems to me that this may be answered by the (true) statement, 'I'm not'. I do not wish to say any more here about this, but will come back to this later, in order to discuss what it means to say someone is the 'jealous type'.

Thus, for Kenny, emotion words must be seen to act as motive words in this manner:

"...when A acts out of fear of x the pattern which he exemplifies is this: A is in danger of x - A acts - A is out of danger of x." (92)

Kenny goes on in the rest of his book, to elaborate upon what

he says here about actions, but this is sufficient for our purposes. To explain an action in terms of an emotion word, is to set the action in a pattern of behaviour. The target of the emotion is necessarily related to the action, in that a man is afraid of x, only if x constitutes some, at least putative danger to him. Any action that he performs in the context of x is a symptom of his fear of x and to explain a man's actions as motivated by his fear, is to say that these actions must be seen as attempts to avoid the danger which he is faced with. To explain a man's avoidance of trains as his being afraid of them, is to say something about his evaluation of the dangers of train-riding.

I feel that the accounts which Bedford and Kenny give are in essence correct but are not sufficient. What they do give us is a fully intelligible account of the logic of distinguishing between emotions; they show how some element of knowledge must be present in accounting for emotions. The pattern account of motives is very attractive. However, it seems to me that they concentrate upon the symptoms of emotion and what makes one man's state fear, and another's indignation. The power of emotions seems to have been lost. I know that this way of talking may be dangerous, for it may seem to suggest a return to the 'naming' theory, but what I want to know is how we account for the fact that emotions, though to a greater or lesser extent controllable, are liable to spring upon us and 'force' us into action. What, are we saying, I want to know,

when we say that a man's emotions get the better of him?

There are two questions which the James account sets out to answer. (1) What is the difference between emotions? and (2) What is acting emotionally?. Kenny to my mind offers us a very illuminating account of the first question but does not seem to help with the second.

On the 'reconstructed' Jamesian account that I gave earlier, acting emotionally, or displaying an emotion, is reacting in an unmediated way to a stimulus. The feelings for James are our awareness of this reaction. Whereas Kenny and Bedford properly dismiss sensations as necessary constituents of an emotion complex, and take emotion words to be explanatory of behaviour in terms of targets, they do not account for, as James does, the fact that there is a difference between emotional and considered behaviour.

However, it is obvious that emotional response is not simply stimulus-response behaviour like knee-jerking in response to a tap with a hammer below the knee-cap. Some element of rationality is necessary to the concept, in that emotional response can be evaluated as proper, or irrational in various ways.

It seems to me that we must make an attempt to relate these facts together and account for them. I shall attempt to do this in the following chapter, by dealing first with some work by psychologists on the emotions.

Chapter Three.

Action and Emotion -
(Part Two).

In a set of experiments carried out in 1962, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer¹ show that emotional response can be artificially manipulated, along one dimension at least. A discussion of these experiments will, I hope, enable me to put my objections to Kenny's account more clearly, and to put forward some positive points as well.

As I said before, most psychological experiments in the field of emotion have represented attempts to prove, disprove or supplement James' theory of emotional experience, but it has, up to fairly recently, been tacitly accepted that something like the James' account is correct. Schachter and Singer try to get away from this by investigating the part played by 'cognitive factors', as they call them, in emotional response.

To repeat another earlier comment, the bodily change most frequent in emotional experience is the secretion of adrenalin and noradrenalin from the adrenal glands. The rate at which these secretions occur is said to be influenced by sympathetic nervous system activity which is directly under the control of the hypothalamus. Maranon, as Schachter and Singer report, carried out some experiments in 1924 which showed that subjects administered with adrenalin did not report any emotional experience. They reported what Maranon calls 'cold' or 'as if' emotions. They said that they felt as if

1. 'The determinants of emotional response', Psychological Review, 1962.

they were angry, as if they were excited, and so on. When, however, Maranon mentioned emotion-laden topics to the subjects, they reported 'full' emotions.¹

It has been clearly recognised that no injection or similar stimulus can bring about an emotional state per se. In the absence of anything that can count as a target, all such a stimulus can do is to bring about certain sensations. A corollary of this which has not been explicitly stated, is that no such stimulus can bring about the state of being emotional, even if we are unspecific as to the actual emotion. A state of physiological arousal, if such a concept can be usefully employed (and many psychologists argue that it can), is not per se an emotional state. Just as no one sensation set constitutes the presence of an emotion, so no unspecific sensation set constitutes the presence of "emotionality".

The phrase 'being emotional' has many uses and the way that it is being used here must be explained. It can be used to ascribe a disposition to a person - that the person is likely to react to any 'emotion-situation' more vividly than the norm. It can also be used in a periodic sense - that the person is reacting with high intensity to a particular situation. The phrase is often used to

1. It is interesting that James claims that if you take away the bodily feelings, all you are left with is a cold intellectual feeling. Maranon says that if you take away the 'cognitive element', all you are left with is a set of 'cold' feelings.

imply that this person is acting to some degree irrationally or can be expected to do so. However, I wish to use it to describe those occasions on which, whereas we know that the person is reacting in a way that can be described and eventually explained by use of an emotion word, we do not know which one to use at that moment. I wish to use it in a sense neutral to any specific emotion, in a way similar to that in which I use the word 'upset'.

On some occasions it is obvious that someone is emotionally upset, (is being emotional) but we do not know in what way; we do not know what is the matter with him. It is often true that in these situations the person involved does not know either.

Now while it is no doubt true that for some types of emotion, the presence of sensations is a necessary part of the experience, this is not all there is to it. Emotions in their specific forms are related to the world in specific ways, and being emotional, in the sense that I have used the phrase, is at least to know that one's 'state' is related to the world in some way other than purely causally. It is not sufficient, for a person to be in an emotional state, that he should have certain sensations.

Thus Maranon is not entitled to think either that the injection could bring about specific emotions (as James would have us think) nor that it could bring about, directly, that peculiar experience of

being emotionally mixed up.¹

The set of very interesting experiments performed by Schachter and Singer are to some extent based upon recognition of this fact. They put forward the hypothesis that emotional experience is a function of both cognitive and physiological factors. They posit that in the Maranon experiments, the subjects did not report emotional feelings because they knew why they were feeling as they did. They had some explanation and were therefore not inclined to say that they were emotional. They posit, in the preamble to their experiment, that emotional states can be manipulated - i.e. if a person is put into a state of physiological arousal without being aware of it, he will have no way of accounting for his sensations. If he is then offered 'an appropriate cognition' he is likely to put his sensations down to an emotional reaction. If on the other hand the subject knows why he is feeling as he does, he will not do so. They conclude from their results;

"(1) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will label this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him...it should be anticipated that precisely the same state of physiological arousal could be labeled 'joy' or 'fury' or 'jealousy'...depending upon the cognitive

1. Although it is not possible to tell from Maranon's account, it would be interesting to speculate upon the reasons why his subjects reported feeling 'as if' they were happy, rather than, for example, excited or frightened.

aspects of the situation.

(2) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation, no evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available.

(3) Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal."¹

In the experiment, volunteer subjects came to the laboratory ostensibly to participate in an experiment on vision. They were injected with what they thought was a drug 'suproxin' which they were told had some effect upon perception. Some of them were in fact given epinephrine (artificial adrenalin) and some a placebo. The subjects can be divided into four groups. (1) Those who were given adrenalin and told what the effects would be - to produce an increased heart rate, hand-tremor and a flushing of the face. These subjects believed, of course, that the drug was 'suproxin' and they were told that these effects were side effects and nothing to do with the experiment; (2) Those who were told nothing about the drug; (3) Those who were misinformed about the drug - they were told that the side effects of 'suproxin' were to produce numbness in the feet, an itching sensation over parts of the body and possibly a slight headache; (4) Those who were given a placebo and told nothing about

1. Op. cit. P 381/382.

the effects of 'suproxin'. These subjects were therefore, in terms of their knowledge, in the same position as group (2). These groups are referred to as (1) Epi-inf (2) Epi-ign (3) Epi-mis (4) Placebo.

The subjects were then individually shown into a room, ostensibly to wait for 20 minutes '...for the suproxin to get from the injection site into the blood stream'. (For most people epinephrine-caused symptoms begin in about 3-5 minutes.) In the waiting-room was a confederate who behaved in a manner calculated to induce at one time, euphoria, and at another, anger. The behaviour of the subject was observed through a one way mirror, and after the experiment each subject was asked to fill in a questionnaire including scales upon which to mark down self-reports of feelings of anger and euphoria. Each subject was treated on his own, the 'groups' not referring to the way the experiment was actually carried out in the laboratory.

D. R. Davies sums the results up as follows:

"In the euphoria experiment (for example), the misinformed group was the most euphoric, as judged from their rated behaviour in the waiting room and from their self-ratings on the questionnaire, followed by the ignorant group, the placebo group and the correctly informed group in that order. In all subjects who had received injections of adrenalin, pulse rate increased from the pre-injection level to the post-injection level at the end of the experiment, while the means

for the placebo group showed a decrease over the same period. Apparently, therefore, the drug succeeded in increasing one index of physiological arousal. But the three groups who received the active drug, and whose arousal levels were increased to much the same degree, behaved in very different ways in the same stimulus situation. The only factor which seems able to account for this difference is the kind of information that the subjects were given beforehand."¹

Thus Schachter and Singer, in this experiment, conclude that 'cognitive' clues are important determinants of emotional state. With this we must agree but what is a little odd is the way that Schachter and Singer proceed to explain the relationship between sensations and cognitions. In this they show that their position is not that far removed from that of James. Much of this can be pruned from the theory with little loss.


What makes the work initially obscure is the way that Schachter and Singer express their starting point. They ask how a man knows that he is angry. This is, of course, rather an unusual question in the way in which asking how a man knows that another man is angry is not. It is indicative of the approach of this theory - and indeed many theories in psychology - that the first question is treated on a

1. D. R. Davies' chapter on 'Autonomic response patterns and emotion', P 197, in Introducing psychology - An experimental approach, ed. by D. S. Wright and Ann Taylor.

parallel with the second. It is implied that the evidence that I have for knowing that I am angry is of the same nature - or the same order - as the evidence that I have for knowing that you are angry. However, there is an obvious asymmetry between the two questions. I know that you are angry from your behaviour; your facial expressions, your words, your actions, all interpreted within a certain situation. (As Kenny points out, a behaviourist analysis alone will not do - it is behaviour interpreted within a context that matters.)

Now whereas it is true that there are occasions when I come to realise that I am angry either by someone else pointing out, or by myself noticing my behaviour (say), this is the unusual and not the usual case. Indeed sense is made of it by use of the word 'realise' and not 'know'. In the normal case, it is not true that I need evidence for the statement 'I am angry'. (Viz. Wittgenstein's comments upon this sort of statement as an avowal.) The question asked 'How do you know?' is a silly one when asked of the first person statement but not when asked of the third person, 'He is angry'.

Schachter and Singer treat all cases of the use of the statement 'I am angry' as examples of the unusual rather than the usual case. Thus, throughout this work, they treat my knowledge of my emotional states as analogous to my knowledge of your emotional states. They reduce the first person case to the third. This gives rise to an essentially dualist position which can be set out thus.



(P.R. = 'physiological reaction')

(Figure 2)

I perceive the situation; the perception 'in some fashion initiates a state of physiological arousal'¹; then given that I am in some state of arousal, I want to know why, so I investigate the situation to find what brought it about. In (A), there is a short form of (B) which demonstrates the Cartesian nature of such an explanation. We are given in fact TWO uses of the word 'I'. The first refers to my seeing the object/event and the second to my 'seeing' the state of arousal (with the mind's eye). The objections to such an account are too well known to go into here and it is enough to point out that Schachter and Singer's account does imply it.

The two faults in the Schachter and Singer analysis which concern us here are (1) that the perception is not to be analysed purely in physiological terms - as indeed Schachter himself notices calling it a perception-cognition at one point and (2) the positing of the 'evaluative need' is a metaphysical white elephant arising out of the parallel with the third person case - it replaces my concern or curiosity about why you are acting as you are.

Schachter talks about 'labelling' my emotional states, according to my investigation of the situation that brought them about. This assumes that the situation brought about an 'emotional state', my being unaware of it. Now while it is true that the injection does give sensations, it is not, nor cannot be true that it brings about an emotional state. As we have shown before, a set of sensations

1. Op. cit. P 380.

(per se) cannot be an emotion neither can it be an emotional state. The sensations engendered in us by the injection may be sensations that are present in emotional states, but they cannot be the sensations of an emotional state until we are prepared to say that they are in some way connected non-empirically to the world. (Until we are otherwise prepared to say that the subject is emotionally aroused.)

Schachter and Singer talk as if they could give some content to the unspecific state of being emotionally aroused, separately from giving an account of anger, indignation, and so on. Since, before we 'add in' the 'cognition', all we have are sensations, Schachter is committed to saying that the state of physiological arousal is equivalent to the state of emotional arousal which is quite obviously untrue.

Thus their question should be not "How do I know that this emotional state is anger?" but, better "What is it which makes me account for my sensations in terms of an emotion word?".

Now, of course, I have suggested a use of the phrase 'emotionally aroused' or 'being/getting emotional' or 'being emotionally upset' which is indeed unspecific as to the actual emotion. But this, I suggest, is not to be accounted for in terms of sensations alone. Given that my heart is thumping and my breath is short, (as autobiographically speaking I have felt after receiving an injection at the dentist) one is not called upon to say that I am emotionally

aroused, as Maranon and Schachter and Singer themselves, by implication demonstrate. Emotions are tied to action and sensations do not of themselves give rise to action. (Pain is not, of course, to be analysed out as a sensation. It is nearer to a-sensation-that-I-want-to-get-rid-of. An itch is nearer to a-sensation-that-I-want-to-scratch.) If emotions were not tied to action they could not function so naturally as motive-words.

An example of a situation in which we might want to speak of someone being emotional without specifying the emotion is this. Imagine a mother whose young son has finally arrived home very late, well past his bed-time. His mother has been searching for him for hours in a frenzy of anxiety. When she finds him, she doesn't know 'whether to be glad or angry'. She doesn't know whether to scold him or kiss him, send him to bed without any supper or clasp him to her bosom. Her feelings are all mixed up, not because her sensations are (how could they be? Of sensations esse est percipi - if you feel them they are there, if you do not they are not), but because she doesn't know if she wants to scold or love. The use of the word 'feeling' here is not that of 'sensation', for indeed, sensations are only one of the things that we feel. It is like 'feeling that one wants to do something' (White's feeling of inclination¹).

Such uses of the word 'feeling' are not to be analysed at all in terms of sensations but already include some 'cognitive' element,

1. Alan R. White. Philosophy of Mind P 114ff.

in Schachter's phrase. For example, feeling like going swimming feels neither like nor unlike feeling like going to bed, for it expresses something similar to a desire or wish - it does not describe a sensation. Such a feeling could hardly be induced by a drug alone. A drug could make us feel tired, and so "like going to bed", but the and so is very important. To say that the drug made a man feel like going to bed is acceptable English of course, but it is only true if, when he feels tired, he likes to go to bed. This may not be true, say, of a member of a tribe who always sleep just where they find themselves at night.

The initial plausibility of Schachter and Singer's treatment of the 'unusual' case lies in this confusion - that we can talk of people being emotionally aroused unspecific as to the actual emotion and in this case it does make sense for me to ask of myself 'What emotion is this?'. Working out what I feel in this situation is working out what it is that I am upset about for given this I can say what emotion it is. However, this differs from Schachter's case in two ways. (1) It is not just sensations that I have but also wishes, wants, inclinations and so on all jumbled up. (2) What I find in the world that helps me to sort out my emotional state is not a cause but a target. Herein lies the truth of Schachter's talk about 'direction' for if I can find what I am upset about I am in a position to sort myself out - I know where to look for what to do. What I am upset about by its nature, or better by its relation to myself, determines what emotion it is. If I am upset because my

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car has been stolen then it may be true that I am angry but if I am upset because my work is going badly then it may be true that I am frustrated. The 'upset state' in terms of any sensation content may be the same (and according to the evidence of Schachter and Singer it does seem to be true that it is the same).

For cases in which I do know, or better am aware of, my emotional disposition, the feelings that I have will not always be the same no matter what emotion that it is, for as long as we interpret 'feelings' here not as sensations, but as felt inclinations, wishes, wants and so on.

If therefore, we ask not, 'What emotion state is this?' but, "Why do I have these sensations?", the answer only may be in terms of an emotion word. Whether it is or not does not depend upon what caused my feelings (sensations) for there is more to it than just a difference in cause. It is logically necessary that our emotional feelings are consequent upon certain events in the world. It is possible that sensations should be caused by injections, blows, diseases and so on without this altering the fact that they are sensations. It is not logically possible that a certain set of sensations should be part of an emotional experience unless they are bound up with the world in a specific way. If this is a logical point then it is part of the meaning of emotion-words. This, we might say, is what we mean by being emotional. To be emotionally upset, is at least to say that there is some target somewhere - the

problem is to sort out which one.

It is not true that the perception of the 'exciting fact', as James calls it, is a cause merely in appearing in our visual field, it must be perceived as...as well. This is why a man is usually aware of his own emotional state, since he is aware of what he sees and what it means. It takes place not only in his visual field but in his attitude field as well - his perceptual field where seeing includes meaning.

If we keep the analogy of a field for a moment we can see why Schachter and Singer's account fits the third person case so well. The perception of X as frightening is the perception of it as dangerous. It is a perception-cognition as Schachter and Singer say (though strangely they forget it as soon as they say it). Our reaction to it is thus an emotional reaction because it is already understood ("cognitised" in Schachter and Singer's terms) and immediately gives rise to the beginnings of behaviour. It is a fact about human beings and all animals that they avoid danger (*ceteris paribus*) and it is this avoidance action that is evidence, among other things, of fear. The reaction, in terms of bodily sensations, are post and not prior to our cognition and our calling it 'anger' or 'fear' expresses our 'perception-cognition' in that the feelings that we have are those feelings consequent upon a certain 'perception-cognition'. If they are not, then they are nothing but sensations. It is in the third person case however, when I am talking about you, that what I have

before me are just bodily reactions and I have to interpret these in terms of your situation. In the first person case the interpretation is already done. To tell you that I am angry about X, tells you not only about my feeling state (and it is possible that I may be correctly described as being angry when I have, at that moment, no feelings of anger) but also about my attitude to X.

Thus, if a man acts jealously regarding his neighbour's wife, the neighbour is very right to treat the man circumspectly. It is not the case only that the man reacts in a certain physiological way to the presence of the wife, but she has a certain meaning for him - he sees her in a certain way. Thus, from the fact that the man displays jealousy, we can deduce that he has certain amorous or perhaps possessive feelings about her - one emotion often quasi-logically implies another. Whereas, if the man said truthfully that he had no regard for the said lady, then it is true that, whatever his feelings may be, he feels no jealousy¹. The direction that Schachter and Singer talk about is a logical one.

Even if the interpretation that Schachter and Singer put on their experiments is largely confused, what they can be taken to show is

1. Again, the situation is a little more complex than this. There is a use of 'jealous' here which might be taken to imply something similar to envy. Thus the man may simply be jealous of his neighbour because he has an attractive wife, for he wants one too. I simplify the situation to show that there are logical implications concerning desires and attitudes in the use of emotion words. The point can be made and simplification perhaps does not matter for as long as we remember that it is simplification.

that emotional intensity along one dimension, at least, can be artificially manipulated. They can be taken to show that, in some sense, sensations indicate, if not the type, the degree of emotion for as long as the subject 'puts his sensations down to' the emotion-complex and not some artificial cause. To avoid the implication here that such 'putting down to' by the subject is a conscious act, we might re-phrase it as something like 'take the sensations as...' (I am not too interested in phrasing this exactly here as I intend to take an over-all view of it later).

In these experiments, the subjects who had artificially induced sensations and did not have any knowledge of the effects of the supposed 'suproxin' - the EPI-ign. group - both acted more emotionally and reported themselves as feeling more emotional, as compared with those who knew 'what would happen to them' - the EPI-inf. group - whereas the latter group both acted and reported themselves less emotional than did the placebo group. Since, as Schachter and Singer declare, the experiments were designed to make the subjects angry or euphoric respectively, all groups were emotionally involved to some degree, but those who had no grounds for suspicion of their emotional state were more emotional than those who had grounds.

The EPI-inf. group, being somewhat alienated by the information that they received from their normal response to the situation, acted less emotionally than did the placebo group who though they had less

Physiological reaction, still declared themselves to be angry or euphoric as the case may be.¹ Thus, we may say that sensations act as reinforcers for the cognition in some sense. To the degree that a man is physiologically aroused, to that degree he is emotionally aroused, for as long as it makes sense to say that the man is emotionally aroused in the first place. The sensations act as reinforcers only of cognitions when they are felt in some sense to complement the cognition, but in the case of the EPI-inf. group, they did not do so.

How angry we are, how afraid we are, is to be measured in terms of what we do (or what we are inclined to do) where what we do can include our physiological reactions. This is Kenny's message. Yet an emotional reaction can be a reasonable one or an unreasonable one. There are occasions when we feel that someone underreacts and occasions when we feel that he overreacts, even to the extent sometimes of considering him somewhat mentally unstable. The measure of the reasonableness of a reaction is its relationship to the target. The greater the danger, the more reasonable is the greater display of fear. Greater fear is reasonable in the face of a herd of charging buffalo than in the face of a yapping poodle, (though a psychologist may explain someone's fear of the poodle).

1. The experimental evidence is interesting here, in that in the situation in which heart-rate &c. increased and in the situation in which it decreased, subjects still acted and reported the identical emotions. This seems experimental disconfirmation of the James hypothesis about distinction between emotions.

Greater indignation is reasonable in the face of a direct and intended insult, than in the face of an accidental remark.

Someone who is being unreasonable about something may be asked to control himself. We show surprise if someone reacts violently to something not proportionate to such reaction.

Schachter and Singer show that, along one dimension at least, our reaction can be manipulated. They show not only that the physiological symptoms can be manipulated but the degree to which a man becomes emotional can be artificially increased or decreased. The man who shows a greater reaction is more emotional. This is a corollary, of course, of the fact that emotional intensity is measured by what we do. Since our reaction is not immediately under our control, this suggests that our evaluation of the situation is not a conscious act. For, were we to consciously evaluate the situation, then no amount of artificial stimulation could interfere with our decision, and the physiological symptoms would be irrelevant to the complex.

Put this another way. The degree to which someone reacts to some situation declares how much it means to him. Someone, acting very upset over some incident, may be offered the excuse, "I am sorry. I did not realise that it meant that much to you", and it is equally possible that he should reply, "I didn't either". A man may, in advance, declare that he will not be angry if X occurs, but

when it does he may be angry all the same. To account for this we often say, "When it came to the point, I realised what it meant".

A man's involvement in the world - what he believes in, what he cares for and how much he cares for it - is shown by what he does as well as what he says. This is a well-known truth. But, his involvement is also shown by configurations of his emotional life.

When I say that our evaluation of the situation is not a conscious one, I do not mean that we carry out an evaluation unconsciously either. There is no need to suppose this though some theorists might find it congenial to their way of thinking to do so. We can equally say that, in a sense, our evaluation is already done for us.

Justin Gosling declares that we learn to consider things dangerous, that we learn in a sense to be afraid of certain things.¹ He discusses Miss Anscombe's example of the child's mistake, thinking his nurse to have said 'A piece of Satan' instead of 'A piece of satin'. Before the child learns the (mistaken) description of the piece of cloth, he is not afraid of it. He learns that it is dangerous.

It is not clear whether we do learn all our fears. James says that a child has 'innate fears' of large animals like cows. This is, however, only to discuss fear of one's life or fear of physical

1. 'Mental causes and fear' Mind 1962.

harm. One's life or safety is perhaps important to us without learning. Animals show fear, and avoid danger, but they avoid physical danger only. They cannot avoid moral danger. They do not thereby lack a skill but a way of living.

Man protects not only his life, but his integrity, and not only his but that of others as well. A mother may fear for her son who first leaves home, not only in terms of his physical danger, but his moral danger. A man may fear for others. We may break out into a cold sweat on seeing a friend near the edge of a cliff.

Children presumably are not born valuing their independence or integrity or other people. Piaget talks of the transition from the ego-centric stage to that of noticing and caring for other people. Children must learn to value such things, and in valuing them they take up a different involvement in the world, one which is shown in the configurations of their emotional life. For some emotions, it is probably true that most children will be incapable of feeling them. Young children seem to make no distinction between disappointment and regret, and to have little concept of shame.

Fear is consequent upon a threat to something we value. A man who no longer cares for life, is not afraid of death. Indignation is dependent upon moral awareness, its range upon how much we care

for others. Such evaluations are not necessarily something we carry out on the spot for they are part of our way of living. They constitute the limits, as Winch has put it, to our lives.¹ A situation then can be seen as affecting something which we value. It can be seen as bringing about something which we value. What we value in this way is how we see the world as ordered.

The only analogy that I can think of here, and perhaps it is not such a bad one, is that of a spider seated, if spiders 'sit', in the middle of his web. Touch one part of the web lightly and the spider immediately runs to it. No time for thought, he just runs, and perhaps in doing so, puts himself into danger. A man is involved in the world in a similar way. If one part of the web of his involvement is affected, he is liable to react. What part and how it is affected determines both what he does (or is inclined to do) and what emotion we say that he manifests. To say that a man is angry, is to say what sort of way what he values has been affected. To say that a man is jealous, tells us what sort of part of his involvement is being affected (or he thinks is being affected).

Fingarette talks of 'explicit consciousness', a valuable concept.² We are explicitly conscious of what we are doing when we 'spell out' what we are doing. A man peeling potatoes at the sink, is not peeling

1. 'Understanding a primitive society' in D.Z. Phillips (ed) Religion and Understanding.
2. Self-Deception P 38ff.

potatoes and thinking about it if he is listening to the radio as he peels. He is not unconsciously peeling potatoes either. He knows what he is doing but it is not until he says to himself (or suddenly 'finds') that he is peeling potatoes that we say that he is explicitly conscious of what he is doing. In this sense, a man is not explicitly conscious of his involvement in the world all the time, but he is still involved.

Thus, to control our emotions, it is necessary that we become explicitly conscious of our involvement and the way that we are acting, though as Fingarette shows, we may have reasons for not spelling out what we are doing.

Kenny's pattern account of motives does not distinguish between emotional actions and policies. Both fit his scheme and decisions, which are part of the concept of a policy, can be said to act as reasons for action as well as emotions. It is typical of emotional reaction that it springs upon us and the way that I have suggested above is a way of accounting for this. The difference between fear and caution, is that whereas we can throw caution to the winds - decide to dispense with or drop a policy - we can only take a firm grip upon our fear. A decision to play the Ace on the King, no matter what one's partner plays, in the hope of gaining an extra trick, is a decision not to be cautious. A decision made by a child, to go ahead and cross the field at night, is a resolve to conquer his fear, something which he may have to do whether or not there are any grounds for believing the night to hold any dangers.

The difference between will and emotion is that the former acts on the explicitly conscious level, whereas the latter works at the pre-conscious level. The Freudian analogy is useful here. Our emotional involvement can become something of which we are explicitly conscious and then make efforts to control.

The distinction between an emotion as a motive and a policy is therefore to be found in the way that the pattern comes about or in the kind of way the action can be prevented or stopped by the agent or others. Such a distinction is not always easy or even possible to make for the right kind of evidence is not always to hand. To the degree that an agent seems to be carrying out, or be prepared to carry out, an action in the face of contrary reasons, or even without wanting to consider contrary reasons, to that degree the action is an emotional one. Such a distinction is not always clear for a policy can be the result of foolish or lazy thinking, but given time we can usually decide. In deciding we often decide the importance of the subject of the act to the agent.

It is this sort of factor which links the three basic sorts of action or behaviour carried out from an emotion. Kenny's account of emotions-as-motives is linked but obscurely to his account of emotions-as-feeling, and Bedford's account does not solve any of our problems about the place of sensations and feelings in emotional life.

We can now say that, generally, a piece of behaviour can be the result of an emotion, or is an emotional act, only if it is linked to, or consequent upon, part of the agent's environment in a way which is not the result of a conscious decision. I take this to be a necessary condition of saying that an action is an emotional one. I also think that given the rest of the three previously considered theorists' points about targets, that this extra point is sufficient to distinguish emotions from policies. X acts as a target for an emotion, if and only if, the agent's behaviour directed at X is something which is initially at least unconsidered. As I said before, our emotions spring upon us.

There are of course, actions which are the result of considered thought which occur on occasions when we wish to say that the agent is afraid or jealous and so on. We may even say that such actions are explicable only on the assumption that the agent is afraid or jealous. It is this sort of occasion that Bedford seems to treat as central to the concept of emotion. However, in my opinion, such occasions are not central to the concept, though they are important constituents of our emotional life, and do not form a counter-example to my thesis. Typically, such actions occur when the agent has controlled his immediate reaction but still wants to 'do' something about the target. On such occasions the agent acts calmly and often carefully but what distinguishes this case from the case of an act done from a policy can be expressed in terms of a perceptual analogy. In an unemotional situation, ideally, every point counts as equal value

with every other just as in a photograph the general area is in focus. In an emotional situation the focus is limited to the target, and its value in terms of decisions is greater than other considerations. Thus, typically, a man acting from jealousy puts his consideration for the other parties involved out of focus; a man acting from ambition limits his view to his success; a man acting from fear may not look far enough into the future, or devalue certain parts of his surroundings, as when a man refuses to obey commands from his superior.

What is important here is the way that the agent views the target, what part it plays in his thinking. Such an account can take care of White's¹ views on feelings in emotions. White talks of 'feelings of inclination' - a man who is afraid feels like avoiding that which he is afraid of. Such feelings are linked to action in that were it not for the fact that the agent is controlling his action, he would carry out the actions that his feelings dictate to him. It is a necessary part of the concept of emotion in such situations that the man have such feelings, that the target, to be one, plays such a part in his feelings. The presence of such feelings is one way of cashing my 'focus' metaphor - but not the only one.

Sensations are linked to emotions not simply in virtue of the fact that they occur when the man is emotional, any more than feelings of inclination are part of the emotional situation in this way, as

1. Op. cit. P 114-115.

Bedford seems to suggest, but in virtue of the fact that they are part of the consciousness of the target. There have been psychological theories which have held that sensations present in emotion are felt bodily changes of the body 'preparing itself' for action. This is not the presently accepted view but on my account, it should be true that sensations of bodily change are in some way connected with action.

What do we mean when we say that a man's emotions have got the better of him? We do not mean that some force within him, the emotion, makes him act against his better judgement, but we do mean something like this. To control an emotion, it is necessary to 'come to the surface', to become explicitly conscious of ourselves in our relationships and see them objectively. To see something objectively is to see something from the outside, to be able to evaluate it. When we are overcome by our emotional response this is what we cannot do, for we remain at the 'pre-conscious' level, too much wrapt up in the situation.

Usually, to say that a man's emotion have got the better of him, is to make a judgement upon his actions - to say that somehow they are ill-advised. Quite often by this we mean that the agent has mis-evaluated the situation, that it is more complicated than he thinks. This can be fitted easily into our scheme, for emotional behaviour on the account that I am presenting, depends upon prior evaluation of situations. We react according to the prior evaluation

when perhaps we should act on a more full evaluation. The focus metaphor can be used here in that typically in an emotion situation we do not see all the ramifications until after we react.

The difference between the over-emotional and the unemotional man here, is that the former reacts before he sees the whole picture, and the latter does not work at the pre-conscious level at all. He has no involvement in the world and therefore what happens can have no meaning for him.

To know, therefore, whether a man is emotional in a certain way, we do have to look at what he does, or what he says he feels like doing. The presence of sensations is itself only an indication of the strength of his emotion, a measure of how important to him the target of his emotion is. But it makes sense, for a man to say that he is emotional even if he does nothing and what he is telling us then is something about the way that the target of the emotion behaves in his consciousness. It tells us something about his conception of his environment and the way that he is involved in it.

The distinction between emotions is a matter of distinction between targets. As Mrs. Foot points out, it is not the description of the object qua thing that counts but its relationship with the agent. To put this in terms nearer to those that I have been using, it is the agent's description of the thing as it affects him that matters.

To say that a man is afraid of X, is to say that X plays a certain part in his life (long term or short), or has a certain meaning to him, even though it may not be immediately clear how it does. Emotion is necessarily connected with action, because the part that X plays in a man's life, is shown by what he does or what he is inclined to do about it. The degree to which something is important to him is indicated, among other things, by the way that he reacts to 'what happens to it'. (One has to use vague terms like this because the complexity of the emotional life allows only of fairly general comments.)

The way in which the target has meaning, the nature of the target, is therefore connected with the way it is connected with or represents something which the agent values. Thus, a man who is afraid of failing an examination must value what passing it would bring or represent. Here the target is not instantiated in an 'object-in-the-world', in that it does not exist like a bull in a field, though there is a sense in which the possibility of failure of the examination exists. The difficulty of accounting for targets lies in the manifold ways that a target, say of fear, can be connected with some form of harm or danger. Thus, a man may fear an examination because he fears failure, or because he fears the oppressive conditions of the examination room, and so on. A man may feel proud of his son because his son is good-looking, has won a prize, is brave, or has succeeded in business. Thus, conditions for something acting as a target can really only be sketched. However, it still remains true

that the concept of importance plays a major role. If someone cares nothing for something then this something cannot act as a target for any but the limiting case of an emotion - that of indifference, which is probably better called an attitude than an emotion.

It is important here, perhaps, to re-emphasise that the 'target' is really a sort of logical construction, not necessarily involving a thing-in-the-world and is not to be considered as a something which is existentially separate from the 'emotion'. Thus emotion words explain action in terms of attitudes of evaluation. The target itself is not necessarily, and indeed is but seldom, that which is evaluated. It is rather a pointer to the evaluation. Thus, if a man is said to be afraid of x (where x is the target) and proud of y (where y is the target) then we know something about his relation to x and his relation to y, but until we know more about the situation - for example why he is afraid or proud - we do not know exactly what x or y mean to him.

Essentially the point that I have been trying to develop here is that a man's life is involved in things which are, in a sense outside of him. We need not, as Kenny shows, postulate states of the body to account for the motive use of emotion words. A man sees himself as involved in the world in terms of those facets of life which he values. Thus we must begin to treat man not as a unit or as a spectator as the tradition beginning with Locke has it, but as an agent in the world.

We may sum this up by saying that what part X plays in a man's emotional life, shows what it means to him. That this is not always easy to see is part of the difficulty of the concept of meaning here - to explain the meaning of something in a life involves the use of a special form of insight and skill.

An understanding, therefore, of a man's emotional life involves an understanding of what he values and of the way in which he values it. Such understanding is only minimally connected with the state of his body and is much more connected with what he considers important.

In the following chapter, I shall attempt to make some comments upon the nature of the concept of happiness, to show how far it is connected with emotion. I shall use the, as yet undeveloped, concept of importance to talk of happiness. I do not think that this will be too much of a bar to understanding for I am not using the term in a very unusual way. However, I shall deal in detail with the concept in chapter five.

Chapter Four.

The Concept of Happiness.

In the last chapter, I attempted to explain some facets of our emotional life in terms of 'a man's involvement in the world' - by what he considers important - what matters to him. It is not true for all men, though it be true for some, that it is only the agent's advancement, considered in contradistinction to that of others, which matters, and therefore we need not see human action as being essentially 'self-interested'. If this is so, then we need not see happiness as essentially that state of having satisfied one's desires nor of having achieved or guaranteed one's advancement - there is no prima facie case for assuming that happiness refers only to the self.

Happiness may be considered as an emotion - at least it bears certain similarities to other emotions in that we talk of feelings and actions in connection with it, but it differs from emotions in general in various ways also - it appears, sometimes, to have no specific target (at least in many of its uses) - it appears not to give rise to action in quite the same way as other emotions. However, the concept of happiness does seem to depend upon some idea of 'importance' in the same way as other emotion words, and happiness is something which may spring upon us - being happy is not centrally something which we can decide to be (as opposed to being cheerful for example).

In what follows, I shall try to show why I think this. I shall begin by considering the concept of happiness from the point of view of 'feeling', both to discredit the idea that happiness is a feeling

(this will refer the remarks made of the general case in the previous chapter to the specific case of happiness), and to attempt to show the place of feeling in happiness. In doing this, I hope to be able to show something of the logic of the concept of happiness, in particular that part of it which is directly relevant to talk of morality.

Thus, I commence with the fairly obvious question, 'Is happiness a feeling?' but intend this question to cover also the question of whether there is always, when a man is happy, a feeling present. By 'feeling', I do here mean simply sensation but use the word to cover other senses of 'feeling' as well.

The answer that I reach divides the concept of happiness into two, intimately connected parts; happiness as an emotion and happiness as an evaluation. These labels are not in fact very precise and I mean nothing to stand upon them, but will demonstrate the difference between the two uses as I proceed.

Is, therefore, happiness a feeling?

But if it is a feeling, what sort of feeling is it? Suppose we look at three examples of happy men and try to work out what they are feeling. In each case it seems that there is not one feeling but a whole set of them.

A fisherman on a river bank on a sunny afternoon, with the fish

biting, perhaps not continuously but enough, might feel a sense of relaxation, of peace and inward calm. Another fisherman in the stern of a powerful shark-boat out of a Cornish port, might feel in the teeth of the Atlantic spray, anything but calm. He is excited, his blood is up, his heart pounds. Again, the marathon runner, finishing 26 miles of hard-fought sun and dust, is exhausted, drained but proud, having barely the strength to acknowledge the cheers of the crowd. Here we have a lot of different feelings but in each case the lucky man is happy and, it seems, undeniably feeling so. That is to say, if we asked each of them, "Are you feeling happy?", each of them would almost certainly answer "Yes". Whereas, if you asked them, each in turn, "Are you feeling calm, excited or proud?", you would get the answer "Yes", in only one or at most two cases. Each man is feeling happy, but their feelings are different.

It seems impossible here to pick out one feeling which is the feeling of happiness. How then do we know that each man, if he is feeling as we have described, is in fact feeling happy? Let us ask the question a little differently. How, in postulating these examples, did we know what feelings to credit to each man? Suppose we had credited the first fisherman with the feelings of the second. Suppose he went down to the river feeling like this, would we still want to say, quite so readily that he was feeling happy? It sounds more as if he is feeling angry or excited. But how can we say this? Isn't it that we know a lot about the situation?

Given the situation and the fact that the man is happy, then we seem to know the rest. We can say what sorts of feelings he will have and we can decide when some sorts of feelings are inappropriate. This is because we know what happiness in this situation is. Suppose we described the man's situation and his feelings, in any one of these cases, would telling anyone 'and he was happy' add very much to what we had said?

Feeling happy in these situations is feeling just as we have described the man as feeling. It is feeling nothing over and above this.

But, one might say, it is possible for a man to say, for example our runner, "Oh, it was wonderful, and I felt so proud and elated, but even then I was not happy". It certainly seems possible, but surely this would come as a surprise. We would want to know why he said it - not out of curiosity but from a lack of understanding. If he explained himself, by saying something like "My child is seriously ill", then we would understand. There is something about the situation which is before the man's eyes but not before ours until he tells us. (This brings us to a point which I would like to examine more closely later. Happiness is situation-bound in that it is possible to be happy doing x, but not to be happy overall. It is possible that a man be happy overall but for his feelings to be describable in other terms from 'feeling happy'. It is further possible that a man's feelings are inappropriate to his situation in some way - our first

fisherman may, for example, have the feelings of the second - this tells us not that they feel happiness differently but that what the man is happy about is not just his fishing. The target is not what it appears.)

How do we know then that the feelings that a man has in these situations are the feelings of happiness? You can have the same feelings in other combinations or perhaps the same and not 'feel happy'. One can be elated but bitter, calm and sad, proudly resigned. But it isn't just the feelings that we must concentrate upon but the whole complex. In this situation, these feelings constitute the feeling of happiness, while in another, the same feelings may be differently described. The complex is what matters.

Let us look at it from a slightly different angle. A man can be a happy man, and can have a happy life, without having any inclination to talk about his feelings. I suppose that a way of talking about this, is to say that the man's situation is such that when he reflects upon it, there arises in him the feeling of happiness. But if we dismiss the possibility of there being one feeling which is the criterion of happiness, then we must ask what constitutes the feeling of happiness here. One could answer that the constitutive feelings are those of satisfaction and contentment.

But, to be satisfied is to be satisfied with something, and to

be content is to be content with something. The use of both words involves some reference to a notion of judgement. There is obviously a great deal of value in considering happiness in conjunction with contentment and satisfaction, but to be happy about one's situation cannot be entirely and always analysed in these terms. One can, for example, be content but not happy. While it seems odd to say that one is content but unhappy, one may well be prepared to use 'content' or 'satisfied', when one would not use the word 'happy'. For many instances of these words, happiness is a different thing from contentment. Thus there is a lot of justification for Mrs. Austin's comment;

"That he should be happy, not content but happy, is ...the highest assessment of a man's total condition".¹

More importantly, for our immediate purposes, one cannot analyse being happy in terms of feeling content, for one can be content and feel content, and the same problems arise. It is as difficult to identify the feeling of contentment as it is to identify the feeling of happiness. The analysis gets us no further. (If one wants to consider this further, one should try comparing feeling content with an essay, feeling content after a meal, feeling content with life and so on.) Not only does the analysis get us no further, but it could get us no further for happiness is not the same as contentment.

1. Jean Austin 'Pleasure and happiness' Philosophy, 1968.

It does seem that the use of the word 'happy' in some contexts, does involve some notion of an assessment or judgement. After all, when we ask someone why he is happy with something, what we often require is some indication of the qualities of the thing, some reason for valuing it highly. We are now talking particularly about the use of the word in contexts like 'happy with...' or 'happy about...' where what is the object of the assessment is a fairly easily identifiable thing.

Suppose we take it as an assessment, what kind is it likely to be? Jean Austin might be taken to imply that it is the highest possible assessment. However this cannot be so. Ranking is involved but not just of the virtues of the thing in question treated objectively. Thus, it is not nonsense to say, 'This is not the best car in the world, nor the best car I could have bought, but I am very happy with it'. To rank something with the best, is to rank it as high as possible but to be happy with something is, approximately speaking, to rank it according to one's wants. Thus, I can be happy with my Morris 1000, though I know that the Morris 1300 is a better car. Really, I might say, I do not do enough driving to notice the difference. This does not imply that I don't notice the difference necessarily, but that if I do, it doesn't worry me. The assessment is relative to my wants, not to any absolute criteria. If I say that the Morris 1300 is the best car for its price on the market, then I am open to your challenge to prove it so according to the generally accepted criteria for a good car, but if I say that

I am happy with it, you cannot fault me by showing that the Renault or Ford has a better engine. Of course, if I am only happy with the best, then this will, if true, make a difference to me, but there is no logical reason why I should only be happy with the best.

To use the word 'happy' in this way, is not to use the word in an emotion sense. If I am happy with my Morris 1000 then it suits my purposes; it does not make me feel emotional about the car. There could be a case in which this is so, especially if the car had some special meaning for me but I am assuming here that it does not. This use of the word 'happy' is very close to, if not identical with some uses of the word 'content' and perhaps both come down to the fact that there is nothing about the car which causes me any worry or feeling that I would prefer something better.

It may be thought here that there are uses of the word 'happy' which are purely objective in character. Thus we may mean by saying that we are unhappy with an argument that we think it is invalid. While I am sure that this is often so, I do not think that such a case materially affects our position. For, if 'I am unhappy with this argument' means 'I think that this argument is invalid/wrong', then why not say the latter? There are of course reasons for adopting the former sentence and that these are not merely stylistic shows us that there is a difference in meaning here.

It seems to me that the use of the word 'happy' or 'unhappy', in these contexts is very often a form of politeness. In using this form of words, I withdraw some of the force of my criticism. After all, it is possible that the argument be entirely valid but for me to be unhappy about it; it is possible that I should be half-way convinced but still be unhappy about it. I could say, "I am sure you are right, but I am not happy about it", and by this mean that I cannot quite see why you are right. On this account, on the occasions where I am sure you are wrong, this form of speech is tactical or polite. I do not want to sound too critical or pushing.

One of the reasons why we can use the word 'happy' on these occasions and effectively mean something like 'right' or 'acceptable' depending upon the context, is that in such circumstances, both parties are assumed to be agreed upon what it is that is relevant to the discussion. Thus, in discussing an essay for example, the fact that it is printed upon orange paper is not relevant to its worth. One of the parties may dislike such paper very much but this does not make him, in the sense that we are discussing unhappy about the essay. The purposes or criteria for evaluation are tacitly accepted by both people in the discussion whereas they need not be in talking, say, about a car. It is tacitly assumed that what makes one unhappy will make the other so too, for happy about here is a phrase used simply for evaluation.

The fault with Jean Austin's analysis is that she presents all uses of the word 'happy' as belonging to this pattern, and if 'happiness' has an emotional use, which I suggest it has, then some idea of the 'unmediated response' must come in. The use of the word 'happy' here is one in the context of conscious evaluation.

It is worth pointing out, however, that even this use carries some 'personal' element. Any evaluation implied in this use, semantically if not tactically, is evaluation according to my criteria, in a sense. Validity applies to the argument independently of my appreciation of it, but whether I am happy about it depends upon my recognition of this validity.

Is a happy man, one who is happy about his life then? Is to claim to be happy to rank one's life according to one's wants? There is something else here which we should look at, and which Jean Austin perhaps doesn't notice. To say "I am happy" may not be to report one's feelings and may be to report the result of an assessment but it depends for its scope upon when it is said.

If we say that a man is happy, we may not mean that he is a happy man or that he is happy overall. This sounds a little paradoxical but what I mean should be clear. Our first fisherman may say that he is happy when we ask him on the river bank but he may say that he is not a happy man overall. In the first instance,

he is assessing only what he thinks we are asking about, i.e. 'Is he happy fishing', while it may be that in the second instance he is assessing his whole circumstance as a man. Indeed, we may say of a desperately unhappy man that his only happiness now, is his bit of fishing on a Sunday afternoon. We may ask someone at the cinema whether he is happy, but we do not expect a dissertation about his whole life.

The man who starts brooding upon his whole life may well start to feel unhappy, if he thinks it unsuccessful in some way, but the fact that a man is not necessarily happy about his whole life, does not mean that he is not happy for portions of it or about parts of it. Of course a man's life may be neither happy nor unhappy; it may be just 'OK' or 'all right', and he might say 'I am not unhappy about it', which does not mean that he is happy about it either.

Of course to ask someone whether he is a happy man, is to invite philosophising, in the non-academic sense of the word.

But let us backtrack a little. What would count against a man being happy at a certain time? Is there something that he is unhappy about?

As Jean Austin says, a man cannot be happy and bored, or happy and worried, and so on. But does this mean, again as Jean Austin

says, that happiness is a negative concept? This would be an encouraging thing to believe, implying as it does that happiness is the normal state of man; that in the absence of any interfering circumstances, he is happy. But surely, to say that one is free from worry, from boredom and so on, while it may be a necessary condition of being happy, is not a sufficient one. It is further necessary that there is a positive element as well. Saying negatively that there is nothing wrong, is not like saying positively that all is fine. One can be content with the average but contentment here is another thing.

What we need is something 'right'. What makes a man happy is not simply the removal of a discomfort, for it is the kind of discomfort which matters. The recovery of one's wife from a serious illness is a positive event, for trivial as it sounds, if one is in love with one's wife, then she is important to one and perhaps (though the philosophy of love is a neglected subject) the most important person. Part of what one means by saying that something is important (when we mean just important, not to...) is that one's happiness is bound up in it.

(Being 'O.K.' differs from being happy in that the former is a negative state. Being happy, to my mind, implies that something is right, whether this be a particular thing, as with happy about..., or everything in general as with just plain happy.)

Thus in the assessment which results in claims to be happy, what counts as the criteria for the assessment depends upon what the person involved counts as important. Since a man usually, though not always, knows himself best, it is difficult to refute a man's claim to be happy.

It is here that I think Mrs. Austin misses another point. There seems to me to be a distinction between misusing the word, and having an unusual conception of happiness. We may not always understand a man when he says that he is happy but this does not mean that he is not.

Let us look at some doubtful cases of happiness. (i) A drunk says that he is happy, that all is well with the world, and he can make efforts to show that all is well. In other words he has reasons for his statement based upon his perception of his surroundings. He feels befriended, safe, warm-hearted and forgiving. Is he therefore happy? Well, whether he is or not, there is a difference between him and the sober, happy man. The drunk's judgement is impaired, his reasons are therefore doubtful. The sober man's judgement is unimpaired. To the one, the world seems fine through a rosy, alcoholic haze, to the other the world is fine. Subjectively, however, there is no difference and so a decision upon whether one says that the drunk is happy depends upon whether one is going to insist upon the soundness of the judgement or upon the willingness to make one.

Mrs. Austin, wrongly I think, insists that the reasons that are offered in support of a happiness statement must be those of the society in which the man lives, and she suggests that it is a misuse of the word if the reasons offered constitute an outrage to these. This suggests, for various reasons that she would not call the drunk happy.

But this is surely mistaken. The drunk certainly would claim to feel happy and within his own evaluation he is happy. It may be that when he sobers up, he will be very unhappy, but this does not mean that he is unhappy while he is drunk. (ii) There may be a difference between the drunk and the man under the influence of a hallucinatory drug like L.S.D. For many people, being drunk does not completely remove one's powers of reason in that one can see that all is not sometimes as fine as one thinks. I am told that, on the contrary, one of the influences of L.S.D. is to remove all powers to question one's circumstance. (Thus it is always held to be very dangerous to take such a drug without supervision.) The man on his 'trip' will therefore claim to be happy no matter what is pointed out to him, and such a person might well be thought to be happy in a very artificial sense of the word.

The problem that we face in these two situations is that in the short-term, occurrent sense, both the drunk and the man on the 'trip' are happy, but both have reached this state by artificial means and it could be that both can be assumed to be, in the long-term sense,

unhappy. This need not be the case - the drunk may be celebrating something which makes him very happy even when not drunk - but it is consistent with the supposition that the men are unhappy when in a normal physiological state. This is not so different from the unhappy man whose only 'bit of happiness' is his fishing on a Sunday afternoon. The difference lies in the means and the lack of ability of the drunk and the man on L.S.D. to question their evaluation. The difference lies not in the state therefore, but in the means to the state.

A much more vital difference that Mrs. Austin does not notice is that her insistence upon the 'public' nature of the criteria is misplaced. It is often said that all sorts of things make a man happy, but while there may be many reasons for a man's being happy, we do not feel that anything can be a reason. If a man said that he was happy when he had just that moment lost his wife and children in a car accident, we should think that, and justifiably at least at first sight, there was something wrong with him. We would want to say that it is odd, because a man just cannot think all is well in this situation. If he did we should think that he was some sort of monster.

However, if he said, "It's awful, and yet I feel so happy. What is the matter with me?", the circumstances are not so odd - or at least not in the same way. We should now think that the man is ill,

and far from saying that he was happy, we should feel even more sorry for him. He has lost his family and his equilibrium.

But we should be somewhat careful here. More careful than Mrs. Austin is, for, charitably, we might consider that anyone who says that he is happy in these circumstances must be unbalanced by grief but we could be mistaken. To pick up a point made earlier, what counts as criteria for the happiness-assessment (to continue for now to borrow Mrs. Austin's terms), is a matter for the man himself. Thus, if the man did not care for his wife, if he considered her the sole bar to his happiness, then, however unedifying the spectacle is, he may be said to be using the word correctly.

To take another example, we might find it odd if a man claimed to be happy because his name was Jones. If he claimed this and this alone as his reason for being happy we should find it very difficult to understand him at all. It is difficult to see how the fact that his name was Jones could make any difference to his life - how it could have any importance for him. But, if he could show us that he was an ardent Welsh Nationalist then the case might have more meaning. His name being Jones has a meaning in terms of his allegiances - it proclaims his Welsh ancestry.

Mrs. Austin's insistence upon the 'public' nature of the criteria is misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, she neglects to distinguish

clearly between 'I am happy (about x)' and '(x) is the best of its kind' and in doing so she misses what we might call the essentially subjective nature of happiness. Secondly, she is somewhat confused over the relation of moral terms to happiness.

She says that an ascription of meanness, or unkindness, to a man is logically incompatible with the ascription of happiness. I, however, do not find those sentences which are supposed to demonstrate this incompatibility, at all odd. Look at these sentences;

- (i) The miser was a happy man until he lost his gold.
- (ii) Of course he is happy! He is so selfish that no one else's misfortune can touch him.
- (iii) He is a wicked man and what makes it worse he seems quite happy about it.
- (iv) He is happy but he is so lonely.
- (v) He is happy although filled with remorse.

I find that on most interpretations of (i), (ii) and (iii) that these are perfectly acceptable sentences while, again on most interpretations, (iv) and (v) are not. The difference that I find here is exactly that which Mrs. Austin finds between lonely and alone. In lonely and in (iv) and (v), the person recognises that something is wrong (compare also sad, anxious, worried, scared &c), but in (i), (ii), and (iii), there is no supposition that the man does so recognise his situation. He may indeed not recognise the validity of the moral judgements that are being passed on him. So long as

things come up to his evaluation, he can intelligibly claim to be happy.

It may be difficult to understand a man when he says he is happy (the same difficulty occurs in a similar way with 'enjoy' - how can the English mountaineer Joe Brown and his friends enjoy climbing up such dangerous rock-faces?). This does not necessarily mean that he is misusing the word. It does not mean that we can never understand his reasons, though it does mean that it will sometimes be more difficult than Mrs. Austin suggests. It is often the novelist's job to help us to this understanding. (Think of Herman Melville's Moby Dick or Nathaniel Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter.)

What goes for the use of 'happy' at this level, goes for other uses as well. To understand why I am happy with my Morris 1000, you need to know how I approach the activity of driving, what I need a car for. Stirling Moss might be happy only with a Ferrari.

Mrs. Austin insists upon the public nature of the criteria for what she calls the evaluation in using the word "happy", whereas I think that she should insist upon the exact opposite. The criteria for using the word are more essentially private, or better - personal.

Mrs. Austin fails to distinguish here between the criteria for the use of the word and the criteria that we expect people to use. The occasion of surprise may indicate not misuse but a different set

of evaluations.

To return once more to talk about feelings, we were asking earlier how we knew that certain people were feeling happy. Why do we say that the way that each of them, (the fishermen and the runner), was feeling, constitutes for them feeling happy? The answer is surely to do with the fact that each of them is participating successfully in an activity which he enjoys. We know the 'point' of the activity, and we know what constitutes doing it successfully. We know what would constitute things going wrong and, as far as our description goes, we know that nothing is going wrong.

Success is not of course the criterion of happiness. One can be unhappy about one's success but when the success is tied to words like enjoyment, importance, and so on, it becomes, in the absence of special conditions, trivial to use the word 'happy'. We thus identify the state of happiness in this way; the feelings are of minor importance.

(The inappropriateness of the feelings of the second fisherman, when credited to the first, is due to our understanding of what the enjoyment of freshwater fishing consists in. It is not logically, or presumably empirically impossible for a man to get excited when he goes fishing but then we want to say that he does not enjoy it in the same way as the first fisherman. He does not fish for the same reasons,

though these may be equally as good.)

Why is it then, if feelings are not of the first importance in talking about happiness, that we are loath to say of a person that he is a happy man or has led a happy life, when as far as we can tell, he has never had any feelings of happiness? It has been suggested to me¹ that one of the criteria for the correctness of a 'happiness' statement is that the person involved must, at some time or another, have had some feelings of happiness.

I am inclined to say that this is true, but to maintain my statement that the presence of some feelings is not in itself enough to say of a man that he is happy. The problem is whether a man can intelligibly claim to have led a happy life, if he has never experienced any feelings.

It seems to me that we are asking questions about the unemotional man here. Can an unemotional man be a happy one? On the surface at least this sounds perfectly possible, after all the Stoics and the Epicureans both agreed that the happy life was that which was farthest removed from the pin-pricks and stabs of everyday affairs. It seems odd to me that members of such initially opposed schools, should be led by their theories to a position where they are likely to end up in neighbouring caves feeding the same goat, but it seems even more odd to call this happiness. It might be true that this is as much happiness as we can hope for (which is

1. By R. S. McGowan in conversation.

not the same thing as being happy), but the man who withdraws from life, saving the religious hermit, withdraws himself from the possibility of happiness, even though his attempt, like the Stoic and the Epicurean is to avoid pain.

This is something that the unemotional man does, whether he does it deliberately or no.

The unemotional man as I said earlier is he who considers very little of any importance, for to consider something important seems part of the concept of emotional behaviour. If a man never considered anything important then we might well consider that happiness was always too strong a word for him, though, of course, we do not mean that he is unhappy either.

Thus, I do not want to say that there is no such thing as feeling happy, but I do want to say that there is no such thing as a feeling of happiness, the presence of which is ever the (one and only) criterion for saying that one is happy. There are lots of different feelings or sets of feelings which in the appropriate situations count as feeling happy. It is not the feelings alone that count as criteria for the use of the phrase 'feeling happy' but the situation plus the inclination to talk about one's feelings. Thus, it is normally odd to say that one feels happy, but that one is not happy, whereas it is not odd to say that one is happy without having any inclination to talk about one's feelings.

One would not know that the feelings that one has are in fact the feelings of happiness without knowing that one is happy. The situation is important and necessary. Thus, in the three cases that we have discussed, feeling happy is feeling just as the men are described as feeling. If a man is happy when he is fishing, there is no need to assume that there are any other feelings that he has over and above those feelings that constitute doing what he enjoys about fishing. A man who seeks excitement is happy when excited. He is not excited and happy, considered that is in terms of two distinct sets of feelings. In other words, here is to be found no feeling of happiness, describable per se.

However, there are occasions when what we feel is 'happy'. On these occasions, we need not be doing anything and enjoying it. There are occasions when we wake up feeling happy. We talk about feeling happy and not knowing why. In these cases it does seem that the feelings are central, and therefore this might appear a counter-example to earlier comments, but I do not think so.

There is an obvious parallel here between happiness and depression in that one can feel pointless depression. However, what is missing in these cases, is not the target, but the cause. (This point is very clearly made by Anthony Kenny)¹ When I feel happy, though I do not know why, I do not know what brought on my feelings but I can still identify them as feelings of happiness because I still have a target. When one wakes up in the morning and feels happy what one

1. Op. cit. P 60-61.

feels happy about is everything, though what it was that made one feel, think or realise that everything was fine, one does not know, nor is it really important for our immediate purposes here to speculate upon possibilities.

The problem of the identification of the feelings is then resolved by the distinction between 'cause' and 'target' but there still remains the content to be examined.

Thus when we were talking earlier about the variable content of feeling-states relative to happiness, it was fairly easy to see that the problem though complicated, was explainable by saying that feeling happy in a situation is feeling as one does when one is happy in that situation. However, in contrast to this, what seems to come first here is the feeling, and not the situation. It seems that to give a full account of this, we must give some account of the feeling-state.

What still seems obvious is that this is not to be given in terms of sensations for reasons detailed before. Let us consider some other uses of the word 'feeling'. Two possibilities come to mind upon reading White's account of the uses of the word 'feeling'. Firstly, there is what he calls 'Intellectual feeling'. This at first sight seems to fit the bill quite nicely. According to Jean Austin, von Wright and others, to say that one is happy is to make a claim based upon an evaluation of one's circumstances. Thus to feel happy,

without knowing why, on this account would be to feel that one's circumstances are good. This use of feeling, according to White, is akin to having hunches, intuitions and suspicions,¹ like thinking something is the case without having any evidence that it is so. Indeed we are not prepared to offer any evidence, in making this sort of statement, only to point to "the aspects of the matter which cause the feeling".

But, surely, this will not do, for it would mean that there were two types of feeling, in feeling happy; the first when we are happy and know why (we have a target and reasons) and the second when we do not know why (we just have a target). For the point is that we can and do feel happy when we are happy and have the best of evidence for the fact that all is fine. We cannot be sure without evidence (an intuition) and with evidence at one and the same time.

White explains this particular use of the word 'feeling' as being part of a family of words with 'believe', 'being sure' and so on, none of which appear to have any connection with emotions or feelings in any other sense. Happiness is not however the name of a certain type of knowledge - it is not centrally important that we know all is well when we are happy but that it is all well and we recognise it. Even then, the recognition is not the happiness, for, while it appears very odd, it does seem possible to me that a man should recognise that all was well but was not happy. Somehow, and this is its connection with emotion, happiness involves a reaction to

1. A. R. White op. cit. P 105-106.

such recognition; not a state of knowledge but something proceeding from it perhaps.

Another use of 'feeling' that White picks out, is what he calls 'feeling as an inclination' which, White says, is relevant to emotion. Thus, he remarks:

"... to feel indignant is to feel inclined to protest; to feel afraid is to feel like taking measures of avoidance or prevention ..."¹.

The difference between emotion-words like 'fear' and the concept of happiness is demonstrated by the difficulty of using this sense of 'feeling' in connection with happiness. Whereas it seems possible to give some indication of what a man who is afraid might feel like doing, it is not possible to give any such indication with the happy man. Certainly, a man who is happy may describe himself as 'feeling like jumping over the moon' but the connection between the (quasi-) act of jumping over the moon and happiness is not the same as the connection between the act of taking measures of avoidance and fear. In the latter case, there is a connection between the target of fear, something seen as dangerous, and the act - the minimisation of the danger. However, since there appears to be no one specifiable target to happiness (the target often appears to be 'everything'), no one action can be carried out with reference to it. However, action does seem to be connected with happiness, but these actions are not those, as in the case generally of other actions proceeding from emotion, which will affect the target of the emotion. Indeed, how

1. Op. cit. P 115.

could one action affect everything? On the contrary they seem to have nothing specifically to do with the target unless one remembers that happiness is often connected with celebration. Actions which we feel like doing when we are happy, express our happiness more in a symbolic or ritual sense. There is a difference here between 'conventional' and 'ritual' in that while our fears may be expressed in 'conventional' ways - the actual notes of a scream for example - such conventional acts contain no 'internal' meaning. It seems to be important to the expression of happiness that what is done is often deliberately out of the ordinary - extreme happiness is expressed in terms of desires to do something impossible, like wanting to jump over the moon.

Thus, 'feeling as inclination' does have some relevance to happiness and feeling happy, but its connection is not the same as with other feelings and what they are symptomatic of. However, this should not be taken to mean that the presence of feelings of this kind is either a necessary or sufficient condition of happiness, for as we pointed out earlier a man may be happy but have none of these feelings, and indeed may have these feelings but not be happy. A man may simply desire a glass of champagne or have an insane ambition to be the first man to jump over the moon. Again, since there is no real hope of delimiting the sorts of things that a man may feel like doing when he is happy, or to express his happiness, no one description of an act or desire to act can have the standing of a criterion of an ascription of happiness. What

one feels like doing when one is happy, what is expressive of one's happiness, depends upon the immediate nature of it. To express happiness at receiving a letter offering a job somewhere, may make one feel like jumping up in the air perhaps. To be happy because at last someone has died after long pain when the death can be seen as a release from pain, is not likely to be expressed in these terms. The nature of the expression depends upon the nature of the circumstances and only in certain circumstances is an action expressive of happiness. Given that we know the situation, then an action or a declared inclination to act, may stand as a criterion or a sign that someone is happy, but the action alone or the declared inclination alone, will not be sufficient to distinguish between various emotions.

Often, that someone does something odd, or immediately (in the sense of 'without (appearing to have)thought), is a sign of emotion, or a sign that some emotion word will explain his conduct, but alone it will not tell us what emotion word to use.

However, though feelings of inclination may sometimes be relevant to talk of happiness, we need not assume that every man who feels happy, feels like doing some act which will express his happiness per se. Thus, if one asked one of the fishermen what they felt like doing, one might expect the answer that they felt like carrying on what they were already doing.

However, it is clear from this that happiness is related to other words which we call emotion words, in that it is connected with action and with feeling, even though it is not to be analysed in terms of feeling. It can indeed be used to explain actions; not only those which are expressions of it but of some which are not.

That one is feeling happy or overjoyed can act as an excuse. To break a cup by one's expression of joy may be a forgiveable act because of one's joy. In this sense it does act like other emotion words.

Happiness may also make us forget to do things that we perhaps ought to have done. Thus, a man may forget a chore or a duty and offer as his excuse that he was feeling so happy that it slipped his mind.

In this use, happiness can be a disturbance in the way that anger is. Happiness involves some perceptual 'focusing' which can make us, when feeling happy act in an unconsidered manner.

Now, according to Mrs. Austin, to say that a man is happy is to evaluate his whole circumstance - to say that everything about his situation is good or fine. There are obvious problems about such a theory, in any case. For example, it would be impossible for us to know someone's whole situation and it would be impossible for anyone to evaluate his whole situation - he simply would never finish the

task in order to make any judgement on it. We cannot and do not evaluate a man's whole situation when we say that he is happy.

The fact that happiness can act as an excuse (or at least a putative one) seems also to require that a happy man is not necessarily one whose whole circumstances are good. A man can be wildly happy (in general) because of x (a specific thing) which leads him to forget some minor worry w, and perhaps excuse himself for not doing anything about w, because of his happiness. It need not be the case that w is forgotten, only that it somehow ceases to count.

If we maintain that happiness has some connection with emotion, through the concept of 'disturbance' of the concept of feeling, then it will be true that the happier the man, the more 'disturbance' and feelings he will experience. It is true, of course, that there are varying degrees of happiness, and it is not the all or nothing thing that Mrs. Austin and von Wright seem to imply. Again, if we still maintain that happiness is a positive state as opposed to contentment, then it can be seen that not necessarily everything need act as the target of happiness.

The more happy that a man is regarding some success or attainment or whatever, the more important that success or attainment is to him. One could say that there were two dimensions which determine the degree of a man's happiness;

(1) the degree to which what is attained, for example, matters to him,

(2) the degree to which the attainment is complete.

However, these two can be seen to collapse into one for it is obviously more important that what is attained is completely attained than partially so. (2) is really reducible to (1), in that it is the result which determines the emotion.

If a man attains something which is totally unimportant, then that man is not going to be happy (nor indeed unhappy), but perhaps only mildly amused. Thus when we say of a man that he is happy then we imply that what has gone right is important to him in the specific case (happy about) or that everything which matters to him has or seems to have 'gone right' in the general case. Referring back to the comments made upon the non-mediated nature of emotions, there is no need to assume that the judgement that everything has 'gone right' is a conscious one. Mrs. Austin's comments upon happiness statements as evaluations are therefore a reconstruction of the situation and not a description.

It may be true then, as for other uses of other emotion words, that the agent involved may not be aware that he cares about something, and that the fact that he feels happy when it goes well may surprise him and lead to examination of his relationship with it. Essentially, happiness involves some awareness of something important having gone well - the feelings of happiness when they

are like feelings in other emotions are feelings of inclination in that the action that one is inclined to do has some ritual connection with the target. The feeling of completion that White talks about - a feeling of general condition - may again be part of the 'feeling complex' but it may not always be so. Happiness must be divided into the periodic (emotion) sense and a long term (state) sense though both involve some sort of evaluation. This evaluation is tied to what the agent considers important in a way that is similar to other emotion concepts.

Thus it becomes possible to take an overall view of the concept of happiness. There appear to be two central uses of the concept - one which is closer to emotion-words than the other. When happiness appears to be an emotion in the periodic sense (when it can also, in fact act as a motive or excuse word), then feelings of inclination appear sometimes to be relevant. It is here that we speak of 'feeling like jumping over the moon'. The ritual expression of the emotion of happiness is connected, though not causally, with feelings which, given the context, we call feelings of happiness. However, a man can be happy, and indeed can be feeling happy, without having these feelings that we might call feelings of happiness. Thus, if a man is feeling those emotions and is doing those things which he seeks and values, it is possible to say that he is feeling happy, even if he has no feelings of inclination in the sense described. I refer here to the examples of the fishermen and the runner. Feeling as he does is feeling happy in this situation. Happiness as an emotion

or as a comment on one's life, does seem to involve an evaluation that all is going well, though what constitutes the 'all' here may vary in scope. It is possible that a man should not make such an evaluation and still be feeling happy, in that it is only when asked whether he is happy that he considers his position which before he was simply immersed in. Happiness as an emotion, like other emotions, may spring upon us which appears to indicate that the evaluation may not be (if it ever is) often a conscious process, but that evaluation is implicit in human life. Again, von Wright for example is correct when he says that 'I am happy' means something like 'All is well' but incorrect if he means by this that 'all' has to be considered before the judgement is enunciated. That something happens which brings about something that we value may be enough for everything to look 'well' - one occurrence may brighten up our life. In fact, the 'all' should be made to refer, not to everything, but to everything which matters. What it is that matters depends upon our evaluations in life; what is important to us.

If a man declares that he has a happy life, he need not be taken to mean that he has experienced the emotion of happiness all his life, or even at frequent intervals. What he probably means is that he thinks his life has been worth while, that he has lived in a meaningful way.

Throughout the above and the previous chapter, I have been using a concept of 'importance' - of something that matters to

someone - of evaluations. I hope that this has not been misleading for I do not think that I have used this concept - I think that there is only one although there are several different verbal forms - in a sense which is so far removed from sense in everyday speech. However, I do use it in a sense which allows me to talk of a man being motivated by what he considers important as opposed to what might advantage him in a self-interest sense. In other words, I use the concept to relate to action. In the following chapter, I shall be concerned to express what I mean by this concept in a more rigorous form, and I hope that what I mean by it in this chapter will become clear then, if it is vague now.

This concept of importance I find valuable because it enables me to see connections between emotions, happiness, and moral thinking which I shall tie together in the final chapter. This chapter has been but an analysis of a concept. In the final chapter, I shall attempt to put the flesh on the bones, by considering happiness in relation to action and to moral thinking.

Chapter Five.

The Concept of Importance
and reasons for action.

The degree to which someone reacts to a situation is a measure of its importance to him. A greater degree of indignation is both reasonable and to be expected the greater the wrong or the nearer to the agent, the recipient of that wrong. A man's happiness is bound up with what he considers important and for something to be a part of a man's happiness it is necessary that it is important to him.

This, in brief, represents the conclusion of the last two chapters. That something is important is shown by what a man does or is inclined to do about it - importance is connected with action and with emotional action in particular. The evaluation of something as important is not necessarily a conscious evaluation. The evaluation may come included in a way of life - an attitude to or an involvement in the world.

As I suggested in the introduction, action is often seen, perhaps covertly, to be the satisfaction of certain desires of the agent, where such desires are identifiable with some notion of the agent's 'interests'. The feeling seems to be that action which leads to promotion of some 'interest' identified as the agent's in contradistinction to those of other people, is the only comprehensible form of action. Reasons, therefore, for action must be those which make appeal to such notions, hence the attempt to show such reasons at work in the moral life.

In talking about the concept of emotion and about the concept

of happiness, I suggested that many facets of human life can only be understood in terms of something that is 'important' to the agent and I now wish to amplify these comments by investigating and explaining this concept of 'importance'. With its introduction, I think that we can introduce a new way of thinking about actions of human agents - a way of thinking about them in terms of value, and what the agent values in particular.

This way of looking at human action cannot, in any absolute sense, be shown to be correct. It is a matter of deciding whether the introduction of the concepts will enable us to make clear certain distinctions that we intuitively feel are there. The test of the usefulness of the description is ultimately whether it makes the right distinctions, but even then the problem may not be solved. Thus, G. E. Moore, in putting forward his 'Intuitionist' theory was able to make clear certain phenomena of the moral life, to make distinctions between actions performed for certain 'consequences' and actions performed for the sake of something ultimately valued. His scheme involved the use of concepts which were themselves dubious - the notion of 'intuition' in itself has been attacked repeatedly before and since Moore's use of it - but it was the distinctions that he drew that were important. If Moore's thought has as little to recommend it as some modern commentators seem to think, then it becomes hard to understand the impact that it had upon his contemporaries who were far from being fools.

While not pretending that I am capable of doing anything like the job that Moore did, I am content to rest my case upon the fact that the distinctions that I hope to draw make sense, even if some of the terms need, in themselves, further analysis. It is with this in mind that I attempt to introduce the concept of 'importance'.

An action, object or whatever can be important as a means to an end. R. W. Beardsmore, in his book Moral Reasoning, offers as an example of this use;

- (1) It is important to keep on friendly terms with the boss.

(See P 16 for Beardsmore's treatment of this.)

To ask in this example why it is important, is to ask what purpose or end is being served. It is important to keep on terms with the boss in the case that one wants to retain one's job and entertain hopes of advancement in it. What is being claimed is that keeping on good terms with the boss is a necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) means or part of the means to an end. He who wills the end, wills the means here, so to speak. However, keeping on good terms with the boss is important to an agent only in the case that he wishes to remain with the firm or perhaps get a good reference. For a man who, for whatever reason, does not seek advancement, then the action becomes unimportant for it does not serve any end which he wishes to attain.¹ In this sort of example, the importance of

1. In the case in which the agent wishes to 'get the sack', it might be said to be important for him to avoid being on good terms with the boss.

the act depends upon the aims of the agent.

There are examples not so simple as this one that begin to throw up the fact that there are other uses of the word 'important'. Take the following example;

- (2) It is important to look in the rear-view mirror before making a right turn.

Initially at least, this example looks the same as example (1). The importance of the act of looking into the rear-view mirror lies in the fact that it is a necessary (though not sufficient) means of avoiding an accident. If you do not look into the mirror you will not be able to see any following or overtaking cars and may be struck as you cross towards the crown of the road. However, it is not the case that it becomes unimportant to carry out the action in the event of one's not particularly wanting to avoid an accident. The end is not one that one can choose to seek or not to seek. The act of looking into the mirror is written into the Highway code as being required of any driver about to turn right - it becomes a duty. The difference here lies in the end and not in the means.

In example (1), if we take it as it stands, the end is simply a matter of choice for the agent. He may choose to advance in his career or not and the importance of his getting on good terms with the boss depends entirely upon this choice. However, in example (2), the end is not a matter for choice and its importance comes from considerations apart from the agent's wishes.

Notwithstanding this, both acts are themselves only conditionally important in that they are simply means to an end - their importance stems only from their relationship to some end. This relationship could, of course, alter. Thus, were some alternative means of ascertaining the position of following cars available to the motorist, which was more efficient than the use of rear-view mirrors, then the act of looking in the rear-view mirror might cease to be important, in the same way that the giving of hand signals is now thought to be unimportant because we have mechanical indicators which give a clearer indication of our intentions to other road users.

Some acts however are not important only in this functional sense. Their importance comes from other considerations. Thus suppose a man asks his wife

- (3) Does it matter if I do not change for dinner?

Whether or not he should change for dinner might, of course, depend upon certain ends in view but it is possible that it does not. For example, supposing the wife's mother is coming to dinner that evening, his not changing his clothes could be a sign of disrespect. The wife might find it 'unfitting' that he receive his mother-in-law in his gardening clothes. What he does, matters, not in virtue of its results but in terms of what it means. The meaning of the act, and its importance, is somehow 'internal' to the act. Here the act itself, not being conditioned by reference to external results, matters in the same sense that the end served by checking the rear-view mirror, matters.

Let us look at this in terms of two other examples.

- (4) My work is very important to me.
- (5) Surely I am more important than that dog!

In example (4), I am supposing an artist talking. Now it might be the case that the artist finds his work just a congenial way of earning a living, but the use of the word 'very' suggests something else. What seems more likely is that the artist is evaluating his activity not in terms of the purpose it serves but in direct contrast with other activities that he might engage in. Implied in this evaluation might be the fact, though we would need to know much more about the artist to be sure, that he would sacrifice anything else for the sake of his work, that he would go further out of his way to engage in his work than for anything else, that he would put up with a great deal of personal discomfort to continue it and so on. In terms of the previous chapter, it would be true to say that his happiness was, in some way, bound up with his work.

Example (5) is a complaint that someone's actions appear to display the fact that he values a dog over a human being. Here again, the evaluation could be expressed in terms of the functions that man and dog serve, but we need not assume this. The importance of a human being over a dog is expressed in choices regarding their comfort, or lives. While a dog is far from being unimportant, first consideration should be shown, in most circumstances, to human beings. For example, most people would agree that, if when driving on a

slippery road a dog runs out in front of the car, the proper thing to do is not to take avoiding action when there appears a chance that the occupants of the car might be injured. The death of the dog is preferred, no doubt regretfully, to the injury of human beings.

It is not, therefore, only actions which are evaluated as important. It is not only 'important to do x', but something may be itself important. Thus, in example (1), it is an action which is important, while in example (5) it is a person. However, even when we are dealing with what we might call 'objects' as opposed to actions, notions of importance still seem intimately connected with action. This is obvious when the evaluation springs from the function that the object might perform, for here what is being considered is a teleological evaluation. The notion of an end is obviously related to action, for while there may be actions which do not serve ends, there can hardly be ends which, in principle, cannot be achieved by action. Of course, a man may have many ends which he cannot achieve, through limitations of his own capabilities, but if an 'end' is in principle unachievable, then it is not properly called an end.

However, if as it seems, we can talk of importance evaluations which do not depend upon functional reasons, then one can begin to see the reason for the use of the phrase 'important in itself' or 'an end in itself'. Some objects are sought, and some actions

performed, not for reasons outside of themselves but because they are simply important, just for what they are. It has been suggested, and I think rightly, that moral aims or actions can be understood in this way. While there are actions which might be seen as morally required in virtue of the results that they bring about - for example the action of buying fruit has itself no moral content but may be morally required, or at least morally praiseworthy, in a man going to visit a sick friend - there do seem to be cases of moral requirements which do not obtain their force from any results - the behaviour of the sea captain going down with his ship may be an example of this.

It would not be true to say, I think, that all objects or actions 'important in themselves' are necessarily moral ones, though the line may be difficult to draw. Thus, the artist in example (4) may not think of his work as 'morally important' while still not thinking of it as serving a purpose.

Thus, I think that from these examples we can pick out three types of 'importance evaluations' which we could roughly characterise as follows:

Type-F. - where what is important is so because of its functional relationship to some end.

Type-I. - where what is important is so in itself. Serving no end, it is valued more highly than other things, by the agent.

Type-A. - where what is important is absolutely so and where no application to the agent is made.

This distinction is not really adequate of course, for it is possible that an action should be of both type-F. and type-A. in importance in one sense. Thus, in the case of example (2), the act of looking into the rear-view mirror is functionally important but is still absolutely required. However, let me amplify these categories in an attempt to explain them.

Type-F., which I take to be an instance of what Wittgenstein called 'relative value'¹, is a measure of importance in terms of effectiveness. It is a factual matter in that the argument about something's importance is, in principle, settled by testing the effectiveness. Any residue of argument would be not in terms of the means but in terms of the end. It can be true that it is important to keep on friendly terms with the boss if one wants to get on in the firm, but not be important for me. It has no importance for me if I do not want to get on or if I consider honesty in human relationships to be more important than success in a career. Thus, it is only important for A to do x, if the end E which x leads to, is itself of (sufficient) importance to A. If E is irrelevant to A, then x is not important for A, though it is still (an) important (means) to E for anyone who wants E.

The question of the end itself may lead to questions of

1. 'Lecture on Ethics', - Philosophical Review 1965.

importance of another nature. Thus, the importance of looking into the rear-view mirror on turning right depends upon its function as a means to some end, safety. However, the end is not one which one can choose, and therefore the act of checking the rear-view mirror (since it is not simply a means but the only practicable one) becomes important no matter what anyone wants. It is still itself, only of functional importance, and it is only an empirical matter that it stands alone as the means to a required end. It remains therefore, an instance of type F importance.

At this point, we move on to type-I. If something is important to a person as an end and not for its functional relationship to some end, then we can say that for this person, E is important in itself. It is something that this person values more highly than other things. It need not be as important for him as other things, but there must be a tendency for him to act for it and want to act for it, in preference to some other things. Again, it need not be important for other people either. A painter can, though he may not, consistently allow that for other people, art is totally unimportant.

When we begin to fail to understand someone when they do not hold something important, or think that everyone ought to hold something important, then we begin to get into the realms of type-A. Moral values, I suggest are of this type, and when we use the

word 'important' in morals, it is type-A use that we employ. I take this to be an example of what Wittgenstein called 'absolute value',¹ and that is why I call it type-A.

It is one thing to show that examples can be analysed out in this way, but it is another to show how it is intelligible.

One of the things that we use 'important' to say is that something is indispensable in the achievement of some end. I suggest then, that types I and A borrow upon this use and mean (to a greater or lesser extent) indispensable to 'life'. However, this is obviously not a simple use for, when we are talking like this, 'life' does not mean simply the continuation of biological mechanism - life in this sense is hardly an end which any of us seek - and if it were we could still ask why we sought it. What we mean by saying that it is important to 'life' is not that it achieves an end but that it is part of the end - part of our lives.

To say that something matters is to give a reason for doing it. In terms of the interpretation put upon (1), it is to give a reason which can be backed up by reference to certain relevant facts about the achievement of the end in view. However, if nothing of this sort can back up statements like (4) or (5) then for 'It matters'

1. Op. cit.

to be a reason for action, it must be the case that this statement is sufficient in itself. To say that it matters blocks further questions in the sense that there is no end in view, in terms of which it does matter. The reason is non-purposive.

As J. L. Stocks puts it:

"Purpose, then, justifies the efforts it exacts, only conditionally, by their fruits".¹

Something which is important, only in so far as it brings about something else, remains important only for as long as it can exist

1. 'The limits of purpose' in Morality and Purpose, (ed) D. Z. Phillips, P 20.

H. W. B. Joseph ('Purposive action' in his Ancient and Modern Philosophy) argues against the identification of 'purposive action' with actions as a means to an end. His objections are possibly more valid against Aristotle's view in Nicomachean Ethics (Books II and III) than against Stocks. Aristotle appears to take as a criterion of rational action that it be action towards an end. The word that Joseph takes as 'purpose' in Aristotle (προαίρεσις) is taken by Sir David Ross in his translation as 'choice', and if Aristotle means that all rational action is a matter of choosing means towards some end then this seems straightforwardly false. In English, to act 'on purpose' is not necessarily to act towards some end and Joseph is correct in pointing this out. To act 'on purpose' or 'purposefully' (which are not identical) may mean only to act deliberately or 'in full knowledge of what one is doing' or 'having thought out what one is doing' and reference to consequences need not be made. However, to act with a purpose is different from this. Joseph is mistaken in taking the word 'purpose' to have a unitary meaning. It may be that the word comes from the Latin proponere but etymology is but a guide to present day meaning and sometimes a fallible one.

One should ask for the meaning of the question, 'What is your purpose in doing that?' to understand this use. Such a question seeks understanding of the nature of the action being carried out but does so in terms of type-F reasons. That is to say, it assumes that the act can be explained by reference to some factors outside of itself. It seems to me that this is the point that J. L. Stocks is attempting to make.

as a means. When the end is achieved or when the putative means turns out not to be successful, then it loses its importance.

Imagine hunting through some old papers, we come across a letter inviting us to a party. You ask, "Is this still important?" or probably more likely, "Do you still want to keep this?". There are two senses in which we can evaluate the importance of the letter - two ways of explaining whether we still want it or not. If the party took place a long while ago, it is no longer important to keep the letter as proof of our right to enter. However, it might be the case that it enables us to remember a particularly exciting occasion, or that, the party being given by a famous man, we can sell the letter for a lot of money. In these instances the letter is still important - there is good reason for keeping it.

But the case may be different for we may just treasure the letter, not for what it can do for us, but for what it means - the last letter of a dead friend - the letter which led one to meet the woman who was to become one's wife. In this sense, there is no change in terms of the possibilities of action which will re-value the letter. This is not to say, however, that it will always remain important to us, for we may discover the friend to have been a blackmailer, the wife to be faithless. Then the importance of the letter will change.

We may discover that something is important to someone by discovering that it serves some end which we know he desires or values. We may also discover that something is important to someone by his actions in respect of it - we discover that he is prepared to go to some lengths to attain or preserve it. To say that someone thinks something important is to say that he will sacrifice other things for its sake or for the sake of something that it will achieve. When importance is of type-F, there is a further explanation which can be appealed to to aid our understanding of the value that someone places on the 'object'. However, when the importance appears to be in terms of type-I or type-A, then it is actions which show the importance. To say that something is important is to give a reason for seeking it, and when no further end can be appealed to to support the evaluation, the claim that something is important appears to 'block' further questioning. Explanation of such evaluations cannot be in terms of something 'outside of' that which is valued but must rely upon getting the questioner to see that the evaluation makes sense.

In other words, a different, though not unusual, form of explanation is required. Claims of importance 'block' further questions, when they do, of a certain kind - they block questions in terms of function.

The concept of a 'question-blocking' reply is of course discussed at length by Nowell-Smith.

In his Ethics, Nowell-Smith talks of 'logically complete' answers to questions. Such answers block further questions about the reason for an action. Such answers make reference to what Nowell-Smith calls 'pro-attitudes'. To refer to a 'pro-attitude' in answering a question concerning the reason for an action, is to give what Nowell-Smith calls a logically good reason. Of this, he says;

"By a 'logically good reason' I do not mean a morally good reason; I mean anything which, when offered as an explanation of why someone chose to act as he did, has the force of making the questioning logically odd".¹

Among the examples which he lists of words having, on many occasions of their use at least, a pro- or con- force, he concludes such words as 'like', 'enjoy', 'approve of', 'happiness', and 'interested in'. Examples that he lists of con-force include 'hate', 'dislike', 'pain', 'disapprove of'. He does not include moral terms such as 'duty' or 'right' in his lists and says of them that a pro-attitude is only 'contextually implied' by their use.

Now certainly that one enjoys doing something is a very good reason for doing it. However, except for the complete egoist, it is not necessarily a good enough reason for doing it. For example, in a situation in which one has calls of duty which guide one in another direction, that one wants to do something is not a good enough reason for doing it.

1. Op. cit. P 114.

Even so, in the absence of other considerations, that one wants to do something, when given as a reason, is, in a sense, a block to further questions. What Nowell-Smith has noticed here, is that not all reasons make appeal to ends beyond themselves. To say that one is doing something for the pleasure of it, is to say, among other things, that there is no reason, beyond the nature of the act itself, for carrying it out.¹ However, the fault with Nowell-Smith's analysis is that having noticed that this is so, he makes no distinction between such 'logically good reasons'. For him, the fact that there is no further end in view, puts all these reasons on a level. For Nowell-Smith, there is no difference in rank between say, disapproval and discomfort, as reasons for avoiding an action.

One difficulty that we might find with Nowell-Smith's account, is that he gives no criteria for recognising that a word is being

1. It is important to stress that it is reasons 'outside of' the act which do not apply. The questions which are 'blocked' are 'Why?' questions which demand a reply in terms of some further end. I am not sure if Nowell-Smith recognises this, for he talks of explanations which makes all further questioning 'logically odd'. This need not be so, for more explanation can often be given and rationally demanded by way of setting the act in its context. In other words, answers to further questions would enable the questioner to see why answers in terms of function could not be given.

Even when we answer a question concerning our actions by replying that we just wanted to do it, or just like doing it, we can often be asked why we think it enjoyable. We can be asked what we see in it. Such questions spring from a lack of understanding of how we enjoy something, and need not be interpreted as demands for answers in terms of the function of what we are doing.

used with pro- or con- force, beyond a sort of behavioural one. He defines a pro- sentence (a sentence being used with pro-force - perhaps pro-statement is better) as one which makes further questioning odd. However, he says himself, that of some statements of this kind, further questions can be asked, specifically moral ones. He distinguishes, as we have seen between 'logically good' and 'morally good' reasons for action, in that a man can 'sit upon' his reason for acting in the face of moral criticism. But we should notice that, except in the case of the complete amoralist, who may or may not exist, to say that one just wants to do something does in fact include a reference to morality. It either declares that morality is irrelevant or that in this case the agent is justified in dismissing an only "prima facie" duty. Implicitly this does include some moral judgement. The moral question is answered by some repetition of the 'want' statement. If this is so, then all 'want' statements are open to some further questioning - further questioning of some higher order than themselves. Thus, no 'want' statement is of itself, complete - it depends upon the situation.

It is still true that any higher order evaluation is not to be expressed in terms of any purpose. There is a ranking involved within 'logically good' reasons. It is because Nowell-Smith misses this point that he wants to say that moral statements are not made, except by implication, with pro-force. However, if the only criterion of the use of a sentence with pro-force is that it has

the effect of blocking further questioning about the reasons for the action in terms of function, then it seems to me that in fact, it is a phenomenon of our moral life that this is just what moral explanations usually do. Nowell-Smith's position is dangerously like the emotivist's. He wants a moral statement to work in connection with some form of 'want' statement and does not realise that wants are evaluated by morals.

If we can break into Nowell-Smith's theory in this way, then other facts may also be relevant. For example, he says that no statements of fact are question-blocking.¹ However, A. I. Melden² claims that the statement, 'He is my father', does just this. If it is a fact, and it does seem to be one, that statements of this kind do, for some people at least, act in this way, then Nowell-Smith's claim begins to look more like dogma than observation.

I would suggest that no limitations can be put, a priori, upon what can act as a question-blocking answer. Nowell-Smith's criterion of the way that a statement works is the only criterion that we can use to discover the presence of some sort of 'pro-attitude' in use. The term, 'pro-attitude' really covers all statements which answer questions without reference to a further purpose, and I suggest that we must make distinctions of rank between such 'attitudes'.

1. *Op. cit.* P 117.
2. Rights and Right Conduct.

The term 'attitude' is, as Nowell-Smith says, a little of a misnomer for not all the statements that he says contain pro-force, are statements regarding attitudes. To enjoy x is not necessarily to have any attitude towards it. It certainly does not imply that one approves of x. One can enjoy something while one disapproves of it - one may be said to enjoy it despite one's disapproval or despite oneself. If someone asks about our attitudes towards x, to reply that it is pleasant or that we enjoy it is not really to say, except by implication, what our attitude is. To say that it is pleasant and to say nothing more implies (though not logically) that we think there is nothing wrong about x but it still could be true that we enjoyed x and thought it wrong. To talk of attitudes towards x is to talk of x in a much more important way than to ask simply if it is pleasant.

Thus, effectively, all we have under the term 'pro-attitude' is a set of reasons for action which do not make any appeal beyond themselves for their cogency. To introduce some term like attitude is, in fact, to be-fog the issue, for it begins to suggest, no doubt against Nowell-Smith's wishes, that all the reasons are to be grouped under some other heading- other than by the fact that they behave in the way described. To try to introduce a term like 'attitude' is to allow some form of egoism to attempt an entry by the back door. This is something which I feel occurs in Nowell-Smith's book.

The recognition of the existence of other reasons for action is a manifestation of a way of being involved in the world. A child, according to Piaget, cannot consider any reasons other than the satisfaction of its own wants. The child lacks a moral sense and by this I mean that it lacks a way of life. In terms of the three-part distinction made earlier, a child's reasons are always in terms of type-F reasons relative to its wants. Guilt, regret and self-criticism are phenomena which indicate the presence of the ability to see that other reasons are possible. The complete egoist cannot suffer guilt in that he does not recognise its possibility. There is no recognition of a distinction between reasons other than in terms of success in satisfying his own desires. Thus, guilt is a phenomenon which the young child does not manifest. It is only with the recognition of other ways of being involved in the world that the child can manifest guilt.

Thus, when we say that moral reasons are more important than reasons in terms of the agent's pleasure, we mean that this is so for the agent who can recognise that such reasons are possible. We do not consider that a child can recognise their relevance and so we do not blame but with an adult we take it that he can see the possibility of such reasons and therefore we are prepared to blame. The problem of the psychopath is a problem concerning the possibility of an adult who seems unable to conceive of such reasons. The difficulty of understanding the psychopath is a difficulty of understanding how an adult can live his life without conceiving

of reasons for action other than the satisfaction of his own desires.

Given that distinctions can be made between reasons for action which do not refer the action to some further end (reasons making reference, that is, to 'pro-attitudes'), to say that one ought to do something is a better reason for doing it, than saying that one wants to do it. Better perhaps, only if the two reasons conflict as when one wants to do x but ought to do y, but certainly the reason in terms of 'ought' is the more powerful reason, if not always the one that we choose to act upon. By this, all I mean is that given a conflict, the more powerful one wins the day. However, its winning the day cannot consist in its being acted upon, for even if we do in fact do what we want to do in preference, the 'ought' reason is still the more powerful one. How can we express this?

There is nothing wrong with doing what one wants for as long as there are no other reasons for doing other things. The presence of another reason enables us to evaluate the action which we want to do, but here again the evaluation is not carried out in terms of any particular criteria. The more powerful reason is the more important one - the one that matters more. Wants, desires, and so on, do yield reasons for action but reasons at a certain level of importance. (Within wants, too, there is a ranking. It is more important/urgent to satisfy some wants than others.) For the egoist, it may be true that his wants are the most important reasons

for action, but it is important to remember that not all men can be described as egoists. Egoists are those who consider their wants to be the most important reasons for action. Some may not, indeed, recognise the existence of any other reasons.¹

Reasons given in terms of one's wants or desires are less important than reasons given in terms of one's duty. Obviously, and trivially, the reason for this is that morality is more important than the satisfaction of our (immediate) wants. The 'power' of the reason comes from the importance of the part of life it refers to.

The concept of 'winning the day' therefore can only be explained by what appears to be an explicitly circular method. That a reason 'wins the day' can be seen only in that it functions together with the 'oughts' of the situation. With these oughts go certain other

1. That there may be people who can be described as egoists does not imply that all human action is egotistical. The philosophical theory of egoism seems to me to deny many facts of life, and in particular the moral life, as it is lived. Someone who is, by nature, an egoist may find it difficult to believe that there are any other reasons, other than his own wants or interests, for action and may therefore feel drawn to a theory concerning human nature that all men are egoists. However, the fact that someone cannot see a distinction does not mean that such a distinction cannot be made, and the impossibility of making distinctions which seem to many people vital, counts, in my view, against the theory of egoism. A theory that holds that not all men are egoists can account for the existence of egoists, but a theory that holds all men are egoists cannot account for altruism, and must be held either by the egoist himself or by someone who cannot recognise differences between certain of his reasons for action.

phenomena like 'remorse', 'self respect', 'self criticism'. For a man who cannot experience remorse, then no other reasons for action other than his own desires can be given. What the man lacks is a way of being in the world, in the same sense that young children have such a lack. If a man cannot see that certain reasons have stronger claims than his own (bodily determined) desires, then there is not much that can be said to him. But a man may learn that another reason really won the day, when he experiences remorse after an action.

These terms do exist within a circle for there is no possibility, as we saw earlier in talking about self-interest theories, of translating them into other terms. It can only be explained as it stands. Thus my explanation of the concept of 'winning the day' must necessarily seem circular if an explanation in terms of some non-moral or functional type is required.

Conflict between reasons for action comes usually only with decisions over alternative actions. Thus, the idea of 'winning the day' applies to those occasions when there is a choice between actions, one perhaps that one wants to do, and one that one feels one ought to do but does not want to do.¹

1. Occasionally we may worry over our reasons for carrying out an action - we may ask ourselves whether we did it from duty or because we wanted to do it. Pace Kant, in my opinion, this makes but little difference to the quality of the act. We worry about it, it seems to me, because we are worried about the possibility of bias in any insistence we may put upon doing the act, or are worried about our quality as moral agents in general. Thus a man whose desires always coincide with his duties as he sees them is suspicious. He is either a saint, or a self-deceiver.

There is not always a conflict between wanting to do something and feeling it one's duty for one can, as Mrs. Austin points out,¹ take pleasure in doing one's duty and even find pleasure in doing what one ought to do.

The concept of pleasure is yet another motivation concept, particularly when one realises that pleasure, no more than happiness, cannot be analysed out in terms of sensations. Indeed, even when what is pleasurable is a sensation, the sensation does not itself fully cover the case. Thus, given two pleasurable sensations, S1 and S2, their being sensations of pleasure depend upon their being pleasurable sensations. Pleasure, even of this kind, is not itself a sensation. This is quickly realised if one recognises that one can ask of two pleasurable sensations, what makes them both sensations of pleasure, if they, S1 and S2, are not identical as sensations. Thus, suppose that S1 is the sensation of warm brandy trickling down one's throat on a cold day, and S2 is the sensation of stroking a fur coat. S1 and S2 'feel' nothing like each other but are both pleasant. Unless we posit yet another sensation which both these sensations give rise to, the only thing that connects S1 and S2 is that they are pleasant. The supposition of a third sensation caused by both S1 and S2 is an odd one in itself for it appears to be unfelt and indescribable. Apart from this, it still seems possible to ask of this sensation, why it is pleasant, which

1. Op. cit. P 57.

prevents it from being the 'stopping place' of the questioning that its supposition intends for it.

Thus, sensations of pleasure are really better described as pleasurable sensations and are only one of the types of experience in which we find pleasure.

If pleasure is not to be treated as a sensation, therefore, the problem arises, as Bernard Williams points out¹, of making sense of the relationship between the pleasure and the object of pleasure. Were pleasure a sensation, the connection would be, more or less simply, a causal one - the object causes in the viewing or participating agent a certain sensation.

Williams treats 'pleasure' as an attention concept:

"If I am pleased by something, my attention is drawn to it; and the more I am pleased by it, the more my attention is absorbed in it".²

Of course, it is not only pleasant things that absorb our attention, as Williams recognises, for the horrible and the ugly can exert a fascination as well. Thus Williams declares that pleasure is 'one mode or species of attention'.³

1. 'Pleasure and Belief', PAS 1959.

2. Op. Cit. P 70.

3. Op. Cit. P 71.

Williams' position is similar to that of Ryle and Gallie, and is one attacked by Manser who says:

"... it does not seem to follow that, as Ryle and Gallie appear to argue, because lack of attention is a sign of enjoyment, enjoyment is a particular kind of attention".¹

In Manser's opinion:

"To say that I enjoy something is to give a reason for my doing or experiencing that thing; there is no need to look for a reason for its being a reason".²

Manser's standpoint shares in its turn, similarities with that of Peters³ and Nowell-Smith⁴. They all take pleasure to be centrally connected with motivation. To say that one gets pleasure from doing x, is to give a reason for doing it, denying that there is anything beyond the act itself which, in terms of purpose or ulterior motive, is relevant to one's doing the act. As Peters says:

"... to say that one enjoys doing something is a way of denying that one has a motive for doing it and usually blocks further 'why' questions".⁵

Though there appears to be a radical disagreement between these thinkers, I find myself in agreement with all of them, because it

1. 'Pleasure' PAS 1960/1, P 231.
2. Manser, op. cit. P 238.
3. The Concept of Motivation.
4. Op. cit.
5. Peters, op. cit. P 144.

seems to me that they differ only in emphasising different facets of the concept. There is an obscurity in what they say because they do not distinguish between the use of the word as a motive word (I do x for pleasure) and the use of the word as a description of an attitude (I am enjoying x). Indeed, particularly in Manser's treatment, no difference is noticed between the use of the word 'enjoy' and the uses of the word 'pleasure' which are not equivalent to it.

There are many locutions which involve the concept of pleasure in different ways. Thus we have for example:

Group M.

- (1) Doing x for pleasure.
- (2) Doing x because I enjoy it.
- (3) Treating x as a pleasure.

Group A.

- (4) Enjoying doing x.
- (5) Finding pleasure in doing x.
- (6) Finding x pleasant.

Group W.

- (7) Taking pleasure in doing x.
- (8) Doing x with pleasure.

There are, I am sure, many other uses of the words 'pleasure', 'pleasant', and 'enjoy' that I do not mention here, but I think

that in these eight examples can be seen three fairly distinct uses of the concept of pleasure, which I have marked M, A, and W.

The use of the concept in group M is to explain the reason or nature of the action - it is a motivation use, classifying the action as being of a certain kind.

In group A, the use appears to me to make reference to the attitude of the agent in the activity.¹

These two uses are connected in that if a man does something for pleasure, then he will normally enjoy it while he is doing it. Thus, if a man plays football for pleasure, then while he is playing this particular game, we can suppose that he is enjoying himself. However, a man may play football for pleasure, but not enjoy this particular game (it is too wet, the other team are too good or too bad &c.), but if this happens too often, the man may cease to say, if he continues to play football, that he does it for pleasure. Alternatively, a man may play a game of football for some other reason (be it money, duty, friendship &c.) and enjoy it, even to his own surprise.

1. I do not wish to claim that the examples must be interpreted in the way that I interpret them for I am sure that those, for example in group M, might be used in the same way as those in group A on occasion. I hope, however, that their most frequent uses will bear out the distinctions that I wish to make.

Enjoyment normally refers to the attitude in the activity so that example (2) may be said to differ slightly from example (1) in that it implies (though not logically) that the agent always enjoys doing x when he does it, whereas in example (1), the implication is not so strong. Again, example (2) implies that the agent has done x before (and knows that he enjoys it) whereas example (1) does not. A man may do x for pleasure, even if he has never done it before (but thinks that he will enjoy it).

If a man treats x as a pleasure, then the supposition is that he enjoys x and does x for pleasure - though there may be other reasons for doing x, his reason is that he enjoys it.

I do not suppose to deal in detail with these two groups any further except to say that it appears to me that Williams, Gallie, Ryle et al. concentrate upon the sort of use of the concept of pleasure exemplified by group A. while Peters and Manser appear to concentrate upon examples like group M. Thus I think that both groups of philosophers are correct in what they say, but that neither group covers the ground fully.

In what follows, I am centrally interested in pleasure as motivation (group M.) - giving pleasure as a reason for doing something.

Group W. is slightly different from the other two groups of examples, in that it seems to me that pleasure is not central to either the motivation or the activity. A man who takes pleasure in doing his duty, for example, does not do his duty because he enjoys it, but does it willingly.

We have already seen that there are reasons for not acting for pleasure, for in any given situation there may be cogent moral reasons for acting otherwise. The reason for this, according to my theory, is that moral reasons (for the good man at least) are more cogent, more powerful - not because of what they provide or lead to but in themselves.

It seems to me that in addition there may be other reasons, other than obviously moral ones, for forgoing pleasure. This is because to say that x is done (only) for pleasure is to rank its importance to the agent. In itself the act is unimportant - it is done 'merely for pleasure'. By this I do not at all mean that it is the pleasure and not the act which is important, for this would be to commit the same fallacy as Peters et al. have warned against. What I do mean is that to give pleasure as the reason for doing something is to say that what one is doing is not important to one. There are occasions when we say that someone ought to enjoy themselves, that they ought to 'take time off', but this is not to say that what they will do is more important than what they are doing, but that relaxation is itself often

necessary. If someone does not take any pleasure, then he may 'crack up'. To say that pleasure is important however, is not to say that any act of pleasure-seeking is important, for the importance of the pleasure is importance as a means. The end to which it leads or assists, is what gives importance or value to the means.

It is indicative of something being a pleasure that no 'ought' is involved in the doing of it. If something is done 'merely for pleasure' then (trivially) if we do not feel like doing it on a particular occasion, there is no reason for doing it. To say that x is done for pleasure is to say that x will only be done when we want to do it - ceteris paribus. However, if something is important, then there is a reason for doing (something about) it, whether we feel like it or not. The painter may paint even when he does not want to (in one sense). He may feel that he would like to spend such a sunny day lazing upon the beach, but in fact spend the day painting because this is more important to him. To say this, is to say that painting, for him, can on occasions present itself as something that ought to be done. We express this, sometimes, in terms of 'self-respect' or 'pride in oneself'.¹ This 'ought', however, being limited to ourselves, is not necessarily a moral ought.

1. Compare here J. S. Mill on the 'qualitative' differences between pleasures. Mill confuses, as Jean Austin points out, doing something for pleasure with taking pleasure in doing it, but perhaps more importantly, he misses the point that those things nearest to our self-respect are not simply pleasures.

There is not a one-to-one correspondence between doing x because it is pleasant and doing x because it gives pleasure. Thus, when a speaker says, "It gives me great pleasure..." we need not assume that he is enjoying making the speech. We might argue that the proposing of the toast gives pleasure but that the making of the speech which is the matter of the proposing of the toast is something that he does not enjoy. But the essence here is that the speaker is saying that, even though there may be reasons of duty for proposing the toast, his motive is not foremost that of duty. He welcomes the opportunity of proposing the toast even though it commits him to making a public speech which he does not enjoy. Saying that it gives him great pleasure is saying that there is no 'ought' figuring in his reasons for acting, that he does it willingly and welcomes the opportunity.

An act can be described in itself or as a part of something else and this variability of description gives rise to what appears to be something of a paradox concerning pleasure. Thus, a man can properly be described as doing something for pleasure which is not obviously pleasant. Thus, when the act is described in itself, it may be, as in the case of the man making the speech, unpleasant but as a way of doing something else, or considered as part of the totality of some other act, it can still be said to be done for pleasure. Sailing has been described as 'Standing under a cold shower, tearing up five pound notes'. Indeed, if one thinks only of the physical act of sailing then it is not always pleasant.

'Sitting out' in a dinghy in heavy weather is decidedly uncomfortable, wet and exhausting. However, it is not just this act which counts. The pleasure is in driving the boat to windward against the forces of nature by means of them, better than anyone else. The activity of sailing is one 'done for pleasure' but one which involves (though not always) acts which may not be in themselves pleasant.

The difference here is between doing something for pleasure and taking pleasure in doing it. 'Pleasure', centrally involves the notion of 'willingness' to do something.

The difference here between doing it for pleasure and finding pleasure in it is that the former reason suggests that the only motive is pleasure. However, a man who takes pleasure in doing his duty for example is not motivated necessarily by pleasure. Indeed if he did not think that he ought to do it then it would make no sense to say that he took pleasure in doing it as his duty. An action done merely for pleasure or simply because it is pleasant or just because the agent enjoys it is not an action that one takes pleasure in doing - one gets it.

In one of the examples earlier, there was mentioned the case of a man saying that his work was very important to him. Now it may be the case that the man loves his work, that he goes to it with relish, and literally doesn't enjoy anything else, but it is

more likely the case that while he often enjoys it, there are occasions when he has to make himself work against his inclinations. Now, if it is not the case that on these occasions he has to work for money (and the example is comprehensible without this assumption), then we are faced with explaining that he works when he doesn't want to. The answer is obviously that he considers his work more important than his pleasure - important in itself if we can assume that there is no immediate end in view.

Thus we can say that there are other pro-attitudes besides pleasure and morals which a man can give as his reason for acting, and that some of these reasons are more cogent than acting for pleasure. Some things are more important to a man than his pleasures.

Nowell-Smith does, in fact, notice a difference between giving 'pleasure' as a reason and other 'pro-words'. He says,

"A man who says he listens to Beethoven's Grosse Fuge or reads Paradise Lost because he finds it pleasant either has a lot to learn about music or literature, or, more probably, is abusing the English Language".¹

However, having said this, Nowell-Smith does not go on to draw any conclusions concerning 'pro-attitudes'. It is not just the case that we do not use the word 'pleasant' of Paradise Lost, in the same way that we do not use the word 'herd' of a group of

1. Op. cit. P 138.

pigeons. That we do not, is indicative of a value judgement made about Paradise Lost as opposed to, for example, The Importance of being Earnest. The latter is light and amusing, but not a great work in the sense that Paradise Lost is.

A man's happiness is bound up with what he considers important - important in itself - and if we can say of his pleasures that they are not important things in themselves, then the distinction between pleasure and happiness is clear. Pleasure can be but is not necessarily a part of happiness. It can be, and usually is, because men normally consider a certain amount of pleasure to be important in life. For some men there is nothing else important, but this is a fact about the way that they see life and not a fact about the logical connections between the concept of pleasure and the concept of happiness. We might find it odd that a man who did nothing for what we could call pleasure, was a happy man, but this would be an oddity about the man and not an oddity about language. We might find him too serious, too much wrapped up in a vocation, somewhat inhuman, but we could not say that he was misusing language if he said that he was a happy man.

It seems then that there are reasons for acting which cannot be understood in terms of purpose, nor in terms of pleasure but which are not moral reasons either. It is this form of reason for acting which comes under type-I, in terms of importance.

If we ask why Ahab chased the White Whale, it is difficult to see that it was for any moral reason and impossible to say that he did it for pleasure.¹ Melville shows us a man driven by a desire which overcomes him and he often shows it in terms of revenge. He suggests sometimes that Ahab seeks to revenge himself upon Moby Dick because the whale removed his leg, but there is much more to it than this. For Ahab as for Melville, the White Whale is a symbol, and has meaning beyond itself. That the whale took off Ahab's leg could be a reason for destroying it, but a weak one - one that only an insane person could use, and Ahab, though a man driven by powers beyond his control, is not insane in this way. For him, the destruction of the whale is a symbolic act, and has meaning only within the life of Ahab. The fact that the whale is white, not just huge, should make us suspicious of accepting the simple revenge motive. The whale is different in its shape and its nature and though zoologically speaking it is a whale, for Ahab it is more than this - it is a direct challenge to his manhood, to his power over the sea and its creatures. For Ahab, his life must be seen in terms of his attitude to the sea - he is a champion whaler, the lord of the Nantucket seaman and Nantucket seamen, we are told, are the lords among whalers. Ahab, unlike the other whalers that we meet in the book, does not seek solely to catch whales. His

1. And even more impossible to say that he found it pleasant. It is conceivable (outside of the context of the book) to say that Ahab should have commenced his chase of the White Whale for pleasure - that his motivation was of this kind. It is not conceivable that anyone should enjoy the experiences that Ahab had on the chase. The difference here is again between the motivation use of 'pleasure' and the attitude or activity use.

whaling is not simply a commercial enterprise. He is a man, as we see in the incident of the electrical storm, who can challenge the Gods - he goes beyond the normal endeavour of the whalers because for him whaling is a way of life, not one among others but his way of life. The White Whale challenges his dominion, threatens his view of himself and so he has to kill it. That it destroys him and the unfortunate crew who are with him in the Peqod, is Melville's comment on those who seek to usurp the kingdom of the Gods. (The whole book can be, of course, seen as an allegory - as a demonstration that man is not a god and cannot go beyond his limited powers. Ahab's story is the story of a man whose life has a meaning in terms of his livelihood, it is an instance of the general case. To be an instance, it must be self-sufficient.) To say then that for Ahab, the destruction of the White Whale matters, is to say something about the way that his life has meaning. The meaning of the destruction of the White Whale, is part of the meaning of Ahab's life.

Ahab's chase of the whale is a passion, something beyond his control. Part of his 'web', indeed the most important part his concept of himself, has been attacked - the spider runs to that part of the web, not after a decision but automatically - Ahab is driven to his hunt of the whale and cannot stop himself because of the importance of the part of himself which is under attack. It is a passion and not just an anger by courtesy of the degree of

importance of the act and the degree response involved.

To understand that something is important to an agent, A, therefore, we may sometimes seek and find what it leads to, what purpose it serves. The degree to which it is important depends upon (a) the degree to which it is valuable in achieving the end and upon (b) the importance of the end to the agent. The latter can be seen by how much trouble A is prepared to go to to attain it, what he will sacrifice as less important and so on, but to understand how it is important, we need to understand what meaning it has for him, what part it plays in his life. But if a man's happiness depends upon what is important to him and not only important as a means, then to understand that he is happy and how he is happy we need to know something about the nature of his life.

To say that there are some things which can be more important than pleasure is not, in my view, to make an evaluative statement about pleasure - it is not to moralise. To say that something is pleasant is to evaluate that something, to say that there are reasons for (doing) it, but not reasons which are of the strongest. It is to say that that something is not, in itself, important. Thus, it is pleasant to read C. S. Forester, a very enjoyable novelist, but his books are ultimately only pleasant. They are not important novels, nor great works of fiction.

The reason why a man who is enjoying something is often describable as happy is that to be fully enjoying something, it is necessary that one's attention is focused upon what one is doing. In the case where one's attention is so focused, everything that can be considered in a happiness judgement is (ex hypothesi) going well and therefore the word happy (in its short term sense) is correctly used. As soon as the man stops doing what he is enjoying, or stops enjoying what he is doing, then the focus ceases¹ and the rest of his life can come back before him. It need not be the case that he is a happy man. Thus, we can say of the unhappy man that his only bit of happiness is his fishing on a Sunday afternoon, because when he is fishing he manages to forget in his enjoyment what makes him unhappy. The 'focus' when he is fishing limits his view to his fishing. Pleasure is then connected with happiness but neither the whole nor a necessary part of it.

What I want to say is that if a man finds x important (I), then his life is orientated around it; x has meaning in his life; it is part of the meaning of his life; it is part of what makes life meaningful for him. To understand that x is important is to understand that x has meaning. To understand how x is important, is to understand what meaning it has. What makes a man happy, what form his happiness takes, (what he feels, does, and feels like doing when he is happy) depends upon what he takes as important - what meaning

1. This is not a causal but a logical point.

life has for him. If a man finds life meaningless, then on this account, necessarily he is an unhappy man.

When a man says of x that he could not be happy without it, what he is not saying is that his happiness is the end-state, the means to which happens to contain x. This is a mistake that Mill makes in Utilitarianism. Mill treats happiness as an attitude of mind which just happens to be produced, for different men, by different things. If my account is correct, then to say that one could not be happy without x, is to say that x is important to one - that it is constitutive of the circumstances which, for the speaker, are going 'right' when he is happy. If to say that one is happy is to say that everything (important) is fine, then if x is important, one's happiness depends upon it, not causally but logically.

To say that x is indispensable to life, if by this we do not mean x is part of the biologically necessary conditions for life, is to say that life has no (or less) value without x. It is not to say that one will die without x, though sometimes it is to say that one might as well die. (Man does not live by bread alone.)

G. J. Warnock, in his Contemporary Moral Philosophy, argues

for some constant element in the concept of happiness, saying that though there are many things which human beings want or need, all of them need food, warmth, and affection. That all human beings need these things in various degrees is obviously true, but this neither proves that there is some constant element in the concept, nor indeed that these things are constitutive of every man's happiness. That they are necessary to life is not to say that they are necessary parts of happiness. Indeed, I should want to say that it is only the very deprived man who would see any consummation in the possession of these things alone. The meaning that life has for a man depends not upon what he biologically needs, but upon the way that he sees life as organised.

J. R. Jones distinguishes with Wittgenstein between two questions. The one 'How the world is', is the task of science, the other 'That the world is' is the experience of the mystical. (Wittgenstein Notebooks P 74: "The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling".) He says that science is concerned with the totality of facts and "In one sense then, all you have is science".¹ But,

"On the other hand, as we face our lives and in those moments when the question arises for us whether our life has any meaning at all - when we suddenly have what might be described

1. 'Love as the perception of meaning' in D. Z. Phillips (ed) Religion and Understanding P 145.

as an awareness of existence and the whole question whether existence has sense arises for us, then we know perfectly that the world is not unmysterious".

To ask questions about life in this manner is to abstract ourselves from it, to see it as a whole. However, since there is nothing beyond life, no external viewpoint from which to look back on life, such a question is an odd one. It is one that Wittgenstein was inclined to call in terms of the 'Tractatus', which is up against the boundaries of language.

Peter Winch argues, supporting this point, that

"... a concern with one's life as a whole, if it is to be expressed within a person's life, can necessarily only be expressed quasi-sacramentally. The form of the concern shows itself in the form of the sacrament".¹

To see a meaning in life, is to see that it can be unified according to certain rules. To state that life has a certain reason is to talk about life from the outside, but the stating of such a meaning is done 'quasi-sacramentally' by the life that we lead, by the way that our actions relate to what we consider important. To hold that x is important in itself is to have a certain attitude towards x, which is expressed by the way that we act in relation to

1. 'Understanding a primitive society' in D. Z. Phillips (ed) Religion and Understanding.

x. Since x, ex hypothesi, serves no purpose beyond itself, it behaves in our lives like a sacrament. It is something which we hold sacred, to be valuable in itself and for itself.

The 'scientific' view that Jones talks about is the view which holds all things on a level. To describe x in terms of scientific discourse is to describe its functional relations with other parts of the world. To see, on the other hand, a meaning in life is to see life in a certain way, the correctness of which is not testable as a matter of fact. To hold certain things as important involves seeing a certain sense in life. If someone else sees different things as important, then he sees a different sense in life. There is no argument that can be resolved in the way that the argument concerning the importance of looking in the rear-view mirror can be resolved.

Since there is nothing beyond life by which we can judge the meaning of life - there are no lexicons for life - the correctness of a statement about value 'in itself' or meaning, cannot be evaluated. The sense that we see, and the importance that we give to certain facets of our lives are interrelated, but their consistency is a necessary condition of their propriety not a test of their truth.

J. R. Jones expresses this fact when he talks about love yielding a perceptive understanding of the meaning of the world. Such meaning

is not a fact about the world - not yet another fact which is on a par with facts about gravity or the solubility of salt. To put it in the terms of the later Wittgenstein, to see the meaning is to see the world as ordered in a certain way.¹ There is no way of expressing such a perception. To see it is a performative insight and thus, of questions concerning the sense of life, John Wisdom says;

"We must however remember that what one calls answering such a question is not giving an answer. I mean that one cannot answer such a question in the form; 'The meaning is this'".²

We may be able to see that something has meaning for someone but not be able to see what meaning it has. On occasions however, we are able to say that we understand someone, that we can see it his way. Yet this form of understanding cannot be communicated in a form of words which says 'The meaning is this'. Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, talks of seeing an aspect; of seeing the picture as a duck or as a rabbit. If you can see it then all well and good, but it is impossible to prove to someone who cannot see it, say, as a duck, that it can be seen this way. I can indeed draw my fingers along certain lines and say 'This is its beak. That is its forehead' and in this way 'get' the other person to see it for

1. I refer here to Wittgenstein's use of the phrase 'seeing as' in the Investigations P 193-194 (2nd edition 1967).
2. Paradox and Discovery P 41.

at least as long as he is trying to see it; for as long as he is willing to co-operate in the exercise. For him to co-operate it is at least necessary that he is willing to concede that, in general, pictures can be seen more than one way. If he refuses to admit this, then there is really no possibility of his trying to see it as a duck.

Seeing it as a duck, seeing an aspect is really getting into a way of looking at things, of ordering one's perceptual experience. Wittgenstein's comments upon this 'seeing as' can be used, metaphorically if you like, as a way of explaining the idea of life having a meaning or being meaningful to someone.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein talks of facts being all on a level (6.373) and says at 6.41;

"The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it would have no value...For all that happens and is the case is accidental".

In the language of the Tractatus as I have said, to talk of the sense of the world is to go beyond what can be said and therefore beyond, claims Wittgenstein, what can be thought. He calls such experiences, the experience of the mystical and in the Lecture on Ethics¹ he gives examples of such experiences to show what he means.

1. Loc. cit.

This experience is, however, only mystical if one treats language, as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus as a way of describing the scientific world - the only proper propositions being those of science. It seems to me that this way of thinking about the relationship between man and the world - a tradition that finds Locke as a founder member - of seeing man as essentially a passive receiver and tabulator of stimulation from the 'outside world', necessitates for Wittgenstein this way of talking about the mystical. If the only relationship between man and the world is in terms of knowledge of facts about the constitution of spatio-temporal objects, then any other thinking about the world is bound to be odd. But if we see the scientific way of looking at the world as only one way, and a 'cold' way at that, then language, though it can be and is used to report facts, can be used in terms of other ways of seeing the world as well. A way of seeing the world would be constitutive of a way of being involved in the world, a way of living, and in the language of his later writings, we could say with Wittgenstein that 'an expression has meaning only in the stream of life'.¹

Coleridge, in Biographia Litteraria, says of the similarity between poets and philosophers;

"In poems, equally as in philosophic disquisitions, genius produces the strongest impressions of novelty while it

1. Quoted by Malcolm in his Memoir of Wittgenstein, P 93. (See also Zettel 173.)

rescues the most admitted truths from their impotence caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission".¹

The key word here is 'rescues' for he says of Wordsworth's genius that it comes from his ability to "find no contradiction in the union of old and new; to contemplate the ancient of days and all his works with a feeling as fresh, as if all had then sprang forth at the first creative fiat".²

The facts that Coleridge is talking of as being 'rescued' are not facts in the scientific sense, or at least not these facts as used for the purposes of science. He is talking about facts which can make a difference to our lives - facts which are keynotes of a way of finding the world. Poetry, for Coleridge makes or remakes the world meaningful. Poetry in other words enables us to see the world differently - to change the aspect. But for it to be able to do this, it is both necessary and expected that we are prepared to see it differently and are prepared to admit that it can be seen differently.

If facts in every sense were 'on a level' then the fact that grass is green would be on a level with the fact that men die without air. However whereas the former fact yields a reason for action only in the case that one wants to find the lawn or distinguish between the grass and the hollyhocks, the latter fact gives a reason for action

1. Biographia Literaria in the Shawcross edition, Vol. 1. P 60.
2. Op. cit. P 59.

independent of any of my wishes. It is a fact which gives rise to moral pronouncements and ipso facto to limits upon our actions.

The difference between the acorn giving rise to a tree which supplants that from which the acorn fell, and parricide, in Hume's famous example, is a difference not to be seen, as Hume himself implies, in terms of facts but in terms of the meaning of the relationships. There is no meaning to the relationship between a tree and an acorn in terms of the life of either, but that someone is my father gives rise, as Melden shows,¹ to certain duties. In terms of Hume's law, oughts are implied in 'is-statements' because, in human life, certain facts 'jump out of the world' as important. Many apparent 'is-statements' involve 'oughts'. That they do, is something to do with the form of life in which they appear. The same two facts may have different meanings in different forms of life though one might want to say that in this case they only appear to be the same facts.

The expression of meanings of this kind - the expression of the recognition that something or someone is important - can be seen in two ways; that x is important can be seen in the way that other things are sacrificed to it, but where there is no such opportunity for such sacrifice, the expression of evaluations of this kind can only be carried out in terms of what Winch has called 'quasi-

1. Rights and Right Conduct.

sacramental' acts.¹ I take it that he adds the prefix 'quasi' because a sacrament is something within a particular form of life - a religion of a particular kind - but he does not want to restrict himself to comments upon religion. The expression of meaning or importance notions cannot be in terms of 'explanations-why' since no 'Why?' question can be answered but is in terms of acts which show that the evaluation has been made - which show that the 'object' matters to the agent. This need be no great ceremony, for love for one's mother is shown simply by never failing to kiss her goodbye - a kiss, it seems to me, being a conventional act (Eskimos we are told rub noses), is a very good example of what Winch means.

It is, I think important to remember that statements that purport to be about 'life' in the sense that they refer to the purpose of life, the meaning of it, and so on, are not statements that simply refer to the world of fact. A statement of the meaning of life, is a reason-backing statement, or a reason giving statement. Thus, if we think about remarks like 'No one gets anything for nothing in this life', or 'Life is a struggle, the weakest go to the wall', one can see that, although there is a sense in which these statements can be 'tested' (one can point to the existence of or the need for charity, or that there are differences between evolutionary explanations of animal and human development and

1. In 'Understanding a primitive Society', loc. cit.

behaviour), they primarily serve as expressions of attitudes, and as such give rise to the relevance of certain sorts of justification for acts. These attitudes are 'expressed' in action more articulately than in words, for in words such statements often sound 'trite' or 'silly'. This, I take it, is what Winch means by 'quasi-sacramental acts' - acts which give expression to such statements, even if the agent has never formulated (or spelt out¹) his engagement or attitude. Insincerity, even self-deception, is a possibility where the verbalisation of such attitudes does not correspond with the expression of them in terms of action, as Fingarette points out.²

There is little point in a philosopher speculating upon why such expression needs to be carried out except to say that such expression is a way of demonstrating one's evaluations.

Thus, to see certain things as important is to see that they have meaning, that they are part of the meaning, a larger one that one sees in the world. To be able to see that this is possible is to recognise the possibility of being engaged in the world other than as a spectator - it is contrary to Locke's view of man for it is a view of man as an agent and not a passive recipient of information.

The happy man is he who sees what he values as in some way 'well' or 'fine' (the interpretation of what counts as 'well' or

1. In Fingarette's useful phrase in Self-Deception.

2. Op. cit.

'fine' depends upon the individual case) and this need not, and almost certainly does not refer to his own (bodily identifiable) desires but to the way that he is involved with other people and ideals. For the unhappy man, the world is 'out of joint', which may be what Wittgenstein is saying in the Tractatus where he says that the world of the happy man is a different world from that of the unhappy one.

Chapter Six.

Happiness and Morality -

Conclusion.

Up to this point, I have been attempting to generate and employ the concept of importance - using it to discuss happiness and emotions in general and also using it to discuss reasons for action. Among such reasons, I have included moral reasons. Thus, this concept can be seen to be usefully employed in talking about morality and about happiness. In this chapter, I shall attempt to draw together the three concepts in an informative and meaningful manner. I shall try to demonstrate the place of happiness in morality by means of the concept of importance, thus answering, I hope, the questions that I posed in chapter one.

In the previous chapter, we saw a threepart distinction between reasons for acting. I called these; Type-F where the reason was given in terms of some function that the intended act served; Type-I where the act was important in its own terms, the reason for acting being given in appeal to this importance evaluation; Type-A where the act had an importance similar to those under type-I but was felt to be in some way not restricted to the life of one man.

In terms of the concept of blame, a man not following a type-A reason for acting may blame himself for not doing so and may feel that he is open to blame by other people. He may blame some other person for not following such a reason, where he thinks that it applies to them, whether or not they recognise that it does or not. The justification for this depends, of course, upon the instance. A man not following a type-I reason may accuse himself of backsliding

but could not accuse someone else of the same unless he knew that they held importance evaluations similar to his own which generated such type-I reasons. If someone does not hold an importance evaluation which generates a certain type-I reason, then nothing can be said about his actions in respect of objects covered by such type-I reasons. However, if a man does not recognise a type-A reason, there can still be grounds for saying that he ought to. Type-F reasons differ from these two in that the concept of blame applies, when it does, only in an incidental way. A man not following a type-F reason can only be accused of foolishness or stupidity unless the function that the action, required by the type-F reason, serves is in itself important in some moral way. Stupidity can be castigated for example when it results in some event which more care would have prevented, and which should have been prevented. Thus, a man who, when taking the baby out, leaves the pram on a hill without checking the brake and goes into a shop to buy cigarettes, does nothing intrinsically wrong. However, if the pram runs away down the hill, the man is responsible for the harm that comes to the baby.

We have, it might be said, a duty to be careful in respect of those things considered important. Indeed this is trivially true since our way that the importance of something is demonstrated is through the care that we take or ought to take with respect to it. Thus, in the example above, the man might be castigated for doing something, or omitting to do something, which might have,

even though it did not actually, result in harm to the baby. Thus, suppose that the pram had rolled only a few yards down the hill, coming to rest against a fortunately situated tree, the man would still be open to a charge of carelessness. The act of putting the brake on the pram matters however, only conditionally in either case.

I want at this point to go back a little to consider a theory, not mentioned in chapter one, concerning the relationship between morality and happiness. I shall deal with this using the distinction that I have just reiterated, and, by means of discussing it, hope to throw light on the relationship as I see it.

The question arises for some philosophers of the possibility of delimiting in some way, the scope of type-A reasons. The question is asked whether there are any defining characteristics of a type-A reason - in other words, the question is asked whether morality is about anything.

A recent, though brief, discussion of this problem occurs in G. J. Warnock's book, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, which I propose to discuss. It may be that I am in the following discussion of Warnock slightly misrepresenting him. My excuse for this is twofold. (1) I wish to discuss a particular form of attempt at finding a content to morals and Warnock's attempt is very close to this; (2)

that if I am re-interpreting Warnock, I think that it is a stronger thesis that I credit him with, than the other possible interpretation that can be put upon his work.

I take Warnock to be saying that morality makes demands upon us which safeguard the interests or happiness of others. It restricts our actions in such a way that we do not harm other people. This is not a self-interest theory in that the motive for my action is not to gain anything myself, my gain being only incidental. My gain will be in others acting in accordance with the moral law, but my action itself cannot guarantee the occurrence of this. My motive, on this theory, is either concern for others or respect for the moral law.

In his book, Warnock argues for the urgent necessity of a study of the 'province' of morals, in order to ascertain how moral views, beliefs, and arguments are to be distinguished from non-moral ones. Until this study is completed, he says;

"... it seems that moral philosophers cannot really know what they are talking about, or at any rate, perhaps no less importantly, cannot be sure whether or not they are all talking about the same thing".¹

We must, claims Warnock, be able to identify the field of morals before we can investigate its logical nature.

1. Op. cit. P 52.

Why delimit the field of morals? G. J. Warnock thinks that an attempt to do this is part of a larger attempt to uncover the logic of moral discourse. If we can isolate those principles which are moral ones, those arguments which are moral ones, and so on, we can then make meaningful comments about the logical nature of such principles and arguments. Thus, he attacks C. L. Stevenson for making statements about the nature of moral judgements without being clear whether he is talking about morality itself or whether he is talking about a certain area of discourse, part of which is morality. In the latter case, it is up to Stevenson to say why and how we mark this particular area off as morality. Still, I am sure that Warnock's criticisms of Stevenson at this point are not wholly successful for the latter can reply that what morality shares with other sorts of language is its emotive meaning and for the purposes of Stevenson's work, this similarity is as important as any differences that may also be discoverable. Stevenson is after all, largely interested in the 'Fact-Value controversy', and his answer, however inadequate on other grounds, is not necessarily open to Warnock's criticism, since his answer is that moral judgements like other sorts of language-use, do not state facts. What does seem objectionable in Stevenson's theory, as Warnock and others have argued, is that he does not account for many of the phenomena of moral discourse, particularly the fact that it is not the case that simply any reason can be offered in support of a moral statement. According to Stevenson, the relationship between any set of facts and a moral

statement, is simply a causal one. Brutus thought that Caesar ought to die because of his dangerous pride, but on this theory, it would have been as equally rational for Brutus to have chosen as his reason the fact that Caesar could read.

It is a fact in Brutus' favour that he assassinated Caesar for reasons concerning the interests of Rome, while it is a point against Cassius that he acted from envy. On Stevenson's scheme however, it is only an interesting psychological fact about either of them. While there might be psychological reasons for Cassius's envy, it seems to me that this does not nor cannot excuse his action, nor even act as an extenuating circumstance. On the other hand, Brutus' love of Rome does just this, as Anthony declares. ('This was the noblest Roman of them all'.)¹

The fact that some reasons do seem to be morally relevant while others do not, does indeed militate for an examination of why this is. An examination of this kind might, though not necessarily, be termed an investigation into the content of morals.

However, one should remember, and this will be picked up later, that the fact that moral statements need reasons does not necessarily imply that there is only one kind of reason that can be given.

1. It may also be true that the essential humanity of Cassius makes us feel more sympathetic towards him than the austerity of Brutus, but this does not affect the quality of what they do.

The tentative suggestion that Warnock makes concerning the province of morals is similar to that made by Mrs. Foot,¹ and it is that morality is in some sense concerned with the harm and happiness of human beings. Warnock says:

"Is it not natural, and besides a perfectly defensible position, to reserve the appellation of moral ideals for those whose pursuit is supposed to tend actually to do good rather than harm, to make things on the whole better rather than worse, while regarding as not forming any part of any 'moral point of view' such ideals as are openly destructive, damaging or insane?"²

There is an air of triviality about what Warnock says here, but I think that he is in fact trying to make a positive point - that morality is concerned to make the human lot happier. At this point there is a great deal of resemblance to the functionalist theories that we discussed earlier, but the resemblance is not complete.

Mrs. Foot's arguments for some 'content' to the word 'moral' are very similar to those of Warnock. She argues that it is not true that simply anything will do as a moral principle. She points to the fact that we do have and understand the concept of a moral argument, but if anything at all could count as the grounds upon

1. Mrs. Foot 'Moral Arguments' in Mind 1958 and also in 'Moral Beliefs' loc. cit.

2. Op. cit. P 59.

which such arguments are based, then the concept would become meaningless. There must be, she says, some determinable boundary to the evidence that can be adduced to a moral statement to make such arguments possible at all. If not, then;

"One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as evidence at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of evidence rather than another".¹

She goes on to say that the most ridiculous grounds may be offered in support of a certain principle, if 'moral' is left as a sort of 'blank-cheque' word as for example Hare seems to leave it, for all his talk about universalisability.

It can be, of course, immediately argued against Mrs. Foot that moral arguments are indeed often of the kind that she describes. However, this argument is not conclusive as it is put since it leaves open the question of why some statements could never intelligibly be offered in support of a moral judgement. For example, the statement, 'He did not clasp and unclasp his hands while turning NNE from SSW,' could not, if offered in total absence of further explanation, ever be a justification for sending a man to Coventry. It is not, as it stands, meaningfully a moral judgement.

1. 'Moral Beliefs', loc. cit., P 84.

Thus, Mrs. Foot might argue, even if some room is left for manoeuvre, the field must be limited in some respects.

There is, then, with these two philosophers a decided interest in discovering what it is that makes a principle a moral principle. (This indeed is the title of a paper published by Mrs. Foot in 1954.¹)

What, however, is the nature of the distinction that they are trying to make? In investigations such as this, it is well known that there appear two dichotomies: moral-non-moral, and moral-immoral, which it is often difficult to separate. I take it that it is the former distinction that Warnock is after, but his comments on page 59 (quoted above on P 186) suggest that he wants to use this distinction to make moral comments. Indeed, it seems to me that no distinction of the first kind can be made without making a distinction of the second kind. The two dichotomies, when we talk of ideals or actions and so on, collapse readily into one three-part distinction; the moral, the immoral and the morally neutral.²

G. J. Warnock argues that there are ideals that a man may unselfishly follow which are not moral ideals. This seems in many

1. 'When is a principle a moral principle?', PAS 1954.
2. The two dichotomies may remain separate if one is talking about statements. If a man makes a statement, claiming for example no interest in the morality of the case, his statement is in this sense a non-moral one. The act of making the statement would still be classifiable only as moral, immoral or morally neutral, in the way that I describe in what follows. Warnock is not primarily interested in statements, but in ideals and actions, however.

senses true. If a man elects to devote his life to the collection of stamps, or sea-creatures, then this seems to be a case that Warnock seeks. If, on the other hand a man devotes his life to helping the poor this seems to be a case of a moral ideal. Again if a man devotes his life to the destruction of everything that can bring happiness to anyone, this seems to be straightforwardly an immoral ideal. If these ideals are translated into action, it appears that we have three types of action. One which is morally good, one which is morally bad, and one which is morally neutral.

It is the case of the morally neutral that attracts my attention. When one says that an act is morally neutral, then presumably one means that it doesn't matter whether one does it or not. By this, we mean, of course that it doesn't matter morally, for, in the case of the man who collects sea-urchins, the giving up of a good opportunity to collect a rare specimen might make him accuse himself of laziness and so on.

It does of course matter to him. It is an example of a type-I reason but one can agree with Warnock that it is not a type-A reason. But whether he collects the sea-urchin or not does not seem to matter morally, at least when we consider the action in itself. But is it true that a morally neutral action is always morally neutral? Suppose the man has a choice of saving a drowning man or collecting a particular sea-urchin? Is his action in collecting the sea-urchin still morally neutral? It seems not. He ought to have given up

the sea-urchin and made (*ceteris paribus*) an attempt to save the drowning man, for the fact that he chooses to collect the sea-urchin instead makes his guilt so much worse.¹

Thus, a morally neutral action is only morally neutral when there are no moral demands made upon the man. In other words a morally neutral action is only morally neutral in the absence of moral demands, or to put it bluntly, a morally neutral action is only morally neutral when it is morally neutral. This seems a very uninformative remark, but it is not entirely so.

Warnock takes the harm and happiness of human beings to be the criterion of moral correctness. Human beings can flourish (as Miss Anscombe puts it²) or can be harmed, but they are not alone in this. There is a vast category of things of which it makes sense to talk of them flourishing or failing.

For example, take a bed of roses. Any action which harms the roses is 'bad' for them, and action which results in their flourishing is 'good' for them, and there are some actions (many in fact) which as far as we know do not affect them in any way. These we may call 'rose-neutral'. However, the discovery that any rose-neutral act in fact harms the roses, will mean that the act becomes 'bad' for the roses. Alternatively, a 'good' act may prove 'bad', or a 'bad'

1. In that he considered the sea-urchin more important than the man.
2. 'Modern Moral Philosophy' in Philosophy 1958.

act rose-neutral and so on. The categories are not necessarily stable but depend upon our knowledge. There are no acts in this case which are intrinsically members of any of the three categories, for their categorisation depends solely upon their relationship to the roses. There are some acts of course that by the largest stretch of the imagination are likely to remain rose-neutral (at least in our society)¹ but it is of course an empirical matter that it is so. There is no logical reason why my saying 'Boo!' to my friend in Switzerland should not affect my roses in Leicester.

There are therefore some acts which are 'rose-neutral'. Is it true that there are actions which are morally neutral - actions in which morality does not interest itself? It does seem, on the surface, that there are such actions. If, for example, I were to scratch my foot now, no comments on the morality or upon the immorality of this would be made. It would be a fanatic of the strangest persuasion who wanted to say anything about it, in the same way that it would be the oddest of fellows who thought that my shout of 'Boo!' might harm my roses. There are therefore some actions which are morally 'indifferent'. However, it is surely relevant to ask why, and how we decide that, this is so.

1. I say, 'in our society' advisedly, since connections of this kind depend upon the understanding that a culture has of the nature of the world. Thus, in Levi-Strauss's book, The Savage Mind, it is pointed out that not all cultures have the same way of looking at things. In the Lakoute tribe for example, the touch of a woodpecker's beak is thought to be 'good for' toothache. We should remember that the concept of 'good for' may not be identical in this case with what we should mean by it.

Suppose for the moment that we take morality to be about the welfare of human beings, then in the case of my scratching my foot no one is affected by my action either way. However, in deciding this, one has to decide whether other people are affected - the action has to be considered from a certain point of view. If I were to look at the action from the point of view of my roses, quite obviously I would decide that it was 'rose-neutral' - it is quite irrelevant to the welfare of my roses. In deciding whether it affects other people, I look at the action from the point of view of their harm or happiness. In both cases I make a decision from a point of view. If morality is a matter of the harm and happiness of other people, then the decision that I made that this action is indifferent, is itself a moral decision for I looked at it, in Warnock's terms, from the moral point of view. I am asking myself what morality says about this action.

It is not quite clear that this is the way that Warnock approaches this problem of the word 'moral'. The way that I have outlined here of dealing with the dichotomies gives a sort of 'dimensional' approach. There is a dimension or mode of thought - a way which looks at the world from a certain point of view (one incidentally among many others - no answer is yet given as to why this way should be any more cogent than any other).

It seems at times in Warnock's book that he has another way of looking at the question - one on an analogy of a 'field' or 'class'.

He seems to say that there are a number of ideals, actions and so on which do, as a matter of fact affect the happiness and harm of others. These are to be called moral ones and within this category those that bring harm are immoral and those which bring good are moral ones. This is somewhat confusing for in the passage on page 59¹, Warnock says that insane or destructive or damaging ideals are not part of the moral point of view whereas one feels that he wants or needs to say that they are not part of the moral, moral point of view. Being connected with human good and harm, they are a subject of moral concern - and they are immoral on this count.

Thus, Warnock seems to take it as a matter of fact that actions which connect with human good and harm are descriptively 'morally relevant', but it seems that no evidence for this 'fact' can be given. Surely, morality is concerned with human wellbeing but this is because it is morally important, and to say this is to make a moral statement.

The three-part distinction will throw up different distinctions based upon what one takes as a matter for moral concern and to choose 'human good and harm', to which I have no moral objection, is to choose a certain way of looking at morals - to choose a certain set of reasons and make them type-A reasons for action. There is nothing

1. Quoted above on P 186.

wrong with this, but it is a moral point of view and not a fact about language that human wellbeing is morally important - respect for it generates type-A reasons.

One could re-interpret what Kemp says in line with this approach. If instead of treating morality as a means to some further end desired by all men - some form of social harmony - we took him to mean that social harmony was morally important, then a similar 'dimension' theory can be generated. It no longer becomes a matter of fact that morality exists to bring about social harmony, but a criterion of a moral statement that it shows concern for such harmony. Actions are considered morally good, neutral or bad in so far as they affect such harmony but the reason for this is a moral standpoint - that social harmony is of ultimate value.

However, Kemp's approach, on this account, would suggest that the only ultimate is social harmony which seems factually false, in that there are reasons given as moral reasons (type-A reasons) which do not conform to this pattern. The same could be said of Warnock's approach, that it is factually false as an account of moral thinking. Both theories, it seems to me, would yield on this interpretation, substantive moral codes or positions, in that they yield one type of type-A reason, and ignore the possibility of any other.

D. Z. Phillips appears to argue against the possibility of morality being construed in anything like this fashion. In several

places he has argued that the philosopher should not interest himself in the material side of morality but in its form.¹ He argues, with Kierkegaard, that philosophy of morals should not be 'inquisitive' concerning the actual nature of a moral position except in its logic. His attack is mainly directed at Mrs. Foot's position in 'Moral Beliefs', where she argues that the just man will and must profit by being just, but in general he argues against all attempts to 'justify' morality.

In this, he is essentially correct as we had reason to see earlier, that any attempt to justify morality in the sense that Mrs. Foot means it, must fail because it makes morality a means to some end, and thus, in principle replaceable. In other words, any attempt to justify morality from outside of morality is doomed to failure in that it misses the essential point that morality can evaluate the moral worth of any such justification. If an act is to be justified by the end it achieves, then morality can not only make remarks about that means but about that end as well.

However, it seems to me that Phillips' enthusiasm for this, admittedly correct, point leads him to reject any attempt to justify a moral position or moral statement, and surely this is not correct.

It should be noticed of the sort of theory that Warnock and on the re-interpretation, Kemp put forward, can be seen as some kind of

1. In particular in two essays: 'On morality's having a point', (with H. O. Mounce), Philosophy 1965 and 'Does it pay to be good?' in PAS 1964/5.

'consequentialist' position. A man acts correctly if his act does produce happiness or reduce harm; or does bring about or safeguard the possibility of social life. Of course, the agent may only be obeying the rules but his action based upon these rules, or the propriety of the rule can be tested by reference to 'social life' or 'happiness of others'. This position is very complex, far more so than perhaps Phillips allows for it may be the case not that the rule produces the end result directly but that the rule forms part of a complex of rules which acts in terms of the end result. This, perhaps is the difference between 'act-' and 'rule-' Utilitarianism.

It is the purposive nature of this theory that D. Z. Phillips criticises. In his view, all 'content' theories are directly involved in the difficulty of retaining objectivity, in that, since, as he claims, the content of morality is a changeable thing, a philosopher holding such a theory is in danger of maintaining a substantive moral position, and so not talking about the nature of morality as a whole. Thus, he might claim that the Foot-Warnock position is being prescriptive and not descriptive, however much against its proponents' will, a charge that has much to substantiate it.

What Phillips insists upon is that a good action is done because it is good. The agent, in doing his duty, is doing it because it is his duty. It is this that is indicative of the act being a moral one. What the man is doing is of no concern to the philosopher for it is

the reasons that the man gives for acting which are indicative of the nature of the action.

This way of talking is very reminiscent of Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics',¹ in which a distinction is made between relative (to a purpose) values and absolute values, and is meant to show that the philosopher must concern himself with the form of the moral statement and not its content. This, says Phillips, is the point of Kierkegaard's comment, that his talk is not 'inquisitive'. What the purpose of a type of action is, is not what makes it a moral action and a man acting morally is not acting in order to achieve anything but acting in a way that is required of him. Thus, the fact that certain actions that we call moral actions can be seen as achieving something is not an indication that this is what the moral 'content' consists in. Phillips identifies as 'moral actions', those that are required of a man. This is the form of morality and the actions that are required constitute the content which may vary from society to society.

Kierkegaard's attack upon 'consequentialism' is mounted in terms of his concept of 'double-mindedness' which Phillips explains. He says:

"Actions are morally indifferent for a person when it no longer matters to him whether he does one thing rather than another".²

1. Loc. cit.

2. 'Does it pay to be good?' loc. cit. P 53.

The example that he gives is of giving alms to a beggar which if done in order to curry favour with my boss is a purposive action - done as a means to an end. But as he says "helping a blind man across the street, bribery,...flattery,... might have done just as well in securing the desired end".¹ However, if I help the beggar because it is my 'duty' so to do, I do it for no end. Its 'justification', so to speak, is contained in the action. Thus, Phillips says;

"One cannot explain remorse unless one realises that the just man cares about just actions".²

The point about 'double-mindedness' can be summed up in the following way. Any action that is done for a purpose - which has an end in view so to speak - can, in principle at least be replaced by another action which achieves the same end. It is a matter of empirical fact that one action serves the end better than another. However, in moral action, if an action is one's duty, it cannot be replaced by another action for it is that action and no other which is required of us in this situation.

It will be seen that this is an argument which is from the facts of moral life - the phenomenology of morals, hence Phillips' comment about remorse. To have acted inefficiently, in the sense of choosing the wrong action to achieve a certain end, in itself,

1. Op. cit. P 54.

2. Op. cit. P 56/7.

is not sufficient to account for the phenomenon of remorse. The man who doesn't achieve his end through choosing the wrong action has acted foolishly not evilly. (Though there may be occasions when it is one's duty to do something for someone and in acting foolishly one is guilty in some way.)

How does this affect the position that we are examining? Let us take the example of lying. If on every occasion that we think of telling a lie, we consider whether this will harm another person, or bring about his happiness, Phillips suggests that we are forgetting that lying is wrong. We can indeed justify lying on some occasions (white lies and so on), but it is a fact that such action needs justification. It is wrong, *prima facie*, and only on special occasions acceptable. The 'consequentialist' position is thereby accused of getting things back to front. It is not the prohibition that needs justification in everyday life, but the breaking of it, while the consequentialist position suggests that every occasion in itself when we consider an action, we have to consider it afresh.

Thus, Phillips says that the purpose of a type of action is not what makes it a moral action and a man acting morally is not acting in order to achieve anything, but acting in a way that is required of him. Thus the fact that certain actions that we call moral actions can be seen as achieving something is not an indication that this is what the moral content consists in. Phillips identifies

as 'moral' actions, those that are required of a man. This is the form of a moral statement and the actions that are required and what they do are the content which may vary with the moral climate.

There are, of course, some difficulties in such a position, especially in the way that it depends upon a sort of behaviouristic test for a principle being a 'moral' one. It can also be shown that the Foot-Warnock position can avoid most of the initially powerful objections that are raised. To show this it is necessary to return to the use of the term 'absolute value' that Wittgenstein uses.

The term 'absolute value' as used by Wittgenstein, is said to have its origins in Kierkegaard's idea of 'willing one thing', but both, as they stand do not mean very much. It is only when we see them in contradistinction to their opposites that they make sense. Thus, Wittgenstein uses his term to show a distinction between this and 'relative values', and it is relative values that must first claim our attention. Of these Wittgenstein says;

"...Every judgement of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can therefore be put into such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgement of value: Instead of saying 'This is the right way to Grantchester', I could equally well have said, 'This is the (right) way you have to go if you want to get to Grantchester in the shortest

time'...".¹

Thus, Wittgenstein is saying that relative judgements are those judgements which when fully opened out to include a reference to the purposes of the agent, become no more than factual ones. A relative value-judgement is one which includes an implicit 'if you want... then...' structure.

There have of course been many philosophers who have said that this is all there is to it - that all value-judgements are of this form and that the function and true study of morals is to find what purposes morality serves. This is what Phillips is displeased about but it seems to me that there is nothing wrong with the present position unless we interpret 'purposes' to mean the purposes that concern the self-interest of the agent.

This, surely, is part of the point of Wittgenstein's distinction - the distinction is made firstly between those acts that I want to do because I desire the result or because the act itself is 'pleasurable' where the interests of anyone else are just not considered, whether they ought to be or not, and those acts which I ought to do whether I want to or not. It is because many philosophers have tried to understand all human action as self-interest motivated that Wittgenstein's distinction is necessary.

It seems to me that the distinction between absolute and

1. 'Lecture on Ethics' Loc. cit. P 6.

relative values is a distinction that is made to combat self-interest theories.

Interest theories, as we have seen, are in general attempts to answer the question, 'Why should I be moral?' in terms of the function of moral rules. However, they try to answer the question in non-moral terms - by appealing to considerations and motivations beyond morality. Thus we may see theories constructed in terms of the 'evolution of the species' or the 'general happiness' for example. Of these theories, it always makes sense to ask why such ends are desirable, and the answer is often fatally given in terms of the satisfaction of interests of the agents concerned. Such a theory is of course not a moral theory but one concerning prudence.

Thus these theories spring from an acceptance of two fallacies. Firstly, they accept the meaningfulness of the question 'Why should I be moral?' and secondly they take all man's actions to be self-interested in some sense.

The first fallacy is one if one takes it as a simple question which demands an answer on a parallel with 'Why should I look both ways on crossing the road?'. It is not in fact a question which can be answered for the 'should' is empty. It cannot be answered in terms of prudence without nullifying the morality it recommends, and it cannot be a moral 'should' since this would assume what is at issue. Still, the question is not a silly one, in that though

it cannot be answered in a form of words, it does express a worry - it asks what is the point of morality, but such a point cannot be demonstrated in words - only seen by the questioner. This problem is virtually identical to the one discussed earlier where a man might ask in despair 'What is the meaning of it all?'.¹

The second fallacy - that all actions are self-interested - stems merely from an inability, or a refusal, to see that men do not always act out of greed, or desire or whatever. Such a blindness simply guarantees the inability to understand the nature of the moral life.

It is this position that Wittgenstein attacks in his Lecture, attempting to show us that morality is a species of human behaviour which is not linked to self-interest. To look for an account of it on the 'desire' theory account of human action is to miss the point and therefore he makes the distinction between relative (to my purposes) values and absolute (irrelevant to my self-interest purposes) values. The difficulty of explaining the distinction in terms of talk of 'values' which are always conceptually tied to purposes to which the evaluated thing is put, leads Wittgenstein to talk of 'going beyond the world' of bald facts which is to go 'beyond significant language'.¹ But it is to do so for just as long as human conduct is seen in a particular way and with it human

1. 'Lecture on Ethics', loc. cit. P 11.

values. This is what is meant by morality being non-purposive, that it has little to do with my or your purposes, if by purposes we mean something that refers back to 'interests'. Not all reasons for action are of type-F nor do they all rely upon desire for their potency. We can distinguish within Wittgenstein's category of 'absolute value' two types of reason for action which I have called type-A and type-I neither of which make reference to the 'self-interest' of the agent as previously described. Thus, Warnock's question concerning the field of morals remains a sensible one if we take him to be asking not for reasons to be moral, but, accepting the possibility of moral (type-A) reasons, to be asking what is morally important.

In placing 'absolute' value on the happiness of others all we are saying is that the happiness of other people is important to us. Such happiness is not important because we want to do anything with it or even receive any returns - though we may receive them and we may say that people ought to recognise unselfishness and be grateful - it is simply important. Recognition of this and recognition of the fact that a man may act rationally and intelligibly in ways that do not 'profit' him is a necessary pre-condition for being able to discuss morality and certainly Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's insistence upon this go a long way towards countering a view of man's actions that make this impossible. In Wittgenstein's terms, we might say that it is a grammatical remark that man does not act solely for his own pleasure; what we have are two ways of attempting

to understand human action.

However, these points do not wholly answer Phillip's objections for they do not account for the fact that often it is not the results of an action which are 'required' of us, but the action itself. Again, I think that Phillips' criticism of the sort of position that we are here discussing is misplaced, for it is not really results that matter. In Kemp's view at least, the question of results does not loom very large for what he is concerned to show is that something (for Warnock the happiness of human beings and for Kemp the possibility of the good life) acts as the rationale of the moral system under consideration. Note here that such a rationale need not be of morality in general but of a particular moral way of life. Thus, Warnock could say, though changing his tune somewhat no doubt, this (some particular) morality can only be understood on the assumption that this (facet of life or way of life and so on) matters to the agents. It is not the case that moral action results in a certain state of affairs, but that something being valued gives rise to certain moral judgements.

What Warnock and Kemp appear to be doing is to re-evaluate the moral life as it is now, asking whether all of it still makes sense. They ask this by asking what matters in life - or better what matters in life considered as social.

True, both Warnock and Kemp talk of morality as a whole and not

in terms of this or that moral system but it would not be possible to talk otherwise without at the same time admitting that perhaps what one decided mattered did so only to a limited extent. When deciding what is morally important one does not make such decisions limiting oneself to a particular culture, for such decisions can only be made by and for the agent for the whole of his life. Admittedly, the social anthropologist discovers different value-systems but these interest us as possible alternatives to our way of life - alternatives or additions of course, because the recognition of different possibilities is a necessary condition for re-evaluation of our own way of life. In deciding what morality is 'about', I am deciding what I ought to do, what duties I have and so on. Such a decision is made for me and for (at that moment) all time (though this does not preclude the possibility that I may change my opinions at some later date). Phillips may be correct, with Kierkegaard, that this is not to do moral philosophy, but this depends upon one's view of philosophy.

It is not really necessary therefore to see the position that can be culled from these writers as 'consequentialist', and certainly wrong to say that they are 'self-interest' theorists. However, it seems to me that they are mistaken in oversimplifying the case. It seems to me highly improbable that the whole of morality can be understood in terms of just one or two evaluations of importance. It seems further that it is difficult to see 'happiness of others' as a moral aim in the simple way that Warnock treats it.

Warnock recognises several lines of attack that might be mounted upon his thesis,¹ the most important for our consideration is the third which is in two parts. It is first, and here Warnock switches from talk about a man's happiness to what is 'good for him' - a point which I will deal with in a moment - that what is 'good for a man' is not simply a matter of factual discovery, that the notions of good, in this sense, and harm "are themselves 'evaluative' notions".² Secondly that these evaluative notions include reference to moral evaluation.

Obviously, were it true that what constitutes harm, for example, is a matter for evaluation and not empirical discovery, then the answer that Warnock attempts to give is vitiated because it solves nothing. Warnock is attempting a 'neo-naturalist' resolution of the problem of morality and if his standard is seen not to be a 'natural' one then the standard collapses. If moreover, this 'standard' is seen to include moral evaluations already, it becomes a circular argument to say that morality is concerned with it.

Warnock argues that neither of these criticisms are likely to be sustainable on further investigation (which he does not carry out) but it seems to me that his hopes are not likely to be fulfilled.

Against the first point of the criticism, he argues that:

1. Warnock, op. cit. P 60.
2. Loc. cit.

"... we all have, and should not let ourselves be bullied out of, the conviction that at least some questions as to what is good or bad for people, what is harmful or beneficial, are not in any serious sense matters of opinion. That it is a bad thing to be tortured or starved, humiliated or hurt, is not an opinion: it is a fact. That it is better for people to be loved and attended to, is again a plain fact, not a matter of opinion".¹

Against the second point, he does not really offer any argument but claims that even if human good or harm is a matter for judgement, it is not clear that it is necessarily moral judgement that is involved. Thus, Warnock appears to have the view that 'human good' can be described quite apart from moral evaluations. This implies the view, as I shall attempt to demonstrate in a moment, that happiness can be seen as something apart from morality, and indeed that morality acts as a sort of barrier to the achievement of our happiness. It constrains us to act for the good of others, at least some of the time, instead of seeking our own happiness. Morality puts limits upon the ways in which we can seek our happiness. It seems that Warnock might agree with the psychiatrist referred to earlier that man would, himself, be a lot happier if he did not feel bound to act in certain ways by moral considerations.

Can however, Warnock's defence be maintained at this point? I think not, for he seems to miss some of the essential elements of

1. Warnock op. cit. P. 60.

the concept of happiness.

However, let us first deal with Warnock's shift from talk about happiness to talk about 'good and harm' in an attempt to justify a continuation of the use of the concept of happiness in talking about Warnock. It might be thought, and with some justification, that in moving from talk about 'happiness' to talk about 'good and harm' a major shift has occurred. After all, what makes a man happy may well not be good for him. On a simple level, eating a whole box of chocolates may make a child happy, but it will hardly be good for him. It may well bring about stomach-aches, cause his teeth to decay and so on. Thus, one might argue, it is not a good thing to act for the happiness of the child but better to bring about what is good for him, allowing for the fact that indulging his desires to some extent is probably good for him.

However, the confusion here is over the two senses of 'happy' that we noticed earlier. Paradoxically, acting for someone's happiness need not involve making him, at that time, happy. The periodic or emotional sense of the word differs from the evaluative or long term sense. Acting to make someone happy in the emotional sense is acting to bring about a certain reaction, a certain momentary attitude to the world which may or may not reflect the true position of the person in the world, vis-a-vis that which he considers important. Passions, as we have noticed, whether for chocolates or for the death of whales, result in a distortion of the focus which the agent has

upon the world, setting some things up as important or ultimately desirable which the agent might not consider on maturer reflection. Thus, the emotion of happiness is inherently suspicious simply because it reflects a momentary appreciation of the world which may not represent (though of course it may on occasions) the true configuration.

We ought to consider here, as a useful sidetrack, what it means to act 'for the sake of happiness'. J. S. Mill takes it to be a matter of fact that what men seek is happiness but there seems to be an air of triviality about this - it seems trivially true that men seek happiness, as if such an end is not as a matter of fact the ultimate end, but is so 'by definition'. However, people have argued that it is possible to seek other ends than happiness. Thus, we find John Wilson saying:

"It is perfectly intelligible for someone to seek money rather than happiness, or even for someone to seek something directly opposed to happiness (It's not right to be happy with all this suffering around us, we ought to feel sad and worried about it)",¹

There is some truth in this, that both these cases are possible, but they do not mean exactly what Wilson takes them to mean. In fact, I think that it can be shown that happiness must be the ultimate end for human life, and that therefore Mill is incorrect in taking it to

1. 'Happiness', in Analysis 1968, P 18.

be only empirically true that men seek happiness. This must be seen in terms of the distinction made between the emotion sense and the evaluation sense of the word.

Acting for happiness must not be seen as action designed to bring about the emotion of happiness, but since a man's happiness is bound up with what he considers important his happiness is necessarily connected with his actions. Thus, if we take the evaluation sense, a man acting for happiness acts directly for those things which matter to him. The evaluation of importance, as we have seen, is intimately connected with action, for such evaluations act as reasons for action.

Wilson's mistake in the passage above depends upon an insufficiently close examination of his examples. It is indeed perfectly intelligible for a man to act in a way describable as acting for money rather than happiness, but doesn't this indicate a rather jaundiced view of the world? In the film, 'The Pawnbroker'¹, a tragic tale of a Jewish pawnbroker working in Harlem and seeing where he works echoes of the horrors of Nazi Germany, the central character, Sol Nazerman, claims, willing himself to believe it one feels, that only money matters. Money will protect you for happiness is unattainable in this dreadful world. The tragedy of the affair is that Sol, a humane and basically loving man, causes the death of

1. From the novel of the same name by Edward Lewis Wallant.

his negro assistant and is himself broken upon the ideal that he has set himself, committing suicide in a most awful fashion. The point of this example is that the agent chooses to seek money as the only thing that can protect him in this world - he does not choose to seek it but realises that he has to, not in place of happiness but as a way of maintaining what little there is left to him. With his money, he is able to carry on living. He is not happy but he is at least alive. Only with a view of the world like this one, does it seem possible to seek money rather than happiness, for in seeking the latter, one seeks the fulfilment of everything that one values. The restriction of the search limits the consciousness of value. The tragedy of the pawnbroker is that he attempts to force himself not to care but his essential humanity breaks through and he cannot avoid caring.

Again, when Wilson claims that there are occasions when we feel that we ought not to feel happy, he confuses the emotion sense and the evaluation sense. It is possible to feel happy when things go well, as we have discussed, even when one recognises that other things are going ill. There are two ways of accounting for this. Firstly, those things that are going ill are either devalued by our emotion response or we do not care about them. In the first case, referring back to Wilson's example, one would expect the emotion of happiness to cease when one becomes aware of the suffering of others. In the second case, we feel that we ought to care - that

although it appears that our involvement with the world does not include the suffering of others, we feel that it ought to. In other words, the importance notions that are bound up with our happiness ought to, but do not, include the suffering of others. Such a comment is not a decision not to seek happiness but a critical comment upon oneself as a moral agent.

Wilson argues that the statement 'You ought to pursue happiness' is a meaningful one and that it is a way of saying:

"... 'Your desires ought, if you're going to be reasonable about it, to be arranged in a certain way, i.e. to avoid conflict &c.', and neither a way of saying, 'Pursue your desires', nor a way of saying, 'Choose this object of desire rather than the other'".¹

He claims that the statement is similar to the advice 'Check your facts' or 'See if the experimental results confirm it' in science.

I cannot see that any of this is justified, and while not wanting to say that the statement 'You ought to pursue happiness' is never used meaningfully, I find it difficult to understand what it could ever mean. Wilson's theory again divides happiness from morality in that it is something that can be 'morally' commanded, can be given up for various reasons and so on. Wilson's position seems to me dubious because he has not fully grasped the nature of happiness -

1. Op. cit. P 19.

he still takes it as only an emotion word. Inter alia, he seems to think, with Mill, that happiness is the result of the satisfaction of desire; thus he argues that happiness can be achieved by the 'arrangement' of desires so that they do not conflict. When we recognise that desires are not all there is to it, then Wilson's advice becomes an argument for compromise which for some people would be out of the question. (It would make them more unhappy.) Wilson's advice is very much like asking someone to 'come to terms with the world' which is often misguided in that the 'terms' involved may not be common to the giver and the receiver of the advice.

Wittgenstein's comment that the world of the happy man is a different world from that of the unhappy man is relevant here,¹ for if all which matters to us 'fits together' then the world will make sense, but if all that is important to us involves us in contradictions and impossible choices, then the world will not make sense. Wilson is correct in saying that happiness comes when the world makes sense but he cannot express this thought if he sees happiness as connected with only desire, or thinks that compromise can bring about the sense of the world. As Lloyd-Thomas points out;

"... a person cannot just decide for himself what standards he will adopt for a happy life: one's freedom to choose standards is limited by the kind of person that one is".²

1. Tractatus 6.43.

2. D. A. Lloyd-Thomas, 'Happiness', Phil. Quart. 1968, P 105.

I do not think that 'the kind of person that one is' is to be understood, even if this is the way that Lloyd-Thomas understands it, in terms of psychological factors of personality, for it seems to me that the kind of person that one is depends upon the way that one is involved in the world.

A form of compromise solution to the dilemma of life might be seen to be offered by Creon, in Anouilh's 'Antigone'. Faced with the dilemma of deciding between executing Antigone for disobeying his commands against burying the body of her brother, and saving her life, he is faced with the choice between his duty as he sees it to the City of Thebes and his love for his niece. He justifies his actions on behalf of Thebes, replying to Antigone's implied criticism that he ought to have refused the tasks he performed, saying:

"It's easy to say no. To say yes, you have to sweat and roll up your sleeves and plunge both hands into life up to the elbows".¹

He sees that life must be lived sacrificing some values for the sake of life's continuation. He sees man as an animal:

"Animals are good, simple, tough. They move in droves, nudging one another onwards, all travelling the same road. Some of them keel over; but the rest go on; and no matter how many

1. Jean Anouilh, Antigone, Methuen edition, translated by Lewis Galantiere. P 51.

fall by the wayside, there are always those few left which go on bringing their young into the world, travelling the same road with the same obstinate will, unchanged from those who went before".¹

His view of his duties to the continuation of the Theban State springs therefore from his view of man's place in the world. It is perhaps true to say that Creon, even before the trouble with Antigone, is not a happy man for his view of happiness seems different from his appreciation of what he has to do. He says:

"Life is a child playing around your feet, a tool you hold firmly in your grasp, a bench you sit down upon in the evening in your garden".²

I say that perhaps he is not happy for one cannot be sure that this is not simply the sentimentality of the man of action. It may be true that Creon is happy wielding the reins of power. One cannot be sure because Anouilh's characters are nothing if not complex: indeed it is this complexity that is much of the interest of the play.

However, even if it can be said that Creon is not happy, it need not be thought that his duties act, per se, as barriers to his happiness. Certainly, his view of his duties prevents his attaining this rather sentimental aim of living close to his simple

1. Op. cit. P 51.

2. Op. cit. P 56.

workbench and hearth, but he would not be happy if he refused to do his duty. He sees the continuation of the life of Thebes as important and as something which depends upon him - it is part of his happiness. In this sense his duties are not in conflict with his happiness but part of it.

Creon offers Antigone the compromise, telling her that the view of life that she has is impractical. He asks her to give up her ideas of duties towards her brothers and live 'happily'. Antigone would be happy if she did not feel bound to bury her brother, but she does not, in rejecting Creon, claim that she wished that she did not have to bury her brother - she rejects Creon's idea of happiness.

"What kind of happiness do you foresee for me? Paint me the picture of your happy Antigone. What are the unimportant little sins that I shall have to commit before I am allowed to sink my teeth into life and tear happiness from it? Tell me: to whom shall I have to lie? Upon whom shall I have to fawn? To whom must I sell myself? Whom do you want me to leave dying, while I turn away my eyes?"¹

It is indicative that she also rejects his view of life:

"Animals, eh, Creon! What a king you could be if only men were animals".²

1. Op. cit. P 56/7.

2. Op. cit. P 51.

Antigone's ironical use of the word 'happiness' here is in dismissal of Creon's attitude to life. The acceptance of the compromise that he offers is impossible for her for moral reasons. She could not be happy accepting it for it goes against what she considers important. To accept the compromise, she would have to accept that some of the things that have meaning in her life do not matter, and she prefers to die rather than give them up.

Here, we do not have the emotion sense of happiness for we are talking not about feelings but about evaluations, and some of the evaluations are moral ones. Antigone could not be happy if she were to give up her duty, any more than Creon could be. The dead-lock that appears between the two disputants is a dead-lock about the purpose of their lives or the form that makes it meaningful.

Thus Warnock is wrong on both counts for what constitutes happiness depends upon the way life is lived, and although certain evaluations are likely to be common to most ways of living, certainly those appertaining to physical well-being, this is not necessarily true for all of them. Moreover, many of these evaluations are already moral ones.

This problem arises whether one talks about happiness or 'what is good for' someone. If one ignores the emotion sense of the word,

then acting for someone's happiness is acting for what they consider important, while acting for someone's good is acting to make their life better or enabling them to live their life in the proper way. What constitutes 'better' and 'proper' here can only be understood in terms of the life itself, and will not necessarily be constant through the lives of different people.

It seems therefore that morality cannot be explained simply in terms of acting for the happiness of others since moral evaluations are prior to an understanding of what that happiness consists in. Yet it is true that it is a good thing to act for the happiness of others at least some of the time. However, the question can and does arise of whether acting for the sake of someone's happiness is right. The conflict here is between what one considers morally important and what one recognises as part of someone else's happiness.

What then is the conceptual connection between happiness and morality? The answer lies in what has been said already, but I will try to spell it out more clearly. In doing so, it will be profitable to speculate upon the connection between morality and emotion for if we can answer the question of the genesis of emotion then I think we can answer the question of the genesis of morality.

There are several theories of morality which, in one way or another, claim that moral language is intimately connected with

emotions. A. J. Ayer,¹ for example, takes moral statements to be the expression of, and the attempt to arouse, a particular 'moral' emotion. C. L. Stevenson's² theory is very similar to this.

It is, however, not clear what is meant by 'expressing emotion' for while many moral statements, indeed those we perhaps most often hear, do have emotional 'content' in the sense that they are very far from being unemotional comments, the examples of moral judgements that Stevenson and Ayer seem to take as typical (X is good: you ought to do X: Y is right) are not of this kind. Typical emotional statements of a moral order are: How awful! How wonderful! What a dreadful thing to do! How could he do such a thing?

On the other hand, statements like That is good are more often, when said at all, said 'coldly' as the result of a considered judgement which is not typical of the configuration of emotional life.

It is true that Stevenson turns from talk of 'expressing emotion' to talk of 'expressing attitudes'. Attitudes can, of course be 'coldly' expressed, in a way in which emotions cannot. However, Stevenson still retains the concept of 'emotive meaning' as a facet of what he calls the 'dynamic use of language'. Indeed,

1. A. J. Ayer Language, Truth and Logic.
2. C. L. Stevenson Ethics and Language.

it seems to me that Stevenson's change of terms is very little more than simply a verbal change, for his term 'attitude' appears to have the same logic as his use of 'emotion' earlier. In other words, he appears to see both attitudes and emotions as reactions, or forces resulting in reactions, which are of an essentially non-rational nature. In this, he is still a full member of the emotivist school. It still makes sense to ask, in the terms of his theory, whether morality springs from the emotions or not. In my view, this is not a possible question.

Fundamental to any 'emotive theory' and indeed to many theories not centrally emotive, is a recognition of a difference between sentence or statement-types (the fact-value distinction). Thus, for what Austin called 'constative'¹ language use (fact-stating) there are tests for truth or falsity supposing only rationality and a knowledge of the ontological position of the terms in use. A factual statement in principle, can be shown to be true or false within its own evidence terms and this includes, as Carnap shows, existential statements as well.² This is true whether the statement be 'Most swans are white' or 'Bodies in a vacuum accelerate at 32 ft/sec/sec.'. Again, certain statements in Mathematics are of this nature; '32 squared equals 1024' can be tested by simple

1. J. L. Austin, 'Performative Utterances' in his Philosophical Papers.
2. Rudolf Carnap, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, reprinted in Richard Rorty (ed) The Linguistic Turn, P 78.

procedures of Arithmetic as can any theorem in Geometry or Logic for example. In a sense, these statements are unproblematical.

However, it is equally obvious that there are many statements which will not fit such a framework - they do not necessarily have a public test-frame. Among these statements are some that Stevenson has called the 'dynamic use of language' but not I think what Austin at one time called the 'Performative use' of language.¹ The distinction that I am making here is not between stating and doing in language for I do not think that the problem is that simple, but between two types of 'stating'. The type of statement that I am concerned with is that which appears to be of the same form as what we would normally recognise as factual statements. Among these we can number certain aesthetic evaluations, Picasso is a great painter, El Greco is a very emotional painter and so on.

Thus, while it is possible to say, in the sense that it is not against any obvious rules of rationality or evidence tests, that Picasso is a lousy painter or that it is El Greco's frigidity that attracts one, it would be someone with a very odd taste or way of looking at paintings that said it. Still, there is a difference between the person who says this and the person who denies that bodies fall at 32ft/sec/sec. in a vacuum. While we may want to say that the first person knows nothing about art, we cannot actually

1. Austin op cit.

say it on this evidence alone but we could say that the second person knew nothing about physics. It is possible for two different people to agree to hold contrary positions on art but not possible in science if all the evidence is to hand.

It is this difference that attracts the attention of Stevenson and Ayer and yet, initially at least there are no grounds for dismissing the claims of aesthetic and ethical remarks to be statements. Suppose someone to say that while they loved listening to Beethoven, they thought that Berlioz was quite an atrocious stylist and unbearable. There is something very odd here, for while there are differences obviously between the two composers, Berlioz is so much within the same tradition of composition as Beethoven that the differences do not seem marked enough to warrant such a statement. One could perhaps understand the remark made about Poulenc or Ibert whose music is of a different order, but, and this is the point, unless this person is using criteria of an unusual sort, then he is making a foolish remark. Now there is nothing to stop him using unusual criteria but this does not alter the initial point that in form such statements to obey the same rules of appeal to criteria that what we have called 'factual' statements do. What remains to be explained is the nature of these criteria and how it comes about that we use them. The essential thing is that these criteria while not essentially private may be personal in a way that criteria for remarks about scientific subjects cannot be. Disagreement in attitude, as Stevenson has

called it, is not ultimately of the same nature as disagreement in belief.

One need not believe that these criteria are expressible in terms of universalised rules of art or ethics any more than the criteria for the propriety of scientific statements can be spelt out. Scientists recognise acceptable reasons for making statements in the same way that the judge and jury recognise the relevance or irrelevance of evidence presented in court, and the lack of codified rules need not lead one straightway to suppose that statements like 'X is right' are expressions of emotion. Such statements when they are made need as much or as little support as any 'factual' statement. In other words and pace Ayer and Stevenson, reasons are given and required for the making of such statements, but pace Hare, such reasons need not be generalised into universal metaphysico-moral pronouncements.

It seems to me to be plain silly and quite against what we see and hear of moral arguments to say that statements like 'X is good' are expressions of emotion. When they are made, and it is not often that they are made, they are typically the presentation of the result of thinking and argument.

However, it is worth asking whether the basis upon which such statements are made is 'emotional' for here at least we do have an assymetry with 'factual' statements. For the basis upon which they

are made, as we saw before, can be personal in a sense that 'factual' ones cannot.

From our previous remarks upon the nature of emotion, we can say that the criterion of an emotional life is that the agent be involved in the world in such a way that he sees certain things as important. The apparent irrationality of human life comes only from the fact that often we are faced with contradictory evaluations. A man charged with the carrying out of a certain task may be emotionally committed by loyalty or love to the completion of that task but if he is anything like a normal man there will be certain things which he will not do to attain that end. In other words, it is only when he is so single-minded that nothing else matters to him that the possibility of choice between ends important in themselves will not arise. Most human beings are thankfully not like this. The difference between man and a computer as we know them at the moment is that no computer can be 'directed' at the attainment of more than one task. In this sense, no matter what else goes, one can hardly say of a computer that it could have anything more than a single-minded nature.

Emotional commitment comes from importance evaluations - not necessarily conscious ones - which are constitutive of the way that a man is involved in the world. We could say of a man's moral commitments that these involve and are made up from his 'absolute' commitments. I have expressed this before by saying that the

configuration of a man's moral life is determined by those things which he takes to be of overriding importance and have tried to describe this by description of the phenomenology of guilt and remorse.

It seems therefore possible to agree with Stevenson and in saying that at this 'commitment' level, morality is correctly described in the language of emotion. But this, I think would be a mistake by oversimplification. It is true that man's emotional life springs from his way of life, and it is true that a man's moral life is structured in the same fashion but this does not mean that the two things are one or that the latter is a subset of the former. We must remember here, I think, that we have decided that there are no such things as emotions, and that therefore, it is really of no explanatory value to say that morality comes from emotion. Emotion words are words which describe and explain certain types of behaviour, sensations, feelings and so on. They tell us not where they come from but of what nature they are. We should not be surprised that men get emotional over moral problems but we should be wary of saying that emotion is all that there is to it.

What is true is that the possibility of a moral life depends upon the possibility of an emotional life, in that for a man to care about anything morally, some things must matter to him and for a man to 'get emotional' over anything, some things must matter to him.

However, this does not mean that the expression of a moral evaluation is an expression of an emotion, for emotion concepts describe ways that importance evaluations are expressed whereas moral evaluations are a type of importance evaluation. Thus, the two concepts are not at all on the same level. Morality is not like emotion nor unlike it, since there is no possible way that they can be compared.

Emotional expression can be given to any importance evaluation from type-F to type-A, but, it seems to me, morality is a matter of type-A evaluation. I have tried before to distinguish between type-I and type-A, and I do not feel that I have been particularly successful, but I shall not try to improve upon it because this thesis is not one about the nature of moral thinking. The distinction that I find, I have pointed to before, but it is enough for my purposes to say that morality appears to spring from man's ability to involve himself in the world such that some things matter to him. Since I have tried to analyse the concept of happiness in terms of what matters to a man, my answer to the problem of the relationship between happiness and morality must be clear. Morality must be part of happiness.

The problem of this thesis now reverses itself for we started by considering the man who acted from reasons of 'self-interest' as comprehensible and the man who refused so to act as a problem. Given this remark, that morality is part of happiness, we now find

that it is the former man who represents the problem. This is not entirely so for the egoist represents no real problem still, for he is the man who cares nothing for anything but his own advancement or does not recognise the applicability of reasons other than those couched in terms of his own advancement. The problem is the man who sees morality as a barrier to his happiness. In order to see this, he must obviously have some appreciation of moral demands or else the problem would not arise for him.

In my opinion, this view, that morality is a barrier to happiness, springs from a misapprehension concerning the relation of morality to life - a failure to make sense of the position of moral demands and their justification. The actual nature of the morality that this man holds is odd in some way.

Morality is a function of social life. This is not an empirical fact - if there were no social life, there would be no morality - this is almost a 'grammatical remark'. Social life is, trivially, life with other people, but not life simply in contiguity with other people, for no haphazard group of people

would be a society.¹ A society is a group of people who share, in at least a minimal sense, a way of living. The way that these people interconnect is the form of the social life. It may be true, and probably is, that many rules that spring from this are, in themselves, meaningless for they simply do a job. They enable the social life to continue in the way that the members want it to. (Examples of this are traffic regulations, tax laws and so on.)

Moral rules, on the other hand, are somewhat different in that they cannot be changed without changing the form of the social life. We could, with some upheaval, decide tomorrow to drive on the right in Britain and nothing would essentially change. We could not, however, change our moral 'rules' against rape for example.

There seem to be several important factors in life - in a shared life - which give rise to special ways of relating to other

1. It has been suggested to me that there might be moral relations between people who simply lived near one another in this haphazard manner. It might still be possible to use the word 'murder' if one man killed another. I think that this possibility exists in two ways. (1) The concept could be applied from the outside in the (erroneous) manner in which people use moral concepts to apply to the behaviour of animals. (2) The inhabitants of this artificial group may in fact belong to other groups, the social life of which explains their morality. In this sense, the moral life is lived, but its configuration depends not upon the nature of the artificial group but upon the extended groups to which the people respectively belong. The point remains in either case that the possibility of the moral life depends upon the possibility of meaningful social life. My example of the haphazard group of people is meant to refer to a group which had no external nor internal allegiances.

people. These factors yield the limits in which we live. Actions which affect other people in respect of these factors are subject to special rules.

However, morality and social life changes and the one is only meaningful with the other. Thus, if social changes occur without accompanying moral changes, the moral rules become meaningless. There is this much truth in Lord Devlin's comments upon morality and the social order.¹

Let us take the example of the changing attitudes towards sexual relations between men and women in our society and try however amateurishly, to set out certain social changes which might account for or at least go along with this change. The purpose of this is not to give some form of sociological account of a moral change but to attempt simply to describe in terms of a perhaps fictitious example the sort of change that I take a moral change to imply.

Along with the fact that sexual relations between men and women are no longer universally taken to be restricted within the context of a marriage go all sorts of other changes in the relationship between men and women. For example, it is no longer thoroughly accepted that a man stands up for a woman on a bus or train,

1. Lord Devlin, 'The Enforcement of Morals', Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence to the British Academy, 1959.

especially among commuters in the Home counties. Men no longer feel required to raise their hats to women, and perhaps the fact that men no longer wear hats frequently is something to do with it as well. The tradition that women are the weaker sex is dying out. In some ways it is obvious that the average woman is physically weaker than the average man, despite certain evidence that women live longer than men and that women are capable of surviving certain hardships better than men, but this is not the relevant sense in which women have been considered weaker in any case. Women were protected not only from physical hardship but from mental effort as well. Thus, in the 'traditional' family, it was always the man who made decisions regarding money, the place of habitation and so on. This is no longer so. Traditionally, again, women did not work for wages, or if they did then they chose work which was 'temporary' at least in the sense that they did not very much consider advancement within their employment as an aim - the 'career woman' is a relatively new phenomenon as an accepted and common occurrence.

Perhaps a caricature, but a recognisable one of the relationship between men and women traditionally, was of the man as the 'breadwinner', the independent soul who included in his life, though only parts of it, a wife and family. The woman was the family provider. She essentially took the position of the provider of sexual pleasure and the child-raiser. Often her job was to provide a situation in which the man could relax after his work which fed the family.

From this, certain views of a woman's place in a man's and her own eyes - a metaphysical position in the world - derive. After all, in the marriage service the woman was given to be married in church by her father (not by her mother) and she promised to obey her husband. Changes in the marriage service are taking place of course, for the man no longer promises to endow his wife with his worldly goods (it is not taken to be the case that the wife needs this security) and the woman no longer promises to obey. (Note here that she in fact gave over not her worldly goods but herself in promising to obey - just as her father gave her to her husband. She has no rights here as an independent agent.) One can understand from this how the sexual rules in our 'received morality' applied. If a woman is given, then she has no responsibility as an agent except to keep herself pure as an object to be given to a man later. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between women of pleasure (note - of the man's pleasure) and wives. In a marriage the man promises to keep his wife, so that her giving herself has a return in security, but a woman of pleasure receives no such assurance but remains an independent individual dependent upon monetary reward for her services.

That such women were looked down upon, by men as well as women shows us something about the moral status of all this. The sexual relationship, including notions of virginity, of love and so on, reflect a concern with the relationship between the man and the woman. Notions like virginity, which is only incidentally a physical

state, and is not always that, have a symbolic content in that they have meaning and express the meaning of a certain man-woman relationship.

Now all this is only possible for as long as the participants in the relationship can see each other in the relevant way. It is when a tension arises between the symbolical and the practical that the relationship changes. When it becomes difficult or increasingly impossible for a woman to see herself as something to be given or as a person with strictly limited possibilities in the world, and when it becomes likewise difficult for a man to see a woman as metaphysically weaker than the symbolism and the moral thinking and action which expresses this meaning begins to break down. If a man begins to see that a woman has the same possibilities in the world as himself - that she too can have a career, can reject a life as a family provider - that he begins to see her as an individual like himself. Again, when the woman begins to see that her life is not ruled by certain set-out patterns, that she is not limited to a fixed position in the world, she begins to recognise that she is an individual like a man. The relationship now has a different symbolic meaning, and those parts of behaviour which are most closely related to this meaning - sexual relations - must necessarily place themselves differently in the metaphysic. An act which once expressed a relationship now can become simply an act of pleasure, in that the fact that it expresses, the conclusion that this part

of life does not matter any more.¹

If the moral rules are held static however, then a tension is set up between what is considered 'normal' and what is considered 'right' and the rule becomes meaningless because it derived its meaning from importance evaluations no longer held. In this situation, the moral rules do become barriers to happiness because they are out of tune with the form of life.

The truth in Warnock's theory is not in the content so much as in the form. It seems to me that a moral position can be justified within its own terms, by pointing out the importance-evaluations that underlie it. Thus, Kemp's approach is surely correct in attempting to show that morality makes sense if we see this as an attempt to show that morality, or a particular morality, is concerned with those things that we feel are morally important. In one way this is a circular process but this does not appear to be a fault unless one construes the argument as an appeal to the man who does not care for morality at all. Kemp's explanation of morality, in its form, is an explanation for the man who sees the possibility of moral reasons - can understand the possibility of what I have called type-A reasons - but cannot see the rationale of the morality that he is faced with. An explanation along these lines, given that the man does in fact value some things, could bring him

1. I do not state that this is what has or must happen. I have exaggerated the situation to show what I consider the logic of the case to be.

to understand the moral necessity of the moral system. This is what I referred to earlier when I said that one facet of Kemp's argument appears to be that morality guarantees the possibility of the morally good life.

Thus, it surely can be said that we do justify our moral pronouncements by reference to certain reasons, but these reasons must be of a particular order - they must be in terms of those things which we hold to be absolutely important. Such reasons - for the good man - override all other reasons, and it is through these reasons that we understand the configuration of his moral life. Warnock claims that the only type-A reasons that there are, are reasons in terms of the harm or happiness of human beings - Kemp sometimes claims that the only type-A reasons are in terms of 'making society possible'. Both these reasons seem to me to exist in our morality but not to be necessarily all that there is to it.

Suppose then, that there are sets of reasons for acting which behave in this way that they are felt not to be valid as reasons in terms of some purpose but in themselves and that they appear to, for the good man, override all other possible reasons for acting. In studying the configuration of a moral position, we look for those reasons for acting which a man gives as those which he finds difficult to conceive that others do not act upon - which he would blame others for not acting upon in certain circumstances. How is the happiness of the good man connected with this?

From our discussion of happiness we said that a man's happiness was bound up with that which he considered important and, ex hypothesi, that a man recognises the existence of a certain set of type-A reasons implies that he finds the objects of these reasons to be of the greatest importance. Thus, to put it simply his happiness is bound up with these objects. For the good man, happiness cannot be found apart from these objects - he cannot be happy in acting against the fulfilment of these ideals and will judge the virtue of a man's character by how far he can be happy acting against them.

This is obviously a simplification if only because we are talking here about the 'perfectly good man' - the man of Kant's perfectly good will,¹ to whom morality does not appear as the categorical imperative. To this man morality still appears as unconditionally important and necessary but since he recognises this 'in his heart', he is not commanded to act or not to act in certain ways but does what he does willingly.

How do we account here for the man who obeys the 'categorical imperative' but still feels that often he would be happier doing otherwise? Surely the answer lies in the fact that this man recognises the possibility of type-A reasons as those enshrined in morality but does not entirely feel that they are his reasons. If

1. I am using Kant's terms metaphorically here - not strictly in accordance with the way that they are used in his work.

for example we take morality to be, for the moment, connected with the happiness of others, then this second man recognises that morality may make demands upon him, and indeed would not be happy in acting against it, but he does not fully recognise that the happiness of others is of ultimate importance. For this man it is that the command bears the imprint of morality that makes it necessary to follow, for to him morality is important, he may have no particular love for his fellows.

A tension is set up when a moral position becomes no longer fully meaningful as I sketched briefly in talking about man-woman relations. Here we begin to be left with an idea that certain actions are required of us but cannot fit this into a meaningful and comprehensible set of reasons. We cannot understand why it is that certain acts are wrong. That they seem wrong to us but not comprehensibly so, brings about a state of skepticism regarding the 'rules' that the moral opinions may by now be couched in. Such a skepticism by a form of sickness becomes a general sickness - a feeling that nothing matters. When all that is left of a moral position are certain unsupported rules then morality becomes restrictive and operates on a different level to happiness. The man who does not understand what is happening to him comes to see morality as a set of rules restricting his attainment of his happiness. But when the rules are meaningful, as Warnock's comments on morality are to him, then there is not this tension between happiness and morality for in understanding the reasons that support a moral

pronouncement a man is understanding why the objects of the moral statement are valuable in the way that they are. If he grasps this, there is no possibility of morality interfering with his happiness - indeed it is, in a sense safeguarding it, for an immoral act is an act against what the man considers important. I say, 'in a sense', for this is not the purpose of the morality. The morality, quite on the contrary springs from his evaluation and does not come along afterwards to safeguard it. The 'imperfectly good will' in these terms is the man who does not see that what morality 'protects' is what is valuable - but against Kant one can argue that morality is not the 'same' the world over and that morality must differ according to difference in form of life - it is not the case (pace Mill) that happiness differs but morality stays the same, nor the case that happiness is the same but morality differs (thus bringing about happy or guilt ridden societies) but that morality and happiness differ as a unit from other units. If one wanted to fill in the rest of the gaps, one would want to say that the form of the social life differed with these two as well. Morality reflects the form of life which also reflects what is held valuable in the society. At moments of moral change - one will find change in terms of the 'ultimate aims' of life and in terms of the form that the society takes - the way that members of it relate to one another.

The conclusion, therefore, of this thesis is that for the good man, his happiness is bound up with doing what is right. A

man's happiness depends upon those things that he considers important, and morality springs from such evaluations. Thus, ideally, there is no tension between the two. However, happiness is intimately connected with emotions and the emotional life is not, initially at least, under conscious control. Evaluations which give rise to emotional response are not always carried out consciously but often spring from an attitude to life, or a way of living. I have not investigated the conceptual problems involved in talking in this fashion, except to say that the use of the term 'evaluation' here is more a reconstruction than a factual description of 'what happens'. What still needs to be done includes a discussion of the concept of 'personality' in the psychological use of the term. Within this personality there may be conflicting evaluations. A man may be involved in life in ways that do not happily co-exist. There may be contradictions in people's lives arising from contradictory evaluations. Hence my examples of the business man who acts contrary to the tenets of his morality, not from self-interest but from pride. One part of his life involves the view of it as a struggle for domination - involving admiration for the 'strong man' - whereas he accepts, at other times, values which deny this view of life. It is not impossible for a man to appear to live two lives.

The idea that the soul of man is divided into two parts, the conscious and the unconscious, is, of course, not a new one. It is part of the problem of 'self-deception', of the problem of the

concept of 'self-control', and of 'strength of will'. The unhappy man, like the man who is the jealous type for example, is often the man who cannot reconcile his 'unconscious' involvement with his 'conscious' recognition of the world.

The truth of Wilson's talk about arranging one's desires to avoid conflict is that the absence of conflict is a necessary condition of happiness.¹ However, he is totally wrong in thinking that such re-arrangement is simply or easily carried out. Often, as I have pointed out, it is not even possible. A man does not choose his involvement in the world; it is something that he grows into. Sartre's description of Roquentin finally succeeding in finding a way of 'accepting' himself, of overcoming the 'nausea',² is artificial simply in that it happens too quickly, and too consciously. The passage from the 'conscious' to the 'unconscious' is a slow process when one is talking about facets of personality.

A man seeking happiness has to sort out his life, and find a meaning or rationale in the world. Morality does not act as a barrier to this, for in sorting out a meaning, one is sorting out what matters, and in doing so one creates moral evaluations.

1. Op. cit.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, (Penguin edition) P 252 ff.

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Summary

This thesis represents an attempt to dissolve the problem of the relationship between happiness and morality. Morality is often seen as a barrier to the achievement of happiness, and many theories have been created to show that this is not so. Unfortunately most of these theories assume that man acts only in his own interest and therefore attempt to treat morality as a means to happiness. This is held to be a misunderstanding of the nature of morality.

The concept of self-interest is examined briefly here and found not to be so self-explanatory as is sometimes thought. For this and other reasons, these theories are rejected. An attempt is then made to generate a different way of viewing human action. To this end, the nature of emotional behaviour is discussed at length, both because it is related to the concept of happiness and because its investigation permits the generation of a methodologically useful concept - the concept of 'importance'. This concept is explained only by a description of its behaviour, for it is to some extent an artificial one, generated to serve a function, although it is held that it is implicit in ordinary language. The concept is used as a bridge between morality and happiness, both of which are discussed in terms of it. It is argued that reasons for human action do not often spring from internal 'forces' or 'states', but from a man's appreciation of what matters in the world.

The conclusion of the thesis is difficult to summarise, but depends upon the fact that what matters, may often be what matters morally. Thus, it is held that, for the good man, happiness is inseparable from right action, and that when morality is seen as a barrier to happiness, it is possible that it is either being misunderstood or that the particular form of it is fossilised.